Understanding Separatism in Chinese Political Culture
1
Introduction
In existing English language literature, terrorism is disproportionately studied from a Western state
perspective which articulate Western experiences (Silke, 2004; Jackson et al., 2011), whereas the
understanding of terrorism in China is distinct from those experiences with international terrorist
organisations, for example, Al-Qaeda, and more recently, the ISIS. Likewise, the causes of China’s
terrorist threat would not be the same as, for instance, the retaliations against the West and second
generation Muslim migrations who had experienced institutional discrimination. Terrorism in China is
neither a representation of Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” theory, as the “Sino-Islamic
connection” seemed to have failed to explain the tensions between the external supports from
Muslims – mainly from Turkey – for Uyghur separation. In Chinese domestic political discourse,
“terrorism that challenges China’s security” is a concept used interchangeably in many occasions with
separatism, in particular, the Uyghur separatist movement. Although there are other separatist claims
from Tibet and Taiwan, they have not shown propensity to indiscriminately employ violent means to
attack civilians. In addition, the Uyghur separatist group Eastern Turkistan Islamic movement is the
only terrorist groups recognised by the United Nations (United Nations, 2016), making it different
from the situations in Tibet and Taiwan. The international agreement in the nature of this group
provides ground for cooperation in counter-terrorism operations. This said, the mindset underlying the
government’s response to separatism is to some extent generalisable, as they are all related to the two
the collective memory of the “century of humiliation” and collective dream of “the rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation”.
This section articulates the underpinning framework embedded within Chinese political culture
wherein separatism is viewed as a national taboo. The discourse of separatism evokes a sense of
humiliation at the hand of imperialist invasion in the nineteenth century, a sense of trauma and
incapability to save the nation, and thus a sense of anxiety to realise the rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation. Separatism, in Chinese eyes, is thus not merely attempts and actions to demand more political
autonomy. The discourse of separatism is highly emotional in Chinese politics. The mixed feelings
are linked to the survival of the Chinese state, making is a sensitive issue, in other words, a “taboo” in
Chinese politics. In 2001, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation signed the Shanghai Convention on
Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, officially named separatism as one of the “three
evils” (Organisation, 2001) – a term that is frequently used in Chinese policy documents, regular press
conference of the Foreign Ministry, news reports, scholarly works regarding China’s counterterrorism policy. It can be seen that the Chinese government has constantly conflated these concepts
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and replaced it with one another for the convenience of political communication. Due to the plasticity
of Chinese political language, separatism cannot be taken by its literal sense, but requires a further
enquiry into the political culture wherein the discourse of separatism is framed to suit the political
interests of the central authority.
This section starts with a clarification of the collective mentality in Chinese political culture and the
way it justifies the prioritisation of “state security” over “civil liberty”. A detailed analysis of
nationalism in relation to shifting self-identification is then provided to explore the cultural, historical
and social context in which separation is related to national humiliation. This is followed by a
discussion of the impact of the ideal “Grand Union” on current political elites in terms of a sense of
obligation to strive for unity. Then further questions regarding democracy and its deviant form in
China is examined, before reaching a concluding note on whether the differences in Chinese political
culture would qualify a Chinese school in International Relations.
2
Collective mentality
A major feature of Chinese political culture, compared with liberal democracies, is the adherence to
collectivism (see also Chung and Mallery, 1999). It is not to say that this characteristic is fixed and
unchanging throughout history and regardless of different circumstances. It is certain that Chinese
government may display individualism in some social settings, for example in the heyday of Chinese
liberalism during the New Culture movement and the May Fourth movement when “individuality”
became relatively more important than “state” and “society” (Zhao, 2000 p. 124). However, in
comparison to liberal democracies more generally, China tends to be associated with collectivism.
This is inherent from the Confucian understanding of China as a “culturally defined community”,
rather than an “ethnically/politically defined nation-state” (Zhao, 2004 p. 12). Given this feature,
China is seen as by nature authoritarian, because “[c]ollectivist ideologies are inherently authoritarian,
for when the collectivity is seen in unitary terms, it tends to assume the character of a collective
individual possessed of a single will, and someone is bound to be its interpreter” (Greenfeld, 2000 p.
11).
Collective mentality is important to understand China’s security policies related to the survival of the
whole state, requiring collective decisions. It is, on the other hand, contentious with the individual
freedom when such policies potentially limited personal access to civil rights. From the state’s
perspective, the survival of the “party-state” is the most significant collective concern. A good
example is the overwhelming slogan “harmonious society” which reflects a burning anxiety to
achieve uniformity in policy discourses (Zheng and Tok, 2007) at state level, without satisfyingly
addressing emerging social challenges at individual level. The way collective mentality is applied in
policies is helpful to understand how the decisions in favour of collective interests but potentially
limit individual right are negotiated to the public through official discourse.
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There are two concepts in Chinese political culture that require further clarification in order to make
sense of its security concerns. The direct translation of “right” (quanli) and “democracy” (minquan) is
confusing and did not help understand the collective mentality, particularly when the Chinese nation
is seen under serious security threat, or at a “juncture of national survival” (minzu cunwang guantou).
A second fundamental concept which requires clarification is stability. The main focus of the politics
of stability has shifted from external intervention to internal contradictions, and the concept has been
appropriated for stronger social control in other policy areas.
2.1
Quan (right) and minquan (democracy)
“Chinese rights discourse is not merely an imperfect attempt to mirror Western ideals”, despite the
convergence of right discourse in the 1920s between the East and West (Angle, 2002 p. 206). The
term “right” in English can be used to refer to two ideas according to contexts: sovereign rights
(zhuquan), and democracy, or popular rights (minzhu or minquan). More specifically, it implies
freedom, equality and the autonomy of the individual. The word “quan”, however, was first
introduced to refer to national rights and sovereignty and “remained the dominant use for the next two
generations” (Wang, 1980 p. 3).
In contrast to Western usage, Chinese rights discourse began in the late eighteenth century, at the
collapse of the feudalist empire and the dawn of a republic. The notion of right was introduced mainly
in the context of a national crisis. Since the First Opium War, the lost of sovereign right and the acute
sense of humiliation brought by it has greatly traumatised the nation. This painful experience of
territorial cession had unified the nation psychologically in the face of a common enemy – external
imperialist invaders. At that time, it does not matter whose “right” it is, state or people, because none
of them enjoyed “right”, whereas the notion of “right” was raised to challenge state’s right if the ruler
went against natural law and failed to protect people’s life, liberty and property (Locke, 1965). In a
very short period of time before 1911, Sun Yat-sen had promoted people’s right against the Qing
rulers (Chen, 2005 p. 39). But this had soon turned to a double loss of right when the ruling
government began to accept unequal treaties.
When Sun Yat-sen sought to promote “Three Principles of the People” (nationalism, democracy, and
the livelihood of the people), there was no clear boundary between sovereignty rights and democracy.
In his article in Minbao (Sun, 1905), minquan (democracy) is actually used in the sense of sovereign
rights, not in the individual sense. The priority of minquanzhuyi (democracy ideology), according to
him, is “creating Republic of China the” (Guangdong Local Chorography Editorial Committee, 2004),
not to grant freedom and equality for at individual level. The notion of freedom, from Sun Yat-sen’s
perspective, is firstly the freedom of the nation and of the state, and the basic unit should be the
society as an organic whole. This idea was solidified by the CCP when it made the commitment to
transfer the right from the hand of the state to the hand of “the class of the labouring masses”.
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Furthermore, other early reformists such as Yan Fu, and Liang Qichao “spoke of rights and liberties
very much in terms of what would best serve collective goals” (Wang, 1980 p. 16). Although Liang
Qichao did recognise the liberal notion of individuality, the main concern at his time was to revive
China and resist foreign aggression, making the survival of the nation the priority over individual
rights (Zhao, 2000 p. 123). According to early reformists, individual freedom is limited and subject to
restrictions when it is for the best interests of the nation. This means only those who are fighting
against the correct enemy (imperialism and warlords) are entitled to enjoy freedom. Furthermore,
unlimited freedom can potentially lead to complete anarchy, therefore, in early revolutionary
collective mentality, “to ensure the success of revolution”, individual freedom should be limited
(Guangdong Local Chorography Editorial Committee, 2004).
The surrender of individual freedoms and submission to the authority in exchange for protection of
their rights reflect a Confucianist approach to social contract theory. From a Confucianist perspective,
social hierarchy, and the strict, obligatory roles of different social actors are the mechanism to
maintain social stability. In this context, individual rights are seen as a radical notion because they
pose challenge to existing social order (Wang, 1980 p. 4).
In the eyes of Chinese political elites, collective mentality fits well with the majority rule principle of
democracy, because theoretically the majority will choose what is for the best of the majority. What
makes this controversial, however, is how much individual right can be satisfied and the issue of
transparency of policy-making process. Democracy principle in China therefore implies the rights of
“the people” as a holistic entity, the autonomy of “the masses” as opposed to imperialism and
feudalism, but seldom refers to individual liberty (see also She, 2004 p. 223). In a word, democracy in
China is the “democracy without individualism”.
