Report on Sacramento City Unified School District’s Proposed Elementary School Closures Prepared for Plaintiffs in Arriaga, et al. v. Sacramento City Unified School District Submitted by Jesus Hernandez, Ph.D. 1 This report provides an analysis of the proposed closure of seven elementary schools by the Sacramento City Unified School District (SCUSD). The schools scheduled for closure in June of 2013 are Clayton B. Wire, Collis P. Huntington, Fruit Ridge, Joseph Bonnheim, Maple, Mark Hopkins and Washington. Given the strong link between community development and education, school closures present very real social and economic problems for residents located in economically distressed areas where these closures will occur. A substantial amount of research makes a direct link between public school facilities and economic development spending in a community. School construction from renovations, additions and modernizations create jobs and related spin‐off spending in neighborhoods (Agron 2003; Dodge 2003). Black (1999) notes that an increase in per‐pupil expenditures also results in increased property values. Property values improve and help revitalize neighborhoods where investment in facility maintenance is a priority (Spector 2003; NAR 2002; Byron et al. 2001). Therefore, from an economic perspective, school quality capitalizes into home values, which can also determine the potential for commercial and business development within a neighborhood (Chung 2005). Finally, Grogan and Proscio (2000) note that schools are probably the biggest factor in a family’s decision about whether to remain or flee a community. Clearly, there is a strong relationship between school facilities and the impact on distressed communities. The absence of schools in a neighborhood causes considerable concern for homeowners and local business owners as the presence of an operational elementary school remains an essential asset for maintaining a socially and economically healthy community. Data used in this analysis were obtained from the US Census, published academic and government agency research and reports, California Department of Education (DataQuest) school specific reports, SCUSD Archives located on the District web site, SCUSD Board Meeting agendas and backup materials, attendance and observation at numerous public school board meetings, attendance and observation at community workshops and meetings, and interviews with affected parents and individuals knowledgeable of school district conditions all taking place over the period of six months. In keeping with academic research protocol, the identity of all interviewees must remain confidential. I.
Problem Statement The District reports a steady decrease in enrollment from a high of 53,418 in the 2001‐02 school year to a low of 47,890 in 2009‐10. The bulk of this decline took place during the recent suburban housing boom that pulled residents to newer developments when creative mortgage credit temporarily made new homes more attractive than living in older economically disinvested neighborhoods. An increase in charter school attendance also contributed significantly to the decline in district enrollment. The charter school population in the area is currently 3,035 students (10/5/12 enrollment CBEDS) and accounts for 55% of the decline in district enrollment with 69% of charter school students at the elementary school level. However, enrollment appears to be stabilizing with slight increases occurring each year since 2009‐10. In a number of recent school board meetings, the District has stated that this reduced enrollment, coupled with a decade of state budget reductions, now significantly impacts the ability to provide adequate educational services. Despite reductions in certificated staff (398) and to classified employees (225), the District has publically stated that the closure of seven elementary schools to save an estimated $1.5 million (or 0.003% of a $484 million budget) remains an absolute necessity towards attaining fiscal stability for the district. The District contends that many schools in the area are operating inefficiently due to declining enrollment rates. The District states that such inefficiencies contribute to fiscal instability and recommends that schools operating with low enrollment/capacity ratios be closed as a measure of urgent fiscal austerity. 2 II.
The Geographical Context for School Closures The schools scheduled for closure are all located in the South Sacramento area, an area historically populated by a large proportion of nonwhite, low‐income residents. The concentration of these closures in South Sacramento indicates that class and racial disparities will occur in student displacement and that the closure criteria may have not been evenly applied to all schools. Given that the racialized concentration of residents in Sacramento reflects intergenerational patterns of economic disinvestment, it is important to consider the school closures within the context of Sacramento’s long history of racial segregation to properly assess potential issues of equity.1 South Sacramento is an area with many signs of crippling intergenerational poverty, all of which are rooted in the history of its development. Beginning in the late nineteenth century and extending through the 1920s, South Sacramento served as an entry point to the region for much‐needed European labor and was home to families of varying backgrounds. During this critical point in the development of Sacramento neighborhoods, developers began to use racially restrictive covenants ‐ exclusionary property deed restrictions promulgated by the real estate industry and designed to prevent nonwhites from integrating all‐white neighborhoods. The use of these covenants initiated the development of a racialized residential geography in the Sacramento region. Figure One displays census tracts in Sacramento with racially restrictive covenants and shows how a west to east geography of residential market segmentation took form that prohibited nonwhite residency in restricted neighborhoods. Figure One: Preliminary Map of Census Tracts in Sacramento County with Racially Restrictive Covenants Prior to 1950. Source: Sacramento County Public Records Like the rest of the nation, Sacramento experienced a housing boom in the 1940s and 1950s fueled by Federal New Deal housing programs aimed at economic recovery following the Great Depression. However, these federal programs institutionalized the use of racially restrictive covenants and mortgage redlining, which prohibited federally sponsored housing credit in racially integrated neighborhoods. The resulting market policies engineered a bifurcated geography of housing, driving Sacramento’s first wave of urban sprawl. In turn, these policies effectively confined over 75% of the city’s nonwhite population to the older Downtown business district known as the West End.2 Figure Two shows the West End, an area “redlined” by the Federal Housing Administration during the 1930s. The area became a source of blight as redlining prevented buyers from obtaining financing, 1
2
Historical background taken from Hernandez (2009a and 2009b) Ibid. 3 preventing property owners from participating in the real estate market. The inability of West End property owners to participate in normal market exchanges led to a drastic decline in the value of redlined real estate. By the late 1950s, federal housing policy continued to fuel disinvestment and blight in Sacramento’s Downtown district and led to opportunistic urban redevelopment and freeway construction projects in redlined areas where approximately 75% of the city’s nonwhite population resided (See Figure Three). These projects forced the removal of entire nonwhite communities to areas without racial restrictions. Consequently, South Sacramento quickly became a primary repository for these displaced low‐income, nonwhite households. Figure Two: 1938 HOLC Residential Security Map of Sacramento Figure Three: 1949 Redevelopment Survey Map of Sacramento While South Sacramento had long been the center of interstate transportation routes for the region, new caverns of freeways constructed in the 1960s drastically altered vehicle access to its once vibrant business and retail districts. Between 1960 and 1980, the racial composition of Sacramento residential space was redefined and drastically altered; new episodes of mortgage redlining coupled with realtor gatekeeping marked a time of cataclysmic disinvestment and racial tensions in South Sacramento. Figure Four overlays the geography of race covenants with a second episode of mortgage redlining, redevelopment displacement and realtor gatekeeping that steered nonwhite residents into neighborhoods without race covenants. Figure Four: Census Tracts with Racially Restrictive Covenants (dark grey) and Mortgage Deficient (redlined/light grey) Census Tracts. 1974. 