THE INFLUENCE OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION ON
THE MEXICO-TEXAS BORDER, 1910-1916
by
RODOLFO ROCHA, B.A., M.A.
A DISSERTATION
IN
HISTORY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved
^Accepted
May, 1981
•CI <2
/
^
/
/
PREFACE
For years historians have studied the Mexican
Revolution in detail.
The influence that the revolution
had along the Rio Grande borderland, however, has escaped
historical scrutiny.
Most of the revolutionary movements
had their start in Texas; none could have succeeded were
it not for the crossing of men and war supplies from Texas.
All Mexican border towns had their share of excitement
during the upheaval.
Likewise, the American sister border
cities also experienced much revolutionary activity.
Men
were recruited in Texas, arms and ammunition arrived at
American border points destined for rebel factions in
Mexico while American troops tried in vain to keep the
peace.
The Mexican Revolution, an element of hope for
Mexicans, served as a catalyst for Mexican Americans in
South Texas, who felt abused and oppressed by Anglo
Americans, to rise and confront the dominant element.
In preparation of this dissertation, I am deeply
indebted to Professor Alwyn Barr whose untiring efforts
*
contributed a sense of order to a bunch of facts.
I am
also grateful to Professors Lowell L. Blaisdell, James
W. Harper, Charles L. Wood, Robert A. Hayes, and Edmundo
Garcia-Giron for their helpful criticism.
ii
I am especially
beholden to the late Professor David M. Vigness who guided
me early in my doctoral work and the initial phase of the
research of this dissertation.
I am thankful to many
people at various institutions for the assistance they
provided, especially the staffs at:
Archive de la
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Archivo de Venustiano
Carranza, and Archivo General de la Nacion, in Mexico City;
Southwest Collection and the Texas Tech Library in Lubbock;
Barker Collection and the University of Texas Library in
Austin; and the Learning Resource Center at Pan American
University in Edinburg.
I wish to express my thanks to
Joan Weldon and Mary Gonzalez for the long hours spent at
the typewriter to produce this project.
Finally, I wish
to thank my wife, Hilda, and son, Rodolfo, for the time
that they sacrificed so that I could earn a doctoral degree
111
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
ii
Chapter
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
CULTURAL CONFLICT ALONG THE BORDER
1
MADERISMO AND THE MEXICO-TEXAS BORDER
49
C H A L L E N G E TO M A D E R I S M O ALONG THE RIO G R A N D E . .
87
H U E R T I S M O A N D T H E M E X I C O - T E X A S BORDER
137
C A R R A N C I S M O ALONG T H E R I O G R A N D E , 1914-1915. .
203
T H E M E X I C A N O "SOCIAL B A N D I T S , " 1915
256
CONCLUSION
335
BIBLIOGRAPHY
352
IV
CHAPTER I
CULTURAL CONFLICT ALONG THE BORDER
Along the long, often strifetorn border between
the United States and her southern neighbor, it is the
Texas Coahuila-Chihuahua section that has been the most
trouble-ridden.
When the United States annexed Texas in
1845, the boundary with Mexico remained in dispute.
For
that reason the treaty of annexation allowed the United
States to negotiate the boundary with Mexico.
The final
solution to the dispute came in 1848 with the signing of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which established the
Rio Grande as the boundary.
Thereafter the frontier had
a history of frequent turmoil.
The border experienced
acts of banditry, cattle and horse rustling, smuggling and
from 1910 to 1920 revolutionary activities.
The most memorable period of conflict came during
the years of the Mexican Revolution beginning in 1910.
William M. Malloy, ed.. Treaties, Conventions,
International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the
United ^' ates of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909,
Vol. 1 ,/Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office,
1910), pp. 1109-1110; Daniel Cosio Villegas, The United
States Versus Porfirio Diaz, trans. Nettie Lee Benson
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 37.
2
During that struggle the border separating Texas and
Mexico became an
area of intrigue which intensified with
the explosive political conditions in Mexico.
The Revolu-
tion also provided an outlet for the frustration that had
brewed within the people who lived along the border.
The
Mexico-Texas frontier became a breeding ground for revolutionary movements from small local raids into Mexico to
larger filibustering expeditions.
Geography made the border susceptible to intrigue.
Along the Texas frontier the United States and Mexico are
politically separated by the Rio Grande.
Beyond Texas and
to the Pacific Ocean, the United States-Mexico boundary is
artificially set.
Along the Rio Grande there are fourteen
important cities, seven on each side of the border:
Brownsville-Matamoros, Hidalgo-Reynosa, Laredo-Nuevo Laredo,
Del Rio-Las Vacas (Ciudad Acuna), Eagle Pass-Ciudad Porfirio
Diaz (Piedras Negras), Ojinaga-Presidio and El Paso-Ciudad
Juarez.
The space between any two sets of cities, was
extensive, arid, isolated and sparsely populated.
Thus
the 1,250-mile Texas border from the mouth of the Rio
Grande to El Paso permitted ample space for illegal activity
The region from Brownsville to Laredo accounted for
most of the agitation along the United States-Mexico border.
Since the mid-eighteenth century when the Spanish settled
and named the area Nuevo Santander, the terrain has been
used mostly as farm and ranch land.
This section served
3
as the staging area for the revolution that brought
Porfirio Diaz to office in 1876 as well as the
1910
revolution that brought about his downfall.
Above the Lower Rio Grande Valley to Eagle Pass
and on to Del Rio, mesquite, prickly pear, huisache,
cenizo, black brush, catclaw, dwarf oak and other wild
shrubs covered the land.
Since Spanish colonial days, the
scrubby soil had been used mostly for pasturage of cattle,
sheep and goats.
Irrigation, however, made some of the
land fertile, as the produce of Dimmit County (the Winter
Garden sector) demonstrated.
This section had its share
of revolutionary activity, but not to the same extent as
2
the lower border.
The terrain from Del Rio to El Paso can best be
described as "the hard country" of the Rio.
The land is
mountainous, rough, unpredictable and hazardous.
There are
occasional water holes that dry up periodically.
The
desert is unyielding and unforgiving of the slightest
error in judgment or conduct.
Because it is so sparsely
populated, the area is called despoblado (uninhabited).
Today, as in 1910, most of the people living in the "Big
Bend" of the Rio Grande raise cattle, goats and sheep.
2
Arthur W. Bush, "Environmental Management: A
Basis for Equitable Resource," in Stanley R. Ross, Views
Across the Border: The United States and Mexico
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978),
pp. 346-348.
4
During the Mexican Revolution the arroyos, canyons, caves
and mountains served as hideouts for bandits and gun
3
runners.
Finally, El Paso is surrounded by an arid-desert
terrain.
Nevertheless, it was an important commercial
center, for it was the junction of four rail lines, and
therefore played an important role for revolutionists
4
along the border.
The Rio Grande is largely a political boundary.
On the Mexican side of the river Spanish is the official
language, while on the Texas side Spanish is the native
tongue, though not the legal language, for the majority
of the population.
The mesquite, prickly pear, and
huisache in Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila and Texas
look exactly alike.
When Mexicans crossed the political
line separating the two republics to recover strayed or
stolen cattle
and horses, Texans called them "bandits."
VThen Texans crossed the border to recover strayed or
3
U.S. Deoartment of Interior, National Parks
Service, Ronnie C. Tyler, The Big Bend: A History of
the Last Texas Frontier (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1975), pp. 1-20; U.S. Department of
State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of
Mexico, 1910-1929, Ellsworth to Secretary of State,
5 December 1910, RDS, 812.00/547.
4
Armando Gutierrez, "The Politics of the Texas
Border: An Historical Overview and Some Contemporary
Directions," in Ross, Views Across the Border, p. 118.
stolen cattle and horses, the Mexicans called them
"bandidos."^
Nevertheless, when the Rio Grande became the border,
friends and families who had been neighbors became citizens
of two separate nations.
They could no longer swim or row
across the river to visit each other; the law required
that they travel up or down the river to the nearest
official crossing point.
Yet, very few people paid atten-
tion to the requirements of the law.
Relatives visiting
on either side of the boundary traversed it at the nearest
crossing point.
Children born on one side of the river
were sometimes baptized on the other side without regard
to immigration laws.
Mexicanos viewed the Rio Grande as
another waterway crossing and not as a line that separated
them.
The entire Mexico-Texas border had been home to
the Mexicanos since the Spanish first came to the area in
the eighteenth century.
By 1910 the population of South
Texas was approximately 54,037, of whom two-thirds were
Joe B. Frantz, "The Borderlands: Ideas on a
Leafless Landscape," in Ross, Views Across the Border,
pp. 36-38; Mexican is useci to identify Mexican nationals;
Mexican American to identify native Americans of Mexican
descent; Mexicano is used when both Mexican nationals and
Mexican Americans are involved in an incident or when the
nationality of the person is not clearly known.
6
f
Americo Paredes, "The Problems of Identity in a
Changing Culture: Popular Expressions of Culture Conflict
Along the Lower Rio Grande Border," in Ross, Views Across
the Border, pp. 74-76.
Mexican Americans.
South Texas remained the most tradi-
tionally Spanish of the entire borderland, probably because
of its isolation.
Many of the Anglo Americans who came to
the Lower Rio Grande Valley in the mid-nineteenth century
had been impressed by the conservatism and traditionalism
of the area.
Although Anglos had definite racial attitudes
atxDut the Mexican, there were many occasions when both
Anglos and Mexicans accommodated each other.
The Anglo
who desired to co-exist with the Mexicano found a lifetime
comradeship was possible.
Some Anglos married into Mexican
7
families, although very infrequently.
Meantime Mexican
Americans in the Valley carried on normal lives, still
celebrating Mexican secular and religious holidays and
preserving their family structure.
Mexican Americans
participated in the Anglo dominated economy as railroad
workers, cowboys, law officers and merchants.
Nevertheless, most inhabitants carried guns in
Brownsville, and all along the border, for that matter.
7
Harbert Davenport Collection, "The J. Harbert
Davenport Papers," (Archives, University of Texas Library,
Austin, Texas), pp. 9-11; James B. Wells Collection
(Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin, Texas),
"Census Book," p. 77; Joe'Robert Baulch, "James B. Wells:
South Texas Economic and Political Leader" (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University, 1974), p. 38; Ozzie G.
Simmons, "Anglo Americans and Mexican Americans in South
Texas: A Study in Dominant-Subordinate Group Relations"
(Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 1952), pp. 234235, 271; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population of the
United States at the Thirteenth Census, pp. 119-120;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 5 April 1911, p. 1.
With frequency, the Sheriff in Brownsville reported that
his prisoners tried to escape leaving him no choice but
to kill them.
The young French missionary priest Emmanuel
Abbe passed through the area early in the 185 0s and noted
that:
The Americans of the Texas frontier are, for the
most part, the very scum of society, bankrupt, escaped
criminals, old volunteers, who after the Treaty of
Guadalupe [sic] Hidalgo, came into a country protected
by nothing that could be called judicial authority to
seek adventure and illicit gains.8
Probably, the Cortina uprising best exemplified the
growing animosity between the proud landed Mexicano and the
encroaching Anglo American.
Juan N. Cortina, descendant
of an original Spanish settler in the area, noted the
exploitation of the Mexicano by Anglo lawyers.
mother had also been victimized.
ill feelings towards the gringo.
Even his
As a result he harbored
9
On July 13, 1859, Cortina shot Brownsville City
q
Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The
United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (London:
The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 5.
9
/
Jovita Gonzalez, "Social Life in Cameron, Starr
and Zapata Counties" (M.A. thesis. University of Texas,
1930), pp. 17-20; Gilberto M. Hinojosa, "Settlers and
Sojourners in the Chaparral: A Demographic Study of a
Borderlands Town in Transition, Laredo, 17 55-1870" (Ph.D.
dissertation. University of Texas, 1979), pp. 83-84;
Frank C. Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier: A Brief History
of the Lower Rio Grande Valley (Menasha, W i s e : George
Banta Publishing Co., 1917—reprinted in 1962), p. 34.
8
Marshal Robert Sheers who allegedly had beaten one of
Cortina's workers.
Cortina fled from the city to his
ranch from where he organized a revolution against the
gringo element in the area.
Cortina with fifty to eighty
men attacked Brownsville on September 28, 1859.
After
killing five people, he retreated to his headquarters at
his ranch.
Texas Rangers and a large number of volunteers
fought several skirmishes with the rebel Cortina throughout October and November.
Only after United States troops
arrived did Cortina abandon his revolt in the Valley.
Brownsville remained dormant for much of the
period after the war against Mexico.
Then from 1850 to
1880 the area grew steadily, with the population almost
doubling from 8,541 to 14,959.
A steady growth set in for
the next ten years, only to be stopped by a change in trade
routes.
Before the 1880s Brownsville was the most impor-
tant supply route for merchandise going to Chihuahua,
Durango and Zacatecas.
Anglo American merchants, induced
by the lucrative market along with the liberal Mexican
tariff laws, moved into the area to make their fortunes.
J. Lee Stambaugh and Lillian J. Stambaugh, The
Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas (Austin: The Jenkins
Publishing Co., 1974—first printed in 1964), p. 103;
W. H. Chatfield, the Twin Cities of the Border (New
Orleans: E. P. Brandao, 1893—reprinted in 1959 by Lower
Rio Grande Valley Historical Society), p. 2; Pierce,
Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 34-36; Gonzalez, "Social Life,"
pp. 17-20.
Hundreds of wagons pulled by oxen and mules made their
way through the northern Mexican states selling their
wares.
But with the building of a rail line from Corpus
Christi to Laredo and on to Monterrey early in 1883,
Brownsville's growth slowed to a halt.
The city and the
area recovered early in the 1900s when it was connected
by rail to the Midwest.
The St. Louis, Brownsville and
Mexican Railway brought new opportunities to the economy
of the Valley.
Among the newcomers were thousands of
midwestern land speculators who came by the train loads
to the border.
A major inducement to this immigration was a
decrease of the traditional conservatism of the Valley
area.
Since the mid-eighteenth century, the Valley had
remained a feudal dominion.
The lack of growth had
created a patriarchal life and a spirit of conservatism,
with the majority of the inhabitants consisting of landless servants working the land of their masters whom they
obeyed blindly.
The peon class depended on the landholders
for constant support—from meager wages to transportation
to a dance in town.
Of the landowners, the few who were
Mexican felt a double sense of independence from the
Arnoldo de Leon, "White Racial Attitudes Toward
Mexicans in Texas, 1821-1900" (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas
Christian University, 1974), pp. 164-168; Gonzalez, "Social
Life," p. 46; Baulch, "James B. Wells," pp. 28-34; "Davenport Papers," p. 5.
10
Anglo and from the lower class Mexican peon.
The Mexican
American ranchero took pride in his possession of land,
and stood ready to defend his title, a task he was forced
to undertake with increasing frequence.
At the turn of
the century many prominant Mexican American families still
owned ranches given to them by either the Spanish or the
Mexican government.
For instance, Don Macedonio Vela
owned Laguna Seca Ranch, Hipolito Garcia, Randado Ranch,
Dionisto Guerra, Los Ojeulos Ranch and there were many
others.
Late in the 1890s, Mexicans in the Valley faced a
new challenge from newly-arriving Anglos whose Anglo-Saxon
supremacist attitude made them think of Mexicans as savages,
not "persons."13 The new arrivals had a:
Ruthless disregard for the rights and prejudices of
the old inhabitants, usually without any knowledge
of the conditions under which they were living, and
with little understanding and less sympathy for the
opinion and traditions of those who had preceded
them.14
To many newly-arrived Anglos, Mexicans seemed
un-American because they lacked ambition, Protestant
values and destiny; thus, they seemed unfit to participate
Arnoldo de Leon, "Los Tejanos: An Overview of
Their History," in Ben Procter and Archie P. McDonald,
The Texas Heritage (St. Louis, Mo.: Forum Press, 1980),
pp. 136-137.
•'•'^de Leon, "White Racial Attitudes," pp. 164-168
"Davenport Papers," p. 13.
11
in the democratic process.
Other Anglos, however, feared
that the Mexicanos would rise and overthrow the newly
established order. 15
Mexicanos in Laredo, Texas, on the other hand,
seemed to have experienced less friction with Americans
than Mexicanos of the Lower Rio Grande Valley.
The first
Anglos came to Laredo after Fort Mcintosh had been established in 1849 to supply the military post with essential
goods and services.
Late in the 18 60s Laredo became a
vital trading center for both ex-Confederate and Juarista
rebels.
Slowly Laredo replaced Brownsville as the most
important trade center along the river, especially after
1881-1883 when the first rail lines connected that border
city with Corpus Christi, San Antonio to the north and
Monterrey to the south.
population tripled.
Laredo quickly prospered and its
It became a stopping point for many
distinguished travelers on their way to Washington, D.C.
16
or Mexico, D.F.
C. A, Hawley, Life Along the Border (Spokane,
Wash.: Shaw and Borden Co., 1955), p. 35; Baulch, "James
B. Wells," p. 282; Gonzalez, "Social Life," pp. 64-65;
Simmons, "Anglo Americans and Mexican Americans," pp.
31-40; de Leon, "White Racial Attitudes," pp. 9, 58, 75,
88, 216.
J. B. Wilkinson, Laredo and the Rio Grande
Frontier (Austin: Jenkins Publishing Co., 1975), pp.
364, 376; Hinojosa, "Settlers and Sojourners," pp.
70-71, 82, 85-86, 92, 115.
12
Anglo Americans and Mexicanos appeared to have
frequently accommodated each other in Laredo before the
1880s.
Generally, Mexicanos made their living as farmers,
while Anglos became the area's merchants.
There appears
to have been no serious land title dispute in the area.
Mexicano landowners, most of whose families had received
their ranches as original grantees from the Spanish government, had clear titles to their lands.
Anglo speculators
failed to contest successfully the Mexicanos' land holdings
Consequently, Anglos owned only 10 percent
of the real
estate in the Laredo region by the end of the nineteenth
century.
Relationships that developed between Anglos and
Mexicanos appeared to have been mutually beneficial and almost never hostile.
Local officials published ordinances
both in English and Spanish; together, Anglos and Mexicanos
celebrated American and Mexican national holidays and
shared political offices almost equally.
The situation
changed after railroads brought a new breed of Anglos
with much different perspectives about Mexicanos.
By the
late 1880s, Mexicanos and the newly-arrived Americans
bitterly contested for control of the area, and the
Mexicanos eventually lost.
The Mexican lower classes
did not share in the new prosperity and retreated to a
meager survival status.
By the turn of the century.
Rangers and the Texas militia frequently saw duty in
Laredo to stop bloody fighting between different factions
13
vying for control.
The area west of Laredo from Eagle Pass to the Big
Bend district developed extremely slowly.
As late as 1890
less than 4,000 people lived in Eagle Pass, 3,000 in Del
Rio, and 1,7 00 in Presidio.18 While most Mexicanos living
in the area were subsistence farmers, Anglo American merchants and others came to meet the demands for goods and
services created by the introduction of army posts.
Later
a few Americans expanded their trade into Mexico, but such
trade never approached the volume of that of Brownsville or
Laredo.
The presence of hostile Indians also retarded the
growth of the section.
Eagle Pass and Del Rio served as
trading centers for the Juaristas fighting the French in
the early 1860s.
Because of their economic status, many
of the Anglo Americans who came to this part of the border
assumed positions of authority and superiority.
After
this settlement, a diversified economy evolved, made up of
mercantile trade, farming and ranching.
The section, how-
ever, became a mere shadow of its western neighbor
El Paso.
^"^Wilkinson, Laredo, pp. 233-234, 270-273, 370-376;
Hinojosa, "Settlers and Sojourners," pp. 85-89, 114.
•'-^Thirteenth Census, pp. 119-120.
•^^W. D. Smithers, Chronicles of the Big Bend
(Austin: Madrona Press, Inc., 1976), pp. x-xi; Wilkinson,
Laredo, pp. 234, 293; Hinojosa, "Settlers and Sojourners,"
p. 82.
14
The extreme western Texas border region around
El Paso developed slowly until the 1870s, but rapidly after
railroads came.
only 300.
For example, in 1853 its population was
Probably because of Civil War lawlessness and
increased Indian raids. El Paso stopped growing and business declined during the war years and early Reconstruction.
Then it began to grow rapidly, increasing by 1880 to 3,845,
in 1890 to 15,678, in 1900 to 24,886, and in 1910 to 52,599.
El Paso became prosperous, however, after major rail lines
reached the city in the early 1880s.
Mexicanos accounted
for three-fourths of the population in the early years;
yet, at the turn of the century, they made up only half.
Early travelers found the isolation and barren terrain along
with the constant threat of Indian attacks hard to endure.
Consequently, few settlers came to El Paso.
Most who did
come, only passed through on their way to California.
Many who stayed became merchants supplying military garrisons in West Texas and southern New Mexico. 20
In the latter part of the nineteenth century
El Paso grew rapidly.
In addition to the completion of
20
Nancy Lee Hammons, "A History of El Paso County,
Texas to 1900" (M.A. thesis. College of Mines and Metallurgy, El Paso, 1942), pp. 57-58, 78-81, 125-126; Richard
M. Estrada, "Border Revolution: The Mexican Revolution in
the Ciudad Juarez-El Paso Area, 1906-1915" (M.A. thesis.
University of Texas at El Paso, 1975), p. 3; Thirteenth
Census, pp. 119-120; Oscar J. Martinez, Border Boom Town;
Ciudad Juarez Since 184 8 (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1978), p. 10.
15
railroads, there was a cattle boom, an expansion of the
mining industry, and a westward movement of cotton through
the increased use of irrigation.
Railroads reached the
city between 1881 and 1883.
There were many railway jobs
for train and repair crews.
The lines provided contact
with wealthy mining districts on both sides of the boundary
and the city began to provide mining supplies and became
a processing, smeltering and refining center.
With ample
capital flowing in to develop agriculture, trade and industry. El Paso became a boom city.
During the 1880s packing
sheds sprang up throughout the city as a result of the
cattle boom.
Gambling houses and saloons appeared in
greater numbers, and ruffians appeared to reap v/hat they
could from the newfound wealth.
The Mexican government
expanded its Zona Libre (Free Trade Zone) to include Ciudad
Juarez in 1885, further adding to the growing commerce in
the city.
Then a new impetus to growth came when the
Mexican railway built up to Ciudad Juarez and El Paso in
order to increase trade with the interior of Mexico. 21
Relations between Mexicanos and Anglo Americans
became strained as the number of Anglo settlers rose.
Anglo Americans in El Paso generally believed that the
Mexicans were united by their "mutual hatred of the
21
Estrada, "Border Revolution," p. ii; Martinez,
"Border Boom Town," pp. 39-43, 59; Hammons, "El Paso
County," pp. 123-124, 129.
16
'gringo'. . . . "
22
The Anglos took control of the area's
political machinery, despite the fact that they were very
few in number.
The El Paso Salt War best illustrates the
tensions between the two groups.
In 18 62 Mexicans dis-
covered salt beds alDout one hundred miles from the city
and quickly began to sell the product both locally and to
Mexicans across the river.
Although at first no individual
claimed the beds, early in 1870 a group of Anglos conspired
to gain control of the salt beds and charge Mexicanos for
the salt they removed.
When Mexicanos resisted and con-
tinued to extract salt, Texas Rangers were sent to the area
to stop the Mexicanos.
Fighting erupted, several people
died and Mexicanos in El Paso rioted for several days until
Texas Rangers and United States troops suppressed the
23
violence.
Alongside local conflicts between Mexicanos and
Americans, friction arose between national governments
22
Roger Batchelder, Watching and Waiting on the
Border (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1917), pp. 61-62;
Tracy Hammond Lewis, Along the Rio Grande (New York:
Lewis Publishing Co., 1916), p. 170; Lewis' outlook differed from that of the general attitude of Anglo border
people. He attributed much of the Mexicanos' plight to
the hard life that they had to endure in Mexico and in
the Anglo dominated area in the borderlands. He wrote
well of Mexican children and women.
^•^de Leon, "White Racial Attitudes," p. 2 57;
Rodolfo Acuna, Occupied America: The Chicane's Struggle
Toward Liberation (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1972),
pp. 50-52.
