494345
research-article2013
QIXXXX10.1177/1077800413494345Qualitative InquiryRosiek and Pratt
Article
Jane Addams as a Resource for Developing
a Reflexively Realist Social Science Practice
Qualitative Inquiry
19(8) 578­–588
© The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/1077800413494345
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Jerry Lee Rosiek1 and Scott Pratt1
Abstract
The last four decades have seen a reflexive turn in the qualitative social sciences, an increased self-consciousness about
the culturally contingent nature of our methods of representing human experience. This has given rise to a wave of
experimentation in social science writing. Scholars have sought to develop research that does not just describe the object
of study but also deliberately transforms the subject of the reader. In recent years, however, there is a growing sentiment
that the obduracy of social reality seems to have been underemphasized in much of this experimentation. This article
examines the inquiry methods of turn-of-the-century social theorist and settlement house founder, Jane Addams. The
paper identifies themes in Addams’s approach to inquiry that was ahead of her time and relevant to this contemporary
discussion. The paper argues that Addams has much to offer as an effort to develop a reflexively realist approach to social
science inquiry.
Keywords
reflexivity, new empiricism, activism, Jane Addams, pragmatism
The last four decades have seen a remarkable transformation in the social sciences. Referred to variously as the crisis of representation (Clifford, 2002, Denzin & Lincoln,
2005; Marcus & Fischer, 1986), the reflexive turn (Lather,
2004, 2006; Mazzei & Jackson, 2009), a postmodern
moment (Anderson, 1995; Best & Kellner, 1991; Sullivan,
2001), or a de-centering of White-supremacist, patriarchal,
Eurocentric norms of thought and scholarship (Lather,
2004; Scheurich & Young, 1997; Tuhiwai-Smith, 1999),
this transformation is most evident in the way social scientists think about methodological issues. A greater critical
scrutiny is applied to the social and cultural conditions that
enable social scientific questions to be formed, data to be
defined and analyzed, and conclusions to be represented to
various audiences. The knowing subject conducting social
scientific inquiry is no longer assumed to stand innocently
outside the phenomena it studies and is instead understood
to play a part in producing many of the realities it purports
to describe. Reciprocally, the nature of the knowing subject
is no longer assumed to be independent of the processes of
inquiry and representation. The process of knowing is
understood to ontologically constitute the knowing subject.
Consequently, practitioners of social science inquiry find
the boundary between their empirical and philosophical
work increasingly hard to distinguish.
These developments are not without their detractors.
Many scholars find this increased attention to the processes
of representation to be at best overwrought and distracting
(Phillips & Burbules, 2000; Ruitenberg & Phillips, 2011;);
at worst, they consider it antirealist and politically disempowering (Eagleton, 2004; Jameson, 1983, 2009). Still others embrace the necessity of this reflexive turn, but see it as
inadequate on its own to address current social, cultural,
and political challenges (Heckman, 2010; Koopman, 2009;
Mohanty, Moya, Alcoff, & Hames-Garcia, 2006; Rosiek &
Atkinson, 2005; Sorrell, 2004; Stone-Mediatore, 2003;
West, 2010). Whatever the response to this reflexive turn,
however, it raises questions that, once asked, reframe even
objections to its salience. For better or worse, social science
scholarship has acquired a heightened self-consciousness
about the assumptions underlying its rhetoric and methods
of inquiry.
This essay grants the inevitability and potential promise
of the reflexive turn in the social sciences, and asks what
conceptual resources are available to help us make the
most of this promise. We offer that contemporary conceptions of reflexivity informed by poststructuralist theory
have been invaluable to raising profound questions about
processes of representation in the social sciences, but are
not sufficient for conceptualizing the range of possibilities
1
University of Oregon, Eugene, USA
Corresponding Author:
Jerry Lee Rosiek, Department of Educational Studies, University of
Oregon, 2715 Terrace View Drive, Eugene, OR 97405, USA.
Email: [email protected]
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Rosiek and Pratt
for social science practice opened up by these questions.
The antirealist semiotics underlying poststructuralist theory limit the ability to explore new ontological commitments in the conduct of social inquiry.
In the remainder of the essay, we review the work of Jane
Addams at Hull House in the early 20th century as a potential resource for postreflexive methodological explorations.
We focus in particular on Addams writings about social
inquiry and learning both about and with the community in
which she works. Addams, we offer, was ahead of her time
in conceptualizing what social science could be. There were
clearly reflexive themes in her conception of inquiry; however, these were integrated with both realist and normative
commitments to social transformation. Although Addams
did not write as a methodologist, we think there is much
methodologists can learn from attending to her work.
The Recent Experimental Moment in
the Social Sciences
Over two decades ago, George Marcus and Michael Fischer
(1986) observed the emergence of “an experimental moment
in the human sciences,” one in which scholars had become
willing to suspend their adherences to certain disciplinary
norms, in the hopes of developing new approaches to
inquiry that build upon past practices while avoiding their
excesses.
