“Demilitarization of Europe”?
IF the Atlantic Alliance has a Problem it is that EUrope is Transnationalizing Security
while the US is Remilitarizing along National Security Lines
Gunther Hellmann1
“The challenges we face, and the reforms we need, are simply too pressing to wait for the conclusion of the
Strategic Concept process. In parallel with our deliberations on the Strategic Concept, we must also
address numerous structural flaws. (…) Right now, the alliance faces very serious, long-term, systemic
problems. The NATO budgetary crisis is a case in point and a symptom of deeper problems with the
way NATO perceives threats, formulates requirements, and prioritizes and allocates resources. It is
hardly two months into the new year, but we already face shortfalls of hundreds of millions of euros – a
natural consequence of having underinvested in collective defense for over a decade. The problem is not
just underfunding of NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and national defense budgets
have fallen consistently - even with unprecedented operations outside NATO's territory over the past five
years. Just 5 of 28 allies achieve the defense-spending target of 2 percent of GDP. These budget
limitations relate to a larger cultural and political trend affecting the alliance. One of the triumphs of the
last century was the pacification of Europe after ages of ruinous warfare. But, as I've said before, I
believe we have reached an inflection point, where much of the continent has gone too far in the other
direction. The demilitarization of Europe - where large swaths of the general public and political class
are averse to military force and the risks that go with it - has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to
an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st. Not only can real or perceived
weakness be a temptation to miscalculation and aggression, but, on a more basic level, the resulting
funding and capability shortfalls make it difficult to operate and fight together to confront shared
threats.”2
These remarks by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have reverberated in European as well
as the US. They probably provide a good summary of what many American foreign and security
decision-makers consider to be “very serious, long-term, (and) systemic problems” of the Atlantic
Alliance. Some of the analytical points made in Gates’ remarks will be widely shared on both
sides of the Atlantic. For instance, even if culprits would be located differently in different
member countries few would disagree that NATO’s budgetary crisis is “a symptom of deeper
problems with the way NATO perceives threats, formulates requirements, and prioritizes and
allocates resources.” It is not surprising that the Secretary of Defense of the most powerful
NATO member sees little to blame in his own country – and much as far as the allies in Europe
This essay draws on the chapter “Why EUrope has stopped Defending the ‘West’. The Transformation
of ‘National Security’ in the European Union” which is scheduled to be published in a forthcoming
volume edited by this author and Benjamin Herborth under the provisional title “The Uses of the West”.
It is part of a larger research project (“Secur(itiz)ing the West. The Transformation of Western Order”) at
Goethe University, Frankfurt Germany; see http://www.normativeorders.net/en/research/projects/53securitizing-the-west-the-transformation-of-western-order. This essay has benefited from intensive
exchanges over the last two years with Benjamin Herborth, Gabi Schlag and Christian Weber who have
been collaborators in the Goethe University project. They bear no responsibility, however, for this essay.
2 Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, National Defense University,
Washington, D.C., February 23, 2010, available at
http://www.defense.gov/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?sp
eechid=1423 (March 2, 2010).
1
is concerned. “Europe” (ie. the United States’ European allies and partners3) has presumably
been “demilitarized” to such an extent that “real security and lasting peace” are endangered
because “capability shortfalls make it difficult to operate and fight together to confront shared
threats”.
In his essay Stephen Szabo has correctly pointed out that Gates is working on a highly
problematic “shared threats” assumption. Since I share his assessments I will not dwell on this
point here. Instead I will focus on Gates’ notions of “real security” and “lasting peace” and the
differences we can observe in this regard between EUropeans and Americans. This relates in
particular to the degree of “militarization”, “demilitarization” and/or “remilitarization” on both
sides of the Atlantic and what this tells us about different understandings of security. In short, I
will make three points.
(1) To the extent that the characterization of EUrope as “demilitarizing” is identifying a
trend it is a trend which becomes meaningful only against some objectified point of
reference – an imagined zero-point of “militarization”, so to say. If we choose the US as
such a zero-point, Gates’ analysis is correct. However, if we decide to let EUrope set the
zero-point of militarization the phenomenon to be explained is the remilitarization of the
US instead. In any case, the overall trend is clear: EUropean and American threat
perceptions (measured in terms of medium-term defense spending, weapons procurement
decisions and doctrinal adjustment) are diverging.