Related to current counter-terrorism policy, criticisms on human rights violations indicate that the
trade-off between the sacrifice of individual rights in exchange for national security is still the
dominating mentality among political elites. Chinese official documents, including the 2000 White
Paper has been quite clear about the priority of socioeconomic considerations over human rights
(Perry, 2008 p. 38). Human rights in China place emphasis on firstly the survival and development of
individuals, while this discourse in the West concerns with civil rights and political participation
(Chang, 2012 p. 12).
2.2
Stability-oriented mentality
Stability is one of the major security concerns for the CCP, the meaning of which has gone through
several changes throughout history. During the transition from the China under colonisation to an
independent state, the major social challenge had changed from the conflict between Chinese nation
and external imperialism to internal ones. In this context, the state need the power to “clean away the
corruption and anarchy and bring China back to unity and stability”, and “without that unity and order,
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all else would come to nought” ” (Wang, 1980 p. 17). A stable environment is thus regarded as the
precondition of any forms of development, without which what has been achieved will eventually be
lost (Zhang and Lv, 2013 p. 35).
The politics of stability after 1989 was not targeted at its own people, but the people suspected to be
affiliated with the US. In the aftermath of 1989 Tian’an men Square protest, Deng Xiaoping
repeatedly reminded people of the importance of stability, and three integral parts of socialist
modernisation: stability is the precondition, reform the motivation, and development the goal (Zhang
and Lv, 2013 p. 35). A prevailing interpretation in China is that the 1989 protest was a plotted
conspiracy seeking “to slit China, subvert the regime, cause chaos and end China’s rise” (Friedman,
1997 p. 13), as happened in the wave of separation movements in East Europe and the collapse of
Soviet Union in the name of democratisation. In the early years of patriotic education campaign, the
conservative took the West as an enemy, and the campaign as a tool to frustrate its subversive attempt
in line with the “peaceful evolution” strategy (heping yanbian) (Zhao, 1998 p. 292). Drawing upon
this observation, the anti-West sentiments can also be seen frequently in official terrorism discourse,
diverting the attention from domestic Han-ethnic conflicts to a contradiction between China and the
West.
On 5 May 1994, in his inspection tour to Shanghai, Jiang Zemin rescoped the stability discourse to
accommodate to internal social contradictions (Rong and Chen, 2011 p. 89). He highlighted the need
to “correctly deal with the relationship between reform, development and stability”, drawing upon
Deng’s three integral part of socialist modernisation (Chen, 2011). His shifted the focus from external
intervention to the relationship with the masses (Xinhuanet, 1999).
Despite the changes in its objective, the politics of stability persists. The reform era has opened up the
space for the globalisation of social norms including individual rights. Yet the proclamations of
individual rights, legal rights, and human rights had not directed CCP’s attention away from the
concerns for social stability. Xi Jinping’s China’s dream highlights “the unity and coalescence of
public sentiment as a part of the great revival of the Chinese nation/race” indicating that regime
stability is still the party’s abiding focus (Leibold, 2013 p. xiii). Today stability is still the most
enduring and salient theme in political communication (Hassid and Sun, 2015 p. 9), in a subtler form
of “social management” (shehui guanli) or “social governance” (shehui zhili), though (Steinhardt and
Zhao, 2015 p. 193).
However, the change of the name does not mean that it has adapted well with current China. At
operational level, the extension of the concept of “stability” has resulted in stronger control in a broad
range of issues, including security governance, migration control, the control over public opinions and
other emergencies (Rong and Chen, 2011 p. 90). Distortion and oversimplified interpretation in
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implementation has led to a decrease in effectiveness and an increase in the stability maintenance cost
(Zhang, 2011).
3
Nationalism
The following section introduces what nationalism means to the Chinese people and to the CCP
respectively, as well as its origins in history, and the ways in which it has been constructed as a master
narrative of politics. For analytical convenience nationalism is divided into state-led nationalism and
ethnic nationalism in this section.
State-led nationalism is unique in China, different from American pride in Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, Japanese feelings about monarchy and the British pride in the
parliament (Zhao, 1998 p. 301). Zhao (2004 p. 50) points out that whereas European nationalism
stems from an “indigenous process driven by the combined force of mercantilism and liberalism,
nationalist consciousness in China was triggered by external stimulus” in response to external threats.
Unlike the American nationalism that is proud of their independent and liberal identity, Chinese
nationalism is empowered by a profound sense of humiliation. As a multiethnic state, Chinese
political leaders are always in desperate search of a motivating force to unite the whole nation as a
community. The background of it being diverse, there are generally two kinds of influence that
facilitated the rise of state-led nationalism. Externally, nationalism can be seen as the glue which
keeps the nation from falling apart in an era of vibrant separatist movements across the globe, and in
particular, an era when the Uyghur separatism has been encouraged in the name of the right to
national self-determination (Amnesty International UK, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2011). Internally,
in the eyes of Chinese leadership, the rise of Chinese nationalism (state-led nationalism) is generally
seen as helpful to maintain political legitimacy at a time when the belief in Marxism and Maoism
declines (Zheng, 1999 p. 2).
Chinese nationalism has gone through several distinctive stages as the following table shows. It is not
to say that history can be neatly divided according to different characteristics of nationalism across
different time periods. The dynamics of the ways in which the imagined community of “us” has been
shaped would be helpful to understand the political functions of nationalism throughout history.
“civilised us” vs.
“barbarian them”
“weak us”
vs.“strong others”
“reviving us” vs.
“peripheral
others”
Table 1 Three stage of nationalism in China
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3.1
First stage of nationalism
Early nationalism in ancient China came from the dichotomy between “civilised us” and the
“barbarian them” through making salient the distinction between “huaxia” (China) and “yidi”
(Barbarians) (Feng, 1985 pp. 211–2; Chen, 2005).According to a contemporary Chinese philosopher
Feng Youlan, such distinction is made based on cultural criteria rather than radical differences. As
such, the creation of the notion is China as a “nation” is constructed through deliberately reinforcing
the cultural differences between “huaxia” and “yidi”.
This distinction, however, was not strong enough to qualify China as a “nation” in the sense of nationstate until the collapse of Qing dynasty. James Harrison (1969 p. 2) points out that the traditional
Chinese self image has not been defined as nationalism based on the Westphalian nation-state, but as
“culturalism” based on the historical heritage and acceptance of shared values (Chen, 2005 p. 36).
Another key difference of nationalism in this stage is that China did not see itself in relation with a
world with multiple great powers. As early reformist Liang Qichao puts it, “the reason Chinese do not
know patriotism is because they do not know that China is a state” (Zhao, 2014 p. 59). The usage of
modern concept of “nation” was imported since the “dongxue xijian” (East Transmission of Western
Sciences)1, the use of “nation” in the sense of clan and as opposed to “barbarians” had existed
throughout history, though (Chen, 2005).
3.2
Second stage of nationalism
The second stage of nationalism emerged since the First Opium War. China had confronted new
“others” which fundamentally challenged the huaxia-yidi dichotomy. The distinction which is used to
consolidate the identity of a “Chinese”, had been changed from “civilised us” verses “barbarian others”
to “weak us” (a traumatised people) versus “strong others” (imperialist invaders).
Before the founding of the Republic of China in 1911, Sun Yat-sen’s notion of “nation” was a Han
Chinese nationalism, which called on all the Han Chinese to “recover the state for our nation” (Chen,
2005 p. 39). At this point the conflict was still between the Han Chinese and the feudalist Manchu
rulers who came within Chinese territory. At the end of the First Opium War, China was forced to
open the door to foreign forces. Collective sentiments had been generated from the same experience
with the suffering at the hand of imperialist invaders. At this point, Sun realised that the major threat
to the survival of Chinese nation was no longer Manchu rulers and the whole nation confronted with a
more serious threat at the hand of the foreign “strong others”. This is when Sun Yat-sen reconstructed
“us” by calling for a unification of all Chinese people including five ethnic groups: Han, Manchus,
Mongols, Hui, Miao and Tibetans (Zhao, 2014 p. 59), and the “others” became the imperialists, the
1
“East Transmission of Western Sciences” is the process when Western thoughts are gradually
accepted within China in the late Qing dynasty and the Republican China period.
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repressing nationalist government, warlords, bureaucratic capitalists and feudal landlords (Chen, 2005
p. 40).
Political parties were quick to grasp this dichotomy of “weak us” and “strong others” in order to
obtain legitimacy. Speaking in the name of the survival of the nation allows a party to demand that
citizens identify themselves with that nation and subordinate other interests to those of the state (Tilly,
1995 p. 190).During the period when the contradiction between the KMT (Kuomintang, or the
Chinese Nationalist Party) and the CCP (the Chinese Communist Party) was more intense, they were
competing in terms of the ability to achieve the nationalist goal of protecting “us” from imperialist
“them”. In 1929 the KMT claimed that “our party’s foreign policy is always to abolish unequal
treaties” (KMT, 1929; cited in Xiong, 2013 p. 173). KMT was able to reduce the extraterritorial
privileges enjoyed by foreign powers under the banner of nationalist anti-imperialism prior to 1931.