4 During this period of redevelopment and military escalation, white residency rates remained consistently high in Sacramento areas with race covenants and in those protected by realtors. In East Sacramento, whites constituted 99 percent of the population in 1950 and just over 97 percent in 1970. Similarly, the neighborhoods of Land Park and Curtis Park combined had a white residency rate of 98 percent in 1950 and 92 percent in 1970 – a full twenty years following the outlawing of race covenants in the landmark Shelley decision. Census data provide even more compelling evidence that the effects of race covenants in the city of Sacramento continue to persist years beyond their legal life. Using East Sacramento as an example, Figure Five shows how these patterns of segregation from the use of race covenants are constant over a fifty year period. Figure Five: East Sacramento Area (McKinley Park, River Park) Census by Race 1950‐2000. Source: US Census of Population 1950‐2000. East Sacramento, a neighborhood with race covenants incorporated as part of the city at the same time as Oak Park, remains relatively free of black residents. The neighborhood experienced only a 1.2 percent increase in black residency in 50 years. Conversely, Figure Six shows how black residency in Oak Park, a South Sacramento neighborhood without race covenants, increases to the point where it is equal or greater than the number of white residents following the years of downtown redevelopment reflecting a dramatic shift in South Sacramento’s population when racial protections on residency were not in place. Figure Six: Oak Park Area Census by Race 1950‐2000. Source: US Census of Population 1950‐2000. Historic public and urban planning policies successfully shifted the bulk of Sacramento’s poor, nonwhite residents to South Sacramento communities like Oak Park, Glen Elder, Fruitridge, North Franklin, Lemon 5 Hill and Meadowview. Once prosperous entrepreneurs now struggled through post‐redevelopment displacement and disinvestment with a new clientele unable to support local businesses. Increased policing combined with high crime rates inherited from downtown redevelopment projects, substandard housing, forced school integration, and high unemployment rates kept South Sacramento constantly on the edge of civil unrest. Figures Seven and Eight capture the resulting concentrations of Latino and African‐American residents in Sacramento. Finally, refugee resettlement programs following the end of the Vietnam War initiated a steady stream of immigrants from Southeast Asia that amplified existing conditions of poverty in South Sacramento. Figure Seven: Latino Households in Sacramento County by Census Tract (2000) Figure Eight: African American Households in Sacramento County by Census Tract (2000) As such, a series of institutional processes resulted in the intergenerational economic demobilization of South Sacramento leaving neighborhood social systems in the state of crisis that continues to this date. As opportunity continues to be suburbanized, the boundaries between white and nonwhite residency established by housing discrimination and regional disinvestment play an important role in defining the fate of South Sacramento. This economically fragile and credit‐starved population, unable to integrate into the mainstream economy, remains vulnerable to multiple forms of predatory economic extraction, financial disaster and now fiscal austerity initiatives from various configurations of local government. This racialized north/south geography is the baseline for measuring every social and economic ill of the region. It is this intergenerational process of social closure based upon a geopolitical collective action that ties together social boundaries, legal rule making, and economic policy into everyday life in South Sacramento. As Figure Nine shows below, it is this racialized location that provides the context for implementing school closure policy in the Sacramento Unified School District. Figure Nine: Map of SCUSD Proposed School Closures 6 III.
Enrollment Demographics Using 2011‐12 data from the California Department of Education’s DataQuest Information System, District school closures single out a predominantly poor, nonwhite student population. Approximately 76% of the District enrollment is nonwhite. However, in schools targeted for closure 90% are nonwhite (93% when including students indicating more than one race). White student enrollment in the District is 19% but only 6.5% in target schools. Latino enrollment is 37% district wide but 54% in target schools. Latinos in target schools comprise 12.5% of the district‐wide Latino elementary school student enrollment. In contrast, whites in target schools comprise 3% of district‐wide white enrollment in elementary schools. Ninety‐eight percent of students in targeted schools are designated as socioeconomically disadvantaged. In contrast, only 71% of students in schools to remain open are disadvantaged. Thirty‐eight percent of students in target schools are English Language Learners compared with 26% for the remaining elementary schools. Finally, no school with a disproportionately white enrollment is facing closure. These racially disparate and concentrated demographics on the surface indicates the disparate impact that these school closures will have on the poor, minority communities in which the schools slated for closure are located. Here the analysis turns to how these racially disparate demographics can impact the process used to identify the seven elementary schools targeted for closure. IV.
Analysis of Rationale for Closure In November of 2010, the District formed a 7/11 committee to review data and recommend sites for consolidation and closure. The Committee issued a report dated August 29, 2011 with recommendations for school closures and school consolidations. Key recommendations noted in the report were to close West Campus and George Washington Carver High Schools and relocate students from both schools to the former Sacramento High School (SHS) campus currently occupied by St. Hope’s Charter High School program, a program with an enrollment that considerably underutilizes the large SHS site. The Committee noted that West Campus has a waiting list and the larger SHS facility would accommodate students on the waiting list. The Committee also recommended consolidating the Carver program with West Campus at the SHS site to optimize the use of such a large facility and amenities. The SHS site is sufficient in size to accommodate both programs and can also provide appropriate sports facilities and arts programs for a greater number of students. The St. Hope charter school would then be moved to the smaller Carver site. Regarding middle and elementary schools, the Committee recommended consolidation of the Sutter and Kit Carson middle schools both located in the East Sacramento neighborhood. Sutter has the highest middle school enrollment in the District, a rate over 3.5 times that of the Kit Carson campus, which has the lowest enrollment of all middle schools in the District. The Committee recommended that the Leonardo DaVinci and Hollywood Park elementary schools located next door to each other in the Hollywood Park neighborhood be combined and absorb students from the proposed C.P. Huntington closure. Finally, the Committee recommended closing the C.P. Huntington, Oak Ridge and A.M. Winn elementary school sites. District Right‐Sizing – The School Board members were unable to reach a majority consensus on adopting the 7/11 Committee closure/consolidations recommendations. Subsequently, the District unveiled a school “right‐sizing” proposal that called for the closure of 11 elementary schools. Only one of these schools, C.P. Huntington, was on the initial 7/11 Committee list. In its proposal, the District states that despite continuing efforts at program innovation aimed at attracting new families, the District is unlikely to see an enrollment surge in neighborhoods hard‐hit by job losses, foreclosures and California’s shifting 7 demographics. Referencing a January 2013 report released by the USC Price School of Public Policy and the Lucile Packard Foundation for Children’s Health, the District warned that California is facing an “unprecedented decline” in its child population, a trend triggered by lower birth rates, fewer newcomers arriving in the state and a smaller population of women of child‐bearing age. Clearly this warning holds true for a number of neighborhoods such as Land Park, Hollywood Park, Curtis Park, and East Sacramento; areas populated by predominantly middle class white households. For example, in the five East Sacramento census tracts, the average female age is 43.5 (tract 1), 44.2 (tract 2), 39.1 (tract 3), 43.8 (tract 15), and 43.5 (tract 16) respectively. In census tract 25, where Bret Harte elementary school is to remain open, the average female age is 47.6. However, in South Sacramento, census data reveal a different scenario unfolding. In census tracts with schools scheduled for closure, we see a much lower average female age of 33 years. As Figure Seven showed, South Sacramento is home to the largest concentration of Latinos in the county, a population with the highest fertility rate (23 points higher than whites) according to the most recent Community Health Status Report from the County of Sacramento (2008). With South Sacramento being a “port of entry” for immigrant families from Central America and South East Asian countries, countries with traditionally much larger families than US born families, it is apparent that the very neighborhoods where schools are forced to close will also become the primary source for future District enrollment. The closing of South Sacramento schools will continue a trend of directing District resources away from neighborhoods of growth to support older middle class neighborhoods with declining and aging populations. Again, census data provides an appropriate demographic context for analyzing the District’s right‐sizing recommendations based on ill‐informed warnings of a declining population. Site Selection – Following the School Board’s lack of consensus on the original closure recommendations, the District, without the use of the 7/11 Committee, moved to using a measurement of school efficiency, measured as student enrollment divided by school site capacity, to identify sites that needlessly tax limited District resources. In addition to the seven schools currently on the list, the