Ours is once again a period rich in experimentation and
conceptual risk taking. Older frameworks are not so much
denied—there being nothing grand to replace them—as
suspended. The ideas they embody remain intellectual
resources to be used in novel and eclectic ways. (Marcus &
Fischer, 1986, p. 10)
Since this observation, the forms this experimentation
has taken have been quite various—from the blending of
autobiographic and ethnographic styles (Behar, 1996; ReedDanahay, 1997) to polyvocal representational tropes (Lather
& Smithies, 1997; Rosaldo, 1993), the use of artistically
crafted narrative modes of representation (Barone, 2001;
Barone & Eisner, 2010; Leavy, 2008; Saldana, 2011;
Sconiers & Rosiek, 2000), the deliberate evocation of
emotional response in the reader (Saldana, 2011), satire
(Rosaldo, 1993), and so on to name some of the more
widely circulated ideas. Despite this variety, the goal of this
experimentation has remained largely consistent. Scholars
are looking for ways to acknowledge the historical and cultural contingency of their subject position as authors and to
include relevant information about their positioning in
their analysis, while retaining a commitment to generating
insights that can help ameliorate suffering and injustice.
The shared pursuit of this common, albeit diffuse, goal
has worked some specific changes on a large segment of the
social scientific community—particularly in the more social
of the social sciences,1 such as anthropology, sociology, history, and cultural studies, as well as in area and applied
fields such as women’s studies, ethnic studies, education,
journalism, and nursing. Scholars embracing this experimental moment have shifted from a focus on processes of
description to a discussion of processes of representation.
“Description” presumes that the object of inquiry has an
ontological status that is independent of the community
engaged in the inquiry. This term signals an aspiration to
conduct inquiries modeled upon the natural sciences; it
emphasizes the need to establish a close fit or correspondence between our descriptions of the world and the world
as a reality independent of our describing activity. In contrast, the term re-presentation acknowledges the ontological gulf between description and what is described; it
emphasizes the role communities of inquiry play in constituting the objects of their inquiry. This term positions social
science more closely to contemporary humanities disciplines. Through its root verb “to present” and the prefix
suggesting repetition and alteration, it emphasizes the performative and therefore potentially creative dimension of
social scientific inquiry (Denzin, 2003). It is within this performative and creative dimension of social science scholarship that some see new possibilities for contributing to
ameliorative social transformation.
The Hard Work Ahead
This sense of possibility comes at a cost, however. Even for
those who see the promise of this reflexive turn, unguarded
celebration seems the wrong affect. Abandoning the pursuit
of an ontological referent independent of our own representational activity as an ignis fatuus, the social sciences have
been, in effect, cut adrift midway through a journey started
on false premises. Feminist poststructuralist and research
methodologist Patti Lather (2006) represents this condition
as “Getting Lost.” In her book with that title, she frames this
condition as one of possibility accompanied by increased
responsibility.
For those who have moved out from under a narrow scientificity,
other practices are being rehearsed toward changing the social
imaginary about research. Moving beyond the normalized
apparatuses of our own training, a social science more
answerable to the complications of our knowing is beginning
to take place. (Lather, 2006, p. 19)
The complications to which we become more answerable turn on the way social scientists act on an understanding of themselves as culturally and historically contingent
subjects in their inquiries. This involves far more than confessional or testimonial paragraphs, usually placed in the
introduction or preface of a manuscript, that acknowledge
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Qualitative Inquiry 19(8)
motivations for a study that have roots in the author’s life
history. It requires at the very least a philosophical examination of the taken-for-granted goal in most modern social
science: explanation of human activity. The very desire to
explain, Gayatri Spivak (1996/1979) offers, presumes a certain ontology, and this ontology underwrites a certain kind
of politics.
. . . the will to explain was a symptom of the desire to have a
self and a world. In other words, on the general level, the
possibility of explanation carries the supposition of an
explainable (even if not fully) universe and an explaining (even
if imperfectly) subject. These suppositions assure our being.
Explaining, we exclude the possibility of the radically
heterogeneous. . . . On a more specific level, every explanation
must secure and assure a certain kind of being-in-the-world,
which might as well be called our politics. The general and
specific levels are not clearly distinguishable, since the
guarantee of sovereignty in the subject toward the object is the
condition of the possibility of politics. . . . (Spivak, 1996/1979,
p. 33)
When the “object” of study is other human beings, the
political upshot of Spivak’s remarks come into high relief.
Developing explanations of other people’s experience is an
activity that constitutes us as knowers at a voyeuristic distance from those persons. It is also an activity that presages
a technocratic sovereignty over those others. This implies,
conversely, that suspending the imperative to explain
involves relinquishing at least an intention to sovereignty
over the other—and perhaps giving up an existing materially sovereign relation. It may also entail dissolution of our
sense of self that depends on the sovereign relation.
Many contemporary authors have explored the salience
of a researcher’s life history in this methodological and
philosophical borderland. Ruth Behar has written about the
researcher as a “vulnerable observer” whose ethical self is
put at risk in social science research, and others have contributed to the development of a genre known as autoethnography, a blending of ethnographic and autobiographical
analytic and writing styles that highlights the tension
between first-person experiential accounts of encounters
with cultural difference and third-person descriptive
accounts of that difference (Behar, 1996; Ellis, 2008; ReedDanahay, 1997). Others like Linda Tuhiwai-Smith (1999),
Trihn Minha (2009), Chela Sandoval (2000), and Sandra
Mohanty et al. (2006) have given compelling accounts of
the tensions involved in being a member of a colonized
community and writing about that community as a member
of a professional community that has contributed to the
colonization.