(2) This is connected to increasingly diverging cultures of security. The problem with
normatively charged concepts such as “real security” and “lasting peace” is, of course,
that everybody can readily subscribe to them even though (or: precisely because) the
actual meaning associated with these concepts may be radically different. Indeed, as I will
briefly argue below, notions of security have been diverging ever since the end of the
Cold War and the aftermaths of 911/Iraq with EUropeans increasingly shifting to an
understanding of security in terms of transnational security whereas the culture of national
security has even been reinforced in the aftermaths of 911 in the US.
(3) However, the discrepancies, tensions and conflicts resulting from (1) and (2) do not
per se justify what many “Atlanticists” consider to be the “gloom”-scenario of a
disintegrating Atlantic Alliance. If one is interested in understanding the causes of
“transatlantic cohesion” (or, for that matter, “transatlantic disintegration”) one has to
keep in mind that security identities are mutually constituted by “Ego” and “Alter”. One of
the findings of the Frankfurt research project mentioned above (ftn 1) is that ascriptions of
commonalities vis-à-vis EUrope and North America (often including Canada) from outside
are as present as ever. Indeed, they may actually have become more widespread in recent
years – which is, at least in part, the result of what is perceived to be an increasingly
“Europe” here probably stands for two different groups: the US’ European allies in NATO and the
member states of the European Union which – even if they are not members of NATO – are mostly
sympathetic to the US. It most certainly does not include Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, which are also located
on the “European” continent. It has become a common practice to speak of “Europe” referring both to
the EU and the European continent. Even official EU documents often take the EU pars pro toto for the
whole continent. Since obviously not all European states belong to the EU I will use “EUrope” and
“EUropean” to denote that I am only referring to the EU part of Europe.
3
hegemonic role of “the West”. Such “external” ascriptions are as crucial as “internally”
generated sentiments about commonalities in the process of identity formation.
Ad 1. What is the evidence for EUropean “demilitarization” and/or American “remilitarization”?
At the level of NATO it is noteworthy that defense spending patterns have been developing in a
fairly symmetrical fashion since the 1980s. Both the US and European member states have reduced
defense spending in a similar fashion in the 1990s such that NATO-Europe spent a bit more
than half of what the US spent (in terms of a percentage of GDP in constant prices) in both the
second half of the 1980s and the first half of the first decade of the 21st century. It was only in the
aftermaths of 911 that defense spending patterns started to diverge (see Table 1).
Table 1: Defense Expenditures of NATO Member Countries as a Percentage of
Gross Domestic Product, 1985-20084
Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense,
NATO Press Release PR/CP(2009)009, 19 February 2009, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2009/p09-009.pdf (15 September 2009).
4
A closer look at long-term spending patterns reveals that US spending has indeed picked up after
2001, both in terms of inflation-adjusted US Dollars …
Graph 1: US Defense Spending 1962-2015 (inflation-adjusted 2009 dollars)
Source: Wikipedia
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/86/InflationAdjustedDefenseSpending.PN
G/500px-InflationAdjustedDefenseSpending.PNG), based on US government figures (3 March 2010)
… and in terms of percentages of GDP as part of total government spending (Table 2).
Table 2: Total US Government Expenditures by Major Category as Percentage
of GDP (1988-2009)
Source: US Government, Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables,
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/)
The more surprising figures, however, are provided if one looks at EUrope’s continuing high
defense spending. Since these figures are not widely known I will provide more space. First, to be
sure, in terms of a percentage of GDP military spending among former and current EC/EU
member states has dropped from more than three percent in the late 1980s to less than two
percent in 2006 (see Graph 2).5
5
All data in the subsequent graphs are drawn from SIPRI Yearbooks.
Graph 2: Military Spending in the EU as a Percentage of GDP
3,500%
3,000%
2,500%
2,000%
EU-12
1,500%
EU-15
1,000%
EU-25
0,500%
0,000%
1988
1992
1997
2002
2006
Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP.
Yet in 2006 the EU-25 still spent almost as much on defense (as measured in constant US$) as
the same group of states spent under radically different conditions in the second half of the 1980
when Europe was still divided (see Graph 3).