17
because of shared common concerns in trade, smuggling,
and raiding by outlaws and Indians.
Mexico, occupied
much of the time with its own political problems and
later with its political fears of the United States,
could do little to alleviate conditions along the river.
The United States, however, usually reacted militarily
to border concerns.
In the 1850s the border became an important reason
for the growing commerce of the region.
At first Anglo
American merchants came merely to supply the military posts
established on the newly-defined boundary.
The earliest
trade centers were located along the lower section of the
river in South Texas; but, as the railroads made their
first connections with the mid-section (Laredo) and later
El Paso, the trade centers shifted.
Trade consisted of
hardware, cotton cloth, firearms, ammunition and wagons
going to Mexico in exchange for flour, wool, liquor, handcraft leather goods, handwoven cloth, copper, lead and
silver bullion.
24
The Mexican government encouraged trade along the
border.
After the war in 1848, the newly-created American
communities which sprang up along the river to supply the
24
/
Gonzalez, "Social Life," p. 44; Baulch, "James
B. Wells," pp. 23, 153; Martinez, Border Boom Town, pp.
26-27; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 126-127; Stambaugh,
Lower Rio Grande Valley, p. 88; Wilkinson, Laredo, p. 325.
18
forts threatened to replace the older Mexican towns.
Mexican officials desiring to encourage their nationals
to settle in the northern states to protect the country
from further territorial losses to Americans, established
a Zona Libre (Free Trade Zone), where goods could be
imported duty free along the border.
As a result, the
population of the Mexican border doubled and tripled that
of the newly-created American towns.
Libre quickly surfaced.
Abuse of the Zona
Under the program duty free goods
had to remain in the zone; because of limited personnel to
enforce the policy, however, contraband trade developed
with the interior of Mexico and into Texas.
Both govern-
ments accused the other of not policing the area adequately
and creating an unhealthy economic situation for their
citizens.
Under tremendous pressure from merchants in
the interior of the republic, Mexican officials amended
the policy in 1891 to charge a 90 percent tariff on items
imported to the zone and destined for the interior; and
finally in 1905 the Diaz government abolished the Zona
T -w
25
Libre.
The unduly large number of persons living along the
Rio Grande who engaged in'smuggling provided a high percentage of the border trade.
Many outcasts had moved to
25
Karl M. Schmitt, Mexico and the United States,
1821-1973: Conflict and Coexistence (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 1974), p. 84.
19
the border fleeing the experiences of both the American
Civil War and the Guerra de la Reforma (War of the Reform)
in Mexico.
The need for money and the ease with which
Mexican cattle, from both Mexican nationals and Mexicanos
in Texas, could be rebranded induced many men to enter the
lucrative life of a cattle rustler.
As many as 2,000 head
of cattle were stolen in any given month in the mid-1870s.
The thieves, whose violent reputation became well-known,
successfully intimidated grand and petit jurors, as well as
law officers, some of whom were parties to the thievery,
guaranteeing themselves freedom of operation.
Texas
Rangers moved to the border to clean up cattle rustling
in the mid-1870s and, along with an epidemic of smallpox,
they had put a dent in the profession by the early 1880s.
Beating the gringo custom laws, however, continued to be
an active industry along the Rio Grande into the twentieth
26
century.
Raiding across the river by both American and
Mexican outlaws and Indians brought the two nations into
constant discord.
Border residents, on both sides of the
river, suffered from plundering, pillage and murder at
the hands of brigands.
In 18 54 outlaws disguised as
26
"On the Mexican Border," The New Republic,
9 October 1915, p. 256; Stambaugh, Lower Rio Grande Valley,
pp. 145-151, 204; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 109111; Wilkinson, Laredo, pp. 331-334, 338-339, 347-348;
Villegas, United States Versus Diaz, pp. 43-45.
20
Indians raided Roma and Rio Grande City.
In the 1870s
bandits waylaid Americans throughout South Texas.
The
area west of Laredo suffered less from raiding because
the adjacent Mexican country was almost uninhabited;
Indian raiders, however, caused problems for both governments in that area.
Only after Texas Rangers and American
troops under Brigadier General Edward 0. C. Ord chased
bandits into Mexico did some of the raiding subside.
In
1882 a reciprocal hot pursuit treaty, however was signed
by Mexico and the United States.
Earlier filibustering
and smuggling of arms, ammunition and horses in Mexico for
anti-Diaz factions in 1877 sent American soldiers rushing
to the border to uphold American neutrality.
President
Diaz reciprocated by deploying General Jeronimo Trevino
with 6,000 troops to the frontier to cooperate with
American officials in stamping out lawlessness.
Later
Diaz organized a rural police force recruited from former
bandits, who for a lucrative salary, became law officers. 27
Unsettled border conditions prompted American
military officials to respond to the situation.
Because
of the unrest along the border from 184 8 to the outbreak
27
Clendenen, Blood on the Border, pp. 72-75, 81;
Schmitt, Conflict and~oexistence, pp. 89, 91-96; Wilkinson, Laredo, p. 360; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp.
33, 108; Stambaugh, Lower Rio Grande Valley, p. 204;
Martinez, Border Boom Town, pp. 5-6; Villegas, United
States Versus Diaz, pp. 46-49, 64, 71, 90-91.
21
of the Civil War, one-fifth to one-fourth of the United
States Army made its home from Brownsville to Eagle Pass.
Most of the soldiers were infantry, however, not suited
for chasing bandits.
From the 1850s to the 1880s Army
troops fought bandits in South Texas and Indians in the
Big Bend.
Immediately after the Civil War, Major General
Philip H. Sheridan with 25,000 men proceeded to the border
in order to keep Emperor Maximilian from providing any
last minute assistance to the Confederacy and to pressure
the French out of Mexico.
Early in the 1870s the army
reduced the number of troops along the river, periodically
reinforcing border garrisons as conditions warranted.
Troops returned to the Mexico-Texas frontier in large
numbers in 1911 during the Madero Revolution. 2 8
Anglo Americans in South Texas reflected racial
and Social Darwinist attitudes that seemed to prevail in
the country at the time.
Many Americans seemed to oppose
the entry of non-Teutonic immigrants who were politically
inferior, "the exact opposite of genuine Americans."
Both
in academia and the business world, Herbert Spencer's
theories on the struggle for survival were very well
received.
Many Americans- accepted the idea that
Gonzalez, "Social Life," pp. 28-2 9; Stambaugh,
Lower Grande Valley, p. 12 9; Texas' Last Frontier, pp.
33, 60; Wilkinson, Laredo, pp. 227-229, 267, 317-325;
Villegas, United States Versus Diaz, pp. 58-61.
22
civilizations evolved gradually only and that a society
could not be accelerated into evolution without bringing
catastrophe.
Mexicans m
There were some Americans who viewed the
the Valley as Indians in a primitive state.
29
Mexicanos in the American Southwest met constant
reminders that they were not considered equals by the
norteamericanos (Anglo Americans).
Texas remained the
most notorious place for abusing Mexicanos.
treated like Negroes.
(respect).
"We are
We are given no consideration
When a robbery occurs where we are employed,
we are the only ones suspected by the authorities," wrote
a Mexican newspaper reporter in 1910.30 Anglo Americans
along the border from the Valley to El Paso believed most
Mexicanos to be both disloyal and dangerous.
letter to President Woodrow Wilson,
In a 1913
Texas Governor Oscar
B. Colquitt questioned the loyalty of Mexican Americans.
He quoted a Valleyite who said that at least four-fifths
29
Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea
in America (New York: Schodken Books, 1965), pp. 113-116,
144-146, 151-153, 292, 233, 366.
30
El Tiempo, 31 de Enero de 1910 as quoted in Juan
Gomez-Quinones, "Piedras Contra la Luna, Mexico en Aztlan
y Aztlan en Mexico: Chicane Mexican Relations and the
Mexican Consulates, 1900-1920," in James W. Wilkie, Michael
C. Meyer and Edna Menzon de Wilkie, eds., Contemporary
Mexico: Papers of the IV International Congress of Mexican
History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976),
p. 502; Charles Askins, Texas, Guns, and History (New York:
Winchester Press, 1970), p. 205.
23
of the population in Hidalgo County was Mexican, including
both Mexican Americans and Mexican refugees who "make no
hesitancy in expressing their intentions to fight for
Mexico, . . . Their minds embrace loyalty to the Patria
only."
The governor added that Mexicanos held "open air
'juntas' making plans for the slaughter of a certain number
of Americans. . . . "
According to Colquitt, all Mexicans,
both men and boys, had armed themselves with either pistols
or rifles.
Colquitt also pointed out that Mexicanos had
not been allowed to fire their weapons that year during
the Cinco de Mayo celebrations.
He concluded by calling
for troops to be sent to the Valley to protect the
"Americans" from the disloyal Mexicanos.
In the Big Bend
and El Paso area Anglos also considered Mexicanos to be
dangerous.
El Pasoans described Mexicanos as illiterate,
unscrupulous, untrustworthy, suspicious and coldblooded.
Mexicanos were construed as "natural cowards" who became
31
macho only when "inflamed with liquor."
f
Many Mexican Americans along the Rio Grande felt
a stronger attachment to the Mexican government than to
the American.
Mexican nationals held similar views of
the situation faced by Mekicanos.
When Mexicans in the
0. B. Colquitt to President, 25 July 1913, RDS,
812.00/8679; Batchelder, Watching and Waiting, p. 62;
Arnold'de Leon, "Mexicans and Mexican Americans in Texas,
1910-1920" (M.A. thesis, Texas Christian University, 1971),
p. 33.
24
United States suffered
they had two recourses.
an injustice or felt exploited,
The Mexican could defend his
rights como un hombre (like a man) with his pistol, or
he could appeal to the Mexican consul for protection.
The Mexican consuls in border cities provided one
of the few outlets for Mexicans concerned about their
treatment in the United States.
At the turn of the
century Mexican consulate offices noticed an increase in
the number of complaints from Mexican workers in the United
States.
Conditions were not what the Mexicano had imagined
Salaries were nominal but hours long.
Mexicans were "in
the most degrading misery and are treated with the most
32
ignominy."
Discrimination against Mexican children in public
schools also
came to the attention of the Mexican consuls.
Most Mexicans were illiterate.
Many Anglo employers did
not encourage Mexican children to attend school for fear
that the parents would leave the area and deplete the
number of laborers available.
On the other hand, most
Mexican families (especially the peon class) neglected
public education.
Those Mexicans concerned with the
education of their children usually came from the middle
Gomez-Quinones, "Piedras Contra la Luna," p.
496, 501; Askins, Texas, Guns, and History, p. 205; Americo
Paredes, A Texas-Mexican Cancionero: Folksongs of the
Lower Border (Urbano: University of Illinois Press, 1976),
p. 23.
25
class who could not afford to send their children to
private schools.
Texas officials justified the separation
of Mexican children from Anglo children because Mexicans
could not speak English.
They also cited the lack of
facilities for all school age children.
Public school
officials did not permit most Mexicanos to enroll in
schools.
Those who managed to attend schools found them-
selves placed in segregated classrooms with inferior
facilities and teachers who perpetuated Anglo-Saxon views
of superiority and emphasized Mexican inferiority.
Many
Anglo Americans accepted the results of various tests
that showed the average Mexican child to be below the
average intellect of the average Black child, whose scores
fell below those of the average white child. 33
In reality the Mexican consuls could do little
for the Mexicanos.
Although the consuls had an awareness
of and showed a degree of concern for the plight of the
Mexicano, fear of antagonizing officials in Texas rendered
them ineffective in giving Mexicans actual support.
Never-
theless, the Mexicanos believed that they had recourse to
33
Ibid., p. 503; Luis Guzman Zorilla, Historia de
las relaciones Entre Mexico y Estados Unidos, 1800-1958
(Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Porrua, 1958), pp. 192-193;
Gonzalez, "Social Life," pp. 69-81; Archivo General de la
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico, D.F.) Mendoza
y Vizcano to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 12
October 1912, AREM, L-E-736, R-Leg. 33 de Leon, "Mexicans
and Mexican Americans in Texas," pp. 47-49.
26
the representatives of the patria (fatherland) in America.
Many Mexicanos at the beginning of the twentieth
century saw themselves as pawns of the Anglo Texans who
kept them in their place.
For instance, a poll tax was
used to keep the poor Mexicanos from voting.
Loyal Mexi-
canos were given jobs, such as deputy sheriff or county
clerk while disloyal Mexicanos were harassed by law officers.
Thus most young Mexican Americans felt a contempt
for the Anglo Americans who manipulated the lives of
Mexicans living along the border. 34
Animosity towards Mexicanos took the form of Jim
Crow laws that prohibited Mexicanos from trading in public
places.
At times Anglo Texan bigotry also took the form
of religious prejudice, as Anglos threatened Mexicanos for
admitting to being Catholic.
At the turn of the century
city fathers in Corpus Christi passed an ordinance segregating Mexicanos into the southern part of the city.
In
1913 when Mexicanos celebrated el 16 de Septiembre (Mexican
Independence Day) in San Antonio, Texas, Anglo Americans
tore down Mexican flags and forced the Mexicanos to raise
Carlos Larralde, "Chicane Revolution in South
Texas: A Study of a Marxist Movement in America, 19041919" (Unpublished manuscript in possession of writer),
p. 22, Larralde wrote the article in preparation of a
book on Aniceto Pizara; Evan Anders, "Boss Rule and
Constituent Interests: South Texas Politics During the
Progressive Era," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 84
(January 1981): 283-288.
27
the American flag. 35
Mexican-Americans faced exclusion from the judicial
process along the Lower Rio Grande Valley where they were
more numerous than in any other area of the border.
In
1910 the Brownsville Daily Herald noted that only two
Mexican Americans served as members of the grand jury for
^u
36
the year.
A study of other juries in Cameron County from
1900 to 1912 also revealed judicial discrimination by the
Anglo Americans.
Court records showed that out of 215
jurors, only 57 Mexican Americans served on grand juries
from 1900 to 1912 in Cameron County.
From 1900 to 1905
Mexican Americans had formed about 45 percent of the
juries.
Beginning in 1906, however, Mexican participation
began to decline until 1912 when only three of the 25 grand
jurors summoned were Mexican Americans.
In three separate
murder trials in 1910, out of a total of 557 prospective
petit jurors summoned, only 58 were Mexican Americans.
Only one Mexican American out of a total of 35 petit jurors
served an the same three cases. 37
35
/
.
.
.
de Leon, "Mexicans and Mexican American m
Texas," p. 38, 51-52.
^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 21 October 1901, p. 1.
37
Rodolfo Rocha, "Background to Banditry m the
Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas: 1900 to 1912" (M.A.
thesis. Pan American University, 1974), p. 76.
23
In Laredo, however, Mexican Americans seemed to
have been represented adequately on the juries at District
Courts.
Most grand jurors had been Mexicanos.
Anglos
also served, however, and usually as foremen probably
because of their acquaintance with the Texas legal system
and their command of the English language.
Mexicanos had for years suffered violence at the
hands of the dominant group along the border and throughout Texas.
Many border Mexicanos, both young and old,
remember stories told by their parents and grandparents
of the horrendous treatment received at the hands of the
39
Anglo Texans.
Mexicanos at the turn of the century knew
that after Texas' status had been permanently settled by
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Anglos throughout the
1850s coerced their ancestors into fleeing their homes in
communities; thus, leaving their property and lands to
fall into the hands of the Anglo-Texans.
Seguin, Austin,
Nacogdoches, Goliad, and Gonzales as well as Colorado
County banned "greasers" or peon Mexicanos from their
jurisdiction.
People remembered the reign of terror that befell
38
Hinojosa, "Settlers and Sojourners," p. 90.
39
Eliseo Paredes, interview with Rodolfo Rocha,
Matamoros, Mexico, 26 March 1974.
40
'
de Leon, "Mexicans and Mexican Americans in
Texas," pp. 6-7.
29
the Mexicanos in the area from the Nueces to the Rio Grande
after a band of Mexicanos raided Corpus Christi in 1875.
All Mexicanos living in the area faced suspicion; Anglos
burned ranches belonging to Mexicanos and murdered or
indiscriminately lynched innocent farmers.
Many Mexicanos
had been killed merely to settle old scores. ^•'"
Obviously, one law applied to the Mexicano and a
less rigorous one to the American.
A Mexicano who injured
an Anglo American probably faced certain death.
When a
"White" injured or caused the death of a Mexicano, Anglos
however, generally assumed that the White had been
justified.
Besides the judicial indignities that the Mexican
population had to endure at the hands of American law officers, some Mexicanos worried that their life depended on
the mercy of Los Rinches (Texas Rangers).
Local law
officers also seemed to have excessively abused Mexican
Americans.
Among those law officers were Mexican Americans
who held the confidence of Anglo officers.
Incidents of
violence between Mexicanos and the Rinches were numerous
^•'"Ibid., pp. 8-9.42
Larralde, "Chicane Revolution in South Texas,"
p. 17; Walter P. Webb, The Texas Rangers: A Century of
Frontier Defense (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935—
reprinted 1965), pp. 175-176; T. R. Fehrenback, Lone Star:
A History of Texas and the Texans (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1968) , pp. 509-510.
30
and the intimidation against Mexicans in Texas often seems
to have had an official or semi-official status.
Los Rinches committed several acts of violence in
South Texas at the turn of the century.
The 1902 fued
between Ranger A. Y. Baker and the Ramon Cerda family is
a good example of Ranger lawlessness which drove the
Mexicanos to become revolutionists as the tide of the
Mexican Revolution came to the border.
Ramon Cerda, his
wife and two sons, Ramon Jr., and Alfredo, owned El Rancho
de San Francisco de Asis, adjacent to the El Sauz Ranch
owned by the Richard King family.
Frequent cattle stealing
occurred betv/een the two ranches because of the close
resemblance m
the cattle brands used by the two families. 43
Early in 1900 Ramon Cerda, Sr., met a violent death
at the hands of a Brownsville city policeman.
Within two
years Ramon, Jr. also died when on May 16, 1902, Ranger
Baker caught Ramon branding a calf near El Sauz Ranch
fences and suspecting the younger Cerda of cattle theft,
killed him when the young Cerda resisted arrest.
Fearing
for his life, the elder brother, Alfredo, fled to
Matamoros.
44
Alfredo then threatened to kill Baker and offered
43
Rocha, "Background to Banditry," p. 84.
Ibid.; Catherine G. Baker, "The Man of the Hour,"
The Junior Historian 26 (September 1965), p. 14; Webb, The
Texas Rangers, p. 462.
31
a $1,000 reward to whoever killed the Rinche.
On September
9, 1902, Rangers A. Y. Baker, W. E. Roebuck, and Jesse
Miller were ambushed.
Roebuck was killed. Baker slightly
wounded, and Miller escaped unharmed.
with the ambush.
Alfredo was charged
He gained freedom on bail but, fearing
for his life, again fled to Matamoros; however, he returned
on October 3, 1902, to visit Juan Fernandez.
Fernandez store. Baker fatally shot Cerda.
While at the
A crowd gathered
after the killing and forced Baker to seek refuge in the
nearby military pest.
Officials arrested Baker and charged
him with murder, a mere formality, apparently, since a jury
later in 1903 acquitted the Rinche for the murder of the
two Cerda brothers. 45
The killing of the Cerdas stirred so much hatred
between the Mexicanos and Los Rinches that Merril Griffith,
American Consul in Matamoros, found it necessary to send a
detailed account of the incident to his superiors, "In
case the subject matter of this dispatch may on any future
occasion
be of service to the office."
45
Brownsville Daily Herald, 10 September 1902, p. 1;
Americo Paredes, With His Pistol m His Hand: A Border
Ballad and Its Hero (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1958), p. 24; Rocha, "Background to Banditry," p. 87;
William W. Sterling, Trails and Trials of a Texas Ranger
(Book privately printed by author, 1959), pp. 324-325;
Texas v. A. Y. Baker, 2898 and 2937, Cameron County, Texas;
Baulch, "James B. Wells," p. 249.
32
The two Cerdas were American citizens but Mexicans
in descent, sentiment and inclination. Naturally, in
this unfortunate affair they have the sympathy of
almost the entire population on both sides of the Rio
Grande, seven-eighths of which is Mexican. Trouble of
this kind is to be regretted exceedingly in-as-much as
it stirs up the most intense feeling of ill-will and
hatred among the lower ignorant classes both in Brownsville and Matamoros, not only against the Rangers but
against Americans in general. This feeling is stimulated to a great extent too by the publication of
articles in the local papers in this city. They have
made use of statements recently, on several occasions,
which had better remain unsaid. I protested the other
day to one of the local authorities concerning the
libelous character of one of these articles and
insisted on his having them suppressed immediately.
He assured me that he would attend to the matter. In
this connection and in justice to the local authorities,
here, I will say that the relations of this office have
always been very pleasant with them and they have extended it every courtesy and consideration. They nearly
always grant any request that I may see fit to ask for
and very seldom have I been compelled to appeal to
their Foreign Office through our Ambassador. . . .46
Possibly, the consul foresaw the day when the Mexicanos
would rise up in arms against Los Rinches and other "Americans in general."
Certainly Griffith noted that a great
deal of excitement, especially among the Mexicanos, had
been created by the actions of the Rangers.
On August 21, 1901, violence occurred again when
two Rangers went to arrest a Mexicano on charges of theft
at Los Realitos Ranch.
According to the Rangers, the
Mexicano resisted arrest and they had no choice but to
shoot him.
Three years later on February 6, 1904, Ranger
Sam McKenzie fatally shot Eulegio Zambrano, who tried to
^^Quoted in Rocha, "Background to Banditry,"
pp. 88-90.
33
escape as the Ranger escorted him to jail from the courthouse.
The Mexicano had been assessed a thirty day jail
sentence for stealing a horse.
In 1910 the Texas Rangers again aroused tensions
in the Valley.
In Rio Grande City on the night of May 6,
1910, Texas Ranger Levi Davis killed Severe Lopez, a
Mexican American from Falfurrias.
Davis alleged that he
tried to arrest Lopez for disturbing the peace, but the
Mexicano resisted.
On May 30, 1910, Ranger Buster Jones
tried to arrest Esteban Cervantes on a charge of disorderly
conduct.
Supposedly, the Mexicano drew a pistol on Jones,
who with his own already cocked gun killed Cervantes. 48
Thus, the seeds of hatred for the Rangers had been
sowed in the Mexican community during the first decade of
the twentieth century before the ideology of the Mexican
Revolution came to the border.
The methods used by the
Texas Rangers to enforce the laws of Texas added to the
disrespect in the hearts of the Mexicanos for American
officials.
In response, the Mexicano in the Valley felt
free to initiate his own acts of violence.
As one
Mexican American scholar explained:
Ibid., p. 91; Brownsville Daily Herald, 21
August 1910, p. 1.
48
Brownsville Daily Herald, 30 May, 13 October,
and 1 November 1910, p. 1; Rocha, "Background to Banditry,"
p. 98.
34
Terror cowed the more inoffensive Mexican, but
It also added to the roll of bandits and raiders
many high-spirited individuals wtio would have otherwise remained peaceful and useful citizens.49
Many respectable citizens had been transformed into outlaws by the application of "Ranger law" in which "a man
was killed if he did not defend himself, or was tried for
murder and hanged if he did."^^
Some Mexicans resorted to what may be described as
"social banditry" in the struggle for their rights and
their liberation.
British historian Eric J. Hobshawn
describes "social banditry" as a "primitive form of organized social protest."
He adds.
The point about social bandits is that they are
peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard as
criminals, but who remain within peasant society,
and are considered by their people as heroes, as
champion avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps
even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men
to be admired, helped and supported.51
Several Mexicans fought for their people as "social bandits"
in 1915.
But from 1890 to 1910 three Mexicanos sowed the
seeds of the resistance movement for 1915.
Catarino E.
Garza fought for the civil rights of the Mexicans both in
49
Paredes, With His Pistol m His Hand, p. 32.
^^Ibid., p. 93.