District included A.M. Winn, James Marshall, Tahoe and Susan B. Anthony to the new right‐sizing closure list. Mark Twain was also considered for closure at a later date. During this time, the District also created “design teams” consisting of parents and community members. Design teams were created for Kit Carson and Caleb Greenwood in East Sacramento, A.M. Winn in Lincoln Village, and John Still middle and elementary schools in the Meadowview neighborhood. Soon thereafter, the Winn design team recommended a Waldorf program and the Greenwood and Carson design teams recommended that an International Baccalaureate program be added to the District’s educational programming options. The District quickly moved to implement design team recommendations for alternative education programming at schools initially targeted for closure/consolidation by the original 7/11 Committee. At A.M. Winn, where enrollment is 43% white, a Waldorf influenced curriculum is scheduled to start in 2013‐14 and act as a “feeder” to George Washington Carver, a small high school with 58% white enrollment originally recommended for closure and consolidation at the Sacramento High School facility. This recommendation for consolidation meant transferring Carver students to the Oak Park community, a less desirable historically nonwhite, low income neighborhood. Keep in mind that the average white student enrollment in District elementary schools is 18.8%. For District high schools the average is 19.9%. This becomes even more important to our analysis when we compare white enrollment for The Met (44%), a small high school now being considered for occupying the Washington Elementary School site targeted for closure and displacing an enrollment of 65.9% Latino and 87% nonwhite students. An International Baccalaureate (IB) program was also created for East Sacramento schools. Caleb Greenwood will open as a Primary Years Candidate Program (grades K‐6), and Kit Carson as a Middle Years Candidate Program (grades 7‐10) in September 2013. Kit Carson will expand to include 8 a Diploma Candidate Program in 2015‐16 (grades 11‐12). Shifting to the IB programming protects an aging Greenwood campus (the campus with the highest white enrollment in the district at 57.7%) and an underutilized Kit Carson campus from future closure while laying the foundation for creating an East Sacramento K‐12 system that circumvents the consolidation recommendations from the 7/11 Committee. The change in programming facilitates access to Measures Q and R bond money to upgrade these sites for IB implementation and to avoid the transfer of students to underperforming schools in less desirable neighborhoods. Since the conversion of the SHS campus to a charter program, a program with less than 3% white enrollment that East Sacramento students do not attend, the neighborhood has consistently reminded the School Board of their desire for a high school. Keep in mind that no alternative programming was initiated at the John Still and the School of Engineering and Sciences (SES) sites, which also had design teams. The District’s efforts to roll out alternative educational programming at East Sacramento schools reminds one of earlier arts programs initiated to deter the busing of Theodore Judah students to the less desirable Washington Elementary campus when the schools were paired for the purposes of integration during the 1970s. What appears to be taking place is a systematic shift in resources to support low efficient schools in predominantly middle‐class neighborhoods with an economically stable and aging white population that now experiences a declining school‐age population. The premature closing of South Sacramento schools directly supports this phenomenon. During this time, the District also began plans for extensive and expensive renovations to the West Campus site that services a large number of East Sacramento students. West Campus was initially recommended for closure and relocation to the former Sacramento High School site, which had undergone millions of dollars in bond‐funded renovations a few years earlier. Recall that one of the 7/11 Committee’s primary justifications for recommending the West Campus relocation to the site now occupied by the St. Hope Sacramento Charter High program was to allow the West Campus program room to grow, efficiently utilize better athletic facilities, and take advantage of a recently updated campus that is severely underutilized. This would also allow for consolidation of inefficient small high school programs as well. Following the School Board’s rejection of the 7/11 Committee recommendations, the West Campus community was informed it would get serious upgrades so that it could still experience the benefits of the move to the larger, better equipped SHS campus. Also during this period, the School Board voted to close Freeport Elementary School, a low‐performing school with 95% nonwhite enrollment servicing the Meadowview community in South Sacramento and located near new residential tracts currently under development. The school was immediately converted to a charter school further contributing to the loss of District revenues. The Freeport campus was not identified by the 7/11 Committee as a school targeted for closure. Enrollment/Capacity Efficiency ‐ According to the District’s right‐sizing recommendations, the enrollment/capacity efficiency rate is the primary guideline used in identifying schools for closure. However, the use of capacity to determine “efficiency” calls into question how such a rate can be equitably applied in identifying schools for closure when all of the seven schools scheduled for closure are located precisely in the geography of segregated space previously identified above. Also of concern is an inconsistent and arbitrary application of the efficiency rate. Four schools scheduled for closure, C.B. Wire (44%), Maple (44%), Mark Hopkins (44%), and Joseph Bonnheim (43%), have higher efficiency rates than eight of the schools scheduled to remain open. A thorough analysis of classroom utilization indicates that the District capacity rate does not actually reflect operational factors that determine the number of students a site can actually serve. More important, the District calculation fails to consider 9 how policies regarding classroom size actually intervene and halt future student growth at schools slated for closure, an intervention not reflective of neighborhood conditions. Using Maple Elementary School as an example, we recalculate the efficiency rate. The Maple site has an RSP/intervention (Special Education) program. Including this program in the capacity calculation double‐counts 28 students. Also, like other sites in the district, Maple utilizes a room for winter/bad weather physical education classes. This room cannot be used as a classroom as it must be available for PE classes. This reduces the capacity total by 33 students. Maple also hosts a parent resources center. This is an activity implemented as a result of the District’s strategic plan with Maple selected as the model for the District’s goal of increasing parent/school engagement. However, the center was included as part of the school’s capacity rate. Given the importance placed upon this model program by the District due to the positive results in encouraging parent engagement, the school’s capacity should be reduced by an additional 33 students. Finally, the Preschool, which is on a separate parcel of land across the street from the main facility, was also included in the school capacity rate. The capacity level should be reduced by an additional 33 students. In sum, our review suggests that the capacity rate should be reduced to 401 students. This would result in a recalculated efficiency rate of 58%, placing Maple two percentage points over the District average of 56% for those schools selected to remain open. A similar capacity review conducted at C.B. Wire Elementary School also supports the need for questioning the use of efficiency rates for identifying schools to close. After identifying common use areas, capacity was reduced from 1,022 students to 741. The result is a recalculated efficiency rate of 63%, a rate that would warrant the removal of this site from the closure list. This type of capacity review should be conducted at each of the sites scheduled for closure. District Policies on Classroom Size ‐ Policies for classroom size also call into question the use of enrollment/capacity rates in determining school closures. For example, at Maple, kindergarten student enrollment at the beginning of the year was 42 students, 11 students above the listed capacity. Rather than authorize additional instructors and create two classes of 21 students, the District bused Maple’s overflow students to other schools. Strict adherence to classroom sizing has resulted in the busing of approximately 25 Maple students to other schools and the revocations of 10 inter/intra district permits. A total of 35 students were denied entrance to Maple school as a direct result of classroom sizing polices. Acknowledging this district‐caused overflow means that the Maple school enrollment should be at approximately 268 students. Incorporating this information into the Maple School capacity calculation produces a new efficiency rate of 67%, a rate that would rank Maple within the top 1/3 of schools in terms of efficiency; a rank that is more reflective of neighborhood population patterns. Interviews with individuals knowledgeable on school conditions indicate similar problems with calculations for other sites. Because enrollment rates are used as a key indicator of school efficiency in re‐determining schools to be closed, it