However, its legitimacy was eroded when KMT “failed to stand up to the Japanese occupation of
China’s Northeast provinces (Manchuria) in 1931” (Chen, 2005 p. 40). While the KMT leader Chiang
Kai-shek was preoccupied with combating warlords and communist party, the CCP reasserted its
position against the “correct enemies”, thus winning the hearts and minds of the masses and gained
support from those who were disappointed as KMT’s non-resistance after Japanese army had taken
over three North-eastern provinces2. Mao Zedong’s (1935) proclamation of “turning China into a free
and independent country with full territorial integrity” thus became more appealing to the Chinese
people because it stressed the relationship between “weak us” (a traumatised people) and “strong
others” (imperialist invaders), which was the major security threat to the Chinese nation at that time.
Other than competitions, there was also cooperation between two parties for the purpose of translating
the identity dichotomy into legitimacy. The transient and recurrent cooperation between the KMT and
the CCP – the anti-Japanese nationalist united front – contributed to the reinforcement of Chinese
national identity by putting aside contradictions between Chinese people and working together to
combat the same “others”: feudalism, imperialism and Japanese invaders. However, conflict between
two parties exacerbated again when international situation was in favour of anti-Fascist forces. Both
sides publish articles and books to demonise the other, and more importantly, to align itself with the
nationalist “us” to gain legitimacy. The fate of China (Tao, 1943) published on behalf of Chiang Kaishek detailed the relationship between national humiliation (guochi) and the origins of their revolution.
Chiang Kai-shek had also clearly stated:
“[w]e, the Chinese nation, after fifty years’ of sanguinary revolutions and five and a half years’ of
sacrifice in the War of Resistance, have finally transformed the history of a hundred years of Unequal
Treaties of sorrow into a glorious record of the termination of the Unequal Treaties” (Kai-shek, 1943,
cited in Wang, 2003 p. 400).
2
Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang
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At the eve of the victory of anti-Japanese war, the Nationalist government consciously convert the
sense of humiliation to national pride, highlighting the traditional value and morality of the Chinese
nation (Xiong, 2013 p. 173).
In this stage, the reconstruction of the concept of “nation” is accompanied with a cognitive transition
from China as “tianxia” (all under heaven) to China as a “nation-state”, and a parallel transition of the
vision of “tianxia” as all territory in China to “tianxia” as international community (Luo, 2007). Until
then China’s vision of itself has started to be synchronised with other members of international
community. Due to the defensive nature of the nationalism born out of outrage against foreign
suppressions, it has contained a strong anti-Western mentality (Zhao, 1998 p. 290). The following
cascade of a series nationalist books in the 1990s – such as The China That Can Say No– is a
continuum of nationalism in modern China, because they still reflect a major dichotomy between the
“Chinese us” and the “foreign them” (particularly the US and Japan) (Zhao, 1998 p. 287).
3.3
Third stage of nationalism
The third stage of nationalism is characterised by an increasingly multi-polar tendency at the end of
the Cold War. Nationalism was no longer desperately needed for state-building, and the nationalist
“fever” has generally softened since the early 1980s (Chen, 2005 p. 36). The third stage of
nationalism is an epitome of the international context “of a global rising tide of the revolutionary
struggle” (Hall, 2013 p. 168; Zheng, 2013 p. 125).
From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, official political discourse had prioritised Marxism-Leninism
and Mao Zedong Thought over nationalism (Zhao, 1998 p. 288). According to Zhao Suisheng, Deng’s
reassess of Maoism in the reforming era in the following decade was initially targeted at eradicating
ideological and psychological obstacles to economic reform. However, this has resulted in an
unexpected demise of the official ideology and a profound crisis in political legitimacy (Chen, 1995).
The crisis of faith in socialism, Marxism and the Communist Party has evolved into a pro-democracy
movement and the subsequent full-blow Tian’anmen protest in 1989 (Zhao, 1998 p. 288).
At the same time, ethnic nationalism in border areas has also evolved. The rise of ethnic/peripheral
nationalism has come to confront the single CCP interpretation of nationalism which is used to
maintain legitimacy by forging the image that the CCP is the only party that successfully saved the
“weak us” from the hand of the “strong others”. The reassertion of ethnic identities is largely
influenced by an increasing awareness and the willingness to exercise civil rights and the right to
national self-determination, and this has been increasingly entangled with territorial claims (Ma, 2013
p. 3) with the help and support from outside. For example, many pro-Uyghur separation organisations
such as Free Asia Radio, Uyghur American Association and World Uyghur Congress have publicly
support Uyghurs to exercise their right to national self-determination.
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Internationally, the globalisation of liberal ideas and norms has accelerated the process in which
formerly less informed ethnic groups pursue more political/civil rights. Domestically, China’s
economic booming has generated aspirations for localism, such as peripheral nationalism in
Guangdong province (Wang, 2001). The ability of nationalism to consolidate the CCP legitimacy is
less effective in the economic advanced areas along the East coast. Regionally, the disintegration of
Soviet Union and the independence of Central Asian countries have reified the ethnic nationalism as
part of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism (Zhang, 2003; Yuemin and Lifang, 2004; Fan, 2013).
Surrounded by “five nations whose populations are predominantly Muslim”, domestic situation in
China for its Muslims and inter-ethnic relations have changed dramatically (Gladney, 1996).
At this stage, the leadership had to change their revolutionary mindset and “sustain and consolidate its
political legitimacy” by meeting people’s needs in terms of “economic development, political stability
and national unity” (Chen, 2005 p. 49).
Against this backdrop, State-led nationalism is promoted again to balance growing awareness of
ethnic nationalism. The latest “Chinese dream” narrative by Xi Jinping reflect CCP’s attempt to
translate nationalism into a bounding force, one that is stronger than the ways in which socialism bond
working classes together (see Nye, 1993 p. 61).
3.4
Three stages in comparison
The first two stages of nationalism can be seen as a top-down construction. Although the reason that
state-orchestrated nationalism was able to take root is that it reflected, at least to some extent, the
mindset of the masses, the political process whereby it is framed, reified, and used to serve as a
political apparatus to mobilise the masses is centralised (Chen, 2005 p. 50). In comparison, the third
stage projects the decentralisation of the concept of nationalism, a bottom-up construction whereby
ethnic/peripheral nationalism has been increasingly prevailing and has distracted people’s attention
away from state-orchestrated nationalism, challenging the official discourse of patriotism (Chen, 2005
p. 50). In response to the de-centralisation of nationalism, the central authority has encouraged “a
narrower brand of ultra-nationalism that could herald a revival of ‘leftist’ xenophobic sentiments tined
with a resurrection of some ‘victim complex’ remnants” (Chan, 2010 p. 43). A comparison of three
stages of nationalism also shows that identities are formed “only in relation or contradiction to other
identities” (Newby, 1996 p. 67). The understanding of “us” is constructed when the “other” becomes
salient through conflict.
3.5
The century of humiliation and unequal treaties
Separatism is regarded as a cultural taboo in China. To understand current anti-separatism policy, it
would be appropriate to trace back to Chinese modern history when separation has been a major part
of national trauma from the “century of humiliation”. As Wang (2013) argues, key historical events
are crucial in defining and shaping a group’s identity.
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The history of national humiliation begins when Britain sent gunboats up the Yangzi River,
compelling Qing rulers to open ports and markets to the opium trade (Kaufman, 2011 p. 2). One of the
most significant symbols of humiliation history is the authority’s acceptance of unequal treaties.
Simply put, these treaties are called “unequal” because a) they were not signed on a reciprocal basis; b)
the terms in the treaties were imposed by force upon China under duress; and c) under the “mostfavoured-nation” clause China had to “extend ipso facto to all other powers the concessions granted to
one” (Fung, 1987 pp. 795–6; Wang, 2003 p. 401).
A sense of humiliation is constructed by the talk of unequal treaties, making it an effective
propaganda apparatus to “conceptualise the contours of China’s encounters with foreign nations”
(Wang, 2003 p. 400). By signing the unequal treaties, China not only lost territory, sovereignty,
control over its internal and external environment, but more importantly, it also lost the dignity and
confidence which psychologically injured the Chinese society (see also Kaufman, 2011 p. 4). The
legacy of “unequal treaties” combined with the obligation of national unification suggest that conflicts
over territory should be highly salient for China’s political elites and basically non-negotiable (Fravel,
2005 p. 47).
Not only did unequal treaties directly result in a sense of humiliation and inferiority, but also changed
the Chinese understanding of itself politically. Unequal treaties shaped the Chinese identity because
by signing the treaties, the concept of Westphalian sovereignty is imposed on China by forcing it to
recognise the principle of legal equality between nation states, “shattering the fictive remnants of
sinocentrism” (Zhao, 2004 p. 48). Therefore the globalisation of the Westphalian system of state was
a catalyst for the rise of Chinese nationalism (Zhao, 2004 p. 50).