Graph 3: Military Expenditure of EU-25 in Constant US$
$300.000
Sweden
Sl oveni a
Sl ovaki a
$250.000
Pol and
Mal ta
Li thuani a
Latvi a
$200.000
Hungary
Fi nl and
Estoni a
Czech Republ i c
Cyprus
$150.000
Austri a
Uni ted Ki ngdom
Spai n
Portugal
$100.000
Netherl ands
Luxembourg
Ital y
Irel and
$50.000
Greece
Germany
France
Denmark
$1988
1992**
1997
2002
2006
Bel gi um
Mi l i tary expendi ture i n constant 2005 U.S. dol l ars m.*
More stunning still is the fact that EU military expenditure as a percentage of global military
expenditure has actually increased after the end of the Cold War and has reached lower pre-1990
levels only recently (see Graph 4). Still, in 2006 the EU-25 – one of the most peaceful regions on
the globe even in the perception of the EU’s member states – collectively accounted for one fifth
of total military spending worldwide.
Graph 4: EU Military Expenditure as a Percentage of Global Military Expenditure
As a percentage of GDP.*
As a percentage of global military expenditure.
1988
1992
1997
2002
2006
1988
1992
1997
2002
2006
EU-12
3.1%
2.6%
2.1%
1.9%
1.9%
19.6%
24.4%
25.0%
23.3%
18.9%
EU-15
-
2.6%
2.0%
1.9%
1.8%
-
25.5%
26.3%
24.5%
19.8%
EU-25
-
2.6%
2.0%
1.9%
1.8%
-
26.5%
27.4%
25.7%
20.9%
30,00%
25,00%
20,00%
15,00%
EU-12
10,00%
EU-15
EU-25
5,00%
0,00%
1988
1992
1997
2002
2006
In a comparative perspective with other “great powers” the figures look still more impressive (see
Graph 5). In terms of pure numbers of military spending the EU-25 is outranked only by the US.
In comparison to the rest, however, it looks like a real military heavyweight. In 2006 the EU-25
collectively spent double the amount on defence compared to what Russia, China, India and
Brazil spent together. Even the four biggest defence spenders in the EU (UK, France, Germany
and Italy) clearly outranked this group of four great powers. Moreover even individually France
and the UK still outspend China in terms of constant US$ - and even Germany and Italy each
individually still outspend Russia – not to mention Brazil or India.
Graph 5: EU-Military Expenditures in Contrast to other Great Powers (2006)
50,0%
40,0%
30,0%
20,0%
10,0%
0,0%
USA
Russia
China
Brazil
India
EU-4
EU-12
EU-25
Military Expenditure 2006*
Total in constant 2005 U.S.
dollars m.
as a Percentage of GDP
as a Percentage of Global
USA
Russia
China
Brazil
India
$ 511,187.00
$ 31,181.00
$ 51,864.00
$ 13,803.00
$ 23,615.00
4.0%
3.6%
2.1%
1.5%
2.7%
42.5%
2.6%
4.3%
1.1%
2.0%
EU-4
$ 182,382.00
2.0%
15.1%
EU-12
$ 228,139.00
$ 251,682.60
1.7%
18.9%
1.8%
20.9%
EU-25
To be sure, adding up national defense spending data from EU member states does not mean
that Europeans will jointly make (relatively) efficient and effective use of these resources as this is
normally done in a national context. As a matter of fact, the charge that Europeans don’t get as
much “bang” for the “buck” as the US would wish has been a constant one in transatlantic
exchanges during the last decades. Yet irrespective of efficiency and effectiveness these are
nevertheless stunning figures since many of those EUropeans who belonged to opposing alliances
before 1990 now only spend marginally less on defense even though the former threat they posed
to one another has been radically transformed under the collective roof of the EU security
community. As the introductory sentences of the “European Security Strategy” (ESS) described
what Gates called Europe’s “pacification”: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor
so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and
stability unprecedented in European history” (ESS 2003: 1). War has become unthinkable among
the members of the EU and the most likely threat scenario which might justify a return to a more
traditional military defense posture, a resurgent Russia, is currently highly implausible and would,
in any case, allow for sufficient warning time if it were recur. Thus, given a radically improved
security environment the puzzle to be solved is EUrope´s continued high defense spending, not its
“demilitarization”.