is extremely important to point out the negative effects of District policy on future year enrollment rates. As kindergarten enrollment increases, so does the enrollment of grades 1‐6 in future years. Artificially stunting this growth via classroom sizing policy leads to unnecessary school closure that tragically affects not only future year enrollment but the economic vitality of neighborhoods like North Franklin where Maple School is located. Parents will be inclined to relocate to locations not bound by such punitive enrollment policies. Homeowners will be less inclined to move into a neighborhood without a school and further stunt the economic growth of a community. As a consequence, the sustainability of schools and their communities will be economically and socially compromised; elementary schools remain a critical hub for community‐building. District classroom sizing policies, 10 regardless of reason, needlessly create a fragile economic and social eco structure contingent upon inflexible school admission policies that shift resources away from struggling communities. This indeed strikes at the very heart of the disparate impact concept. Arbitrary Rationale for Closure/Non‐closure – Following the Board’s rejection of the proposed closures, the District moved to close eleven elementary schools identified without the use of the 7/11 Committee. Here, the concern is the arbitrary inclusion of additional criteria for removing schools from the closure list. For example, the A.M. Winn site was not considered for closure because of the new Waldorf “influenced” programming despite an efficiency rate of 39%. The Marshall site, in close proximity to Winn, was removed from the list due to the “unknown impact” the new Waldorf program would have on attendance at Marshall, a site with an even lower efficiency rate (36%) than the Winn site. The District’s rationale of course defies any semblance of logic. How could a school with one of the lowest efficiency rates remain open and actually have a potentially positive impact on a school with an even lower efficiency rate? Clearly the District needed to keep the Marshall site, an underutilized site with 40% white enrollment, open to prevent actions from organized angry parents who refused to have their children forced to attend a Waldorf‐programmed school. In order to save the Winn site, the District was forced to keep the Marshall site open as well. Similar suspect forms of logic were used to justify removing Tahoe Elementary and Mark Twain Elementary from the school closure list. The District Superintendent, in a recent board meeting claimed that closure of the Tahoe site would present safety issue for students if they were forced to travel across high traffic streets to the Mark Twain site. This was apparently sufficient justification for removing the Tahoe site from the closure list with no further discussion on how to mitigate this problem. A simple solution such as hiring a crosswalk attendant would resolve the safety issue. This safety problem apparently is a higher concern than the safety issues facing displaced C.B. Wire students who must now navigate rival gang boundaries and a known corridor of registered sex offenders as they walk to and from their new receiving schools. Wire students will also lose access to a very successful afterschool program designed to mitigate the effects of neighborhood strife that also acts as a safe place for afterschool learning. The District also claims that future renovations to Hiram Johnson High School and its West Campus, to be funded by Measures Q and R, may somehow disrupt educational activity at the Mark Twain site, which is adjacent to West Campus. The District argues that because such repairs at West Campus could potentially impact the Mark Twain site, it should remain open. Again the logic simply holds no merit. How can the scope and magnitude of the repairs planned for West Campus – a high school site ‐ somehow present potential problems for the Twain Elementary School site? The District also argues that the Twain site has a strong connection to West Campus students due to mentoring programs that link West Campus students with Twain students. Both the 7/11 Committee recommendations and the right‐sizing criteria used to identify sites for closure are simply tossed aside when white parents mobilize strong voting blocks in opposition to closures in their neighborhoods. The District removed two sites from the list due to their proximity to future residential development; the logic being that new residential development will increase future school enrollment. Bret Harte, located in the heart of Curtis Park neighborhood, was saved from closure due to its proximity to the new Curtis Park Village an upscale residential community currently under construction. Homes are anticipated to sell in the $490,000 to $700,000 range. If this school were closed, new Curtis Park Village elementary school students would be forced to attend Ethel Phillips, a school located in the heart of the North Franklin neighborhood, a location with high concentrations of nonwhite residents under the Federal poverty level. Important to note here is that Curtis Park is an older community with the bulk of enrollment at Bret Harte coming from other, less well‐to‐do neighborhoods. Finally, the District 11 removed Susan B. Anthony from the closure list to provide service to the new Delta Shores community planned just south of the Meadowview neighborhood. Two schools are planned for the new community, which anticipates homeowners with annual incomes upwards of $68,000. Again, we see District concessions that provide resources and advantages based on socio‐economic status. The odds of these two developments providing increases in enrollment to these two schools over the next few years are remote given the time necessary for construction and the fact that the income levels of these new homeowners will more than likely provide options and opportunities to attend better schools. If we follow the District’s logic, then the closure of the Washington and Maple sites should be reconsidered. The Washington site is in the heart of downtown development where the Downtown Sacramento Partnership is pushing to transform the area into a dynamic urban destination. The Partnership’s “return to the city” movement encourages suburban dwellers to reside in new sustainable but higher density housing. Washington Elementary is located just steps away from La Valentina, a sustainable transit oriented development site that has become the model for downtown residential development. Also in close proximity is the Washington Park development, a series of row townhomes under construction. Washington Elementary School is now strategically located among growing housing opportunities for all family types, from condos and townhomes to penthouse units and lofts. In contrast to development proposed near the Bret Harte and Susan B. Anthony sites, development is already at the point of occupancy near the Washington site. A similar situation is occurring near Maple Elementary School with the North Franklin Business District’s Community‐Based Economic Development Plan, which is currently unfolding in South Sacramento. As part of this plan, the Business District is exploring the potential for transit oriented development at the 47th Avenue Light Rail site and considering affordable housing opportunities along the Franklin Boulevard corridor. The plan will place Maple School in the direct path of future economic development and positively impact future enrollment rates. Capacity and Funding – This artificial cap on enrollment has an important negative impact on South Sacramento schools when coupled with the capacity/efficiency based formula to identify schools for closure. It incorrectly conveys a false illusion of Maple Elementary and other schools slated for closure as failing, fiscally inefficient campuses. The effects of school closure are even more pronounced with the unnecessary shifting of school revenues away from schools targeted for closure. At Maple, all students are designated as “categorically funded” students (Title I, EIA‐SCE, EIA‐LEP). When students are bused to other schools or permit‐revoked because of punitive district enrollment policies, categorical funds associated with those students also move. Maple School enrollment and funding is needlessly depleted while more well‐to‐do schools like Pony Express and Sutterville, schools not slated for closure, reap the fiscal benefit from Maple School displacement. This artificial student and fiscal redirection, or disinvestment from low‐income schools, places other schools in a better position to avoid closure at the expense of schools like Maple Elementary and other schools on the closure list. The district’s classroom sizing policies artificially and arbitrarily stunts the growth of schools slated for closure while improving enrollment and funding at schools designated to remain open – schools with students that do not always reflect the racial composition of neighborhoods with declining elementary school‐aged children. The effects on the communities facing school closure are devastating and create the illusion that said places are in further decline. This is the silent but devastating blueprint of structural racism. Seemingly race‐neutral policies deemed as economically rational have set in motion a pattern of disinvestment in segregated space under the rubric of a necessary fiscal action that saves the larger community from greater cataclysmic harm. Clearly the use of enrollment and capacity in determining school closure sites is questionable and raises serious concerns of equity. 12 V.