The complications of reflexivity, however, are not
exhausted when authors turn inward. Such a focus on the
researcher’s self risks narcissism on the one hand, and privileging the critical analysis of a researchers’ internalized
discourses over dialogue with those being studied on the
other. Lather (2006) presents the evolving challenge
succinctly:
Two problems arise: the anxiety of voyeurism that can so easily
entangle the researcher in an ever more detailed self-analysis,
an implosion into the self, and secondly, the displacement of
more interactive social relations of research by an exclusively
textual focus. (p. 44)
The contemporary critical focus on the researcher’s self
is motivated by a concern about the way various cultural
discourses motivate and mediate the researcher’s encounter
with those whom they study. It begins with an intention to
avoid unconsciously or imperialistically overwriting the
experience of others. An overemphasis on this self-interrogation, however, ironically risks diminishing the significance of the reality of the experiences of others.
This latter concern has given rise to a more recent wave
of scholarship that seeks to retain a critical cognizance of the
mediated character of our claims about social realities while
finding ways to acknowledge that such realities nonetheless
exceed such mediation (Grande, 2008; Lather, 2006; Moya,
2000; Nagoshi & Brzuzy, 2010; Rabinow, 2009; Rosiek &
Atkinson, 2005; Siebers, 2006). Operating under the organizing term of postmaterialism or the new materialism, some
scholars have begun drawing upon Gilles Deleuze’s theory
of becoming and Karen Barad’s onto-epistemology in their
efforts to develop new practices of social inquiry (Barad,
2007; Deleuze, 2004; Heckman, 2010; Hultman & Taguchi,
2010; MacLure, 2011; Tuck, 2010; Jackson & Mazzei,
2012). Lather (2006), paraphrasing Bruno Latour and Bill
Brown, describes this movement as a “return of the thing”
and has called for a “postpositivist, interpretivist scientificity that takes into account the ability of the object to object
to what is told about it” (p. 71). A comprehensive review of
the growing literature on these foundational methodological
issues is beyond the scope of this paper. However, one aspect
of this emerging conversation is particularly important to a
contemporary appreciation of Jane Addams’s approach to
social inquiry.
Within this renewed attention to the way “things”
exceed our formation of them as objects of inquiry, there is
the renaissance of interest in the reality of social and cultural identity. Scholars have recently attempted to “show
how identities can be both real and constructed: how they
can be politically and epistemically significant, on the one
hand, and variable, non-essential, and radically historical,
on the other” (Moya, 2000, p. 12). This renewed interest in
the ontological ballast of culturally and historically contingent identities has implications for the way social sciences
can take into account the relationship between the social
and cultural identities of researchers and those whom they
study.
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It raises questions, in particular, about the adequacy of a
conception of reflexivity that emphasizes an infinite regress
of interpretative refractions between the social location of
the researcher and the researched. Whether it is a postmodern hermeneutic circle, a Derridean endless play of interpretation, or a Peircean infinite semiosis, this approach to
reflexivity works a generic transformation of the subject of
the researcher through forcing an awareness of the limitation of our ability to reach closure in our efforts to explain
the actions of others. This frustration of the will to explain,
per Spivak (1996/1979), inspires a questioning of the general assumptions underlying the process of social scientific
explanation and the elements of our identity tied up in the
possibility of explanation. It does not, however, support an
exploration of the way the particulars of the experience of
those being studied can work specific transformation on the
subjectivity of the researcher.
There is something very Kierkegaardian about this
moment: Epistemic limits are ironically acknowledged;
however, this acknowledgment precipitates only a limited
change in the knowing subject of the social inquirer. In fact,
the intense focus on the epistemic limits of representational
processes often has the feel of a defensive maneuver, an
anxious effort to explain the limits of explanation without
interrupting or significantly displacing the practice of
explaining. Paul de Man (1983) observed this limitation of
an analytic that relies primarily on an ironic stance long ago
in Blindness and Insight:
Irony divides the flow of temporal experience into a past that is
pure mystification and a future that remains harassed forever
by a relapse within the inauthentic. It can know this
inauthenticity but can never overcome it. It can only restate and
repeat it on an increasingly conscious level, but it remains
endlessly caught in the impossibility of making this knowledge
applicable to the empirical world. (p. 222)
What remains only nascent in the field are alternative
conceptions of the ends of social inquiry, conceptions that
begin with the idea that explanations of the human and social
will always leave an ontological remainder—something real
that in principle evades the practice of representation.2 Our
inherited practice of developing methodological techniques
intended to minimize that remainder and provide greater
and greater approximations of certainty will not suffice.
Instead, we need conceptions of inquiry that embrace the
pluralism and the reciprocal ethical obligations made manifest by acknowledging the limitations of our representational practices. John Tresch (2001), writing about the
implication of “the resistance of things-in-themselves” for
social inquiry, indicates the direction such conceptions are
likely to take.