“Trauma” and “humiliation” are two keywords defining modern Chinese identity. The selected
traumas of a group reflect “this group’s deepest threats and fears through feelings of hopelessness and
victimisation” (Volkan, 1997 p. 48). The consequent feelings of incapacity to reverse the injury to the
group’s self-esteem and humiliation (Wang, 2014 p. 3) continued to fuel nationalism in current
Chinese politics. A sense of victimisation comes from not only from external humiliations caused by
the cession of territory, the loss of jurisdiction on its own land, huge reparations, extraterritoriality and
foreign settlements and concessions in the treaty ports, but also from the deep anxiety about China’s
own “political decay, technological backwardness, and economic weakness” (Zhao, 2000 p. 9).
Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to attribute national humiliation (guochi) solely to unequal treaties
(bupingdeng tiaoyue) (Tao, 1943) aroused intense criticism – mainly from the CCP – that he was
trying to convince the Chinese people of their “intrinsic morality” (guyou de dexing) and distract
people from their political failure (Chen, 1949; Pu, 2009).
A sense of humiliation does not exist on its own. Modern Chinese history is viewed as a particular
dark era because it stood as a sharp contrast with the glorious past. The pre-modern greatness invokes
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a sense of obligation to restore great-power status, if not the outmoded understanding of China as the
“centre of the world”. The humiliation is incomparable not only in comparison with the politically
stable, economically advanced, and culturally rich past with “ascendancy in comprehensive power”
(Deng, 2008 p. 9). It is also recognised as unprecedented even comparing to other humiliation
moments throughout history, for example, marrying princess to “barbarian” tribe leaders in order to
please political alliance and maintain border security (heqin), massacres by tyrants, cannibalism
caused by famines, turbulent times during dynastic changes, and the abuse and overkill of the royal
family after dynastic change.
In a word, the “century of humiliations” after the Opium War is deemed as the worst moment the
nation had experienced in its international history (Zhang 2000, cited in Deng 2008, p.9). There is no
other historical period that has been officially summarised as “humiliation history” as it is in history
education (Peng, 1991). It is the master narrative of modern Chinese history (Callahan, 2004). Despite
some diplomatic call for China to move forward (Schell and Delury, 2013), the century of humiliation
is still serving as a strong motivating narrative. For countries of China’s “ex-colonial aggressors”,
“the notion that time heals all wounds is often taken for granted” (Wang, 2012 p. 32). It is not that
easy to create a new national story to replace it, one that could bound the whole nation together as
much as the “century of humiliations”(Wang, 2014 p. 3). It is more unlikely if Edward Friedman
(1997 p. 13) is correct that the state-centric nationalism created in the post-Deng era was to replace
Communism as the new source of legitimacy.
The trauma and humiliation of the past make it politically significant that the Chinese ruling party
would be capable of bringing an end to the “overlong century of humiliation and subordination to the
West and Japan that began with British imposition of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842” (Samuel, 1996 p.
229).
3.6
Legacies of the century of humiliation
One of the legacies of the century of humiliation is the political aspiration for a “grater Chinese nation”
which had its roots in the official Qing view of China and violently frustrated by the century of
humiliation. This notion has been widely disseminated through education system and political
propaganda, which effectively replaced Han nationalism with a wider concept of state nationalism
(Zhao, 2006 pp. 21–3).
Although in recent two decades humiliation appears less frequently in today’s political discourse, it is
still a key element in the framework whereby the Chinese people view its place in the world. As
Callahan posits (2004 p. 200), “humiliation has been an integral part of the construction of Chinese
nationalism”. It has been effectively used for mass mobilisation (Wang, 2014 p. 4; Callahan, 2004 p.
200). The ambition to blot out humiliation is a motivating factor for Chinese political elites and a
recurring theme in contemporary Chinese history (Zhao, 2004 p. 12). The discourse of humiliation
12 / 35
runs through generations of leadership. The notion of “Rejuvenation of China” (zhenxing zhonghua)
was raised by Sun Yat-sen and inherited by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and
Xi Jinping. The normalisation of the use of humiliation discourse means that its implication has
changed from a morbid, irrational sentiment that requires treatment, to a social practice that needs to
be understood in terms of political and historical narratives (Callahan, 2004 p. 201).
Humiliation politics can be both stabilising and destabilising. It highlights the similarity among ingroup members and resists globalisation which tends to remove differences between different groups.
Humiliation discourse is also understood as an indirect cause for military actions. The 1995 and 1996
military manoeuvres in the West Pacific Ocean region are often explained as a response of patriots to
blot out humiliations that imperialism imposed (Friedman, 1997 p. 7).
The Chinese government seek legitimacy from humiliation politics as much as it is confined by it. As
Wang (2014 p. 4) argues, humiliation discourse is a key element in the construction of the Chinese
national identity. Promising a prospect to lift the whole nation out of the past misery is always one of
important starting sentences in many official political speech and documents. While legitimacy can be
gained from making such commitments, the government cannot afford to despise popular patriotic
sentiments. Taking the anti-Japanese sentiment as an example, rational response to Japanese leaders’
visits to the Yasukuni war shrine can be seen as a sign of weak state from the eyes of chauvinists,
which will in turn damage the legitimacy. Grassroots, or “fenqing” (angry youth) (Zheng, 2013 p.
127) nationalism had been another destabilising factor in this context.
Therefore, the Chinese government has to maintain a delicate balance when it seeks to take advantage
of its political function. The official writings on memorising national humiliation always end with a
clarifying note that the mourning of the dead is not a revision of hatred, but a vision for peace. “Only
those who respect their own history deserve respect from international community” (people.cn,
2014a).
However, the use of humiliation politics is not always proper. With the spread use of internet,
personalised experiences have been popularised to construct an example (shuli dianxing) for the
convenience of patriotic education in China. The cascade of ridiculous anti-Japanese drama approved
by the State Administration of Radio Film and Television reflects a process of nationalisation of
individual encounters with humiliation, as well as a reconstruction of nationalism through popular
culture. Soon after the absurd story plot became a laughing stock, Xinhua News Agency (2015)
condemned the distortion of and disrespect to the painful history, “showing a morbid view of history
and values”.
The commemoration of humiliation has become officialised throughout history. In response to
Japanese modification of invasion history in text book, Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing
Massacre by Japanese Invaders was built. During the 20 years since its opening, it has received over
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10 million visitors, among which 750 thousand youngsters received patriotic education here (Duan,
2005). The Memorial Hall provides the venue for many party related activities, such as the ritual of
taking the oath to become party members, making a typical case for patriotic education (Duan, 2005).
Through selection, recognition and emotional resonance, the archives have been used to reconstruct
the social memory (L. Wang, 2013 p. 28).
On 25 February 2014, National People’s Congress has passed a draft bill of The National public
Memorial Day of Nanjing Massacre, the first official national day of mourning. An editorial of
People’s Daily writes:
Chinese people did not yield in front of the atrocity of unparalleled savagery. The entire nation, no
matter he is from south or north, old or young, share a bitter hatred of the enemy, fighting together
against national humiliation at the hand of foreign imperialism. People has built a new Great Wall
with their blood and flesh, and gained a great victory of anti-Japanese war (people.cn, 2014b).
The setting up of the Memorial Day by law is explicitly to “strengthen national memory and the
spiritual belief of ‘never forget national humiliation, rejuvenate the Chinese nation’. “Forgetting
history is a betrayal, and denying crime is committing the crime again” (Xinhuanet, 2014). As history
is always reconstructed for political purpose in China, this move can be seen as an effort to shape the
collective memory to the extent that it is suitable for political mobilisation. Setting up Memorial Day
may result in a shift from the “contradiction between state and ethnic nationalism” back to one
between the Chinese nation and foreign forces.
3.7
Humiliation and patriotic education
One reason for creating official interpretation of humiliation for patriotic education is that a sense of
humiliation does not necessarily convert to patriotism. The literal engagement with humiliation was
instigating and radicalising, sometimes insulting, for example, the use of “slave” in mobilisation:
“…thus China has become not only the colony of one country, but many countries; Chinese people
have become slaves of not only one country, but many countries” (Xiong, 2013 p. 173). Humiliation
is more than patriotism, “all rights lost, our state is no longer a state. How painful it is! How can the
people of Chinese nation exist in society with such burning shame? … our flesh will die, our wills
will not” (Luo, 2001 p. 75).
In attempting to direct this intense feeling towards a positive output, the CCP had, like in other
atrocities and natural disasters, employed a tactic to reverse the negative emotion into a praising and
constructive one.
What is impressive, in those sanguinary days, our people helped each other, supported each other.