********
Ad 2. At least part of the solution of the puzzle of EUrope´s continued high defense spending is
a more fundamental transformation of EUrope’s security culture – ie. what “real security” and “lasting
peace” (Gates) actually means to EUropeans. To summarize the argument of the longer paper,
the European Union is an evolving institutional expression of an understanding of trans-national
security which is distinct from the concept of “national security” which was embodied almost
prototypically under the Bush administration. Yet even under the administration of President
Obama the culture of national security still holds. In contrast to the concept of “national security”
“transnational security” emphasizes both the trans-national sources of threats as well as the transnational dimension of effective responses to such threats. However, this shifting understanding of
security in EUrope is not the result of the fact that the EU represents a different type of
international actor acting according to some higher moral standard (as sometimes implied by the
concept of a “normative power”). Rather I postulate a self-reinforcing dynamic in the mutually
constitutive relationship between EUropean historical experience and institutional development
in the field of foreign and security policy on the one hand and conceptual change in security
thinking on the other which essentially results from the interplay between an improved threat
environment, shifts in global power and patterns of alignment, material resources at the disposal
of the EU, regional and global ambitions of both member states and EU representatives, and
institutional constraints within the EU-polity. As a result the EU has become a unique global security
player which is neither adequately captured with traditional categories such as “great power” or
“normative power”.
The argument of a crucial conceptual difference between “national security” and “transnational
security” is based on an analytical distinction between three ideal types of security: “human
security”, “national security” and “transnational security” (see Table 3). Given the current focus I
will only focus on the latter two here. Three observations regarding the differences between the
two need to be spelled out in particular. First, for conceptions of “national security” the
distinction between domestic and foreign, between internal and external has always been central.
As a consequence, borders have played a crucial role in defining what security meant. The notion
of “threat” was almost always closely linked to territorially bound actors and accompanying
notions of military attack stemming from some territory “abroad” and the emphasis on territorial
defence this implied. For the EU and its emerging understanding of transnational security the
project of integration has meant from its beginnings to not only render borders permeable, but to
alter their very meaning. “Security” internally (ie. peace within the EC) resulted from not engaging
in traditional security practices, including the symbolic emphasis on territorial borders as dividing
lines. Therefore, where the logic of “national security” dictates the territorial “containment” of
potential opponents, the logic of “transnational security” conceives of borders as markers which
challenge the respective sides to arrive - at a minimum - at a modus vivendi. In the history of the
EU after WW II borders have even become crucial markers for arriving at cooperative
arrangements which have shaped the integration project internally (from the common agricultural
market all the way to “Schengen” – ie. the agreement on abolishing all border controls within the
EU).
Table 3: Three Conceptions of Security
human security
national security
transnational security
referent object
individual
(nation) state
associations, groupings of states;
(trans-) national societies and
groups; international community
imputed “culture(s) of
anarchy”
Hobbesian, Lockean, Kantian
Hobbesian, Lockean
Lockean, Kantian
core stakes
individual / collective survival;
basic human needs; “good
life”
survival and welfare of
nation state
“international stability” /
cooperative inter-state relations;
non-violent conflict resolution
“sources” of threat
state failure, environmental
degradation,
“underdevelopment”
competing powers (eg.
states, terrorist
organizations)
“uncertainty”; state failure
(terrorism); great power
hegemony
instruments for
providing security
development assistance;
state-building capabilities;
multilateral coordination via
IOs/INGOs
armies, sophisticated
weaponry and strategy,
diplomacy
multilateral coordination;
capabilities for crisis
management (military and
civilian); economic assistance;
state building capabilities;
rule of law
primary securitizing
agents
IO bureaucracies,
transnational lobbies
state officials and national
security lobbies
state officials, IO bureaucracies,
transnational lobbies
primary audience of
securitizing speech act
“international community”,
“activist” governments, IOs
and INGOs,
domestic society, national
security decision-making
elites
other governments, IOs and
INGOs, “international
community”
It is this experience which has been externalised after the end of the Cold War via the policy of
“enlargement”. Instead of containing (or “appeasing”) potential enemies or opponents by
keeping them at arms’ length, neighbours and “partners” were co-opted or bound in a network of
diverse institutional arrangements and/or joint decision-making. This externalisation of the EU’s
internal system of governance is visible even now – after the biggest wave of accession has been
completed and after a certain “enlargement fatigue” has taken hold. The EU’s so-called
“Neighbourhood Policy” which has been anticipated in the ESS is designed to draw
neighbouring states to the East and South into an institutionalized dialogue with the aim of
arriving at joint decisions on internal and external policies. While eventual EU-membership is
highly unlikely for these “Neighbours”, the EU has nevertheless been quite successful in
establishing close relations with these countries. To be sure, borders have not disappeared within
the EU. In some respects they have even been “fortified” in the aftermaths of 911. Moreover,
borders continue to serve as means of differentiating between different degrees of inclusion and
exclusion. However, even in those cases where the EU’s external borders are re-emphasizing the
dividing function of borders they function differently compared to the traditional role of borders
in the logic of “national security”. Rather than being barriers against potential military aggressors
they function primarily as policed check-points for migrants, criminals or terrorists.