Kuhn’s metaphor of the double-sided “coinage” of
language and nature suggests a fitting metaphorical
conclusion. To locate human knowledge exclusively at the
level of language, symbols, or other forms of representation
is to devalue this coinage. One then produces “translations”
or interpretations of other beliefs in the form of texts that
hold the place of the lived phenomenal world they describe.
To make this “exchange” equitable, the double-sided coinage of one’s own phenomenal world must be put at risk. The
exchange of knowledge then ceases to be one of “translation” but becomes instead one of “conversion.” What can be
gained from such research is a first-person understanding
on its own terms of a different mode of embodied subjectivity. The cost may be certain dear convictions that exclusive
investment in one’s own phenomenal world keeps secure
(p. 317).
This, then, is the question we arrive at: “What would a
methodological stance look like that instead of seeking to
reduce the ontological remainder of social scientific
inquiry seeks to leave the researcher open to the transformative influence of this remainder?” Having taken considerable time to arrive at this specific question, we now turn
in what remains of this essay to look at a historical figure
whose work and writing can inform our efforts to develop
such a stance. Jane Addams, we offer, saw the necessity
and promise of traveling down the rabbit hole of reflexivity when conducting social inquiry. She undertook this
journey courageously, wrote about it at length, and has
been overlooked for too long by social science methodologists. We will begin our review of her social inquiry with
a survey of the intellectual, political, and cultural context
in which she worked.
Jane Addams—Activist and Social
Theorist
Addams and Ellen Gates Starr founded Hull House in 1889
on Halsted Street in Chicago inspired by Toynbee Hall in
London and the developing Settlement Movement in the
United States. Over the next 50 years (Addams died in
1935), Addams developed a distinctive reflexive social science methodology that informed changes in the local community, in the expansion of social services around the
United States, in juvenile justice, and in labor laws (Elshtain,
2002; Knight, 2005, 2011). Her work directly influenced
the Chicago School of sociology, and her books and essays
influenced a range of philosophers (including John Dewey
and William James), social theorists, and activists (Deegan,
1988; Seigfried, 1996). To understand how her work
achieved this reach, it will help to note how her methodology was itself shaped by the confluence of several intellectual developments in post–Civil War America. Among these
were the Social Gospel Movement, the effort to answer
human problems using the methods of science, and the
development of domestic fiction.
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The first development sought to transform, theologically, the effort of Christian churches from otherworldly
worship to social activism that could bring about the
Kingdom of Heaven on earth. Significantly, for our purposes, the Social Gospel aimed at social reform but overtly
committed to a set of moral principles that would inform its
work. These included commitments to the right to food and
housing, to good working conditions and fair pay, and the
right to justice even in the context of industrial capitalism
and communities of immigrants (Dorrien, 2011). Following
a pattern set by missionaries, settlement houses were established in poor neighborhoods and occupied by settlement
workers, women mostly, who came from middle and upper
middle classes, to live full-time in the community (Addams,
1910/1990; Knight, 2005). Also, like missionaries, many
settlements carried out their work as a process of preaching
the gospel and winning converts according to plans established by the settlement workers or their sponsoring organizations (Henderson, 1899). Such efforts were often blocked
by the unfamiliarity of the doctrines presented (often based
on a liberal Protestant theology at odds with the traditional
Catholicism of many immigrant neighborhoods) and by the
incompatibility of the practices to be imposed.
Hull House began by following this same pattern, but
within a few years, Addams and Starr realized that their
efforts would not succeed as long as they attempted to
address the problems of the neighborhood using goals and
strategies imported from outside. In an address given in
1892, Addams summarized,
reconstruction of American education and the process of
industrialization. The new field of sociology, however, did
not look like a contemporary version of empirical sociological studies with a focus on objective description and a
regulative ideal of insulating social inquiry from the partisan values of the researcher. Instead, early sociology was
founded on the idea that science would be in service of
social change and would not merely be descriptive of the
problems (Bascom, 1887; Bernard & Bernard, 1943;
Deegan, 1988; Small, 1905). John Bascom (1887), who
founded the study of sociology at the University of
Wisconsin, wrote in his 1887 volume, Sociology,
The Settlement, then, is an experimental effort to aid in the
solution of the social and industrial problems which are
engendered by the modern conditions of life in a great city. . . .
The one thing to be dreaded in the Settlement is that it lose its
flexibility, its power of quick adaptation, its readiness to change
its methods as its environment may demand.
Writing in 1905, Albion Small, founder of the sociology
department at the University of Chicago, summarized,
To accomplish this work, Settlement workers “must be
content to live quietly side by side with their neighbors,
until they grow into a sense of relationship and mutual
interests.” Rather than “being good ‘to’ people” based on
what they think is best for them, Settlement workers must
act “with” their neighbors and be “open to conviction and
have a deep and abiding sense of tolerance . . . [They] must
be hospitable and ready for experiment.” This readiness,
she concludes, also requires “a scientific patience in the
accumulation of facts and the steady holding of their sympathies as one of the best instruments for that accumulation.” Even as the Social Gospel suggested the goals,
achieving them demanded a new “science” (Addams,
1902/2002, p. 70; Addams, 1910/1990, pp. 75-76).