Many international friends also risked their life to protect Nanjing citizens and record the savage act
of Japanese invaders… The atrocity did not destroy the Chinese people, in contrast it united our
14 / 35
nation to fight against invaders….Under the leadership of the CCP, with the efforts of all the ethnics,
all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation was able to fight the same enemy, face death
unflinchingly (Xinhuanet, 2014).
In current official discourse, “nationalism” and “chauvinism” imply the parochial and reactionary
attachments to nationalities, whereas “patriotism” has a positive connotation, always blurring the love
for the Chinese state and the Communist Party (Zhao, 1998 p. 290).
The second reason is that people would not spontaneously translate the experience of humiliation to
patriotism. There has been a persistent sense of anxiety over many intellectuals as China’s
obliviousness to such humiliation (Cohen, 2002 p. 1). Lu Xun, one of the early radical nationalist
writers sarcastically depicted a society which was so traumatised that only “obliviousness” can relieve
the pain from the trauma-related cues (Lu, 1973 p. 148). He has been famous for his trenchant
criticism on the obliviousness as one of “inherent weaknesses” of the nature of Chinese people.
Despite current skeptics that his works are in fact challenging the CCP’s rule, two of his former
residents (in Shanghai and Zhejiang) have been listed in the Bases for Patriotic education3.
The anxiety of forgetting national humiliations has been reflected in the commemorations of national
humiliations days. In a study based on achieves in late Qing dynasty, Xiong Bin examines the
tendency to extend the notion of national humiliation. Previous researchers list out twenty different
national humiliation days on the signing of unequal treaties, Opium war, invasions of the Eight-Power
Allied Forces, territorial occupations and massacres respectively. Xiong cites the sarcasm that “the
number of China’s national humiliation days has broken world record” (Xiong, 2013 p. 173). He
argues that too many commemoration activities have in fact blurred the actual time of a particular act
of humiliation, which indicates that it is not the date per se, but mobilising effect that makes
commemoration necessary.
A third reason is the century of humiliation is too remote for current generation. Pre-occupied by
socio-economic development and the well-being of themselves, ordinary people would not be willing
to be bothered to put on this self-imposed hardship.
In this context, patriotic education was introduced to intervene in the otherwise discursive sense of
humiliation. As Americans are expected to learn the preamble of the Declaration of Independence,
every Chinese high-school students will be assessed on their knowledge of the official narrative of the
Chinese modern history neatly apart with pre-modern China by the Opium War.
3
The construction of the Bases for Patriotic education is under the leadership of State Education Committee,
Ministry of Civil Affairs, State Cultural Relics Bureau, the Central Committee of the Communist Young League,
General Political Department of People’s Liberation Army, and Propaganda Department. The aim of this
programme is to popularise patriotic education among primary and middle school students. Among the first 100
locations for patriotic education, 9 reflect the humiliation history and the struggle at the hand of imperialist
invasions.
15 / 35
Patriotic education regarding to humiliation is based upon s sense of shame that is greatly valued as
fundamental virtue of being a human in Chinese culture. Early philosopher Mencius developed the
idea that “a sense of shame is the start of righteouseness” (xiu e zhi xin, yi zhi duan ye) (Yang, 2013 p.
73). Another well-known historical narrative of national humiliation (Sima, 1959) entrenched the
value of having a sense of shame. The story of “woxin changdan” (enduring self-imposed hardships to
remember humiliations) is frequently taught in children’s book and educational TV programmes on
“traditional Chinese values”. The King of Yue, Goujian was defeated by his opponent the King of Wu,
Fuchai, and his attempt to make peace with the latter was frustrated. Goujian left his country and
acted as a servant at Fuchai’s court until Fuchai believed that Goujian had genuinely subjected to him.
Two years later Goujian was released and went back to his country. To ensure that he would not
forget the humiliation he had experienced after being defeated, Goujian hung a gall bladder from the
ceiling, tasted it before every meal. He worked hard to revive the nation from the suffering after war.
Several years later Goujian waged another war against Fuchai and eventually had his revenge. Fuchai
was exiled and committed suicide in deep regret4.
In modern China, Chiang Kai-shek is said to be the first politician to use humiliation education to
maintain a positive image of the KMT (Xiong, 2013 p. 173). It is also used to arouse a sense of crisis,
a sense of urgency, a sense of responsibility for the rejuvenation of Chinese nation (Shi, 2009 p. 34).
In the aftermath of 1989 movement, the state-led patriotic education redefined the legitimacy of the
post-Tian’anmen leadership, so that the CCP could continue on the basis of a non-Communist
ideology (Zhao, 1998 p. 288).
3.8
State-led nationalism vs. ethnic nationalism
There are always certain prefixes for nationalism for the purpose of analytical convenience. In China,
the competition between two types of nationalism – state-led nationalism and ethnic nationalism – is
increasingly salient. Before digging into the contradiction between the state and society, it is
necessary to clarify what the state-led nationalism means in different contexts.
It is not accurate to equate state-promoted nationalism with Han nationalism. Chinese nationalism has
clearly gone beyond from Sun Ya-sen’s initial definition of Han nationalism in opposition with
Manchu imperialism, and the Chinese nationalism with five ethnic groups. China’s state nationalism
was propagated, popularised, and passed on to the following generations through an ongoing patriotic
education that transcends a narrow nationalism based on ethnicity (Jiang, 1996).
When seen as a holistic idea, Chinese nationalism is studied mostly out of realist concerns for the rise
of an “antagonist” China. Since the seemingly provocative book China Can Say No (Zhao, 2004;
Zheng, 2013), it is the notion that the rise Chinese nationalism might challenge the US hegemony that
4
This story is recorded in Chinese classics The Commentary of Zuo (Zuozhuan), Discourses of the States
(Guoyu), Records of the Grand Historican (Shiji), Spring and Autumns of Wu and Yue (Wu Yue Chunqiu)
16 / 35
generates a booming in academic interests in English language literature. In Western discourse, the
“rise” of China becomes increasingly disturbing due to the “worrisome nature of recent expressions of
Chinese nationalism” (Chen, 2005 p. 35) . Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro (1997) worry that the
yearning to redeem the humiliations of the past can be transformed to an attempt to replace the US as
a regional hegemon in Asia.
In response, Chinese scholars understand it as a defensive reaction to realist Western policies.
According to Zheng Yongnian, state-orchestrated nationalism is used to mobilise national resources to
resist the American containment policy5 (1999 p. 142), and resist the influence of Western countries
more generally (Zheng, 2013 p. 126). This is evident from a nationwide patriotic education campaign
has been employed to oppose the West’s strategy of “peaceful evolution” (Zheng, 2013 p. 126) which
had previously led to pro-democracy movements and regime change in East Europe (Welsh, 1994;
Hill, 1993) and Central Asian countries (Way and Levitsky, 2005).
However, international impact is only part of Chinese nationalism. Domestically state-led nationalism
clashed with the growing self-awareness of ethnic identity among the Uyghurs. It is not to say that
there are clearly two parties in conflict.
Firstly, Uyghur identity is not necessarily a spontaneous ethnic group. Current categorisation of ethnic
groups inherits the understanding of differences among ethnic groups the from anthropological and
ethnographical research and ensuing identification since the 1950s (Schwarz, 1979 p. 141; Fei, 1992).
According to Gladney’s (1990) investigation into the ethnogenesis of the Uyghur identity, the creation
of Uyghur ethnic identity when the Chinese government implemented a Soviet-style ethnicity
identification policy is clearly a discursive process where the distinctions between groups are made
clear for administrative management. Ethnic issues are understood in a theoretical framework based
upon Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist, Maoist and Deng’s theories (Zhu and Blachford, 2006). Political
leaders and intellectuals have increasingly recognised that the “divide and rule” tactics borrowed from
the USSR model had been out of date, and ethnicity problems cannot be “resolved”, but can only be
“managed” (Zhu and Blachford, 2006; Leibold, 2013).
Secondly, not all Uyghurs favour the same political goal. Reed and Raschke (2010) identify four ways
of Uyghur ethno-political thoughts: apathist, assimilationist, autonomist and separatist. It is true that
the political goal of the Uyghur is no longer congruent with national unit (Gellner and Breuilly, 2008),
but this did not immediately mean that all Uyghurs have a same level of aspirations for independence.
5
Yet, Edward Friedman (see 1997 pp. 14–5) argues that American containment policy in Asia only
targeted the Korean peninsula at the DMZ, and the reason its policy is portrayed as one of
containment is that “chauvinists” try to “defeat their domestic opponents by depicting reformers who
preach meeting America half-way as traitors”. In addition, “ezhi” (throttling) is not the precise
translation. However, the American support for Taiwan and Tibet separation is seen as strong
evidence for a combination of “soft” and “hard” containment policy (Wang, 2009; Li and Zhang,
2005).