This intuition of transforming “external security” relationships to “internal security” relationships
is characteristic for the discursive shift from national security to transnational security. Thinking
security “transnationally” rather than “nationally” does not per se transform common
securitization practices (as characterized in the Copenhagen School). However, it does represent
an important dispositional shift in terms of how securitization is actually approached. Whether
securitizing agents frame threats against the background of a Hobbesian “culture of anarchy” or a
Kantian “culture of anarchy” (A. Wendt) makes a crucial difference as to the identification of
sources of threat, key referent object of security and instruments for countering such threats.
Moreover, if the sources of threats are located in structures (such as failed states or organized
crime) as well as agents (dictators, Mafia organizations) the policies for countering such threats
effectively need to address both sides. Under such conditions appealing to the security of the
nation state (as the key referent object) in order to mobilize effectively will no longer suffice.
“Selling” threats has to appeal to other (national as well as transnational) actors as well.
If one examines the “European Security Strategy” closely (especially against the background of
the two “National Security Strategies” of the US written under the Bush administration) the
dispositional shift from national security to transnational security is clearly visible. More
importantly, however, it is also reflected at the level of the nation state within the EU. Since
traditional “national security strategies” have appeared shortly before, in parallel to or quickly
after the adoption of the ESS a closer look at this type of security document should reveal how
deeply the suggested transformation from national security and transnational security actually
runs. Given limitations of space I will only refer to a sample of EU member states which have
been known for comparatively strong views on either “nation state” reservations vis-à-vis the
Union or more far-reaching supranational orientations. As the following summary shows, the
views expressed in these documents are largely in accordance with the understanding of
transnational security expressed in the European Security Strategy.
Although the hierarchy of core “values” to be defended against sticks with traditional notions of
security – most “national security strategies” examined mention the “security for the nation and
its citizens” (as in the case of the UK) or some equivalent – the sources of threat are depicted in
very different terms compared to the traditional “national security” focus on competing powers.
A quote from the UK document is quite representative in this regard. Right at the start the
document states explicitly that “no state threatens the United Kingdom directly“. Rather “the
security landscape” is described as “increasingly complex and unpredictable”. “The Cold War
threat has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks, which affect the
United Kingdom directly and which have the potential to undermine wider international stability.
They include international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states,
pandemics, and trans-national crime. These and other threats and risks are driven by a diverse and
interconnected set of underlying factors, including climate change, competition for energy, poverty and
poor governance, demographic changes and globalisation” (UK National Security Strategy 2008:
3, emphasis added)
This type of language is found in almost all national security strategies. Even those EU members
most fiercely protecting the symbols of “national sovereignty” are granting that traditional
notions of “national security” no longer provide for the most likely scenarios. In the Czech
“national security strategy”, for instance, “ensuring of CR existence, its sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence; defense of democracy and legislative state, protection of
human rights and liberty of inhabitants” are still considered to be the outstanding “vital
interests”. However, the document also states that “large-scale armed conflict interfering CR
territory and territory of another NATO member country in predictable time horizontal is very
improbable” (Czech Republic Military Strategy 2004: 3). Competition for energy and dependence
on energy imports, in contrast, is often identified as a new threat. Among the European public it
even ranks highest alongside “global warming”, well ahead of “international terrorism”, “Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons” and “Islamic fundamentalism” (see Graph 6).
Graph 6: Key „Threats“ for EU and US
(Transatlantic Trends 2008)
In the Polish National Security Strategy of 2007 the country’s dependence on supplies of energy
“from one source” is identified as the single “greatest external threat to our security”. Moreover,
“the collapse of the process of European integration as a result of states returning to making
decisions solely through the prism of their national interests (…) as well as EU’s inability to
architect a common policy” are explicitly mentioned as “a potential threat to Poland’s interests”
(Polish National Security Strategy 2007: 8-9). Thus even those EU member states best known for
their strong national sentiments emphasize that traditional notions of “national security” are
inappropriate to guide their security policy.