51
Eric J. Hobshawn, Primitive Rebels (New Hork:
W. W. Norton and Co., 1959), p. 13; Bandits (London:
Delacorte Press, 1969), p. 13; Armando Navarro, "The
Evolution of Chicane Politics," Aztlan 5 (Spring 1974.),
pp. 58-59.
35
Texas and in Mexico; Gregorio Cortez resisted Anglo-Texas
abuse of the Mexicano; and Jacinto Trevino refused to be
intimidated by the powerful norteamericano.
Catarino E. Garza, who lived on a ranch near San
Diego, Texas, distinguished himself as a defender of the
Mexicano from the abuses of Anglo American law officers and
later as a revolutionist against the oppressive rule of
/
52
Mexican President Porfirio Diaz.
Garza pleaded with the
Mexicano population to take pride in their heritage and
demand their rights.
On September 15, 1891, Catarino and
several other Mexicanos launched a revolution against
Porfirio Diaz, demanding liberty, justice and equality for
r
all Mexicanos.
Mexicanos on the Texas side of the Rio
Grande supported and sheltered the Garcistas.
As the
United States Army pursued Garza for using the American
side of the Rio as a base of operations, they violated the
civil rights of the local Mexicano population whom the
Army accused of supplying and hiding the Garcistas.
Garza
was never captured, but he eventually left the border in
frustration because he could not weaken Diaz's rule in
Mexico.
Nevertheless, Catarino Garza proved himself a
Mexicano social patriot because of his early opposition
52
. '^
- • '^
Giro R. de la Garza-Trevino, La Revolucion
Mexicana en el Estado de Tamaulipas, Vol. I (Mexico, D.F.:
Liberia de Manuel Porrua, S.A., 194 9), pp. 15-21; Pierce,
Texas' Last Frontier, p. 72.
36
to injustice and inequality imposed on Mexicanos on both
/ 53
sides of the Rio.
Less than ten years after the Garza fire had been
smothered, a second "cause celebre" involving a Mexicano
led to violence along the Mexico-Texas border.
Gregoria
Cortez refused to be intimidated and resisted the rule of
the Anglo-Texans in South Texas.
"con su pistola en la mano."
Matamoros in 1875.
He defended his rights
Gregorio Cortez was born in
His family moved in 1389 to Karnes
County, Texas, where they became small ranchers.
On
June 12, 1900, W. T. Morris, sheriff of Karnes County,
came to the Cortez ranch seeking a horse-thief who' "was a
medium-sized Mexican with a big red broad-brimmed Mexican
hat."
The sheriff did not speak Spanish and Gregorio did
not speak English.
Boone Choate accompanied the sheriff to
serve as an interpreter, but Choate knew very little
Spanish.
An argument ensued, probably because of the
poor communication, causing Sheriff Morris to draw his gun
and mortally wound Gregorio's younger brother, Romaldo.
Gregorio Cortez drew his pistol and fatally shot the
53
^
/
Garza-Trevino, Revolucion Mexicana en Tamaulipas,
pp. 241-243; Paredes, Cancionero, p. 29. Robert J. Deger,
Jr., "Dos Ejemplos de los Problemas Relatives a les Grupes
de Bondeleros y Agentes Policiacas en la 'Tierra de Nadie,'
1880-1910" (Unpublished manuscript located in Archive
Histerico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores,
Mexico, D.F., n.d.), pp. 10, 18, 22-23; de Leon, "White
Racial Attitudes," p. 263.
37
sheriff.
Cortez quickly fled, knowing what his fate would
be if apprehended by the Texas Rangers. ^"^
Near Gonzales, Texas, Cortez sought the assistance
of a friend, Martin Reblede.
His presence at the Rebledo
residence became known to Gonzales County Sheriff Richard
M. Glover and deputy Constable Henry Schnabel.
Cortez
killed both men in a gun battle when they came to arrest
him.
At this point the Anglo community in South Texas
launched a manhunt for Gregorio Cortez.
As a result many
innocent Mexicanos of the area faced abuse, terror, lynching and shooting for allegedly aiding Cortez to escape.
All Mexicans in Gonzales County were ordered disarmed.
In
all, nine Mexicanos were killed, three wounded and seven
arrested throughout South Texas for being part of a non55
existent "Cortez gang."
A group of twenty-two Mexicanos
from the Galveston, Texas area asked Presidente Diaz to
intervene on behalf of Mexicans being abused in Texas.
They reported that:
The authorities and residents of the said place,
as well as those of neighboring counties, taking
advantage of the excitement and thirst for revenge.
54
Paredes, Cancionero, p. 31; Paredes, With His
Pistol in His Hand, pp. 35, 40, 55, 59-62; Deger, "Tierra
de Nadie," p. 25.
^^Deger, "Tierra de Nadie," p. 26; Paredes, With
His Pistol in His Hand, pp. 84-86.
38
are committing horrid, unwarranted atrocities uoon
the peaceful Mexicans who reside in those areas',
abusing entire families v/ho are not party to any
of the unfortunate events.56
Mexican officials ordered consuls to investigate the situation.
Plutarco Ornelas, Mexican Consul at San Antonio,
confirmed the charges and reported that racial hatred lay
at the bottom of the American terrorist activities.
In the meantime, Gregorio Cortez headed for the
Rio Grande, chased by a posse that eventually numbered
between 800 to 1,000 men.
On June 22, 1901, officers
captured Cortez as he prepared to cross into Mexico near
Laredo.
Many Mexicanos of the Mexico-Texas region dashed
to their hero's defense.
During the flight to the border,
Mexicanos gave Cortez shelter and refused to cooperate
with law officials with his capture.
It was a Mexicano,
Jesus Gonzales, however, who revealed Cortez's whereabouts
to the authorities for the $1,000 reward which legend says
he never spent.
Mexicanos from all socioeconomic levels
rallied to Cortez's legal battle.
Societies organized to
raise money for the legal defense that people hoped or
wanted Cortez to put up.
Mexicanos saw their own despair
in the clash between Cortez and the Anglo-Texan law
officers.
Thus the struggle of Gregorio Cortez against
Deger, "Tierra de Nadie," p. 27.
39
oppression became the struggle of all Mexicanos in
57
Texas.
Jacinto Trevino also refused to be intimidated and
challenged los Rinches.
Mexicanos admired him for he sym-
bolized the politics of insurrection.
Jim Darwin, an
engineer for the San Benito Canal Company, mortally beat
Jacinto Trevino's younger brother, Natividad, after an
argument over whether or not the lad, who worked for
Darwin, could take the afternoon off.
Jacinto Trevino
learned of the incident at his rancho in Mexico and rushed
to see his dying brother.
Angered at what he saw and by
Darwin's reputation for beating helpless Mexicans who
worked for him, Jacinto plotted to kill the engineer.
May 28, 1910, he ambushed and killed Darwin.
On
Trevino then
fled to Monterrey to avoid the consequences of "Ranger
,
„58
law.
"
Sam Robertson, chief engineer for the San Benito
Canal Company, allegedly forced Hilario Trevino, a cousin
who had witnessed the killing of Darwin, to make a
^^Ibid., pp. 27-28, 32-33; Paredes, With His
Pistol in His Hand, pp. 48-49, 77-83, 88.
^^Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, p. 113; Maude T.
Gilliland, Horsebackers of the Brush Country (Brownsville:
Springman King Co., 1968), p. 74; "la Historia de Don
Jacinto Trevino," Magazm I (September 1973), pp. 15-16.
This article is written from an interview with Agapita
Trevino de Yanez, daughter of Jacinto Trevino. Brownsvill(
Daily Herald, 28 May, 2 August 1910; Texas v. Jacinto
Trevino, 3208 Cameron County, Texas.
40
statement accusing Jacinto of the crime.
When Jacinto
learned of the second indignity that a family member had
been forced to endure, he made it known that he planned
to get revenge on Sam Robertson. 59
On July 31, 1910, Jacinto crossed the Rio Grande
to avenge his cousin.
The local authorities with the help
of another cousin, Pablo Trevino, had planned to ambush
Jacinto as he rode into San Benito.
Jacinto became
alarmed, however, when he saw what appeared to be a light
ahead on the road.
Instead of the peace officers ambushing
Jacinto, the Mexican ambushed the officers, killing Texas
Ranger George Carnes and Deputy Sheriff Henry Lawrance, and
wounding Ranger Pat Craighead and Constable Early West.
It
was said of Jacinto Trevino, " . . . he was not afraid, his
hand did not shake, for he had a reason, they had killed
his brother."^^
Jacinto again fled to Mexico.
Local
officials asked Matamoros authorities to arrest Trevino.
Mexican officials agreed to search for the outlaw when and
if American officials filed the proper documentation with
61
the Mexican government.
A reign of terror befell Mexicanos as armed men
^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 1 August 1910, p. 1.
^°"La Historia de Jacinto Trevino," Magazin, p. 16.
^"^Brownsville Daily Herald, 1, 16 August 1910, p. 1;
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 30 August 1910,^RDS,
812.00/400; "Historia de Jacinto Trevino," Magazin, p. 1.
41
from a l l o v e r T e x a s h e a d e d for the V a l l e y .
came from a s far n o r t h as M a r f a , T e x a s .
Peace officers
Vigilante
groups
hunted d o w n M e x i c a n o s s u s p e c t e d of a i d i n g J a c i n t o T r e v i n o .
M e x i c a n o s r e c e i v e d b e a t i n g s as r a c e p r e j u d i c e
intensified.
Many A n g l o T e x a n s d e c i d e d to take a d v a n t a g e of c o n d i t i o n s
and u n d e r t o o k p e r s o n a l v e n g e a n c e on M e x i c a n s .
Rangers a g a i n led m a n y of t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s .
Texas
62
The M e x i c a n o s a l o n g the r i v e r v i e w e d the e n t i r e
affair w i t h b o t h fear and p r i d e — f e a r b e c a u s e the A n g l o
A m e r i c a n s y s t e m of r e s t o r i n g l a w and o r d e r could be d e a d l y ;
pride b e c a u s e o n e of t h e i r o w n kind had d e f e n d e d h i m s e l f
a g a i n s t the A n g l o o p p r e s s o r .
People perceived
Jacinto
Trevino "like an idol b e c a u s e h e fought for j u s t i c e . "
They did n o t see h i m a s a b a n d i t , b u t as a m a n w h o had
d e f e n d e d h i s b r o t h e r , a source of m u c h h o n o r w i t h i n the
Mexican family.
M e x i c a n o s s u p p o r t e d J a c i n t o T r e v i n o , hid
him and h e l p e d h i m to e s c a p e . "
In N o v e m b e r 1 9 1 0 , two k i l l i n g s in Rock S p r i n g s ,
Texas once again stirred Anglo American animosity
towards
M e x i c a n o s , a s w e l l a s a n t i - A m e r i c a n s e n t i m e n t s in M e x i c o .
F e a r s o f a M e x i c a n i n v a s i o n of T e x a s s u r f a c e d , as did p l a n s
of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e m e n t in T e x a s a g a i n s t the D i a z
^ ^ I b i d . , 1, 4 A u g u s t 1 9 1 0 , p . 1; E l l s w o r t h to
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , 30 A u g u s t 1 9 1 0 , R D S , 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 4 0 0 .
" H i s t o r i a de J a c i n t o T r e v i n o , " M a g a z i n ,
pp. 17, 23.
42
government.
On November 3, 1910, Mrs. Lem Henderson was
raped and killed at her ranch home near Rock Springs,
Texas.
The only witness to the crime, Mrs. Henderson's
little girl, told her father that "a Mexican shot mama."^^
Immediately the whole countryside became aroused and posses
scattered to hunt for a Mexican.
They captured Antonio
Rodriguez at the Jim Hunter ranch because he rode a horse
similar to the one ridden by the Mexican who killed Mrs.
Henderson.
Officers arrested Rodriguez and brought him to
the Rock Springs jail.
The same night a crowd stormed the
city jail and carried the Mexican half a mile out of town,
tied him to a mesquite, and set him afire.
to a crisp.
/
The body burned
A coroner's inquest stated that Antonio
65
Rodriguez had been burned to death by "unknown parties."
The deaths of Mrs. Henderson and Antonio Rodriguez
set off a wave of violence along the border.
As had been
the case in the past, Mexicanos faced indiscriminate persecution.
The Mexican Vice Consul at Eagle Pass, Texas,
requested that American authorities protect Mexican citizens living at Carrizo Springs, Texas, where a number of
64
San Antonio Express, 4 November 1910, p. 1;
"Mexican Hostility," The Literary Digest, 26 November
1910, pp. 965-966.
65
Frederick C. Turner, "Anti-Americanism in Mexico,
1910-1913," Hispanic American Historical Review 47 (1967),
pp. 504-505; Secretary of State to President, 11 November
1910, RDS, 812.00/358; Brownsville Daily Herald, 12 November 1910, p. 1; San Antonio Express, 4 November 1910, p. 1.
43
them had been clubbed by Anglo Texans on November 15. A
deputy United States Marshal from San Antonio came to the
area.
In Rock Springs cowboys and city residents armed
with rifles
and revolvers gathered to deal with any
Mexican outburst.
Texas authorities along the border feared that the
incident would cause an invasion by Mexicans who demanded
justice after several lawless acts in Texas.
In Del Rio,
Texas authorities heard rumors that a large band of
heavily armed Mexicans would cross the river to Rock
Springs to avenge the death of Antonio Rodriguez.
Governor
Thomas M. Campbell ordered all law officers in Edwards and
surrounding counties to Rock Springs.
A company of Texas
Rangers also moved to Edwards County.
Strict vigilance
all along the American and Mexican sides of the Rio prevented any Mexican invasion or an uprising in Texas.
Violence in the form of anti-American outbursts
occurred throughout Mexico as a result of the atrocious
act committed in Texas.
There were riots in Monterrey,
"Mexican Hostility," p. 965; Ellsworth to
Secretary of State, 15 November 1910, RDS, 812.00/435;
Brownsville Daily Herald,'15 November 1910, p. 5.
67
Gene Z. Hanrahan, Documents on the Mexican Revo'
lution. Vol. I, part 1 (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary
Publications, 1976), pp. 67-69; Mardee Wetter, "Revolutionary El Paso, 1917-1917" (M.A. thesis, Texas College
of Mines and Metallurgy, El Paso, Texas, 1946), p. 24;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 15 November 1910, p. 5; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 2 3 November 1910, RDS,
812.00/435.
44
Guadalajara and Mexico City.
S t u d e n t s , w o r k e r s , lower and
middle class Mexicans demonstrated
in t h e s t r e e t s in front
of A m e r i c a n C o n s u l a t e o f f i c e s , b u r n i n g A m e r i c a n f l a g s . ^ ^
In t h e i m m e d i a t e b o r d e r l a n d , the only
anti-American
v i o l e n c e o c c u r r e d i n C i u d a d P o r f i r i o Diaz o n N o v e m b e r 1 0 ,
1 9 1 0 , w h e n M e x i c a n s stoned the A m e r i c a n C o n s u l a t e
despite
a s s u r a n c e b y l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s to the A m e r i c a n C o n s u l ,
Luther T. E l l s w o r t h , t h a t n o c a u s e for c o n c e r n
Very l i t t l e d a m a g e o c c u r r e d .
existed.
O f f i c i a l s d i s m i s s e d the
w h o l e i n c i d e n t a s t h e a c t i o n s of a f e w d r u n k e n M e x i c a n s .
69
On the other hand, Matamoros, Tamaulipas, remained
r e l a t i v e l y q u i e t d u r i n g the o u t b r e a k of v i o l e n c e
from t h e l y n c h i n g o f A n t o n i o R o d r i g u e z .
or a c t s o f v i o l e n c e o c c u r r e d .
resulting
No d e m o n s t r a t i o n s
M a t a m o r o s a u t h o r i t i e s had
been w a r n e d to k e e p to a m i n i m u m a n y d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and to
protect American lives and property.
T h e r e a p p e a r e d to be
some a p p r e h e n s i o n , h o w e v e r , for a u t h o r i t i e s learned
that
68
Hanrahan, Documents of the Mexican Revolution,
Vol. 2, part 1, pp. 37-38; Turner, "Anti-Americanism in
Mexico," p. 505.
69
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 14 November
1910, RDS, 812.00/391; Dorothy Pierson Kerig, Luther T.
Ellsworth, U.S. Consul on the Border During the Mexican
Revolution, series in Southwestern Studies Monograph
No. 47 (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1975), p. 31.
45
many citizens suddenly began to purchase handguns.^^
Mexican newspapers published editorials aimed at
exciting public opinion and inciting the populace into
further acts of violence.
Americans in major Mexican
cities met insults and maltreatment.
shared the anti-American sentiment.
Rich and poor alike
It resulted from
"inherited antagonism, from resentment against American
feelings of superiority, and from dislike of the treatment
given to Mexican citizens in the United States." 71
Mexicans seemed to have found an outlet in the
Rodriguez case for their discontent with American treatment of Mexicanos along the border.
Antonio Rodriguez
The burning of
provided a spark that set off feelings
conceived much earlier.
The Rodriguez episode also influenced the brewing
revolutionary element in Mexico and along the border.
Francisco I. Madero had opposed Porfirio Diaz in the
general election in 1910 and afterwards fled from the
dictator's wrath.
Once in the United States, he began
plans to launch a revolution against the Mexican government
70
Jesse H. Johnson to Secretary of State,
21 November 1910, RDS, 812.00/501; Brownsville Daily
Herald, 22 November 1910, p. 1.
71
Turner, "Anti-Americanism in Mexico," pp. 502,
505-506; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1911 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, 1918), pp. 354-355.
46
from Texas on November 20, 1910.
Two weeks prior to the
Rodriguez incident, Madero's brother, Gustavo, had been
arrested in Mexico City for trying to influence army
generals to rebel against Diaz.
The Mexican government
advised the United States State Department on November 19,
1910, that bands of revolutionaries were being recruited
along the Texas-Mexico border.
The revolutionists used
the Rodriguez incident, according to the Mexican government,
to inflame the minds of the "ignorant classes" to join
their cause.
But, because of the explosive situation in
Mexico and the presence of large numbers of armed law
officers along the border, Madero was forced to postpone
his revolution. 72
The Rio Grande, acquired through war as a boundary
by the United States in 1848, continued to be the scene of
conflict into the twentieth century.
The United States
and Mexico had to deal with the problems of an unbalanced
trade market along the border; never ending smuggling
operations, especially stolen cattle; and growing incidents
of raiding on both sides of the river.
The United States
government committed the majority of its troops to the
72
Charles C. Cumberland, "Mexican Revolutionary
Movements from Texas, 1906-1912," The Southwestern Historical Quarterly 52 (January 1949), pp. 307-308; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 14 November 1910, RDS,
812.00/436; Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 358-359; Hanrahan
Documents on the Mexican Revolution, Vol. 1, part 1, pp.
51-52, 66.
47
frontier; the military, however, failed adequately to
control the unrest.
Most Mexican Americans on the frontier felt little
loyalty to the American government, whether local, state
or national.
These people perceived themselves as living
in an area of occupied Mexico.
had to look about them.
To prove this, they only
The Anglo American had forced the
Mexicanos into a lower socioeconomic level that bred oppression.
When permitted to attend school, they found them-
selves segregated, especially along the Lower Valley,
although not to the same extent north of Laredo.
regarded them as an inferior race.
Anglos
Furthermore, Mexicanos
lived in fear of violence from law officers, especially
Texas Rangers.
On the eve of the Revolution in Mexico, a group
of Mexicanos along the Rio Grande seemed to have conceived
a sense of resistance.
Catarino E. Garza, Gregorio Cortez,
and Jacinto Trevino resisted intimidation by the Anglo
American and demanded respeto (respect) for the iMexicano.
Though each engaged in violence, his peers viewed him as
a hero fighting for justice against the oppressive
structure of Anglo society and as a potential leader in a
movement to relieve their oppression.
The three Mexicanos
were precursors of a group of Mexicano social patriots who
under the influence of Mexican Revolutionary ideology
48
subsequently rose up in arms in Texas.
Atrocities like
the burning of Antonio Rodriguez helped to set in motion
the final forces that created the revolutionary element
in 1910 along the
Mexico-Texas borderland.
CHAPTER II
^lADERISMO AND THE MEXICO-TEXAS BORDER
As the first centennial of Mexico's independence
approached, the social and political situation on the
Texas side of the Rio Grande was ripe for turmoil.
South
of the Rio Grande, the social and political milieu also
evolved toward an explosive state.
The thirty-four year
rule of Don Porfirio Diaz neared an abrupt end which would
thrust Mexico into a bloody ten-year revolution.
On September 16, 1910, Mexico celebrated the
hundredth anniversary of el Grito de Dolores (Cry of
Dolores).
It was a grand occasion.
Don Porfirio, who
was completing his seventh term as president, stood less
than a month away (October 4) from embarking upon his
eighth term.
Diaz's despotic rule had met with little
resistance in its thirty-four years.
Many Mexicans desir-
ing to end three quarters of a century of turmoil gladly
traded their political and civil rights for stability.
Anita Brenner, The Wind That Swept Mexico, The
History of The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1942 (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1971), p. 29.
49
50
In 1910 Mexico appeared as a showcase to the world;
but most Mexicans found it a hellish place to inhabit.
The
economic condition of the Mexican lower class had not been
advanced by Diaz.
Mexico City was filled with beggars,
whose filthy rags crumbled and dropped off and who suffered from numerous illnesses—among them enteritis,
pneumonia, malaria and many varieties of veneral diseases.
Diaz distrusted people whom he did not know personally; for that reason, he appointed men of his generaf
tion to positions of authority.
Diaz inevitably surrounded
himself with a clique of self-interested men who considered
themselves the "trustees of the nation."
The so-called
Cientificos (Scientists) organized in 1892, were made up
of wealthy landowners, businessmen, and high government
officials who had decided that the most effective method
for securing the continuation of the progressive economic
system lay in their control of the national government,
as best as they
could during Diaz's life, but absolutely
after his death.
2
Dolores Butterfield, "The Situation in Mexico,"
The North American Review 5 (November 1912), p. 650; Luis
G. Zorrilla, Historia de las Relaciones entre Mexico y los
Estados Unidos de America (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Manuel
Porrua, S.A., 1966), p. 175; Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I.
Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1955), p. 28.
3Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution:
Genesis Under Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1952), pp. 8-10; Butterfield, "Situation in Mexico,"
51
In 1901 a new labor group, the Mexican Liberal
Party, met in San Luis Potosi and denounced the Diaz
administration's land reform program and the lack of
political freedom, free speech, and universal suffrage.
The group demanded an end to reelectionism.
The first
organized confrontation occurred during the April 2, 1903,
state election in Nuevo Leon.
A group who called them-
selves the Oppositionists demonstrated against the
reelection of Porfiristas.
They were ruthlesses suppressed
Two years later, the Oppositionists reorganized and again
opposed the continuation of Porfiristas in the Nuevo Leon
state government.
The Magonistas, as they came to be called, began
publishing a radical newspaper. La Regeneracion, which
charged that corrupt capitalistic societies were doomed
and that the Mexican proletariat had an obligation to help
in their demise.
The name of the paper suggested that
Mexico was embarking on a new era.
Through their paper,
the Magonistas attacked El Porfiriato (the Diaz regime)
and the economic system of the Cientificos.
Mexican
p. 650; Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 54.
4Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1911 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 348; Zorrilla, Mexico y los Estados
Unidos, p. 104.
52
officials hunted and jailed the militants, including
Ricardo Flores Magon in 1903.
Immediately after being
freed in 1904, Flores Magon joined other exiles in the
United States.
In September, 1905, Ricardo and his brother Enrique
Flores Magon reorganized the Mexican Liberal Party in St.
f
Louis, Missouri.
From their new headquarters the Magon
brothers planned to organize, aid, and coordinate revolutionary bands in Mexico to overthrow the Diaz regime.
The
Magonistas led or promoted the raids that occurred along
the frontier from 1906 through 1908.
Beginning in 1906 a series of labor disputes hit
Mexico's industrial sector fomenting severe unrest throughout the nation.