Here, the second intellectual development of the period
came to play a crucial role. The idea that social ills could be
addressed using science was part of a multidimensional
[Social] science is not only opening up for us world within
world, it is greatly helping the moral problem of life by bringing
to it new interpretations; new insight into methods. . . . The
form of individual and social action is, and is still more to be,
profoundly altered by it. (p. 256)
Bringing together both a commitment to the value of
sociology as a method of social change and the goals of the
Social Gospel, Bascom (1887) concludes,
No inquiries should be more fruitful, both directly and
indirectly, than those of sociology. The progress of men in all
directions will ultimately turn on the full favorable development
of those powers and principles by which they are organized
with each other in society. The most complete and vivid
expression for the perfection of human life is the Kingdom of
Heaven. (p. 249)
Sociology is a unified view of human life, derived (a) from
analysis of all discoverable phases of human activity past and
present; (b) from synthesis of these activities in accordance
with their functional meanings; (c) from telic interpretation of
the whole thus brought to view, in so far as tendencies are
indicated in the process analyzed; and it is finally a body of
guiding principles, derived from this analysis, for the conduct
of life. (p. 23)
The final aspect of the definition, that sociology provides a conception of the ends of human life and principles
for achieving them, reinforces the notion that sociology was
taken as an activist methodology that used “scientific methods” for purposes of social reform.
Addams (1935) brought together the central method of
the settlement movement—that social transformation could
only be accomplished through an ongoing presence in the
problematic situation—and the central insight of the new
science of sociology—that research required careful methods of observation bound to a process of inquiry aimed at
solving and not just describing social problems (Deegan,
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1988). It was in this context that Addams borrowed and pioneered observational methods from a variety of sources.
Following the lead of British sociologist, Charles Booth
(1892-1897), she and the other lead workers at Hull House
began to collect information about life in the Halsted neighborhood that included demographic information, information
about nutrition, education, patterns of family life, information about working conditions, wages, and social behaviors,
including domestic violence and sex slavery (Addams, 1909,
1912b; Addams et al., 1895). Such data were collected to
develop practical reform measures that would lead to, for
example, better nutrition and sanitation among the members
of the community, means for addressing domestic violence,
and changing working conditions. Significantly, the problems to be addressed were not ones determined by the Hull
House residents alone, but rather in interaction with members
of the community. Charlene Haddock Seigfried, feminist philosopher and one of the leading contemporary scholars of
Addams’s writings, describes Addams’s approach to inquiry
as a form of experimental method.
[Her] experimental method was literally one of learning from
mistakes, and Addams points out repeatedly how her attitudes
and proposals caused harm that could have been avoided had
she listened more carefully to those she was supposedly
helping. The effectiveness of the experiment was determined,
not by whether it met her original expectations, but by whether
it met those of the recipients. (Seigfried, 1996, p. 200)
This openness to revision of her views based on the experiences of others who lived the consequences of the decisions
extended to her broader public policy advocacy as well. This
is evident, for example, in her public exchange with lifelong
friend and collaborator Ida B. Welles on the subject of lynching (Addams, 1901; Hamington, 2005; Welles, 1901).
In some ways, this sounds like the mode of social
engagement espoused by Paulo Freire (2000) in Pedagogy
of the Oppressed. Unlike Freire, however, Addams does not
posit ideological conscientization of community members
as the ultimate goal of social inquiry and action. Instead, it
is the transformation of the consciousness of the social
worker that she sees as essential for inquiry to produce a
transformative result. She describes a charity worker in her
book Democracy and Social Ethics:
She discovers how incorrigibly bourgeois her standards have
been and it takes but a little time to reach the conclusion that
she cannot insist so strenuously upon the conventions of her
own class which fail to fit the bigger more emotional and freer
lives of working people. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 21)
Instead,
the young woman who has succeeded in expressing her social
compunction through charitable effort finds that the wider
social activity and the contact with the larger experience not
only increases her sense of social obligation but at the same
time recasts her social ideals. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 33)
This reflexive transformation of the social worker yields
practical outcomes. In Twenty Years at Hull-House, Addams
describes the early development of childcare. In the midst
of their development of various outreach efforts, the Hull
House workers had come to recognize that one of the challenges faced by the neighborhoods involved the care of
children. Mothers, when they could, would work all day
leaving their children with neighbors.
When hot weather came, the restless children could not brook
the confinement of the stuffy rooms, and, as it was not
considered safe to leave the doors open because of sneak
thieves, many children were locked out. During our first
summer an increasing number of these poor little mites would
wander into the cool hallway of Hull-House (p. 168).
Thus, although it was not a part of the original conception of the settlement house, “Hull-house . . . was committed to a day nursery” (Addams, 1935, pp. 167-168).