Such a change in perspective is more visible still if one examines the national security strategy
equivalents of older Western European member states of the EU. For instance, the Dutch
“Framework Memorandum on the 2000 White Paper” categorically states that “Dutch armed
forces will always act as part of an international alliance of forces” and that therefore “task
specialisation is attractive in the light of the international orientation of our armed forces”
(Netherlands Framework Memorandum 2000). The Belgian Defense Ministry goes even further
when it calls for “an equitable intra-European burden sharing agreed by everyone” in the EU
based on the expectation that “the European Defence development will sooner or later probably
lead to the alignment of the defence efforts made by the EU member states” (Belgian
Modernization Plan 1999: 5). Countries would then be expected to meet a “minimum defence
expenditure level - expressed for example in relation to GDP”. Based on this reasoning the
documents provides an “evaluation of the defence effort” of its allies which lets Belgium’s own
contribution look quite meagre indeed (see Graph 7).
Graph 7: Distribution of Defence expenditures among EU partners6
EVALUATION OF DEFENCE EFFORT
0,90%
0,80%
45,4
GB
0,70%
FR
0,60%
18,5
NO
25,3
0,50%
equipment expenditure in 1000 $ /soldier
0,40%
19,6
15,7
0,30%
NL
12,6
GE
0,20%
DE
7,2
IT
BE 1990
3,4
SP
4,8
0,10%
6,7 LU
5,0
0,00%
0
-0,10%
PO
1,2
BE
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
DEFENCE PERSONNEL (Civilian + Military) AS % OF POPULATION
The latter two examples are among the clearest indications of a radical shift in understanding
security which goes even beyond the mere necessity of coordinating security policies within a
multilateral/supranational framework. Yet even those EU member states who hesitate taking
such far-reaching steps no longer consider each other to be potential aggressors. Some even
imagine each other as partners with whom one readily shares “task specialization” in the most
sacred area of national sovereignty and mutual budgetary adjustments based on an agreed upon
“equitable intra-European burden sharing”. Thus even those documents which in their very
name are supposed to spell out a “national security” vision articulate an understanding of security
which emphasises both the transnational sources of threat as well as the necessity to organize for
a transnational (EUropean) response.
Source: Belgian Modernization Plan 1999: 5. The horizontal axis shows the total defence personnel
(civilian + military) as a percentage of the total population. The vertical axis shows the equipment
investment expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product). The size of the circle for the
chosen EU member states reflects the proportion of investment expenditure per serviceman.
6
In sum, the postulated transformation of security thinking in Europe from national security to
transnational security is not merely window dressing at the level of the EU. It reaches all the way
down to security thinking at the national level. To be sure, this shift has a lot to do with the fact
that judgments have converged among politicians, experts and citizens7 all over EUrope that
classical security contingencies (such as large scale war) are extremely unlikely nowadays.
However, such a convergence of opinion is merely a necessary condition for the postulated shift,
not a sufficient one. A shift in fundamental beliefs about security is an important additional
condition.
Let me emphasize: the argument here is not that the EU is acting according to some higher ethical
standard or that it is a “normative power” purely by design. Rather I argue that several mutually
reinforcing factors – such as historical lessons learned, a changing threat environment, the joint
experience of close cooperation within the EU context and institutional capabilities and
constraints – together provide for a problem description in response to which the transformation
of security thinking and practice as outlined above is an adequate coping strategy. Moreover,
positioning the EU as a proponent of a different understanding of transnational security also
yields additional advantages. First, it helped to differentiate the EU from the US at a time when
the Bush administration pursued an aggressive strategy of “pre-emption” (US NSS 2002: 15, US
NSS 2006: 18, 23). Secondly and more generally it positioned the EU as a very unique and active,
yet unthreatening actor on the global stage thus projecting an image of itself which was easily
reconcilable with available material resources, institutional constraints and the ambition of
EUropeans. Finally the joint focus on transnational security in the global realm also has the
positive (if unintended) side effect of keeping the EU actively engaging in common security
concerns beyond the EU which helps to dampen any remaining fears that EUrope’s own history
might return (Wæver).