In Tampico, Tamaulipas, an important
petroleum area, Mexican workers made plans to drive foreign
workers out of their industry.
In Chihuahua and
Aguascalientes Mexican railroad workers went on strike
demanding pay equal to that of foreigners and opposing
the importation of foreigners—mostly Americans—to work
on and to operate the Mexican rail lines.
On June 1, 1906,
Mexican miners struck the Green Consolidated Mining Company
Lowell L. Blaisdell, The Desert Revolution: Baja
California, 1911 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1962), p. 5; Zorrilla, Mexico y los Estados Unidos, p. 104;
Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 117.
^Blaisdell, Desert Revolution, p. 5; Zorrilla,
Mexico y los Estados Unidos, p. 105.
53
located at Cananea, Sonora.
Similar strikes occurred in
Veracruz, Tlaxcala and Puebla."^
While the working class in Mexico demanded reforms
in the labor sector during 1906, the Magonista elements
became active along the Mexico-Texas frontier.
On Septem-
ber 26, 1906, a band of thirty heavily armed men crossed
from the United States and attacked the Mexican military
garrison at Jimenez, Coahuila.
The following month, a band
of revolutionists was arrested in El Paso as they prepared
I
8
to launch an attack on Ciudad Juarez.
By 1908 incidents of popular discontent intensified
in northern Mexico.
raids.
Rebel elements launched a number of
On June 19, 1908, twenty Mexicans were arrested
at Casas Grandes, Chihuahua for plotting to raid two stores
that housed large quantities of arms and ammunition.
Later
the same month, raiders robbed the post office, bank and
express office in Villa Viescas, Coahuila.
On June 30, a
band of Mexicans, organized and armed in Texas, attacked
9
Palomas.
7
Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, pp. 16-18;
Zorrilla, Mexico y los Estados Unidos, p. 109-111.
Zorrilla, Mexico y los Estados Unidos, p. 106;
Josefina E. de Fabela, Documentos Hist6ricos de la Revolucion Mexicana (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Us, 1966), pp.
40-41.
9
Paige W. Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco: Chihuahua
Rebel Episodes in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915," New
Mexican Historical Review 36 (April 1961), p. 98; Zorrilla,
Mexico y los Estados Unidos, p. 179.
54
The most significant act of rebellion occurred on
June 26, 1908, when a band of from forty to seventy-five
men, armed and organized on the Texas side of the Rio
Grande, launched a full scale military attack on the
Mexican border town of Las Vacas.
Among the raiders were
Mexican Americans who resided in Del Rio, Texas.
After a
two and a half hour battle, the rebels retreated across
the Texas line and assembled to attack a second time; but
a shortage of ammunition and the stepped up American surveillance deterred any new offensive against the Mexican
garrison.
An investigation by Mexican and American author-
ities showed clearly that the rebels had the unequivocal
sympathy and support of the Mexican lower class on both
t
sides of the Rio.
President Theodore Roosevelt ordered
troops to Del Rio to assist federal authorities in
enforcing the neutrality laws.
The activities of the Magon brothers ended with
their arrest in 1907 at Los Angeles, California on charges
of violating American neutrality laws by organizing an
armed rebellion against a friendly government.
Magonistas accomplished very little.
The
The group was not
Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco," p. 99; Dorothy
Piersen Kerig, Luther T. Ellsworth: U.S. Consul on the
Border During the Mexican Revolution, series in Southwestern Studies Monography No. 4 7 (El Paso: Texas Western
Press, 1975), p. 13-14, 19; Foreign Relations, 1911, p.
349; Fabela, DHRM, XI, pp. 84-95, 136-139; Zorrilla, Mexico
y los Estados Unidos, p. 178.
55
large enough to be of serious concern to Diaz.
It was at
best, only a thorn in Mexico's political stability.
At
most it created unrest not rebellion; however their efforts
served to stir up a more general unrest which, together
with the actions of another group, the Anti-reelectionists,
set the stage for the 1910 Mexican Revolution. •^"'"
Impetus for the earnest organization of opposition
groups came as a result of the Creelman Interview.
On
February 7, 1908, Porfirio Diaz granted an interview to
James Creelman, an American journalist for Pearson's Magazine.
In the interview Diaz stated that he would retire
at the end of his current term and that he did not plan to
support any attempt to reelect him because Mexicans now had
the capability of self-government by means of political
parties.
The Creelman interview provided the catalyst
that spurred the Madero Revolution and ended the Diaz
government in 1911.
The Anti-reelectionists party, which
took literally Diaz's statement that he would tolerate
opposition political parties, laid the groundwork for
Francisco I. Madero.
On October 8, 1908, Madero published
the first edition of a book. La Sucesion Presidencial de
1910 (The Presidential Succession of 1910), in which he
Zorrilla, Mexico y los Estados Unidos, pp. 106197; Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco," p, 99; Blaisdell,
Desert Revolution, p. 7; Cline, United States and Mexico,
p. 117.
56
reviewed the state of affairs in Mexico and called on
Mexicans to establish political parties to prepare Mexico
for the 1910 presidential election. "^^ iMadero organized the
Anti-reelectionists party and prepared for the 1910 election
as the means to change Mexican politics.
The national con-
vention of the Anti-reelectionists convened on April 15,
1910 in Mexico City where delegates assembled and named
Madero its presidential candidate.
It adopted a platform
that called for numerous reforms in education, labor, and
land, as well as a return to the Constitution of 1857."''^
The presidential election was set for June 26,
1910.
Thus Madero campaigned from April to June.
On June 16
in the midst of his campaign, government officials arrested
Madero in Monterrey and charged him with trying to incite a
riot with his rhetoric.
The government transferred Madero
to a prison in San Luis Potosi on June 21, 1910. While he
remained in prison, Diaz won overwhelming reelection in
the popular voting. 14
12
Ross, Madero, pp. 46-47, 57-58; Cline, United
States and Mexico, p. 115; Zorrilla, Mexico y los Estados
Unidos, p. 107, 109; Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 348;
Butterfield, "Situation in Mexico," pp. 651-652; William
H. Beezley, Insurgent Governor: Abraham Gonzalez and the
Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1973), p. 19.
13
Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 120; Beezley,
Insurgent Governor, pp. 29-30; Ross, Madero, pp. 95-96.
14
Florence C and Robert Lister, Chihuahua:
Storehouse of Storms (Albuquerque: University of New
57
Madero escaped from San Luis Potosi on October 5,
1910; two days later he crossed from Nuevo Laredo to
Laredo, Texas, with San Antonio as his destination.
Mexicans along the border and in San Antonio enthusiastically received him.
For fear of violating American
neutrality laws and in order to protect supporters still
in Mexico, Madero denied any intentions of organizing a
revolution in Texas. 15
Despite his public announcements, however, he
secretly prepared the financial, military and ideological
foundation for a revolution against Diaz.
Members of the
Anti-reelection Party Executive Committee joined Madero in
San Antonio within a few days.
For a month the Maderistas in Texas worked on their
revolutionary program, which they made public under the
auspices of El Plan de San Luis Potosi.
They dated the
plan October 5, 1910, the last day Madero was in Mexico,
to avoid any American repercussions.
It declared null and
void the 1910 elections, proclaimed Madero as the provisional president, promised to hold new elections as soon
Mexico Press, 1966), p. 107; Foreign Relations, 1911, p.
350; Butterfield, "Situation in Mexico," p. 654-655;
Laredo Weekly Times, 19 June 1910, p. 8.
Cline, United States and Mexico, pp. 120-121;
Ross, Madero, pp. 109-114; Beezley, Insurgent Governor,
p. 34; Lister, Chihuahua, p. 211; Foreign Relations, 1911,
pp. 350-351; Laredo Weekly Times, 9 October 1910, p. 2;
Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 82-84.
58
as the insurgents controlled at least half of the states;
and prohibited the reelection of government officials.
Finally, it designated November 20, 1910, as the day for
Mexican people to rise in rebellion against the illegitit
•) r
mate government of Porfirio Diaz.
Madero prepared to return to Mexico late in 1910,
but postposed returning until early in 1911.
As provi-
sional president, however, he named temporary governors of
the states where rebel forces operated.
In mid-February
he crossed into Mexico southeast of El Paso
and took com-
mand of the revolutionary forces in Chihuahua.
His military
strategy included control of small towns in the state, to
force federal forces to spread thin into a small, ineffective army. At the same time, Madero moved to isolate
'
.
.
17
Ciudad Juarez from Ciudad Chihuahua.
Although the November 20, 1910, revolution failed
to materialize, insurgents began a policy of harassment
and in some instances challenged federal forces throughout
Mexico, especially along the Rio Grande border.
Unsuc-
cessful revolutionary activities broke out in Zacatecas,
Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 121;
Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, p. 121-122; Ross,
Madero, p. 114; Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 352.
17
Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, pp. 121-122,
129-131.
59
/
TO
Gomez-Palacios, Oaxaca, Puebla, Guerrero and Sonora.
On the Mexico-Texas border rebels threatened
Ojinaga twice, once in November and again in December.
General Abraham Gonzalez crossed the Rio Grande from Texas
on November 20 with twenty-eight men to launch an assault
on the federal garrison in Ojinaga.
He had expected 300
revolutionists to be waiting for him, but they were not.
Gonzalez resorted to harassing federals in Ojinaga.
In
mid-December a Maderista force again threatened the Mexican
border town.
Fearing the rebel attack at Ojinaga, General
Alberto Dorantes drafted all able men to defend the city.
This action forced much of the civilian population of
Ojinaga to seek refuge in Presidio.
The battle failed to
materialize, however, as the rebels only attacked a federal
column fourteen miles south of the city near the Venegas
Rancho.
Maderistas attacked el Mulato the following
week.
18
Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, p. 125;
Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco," p. 97; Fabela, DHRM,
V, pp. 216-217.
•'•^Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 127-128; X, p. 107;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 5, 12 December 1910, p. 1; U.S.
Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, Secretary of State to Secretary of War, 31 December 1910, ^DS, 811.00/589; Ellsworth
to Secretary of State, 15 December 1910, RDS, 812.00/582;
Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 377, 385-386; Beezley,
Insurgent Governor, pp. 41-4 3; Michael Dennis Carman,
United States Customs and the Madero Revolution (El Paso:
Texas Western Press, 1976), p. 22.
60
At the end of December 1910, revolutionary leaders
such as Pasqual Orozco, Francisco Villa and others had
recruited into their armies ranchers, smugglers, drifters
and patriots.
But the success of their endeavor remained
temporary, for they failed to consolidate their victories.
The constant shortages of arms, ammunition and food forced
them to relinquish several victories. 20
By February, 1911 the rebels had decided on Ciudad
Juarez as the target of their first major offensive.
Federal troops in Ciudad Juarez fortified their post and
mined the streets.
In the meantime General Juan Navarro
eluded rebel positions and with 1,000 men reinforced the
.^ 21
city.
While Madero moved against Juarez, negotiations
with the Diaz government had begun in New York.
Francisco
Vazquez Gomez, representing Madero met with Diaz's Finance
Minister, Jose Ives Limantour.
Diaz failed to recognize
the gravity of the situation and refused to negotiate
seriously.
On the military front, Diaz failed to launch
a cohesive military campaign against Madero in Chihuahua
and other rebel forces elsewhere.
On May 25, 1911, after
Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 121;
Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco," p. 101; Brownsville
Daily Herald, 9 January 1911, p. 1.
^-^Brownsville Daily Herald, 2 February 1911, p. 1;
"Mexico's Revolutionists," The Independent, 9 February
1911, p. 281.
61
Ciudad Juarez fell to the Maderistas, Diaz agreed to
resign and turn the government over to an interim president, Francisco de la Barra.
The next day Porfirio Diaz
left Mexico City for Veracruz, to join hundreds of
Cientificos on their way to exile in Europe.
By May, 1911
government forces controlled only state capitals and a few
principal cities.
Maderistas were moving against federal
garrisons throughout the republic.^^
The Madero Revolution could not have begun or succeeded were it not for the activities that took place
along the river frontier.
Rebels operated and received
ammunition and guns as well as sympathy and support from
Americans.
The frontier became tense by late October 1910
as word of wholesale rebel activity spread like wildfire.
Mexican officials claimed they had documents implicating
Madero in the fomenting of an armed revolt from the United
States.
Mexico requested that the revolutionists be
arrested.
The United States responded that Madero could
not be arrested for merely purchasing arms.
Army officials
in Texas argued that Mexican officials exaggerated condi/
tions along the Rio Grande to draw attention to the border
22
Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 19141915; The Convention of Aguascalientes (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 4; Ross, Madero, p. 166;
Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 486-494; Fabela, DHRM, V,
pp. 358, 400-402; Brownsville Daily Herald, 27 May 1911,
p. 1.
62
with the United States in order to cover the domestic
23
problems facing Mexico.
Officials in Eagle Pass expected Madero to cross
/
near the city to launch his revolt against Diaz on November
19, 1910.
In fact, Madero crossed into Mexico on November
20 near Ciudad Porfirio Diaz.
He had expected three to
four hundred men to meet him, but only ten appeared.
Disappointed, he returned to San Antonio, Texas.
Eagle
Pass officials showed concern over the situation in their
city, as a number of Mexicanos held meetings and discussed
the brutality of the Diaz regime.
As a result, city offi-
cials and the American consul at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz
requested federal agents and array troops to protect the
border. On November 22, mounted guards found a rebel
24
camp fifty miles below Eagle Pass.
During November rumors spread that Mexicans in
Del Rio Were holding meetings and organizing an assault
on Las Vacas.
Many idle Mexicanos remained in the Del Rio
area after the cotton season ended.
Later in November
Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 365; Charles C
Cumberland, "Mexican Revolutionary Movements from Texas,
1906-1912," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 52 (April
1949), pp. 308-309; Fowler to Adee, 19 November 1910,
RDS, 812.00/427.
Ross, Madero, pp. 125-127; Herrera, Cuando Villa,
pp. 261-262; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 12 November
1910, RDS, 812.00/412; 22 November 1910, RDS, 812.00/469;
Carman, United States Custom, p. 33.
63
officials in Del Rio found evidence that a group of men
had camped near Eagle Pass but apparently had crossed
into Mexico.
Del Rio officials also learned that fifteen
Mexicans had left St. Louis, Missouri for the border to
join a band of rebels. 25
Rebels engaged in only minor activities along the
American side of the Rio Grande.
Late in December, reports
placed four hundred rebels near Marfa, Texas.
Allegedly,
the rebels had crossed after engaging federales near
Mulato.
Yet custom inspectors who went to the area found
no evidence of any crossing.
In December the Mexican gov-
ernment again requested the arrest of Madero for having
had the Plan de San Luis Potosi printed in the United
States.
With the advent of 1911, events on the American
side had an increasing influence on the course of Mexican
history.
Rumors spread that armed Mexicans were recruiting
and acquiring supplies along the Lower Rio Grande Valley.
At about the same time twenty-five mounted Mexicans
appeared near Mercedes, Texas.
Earlier seven of the
group had been seen trying to enter a local hardware store.
25
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 11 September
1910, RDS, 812.00/416; 22 November 1910, RDS, 812.00/491;
Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 366.
26
Laredo Weekly Times, 23 December 1910, p. 1;
Francisco de la Barra to Secretary of State, 10 December
1910, RDS, 812.00/559; 31 December 1910, RDS, 812.00/616.
64
United States Marshal C
G. Brewster arrived in Brownsville
on January 31, 1911 to investigate rumors that Mexican
revolutionists were receiving aid from Valley residents.
Troops from Fort Sam Houston also reached Brownsville late
in the month to patrol the river. 27
Up the river stories circulated about revolutionists
gathering men.
A squad of troops went from Fort Mcintosh
to the coal mines of Minera to guard the river.
Alonzo B.
Garrett, American consul in Nuevo Laredo, reported on
January 31, 1911 that Mexican revolutionists were offering
$60 to anyone who enlisted in their army.
In Eagle Pass a
group of men apparently expected to cross to Ciudad Porfirio
Diaz in mid-January and challenge the federal garrison.
A
week later Marshal M. A. Houchin found evidence that,
indeed, a crossing of the river had been made three miles
28
from Eagle Pass.
Mexican consul Leon Gomez reported in mid-January
that rebels openly recruited in Del Rio and led raids into
Mexico.
According to him, jobless Mexicans in Del Rio
loitered in the streets reading subversive rebel
^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 25, 27, 31 January
1911, p. 1.
^^Laredo Weekly Times, 1 January 1911,
M. E. Diebold to Captain Charles B. Hagadon, 9
1911, RDS, 812.00/652; Garrett to Secretary of
31 January 1911, RDS^, 812.00/748; Ellsworth to
of State, 16 January 1911, RDS, 812.00/659; 24
1911, RDS, 812.00/688.
p. 1;
January
State,
Secretary
January
65
propaganda.
The majority of the Mexicans sympathized with
the rebel cause.
Gomez charged most city officials were
also sympathetic to the rebels.
Mexican forces across the Rio Grande remained insufficient to patrol the river adequately.
Deputy Customs
Collector Luke Dowe located a rebel camp of fifteen men
near Comstock, Texas.
He found several boxes of ammunition
and a trail that showed the rebels had crossed the river to
29
Mexico.
The Big Bend area experienced frequent rebel
activity in January.
Mexican rebels reportedly recruited
Mexican Americans in the Alpine and Sanderson areas. As
many as sixty men may have crossed into Mexico and later
returned to their homes in the United States.
Late in the
month several bands of Maderistas invaded the Big Bend to
raid stores and plunder ranches of money, food, arms and
ammunition.
Insurgents, believed to be Maderistas driven
out of Mexico by a strong federal force, also appeared
near Valentine and Marfa.
During the battle of Ojinaga, a large number of
OQ
Fabela, DHRM, V, p. 162; Ellsworth to Secretary
of the Treasury, 18 January 1911, RDS, 812.00/664.
"^^Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 180-181; Ellsworth to
Secretary of State, 13 January 1911, RDS, 812.00/645;
24 January 1911, RDS, 812.00/657; 27 January 1911, RDS,
312.00/669; Laredo Weekly Times, 29 January 1911, p. 7;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 31 January 1911, p. 1.
66
women, children and other non-combatants sought shelter at
Presidio, Texas.
Other Mexicans took refuge at Terlingua
and Boquillas where they lived in cold open camps without
food.
President William H. Taft sent troops to the Big
Bend to contain the situation. ^"^
Ricardo Flores Magon had agents in El Paso who by
the end of January had recruited four hundred men.
Numer-
ous reports of rebels crossing to and from Mexico near
El Paso kept American authorities busy.
When confronted
by the Mexican consul about the many crossings, the U.S.
Marshal in El Paso angrily replied that his agents could
not be at all places at the same time.
Rebel elements
watched his agents and conducted their activities in loca32
tions away from where officials were checking.
On the eve of Madero's reentry to Mexico, rebel
activity seemed to have increased.
River crossing and
recruiting occurred all along the river during February,
1911.
On February 15, 1911 United States authorities
arrested six Mexicans in Brownsville on charges of violating the neutrality laws by recruiting men for Madero's
army.
Mexican consul Dr. Manuel Barragan accused them
of meeting with recruits in Cameron, Hidalgo and Starr
31
Laredo Weekly Times, 29 January 1911, p. 1;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 30 January 1911, p. 1.
•^^Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 116, 174-175; X, pp. 111112.
67
counties to plan an attack on Matamoros.
A band of four
hundred Mexicans was reported to be gathering near Mission,
Texas, for an attack on either Matamoros or Reynosa late
in February.
But with the arrest in Brownsville of its
leader, Higenio Tanguma, who had come to the city from
Mexico, the plot collapsed. 33 Reports of rebel activity
from Del Rio, Carrizo Springs, Uvalde, Roma, Rio Grande
City and Marfa led to estimates of four thousand rebels
from the Lower Rio Grande to the Big Bend.
President Taft
responded by ordering more troops to the border early in
February.
After learning that American officials had issued
a warrant for his arrest in mid-February, Madero decided
to cross into Mexico near Ciudad Juarez.
By March Madero
moved to consolidate his forces in Chihuahua.
Diaz, fear-
ful that the rebels would try to capture the state capital,
concentrated federal forces in the city, leaving Ciudad
Juarez vulnerable.
Madero quickly capitalized on Diaz's
35
decision and moved to attack the border town.
•^'^Brownsville Daily Herald, 15, 20, 21 February
1911, p. 1.
•^^Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 220-222; Laredo Weekly Times,
29 January 1911, p. 9; Secretary of War to Secretary of
State, 6 February 1911, RDS, 812.00/754.
"^^ Cumber land. Genesis Under Madero, pp. 128-129,
137; Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 233-234; Cumberland, "Revolutionary Movements," p. 313; Beezley, Insurgent Governor,
p. 53; Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 410, 414; Christiansen,
68
While Madero pondered his military strategy, rebel
forces continued their activities in northern Mexico.
From
Chihuahua to Sonora, insurrectionists attacked numerous
federal posts and recruited several hundred more campesinos.
In late March the federal garrison at Las Vacas began to
barricade its defenses when rumors spread that a rebel force
from Zacatecas was approaching the city.
In March J. H. Johnson, the American consul in
Matamoros, summed up the situation along the border.
I must say that, while the people here are trying to
make the best of the troubles now existing throughout
the Republic. Yet they are intensely excited, and
great fears are expressed on all sides that things
are likely to grow more serious soon. While there
has been no hostile demonstrations here as yet, no
one knows how soon there may be. The revolutionary
forces are getting most of their recruits from our
Country, and it is firmly believed that they are growing stronger daily. In my opinion the Texas Border
cannot be too strongly guarded, taking in consideration
the meanders of the river, the distance from the mouth
of the river all the way up, to guard it properly,
twenty thousand troops would not be too many. If our
Country would place a guard of that kind on the Border
at once, it would in my opinion have a very beneficial
influence upon those on the Texas side who are so
anxious for a fight, no one can again say that the
"Pascual Orozco," p. 104; "The War to Date," The American
Review of Reviews, April 1911, p. 408; Ross, Madero, pp.
135-136, 143-151; Carman,^United States Customs, p. 59;
Giro R. de la Garza Trevino, La Revolucion Mexicana en el
Estado de Tamaulipas, Tomo I (Mexico, D.F.: Libreria de
Manuel Porrua, S.A., 1973), p. 58.
36
"The War to Date," The American Review of
Reviews, April 1911, p. 408; Brownsville Daily Herald,
23, 25, 27 March 1911, p. 1; J. H. Johnson, to Secretary
of State, 21 March 1911, RDS, 312.00/4241.
69
situation in Mexico is not only serious, but alarming.
It has been said that the immediate danger is in the
Mexican Army. I have been informed that a majority of
the Soldiers are conscripts—most of whom sympathize
with the Revolutionists, and of course they had sooner
assist them than not, and might be induced to desert
at any time. If such a contingency should arise, there
would be no hope for the Government. The greatest
drawback to the success of the Rebels is, that they
have no prominent leader. It may be that I have expressed my opinion too freely. If I have, I am very
sorry, but from all the information that I have been
able to obtain, I have outlined the true situation.^^
Diaz could not develop a strong military response
to the Maderistas.
The federal army lacked cohesion,
unity and discipline.
The deteriorating military situa-
tion in Chihuahua forced Diaz to evaluate his attitudes
in Mexico City.
resigned.
On March 24, 1911, most of his cabinet
Diaz attempted to appease the revolutionary
elements who found most cabinet members unacceptable
because of their Cientifico ties.
A week later Diaz asked
congress for a number of reforms including judiciary and
land reforms.
Madero, not impressed, demanded that the
38
President resign.
In April revolutionists continued to raid in
northern Mexico taking horses, food, and other supplies
37
Johnson to Secretary of State, 21 March 1911,
RDS, 812.00/4241.
OQ
Ross, Madero, p. 134; Cumberland, Genesis Under
Madero, p. 136; Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 444; "His
Message to Congress," and "Change of Cabinet in Mexico,"
The American Review of Reviews, May 1911, p. 535; Brownsville Daily Herald, 25 March 1911, p. 1.
70
for their army.
Rebel forces captured the six hundred man
garrison at Ojinaga in mid-April.