To this practice of inquiry involving an openness to the
transformation of the priorities and values of the inquirer,
Addams added a further component to the processes of
research to bring about social change. Since the early 19th
century, American women had produced fiction aimed at
examining the moral character of American homes and
families. Often viewed as a didactic, moralizing literature
(Hawthorne described the authors of this fiction as “a
damned mob of scribbling women”), the genre was nevertheless vastly popular. The work of these women writers in
many cases, rather than being empty moral sagas aimed at
reproducing the morals and mores of the dominant culture,
were often critical works that reexamined aspects of
American life, diagnosed its problems, and offered solutions (Pratt, 2002). These works are often classified as part
of the cult of domesticity and for this reason are generally
set aside in the 20th century as possible sources of critical
understanding. In contrast, Addams drew from these “scribbling women” to incorporate the critical and transformative
power of domestic fiction with the scientific commitments
of sociology. The result was works such as The Long Road
of Woman’s Memory (Addams, 1916) in which Addams
welds together these strands of knowledge formation in a
compelling narrative that is grounded in her experience and
that of other women in the Halsted neighborhood, careful
collection of narratives and traditions alive in the neighborhood, and a narrative voice borrowing from domestic fiction to represent the experiences of women both as an
account of transformation and as a model of the process of
transformation. Addams’s analysis of the Pullman Strike
illustrates the intersection between domestic concerns and
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Qualitative Inquiry 19(8)
the analysis of the problems of industrial communities. “We
have all shared the family relationship and our code of ethics concerning it is somewhat settled,” she wrote.
We also bear a part in the industrial relationship, but our ethics
concerning that are still uncertain. A comparative study of
these two relationships presents an advantage, in that it enables
us to consider the situation from the known experience toward
the unknown. (Addams, 1912b, p. 132)
Even as economists and political scientists considered
the strike in terms of the economics of labor, Addams reconceived the problem in terms of intimate human relations, a
model for her writing in general that moved from lived,
local experience, to a conception of social inquiry in service
of social change.
Addams’s method of social inquiry, then, had three distinctive elements: (a) a commitment to inquiry conducted
not prior to, but as part of the fabric of, processes of social
amelioration; (b) a conception of the subjectivity of the
inquirer as an important site of ontological transformation
precipitated by the inquiry; and (c) a narrative mode of representing the transformation of researcher subjectivity,
including transformations of conceptions of self and intimate relations with others.
It is tempting to think that Addams’s pioneering social
science does not constitute a significant philosophical
departure from the emergent social science of her day, one
organized around the liberal conception of an individual
citizen-subject as its primary unit of analysis. The most
common retrospective view of her work (and of much of the
theoretical work of this period) does exactly this. It is easy,
as Elshtain (2002) has demonstrated, to take Addams as part
of modern liberalism whose work turns on the recognition
of the rights of individuals.
While this was clearly a component of Addams’s first
work in the Halsted neighborhood, by the beginning of the
20th century, she recognized that the cultural diversity of
the neighborhood and the presence of markedly different,
apparently incommensurable traditions required something
other than liberal individualism to serve as the ontological
starting point for her engagement with the community.
Like John Dewey (who learned much from Addams) and
Josiah Royce (from whom Addams may have learned
much), it was quickly clear that the work of social change
required a more complex foundation than just the declaration of individual rights. Human lives are closely bound
with those of family, coworkers, neighbors, churches, food
traditions, and language. It was also clear that one of the
results of this boundedness was that change, if it occurs,
will not easily occur if communities are isolated from one
another.
The challenge Addams shared with 21st-century social
science scholars is the boundary challenge. How can we
acknowledge that an inquirer’s analysis is bounded by the
social, cultural, and historical contexts that shape the inquirer’s subjectivity, and still allow for inquiry that encounters
something real capable of introducing novelty into that subjectivity? What kind of inquiry takes us to our own boundary conditions where such an encounter is possible? What
ontological and epistemological understandings can help us
arrive at and understand these encounters?
The genius (perhaps accidental) of the settlement houses
is that they provided borderlands (Anzaldúa, 1999; Pratt,
2011) that linked and divided communities in a way that
helped to identify the problems at hand and the potential for
solutions that could recognize the bounded character of the
problems and resources. Rather than defining individuals or
even communities as the ontological ground on which to
build practical social science, Addams (as well as James,
Royce, Du Bois, and Follett) took the ontological starting
point as the intersections of differences, the borderlands in
terms of which problems could be identified and framed,
and solutions could be proposed and tried. From this perspective, the participant observer emerges at the intersection of points of view. Even as she is a product of different
communities, she is sufficiently removed from the situation
at hand to serve as a kind of translator in terms of which
problems may be framed and addressed. In Long Road, it is
Addams’s ability to engage women faced with domestic
violence by listening to and drawing out their stories that
the women themselves come to realize that their situations
are not given or required but are a consequence of a history
of gendered work and oppression. At the same time, Addams
herself recognized the limits of her viewpoint and the need
to listen to the women of the neighborhood. This is evident
in her interpretation of the “devil baby” stories that form the
starting point of her narrative in Long Road on Women’s
Memory (Addams, 1916). Hull House and its workers, in
effect, embodied the border between the neighborhood and
the dominant Victorian middle class.