17 / 35
While NGOs are accusing China of the repression of religion (Human Rights Watch, 2005), Uyghur
dissidents’ claims are actually more secular, related to environmental degradation, anti-nuclear testing,
religious freedom, over-taxation, and family planning policy etc (Gladney, 2003 p. 19). The goal of
the Washington-based East Turkestan Government-in-Exile (ETGE) can be seen from its name. The
fact that the ETGE recruit people from different ethnic background indicates that its vision is in fact
aiming at territory rather than establishing an single-ethnic state (Hoshino, 2011 pp. 148–71). By
contrast, the Would Uyghur Congress did not consider it “the right time to push a statehood agenda”
(Chen, 2013 p. 22).
There are several ways to describe the difference between nationalism with a state label and that with
an ethnic label. In terms of state-building and the growing self-awareness of ethnic groups,
nationalism can be divided into constructive and destructive (Zhao, 2004 p. 5). In terms of the
direction a particular type of nationalism is spreading and its political influence unfolding, the
“inward-directed” sentiments “hold a nation together”, and the “out-directed emotions … heap
hostility upon others” (Comaroff and Stern, 1994 p. 38). According to Comaroff and Stern (1994 p.
40), elites in power seek to impose ideologies, images, and social knowledge on the rest of the
population as the collective culture of the nation-state, and remove differences within the political
community and replace it “with a common, hegemonic order of signs, symbols, and values”. From a
Weberian perspective, what constitute ethnicity is a set of selected ethnic indicators – such as physical
appearance, customs, common memories, language, and religion – that create “affinities” with
insiders and “disaffinities” with outsiders (Little, 1995 p. 298). This clearly goes against the state
attempt to minimise the difference and impose a single interpretation of nationalism based on
collective memories. The two are always competing with each other because one’s strengthening is at
the expense of the weakening of the other. As Weber (2009 p. 167) puts it, the significance of a nation
is “preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group”. David
Little’s (1995 p. 297) research on the relationship between nationalism and ethno-nationalism
suggests that the form of nationalism promoted by the Chinese government tends to be more
intolerant to requirements of non-discrimination, and might radicalise ethno-nationalism (e.g. in Tibet)
and contribute to antagonism, hostility and instability, while “liberal nationalism contributes to the
conditions of peace by cultivating ethnic and religious respect and harmony”.
By the same token, Liah Greenfeld (2000 pp. 10–1) argues that the sovereignty of the people implies
the actual sovereignty of individuals as members of a nation. When accentuate the people’s
uniqueness, its very being a distinct people, the sovereign becomes a collectivistic definition reflect
collective being. Therefore, there is clearly a difference between the “individualistic-libertarian
nationalism” and “collectivistic-authoritarian nationalism” (Zhao, 2004).
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In the international community, the cohesive effect of state nationalism is often seen as domestically
constructive and destabilising to the outside, which is evident from the popularity of China threat
theories. The resurgence of Chinese nationalism has caused a gloomy concern among the West that
China would embrace an aggressive attitude in dealing with the West (Zhao, 2004 p. 6). What is at
core is how scholars inside and outside of China perceive its behaviour. Benjamin Cohen (1991 p. 47)
makes a distinction between malign nationalism and benign nationalism, the former “seeks national
goals relentlessly, even at the expense of others”, the latter “is prepared to compromise national policy
priorities where necessary to accommodate the interests of others”. It is clear that scholars worrying
about the rise of Chinese nationalism take it as a realistic, zero-sum game, indicating one’s rise
meaning the fall of another. Scholars in defence of the positive role of Chinese nationalism follow a
liberalist interpretation. The “flattery” discourse of China’s rise is used to urge China to share more
global responsibility (Yee, 2010 p. 3), highlighting the opportunity it created outweigh the challenges
it posed to world order. Edward Friedman predicts that post-Mao nationalism could endanger peace in
the Pacific-Asia region, which reflects a tendency among strategic analysts in the US and Japan to
believe that China is seeking regional hegemony in Asia (Friedman, 1997; Van Ness, 1996). Chen
(2005 p. 36) argues that the positive nationalism constructed since the 1980s is “to accommodate
both the Chinese desire for a national rejuvenation, and the general welfare of the world community”.
David Shambaugh (1996 p. 205) calls it “defensive nationalism”, which is “assertive in form, but
reactive in essence”.
In a word, there is no intrinsically moral value of nationalism. State nationalism can be seen as
threatening to other states, stability-enhancing for the state, and repressive to ethnic minorities, while
ethnic nationalism can be aspirations for liberal and justice for ethnic groups, and at the same time
destabilising to the central authority. Whether it is positive or negative depend largely on the eyes of
beholders. The way nationalism is framed in a certain social context determines its moral value.
3.9
Entrenching political ideas with master narrative
As analysed above, nationalism is constructed in complex political, social and cultural context. To
effectively convey the message out to the public, the CCP needed to offer simplified and catchy
slogans.
Political
leader
Mao
Zedong
Zhou
Enlai
Deng
Xiaoping
Time
Master narrative
1950s
Mass line
1972
1979
Four
modernisations
Well-off society
(xiaokang shehui)
Ideological
framework
Goal
Marx-Leninism
Class struggle
Modernisation
Modernising industry, agriculture,
science and technology and military
Confucianism
Economic improvement
19 / 35
Early
1980s
1987
1989
1989
Jiang
Zemin
Hu Jintao
Xi
Jinping
Invigoration of
China
Three-steps
strategy
Stability overrides
everything
Great rejuvenation
of the Chinese
nation
Nationalism
More powerful & wealthy
Economic improvement
Maintaining stability
Nationalism
2000
Three
representatives
MarxismLeninismMaoism
2004
Harmonious
society
Confucianism
2003
Scientific
development
concept
Marxism
2008
Two Century
Goals
2012
The Chinese
dream
To restore past glory
To represent the development of
advanced productive forces, the
orientation of advanced culture, and
the fundamental interests of the
overwhelming majority of the Chinese
people
Promote harmonious relationship
between different groups within China,
between people and nature, and
between China and the world.
Environmental protection
Well-off society
Socialist modernised China
Nationalism
Two Century Goals
By 2021: moderately well-off society
By 2049: a fully developed nation
Table 2 Evolution of the master narrative in contemporary Chinese political discourse
It can be seen from this chart that the national story has been shifting between nationalism and
Marxism. When the economic improvement is more urgent, the state tend to employ nationalism to
stimulate economy. This is consistent with the hypothesis that “nationalist forces may accelerate
economic advance by weakening regionally-based pre-modern social structures” (Adelman and
Morris, 1965 p. 568). A significant turn from Marxism-based theoretical framework to the emphasis
on nationalism and patriotism is since Tian’an men protest in 1989. The legitimacy of the CCP faced
great challenge after the “crackdown of demonstrations in the spring of 1989 and the collapse of
communist regimes in Eastern Europe” (Wang, 2014 p. 5).
Master narrative is helpful to understand the intentions and the “grand strategy” that the state is
aiming at. As Wang (2014 p. 8) argues, the key question to ask is not “about how to measure China’s
strength, but how to understand China’s intentions”. The rejuvenation Chinese dream reflects a strong
sense of obligation and nostalgia to the restore China in relation to other countries to the extent it had
enjoyed in the past. Therefore what outsiders may see as a “rise”, would be regarded a “return”, or a
regaining of China’s lost international status, rather than obtaining something entirely new (Deng,
2008 pp. 8–9; Xuetong, 2001; Hunt, 1984; Dittmer and Kim, 1993).
20 / 35
4
The contemporary incarnation of “Grand Union”
The notion of “Grand Union” is a political ideal that has hidden influence throughout China’s political
history (N. Yang, 2010 p. 294; Qi, 2015). Although not explicitly spelt out, it has served as a
foundation for many other political ideas, for example, maintaining national sovereignty, social
stability, economic development, defending external invasions, organising water conservancy project,
preventing separatism, strengthening ethnic communications, to name a few (Qi, 2015).
Historian Yang Nianqun articulates that the notion per se contains two implications. On one hand, it
projects a sense of national pride in the harmonious existence of various ethnic groups across
geographically distinctive regions. On the other hand, the practice of “Grand Union” is always under
the shadow of tyranny, dictatorship, and feudalism. According to Yang (2010 p. 57), the notion can be
dangerous for three reasons. First, power is centralised at the hand of the emperor, ties the destiny of a
whole nation to the judgement of the emperor, making it highly arbitrary. Second, the notion
empowered the ruler with a sense of responsibility and superiority, which became an obstacle for
social evolution. In addition, extreme forms of obsession with “Grand Union” have resulted in speech
crime, or the literary inquisition (wenzi yu) 6. Given the ambiguous connotations it contains, Yang
argues that this notion could be better understood as a political cultural ideal which is used to match
with governance.
“The notion of a centralised state was essentially derived from the Confucian concept of Datong
(great harmony) and came to symbolise a presumed historical tradition of cultural unity” (Zhao, 2000
p. 71). Since Qing Dynasty, “Grand Union” had been further crystallised when various policies have
taken place to interpret, complement and realise it7. When Kang Youwei proposes that external threats
need to be combated by strengthening the national identity which is created from five different ethnic
groups: the Manchus, Han-Chinese, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans (Zhao, 2006 p. 21), the
unification of five ethnics is what Kang Youwei called “Grand Union” (Kang 1981; cited in Lin 1984,
p.55).