Mexican authorities in-
formed American officials that General H. Tanguma would
not be returned to the United States to stand trial on
charges of violating American neutrality laws.
On April 26,
the government arrested two prominent men in Matamoros, the
editor of El Matamorense, Pedro Barreda, and Anarcasis Lara
on charges of recruiting for the Maderistas.
To meet the
growing rebel activity in Matamoros, military authorities
39
began to recruit volunteers at $45 a month.
As the revolutionary army prepared to launch the
final blow against the Diaz government at Ciudad Juarez,
rebel activity persisted elsewhere along the border.
When
rumors spread wildly late in May that Matamoros would face
a rebel attack, both Mexican and American authorities increased their guard.
Tensions ran high in Nuevo Laredo
as a four hundred man rebel force approached the city in
mid-May.
The federal commander in the city pledged to
defend the town with his one hundred-eighty man garrison,
but no attack came.
Further up the river in Ojinaga the
situation became more tense.
On May 3, the rebels aban-
doned Ojinaga after controlling it for over two weeks.
T. W. Doelten to Secretary of State, 3 April
1911, RDS, 812.00/1281; Carman, United States Customs,
p. 63; Brownsville Daily Herald, 6, 18, 28 April 1911,
p. 1. The charges could not be proved and the men were
later released.
A
71
few weeks later the federales also abandoned the city and
moved to Chihuahua.
The rebels retook the city.
While the revolution was coming to a close in
Mexico, rebel activity increased along the American side
of the border forcing President Taft to take strong action
Revolutionaries established councils in all border cities.
The councils supplied the rebels and with recruits, guns,
ammunition and food.
Without the aid of border residents,
41
Madero would not have succeeded.
The frontier line in the Big Bend sector probably
became the most active in this phase of the rebellion.
On
numerous occasions residents in the area reported border
crossings by heavily armed men.
Cavalry troopers detained
a number of suspects, most of whom were insurgents.
As
there was no hard evidence to prove the men were involved
in military expeditions, most were released.
Some were
tried for violating the neutrality laws since they were
caught conveying arms and other war supplies illegally
^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 2, 17, 25 May 1911,
p. 1; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 11 May 1911, RDS,
812.00/1779; A. F. Williams, U.S. Army to Adjutant General,
9 May 1911, RDS, 812.00/2034.
^"'•Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 10 March 1911,
RDS, 812.00/951; Eric Tanner, "The Texas Border and the
Mexican Revolution" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Texas Tech
University, 1970), p. 16; "The Movement Towards Mexico,"
The Independent, 16 March 1911, p. 579.
72
• 4. Mexico.
X4
•
42
into
There appears to have been some outlawry during
the confusion.
Late in March, two Texas Ranger companies
were ordered to Chisos in Brewster County to suppress
Mexican outlaws who were roaming the area plundering
farmers and ranchers.
The outlaws announced themselves
as rebels in grave need of horses, cattle, food and money.
43
American authorities in El Paso became concerned
in late April as an attack on Juarez became imminent.
On
February 21 hostile demonstrators marched in front of the
Mexican consul office chanting, "'Abajo Diaz!
/
44
("Down with Diazl
Long live Madero!").
IViva Madero!"
Marshal Eugene
Nolte observed late in April that 90 percent of the citizens in El Paso were "avowed declarants of their sympathy
45
for the revolutionary movement. . . . "
Mexican officials charged that American authorities
in Del Rio sympathized with the rebels and contributed to
the unrest of the area across the river.
American officials
Acting Secretary of War to Secretary of State,
11 March 1911, RDS, 312.00/928; Ellsworth to Secretary of
State, 12 March 1911, RDS, 812.00/970; 21 March 1911, RDS,
812.00/1072; 25 March 1911, RD£, 812.00/1128.
^^"Course of the Insurrection," The Independent,
30 March 1911, p. 636; Laredo Weekly Times, 21 March 1911,
p. 9.
"^^Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 260-261.
^^Eugene Nolte to Attorney General, 25 April 1911,
RDS, 312.00/1543.
73
responded that Mexicans allowed the passage of contraband
of war including horses, arms, ammunition and men.^^
Rebel activity had spread to the South Texas area
by May.
On May 3, 1911 Alberto Leal, Mexican consul at
Rio Grande City, alerted Camargo officials to a rumor that
a Maderista junta from Falfurrias, Texas, planned to cross
the frontier with one hundred rifles and twenty thousand
rounds of ammunition.
also surfaced.
Rumors of an attack on Matamoros
Quick federal deployment of troops to the
border apparently stopped the attack.
A few miles below
Laredo, revolutionists transported a large number of arms
and ammunition.
Ciudad Juarez became the primary objective of the
rebel forces.
On April 18, 1911, Orozco and Madero sur-
rounded the city and demanded its surrender.
General Juan
Navarro refused, but in order to avoid any firing into
El Paso, Madero agents and representatives of the Diaz
regime agreed on an armistice on April 20, 1911.
In the
discussions Madero demanded that Diaz and Vice-president
Ramon Corral resign immediately.
Diaz agreed to allow
^^Fabela, DHRM, V> pp. 298-300.
^^Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 470; Garza-Trevino,
Revolucion en Tamaulipas, pp. 63-64; Brownsville Daily
Herald, 27 May 1911, p. 1; Garrett to Secretary of State,
7 May 1911, RDS, 312.00/1649.
74
Corral to resign, but he would not step down."^^
On May 6, negotiations broke down and the armistice
ended.
Yet, Madero did not want to engage Navarro mili-
tarily for fear of American intervention.
On May 3, 1911,
a group of soldiers from Orozco's ranks met and opened
fire on a group of federales near the river.
Madero
quickly ordered a cease-fire; rebel officers, however, did
not obey him.
Seeing the futility of implementing a cease-
fire, Madero ordered a full scale attack on Ciudad Juarez.
The fighting lasted for two days.
General Navarro sur-
rendered the city on May 10, 1911. Francisco Madero now
controlled a major port of entry and had dealt Diaz a
fatal blow. 49
During the fighting the American consul in Juarez
gave sanctuary to a number
of city officials.
The State
Department became concerned with the actions of Consul
Thomas Edwards, suggesting that he had acted partially
when the United States government was an impartial spectator
Laredo Weekly Times, 16, 20, 23 April 1911, p. 1;
Thomas Edwards to Secretary of State, 17 April 1911, RDS,
812.00/1364; Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, p. 139;
Beezley, Insurgent Governor, pp. 63-65; Christiansen,
"Pascual Orozco," p. 106.'
49
Rafael Trujillo Herrera, Cuando Villa Entro en
Columbus (Mexico, D.F.: Libreria de Manuel Porrua, S.A.,
1973), p. 272; Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 387-383; Ross, Madero,
p. 165; Tanner, "The Texas Border," p. 16; "The Fall of
Juarez," The Outlook, 20 May 1911, pp. 85-86; Steever to
Adjutant General, 3 May 1911, RDS, 312.00/1364.
75
of the conflict in Mexico.
General Juan Navarro was allowed
by Madero to seek asylum in El Paso.
Pascual Orozco and
other rebel leaders protested angrily at Madero's decision.
They demanded that Navarro be tried for the murder of a
number of rebels who the federal general ordered executed
at Cerro Prieto earlier in the year.
Since rebel forces launched their movement in the
north, the border seethed with revolutionary intrigue.
Mexican Americans sympathized with rebels living along
the Rio Grande who received supplies, money and support
from the people along the border.
On February 11, 1911,
Texas Governor 0. B. Colquitt asked Texans to refrain from
"encouraging, aiding, abetting, or participating in the
violation of the neutrality laws. . . . "
But the proclama-
tion had very little effect, as support continued for the
Madero movement.
Troops patrolled the border from Brownsville to
Eagle Pass during the crisis.
They helped officials
50
^
Secretary of State to Edwards (Juarez), 22 June
1911, RDS, 312.00/1864; Ross, Madero, p. 107; Fabela,
DHRM, V, p. 335.
Beezley, Insurgent Governor, pp. 56-57; Berta
Ulloa Ortiz, "Carranza y el Armamento Norteamericano,"
Historia Mexicana 17 (Octubre-Diciembre, 1967), p. 253;
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 5 December 1910, RDS,
312.00/547; Villegas, Historia Moderna, pp. 187-188;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 13 February 1911; Charles H.
Harris and Louis R. Sadler, "The 1911 Reyes Conspiracy:
The Texas Side," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 8 3
(April 1980), p. 328.
76
enforce neutrality statutes and check reports of Mexicans
meeting in large groups.
Troops also went to the Del Rio
sector to prevent the crossing of refugees.
Governor
Colquitt ordered Texas Rangers to Carrizo Springs because
city officials feared an attack from armed Mexicans.^^
The last time that the United States had massed
troops along its border with Mexico in 18 65 the government
of Maximilian had capitulated to rebel forces.
On March 6,
1911 President Taft ordered 20,000 troops to the United
States-Mexican border.
Officially, the troops massed
along the border for an overdue military maneuver to test
the army's ability to respond to a crisis.
In reality the
American government felt concern over the political instability in Mexico and the threat it presented to American
lives and property both in the Mexican interior and along
the border.
The United States, therefore, wished to de-
escalate the fighting in Mexico by stopping military
expeditions from using American soil as a point of
departure.
American officials also wanted to stop the
52
Richard Marcum, "Fort Brown, Texas: The History
of a Border Post" (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University, 1964), p. 234; Brownsville Daily Herald, 22, 23 November 1910; 4 February 1911, p. 1; Ellsworth to Secretary
of State, 19 November 1910, RDS, 312.00/389; 14 November
1910, RDS, 812.00/417; Commanding General Dept. of Texas
to Secretary of War, 21 November 1910, RDS, 812.00/436;
Adjutant General of the Army to Secretary of State,
24 November 1910, RDS, 812.00/454; Capt. C B. Hagadon to
Adjutant General of the Army, 23 November 1910, RDS,
312.00/506.
77
flow of supplies to the rebels.
President Taft assured
/
President Diaz that the maneuvers should cause no concern
53
to the government of Mexico.
American officials expressed concern about what
effect the presence of numerous troops would have on the
Mexican American residents of Texas.
President Taft feared
that a "collision" could occur between the troops and the
"Mexicans who lived in Texas near the border and who sympathized with the insurrectors, and the Federal (government)
soldiers."
Citizens along the border felt apprehensive about
the presence of troops.
They directed their concern, how-
ever, at the Diaz government.
The trouble could be con-
trolled if the Mexican government would also patrol the
border, rather than leaving that task to the Americans.
53
Brownsville Daily Herald, 11 March 1911, p. 1;
Laredo Weekly Times, 12 March 1911, p. 5; Harold Eugene
Holcombe, "United States Arms Control and the Mexican
Revolution, 1910-1924" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Alabama, 1963) , p. 19; "The War Game on the Mexican Border," The Literary Digest, 13 March 1911, pp. 497-499;
"The United States and Mexico," The Outlook, 18 March 1911,
p. 565; "Mexico and the United States," The Outlook,
25 March 1911, p. 613; "Protecting the American Border,"
The Outlook, 29 March 1911, p. 954; "Purpose of Our
Government Explained," The Independent, 30 March 1911,
p. 636; Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 415, 422; U.S.
Department of State, Political Relations Between the
United States and Mexico, 1910-1929, H. L. Wilson to
Secretary of State, 29 April 1911, RD£, 711.12/18.
^^Taft to Wood, 15 March 1911, RDS, 312.00/963A.
78
Troops had to patrol the border because Diaz could not do
55
so.
Military maneuvers continued through the summer.
Early in August, 1911 the United States scattered its
troops and sent most of them home.
patrol assignments.
Others received border
The United States Army had its hands
full guarding the border.
Troops could not cross into
Mexico under any circumstances.
During a number of battles
in border Mexican cities, American troops placed at crossing
points tried to stop the illegal entry of rebels and
federales.
The United States troops also had the difficult
task of keeping American spectators, who hurried to river
points to view the fighting, from getting hurt.
American
military officials made it a point on several occasions to
inform their counterparts across the river that the presence
of large numbers of American troops on the river did not
constitute an imminent invasion of Mexican territory.
To the disappointment of the Mexican government a
large arms and ammunition trade flourished along the border.
Early in November 1911, Mexican authorities charged that
Maderistas in San Antonio
were in possession of a large
^^Laredo Weekly Times, 19 March 1911, p. 7.
Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 335, 482; Brownsville Daily Herald, 13 May 1911, p. 1; "Mexico's Insurrection," The American Review of Reviews, March 1911, p. 283;
Thomas F. Burdett, "Mobilization of 1911 and 1913,"
Military Review 54 (July 1974), p. 68.
79
cache of arms.
They requested that the United States
government look for possible violations of neutrality
statutes.
Custom officials began to check rumors of guns
and ammunition being transferred all along the border.
came to the attention
It
of American officials that many
Mexicans had bought 30-30 Winchesters.
But they could
not ascertain if the rifles were for hunting or other purposes.
American officials who traversed the length of the
border could not substantiate charges of illegal gun shipments into Mexico.
The transference of arms and war munitions created
constant irritation between the two governments.
numbers of guns were shipped to border retailers.
Large
From
March to May American officials monitored and in some
instances confiscated rifles and other munitions from
58
Brownsville to El Paso.
Mexican officials became desperate when Madero
Villegas, Historia Moderna, pp. 370-371; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 25 August 1910, RDS, 812.00/
398; 1 November 1910; RDS, 312.00/413; de la Barra to
Secretary of State, 19 November 1910, RDS, 312.00/424;
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 1 November 1910, RDS,
812.00/547; Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 362.
^^Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 430, 471; Ellsworth
to Secretary of State, 24 April 1911, RDS, 312.00/1517;
2 May 1911, RDS_, 312.00/1596; C G. Brewster to Acting
Attorney General, 5 May 1911, RD£, 812.00/1733; Capt. F. A.
Barton to Adjutant General, 7 May 1911, RDS^, 812.00/1903;
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 11 May 1911, RDS, 312.00/
1779; Capt. A. E. Williams to Adjutant General, 5 May 1911,
RDS, 312.00/2034.
80
surrounded Juarez.
Many of the supplies used by the rebels
had been obtained from El Paso.
American authorities
watched the hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition
and hundreds of guns being bought and stored in El Paso.
American officials could do very little about the arms
situation.
The mere purchase of large amounts of arms was
not illegal nor was the mere trade of arms a violation of
the neutrality statutes.
It was illegal, however, for the
rebels to establish a base openly in El Paso.
As a result of the revolutionary activity across
the Rio Grande, numerous violations of neutrality statutes
came to the attention of American officials.
1911, United States Marshal C
On May 5,
G. Brewster wrote the
Attorney General:
. . . I deem it necessary to state that both the military and the cordon of civil officers from the mouth
of the Rio Grande to the California lines are badly
handicapped in successfully performing the arduous
duties assigned them in preventing the crossing of
munitions of war and other violations of neutrality
laws, because in South-west Texas and all frontier
states of Mexico full eighty to ninety per cent of the
citizens are in full sympathy with the revolutionists
and at all times keep the contrabandistos, careteros,
and others that transport arms and ammunition for the
insurrectors, and merchants at the many forts, towns,
and ranches on the Rio Grande, well informed of the
marches, scouts and movements of the civil and military
59
Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 444, 451-452, 482;
Duncan to Adjutant General, 4 May 1911, RDS, 812.00/1718;
Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 284-287.
31
forces up and down the river which, with the rough,
wild country in which they operate, makes it very
difficult to prevent contrabands goods from entering
the Republic of Mexico.60
On the border, Mexican consuls paid informers and
hired detectives to create an intelligence system.
Mexico
also responded to the situation by ordering its ambassador
to protest violations of the neutrality laws every time a
Mexican agent filed a report alleging the crossing of arms.
Mexico charged that the neutrality laws were violated in
several ways.
First, revolutionists in private and public
meetings agitated and distributed propaganda against the
Mexican government.
Second, rebels used Texas as a base
from which to invade Mexico.
Third, large quantities of
61
arms and ammunition were smuggled to Mexico.
American officials responded that private and
public meetings were not offenses in the United States,
and that an overt act had to follow a conspiracy before
charges could be filed.
Second, they had no proof of men
crossing to invade Mexico.
any smuggling of arms.
Third, they had no evidence of
The sales and delivery of materials
remained legal commerce since the rebels were not considered
^^Brewster to Attorney General, 5 May 1911, RDS,
312.00/1733.
61
Beezley, Insurgent Governor, pp. 42-43; Fabela,
DHRM, V, pp. 99, 120-122; A. Lomeli to H. R. Hilleland,
2 December 1910, RDS, 312.00/625.
32
belligerents by the Mexican government.
Confiscation of
the goods was the harshest penalty for anyone attempting
62
to transport supplies to Mexico.
American authorities, most of whom sympathized
with Madero, noted that most Mexican complaints seemed
baseless rumors.
They investigated many, but could not
prosecute most for lack of evidence.
American officials
on numerous occasions stated that they would prosecute
anyone violating the neutrality laws, if Mexico would
gather evidence and make it available to them.
The United
States also noted that only American officers were stationed along the border.
of the Rio.
Mexico did not police her side
Furthermore, American officials resented
Mexico telling them how to enforce their country's laws.
63
American officials conducted a survey of the situation along the border late in February.
Marshal Brewster
reported that no signs of organized bands of men, suspicious individuals or illegal crossings of men and arms could
62
Ross, Madero, p. 140; Beezley, Insurgent Governor, p. 56; Eugene Nolte, U.S. Marshal, to A. Lomeli,
31 December 1910, RDS, 312.00/625; Fowler, Attorney
General to Secretary of State, 7 January 1911, RDS,
812.00/627.
^^Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 398-400; Villegas,
Historia Moderna, pp. 371-372; Fabela, DHRM, V, p. 214;
Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, pp. 127-128; Beezley,
Insurgent Governor, p. 57; Edward J. Berbusse, "Neutrality
Diplomacy of the United States and Mexico, 1910-1911,"
Americas, 12 (January 1956), pp. 271-274.
83
be confirmed in the Brownsville area.
Matamoros officials
with whom he conferred also reported no signs of rebel
activity.
Rio Grande City, Laredo, and Minera all seemed
quiet and peaceful.
Brigadier General J. W. Duncan re-
ported that the El Paso area was also quiet, with no evidence of men crossing.
Only in the Big Bend country were
there reports of sporadic crossings.
64
conditions seemed good.
Generally speaking
The Mexican government constantly presented accusations that American neutrality statutes had been violated
during the Maderista move against Ciudad Juarez.
The
charges centered around the allegation that rebels used
American territory to recruit men and import arms.
As
was the case in 1910, the State Department refused to act
without concrete proof.
65
T h e o n l y e x c h a n g e o f fire b e t w e e n A m e r i c a n and
M e x i c a n o f f i c i a l s from 1 9 1 0 to F e b r u a r y 1 9 1 1 o c c u r r e d
when
T e x a s R a n g e r s a p p a r e n t l y fired a c r o s s the river on M e x i c a n
soldiers near Ciudad Porfirio Diaz.
denied the allegation.
American
officials
S e v e r a l r e p o r t s a p p e a r e d of
64
Attorney General to Secretary of War, 21 February 1911, RDS, 312.00/329; J. W. Duncan to Adjutant General,
25 February 1911, RDS, 312.00/329; J. W. Duncan to Adjutant
General, 25 February 1911, RDS, 812.00/968.
65
Fabela, DHRM, pp. 234-235; Foreign Relations,
1911, pp. 4 33, 441; "Mexico and International Law," The
Independent, 6 April 1911, p. 203.
84
clashes between American and Mexican forces patrolling
the Rio Grande.
During the fight near Mulato, Mexicans
allegedly fired on American troops across the river and
wounded a young boy.
Near Presidio, Texas on March 24,
1911, Mexican troops apparently fired on an American patrol
Stray bullets from the battle for Ciudad Juarez killed five
Americans and wounded twelve in El Paso.
In the Big Bend
country Mexican federales who crossed the river on May 5
/
66
wounded eight-year-old Salome Flores.
Mexican officials charged that on some occasions
American troops fired on Mexican federales.
Officials in
Juarez reported a Mexican patrol was fired on from the
American side of the river on February 7, 1911.
Americans
investigated but could find no evidence to substantiate
the charge.
/
With the fall of Ciudad Juarez and the resignation
/
of Diaz, the revolution spread to all of Mexico.
By June
1, 1911, Madero controlled ten states and twenty-two cities
Revolutionary elements in support of Madero existed in
66
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 16 January 1911,
RDS, 812.00/659; Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 410, 423;
Brownsville Daily Herald,-24 March 1911, p. 1; 10 May 1911,
p. 1; "The United States and Mexico," The Outlook, 20 May
1911, p. 36; Williams to Adjutant General, 22 May 1911,
RDS, 312.00/2022.
^^Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 425-427, 467;
Attorney General to Secretary of State, 17 April 1911,
RDS, 812.00/1343.
85
seven other states.
After Diaz's resignation Francisco
de la Barra served as interim president while Madero
organized an election. 68
On June 1, 1911 Madero left Juarez for Mexico City.
He entered the capital on the afternoon of June 7 following
an earthquake.
The presidential elections took place on
October 1 and 15.
Opposition to Madero came from the
conservative element in Mexico who backed Bernardo Reyes,
a one-time Porfirista.
Disgruntled with what he termed an
unfair election, Reyes withdrew from the race in September
and went into exile.
On November 2, the national congress
declared Madero elected to the presidency.
m on November 6, 1911. 69
He was sworn
After almost thirty-four years of governing with
an iron fist, Diaz's regime showed signs of weakening.
Although Diaz's power had begun to deteriorate years before, the aged dictator began to lose control of the
situation rapidly in 1910, Mexico's centennial year.
Mexico had begun to experience discontent in its labor
sector, among its indigenous class, and from a small
political and militant group.
Political opposition to
68
Cumberland, Genesis Under Madero, p. 14 5.
^^Ross, Madero, pp. 174-175, 213-214; Herrera,
Cuando Villa, p. 276; James Daniel, Mexico and the
Americas (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p.
153; Brownsville Daily Herald, 7 November 1911, p. 1.
86
Diaz sprang up after the President suggested that he would
tolerate a loyal opposition political party.
Madero challenged Porfirio Diaz.
Francisco I.
But the political chal-
lenge ended in Madero's imprisonment.
When the democratic process collapsed, Madero took
the revolutionary route.
The Madero Revolution organized
along the Mexico-Texas border.
Anti-Diaz factions, mostly
Maderistas, challenged Diaz from all border towns—on both
r
sides of the river.
From Brownsville to El Paso, rebels
recruited men, smuggled arms, and launched military expeditions into Mexico.
the rebels.
The United States did little to halt
When President Taft decided to move against
the rebels, it was too late.
Diaz fell from power in May
1911.
Educated Mexicans knew that Halley's Comet had
destroyed the peace of night in 1910.
The campesino in
the village had a different explanation.
viejitos (elders), it was an omen.
According to the
They told the young to
confess and commune, the Day of Judgment was at hand;
Mexico was to suffer with war, death, famine and plague.
Both were right.
The same year that Halley's Comet
appeared over Mexico to break the peace of night, revolution came to Mexico to break the peace of the nation.
The revolutionary movement began the following year.
CHAPTER III
CHALLENGE TO MADERISMO ALONG THE RIO GRANDE
Madero took control of a country in which the
great majority yearned for change.
Yet there still
existed those bent upon maintaining conservatism.
Madero's trouble was that he seemed to lack a comprehension of the situation in Mexico in its entirety.
to bring about primarily political changes.
He moved
He reevaluated
private land holdings and reclaimed public lands for the
national government.
He established a government bank to
provide loans to small farmers.
school system.
Madero extended the public
He promoted free elections and the separa-
tion of church and state.
Yet Madero had problems.
He called for a free press.
He faced demands from the revo-
lutionists for immediate implementation of the programs
identified in his Plan de San Luis Potosi.
he did not move rapidly enough.
Unfortunately,
Therefore, he found his
revolution challenged by four uprisings.
The Mexico-Texas border played an important role
Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle
of Mexican Democracy (Austin: University of Texas Press,
l95i), pp. 218-219.