Local Control Funding Formula Of serious concern is the scheduled closing of these schools just prior to the implementation of the statewide Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF), a proposal sponsored by Governor Brown to restructure the State’s approach to allocating education funding in California. The proposal, currently under negotiation at the state legislature, seeks to replace current categorical program funding that is no longer reflective of current demographics. The Formula consists primarily of base, supplemental and concentration funding that focuses resources based on a school’s student demographics. The Formula is scheduled for implementation in the 2013‐14 school year and will provide funding to reduce classroom size in grades K‐3 to 24 students. Implementing the LCFF will again create the need for smaller classroom size and require the use of classrooms previously closed due to the District’s current classroom size policy. Even worse, the schools receiving displaced students will require expansion thus necessitating the use of Measures Q and R funds and further adding to the District’s long‐term debt at public expense. The LCFF will have a positive effect on both efficiency rates and revenues for the schools now scheduled for closure. The District will need to expand classroom capacity at schools receiving displaced students once the LCFF is implemented thus requiring additional expenditures to accommodate such growth. The cost for this expansion should be given closer scrutiny as the potential for offsetting any savings from closures exists. A more important reason for questioning the timing of these closures is a recent report from the Legislative Analyst’s Office regarding the LCFF proposal states that the distribution method provides funding increases that will favor student populations in disadvantaged neighborhoods, the very neighborhoods targeted by the District for school closure (LAO 2013). Here it is important to question why these schools are slated for closure when additional classrooms will be needed to accommodate LCFF classroom size reduction. Why is the District closing these schools when the LCFF weights revenues at higher distribution rates for students in disadvantaged neighborhoods ‐ higher levels than students in most District schools selected to remain open? This premature closure of South Sacramento elementary schools has the effect of shifting future increases in funding to other schools in other neighborhoods thus making them more efficient and less vulnerable to future rounds of closure. Again, these closures, along with classroom sizing policies have the dangerous effect of artificially stunting the future growth of South Sacramento communities. This strategy instead has the effect of creating the conditions for school closures and vulnerability to charter school enrollment. There is also a loss of revenues to the District as parents move their children to charter schools and schools outside of the district to avoid the adverse personal effects of closures. Rather than aggressively protecting District revenues, prematurely implementing this strategy for very marginal savings actually sets the conditions for charter school expansion and increasing the potential for lost revenues. The LCFF is just the latest episode of a long historical pattern of classroom expansion and contraction based on teacher contract negotiations, fluctuations in state revenues, and local funding issues dating back to the 1990s when then Governor Pete Wilson worked to reduce classroom size. Closing these schools at this critical juncture during the state’s effort at education finance reform is short‐sighted and negates the District’s ability to deal with the changing dynamics of classroom sizing that will inevitably take place following the Legislature’s approval of the LCFF. 13 VI.
Fiscal Concerns The District argues that the closure of seven South Sacramento schools is necessary to achieve a balanced budget. Failure to submit a balanced budget to the Sacramento County Office of Education would result in a “negative certification,” a financial rating that, if truly present, exposes the District to the risk of a state takeover. A “negative certification” would also adversely affect the marketing and sale of bonds approved through Measures Q & R, local school bond measures that provide up to $414 million in funds to upgrade and renovate the district’s school. According to District documents, a negative certification would reduce the number of potential investors and increase the interest rate that the District would pay for the bonds. Additionally, the District will end the year in a negative cash position if it is unable to issue Tax Revenue Anticipation Notes (TRANs), or short‐term loans used as operating monies while the District awaits scheduled rounds of revenue distribution from the state that are routinely delayed. The Sacramento County Office of Education (SCOE) is responsible for reviewing the District’s financial situation and must offer assurance that the District will be in a financial position to repay the Notes. If the SCOE cannot provide that assurance, the District’s budget will be negative as of June 30, 2013. The District claims that without the closures, the SCOE could not provide the assurance that the District would have the ability to meet its financial responsibilities. The proposal to right‐size the District was presented as a necessary course of action to prevent a negative certification by SCOE. Closures were initially projected to save the District approximately $2.5M per year in ongoing savings (Source: 2/7/2013 agenda package). Removing four schools from the initial right‐sizing closure list reduces this amount to approximately $1.5 million. A brief review of financial documents on the District’s website calls into question the District’s claim of fiscal urgency and the need for school closure. Using information from the District’s Fiscal 16 Standardized Account Code Structure (SACS) Reports, schools scheduled for closure consistently have unspent financial reserves at the end of each school year. Since 2009‐10, schools on the closure list have an average of $1,337,000 in unused budgeted General Fund monies and a total of $5,346,355 over said period.3 The annual average amount of General Fund dollars unspent for schools scheduled for closure nearly equals the projected savings from school closures. For schools removed from the closure/consolidation list, the average annual unspent funds are $2,292,000 with a total of $9,168,224 since 2009‐10 (See Figure Ten). 4 Unspent General Fund dollars for the Oak Ridge priority school site alone were $2,020,300 in 2011‐12 and another $1,079,612 projected for 2012‐13. Even more confusing is the District’s claim of fiscal distress when the General Fund balance for all SCUSD elementary schools (shown in Exhibit A) averages in excess of $10 million annually over the last four years. Average unspent funds for the District increase substantially when balances for middle and high schools are included. 3
Amounts for 2012‐2013 for all calculations contained in this analysis are year‐to‐date as of January 2013. This list includes those elementary schools recommended for consolidation or closure by the original 7/11 Committee and those elementary schools removed from the District’s Right‐Sizing recommendations. 4