According to Yang (2010 p. 296), until today, it has not only been able to limit China’s governing
style, but also shaped Chinese mentality. Because of the fundamental “union” mentality, the CCP was
able to gain legitimacy by envisaging a prospect of China without separation. This notion continued to
exist implicitly and became the presupposed standard to gauge whether China is unified or spitted. In
other words, the notion of “unity”, as well as a closely related notion of territorial integrity in Chinese
political discourse derives more from “Grand Union” and its implications on political practices, and
6
The literary inquisition refers to official persecution of intellectuals for their writings. For details, see Zhang
and Zhang 2010 “A Review of the Studies on Literary Inquisition of the Qing Dynasty”
7
For details, see Yang 2010, “The ‘Grand Union’ historical view from my perspective”
21 / 35
less from the concept of sovereignty in Western political philosophy. Therefore, the construction of
“unity” is confined to an ideal status before some parts of China has been taken from unequal treaties.
It is with reference to “Grand Union” that the Chinese history textbook created a long list of territories
that are claimed to be taken from China when it was week (Friedman, 1997 p. 10). The popularity of
“Grand Union” also helps explain the leading role of the CCP. The multi-party cooperation and
political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China is a contemporary
ramification of the idea of Grand Union. It is designed to blend one-party leadership with popular
democracy, and efficiency with diversity (Qi, 2015 p. 36).
As the political ideal of Grand Union highlights collective interests and good leadership, a political
multiculturalism, as practiced in the UK, would not be an option for CCP, because it does not answer
the question that is fundamental to Chinese political elites: how to accommodate multiculturalism
while guaranteeing the loyalty to state nationality (Li, 2006; Zou, 1990). From a Marxist perspective,
the unlimited emphasis on heterogeneity of multiculturalism can easily extend to ethno-nationalism,
which damaging national unity and stability (Wang, 2010).
Therefore, despite the superficial difference between Socialist democracy and traditional Chinese
political regimes, the fundamental pursuit of the “Grand Union” continued. China is still a multiethnic nation unified under the leadership of the CCP.
Early sociologist Fei Xiaotong argues that Chinese nation is not a simple addition of 56 ethnic groups.
They have integrated into a holistic entity. The national awareness has been an emotion and virtue that
is above ethnic identification. Therefore, as Fei puts it, there is multiple layers of social identities, the
unity of the Chinese nation based on shared experience, shared destiny, and a shared sense of dignity
and humiliation as at the top layer (Fei, 1999 p. 13).
Fei later developed this idea into a theory of “diversity within unity” (duoyuan yiti geju). This theory
is based on Marxist inheritance of the unity of opposites, posting that everything in existence is a
combination of ultimately contradictory forces. Reflected in history, China as a state is experiencing
repeating cycle of unity (he) and division (fen). The cycle is concurrent with the changing status of the
contradiction between unity and plurality. When unity took hold, cultural diversity can be
strengthened and manifested to a reasonable level; whereas in times of turbulence, political unity has
often been prioritised in the whole nation.(Lin, 1991 pp. 9–10).
However, it is worth noting that Fei’s theory confuse a political concept in cultural studies. The idea
of “unity” is a political ideal, which did not necessarily exist if one studied it through an
anthropological perspective (Ma, 2004 p. 125). Wu Zelin’s fieldwork in Yunnan province indicates
that people in border areas were not even aware of being a member of a distinctive ethnic group
22 / 35
beyond his own small living circle, let alone being a member of a nation at a higher level of the
multiple identities.
5
Democracy
Adding a little more depth to this question, it brought us back to the old discussion of whether a
drastic democratisation would be inevitable to China. This question is closely relevant because not
being genuinely democratic is still the target of many NGOs’ accusations (Amnesty International UK,
2016; Human Rights Wath, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2015). In addition, the question of regime
type needs to be clarified before moving on to the relationship between democracy and terrorism.
Most Chinese scholars follow party line and favour a gradual reform rather than a radical regime
change. They believe that in current international situation, China has no choice but to make every
effort to maintain integrity and stability. “China’s current situation absolutely does not allow us time
for old-fashioned Western thought. We should immediately abandon superstitions about democracy…
we need a government with centralised powers that can produce the best talent that is efficient and
competent” (Eastman, 1974 p. 148).
Imposing multi-party election is not necessarily better, because the stable transition of political power
to next generation of leadership is crucial to maintain social stability (Qi, 2015 p. 37). Liang Shuming
adds that a successful leader in a relatively small polity elected by his constituency is not necessarily
capable of handling difficult situations on a larger scale (Liang, 1987). Therefore, compared to a poor
imitation of Western election model and breaking up with the long existed political tradition,
deepening reform in cadre selection is more practical to maintain stability (Qi, 2015 p. 38).
From a Marxist perspective, “Western” democracy is based on private ownership of means of
production and a political philosophy of “natural rights”, whereas Chinese democracy is based on
public ownership and the working class. The CCP and Chinese intellectuals follow Marxist claim that
the Western version of liberal democracy is in fact capitalist dictatorship. According to Mao Zedong
(1940), the “outdated” Western democracy is by nature the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a oneparty fascist dictatorship behind a façade of bourgeois democracy, which is something that the
Chinese people would never welcome. The “dictatorship of the proletariat”, coined by Joseph
Weydemeyer, is a temporary dictatorial method to overcome the inevitable resistance by the
bourgeoisie. The emphasis of the “the dictatorship of the proletariat”, according to Guo (2002, p.101) ,
is the sovereignty in the hand of the people, compared to the king or the church. The purpose of
“dictatorship of the proletariat” is to deprive the rights of those who rule by way of dictatorship. The
“dictatorship of the proletariat” is proposed as a condition to realise the emancipation of the
proletariat, rather than the ultimate goal of socialism and communism (Guo, 2002 p. 101). Following
23 / 35
the majority rule principle as a major democratic spirit, China’s affairs must be decided by the vast
masses, and the monopoly of the bourgeoisie government alone must be absolutely rejected (Mao,
1940).
Consequently, Chinese political elites modified Western interpretations of democracy, adding that
individual rights can only be realised when the collective interests are protected, or in other word,
when the state and society is stable. China lacks the political, social and economic conditions like
those in the West when a complete set of political system of democracy has been developed. The
democratisation processes was also painful and prolonged in many European countries (Liu, 2005 p.
28). Mao Zedong has realised that Marxist-Leninist theory needs to be adjusted to fit into China’s
conditions.
First, democracy by itself would not be directly translated into a successful regime because the rule of
majority means that the minority might also be subject to forced subordination (Guo, 2002 p. 102). An
extreme variation of majority rule is ochlocracy, whereby the majority does not decide for the best
interest of the community. Therefore, it is not the means of democracy that justifies legitimacy, but
what sort of end it is approaching to. Likewise, rejecting using the dictatorship against the people is
not the same with limiting the power of coercion in dealing with the contradiction with the external
enemy, because the former projects dictatorship as an end while the latter a means to achieve harmony.
This is evident also from a linguistic clarification of the term zhengti. Often translated into “regime”
and “political system”, it concerns less with the way the state is organised, but primarily with way the
state is governed under the rule of highest monarch, using Chinese words, the “art of governing the
state” (zhiguo zhidao) (Xu 2007, p.8, cited in Chang 2012, p.6). It further proves that from Chinese
understanding, democracy as a means would not satisfy good governance unless combined with other
means, even dictatorship.
Democratisation that took place afterwards also supports the claim that democracy as a means does
not necessarily lead to good governance. According to Chang, the Utopian understanding that the
establishment of a democratic regime is the cure for social problem does not stand up to scrutiny if
one looks at the democratisation of East European countries. Promoting democracy without regards to
social problems would be counter-productive, and may play a role in inducing nationalist and ethnonationalist separation movements (Chang, 2012 p. 10). The Western obsession with promoting
democracy, as well as popularising democratic peace theory, is derived from a dichotomy between
state and society. If society is seen as intrinsically good, then it would be rational to advocate for a
form of governance where the power of the state is limited by the people. However, as Chang (2012 p.
10) indicates, this perspective overlooks the positive role of the authority in making and influencing
policies.
24 / 35
Second, the party itself is changing. Although the early anti-Feudalism and anti-Imperialism
revolution starts with an aspiration towards democracy, the regime type per se no longer determines
the legitimacy of the ruling party when it began to transform from a revolutionary party to a wellfunctioning government. As a Chinese saying goes, “seizing power is often easier than holding on to
it” (da jiangshan rongyi, shou jiangshan nan) (Jiao, 2013). The CCP is well aware of this law, which
also why it has contributed such great efforts to maintain social stability. As Deng argues, even
according to American experiences of hundreds of years of electoral politics, if China conducts an
election in billions of people, a chaos like Culture Revolution will definitely occur, which will
eventually lead to a full-scale civil war (Deng, 1989). The polity is laid out in constitution, seeking
political pluralism, is by nature seeking regime change (Zou, 1990 p. 17). Based the lessons learnt
from the past that power come from military victory, the unity of China had always been a top-down
activity, and “no Chinese leader could avoid that heritage” (Wang, 1980 p. 17). “Finer issues such as
human rights would simply have to wait” (Wang, 1980 p. 17). Compared to strengthening minority
rights and autonomy, which has been advocated by the West, most Chinese thinkers believe that
China’s fragile national unity is the more urgent task.