37
88
in the fifteen months of the Madero administration.
The
frontier became a source of alarm and intrigue to both the
Madero government and the various rebel factions challenging
the President.
Revolutionary elements planned their move-
ments with the border as a base of operation.
gled guns, ammunition and supplies from Texas.
Rebels smugAmerican
state and federal officials had to respond to the turmoil.
Emiliano Zapata became the first to challenge
Madero's authority.
Zapatistas continued revolutionary
t
activity after Diaz fell from power.
dados' holdings.
They seized hacen-
Zapata demanded that Madero immediately
put into effect agrarian reforms promised in his revolutionary program.
When Madero failed to respond, Zapata
rebelled, announcing the Plan de Ayala which expressed the
aims of Mexico's peasantry.
The Zapatistas demanded imme-
diate land and the withdrawal of federal troops from
Morelos—"Tierra y Libertadl" ("Land and Liberty!")
The
Zapatistas' plan also refused to recognize Madero as the
President of Mexico.
Zapata, who generated support in the
states of Puebla, Guerrero, Tlaxcala and Mexico, could
2
never be subdued by Madero.
2
'
Rafael Trujillo Herrera, Cuando Villa Entro en
Columbus (Mexico, D.F.: Libreria de Manuel Porrua, S.A.,
1973), p. 231; Ross, Madero, pp. 251-252; Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, 1918), pp. 513,
517-513; Dolores Butterfield, "The Situation in Mexico,"
The North American Review 5 (November 1912), p. 659.
89
On February 2, 1912, the garrison at Casas Grandes
revolted in favor of Emilio Vasquez Gomez, the wealthy
doctor who had given Madero token opposition in the presidential elections.
Other towns in northern Mexico rebelled
in favor of Vasquez Gomez and in February Ciudad Juarez
fell to the Vasquistas.
Madero ordered Pascual Orozco,
who had captured Juarez from Diaz, to take the border city
.
t
•
from Vasquez Gomez.
Instead, Orozco joined the rebels on
March 3, 1912.^
Three weeks after joining the Vasquistas, Orozco
took command of the rebellion and denounced Madero in his
Plan Orozquista, charging that Madero had failed to live
up to the Plan de San Luis Potosi.
After the fall of
Juarez to the Madero revolutionists, Orozco had become
discontented with Madero.
He did not become governor o
L.
Chihuahua nor did he gain wealth or power for his support
of the revolution.
The conservative group in Chihuahua
became aware of Orozco's feelings and convinced him that
he must lead the Revolution, not Madero.
temptation for several months.
Orozco resisted
Then on March 3, 1912, he
denounced Madero and assumed the position of
3
Herrera, Cuando Villa, p. 27 3; Ross, Madero, pp.
256-253; Paige W. Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco: Chihuahua
Rebel, Episodes in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915,"
New Mexican Historical Review 36 (April 1961), p. 110;
Michael C Meyer, Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the
Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska, 1967), pp. 50-52.
90
General-in-Chief of the rebel forces in Chihuahua.^
Madero also faced the Felix Diaz revolt.
y
Supported
/
by the conservative element in Mexico, Felix Diaz, nephew
of Porfirio, rebelled on October 16, 1912 in Veracruz.
His was not a social revolution; Diaz merely promised to
restore peace and tranquility for the nation.
navy failed to support Diaz.
The army and
Instead, the federal army
attacked the rebels on October 23.
Eight days later Diaz
surrendered and was taken as a prisoner to Mexico City.
Bernardo Reyes next challenged Madero's government.
General Bernardo Reyes served as governor of Nuevo Leon
until 1910.
As an old Porfirista, he had served in the
Mexican army for forty-two years.
Because of Reyes'
longevity and durability, Porfirio Diaz saw him as a threat
in the election of 1910 and sent Reyes to Europe on a military mission.
He returned in 1911 and ran against Madero
in the presidential election, but withdrew when it became
4
^
William H. Beezley, Insurgent Governor: Abraham
Gonzalez and the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1973), p. 131; Christiansen,
"Pascual Orozco," pp. 103-111; Meyer, Pascual Orozco, pp.
60-65; Richard M. Estrada, "Border Revolution: The Mexican
Revolution in the Ciudad Juarez-El Paso Area, 1906-1915"
(M.A. thesis. University of Texas at El Paso, 1975), pp.
96-97; Josefina E. de Fabela, Documentos Historicos de la
Revolucion Mexicana (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Jus, 1966),
VII, pp. 66-67.
Ross, Madero, pp. 268-272; Robert E. Quirk, The
Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention of
Aguascaliente (New York: Norton and Co., Inc., 1960),
p. 5.
91
obvious that Madero would win,
Reyes went into self-
imposed exile in San Antonio, Texas.
In Texas he began
openly to plot an armed rebellion against Madero for
November, 1911.
His supporters planned simultaneous
uprisings in Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, Piedras Negras, and
Ciudad Juarez.
The Reyes revolution failed, however, and
the old general found himself a prisoner in Mexico City
late in 1911.
It appeared that Madero would endure.
But the conservative elements in Mexico City
plotted to drive Madero from power.
They planned to free
both Reyes and Diaz from custody in Mexico City and turn
over to them the task of overthrowing Madero.
On February
9, 1913, a group of military officers rebelled and freed
the two revolutionists.
In command of the rebels, Reyes
led the attack on the National Palace.
He was killed in
f
the first assault.
Diaz led a ten-day battle until
February 19 when Madero and Pino Suarez, the vicepresident, resigned.
Madero had given the task of defending the government to General Victoriano Huerta who used the crisis to
Vic Niemeyer, "Frustrated Invasion: The Revolutionary Attempt of General Bernardo Reyes from San Antonio
in 1911," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 67 (October
1963), pp. 213-216; Ross, Madero, p. 254.
7
Quirk, Mexican Revolution, p. 7; Ross, Madero,
pp. 230-236; Lowell L. Blaisdell, "Henry Lane Wilson and
the Overthrow of Madero," Southwestern Social Science
Quarterly 43 (September 1962), pp. 130-133.
92
assume the presidency himself.
Huerta coerced Madero
into resigning for the sake of the nation.
Madero agreed
after Huerta promised to uphold constitutional rule and
to guarantee the lives of Madero and his followers.
On
February 23, 1913, federales transported Madero to prison
g
and murdered him.
The Madero revolution was over.
Immediately after the Madero revolution confusion
existed along the border.
In June 1911 the American
consul at Matamoros reported that a wave of general satisfaction seemed to prevail in his district.
People had
returned to their normal business activities.
The American
consul at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz remained apprehensive about
conditions in his district, however, because of the inexperience the Maderistas exhibited in providing law and
9
order.
In August Henry L. Wilson, the American ambassador
to Mexico, wired the American consuls in Matamoros, Nuevo
Laredo, Piedras Negras and Ciudad Juarez requesting a
detailed account of conditions in their areas.
By Sep-
tember all four consuls had filed lengthy reports.
q
Ross, Madero, p.'315; Blaisdell, "Henry Lane
Wilson," p. 134.
9U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to
the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, J. H. Johnson
to Secretary of State, 2 June 1911, RDS, 812.00/2076; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 14 July 1911, RDS, 812.00/2217
Laredo Weekly Times, 4 June 1911, p. 1; Ciudad
Porfirio Diaz became Piedras Negras on June 3, 1911.
93
The consul in Matamoros reported conditions in his
area to be unsatisfactory and getting worse.
People in
his district had no confidence in the revolution and had
realized no benefit from it.
Anxiety remained as it had
been before the rebellion, but the consul expected the
situation to
worsen.
Reyes seemed to have gained support
in the area.
The troubles in Mexico continued and the
situation was just "smouldering."
Too many people had
waited so many years to revolt.
Conditions in Nuevo Laredo seemed to have improved
considerably after the fall of Diaz.
The people enjoyed
a greater degree of liberty and appeared to be treated
"justly" by the new authorities.
Many of the revolutionists
returned to private life and the federal army seemed in
control.
Business conditions appeared good and improving.
Ninety percent of the people supported Madero. 12
At Piedras Negras the Mexicans seemed pleased with
the revolution and felt that they would benefit from it.
Madero's revolutionists in the city had returned to private
life with no animosity towards the federales.
Madero authorities became lax.
The new
Though only rumor of the
counter revolution circulated, business had not improved
Johnson to Henry L. Wilson, 5 August 1911, RDS,
312.00/2346.
12
Garrett to Henry L. Wilson, 20 September 1911,
RDS, 812.00/2402.
94
and there appeared to be unrest among the laboring classes.
Two-thirds of the people supported iMadero. Others favored
some of the revolutionists such as Reyes. 1 3
f
At Ciudad Juarez the people appeared satisfied
/
with the fall of Diaz.
They felt confident that the revo-
lution would be good for Mexico, but expressed concern
about the instability in the area.
Business appeared
stagnant, but the optimistic consul expected this to
diminish within the year. Madero was the man of the hour
14
and the Reyistas and Vasquistas had very little support.
Since his district became the most rebellious against
Madero, however, it is clear that he did not understand
the public's mood very well.
The only disturbance along the border in the summer
of 1911 was a threatened mutiny in Juarez by 100 rebels
who demanded their wages.
General Luz de Blanco quickly
paid the men, who were being used as rurales, and this
calmed their protest.
The border remained quiet through 1911, except for
the Reynosa-Mier area.
In September a pitched battle
occurred near Camargo between Mexican federales and
Ellsworth to Fred Morris Dearing, Charge de
Affairs, Mexico, D.V., 10 August 1911, RDS, 812.00/2346.
•^"^Edwards to Dearing, 11 August 1911, RDS. ,
312.00/2346.
•^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 3 July 1911, p. 1.
>5
Magonistas who had crossed the frontier.
Three months
later they fought another battle near Mier.
the rebels were put to flight.
Both times
On September 19, 1911,
bandits briefly occupied Reynosa forcing many people to
seek refuge in Hidalgo.
The bandits, probably the same
group which had raided Camargo, plundered, looted and
ransacked homes.
In December another band of insurgents
crossed into Mexico near Rio Grande City.
In 1912 the border situation changed when the
various counter-revolutionary factions rose in rebellion
and conditions seemed to worsen for Madero.
Early in the
year problems for the Madero government sprang up in
Chihuahua, Coahuila and Tamaulipas, despite its claims
denying most reports of trouble in the northern states.
As the year closed, rebel activity in the north had not
decreased.
Matamoros remained relatively quiet during most
of the Madero period.
In mid-February, J. H. Johnson,
Ibid., 9 September 1911; 16 December 1911, p. 1;
Laredo Weekly Times, 24 September 1911, p. 5; Archivo
General de la Secretaria de Relationes Exteriores de
Mexico, D.F., J. L. Camarillo to Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores, 21 November 1911, AREM, L-E-7 36.
-^"^Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 367, 713; Laredo
Weekly Times, 13 February 1912, pp. 11-12; 21 April 1912,
p. 1; Assistant Attorney General to Secretary of State,
4 May 1912, RDS, 312.00/3305; Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 9 November 1912, RDS, 312.00/5454; Brownsville Daily Herald, 24 May 1912, p. 2; 24 December 1912,
p. 1.
96
American consul in Matamoros, reported calmness in his
district.
He cautioned, however, that he did not know
how long such conditions would last.
Two weeks later,
word reached the city that a band of thirty Vasquistas
was approaching.
await the rebels.
Reinforcements came from Reynosa to
They made no attempt to take the city,
however, being content to raid further south near Burgos.
Most of the rebel activity in Tamaulipas occurred further
south near the San Fernando area.
In July, however, infor-
mation surfaced that a movement in support of Vasquez was
being organized in the city.
Yet the Brownsville Herald
reported in mid-October that "Matamoros has been singularly
free from warfare." 18
The situation in Matamoros changed dramatically
in the last few weeks of the Madero regime.
On February
17, 1913, federal troops led by Major Esteban Ramos, a
long time friend of Felix Diaz, renounced allegiance to
Madero and declared in favor of the rebel.
The military
took charge of the city and arrested city officials who
protested the takeover.
shot being fired.
The coup was managed without a
Despite this dramatic change in
1 fl
Fabela, DHRM, V, pp. 488-489; Johnson to Secretary of State, 12 February 1912, RDS, 812.00/2836; 4 August
1912, RDS, 312.00/4553; Secretary of State to Johnson,
25 July 1912, RDS, 312.00/4475; Brownsville Daily Herald,
1, 2, 3, 7, 17 March 1912, p. 1; 13 September 1912, p. 1;
13 October 1912, p. 1.
97
Matamoros, the citizens did not seem overtly excited.
Businesses reopened and carried on as usual.
Within a
day persons who had been arrested were released.
Consul
Johnson expressed concern, however, since he regarded
Ramos as unreliable and irresponsible. 19
During the chaos following the murder of Madero,
a rumor surfaced in Austin that United States citizens in
Matamoros were being held hostage and forced to pay ransom
by the rebels.
The mayor. Dr. Miguel Barragan, and mili-
tary officials wired Governor Colquitt,
. . . to assure you that all notices that have been
sent relative to persecutions made against American
citizens by us are absolutely false. The military
commanders are giving full protection to all persons
and interests, especially to American citizens with
whom we have the most friendly relations.20
Consul Johnson concurred with Mexican officials.
Efforts
to force wealthy Mexican families in the city to lend money
to military authorities aroused new concerns.
To make sure
that those citizens cooperated, officers threatened to
withdraw their troops and turn the city over to rebels who
would ransack it.
Governor Colquitt replied that he was
relieved to learn that American lives and property seemed
Johnson to Secretary of State, 18 February 1913,
RDS, 812.00/6337; 21 February 1913, RDS, 812.00/6424;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 17, 18, 20 February 1913, p. 1;
Fabela, DHRM, IX, p. 1221; Assistant Secretary of Treasury
to Secretary of State, 17 February 1913, RDS, 812.00/6238.
^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 25 February 1913, p. 1;
26 February 1913, pp. 2, 3.
98
secure
in Matamoros, but expressed concern over the need
to protect the American consulate.
The governor explained
that he had decided to order troops to Brownsville after
requests from local of f icials . ^"^
Nuevo Laredo also remained quiet through 1912.
Conflict did flare up in the final weeks of Madero's government.
On February 15, 1913, most federal troops revolted
against the Madero regime in favor of Orozco.
The rebel
force departed Nuevo Laredo, leaving a garrison of sixty.
A column of 500 federales from Monterrey came to retake the
city.
Before the troops could attack the city, however,
the rebels joined Huerta who had taken over in Mexico City.
Turmoil in Nuevo Laredo forced 1,000 people to flee the
city for Laredo.
Women, children and the very old crossed
22
the river with all their belongings.
At Eagle Pass early in 1912, Mexican rebels busied
themselves recruiting.
Most of the fighting in the area
occurred south of the border in the Monclova and
Cuatrocienegas region.
On December 13, Consul Luther T.
Ellsworth in Piedras Negras reported that rebels had
Ibid., 17, 26 February 1913, p. 3; Richard
Marcum, "Fort Brown, Texas: The History of a Border
Post" (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University, 1964),
pp. 234-235; Johnson to Secretary of State, 26 February
1913, RDS, 312.00/6393.
22
Haynes to Secretary of State, 15 February 1913,
RDS, 812.00/6227; Fabela, DHRM, IX, p. 130; Laredo Weekly
Times, 23 February 1913, pp. 5, 9.
99
disappeared from his district.
to report.
He wrote, "There is nothing
Americans not complaining.
very satisfactory."
The situation is
Consul Edwards declared conditions in
the vicinity peaceful during the ten days when Madero fell
from power. 23
Bandit raids caused concern in the Las Vacas area
during the Madero regime.
In early 1912 large numbers of
armed Mexicans were reported near the city.
Rumors that a
force of rebels was preparing to assault the city frightened
Mexican residents.
With armed bands of Mexicans raiding
nearby ranches, conditions did not change.
The bandits
harassing the area numbered about 200. Madero authorities
never suppressed the bandit activity, for raids continued
to take place later in the year.
Even as Madero fell in
mid-February, 1913, bandits still molested citizens in
24
Las Vacas, across from Del Rio.
The Big Bend country saw some rebel activity during
the Madero period.
In February, 1912 a rebel force threat-
ened to attack Ojinaga.
The federal force
Ellsworth to Secretary of
RDS, 812.00/3339; 3 September 1912,
13 December 1912, RD£, 812.00/5716;
812.00/6233; Laredo Weekly Times, 5
in the city
State, 16 March 1912,
RDS, 312.00/4819;
15 February 1913, RDS,
May 1912, p. 2.
^ Leon Gomez to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores,
26 February 1912, AREM, l-E-752; Ellsworth to Secretary of
State, 22 November 1912, RD£, 312.00/5597; United States
Customs, Office of Deputy Collector Subport of Del Rio,
Texas, Records 1909-1913, Dowe to Collector of Customs at
El Paso, 21 September 1912, p. 353.
100
proved s u f f i c i e n t to check the threat.
Rebel bands o p e r -
ating n e a r the river along the Big Bend defeated
b y the M a d e r o g o v e r n m e n t to subdue them.
faced an a s s a u l t .
m
attempts
August Ojinaga
The rebels waited until the first week
in September to take Ojinaga.
25
1913.^
They held it until January,
C i u d a d Juarez experienced intense rebel activity
during the M a d e r o p e r i o d .
On January 3 1 , 1 9 1 2 , pro-Vasquez
soldiers m u t i n i e d in J u a r e z .
After arresting the principal
military and c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s , the soldiers then proceeded
to l o o t , p l u n d e r , burn and riot.
A government order r e d u c -
ing the m i l i t a r y garrison from 300 to 135 men caused the
mutiny.
After being discharged, the men joined the
26
Vasquistas in Chihuahua.
Madero ordered federal troops from Chihuahua to
Ciudad Juarez under the command of Jose Orozco.
He had to
recall the t r o o p s , h o w e v e r , when trouble broke out in the
25
Brownsville Daily Herald, 29 February 1 9 1 2 ,
p. 1; 1 0 , 13 September 1 9 1 2 , p . 1; El Paso Morning T i m e s ,
4 September 1 9 1 2 , p . 1; Ellsworth to Secretary of S t a t e ,
13 A p r i l 1 9 1 2 , R D S , 3 1 2 . 0 0 / 3 6 3 6 ; Wood to Secretary of
State, 23 A u g u s t 1 9 1 2 , R D S , 312.00/4731; 30 August 1 9 1 2 ,
R D S , 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 4 7 9 4 ; Secretary of the Treasury to Secretary
o F " s t a t e , 17 September 1 9 1 2 , R D £ , 812.00/4973.
26
E s t r a d a , "Border Revolution," p p . 9 1 - 9 3 ; El Paso
Morning T i m e s , 1 February 1 9 1 2 , p . 1; Brownsville Daily
Herald, 2 F e b r u a r y 1 9 1 2 , p . 1; Giro R. de la Garza T r e v i n o ,
La R e v o l u c i o n M e x i c a n a en el Estado de T a m a u l i p a s , I
(Mexico, D.F.:
Libreria de Manuel P o r r u a , S.A., 1 9 7 3 ) ,
p . 9 8 ; W . S. C l a y t o n , P r e s i d e n t El Paso Chamber of Commerce
to P r e s i d e n t T a f t , 1 February 1 9 1 2 , R D S , 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 2 7 3 0 .
101
state capital.
The rebels sent a peace commission to
confer with federal authorities in Casas Grandes.
The
rebels agreed to be discharged in return for receiving
money due for past service and free transportation home."^"^
By mid-February federal officials had reestablished
full control over Juarez.
By the end of the month, however,
anti-Madero sentiment had grown in the city and government
control began to deteriorate.
On February 27, 1912, a
force of 600 rebels led by Jose Ines Salazar approached
Juarez.
The federal garrison surrendered without firing
a shot for fear of provoking United States intervention
should bullets stray into El Paso.
The rebels controlled
much of Chihuahua by the spring of 1912.
On May 4, 1912
Vasquez Gomez entered Juarez to assume the provisional
presidency of Mexico.
It became obvious, however, that
the Vasquistas no longer controlled the revolution.
Pascual Orozco had become the challenger to the Madero
regime in northern Mexico.
_
/
/
After being expelled by Orozco
/
from Juarez, Vasquez-Gomez crossed into Texas where officials arrested him on July 26, 1912, for violating the
neutrality laws—recruiting and leading a military expedition from American soil. 23
.
27
Fabela, DHRM, VII, p. 73; El Paso Morning Times,
3, 9 February 1912, p. 1; Brownsville Daily Herald, 12
February 1912, p. 1.
23
'•
. ^
Garza-Trevino, Revolucion en Tamaulipas, p. 105;
El Paso Morning Times, 26 February 1912, p. 1; Secretary of
102
The real threat to Madero in the northwest came
from Pascual Orozco, Jr.
The Orozco revolt denied Madero
the badly desired peace that Mexico needed and drained
away millions of pesos needed to implement reforms promised
by the Revolution.
From March to July, Orozco controlled
much of Chihuahua and defeated federal attempts to put down
his rebellion.
He declared Chihuahua's independence and
asked surrounding states to join in secession.
None did.
The March 12 embargo by the United States on the sale of
arms to rebels in Mexico created a shortage of arms and
ammunition which eventually forced Orozco to abandon his
revolt.29
Not until the summer could federal troops regain
the initiative in northern Chihuahua.
As early as June 18,
federal forces attempted to retake Juarez.
The following
month they forced the rebels to give up the border city,
although it was not totally evacuated until August 20.
Juarez stayed in government hands for the rest of the
Madero period.
General Joaquin Telles with 2,000 troops
battled rebels constantly, but with limited success as
War to Secretary of State, 23 February 1912, RDS, 812.00/
2359; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 26 July 1912, RDS,
812.00/4513; Estrada, "Border Revolution," p. 107.
29
Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco," p. Ill; Estrada,
"Border Revolution," p. 100.
103
the revolutionists derailed trains and destroyed bridges. 30
Although Orozco had failed to unseat Madero, he
still held Ojinaga until January 1913, when federal forces
captured the town.
While in control of the area, rebels
raided nearby ranches and imported war supplies from
Presidio.
Rumors persisted in mid-January 1913, that
Orozco would try to recapture Juarez because of the small
federal garrison holding the city.
the city.
But Madero reinforced
When Huerta overthrew Madero in 1913, the new
president called Orozco to Mexico city and appointed him
brigadier general.
Orozco then led Huerta's fight against
Venustiano Carranza in Chihuahua and Coahuila. 31
All major border areas in Texas from the Lower
Valley to El Paso saw rebel activity during the Madero
regime.
In November 1911 it became common knowledge along
the frontier that Reyistas were plotting to invade Mexico.
The Brownsville area sustained several incidents of rebel
action during the Madero period.
Two reports of armed
30
Texas Governor O. B. Colquitt to Secretary of
War, 13 June 1912, RDS, 812.00/4311; Foreign Relations,
1912, p. 825; Estrada, "Border Revolution," p. 109;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 20 August 1912, p. 1; Secretary
of State to Secretary of War, 16 July 1912, RDS, 812.00/
4416; Edwards to Secretary of State, 18 December 1912, RDS,
312.00/5715.
•^•''Christiansen, "Pascual Orozco," pp. 115-116;
Fabela, DHRM, VIII, pp. 114-116; XIV, p. 60; Meyer,
Pascual Orozco, pp. 97-99; R . E . Muzquiz to Secretaria
de Relaciones Exteriores, 11 October 1911, AREM, L-E-770;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 25 January 1913, p. 1.
104
Mexicans crossing from the Valley to Tamaulipas appeared
in September 1911.
In November Mexicans in the Upper
Valley recruited Mexican Americans and bought two hundred
horses.
The Ross Hotel in Laredo, Texas became a common
meeting place for Reyistas from both sides of the river.
In mid-November United States authorities discovered that
Webb County Sheriff Amador Sanchez and other county and
city officials were in collusion with Reyes.