Two additional observations are worth emphasizing. First, most EU member states continue to
have an institutional alternative if they want to get involved in international affairs along more
traditional routes. Indeed the different ways in which EU member states have made use of
NATO and EU resources in the Balkans and in Afghanistan offers ample evidence for the
advantages of these two institutional alternatives. Among others, one (largely unintended) effect
of this preference structure has been a division of labour between the two organizations which has
essentially limited ESDP missions to types of intervention which have stayed close to the practice
of traditional “peace-keeping” and civilian state-building processes – ie. that mode of security
practices closer in line with the concept of “transnational security”. This can be turned (and has
been turned) into an advantage by the EU by fostering the image of not being threatening – or at
least being less threatening than traditional military alliances such as NATO. From the
perspective of the member states of both the EU and NATO this division of labour has also had
the additional advantage of providing a choice of two alternative routes for intervening abroad depending on what image they wanted to project. The point worth stressing from a normative
The most recent survey of Eurobarometer (Special Report No. 308, “The Europeans in 2009” from July
2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_308_en.pdf (18 September
2009)) counted only one percent of EUropeans who listed “defence/foreign affairs” as “the most
important issue” facing either their respective country or the person individually. “Defence/foreign
affairs” thus ranked only 14th (or last together with “other” and “don’t know” responses). “Terrorism”
ranked somewhat higher (# 11th) at four percent. Yet both were easily outranked by classical welfare
concerns such as “economic situation” (47%), “unemployment” (45%) and “inflation” (27%).
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point of view is, however, that with these alternatives EU member states have also preserved an
option for intervening along more traditional lines of “national security” – if they so choose and
if they succeed in mobilizing support among NATO allies. Secondly, despite the official
commitment to the United Nations8 the development of ESDP has clearly affected EUropean
participation in UN missions. Since the late 1990s contributions from EU member states to UNled operations have steadily declined. The propagation of “effective multilateralism” therefore
also means that the creation of ESDP has opened up a new option to EU member states which
they increasingly choose. In this sense the shift to a “transnational security” mode also has the
advantage of positioning the EU globally as a serious and independent actor in its own right, not
merely being a “willing ally” of the US or a component of “the West”. This also helps to justify
high levels of defence spending.
******
Ad 3. In conclusion, none of this implies that the EU and the US are doomed to split. As a
matter of fact, inspite of diverging trends the research in the context of the “Secur(itiz)ing the
West” project at Goethe University also shows a lot of evidence that “the West” is alive and well
– at least in terms of how it appears from the outside. Looked at from China and Russia the EU
and North America often appears like a monolithic bloc with distinct collective values and
interests. To the extent that China, Russia and other global actors (such as Islamic states) are
approaching “the West” as a collective actor this will push EUropeans and North Americans in
similar directions – irrespective of whether they indeed wish to move this way collectively or not.
This is not to say that internal divisions within NATO are unimportant. They do matter – and
given the countervailing transformations of the security environments of the US and EUrope (as
seen by relevant elites and “securitizing” actors here and there) it would be surprising if they
would not. If EUropeans believe (and act as if) they were living in a “post-heroic age”, as
Stephen Szabo recounts, the flip side description, of course, is that Americans may still believe
that it possible (or even necessary) to live “heroic” lives. I guess that this difference would easily
be confirmed if one were to systematically compare EUropean and American movies on matters
related to war, peace and security in our times. To have “large swaths of the general public and
political class (being) averse to military force”, as Robert Gates put it, sounds problematic only if
one sees a basic value in heroism. Many Europeans indeed don’t. Dying in Afghanistan as a
German soldier is a tragedy not only for the relatives but for almost all Germans. There is nothing
heroic in it – and opinion poll data all over EUrope increasingly reflects this. This does not mean
that Americans and EUropeans do not continue to share a deeply felt common sense of what it
means to be able to conduct a decent live under conditions of liberty and the rule of law.
However, there are limits as to what EUropeans (soldiers, relatives, publics and foreign policy
elites) are willing to die for (or have compatriots die for). A “global NATO” may be an obvious
instrument for a globally oriented, great power US security policy. It is certainly not an obvious
route for EUropeans, especially if it involves “peace-making” “missions” as in Iraq or
Afghanistan (rather than policing missions such as “Allied Protector” in the Gulf of Aden). In
this sense the related trends of European demilitarization (if this is what one wants to call it) and
American remilitarization are indeed posing a problem for cooperation between the two sides. Large
junks of the rest of the world (if not Russia or China) would probably be pleased if a lower zero“We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for
international relations is the United Nations Charter” (ESS 2003: 9).
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point of militarization could be reached as a collective point of reference. Whether “real security”
and “lasting peace” would then be any closer would most certainly lie in the eye of the beholder.