14 Figure Ten: Unspent General Funds Comparison for Selected Schools Aggregated by Closure Status Using information from the Fiscal 16a reports, Figure Eleven captures the Average Cost per Student for schools scheduled for closure and compares the annual rate with schools removed from the consolidation/closure list. Again the data calls into question the need to exclusively target South Sacramento schools as they appear to be operating at the same level of efficiency as schools removed from the consolidation/closure list. Figure Eleven: Average Cost per Student by School Year and Closure Status (Elementary Schools) More scrutiny shows how funding categories are used to “park” or reserve funds administratively. Exhibit B lists selected administrative budget line items with increases from prior year or with substantial unspent funds. The concern here is that administrative accounts are used to park funds presumably allocated for District functions. Even with prior year unspent funds many of these line items show substantial increases in the amounts budgeted for the current school year. As classroom costs are slashed, the evidence shows that administrative costs continue to rise. Some examples follow below:  Line item 707: Research/Educational ‐ $106,343 continues to be budgeted without any funds expended over the last two years.  Line item 718: Chief Accountability Office – received a $304,813 budget increase despite an unspent balance of $297,941 in the prior year.  Line item 721: Chief Academic Officer – received a $580,593 budget increase despite an unspent balance of $186,666 in the prior year.  Line item 741: Strategic Plan Initiatives – received a $334,765 budget increase despite an unspent balance of $832,980 in the prior year. An unspent balance of $1,212,442 remains in the current year. 15 



Line item 800: Administrative Services – increased by $1,150,606 over the prior year budget. An amount very near the savings projected with the closure of seven schools. Line item 807: District Operations – received a $657,695 budget increase despite a prior year balance of $348,292. Line item 810: Nutrition Services – received a $60,850 budget increase from $1,870 to $62,720 but funds have yet to be spent from this account. Line item 840: Risk Management – received a $31,968 budget increase despite an unspent balance of $139,708 in the prior year. The concern here is if the closure of South Sacramento schools, which are as fiscally efficient as other schools in the district, are being used to offset escalating administrative costs. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that school closures can prevent the continuing rise in administrative costs. School closures do not appear to be solving the right fiscal problem. Finally, the District presented a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) dated January 17, 2013 (see Exhibit C) that estimated the cost of running the eleven schools initially selected in the District’s right‐sizing Proposal and notes a projected budget shortage of $1,515,381. Here it is important to note that the CBA does not include categorical funds in the estimated revenues received by each school, an important omission that results in over‐estimating budget shortfalls and provides an inaccurate description of the fiscal conditions facing the District. In stark contrast to Exhibits A and B, the CBA represents the fiscal problem as one inherent to school operations. Table One compares CBA estimated shortages to unspent General Funds for each of the eleven schools on the District’s initial right‐sizing closure list by current closure status. Table One: 2013 School Closure Cost Benefit Analysis Shortage Projection
and Annual Unspent General Funds
Unspent General Funds (01)
CBA Schools on Closure CBA List
Shortage
2012‐13
Clayton B Wire
$19,441
$200,665
Collins P Huntingon
$254,674
$154,060
Fruit Ridge
$62,398
$247,975
Joseph Bonnheim
$63,179
$390,673
Maple
$303,866
$299,918
Mark Hopkins
$41,360
$360,032
Washington
$198,713
$218,926
Totals
$943,631
$1,872,249
Difference (unspent minus CBA shortage)
2011‐12
$139,008
‐$57,539
$285,068
$51,542
$53,430
$85,260
$179,194
$735,963
2010‐11
$134,408
$153,928
$426,584
‐$5,313
$123,700
$36,492
$146,586
$1,016,385
2009‐10
$318,400
$267,492
$317,236
$157,305
$51,877
$233,100
$376,348
$1,721,759
$928,618
‐$207,668
$72,754
$778,128
$16,038
$165,273
$288,901
$166,050
$636,261
$263,505
$320,389
$316,788
$88,809
$989,491
$64,510
$417,740
CBA Schools Removed from List
James Marshall
$279,960
$304,133
‐$60,525
Tahoe
$143,087
$139,962
$109,250
S.B. Anthony
$47,258
$91,558
$65,371
Bret Harte
$101,446
$290,557
$24,949
Totals
$571,751
$826,210
$139,045
Difference (unspent minus CBA shortage)
$254,459
‐$432,706
Source: Fiscal 16 Standardized Account Code Structure (SACS) Reports 16 When aggregated, the District presents an estimated shortage of $943,631 for the seven sites scheduled for closure. However, current year unspent funds for these sites exceeds $1.8 million leaving a reserve in excess of $928,000 after accounting for the CBA projected shortage. For school year 2011‐12, comparing unspent funds to CBA projected shortages would result in a deficit of $207,688, hardly an amount to warrant the closure of seven schools given the overall total of unspent General Funds shown in Exhibit A for all elementary schools and in administrative costs shown in Exhibit B. When comparing 2011‐12 unspent funds for the four schools removed from the closure list with CBA projected shortages, a deficit of $432,700 results, over twice the amount for the seven schools scheduled for closure calling into question if the District is identifying the right schools for closure. The CBA clearly does not provide fiscal justification for closing these seven schools. At its core, a Cost Benefit Analysis is a protocol for systematically assessing alternative public policies in terms of their efficiency. The very nature of a CBA is to assess efficiency in terms of net benefits so that policies can be chosen to maximize net benefits to all stakeholders. The CBA is a prospective tool that seeks to determine what net benefits would result if a policy were adopted or if existing policies were continued or replicated. The CBA is intended to be a comprehensive analytical tool. It seeks to include all valued impacts and give “standing” to everyone in society; standing in the case of school closures ultimately requires the inclusion of students and parents as part of the analysis. The Cost Benefit Analysis presented by the District represents a flawed attempt at projecting a fear of impeding fiscal calamity rather than capturing the true nature of analyzing the effects of the proposed school closures. The CBA, as presented by the District, only includes estimates of revenues and expenditures and functions more along the lines of a partial fiscal reconciliation of school costs while inexplicably excluding future state revenues expected from LCFF. As a result, the CBA fails to include all relevant impacts valued by all parties with standing. The District CBA steers clear of identifying all relevant impacts and properly monetizing those impacts with appropriate prices (values). By excluding the essential elements of a CBA, the District fails to comprehensively measure impacts relative to the proposed school closure actions. Instead, the District’s CBA is a false representation of current fiscal conditions and only serves to redirect attention from unsustainable increases in administrative costs, long‐term debt and unfunded liability related to pensions and health care benefits. VII.