What are the lessons of this ontological starting point for
social science research? First, it is a realist point of view in
the sense that it presumes multiple different interests and
traditions that cannot be reduced to a single set of beliefs,
commitments, or interests. The realism here is an experiential realism. It posits a reality that exceeds our representations of the world that emerges in social tensions that arise
in efforts to offer totalizing representations of human experience. We do not encounter that reality in the form of a
more comprehensive picture of human social meaning. We
experience that reality in our encounters with different communities of meaning. This ontology is reminiscent but perhaps not identical to Dewey’s ontology of experience that
was, in turn, a necessary complement to his pragmatic epistemology. These are ontological theories that arguably have
enormous methodological implications that have yet to be
fully explored.
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Rosiek and Pratt
Second, for Addams, agency serves as the dominant
character of the ontologically significant aspects of a situation. Addams presumed the agency of the women she knew
and so was necessarily committed to listening to them and
taking seriously their concerns and ideas for change. She
was also committed to recognizing the agency of the neighborhood and its collective interests. The development of
active responses to problems faced by the neighborhood
were in significant ways suggested by the life of the community as a whole that was manifested in patterns of behavior that were understood through data collection and the
interpretation of data through narratives (Addams, 1909, for
another example).
Third, Addams herself was also an agent, not a passive
conduit connecting cultures or collecting data, but a person
invested in all of the intersecting cultures. One who takes
“the betterment of humanity” for her aim and end, she said,
must also take the daily experiences of humanity for the
constant correction of [her] process. [She] must not only test
and guide [her] achievement by human experience, but [she]
must succeed or fail in proportion as [she] has incorporated that
experience with [her] own. (Addams, 1902/2002, pp. 78-79)3
Fourth, whatever research could be produced in the context of a present problem was local information, transferrable, and universalizable only by degrees and in light of
attention to its limits (Pratt, 2004).
Among the most striking aspects of her account of social
inquiry in the context of her work at Hull House are her
descriptions of the phenomenology of the transformation
such inquiry works on the inquirer. These transformations
were regarded, not as a compromise to her objectivity, nor
as something to be achieved through critical interrogation
of previously held beliefs, but as the inevitable and desirable outcome of conducting inquiry with her fellow community members. Speaking of her own experience at Hull
House, she recounts a story she heard of a young girl bringing a small frog and a large frog together so they could play.
. . . to her inexpressible horror and surprise, the big toad opened
his mouth and swallowed the little one. The moral of the tale
was clear applied to people who lived “where they did not
naturally belong,” although I protested that was exactly what
we wanted—to be swallowed and digested, to disappear into
the bulk of the people.
Twenty years later I am willing to testify that something of the
sort does take place after years of identification with an
industrial community. (Addams, 1910/1990, p. 308)
At the center of Addams’s method of inquiry is the idea
that the ability to address problems depends upon one’s
ability to become integrated, even vanish into, the life of the
community. At the same time, even as the investigator is
taken up into the community, Addams recognizes in the
reflexive moment that she also stands outside, able to experience the life of the community and in some significant
sense see it from outside.
Taken together, Addams’s onto-epistemic starting point
and her experience of being both inside and outside the
community generate the position of the participant observer
as a boundary agent (Pratt, 2011). From this position,
Addams is “swallowed” by different communities (the
industrial community of her neighborhood and the
Victorian community from which she came) and faced, as
such, with potentially incompatible modes of action. Such
a position has the phenomenological character of confusion and disruption but also brings with it the possibility of
creative action.
Addams and Reflexive Narrative
Inquiry
The result of this process of belonging was, for Addams, the
emergence of a method of narrative inquiry with which she
tacked back and forth between the life-worlds of different
communities. Perhaps the best example of this method is
found in The Long Road of Woman’s Memory (Addams,
1916). The putative thesis of the book is that memory functions both as a kind of palliative in the face of extreme
oppression but also functions as an instrument of transformation that can direct social change. Memory does its work
as a narrative process, at first reconfiguring experience to
dull its pain and to locate moments of hope and then as a
process of dispositional and cultural change, transforming
one both inwardly and in one’s interactions with others.
In a later paper, “Education by Current Event,” Addams
concluded that social inquiry is best understood as an emergent practice beginning in the experience of individuals and
magnified when “the newly moralized issue . . . suddenly
takes fire and sets whole communities and public duty with
meaning.” It is “when the blaze actually starts, when the
theme is heated, the settlement can best use it in its unending effort to make culture and the issue of things go
together.” The settlement, as the social investigator, is at
once part of the community and distinct, able to “use” the
experience and knowledge of the present circumstances in a
process of transformation. “From time to time . . . when
such a blaze did start . . . it seemed possible to educate the
entire community by a wonderful unification of effort”
(Addams, 1935, p. 381).
Her narrative style of writing was not simply a personal
preference, or a consequence of the limitations of her skill
set. It was, instead, an integrated facet of her overall conception of social inquiry. Her inquiries sought to produce
a combination of cognitive clarity, affective sympathies
with members of communities, and a sense of possibilities
as yet unrealized in social life. Her narratives sought to
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Qualitative Inquiry 19(8)
communicate this to the reader. Her social inquiries forsook the goal of transcendent perspective, and instead
sought the outcome of being swallowed up and transformed by community life. Her narrative style of writing
invited the reader into a subject space that is different from
the subjectivity constructed by more descriptive objectivist social analysis. Her stories are localized and personal.