Based on these two points, Mao developed the idea “dictatorship of the proletariat” (renmin minzhu
zhuanzheng). The theoretical underpinning of this notion is the ways in which different types of social
contradictions are understood. According to Mao, there are two major types of social contradictions –
the contradiction between the people and enemy, and the contradictions among the people (the
proletariat). Mao called for a differentiation in treating with two types of social contradictions:
dictatorship (coercion or repression) for the former, and democratic centralism (by means of
discussion, criticism, persuasion and education) for the latter. Mao explicates the relationship between
the two types of contradictions:
“The aim of this dictatorship is to protect all our people so that they can devote themselves to
peaceful labour and make China a socialist country with modern industry, modern agriculture, and
modern science and culture. Who is to exercise this dictatorship? Naturally, the working class and the
entire people under its leadership. Dictatorship does not apply within the ranks of the people. The
people cannot exercise dictatorship over themselves, nor must one section of the people oppress
another. Law-breakers among the people will be punished according to law, but this is different in
principle from the exercise of dictatorship to suppress enemies of the people. What applies among the
people is democratic centralism.” (Mao, 1957)
It can be seen that the word “dictatorship” in Chinese context is translated into two words:
“zhuanzhenng” and “ducai”, the former is used in the context of “contradictions within”, and the latter
is dealing with the contradiction with the external enemy. In Chinese middle school education, it is
25 / 35
repeatedly taught that confusing these two words would be politically wrong, because the indication
of dictatorship against its own people challenges the democratic commitment the CCP has made.
It is dangerous to accept without question the idea that only Western liberalisation is modern. Doing
so will intervene current national policy and move China toward Western capitalism (Deng, 1989).
Mao’s modification of democracy is one that combines “the centralism based on extensive democracy”
and “the democracy under the guidance of central authority”. This formulation is reflected from
Mao’s slogan “from the masses, to the masses” (cong qunzhong zhong lai, dao qunzhong zhong qu).
The combination of top-down approach and bottom-up approach leads John Naisbitt to coin the term
“vertical democracy”. Despite the fact that his “flattery tone” is despised within English language
academia, he offered an alternative, context-based application of democracy that is widely welcomed
in Chinese academia.
Even though the CCP has adopted a modified version of democracy, Chinese intellectuals have
applied the notion pragmatically. They understand democracy as something that “could be a means of
communication between government and people to achieve harmony in society as it bring the
solidarity of the group and offers the means of national survival in a world of fierce competition”
(Zhao, 2010 p. 424). According to Zhao, unlike Western assumption that individuals have particular
interest contrary to the general interest of the state, in china popular participation is a sign of
civilisation, an attribute of modernity and a pathway toward collective welfare. From this point of
view, one possibility is that adopting democracy is a combination of an unwilling bandwagon and
refusal to reconcile, in a time it could not resist Americans’ attempt to democratise other countries and
could not afford the Americans’ hostility in non-democratic countries in a time when China did not
have a better political system to describe how collective interests could be prioritised like it did
throughout dynastic history.
Particularly since Xi, China has been following a model of a “state-driven growth combined with
strict political control” (Puddington, 2015 p. 19). The CCP governance under Xi shows an increasing
tendency of politically left and economic right8, or “turning to left with the right turn signal on”.
Given Xi’s willingness to reform and his opposition against the idea of an independent judiciary,
Kristian McGuire calls him an “authoritarian reformer” (McGuire, 2015). Although there are various
policy reforms in policing system (e.g. abolishment of re-education through labour), one-child policy
and hukou household registration system, and the expansion of free-trade zones, the CCP under Xi’s
leadership has imposed greater restrictions on academic freedom, media and is against “Western
values” (McGuire, 2015).
8
The differentiation of political “left” and “right” is different from the West and different at different times in
Chinese history. In this case, Left means conservative, and right liberal.
26 / 35
In relation to terrorism, some would argue that a democratic political culture would curb terrorism
because it provides a save environment to protest for civil liberties9. The CCP would not consider
democracy be the solution because from its realist standpoint, the major cause for separation
movements is the support from the West, rather than resentment caused by bad governance. The fear
that less restrictions on surveillance and investigations, limited ability to prevent terrorism attack due
to weaker intelligence gathering are the very deepest concern for the CCP. Therefore, the case of
China shows that the relationship between democracy and terrorism is not as simple to the extent
hypotheses such as “totalitarianism facilitates terrorism” or “democracy allows room for terrorism”
could be made. Regime type alone does not explain the situation in China. To understand counterterrorism in Chinese context, it is not the regime type but the identification of the “other”, or in
Marxist words, the changing social contradictions, that shaped China’s security policy.
6
Conclusion: A case for a Chinese school of International Relations?
An underlying theme running through this chapter is constant clarifications of previous confusions
caused by either English-Chinese translation or insufficient understanding of cultural and historical
context for political issues. It raises the question does it means that a Chinese school of International
Relations should be introduced in order to balance the “Western” domination in IR studies. China’s
politics is deeply rooted in the its own long-standing history, political ideas and philosophical beliefs,
culture and political philosophy, to the extent that some scholars find it difficult to explain its
behaviour in international interactions through ready-made IR theories (Deng, 2008 pp. 13–4; Zheng,
2009). Despite its adoption of an ostensible Western Marxist theory, Chinese political elites have been
very much affected with its own rationale of how politics work in China. Against this backdrop, a
number of Chinese scholars began to argue that a Western dominated IR theories needs to be
complemented with Chinese perspectives (see Ren, 2008 p. 293). What Chinese scholars see as
“academic hegemony” needs to be confronted with alternative research from non-Western
perspectives, in condition that both sides need to be based on unequivocal conceptualisation and rigid
reasoning (Mei, 2000 p. 65).
The first question to ask is to what extent that Chinese scholarship would qualify as good research,
and subsequently, form effective debate with English language academia. There are some wellacknowledged shortcomings regarding current Chinese scholarly works. Chinese scholars tend to
confuse ideological pursuit with national interests, and policy analysis with academic research (Wang,
1995 pp. 11–2) and always filled with repetitive interpretations of the party line and hollow content.
Chinese academics agree that “IR with Chinese characteristics” needs to be more academic than
“adding footnotes” or “illustrating” China’s behaviour in international community (Li, 2003), in order
9
For the debate over whether democracy promote or prevent terrorism, see Lutz and Lutz 2010 “Democracy
and Terrorism”
27 / 35
to make genuine contribution to academia, and more importantly, effectively enter into conversation
with English language scholars. It is not to say that Chinese scholars will eventually need to be
approved by English academia. Without the exchange of argumentations and academic debate, the
“Chinese school” will only be limited within Chinese academia (despite that they are written in
English), making it pointless to call it a “school”. As Ren Xiao (2008 p. 295) puts it, “a school does
not simply come into being when it is given a name”.
The second question is whether it would be appropriate to stress the dichotomy between “English
language academia” and its Chinese counterpart. It is it is necessary to clarify what a Chinese school
is to bring into human knowledge, and whether it would be legitimate to use Chinese culture to inform
theory (Ren, 2008 p. 300). According to Lin Minwang (2013) if social sciences are to produce
universal theories to understand the world, than a Chinese school would be complementary and there
would be no space for “Chinese characteristics”. By contrast, if human understanding is confined by
culture, then national experiences, ways of thinking, and collective memory do make a difference,
thus a national label for IR theories would be inevitable (Lin, 2013).
Therefore, while blindly applying Western developed IR theories is certainly result in something that
is less qualified as knowledge (Zheng, 2009), both healthy criticism and an open mind are to be
embraced for people favouring a Chinese school. Even if human knowledge is confined by culture, it
does not have a boundary. Knowledge should not be limited within a territorial or linguistic field. If
what the Chinese school is proposing is to discursively create this boundary by avoiding using others’
discourse, then it is something critical theorists would reject. Deliberately creating a national
boundary of IR theories does not stimulate international debate between China and English language
scholars. To break the already existing American and English boundaries, establishing a new system
of IR theories is not the only pathway. There are already traces of similar philosophical ideas from
ancient classes, to name a few, social contract theory in Confucianism, and realism in the Art of War.
An array of studies from a Chinese perspective is also already there (the “unknown known”) without
explicitly given a name of “Chinese school”. The boundary of “Western” knowledge can be pushed to
the extent it has a global dimension by discovering and addressing deviations in existing theories from
English language literature.
28 / 35
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