The sheriff
and several other men were arrested for violating neutrality
laws—recruiting and arming a military expedition in the
/
United States.
reasons:
Sheriff Sanchez supported Reyes for several
first, he was a long time friend of the former
/
f
Governor of Nuevo Leon; second, Sanchez owned large quantities of land in Mexico and believed that with Reyes as
president, his property would be safe; third, the sheriff's
political foe, John A. Vails, was a Republican who sympathized with Madero. 32
Preparing for an invasion Reyistas bought horses,
saddles, rifles and ammunition both in Laredo and in the
Valley.
American officials expected Reyes to cross into
Fabela, DHRM, VI, pp. 235-236, 247-248; Fabela,
DHRM, X, pp. 351-354; Attorney General to Secretary of
State, 16 November 1911, RDS, 812.00/24 99; Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 520; Garrett to Secretary of State, 11
November 1911, RDS, 812.00/2506; 21 November 1911, RDS,
312.00/2472; Charles H. Harris, III and Louis R. Sadler,
"The Reyes Conspiracy: The Texas Side," Southwestern
Historical Quarterly 83 (April 1980), pp. 330-331.
105
Mexico early in November.
Rebel operations in Laredo and Eagle Pass did not
create as much tension as in other parts of the border.
The majority of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, remained
stalwart Maderistas.
The intense vigilance by Mexicans
and the large number of Texas Rangers, local officers and
military personnel prevented any major rebel activity.
Nevertheless, there were some incidents.
On November 19,
1911, a military patrol near Laredo spotted fifteen Mexicans crossing the Rio Grande.
When challenged by the
troops, twelve escaped but three were captured.
The cap-
tives, identified as Reyistas, had in their possession
forty guns, 20,000 rounds of ammunition and five dynamite
bombs.
Five days later officers arrested thirty-seven men
in Laredo.
The captured Mexicans had in their possession
a complete signal service outfit and a hospital kit.
After
the Mexicans explained that they were refugees, the authorities released thirty-one but held six for deportation.
The following month an AiTny patrol captured Jose S.
Montemayor, chief of the Revista movement, and three other
Mexicans as they sent across a wagon loaded with supplies.
After the capture of Reyes in December, conditions improved
33
and border patrols were reduced.
33
El Paso Morning Times, 29 December 1911, p. 1;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 21, 24 November 1911, p. 1;
4 December 1911, p. 1; Duncan to Adjutant General,
19 November 1911, RDS, 812.00/2522.
106
Late in December 1911 Texas Rangers discovered
that a group of Mexican mine workers near Eagle Pass had
organized a "Gun Club."
The Rangers feared that the Mexi-
cans wanted to join the rebels.
But the Mexicans insisted
that the club was organized only for hunting purposes. "^"^
In January 1912 the United States attorney general
reported that conditions on the border from Brownsville to
Laredo had become serious.
He expected them to worsen.
According to two reports Mexicans openly recruited in
Brownsville early in 1912.
A large number of Mexicans
appeared in the vicinity of Mission, Texas late in February,
1912.
The following month United States officials in
Brownsville arrested Miguel Sada, an officer in the Mexican army, for recruiting two Mission residents into the
federal army.
Later in the year tensions flared up again
over reports that an expedition had been organized near
35
Rio Grande City to invade Mexico.
Early in 1912, reports indicated rebel activity
elsewhere along the river.
In February Mexican bands
crossed the river some thirty miles north of El Paso and
34
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 22 December
1912, RDS, 312.00/2660.
35
'
.
Alberto Leal to Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores, 12 September 1912, AREM, L-E-830; Edwardo
Velarde to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 12 September 1912, AREM, L-E-733; Ellsworth to Secretary of State,
21 March 1912, RDS, 812.00/6379; Attorney General to
Secretary of State, 7 February 1912, RDS, 312.00/2752.
107
attempted to stop the El Paso and the Southwestern Railroad.
Late in the month, rumors surfaced that an expeditionary
force had been organized to cross the frontier and attack
Nuevo Laredo.
Reports that large numbers of Mexicans had
organized near Eagle Pass came to the attention of American
officials late in February.
The Mexicans allegedly had
begun to transfer large quantities of arms and munitions. 36
Del Rio, like Eagle Pass, experienced a limited
number of incidents.
Many rebel operations turned out to
be merely rumors of organizing, recruiting and threatening
to cross into Las Vacas.
In February, 1912 Mexican offi-
cials became worried when they heard that a band of Mexicans
had formed on the Texas side of the river to invade Las
Vacas.
An investigation by American authorities failed
to uncover any plot.
Mexicans and Mexican Americans held
several secret meetings.
Yet officials could never dis-
cover any evidence of a conspiracy.
officials charged that as many
as
Apprehensive Mexican
three hundred armed
men stood ready to invade Las Vacas.
At most, however,
there were fifteen to twenty armed Mexicans in the Del
Rio sector. 37
El Paso Morning Times, 7 February 1912, p. 1;
Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 718.
Leon Gomez to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores
(February), AREM, L-E-752; Ellsworth to Secretary of State,
11 February 1912, RD£, 812.00/2308; 15 July 1912, RDS,
312.00/4450; Attorney General to Secretary of State,
103
Beginning in early 1912 the Big Bend
country had
an alarming amount of rebel activity, because the
Orozquistas operated mostly in Chihuahua, on the southern
side of the Big Bend.
Unlike the Reyes revolt, which was
limited to the Tamaulipas area and was very brief, the
Orozco revolt, along with the earlier Vasquez uprising,
lasted throughout the Madero period.
On February 26, 1912,
a skirmish took place between American cowboys and a band
of Mexicans who crossed the river and stole cattle from
the Irvin Ranch near Presidio.
The Americans intercepted
the Mexicans as they drove the cattle to Mexico, presumably
to feed insurrectionists.
In March the El Paso press
reported that three hundred Mexican soldiers disguised as
civilians crossed from Ojinaga to Presidio on their way to
Ciudad Juarez via El Paso. The Madero government denied the
allegation.38 In March Mexican officers reportedly offered
39
Mexican Americans $1.25 a day for service in the army.
In July customs collectors along the river near Eagle Pass
fought a battle with a band of fifteen to twenty Mexicans.
12 February 1912, RDS, 312.00/2874; 23 February 1912, RDS,
812.00/2361.
•^^Robert W. Dowe to Secretary of Treasury, 28 February 1912, RDS, 812.00/3078; El Paso Morning Times, 8 March
1912, p. 1.
^^Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 16 March 1912,
RDS, 312.00/3339; Attorney General to Secretary of State,
23 February 1912, RDS, 812.00/2861.
109
The raiders fled to Mexico but left behind fourteen rifles,
4,000 rounds of ammunition and other supplies.
In April 1912 the situation became tense in Del Rio
when a band of Mexicans crossed the river carrying dynamite
bombs.
When spotted they crossed back to Mexico, but not
before causing much excitement in Del Rio. Americans,
worried about a possible plot to attack the city, requested
more protection from military officials.
An inspection of
the area by Collector of customs Luke Dowe found no evidence
^
T 4- 40
of any plot.
In May 1912 the Mexican consul at Del Rio informed
American officials that rebels met at the home
Borrego in Sanderson, Texas.
of Toribia
The next month Doc Anderson
reported seeing fifty-six armed Mexicans enroute to Mexico
near Sanderson.
Allegedly the Mexicans had stolen twelve
horses from the Cannon Ranch.
An investigation by American
officers failed to substantiate the report.
In the summer
and fall of 1912 several rumors surfaced that revolutionists were crossing the border and recruiting in the Del Rio
sector.
American officials denied reports that Mexican
Americans had joined the rebel army in the area.
The
Mexican consul in Del Rio' reported a band of Mexicans
Eric Tanner, "The Texas Border and the Mexican
Revolution" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Texas Tech University, 1970), p. 39; Laredo Weekly Times, 7 April 1912,
p. 5; Brownsville Daily Herald, 12 April 1912, p. 1;
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 13 April 1912, RDS,
812.00/3635.
110
crossed near El Rancho de Santa Maria to recruit late in
July.
Yet American officials could not confirm sporadic
reports of Mexicans crossing the river.
The Big Bend country became intensely excited on
August 9 when a report reached El Paso that two hundred
heavily armed Mexicans had raided American farms and
ranches and stolen horses near Sierra Blanca and Fabens,
Texas.
El Paso Sheriff P. J. Edwards set out for the area
with a posse of forty men, while a cavalry troop moved to
intercept the raiders.
The rumor proved greatly exagger-
ated, however, as only seven Mexicans had crossed the
river.
American cowboys thwarted their attempt to steal
42
two horses. No depredations actually occurred.
A week later Mexican rebels crossed the border near
Marfa, Texas.
A federal force of 150 men had chased the
revolutionists across the river to Texas.
Three weeks
later United States troops fought two skirmishes near
f Fabela, DHRM, VIII, pp. 56-57; R. S. Bravo to
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 10 May 1912, AREM,
III/510 (73-12) "912"/1; Ellsworth to Secretary of State,
6 June 1912, RDS, 312.00/4131; 10 June 1912, RDS, 312.00/
4215; 15 July 1912, RD£, 312.00/4450; 17 October 1912,
RDS, 812.00/5301.
"^^El Paso Morning Times, 10, 12 August 1912, p. 1;
Laredo Weekly Times, 11 August 1912, p. 2; Secretary of
War to Secretary of State, 9 August 1912, RD£, 812.00/4596;
A. Thompson to A. B. Bielaski, 9 August 1912, RDS, 812.00/
4607; Secretary of Treasury to Secretary of State, 10
August 1912, RDS, 812.00/4619; Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 12 August 1912, RDS, 812.00/4603.
Ill
Marfa with a band of Mexican rebels who were trying to
steal cattle. 43
A number of reports circulated in the summer of
1912 that both Mexican rebels and federal army officials
in El Paso were recruiting Mexican Americans into their
armies.
E. C
Llorente, Mexican consul in the city, orga-
nized at least four military expeditionary forces of
Mexican Americans from El Paso.
Nevertheless, Pedro
Lascurain, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, denied
that his government had authorized recruiting in the United
States.
In July and August evidence surfaced again impli-
cating Mexican officials in a plot to recruit in El Paso.
It was common knowledge that rebel officers constantly
44
recruited in El Paso.
f
As a federal force moved on rebels m Juarez during the summer. El Paso swelled with refugees. The
/
refugees returned to Juarez when the federal army took
possession of the city in mid-August.
After Ciudad Juarez
fell to federal forces a number of rebel raids were reported near El Paso.
43
On August 22, 1912, five Mexicans
'
M. M. Llorente to Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores, 15 August 1912, AREM, III/510 (73-56), "912"/I;
Wood to Secretary of State, 7 September 1912, RDS, 312.00/
4827.
"^"^Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 815-820; Charles B.
Boyton, Assistant Attorney General to Attorney General,
8 June 1912, RDS, 312.00/4220; Ellsworth to Secretary of
State, 24 July 1912, RD£, 312.00/4535; Secretary of State
to Attorney General, 3 August 1912, RDS^, 312.00/4511.
112
dressed in federal army uniforms and carrying bombs tried
to enter the city but were turned back by American troops.
The following month Mexican raiders stole several horses
from a ranch down the river from El Paso."^^
In September when Pascual Orozco advanced on
Ojinaga, Presidio swelled with 500 refugees because the
seventy-five man federal garrison was no match for the
rebels.
The refugees became a problem because of a lack
of shelter or food for them. 46
Twenty wounded Mexicans arrived in Marathon on
October 1, 1912, seeking refuge and medical attention.
The Mexicans seemed to have been involved in recent raids
near Boquillas.
Later in October bandits crossed near
Langtry, Texas and stole a number of horses from the Piedra
Blanca Ranch owned by John R. Blocker.
Rumors persisted
through t^e remainder of 1912 that Mexican rebels crossed
and recrossed the river seeking medical aid.
Reports
also continued to circulate of Mexican bands raiding American ranches along most of the Big Bend.
Most of the
raiders belonged to a band of 1,000 rebels roaming near
^Edwards to Secretary of State, 29 July 1912, RDS,
812.00/4514; 23 August 1912, RDS, 812.00/4694; El Paso
Morning Times, 12 September 1912, p. 1.
46
Brownsville Daily Herald, 3 September 1912, p. 1;
Fabela, DHRM, VIV, pp. 53-55; Ellsworth to Secretary of
State, 4 September 1912, RDS, 312.00/4817.
113
the border. 47
The Brownsville area remained highly volatile in
February 1913 during the Successful Diaz-Reyes uprising
against Madero.
A rumor spread in Starr County that
Mexicans had distributed among themselves 100,000 rounds
of ammunition and several cases of rifles.
Mexican and
American officials believed that a move to invade Mexico
was imminent.
Some eighty Mexicans crossed the Rio Grande
from Texas and raided a rancho twenty miles from the
river.48
When, the Felicistas seized Matamoros in February,
Cameron County Sheriff C
T. Ryan requested Captain George
J. Head to order the Brownsville militia into active
service.
Worsening conditions and the flight of hundreds
of refugees to Brownsville necessitated a special guard
service.
The situation did not get out of hand, however,
for no outrages were recorded on the American side of the
river.
As calm returned to Matamoros, tension decreased
49
in Brownsville.
47
Fabela, DHRM, VIII, p. 156; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 11 October 1912, RDS, 812.00/5235; 24 October 1912, gDS, 812.00/5376; Secretary of State, 4 December
1912, RDS, 812.00/5637; J. G. Ramirez to R. S. Bravo,
31 October 1912, AREM, L-E-752.
^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 14, 21 February 1913,
pp. 1, 3.
^^Ibid., 19 February 1913, p. 3; 24 February 1913,
p» 2; Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 2 5 February
1913; RDS, 312.00/6373; 26 February 1913, RDS, 312.00/6379
114
In February 1913 considerable excitement existed in
Del Rio when word reached Las Vacas to expect an attack from
anti-Madero factions.
Practically all of the people moved
over to Del Rio to avoid the fighting.
After a few days
the fight failed to take place and people returned to their
homes.
Eagle Pass remained quiet during the Diaz-Reyes
uprisings in Mexico City.
Nevertheless, a number of Mexican
citizens and city officials from Piedras Negras crossed to
Eagle Pass to avoid any trouble should an attack occur in
that city.
As Madero fell from power in those tragic ten days
in 1913, rebel operations along the Big Bend intensified.
In February, 1913 Customs Inspector Luke Dowe described
conditions there as gradually changing from "bad to worse"
because of the
inability of the Madero government to check
rebels on the Mexican side.
Earlier in January two fights
with Mexican rebels occurred near Fabens.
On January 24,
1913, Mexican rebels fired on a cavalry patrol.
Six days
51
later a rebel band ambushed a Texas Ranger patrol.
Two weeks later on February 12, Mexican rebels
Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 28
February 1913, RD£, 312.00/6414; 1 March 1912, RD£, 812.00/
6441; Sen. Morris Sheppard to President Taft, 24 February
1912, RDS, 312.00/6557.
51
Luke Dowe to Joe Sitter, Customs Inspector at
El Paso, United States Customs Records, p. 332; Secretary
of War to Secretary of State, 24 January 1913, RDS^, 812.00/
5923; Thompson to Bielaski, 30 January 1913, RDS, 812.00/
6169.
115
ambushed three United States customs inspectors near
Pilares, killing one of the Americans and wounding two.
One week later American cowboys near Alpine reported armed
Mexicans raiding ranches in the vicinity.
were dispatched all along the river
Federal troops
to check rebel
activity in the Big Bend.
were quiet m
For the most part, conditions
52
El Paso in early 1913.
The border played an important role in the counterrevolutions, just as it had in the Madero revolt.
Mader-
istas charged there were violations of neutrality laws,
arms being smuggled to Mexican rebels, and rebels using
American territory to launch military expeditions.
Reports of gun smuggling continuously flooded the
offices of American officials all along the border.
Horses,
saddles, rifles, ammunition, canvasbags, legging, blankets,
and other supplies used by soldiers were taken to Mexico
by the hundreds and thousands.
United States authorities
also arrested Mexican army officials for recruiting in the
Valley.
In February 1912 the army increased patrols to
help enforce neutrality laws.
Six months later federal
agents sought to investigate an increase in recruiting
52
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 15 February
1912, RDS, 812.O0/62381/2; Brownsville Daily Herald, 18,
24 February 1913, p. 1; Sen. Sheppard to President Taft,
24 February 1913, RDS, 812.00/6557; Secretary of War to
Secretary of State, 1 March 1913, RD£, 312.00/6441;
Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. 108-109, 112-113.
116
men for the rebel forces along the frontier.^^
During the Reyes revolt, the Madero government
called attention to neutrality violations by revolutionaries operating in the United States.
Rumors claimed that
Mexicans daily transported weapons into Mexico.
Charges
that Mexican Americans had joined the Reyista army surfaced
frequently.
Francisco Chapa, prominent Mexican American
and close political advisor to Governor 0. B. Colquitt,
and Webb County Sheriff Amador Sanchez became involved
with the Reyista revolt.
Chapa, a San Antonio druggist,
was the most influential Mexican American politician in
the state.
He was a personal friend of Bernardo Reyes
and Miguel Quiroga, in whose mansion Reyes established
his headquarters in San Antonio.
Amador Sanchez, a
descendant from one of the founding families of Laredo,
was the political patron in Webb County.
valuable ranch land in Mexico.
Sanchez owned
Subsequently, he favored
the conservative element, Reyes and later Huerta.
Further-
more, the Republican faction in Laredo led by John A. Vails
supported Madero, challenging Sanchez and his Democratic
machine.
Governor Colquitt considered the Mexican American
vote crucial for his political future.
Thus, he courted
Chapa, whom he commissioned a lieutenant colonel on his
53
Mexican Ambassador to Acting Secretary of State,
29 February 1912, RDS, 312.00/1912; Attorney General to
Secretary of State, 18 June 1912, RDS, 812.00/4220.
117
/
personal staff and Sanchez on whom he depended for the
border Mexican American vote.
The close relationship between Colquitt, Chapa and
/
Sanchez led to a laxness in state officials apprehending
Reyistas using Texas as a base of operation against Madero.
The governor did order Texas Rangers to the border when
rebels began crossing from Texas; however, they actually
did little to limit revolutionary intrigue.
Federal prosecutors indicted Chapa and Sanchez for
violating American neutrality statutes by conspiring with
Reyes to overthrow Madero from Texas.
A barrage of national
and state Democratic politicians testified during their
trial in behalf of the two men.
were found guilty.
Nevertheless, both men
In less than a year, however, Chapa
and Sanchez were granted a pardon by President Taft.
Again,
Governor Colquitt and other national and state officials
including Senators Joseph W. Bailey, Charles C
Culberson
and Congressman John N. Garner pleaded with Taft for a
''
56
presidential pardon for Chapa and Sanchez.
On November 13, 1911, Reyes and sixteen other
rebels were arrested for violating the neutrality laws.
Fabela, DHRM, VI, pp. 295-296; Wood to Duncan,
17 November 1911, RDS, 312.00/2511; Harris and Sadler,
"The Reyes Conspiracy," pp. 32 9-332.
55
Harris and Sadler, "The Reyes Conspiracy," p. 334.
^^Ibid., pp. 335-342.
118
Other Reyistas were arrested in various parts of the border
through much of November and December.
Reyes gained free-
dom on bail, but remained in San Antonio while his supporters continued to plan for an invasion of Mexico.
They
continued to collect arms and war munitions along the
border.
Despite the energies of the Reyista movement in
Texas, Reyes found no support in Mexico when he crossed the
border December 13, 1911.
A group of from thirty to forty
men appeared near Laredo a few days later.
Beyond this
sighting, no large army assembled to support the rebel, who
on December 25 surrendered to the federales in Linares,
Nuevo Leon.
He was later taken to Mexico City to stand
trial for treason.57 Totally disillusioned, Reyistas along
the frontier ceased their activities.
run Its course. 53
The Reyes revolt had
The Reyes revolt failed because the United States
government did not permit it to succeed.
American author-
ities rigidly enforced the neutrality laws.
In addition,
the border was better patrolled and guarded than during
57
Brownsville Daily Herald, 20 November 1911, p. 1;
13, 26 December 1911, p. 1; Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 522;
1912, p. 713; Tanner, "The Texas Border," pp. 19-20; GarzaTrevino, Revolucion en Tamaulipas, pp. 95-96; Garrett to
Secretary of State, 19 December 1911, RDS, 312.00/2657;
Fabela, DHRM, VI, p. 4.16; Ross, Madero, pp. 255-256.
58
Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 713; E. E. Lorente
to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 16 January 1912,
AREM, 111/510 (73-13), "912," 41-7-15.
119
the M a d e r o p r e s e n c e in T e x a s .
It w a s much m o r e difficult
to t r a n s p o r t w a r m u n i t i o n s for the r e b e l s .
Madero r e i n -
forced h i s army a l o n g the border and placed an embargo
on all i m p o r t s o f arms and ammunition to Mexico to stop
the flow o f w e a p o n s into the hands of the R e y i s t a s . ^ ^
D e s p i t e M a d e r o ' s e f f o r t s , the importation of arms
to rebel f o r c e s i n t e n s i f i e d in early 1 9 1 2 .
In an attempt
to check the flow o f arms to M e x i c o , President Taft
ordered an e m b a r g o o n a l l e x p o r t s of arms to that country
early in M a r c h 1 9 1 2 .
The United States Congress passed a
similar r e s o l u t i o n o n M a r c h 1 4 , 1 9 1 2 , and Taft ordered
Stricter v i g i l a n c e a l o n g the b o r d e r .
60
R e b e l s , r e f u s i n g to be impeded by American
increased their smuggling o p e r a t i o n s .
laws,
Ammunition and arms
crossed the border from M a t a m o r o s to Ciudad Juarez through
their sister A m e r i c a n c i t i e s hidden in w a g o n s , c a r s , trains
and c o n c e a l e d o n i n d i v i d u a l s going to and from M e x i c o .
Less than a w e e k a f t e r the embargo b e g a n , a u t h o r i t i e s d i s covered a large c a c h e of a r m s at P r e s i d i o .
Two days later
on M a r c h 21 they arrested five m e n for exporting w e a p o n s
/
to Juarez from El Paso.
In April American officials at
59
Niemeyer, "Frustrated Invasion," p. 224; Holcombe,
"Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution," pp. 24-27.
^^Foreiqn Relations, 1912, pp. 732-733, 745, 746;
Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 12 March 1912,
RDS, 312.00/6116; "Strengthening the Neutrality Laws,"
The Nation, 21 March 1912, pp. 273-279.
120
Eagle Pass seized an arms shipment of 500 rifles and 20,000
rounds of ammunition heading for Ojinaga.
Also in April
an army patrol seized arms about to be smuggled into Mexico
near JTu a'r e z . 61
C o n d i t i o n s worsened along the border during the
summer of 1912 and thereafter as rebel activity
against M a d e r o in n o r t h e r n M e x i c o .
intensified
Reports increased of
men crossing repeatedly with large amounts of arms from
Brownsville to E l P a s o .
62
The United States responded to the several crises
during the Madero regime with military action.
In 1 9 1 1 ,
1912 and the early m o n t h s of 1913 President Taft had to
deploy and redeploy m i l i t a r y units to all border p o i n t s ,
as rebel activity in northern Mexico threatened the safety
of Americans living o n the Texas side of the river.
During the M a d e r o r e v o l u t i o n , Taft had been forced
to send military units to the border.