They present an account of encounter with broad cultural
and economic dynamics, understood and analyzed from
these localized perspectives.
This style of analysis resembles autoethnographic writing. However, it is more focused on the transformation of
the consciousness of the author, whereas autoethnography
remains primarily descriptive in its project, emphasizing
descriptions of the experience of being caught in cultural
and institutional interstices. Addams’s writings are most
reminiscent of the narrative inquiry tradition in educational
research (e.g., Barone, 2001, 2007; Chang & Rosiek, 2003;
Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Eisner, 1988; Huber &
Whelan, 2007). The presumption of this tradition of research
is twofold: (a) that knowledge is ultimately grounded in and
must return for its validation to the course of personal experience and (b) that the form this knowledge most readily or
appropriately take in our lives is that of narratives.
Narratives present insights in a context, a context on which
the meaning of the original insights depends. According to
this view, general empirical claims or transcendent theoretical analyses are understood as analytical means to informing our narratives of personal practical knowledge. They
are not, however, superior endpoints for social inquiry.
Addams’s writings strike similar themes. However, it is
more focused on the conflicts broad institutional dynamics
create in the lives of community members. And Addams’s
writing is more focused on the goal of informing and
inspiring collective group action to ameliorate structural
social ills.
Conclusion
In summary, we hope we have offered enough to convince
that Jane Addams’s life and writings merit renewed attention from social science methodologists. In her accounts of
the social inquiry conducted by settlement workers, Addams
was wrestling with the necessity and difficulty of what we
call reflexivity. However, in contrast to critical theoretic
and poststructuralist formulations of the methodological
implications of the ideal of reflexivity, she operated from an
ontology of experience that led to methodological priorities
that are resonant with poststructuralism, but with nuanced
and significant differences. Addams by no means resolved
the conceptual and research methodological tensions of
reflexivity in her work. However, she did what few others since have been able to do—she worked in the boundary between an analysis of individual phenomenological
experience (narratively rendered) and an analysis of broader
material and macrosocial processes. And she did this without diminishing the ontological import of either and without
succumbing to claims of totalizing authority. She accomplished this, in large part, through an ontology of experience that recognized the agency of other persons and of the
community as a collective (did not treat them as passive
objects of analysis), and the use of narrative modes of representation. We offer that her practice of social inquiry can
provide insight and inspiration to the current efforts to
develop a reflexively realist social science practice.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
1. The field psychology has been the slowest to respond to
these developments. This is, to some extent, understandable
given that the unit of analysis in psychological studies is the
individual human mind. The reflexive turn in the social science has been precipitated by developments in disciplines for
which the unit of analysis is social dynamics. Sociologists,
for example, recognized at some point that the production of
knowledge among academic sociologists was a social process that could be studied using the same conceptual tools
used to study other communities—albeit with more vertiginous epistemic implications. One supposes that, some day,
psychologists may eventually apply their theories to the way
psychology academics produce their own theories, and that
this may or may not create a similar epistemic disequilibrium
in the field.
2. Of course, even this desire involves us in well-rehearsed contradictions that come with an effort to name the unrepresentable. From Kant’s recognition of the problems of referring to
the impossibility of unmediated descriptions of a ding an sich
(thing-in-itself), to Dewey’s allusions to immediate experience, to Derrida’s nonconcept of difference, the challenges
such self-referential metacognition pose for a naïve descriptive epistemology are well documented. Our point here is not
to attempt to resolve those contradictions in an effort to rescue a descriptive social science project, but to highlight the
possibility of dwelling in the contradiction as a generative
space for scholarly social action.
3. Also see Addams (1935, p. 410). “There is a theory of culture
which contends that when people journeyed on foot or on
camels or by other means into a strange part of the world,
their contact with the established civilization there produced
a curious excitement that often resulted in the creation of
a new culture that never existed before. I believe that we
may get, and should get, something of that revivifying and
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Rosiek and Pratt
upspringing of culture form our contact with the groups who
come to us from foreign countries, and that we can get it in no
other way.”
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Author Biographies
Jerry Lee Rosiek is an associate professor of education studies at
the University of Oregon where he teaches courses on the cultural
foundations of education and qualitative research methodology.
His empirical scholarship focuses on teacher knowledge and the
ways teachers learn from their classroom experience. His research
has experimented with the use of narrative modes of representation, narrative inquiry, and most recently theatrical representations
of educational research. His writing has appeared in several major
journals including Harvard Educational Review, Education
Theory, Educational Researcher, Qualitative Inquiry, Curriculum
Inquiry, Educational Psychologist, and the Journal of Teacher
Education.
Scott Pratt is a professor of philosophy at the University of Oregon
where he teaches graduate seminars in American philosophy, surveys of African American and Native American philosophy, and
feminist pragmatism as well as courses on the work of John Dewey,
William James, Josiah Royce, Jane Addams, C. S. Peirce, and W.
E. B. Du Bois. He is the author of a number of books, including
Native Pragmatism, Logic: Inquiry, Argument and Order, and
Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems
(coedited with Shannon Sullivan). He is an editor of the
Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society, the leading
journal of pragmatist philosophy scholarship in the world.
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