Summary In Serrano5 wealth, like race is a “suspect” classification that invokes the standard of strict scrutiny for equal protection analysis. Discriminatory impact in itself suffices in establishing violation of equal protection. Implementing the District’s right‐sizing recommendations will result in a profound disparate impact in terms of race and indigency on South Sacramento students and families. These closures reflect and intensify long‐standing intergenerational patterns of residential segregation and economic disinvestment. District demographics clearly demonstrate that an unusually high concentration of low‐income, nonwhite, and English language learning students attend the schools targeted for closure. Moreover, by ignoring the recommendations of the 7/11 Committee and the subsequent removal of four schools from the District’s initial right‐sizing report, the schools in the neighborhoods with the highest concentration of white residents were saved from consolidation or closure. The subsequent and rapid deployment of specialty programs solidified the District’s justification for keeping these schools open despite the fact that they are as equally or less efficient than schools on the current closure list. The arbitrary 5
Serrano v. Priest 1971 5 Cal. 2d 597, 604‐610. 17 application of right‐sizing criteria produced a racially unequal closure list that targets South Sacramento schools while protecting schools intended to serve populations with race and class privileges set in place through historical processes of urban planning and housing policies. When coupled with classroom sizing policies that artificially stunt the growth of South Sacramento schools, the closing of South Sacramento schools prior to the implementation of the State of California’s Local Control Funding Formula prematurely shifts fiscal resources away from the very schools the new funding policy is intended to aid. This strategy for closure also ignores the fact that the LCFF calls for reduced classroom sizing for K‐3 thus requiring additional classrooms for the schools absorbing displaced students – an expensive expansion that only becomes necessary with the premature closure of South Sacramento schools. The Cost Benefit Analysis presented by the District simply does not provide conclusive justification for the racially disparate school closures about to take place. Each of the schools slated for closure routinely have a sizable balance at the end of each year. Annual unspent General Funds for District schools average over $10 million per year over the last four years. And, a brief review of District administrative accounts show that budgeted amounts continue to increase despite rather large sums of unspent funds in the previous school year. Although the school closure effort gives impression of austerity and cost control on the part of the District, the estimated savings of .003 percent of the annual budget expected from closing South Sacramento elementary schools do not confirm this. Given the consistency of unspent General Funds and the increase in administrative costs, we must ask the question “Are we fixing the right problem?” It appears that fiscal concerns are not operational, or site related, but instead related to rising administrative costs. Currently, the District’s Unfunded Liability exceeds $500 million and increases by millions of dollars annually. Clearly these increases in debt are no longer sustainable. The school closures do not relieve this debt. The fiscal crisis appears to be an administratively produced crisis (e.g. unfunded pensions and health care costs), not a crisis produced by school operational costs. By moving forward with right‐sizing recommendations, the District will fail to protect its revenue source and instead create the conditions for future closures to occur. Savings projected by the District are only realized if displaced students do not leave the district. School closures will not improve revenues since a portion of enrollment will be lost to charter, parochial, and out‐of‐district schools. The steady transition to privatizing schools reduces enrollment, future revenues, and jeopardizes the capacity for future bond financing. Interim budgets with high projections of deficits become credible data sources to justify fear of financial calamity; these projections regularly exceed end‐of‐year actuals by the millions of dollars every year. Rather than relying on inaccurate and overstated projections of debt as justification for closures, an independent fiscal audit should be performed prior to allowing the closure of South Sacramento elementary schools. The audit should focus on whether the fiscal emergency status presented by the District is due to the rise in administrative costs or the rise in costs directly related to school operations. Finally, according to Serrano, the district must prove that more equitable options to the proposed closure strategies do not exist. Closing South Sacramento schools to save $1.5 million, or less than 0.003% of the District’s budget, without clear fiscal justification clearly does not meet the definition of “equitable” options. 18 References: Agron, J. (2003). Bucking the Trend: 29th Annual Official Education Construction Report. American School and University, 29‐38. Black, S. (1999) “Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary Education” Research Paper. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Byron, J., Exeter, H. and Mediratta, K. (2001, July/August). Places to Learn. Shelterforce Online. http://www.nhi.org/online/issues.html. Chung, C. (2005). Connecting Schools to Community Development. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Dodge, F. W. (2003). Historical and Forecast Information on Public K‐12 School Construction. National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities. http://www.edfacilities.org. Grogan, Paul and Tony Proscio. (2000). Comeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban Neighborhood Revival.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press,. Hernandez, J. (2009a). Redlining Revisited: Mortgage Lending Patterns in Sacramento 1930‐2004. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 33(2). ________. (2009b). The Residual Impact of History: Connecting Residential Segregation, Mortgage Redlining and the Housing Crisis. Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethinicity. The Ohio State University. Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO). “The 2013‐14 Budget: Restructuring the K‐12 Funding System.” State of California, February 22, 2013. National Association of Realtors and Local Government Commission (NAR). (2002). New Schools for Older Neighborhoods: Strategies for Building our Communities’ Most Important Assets. Spector, S. (2003). Creating Schools and Connecting Communities through Adaptive Reuse. National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities. http://www.edfacilities.org. 19 Exhibit A
SCUSD Elementary School General Fund Balance by Year
Source: Fiscal 16a Reports
A. M. Winn
Bowling Green ‐ McCoy
Bowling Green ‐ Chacon
Bret Harte
Caleb Greenwood
Camellia Basic
Caroline Wenzel
Clayton B. Wire
C. P. Huntington
David Lubin
Earl Warren
Abraham Lincoln
Cesar Chavez Intermediate
Edward Kemble
Susan B. Anthony
Elder Creek
Ethel I. Baker
Ethel Phillips
John Morse Therapeutic Center
Father Keith B. Kenny
Fruit Ridge
Golden Empire
Martin Luther King Jr.
H. W. Harkness
Hollywood Park
Hubert H. Bancroft
Isador Cohen
Leataata Floyd
John Still Elementary
Leonardo Da Vinci
John Bidwell
John Cabrillo
John D. Sloat
Alice Birney Waldorf
Joseph Bonnheim
Maple
Mark Hopkins
Mark Twain
Matsuyama
Nicholas
Oak Ridge
O. W. Erlewine
2009‐2010
2010‐2011
$481,159
$261,227
$192,662
$246,676
‐$36,291
‐$8,097
$88,808
$166,049
$162,017
$34,371
$117,571
$45,463
$259,566
$16,275
$318,399
$134,407
$267,492
$153,928
$245,155 ‐$128,511
$323,099
$83,185
$155,969
$105,501
$169,017
$125,168
$762,519
$373,159
$316,788
$288,900
$143,179
$170,338
$175,226
$263,566
$950,500
$569,635
$391,698 ‐$142,587
$185,308
$64,625
$317,236
$426,584
$75,078
$62,059
$435,504
$71,603
$112,551
$213,414
$180,985
$230,062
$213,437
‐$3,995
‐$11,812
$38,332
$129,810
$65,865
$494,670
$257,625
$5,554 ‐$126,582
$52,436
$116,794
$924,006
$449,958
$363,427
$397,802
$102,448
$18,886
$157,305
‐$5,312
$51,877
$123,700
$233,100
$36,491
$322,531
$279,718
$154,551
$122,855
‐$24,895
$300,968
$225,094
$333,746
$408,663
$345,041
2011‐2012
$100,476
$176,741
$33,575
$24,949
$181,530
$73,118
‐$4,398
$139,008
‐$57,538
‐$73,226
$49,562
$101,329
$281,766
$211,579
$65,370
‐$17,181
$108,328
$224,406
$530,546
$588,686
$225,278
$59,659
$413,185
$122,232
$122,678
$42,720
‐$51,899
$395,604
$209,422
$27,311
$74,502
‐$153,295
$413,574
$46,050
$51,541
$53,429
$85,259
$316,891
$162,259
$68,479
$2,020,300
$50,529
2012‐2013
$280,571
‐$80,327
‐$118,988
$290,557
$179,266
$101,328
$351,687
$200,665
$154,059
$400,125
$252,605
$131,493
$78,548
$223,703
$91,557
$66,614
$674,719
$273,810
$228,932
$395,954
$247,974
$459,144
$331,759
$127,619
$243,722
$202,418
$168,957
$139,646
‐$12,175
$47,455
$147,483
$112,700
$195,918
$181,060
$390,673
$299,918
$360,031
$144,697
$298,590
$45,832
$1,079,612
$146,368
4 yr Avg.
$280,858
$133,938
‐$32,450
$142,591
$139,296
$84,370
$155,783
$198,120
$129,485
$110,886
$177,113
$123,573
$163,625
$392,740
$190,654
$90,738
$305,460
$504,588
$252,147
$308,643
$304,268
$163,985
$313,013
$143,954
$194,362
$113,645
$35,895
$182,731
$237,386
‐$11,566
$97,804
$333,342
$342,680
$87,111
$148,552
$132,231
$178,720
$265,959
$184,564
$97,596
$914,688
$237,650
Pacific
Parkway
Peter Burnett
Phoebe Hearst
Pony Express
Crocker/Riverside
James W. Marshall
Sequoia
Genevieve Didion
Sutterville
Tahoe
Theodore Judah
Washington
William Land
Woodbine
$627,326
$6,103
$4,377
$141,039
$159,654
$89,303
‐$176,315
‐$21,098
‐$29,382
$80,145
$692,832
$8,845
$263,505
$16,037
$157,593
$147,234
$116,066
‐$86,029
$121,682
‐$59,589
$320,388
$165,272
‐$108,996 ‐$223,786
$376,347
$146,586
$306,972
$62,366
$476,482
$187,531
$13,901,928 $7,238,851
Average Annual Unspent General Funds
$132,752
$114,768
$70,780
$76,401
‐$32,225
‐$64,363
‐$60,525
‐$41,896
$38,857
‐$11,665
$109,250
‐$79,192
$179,194
$103,325
$132,212
$8,162,007
$311,161
$188,807
$309,940
$7,306
$170,683
$114,162
$304,133
$159,895
$67,197
$60,532
$139,961
$176,652
$218,926
$177,435
$395,920
$12,338,989
$10,410,444
$269,336
$112,248
$157,419
‐$28,427
$47,305
$187,869
$130,788
$105,707
$34,023
$27,740
$183,718
‐$58,831
$230,263
$162,525
$298,036
$10,410,444
Exhibit B
Location 705
707
717
718
721
725
733
740
741
743
752
759
772
776
800
801
802
806
807
810
823
830
835
840
842
Total
Selected Administrative Accounts with Unspent Funds or Significant Budget Increases from Prior Year Budget. Source: Fiscal 16a Reports
Employee Relations
Center of Research/Educational
Integrated Services
Chief Accountability Office
Chief Academic Officer
State and Federal Programs
School Family & Comm Partners
Enrollment Center
Strategic Plan Initiatives
Office of Innovation
Youth Engagement Services
Yes 21st Century
Employee Compensation
Staff Development
Administrative Services
Internal Audit
Accounting Services
Facilities Plan
District Ops
Nutrition Svcs
Security Services
Purchasing Serv
Distribution Serv
Risk Management
Reproduction
2012_2013 2012_2013 Revised Budget
Account Balance
$ 39,897.00 $ 22,825.34
$ 106,343.00 $ 106,343.00
$ 1,319,544.00 $ 90,216.72
$ 1,966,616.86 $ 702,613.13
$ 3,523,072.30 $ 1,315,495.66
$ 4,204,372.45 $ 1,276,455.76
$ 639,608.08 $ 96,390.02
$ 708,355.00 $ 39,351.36
$ 1,554,765.00 $ 1,212,442.52
$ 225,000.00 $ 203,679.37
$ 1,278,882.00 $ 239,954.45
$ 1,243,733.00 $ 335,433.82
$ 705,388.00 $ 8,574.04
$ 76,706.00 $ 13,992.58
$ 4,647,284.00 $ 282,326.01
$ 93,490.00 $ 22,990.00
$ 868,887.00 $ 55,439.09
$ 75,212.00 $ 60,010.42
$ 1,559,970.00 $ 337,631.00
$ 62,720.11 $ 62,720.11
$ 226,138.00 $ 2,840.57
$ 940,396.00 $ 251,190.95
$ 178,918.00 $ 13,278.28
$ 2,519,468.00 $ 241,385.28
$ 459,369.38 $ (33,784.78)
$ 29,224,135.18 $ 6,959,794.70
2011‐2012 Revised Budget
$ 39,897.00
$ 106,343.00
$ 1,293,007.65
$ 1,661,803.76
$ 2,942,479.30
$ 4,143,714.78
$ 556,757.00
$ 622,000.00
$ 1,220,000.00
$ 0.01
$ 0.01
$ 0.01
$ 691,590.91
$ 76,316.92
$ 3,496,677.48
$ 85,490.00
$ 769,325.42
$ 54,668.10
$ 902,274.60
$ 1,870.00
$ 126,289.91
$ 888,754.12
$ 102,267.62
$ 2,487,500.00
$ 350,702.68
$ 22,619,730.28
2011‐2012 Account Balance
$ (1,114.74)
$ 160,343.00
$ (674,966.35)
$ 297,941.65
$ 186,666.96
$ 1,085,661.32
$ 38,683.61
$ (127,952.45)
$ 832,980.25
$ 0.01
$ 0.01
$ 0.01
$ 8,642.80
$ 922.25
$ (1,462,463.05)
$ 26,690.00
$ 10,002.03
$ 23,442.31
$ 348,292.30
$ 1,870.00
$ (61,140.83)
$ 198,496.27
$ (78,936.03)
$ 139,708.70
$ 365,519.27
$ 1,319,289.30
Increase from Prior Yr Budget
$ ‐
$ ‐
$ 26,536.35
$ 304,813.10
$ 580,593.00
$ 60,657.67
$ 82,851.08
$ 86,355.00
$ 334,765.00
$ 224,999.99
$ 1,278,881.99
$ 1,243,732.99
$ 13,797.09
$ 389.08
$ 1,150,606.52
$ 8,000.00
$ 99,561.58
$ 20,543.90
$ 657,695.40
$ 60,850.11
$ 99,848.09
$ 51,641.88
$ 76,650.38
$ 31,968.00
$ 108,666.70
$ 6,604,404.90
Exhibit C