Most of the forces
T a n n e r , "The Texas Border," p p . 2 2 - 2 3 ; E s t r a d a ,
"Border R e v o l u t i o n , " p . 1 0 2 ; Secretary of War to Secretary
of S t a t e , 19 M a r c h 1 9 1 2 , R D S , 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 3 2 8 3 ; 17 A p r i l 1 9 1 2 ,
R D S , 3 1 2 . 0 0 / 3 6 2 4 ; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 28
March 1 9 1 2 , R D S , 3 1 2 . 0 0 / 3 4 5 4 ; El Paso Morning T i m e s ,
21 March 1 9 1 2 , p . 1.
^^Ellsworth to Secretary of S t a t e , 1 May 1 9 1 2 , R D S ,
3 1 2 . 0 0 / 3 8 0 7 ; Hillebrand to Attorney G e n e r a l , 3 May 1 9 1 2 ,
R D S , 3 1 2 . 0 0 / 3 9 6 2 ; A t t o r n e y General to Secretary of S t a t e ,
4 M a y 1 9 1 2 , R D S , 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 3 8 0 5 ; Secretary of War to Secretary
of S t a t e , 21 N o v e m b e r 1 9 1 2 , R D S , 3 1 2 . 0 0 / 5 5 5 0 ; A l b e r t o Leal
to Secretaria de R e l a c i o n e s E x t e r i o r e s , 19 September 1 9 1 2 ,
A R E M , L - E - 3 3 0 ; Brownsville Daily Herald, 10 October 1 9 1 2 ,
p . 1; El Paso M o r n i n g T i m e s , 13 A u g u s t 1 9 1 2 , p . 1.
121
I
were withdrawn in August, 1911 when Diaz resigned.
Within
a month, however, American officials found themselves
watching the situation along the border closely as rumors
of counterrevolutions sprang up.
Yet military officials
at first felt that they had enough troops along the border
to provide the needed protection.
Secretary of War Henry
L. Stimson suggested that remaining forces stationed along
the river in excess of the usual garrisons be removed.
The tense conditions created by the Madero revolt and prevailing at the time the troops had been ordered to the
border np longer existed.
The State Department concurred
with Stimson and suggested that only a limited number of
troops be left on the border to aid in enforcing neutrality
,
63
laws.
Texas Governor Colquitt took issue with the assumption that enough troops were on hand to protect Texans
along the border adequately.
The governor wired President
Taft offering to provide the necessary men to protect the
riverfront if the United States would incur the cost of
maintaining a state force.
Taft agreed.
When rumors began
to surface that Bernardo Reyes was to cross the river to
Mexico, Colquitt ordered Texas Rangers to Webb County,
63
Laredo Weekly Times, 24 September 1911, p. 5;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 25 August 1911, p. 1; 26 October
1911, p. 1; Secretary of State to Secretary of War,
17 October 1911, RDS, 312.00/2416.
122
and to the Brownsville and El Paso districts.
also intensified its border patrols.
The military
On November 20, 1911,
Texas Governor Colquitt ordered all Mexican revolutionists
to leave Texas within forty-eight hours.
He also ordered
seventeen more Texas Rangers to the border to carry through
his commands.
The governor requested that United States
troops be used to effect his order.
More troops were
deployed to the border, but not necessarily to help the
64
governor.
In 1912 the United States reacted to border conditions with strong tactics.
It condemned fighting across
from border cities like El Paso, where stray bullets
killed and wounded Americans.
The President deployed more
troops to all border points in 1912 and threatened to send
them into Mexico if conditions did not improve.
Early in February 1912 rebel forces threatened
and eventually attacked Ciudad Juarez, causing grave concern in El Paso.
During the fighting which followed the
mutiny on January 31, Colonel E. Z. Steever, commander at
Fort Bliss, notified Mexican officers they must refrain
from shooting into American territory.
If bullets fell
64
Laredo Weekly Times, 12 November 1911, p. 3;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 27 September 1911, p. 1; 23
November 1911, p. 1; Secretary of War to Secretary of
State, 21 November 1911, RDS, 312.00/2524; 22 November
1911, RD£, 312.00/2532; 29 November 1911, RDS,. 312.00/
5617; Harris and Sadler, "The Reyes Conspiracy," pp. 333334.
123
on A m e r i c a n s o i l , the United States threatened to send
troops into J u a r e z and p o l i c e the c i t y .
Governor
Colquitt o r d e r e d R a n g e r s to El Paso to protect T e x a n s .
L a t e r in F e b r u a r y A m e r i c a n troops received r e i n forcements a l o n g the Rio G r a n d e and served notice on
M e x i c a n o f f i c i a l s that no firing into American territory
would be t o l e r a t e d .
The United States insisted on a
neutral zone a l o n g the b o r d e r .
President Taft felt it
his d u t y to p r e v e n t injury to A m e r i c a n s on this side of
the b o r d e r , e v e n if it m e a n t sending troops into M e x i c o .
W h e n r e b e l s a g a i n threatened Juarez late in F e b r u ary, E l P a s o C o u n t y Sheriff E d w a r d s announced that he would
commission to c a r r y a r m s a l l citizens w h o would help p r o tect the c i t y .
for c o m m i s s i o n s .
F i v e hundred El Pasoans quickly applied
G o v e r n o r C o l q u i t t wired the sheriff to
use c a u t i o n in i s s u i n g c o m m i s s i o n s and n o t to arm "undes i r a b l e s " w h o w o u l d e s c a l a t e the c r i s i s .
Military o f f i -
cials felt t h a t w i t h the a r r i v a l of 2,200 additional
troops from San A n t o n i o , E l Paso w a s w e l l protected by
the a r m y .
The c r i s i s subsided after a w e e k .
66
/
In May and June when Juarez again appeared
Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 3 78; El Paso Morning
Times, 3 February 1912, p. 1; Brownsville Daily Herald,
3 February 1912, p. 1.
^^Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 724-725; El Paso
Morning Times, 25, 26, 27, 23 February 1912, p. 1; Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 27 February 1912,
RDS, 312.00/2917.
124
threatened, Colquitt requested more soldiers for El Paso.
Two troops of cavalry were sent to the border town.
The
governor also ordered the state militia to prepare to
defend the city in case the army could not stop the fightmg
in Juarez.
By mid-August when the federales retook
Juarez, the border seemed to have an adequate number of
troops for protection.
67
Citizens in the Big Bend also requested military
protection.
In March troops from Fort Sam Houston were
sent to the remote area after reports that Mexicans were
threatening that sector.
in mid-March
Troops went to Eagle Pass when
rebels threatened to attack Piedras Negras.
In May, when Mexican rebels attacked the village of
Guadalupe on the border, a company of infantry and a troop
of cavalry moved to Fabens, Texas.
68
Three months later troops and a sheriff's posse
hurried to Sierra Blanca and Fabens when word reached
El Paso that Mexican rebels had crossed and raided the
two border towns.
Governor Colquitt demanded that
Laredo Weekly Times, 26 May 1912, p. 9; El Paso
Morning Times, 2 July 1912, p. 1; Governor Colquitt to
Secretary of War, 25 May 1912, RDS, 812.00/4014; 13 June
1911, RDS, 812.00/4311; Secretary of War to Secretary of
State, 15 August 1912, RDS, 312.00/4629.
68
Laredo Weekly Times, 10 March 1912, p. 1; Browns•
ville Daily Herald, 11 March 1912, p. 2; El Paso Morning
Times, 12 March 1912, p. 1; Secretary of War to Secretary
of State, 22 May 1912, RDS, 312.00/3972.
125
American military forces protect Sierra Blanca and Fabens
from an "invasion" or "I shall repel it with the state
69
troops."
But the raids represented no invasion of Texas;
the governor had overreacted.
The appearance of a large
rebel force at Ojinaga in September made it necessary to
increase the border patrols in the area.
No major engage-
ment occurred.
In South Texas, conditions seemed to have improved
after the Reyes plot ended.
An editorial in the Browns-
ville Daily Herald on March 7, 1912, summed up the
situation:
There has been a good deal in the newspapers of
late about trouble in Tamaulipas. The plain truth
is that there is no serious trouble in that state or
there has not been lately. This is one of the instances where the smoke bears an undue proportion to
the fire. The most careful inquiry into the situation
fails to uncover any happenings of any very alarming
nature over there. A few days ago some bands of
marauders numbering less than fifty men, raided and
looted the village of Burgos. They appear to have
done some loud talking of the things they were going
to do. That is the whole story. There is no fear in
Matamoros of these robbers. The fact that Burgos is
about 200 miles from Matamoros is in itself a fact
worth remembering. All this wild talk should be
^
stopped because it is hurting business in the Valley.
The following month Captain J. N. Monro from Fort Sam
Houston arrived in Brownsville to investigate border conditions which might be influenced by the events in
^^Ibid., 10 August 1912, RD£, 812.00/4601; El Paso
Morning Times, 11 August 1912, p. 1.
^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 7 March 1912, p. 1.
126
Matamoros.
He was to judge the necessity of stationing
more troops in the area.
He reported that conditions
appeared to him as "quiet as a church" and he saw no
.r
1
71
reason for alarm.
When President Taft placed an embargo on arms to
Mexico in March, 1912, the army instructed troops to act
with great vigilance in suppressing all attempts at
violating the president's proclamation.
The government
ordered all shipments of war munitions seized even if
consigned to known dealers, corporations, revolutionary
agents or individuals.
All federal officials along the
border received instructions to enforce the decree to the
letter.72
For most of 1912 rumors persisted that hundreds
of Mexicans and Mexican Americans crossed the border
all along the river to join rebel factions.
Since most
of the reports could not be confirmed, however, the army
decreased its border patrols.
North of Laredo the very
close working relationships between American officials and
their Mexican counterparts contributed to limited rebel
'^•''Ibid., 4 April 1912, p. 1.
72
El Paso Morning Times, 20 March 1912, p. 1;
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 27 March 1911, RDS,
312.00/3435.
127
^. .^ 73
activity.
In October American authorities decided to arrest
and detain any insurrectionists who entered the country.
It seems that once released many of the rebels returned to
Mexico and again engaged in raiding across the border.
When Mexico requested that insurrectionists held in American custody
be extradited, however, American officials
refused, stating that the treaty did not cover political
74
prisoners.
In October Governor Colquitt increased the number
of Rangers along the border.
The governor also inquired
if the United States government would object to Rangers
crossing into Mexico in "hot pursuit" of Mexican marauders.
He learned that only federal troops could cross into a
foreign country and only with the permission of that
country.
•x.
.u
Mexico did not wish to have Americans enter
-^
75
its territory.
/
I
As Madero faced Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes
m
Laredo Weekly Times, 10 March 1912, p. 6; Leon
Gomez to Secretari'a de Relaciones Exteriores, 26 February
1912, AREM, L-E-829; 21 March 1912, AREM, L-E-733; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 16 March 1912, RDS, 812.00/
3339; 2 December 1912, RDS, 812.00/5597; Secretary of War
to Secretary of State, 29 July 1912, RDS, 312.00/4501.
74Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 348
Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 13 October 1912, RDS, 312.00/5275; Colquitt to Taft, 22 October
1912, RDS, 312.00/5372; Acting Secretary of State to
Colquitt, 31 October 1912, RD£, 312.00/5372.
128
Mexico City, the
border became a powder keg.
The United
States responded to the crisis all along the border with
much concern.
The continued disorders in Mexico City gave
Governor Colquitt an excuse to demand that Taft intervene
in Mexico under the Monroe Doctrine to protect American
lives and property and to restore order to the Mexican
nation.
As word came to Austin that Nuevo Laredo and
Matamoros had rebelled in favor of the counterrevolutionists, Colquitt ordered the Texas national guard to the
border at those places.
76
Governor Colquitt pressed his demand for federal
protection of the border as the situation in Mexico City
worsened.
The governor charged that Texas was bearing
the "expense and suspense" of the conflict along the
United States-Mexican border.
He said that "the time has
arrived when property of the state is endangered by incursions of Mexicans that are growing in numbers along the
border country."
77
From along the border came frantic
appeals to the governor's office for aid and protection
of women, families and property.
Conquitt charged that
the Mexican population along the border, both in Texas
and Mexico, had been aroused as rumors of intervention
Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 705; Brownsville
Daily Herald, 17 February 1913, p. 1; Laredo Weekly
Times, 23 February 1913, p.- 3.
"^^El Paso Morning Times, 20 February 1913, p. 1
129
spread.
He feared an uprising along the border.
Yet the
War Department stood by its contention that the 4,000
troops along the border were sufficient to repel any
Mexican uprising. 78
By
the time of Madero's fall all four major areas
on the frontier had become tense.
Citizens in Brownsville
/
became concerned when Matamoros went over to Diaz on
February 17, 1913.
Army
troops in Brownsville were
ordered to take necessary steps to prevent the passage of
bullets across the boundary line.
Declaring that the life
of the Mexican commander at Matamoros would be "forfeit
in case a single Texan is harmed," Governor Colquitt
ordered state militia companies from Houston, Austin and
79
Corpus Christi to Brownsville.
At one point Captain George J. Head, commander
of the state militia in Brownsville, requested permission
to cross into Matamoros to protect the American consulate
which had been threatened with destruction.
The governor
denied the request because it greatly exaggerated the
threat.
As a precaution the federal government sent more
troops to Brownsville to protect Americans on the border
and to prevent the state militia from crossing into
^^Ibid., 21 February 1913, p. 2.
"^^Acting Secretary of War to Secretary of State,
21 February 1913, RD£, 812.00/6294; Brownsville Daily
Herald, 24 February 1913, p. 1.
130
Mexico.
80
By February 27, 1913, the situation in Matamoros
and Brownsville had been settled.
the state militia from the border.
The governor withdrew
The following day
Matamoros commander Esteban Ramos invited American military
officials in Brownsville to visit him in Matamoros. They
were well received and found no signs of conflict. 81
Citizens in Laredo requested that federal troops
be sent to provide protection for that city.
After re-
ceiving a telegram from Laredo officials that Nuevo Laredo
had fallen to the Diaz faction. Governor Colquitt ordered
troops to the city.
In the Big Bend sector troops also
stood on the alert for Mexicans wanting to take refuge
82
in the United States.
El Paso citizens also requested military protection.
Just before the fall of Madero, troops from Fort
Bliss had been ordered to Galveston, Texas for possible
duty in Mexico, and El Pasoans demanded that Fort Bliss
be strengthened.
El Paso Mayor C
C
Kelley stated that
unless more troops were sent to the city,
he would be
^°Ibid., 25, 26 February 1913, p. 1; El Paso
Morning Times, 25 February 1913, p. 1; Secretary of War
to Secretary of State, 25 February 1913, RDS, 312.00/
6354.
^•^Brownsville Daily Herald, 27, 28 February 1913,
p. 1.
^^Colquitt to Taft, 15 February 1913, RDS, 812.00/
6254, Curtis to Secretary of State, 24 February 1913, RDS^,
312.00/6327.
131
forced to organize and arm citizens.
• A 83
arrived.
Reinforcements soon
Requests by the Madero government to transport
troops through Texas caused much excitement in the state.
The first request came in February 1912 when Mexico asked
permission to pass 500 to 600 troops from Eagle Pass
(Piedras Negras) to El Paso (Ciudad Juarez) over the
Southern Pacific.
The troops would be unarmed; their arms
and equipment would be transported in separate cars.
The
United States understood that the troops were needed to
protect Americans in Juarez and not to be used to launch
an offensive against rebel elements.
Governor Colquitt
first expressed no objections to the movement of the
Mexican troops through Texas with proper safeguards.
.
.
citizens m
But
/
El Paso feared that rebels in Juarez might
resist the entry of Mexican troops from American territory
and precipitate a battle endangering American lives and
property.
The governor refused to give his permission and
even threatened to send state troops to Eagle Pass to
prevent the entry of the Mexican troops.
Colquitt charged
that information he had received suggested that the Mexicans planned to use the troops to launch an offensive
El Paso Morning Times, 26, 27 February 1913,
p. 1; Sen. Sheppard to Secretary of State, 25 February
1913, RDS, 312.00/6 376; Secretary of War to Secretary
of State, 26 February 1913, RDS, 812.00/6332.
132
against the rebels in Chihuahua.
The Mexican government
withdrew its request because of the opposition from
Conquitt.34
Mexico made another request in September 1912.
The
Madero government this time wanted to send troops from
/
El Paso (Ciudad Juarez) to Arizona (Sonora).
would cross Texas, New Mexico and Arizona.
The troops
The three
governors agreed because Madero promised to use the troops
to provide protection for Americans on the border.
The
troops would drive rebels from the northern states.
Colquitt agreed because the Mexican troops would cross
through a very small uninhabited portion of the state.
When Mexico made a third request in October to pass troops
through Texas from Eagle Pass (Piedras Negras) to Del Rio
(Las Vacas), the governor refused.
He feared that the
desolate area made an attack on the troops quite possible. 8 5
With the increase in traffic along the border
during the revolutionary period, incidents between Americans and Mexicans became inevitable.
flicts occurred in border towns.
Several near con-
On February 5, 1912,
Rafael Gonzalez, commandant of the Police in Matamoros,
^^Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 833-893; Laredo
Weekly Times, 11 February 1912, p. 2; 13 February 1912,
pp. 5-6; El Paso Morning Times, 9, 10, 20 February 1912,
p. 1.
^^Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 833, 892, 396-899;
"Mexico and Nicaragua," The Independent, 10 October 1912,
pp. 818-819.
133
notified Brownsville Chief of Police J. L. Crixell that
a law had been passed by the State government prohibiting
American officials from carrying weapons in Matamoros.
The
action was in retaliation for a similar action taken by
Brownsville city officials months before, when they
Q C.
arrested several Maderistas for carrying guns in the city.
The most serious incident occurred on February 15,
1912, when twenty soldiers proceeded to the Santa Fe Street
Bridge in El Paso to relieve a detachment already there.
The soldiers took the street railway car that crossed into
Ciudad Juarez before arriving at the bridge.
Being igno-
rant of the topography and the route of the car, the
soldiers remained on the car instead of getting off before
the car turned into Mexico.
Mexican troops detained the
soldiers but released them after the error had been
explained to Mexican officials.
The crossing of American
soldiers into Mexico threw Ciudad Juarez into excitement.
People in the city panicked for fear of American intervention.
A mob of Mexicans surrounded the soldiers and anti-
American feelings sharpened.
Mexican officials quickly
closed the birdges to all traffic.
Within forty-eight
hours the whole affray had been settled and conditions
^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 5 February 1912, p. 1.
134
returned to normal.
87
In June 1912, Mexican officials protested to
American officers in El Paso the "harshness in the searching of Mexican women for munitions while on their way to
/
Ciudad Juarez."
It appears that United States Secret
Service agents forced women to take off their shoes and
stockings in the search for munitions.
The Mexican govern-
ment suggested that if the matter was not corrected it
"may bring about a very ugly situation." 8 8
Several incidents between Americans and Mexicans
occurred in August 1912. On the third American and Mexican
soldiers exchanged fifty shots near El Paso.
No one was
hurt, but both sides blamed the other for starting the
shooting.
Two weeks later Mexicans
filed a strong pro-
test with the American government over the release from
prison of Amador Sanchez on President Taft's pardon.
Sanchez had been convicted of violating the neutrality
laws for assisting Reyes in his military expedition
Tanner, "The Texas Border," p. 52; Secretary
of War to Secretary of State, 16 February 1912, RDS,
812.^00/2807; 16 February 1912, RDS, 812.00/2811; Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores to Mexican Ambassador to
United States, 15 February 1912, AREM, 12-8-85; Edwards
to Secretary of State, 15 February 1912, RD£, 812.00/
2802.
^^Tom Lea (attorney for revolutionists in El Paso)
to Rep. William Sulse, 20 June 1912, RDS, 812.00/4269.
135
organized in Texas. 89
Peace did not come to Mexico or the Mexico-Texas
border with the triumph of Madero.
Within months, counter-
revolutionists sought to challenge Madero:
Emiliano
Zapata, Pascual Orozco, Felix Diaz and Bernardo Reyes.
The Orozco and Reyes rebellions had direct impacts on the
Mexico-Texas border.
Rebels recruited and bought munitions
across the Rio Grande while using the United States as a
basis of operations.
Short of all types of war materials,
they raided American ranches on the Texas side of the
frontier to supplement their needs.
The Huerta revolt
had repercussions along the frontier.
Chaos prevailed in
Brownsville, Laredo and the Big Bend country;
El Paso
was less threatened by the murder of Madero.
There were several crises along the border between
Mexican and American officials during Madero's term.
Despite the near clashes, the United States government
did not believe the situation serious enough to commit
large numbers of troops to the frontier.
Texas Governor
0. B. Colquitt, however, overreacted and demanded federal
protection for the southern (western) boundary of Texas.
El Paso Morning Times, 3 August 1912, p. 1;^
Gral. Jeffe de la Zona Militar (no name) to Secretaria
de Relaciones Exteriores, 21 August 1912, AREM, III/510
(73-26), "912-14"/I.
136
The problems between Mexico and the United States
were just surfacing in 1913.
With the election of Woodrow
Wilson to the American presidency and the rise of Victoriano
Huerta to power in Mexico, American-Mexican international
relations began to face a serious crisis.
Most of northern
Mexico refused to recognize Huerta and rebelled.
The
border along the river again became the home-base of
Mexican revolutionists.
CHAPTER IV
HUERTISMO AND THE MEXICO-TEXAS BORDER
The February 9, 1913, cuartelazo (coup) by conservative elements ended the Madero revolution, but not
the Mexican Revolution.
General Victoriano Huerta, to
whom Madero had turned for the defense of his government,
used the crisis to assume the presidency himself.
Promi-
nent Maderistas, led by Venustiano Carranza in northern
Mexico, quickly denounced Huerta's takeover.
Furthermore,
the new American president, Woodrow Wilson, would not
accept Huerta's claim to the Mexican presidency.
Subse-
quently, counterrevolutionary movements sprang up in
Mexico.
Northern Mexico became the center of resistance.
Inevitably the border between Mexico and the United
States—especially along the Texas line—exploded with
revolutionary activity, as once again it became indispensable to rebel activity.
The United States government
again responded militarily to the pressures created by
activities along the borderlands.
Immediately after the Decena Tragica (Ten Tragic
Days) border cities declared their alliance to Huerta and
by March 1913 all major cities in northern Mexico were
137
138
under federal control.
had two adversaries:
Nevertheless, Huerta's government
Venustiano Carranza in northern
Mexico and Woodrow Wilson in the United States.
Conse-
quently during the eighteen months that Huerta governed,
Mexico experienced revolutionary violence as well as foreign
interference and eventually intervention.
Much of the revo-
lutionary activity occurred along the border.
meddling came from the giant to the North.
The foreign
President
Wilson sent John Lind as his personal spokesman and representative to demand peace, immediate free elections, a
promise from Huerta that he would not be a presidential
candidate and an agreement by all parties to abide by the
results of the elections.
The mission failed, despite
Wilson's threats of armed intervention, grant of belligerent status to the revolutionists, and threat to lift the
Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 19141915: The Convention of Aguascaliente (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., Inc., 1906), p. 13; Richard M. Estrada,
"Border Revolution: The Mexican Revolution in Ciudad
Juarez-El Paso Area, 1906-1915" (M.A. thesis. University
of Texas at El Paso, 1975), pp. 114-116; Kenneth J. Grieb,
The United States and Huerta (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1969), pp. 56-57, 104, 110-111; Irvin Goff
McCann, With the National Guard on the Border (St. Louis:
C V. Mosby Co., 1917), p. 110; Berta Ulloa Ortiz,
"Carranza y el Armamento Norte-Americano," Historia Mexicana 17 (Octubre-Diciember, 1967), p. 257; Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington,
D . C : Government Printing Office, 1920), 1913, pp. 820323, 866; 1914, p. 446; "Both Sides a Debate: Mexico and
the United States," The Independent, 6 November 1913,
p. 263.
13 9
embargo.
With the Lind Mission a failure, Wilson turned to
ending the embargo as his vehicle to rid Mexico of Huerta
and bring democracy.
The president's decision to lift the
Taft embargo on February 3, 1914, amounted to a declaration
of support for the Constitutionalists.
While Huerta had
continued to import arms from Europe, the Constitutionalists had no seaports, and thus had been unable to obtain
arms except the few smuggled across the Rio Grande.
The
Constitutionalists, with the lifting of the embargo, had
unhindered access to American war supplies and moved to
challenge Huerta on more equal terms.
The rebels, who
could have enlarged their armies earlier if they had not
faced a shortage of arms, immediately enlisted hundreds of
men.
Within days the Constitutionalists emptied the shelves
of every kind of ammunition stored along the border from
Brownsville to El Paso.
They transferred rifles by the
tens of thousands and ammunition by the millions of rounds
from Texas to Mexico.
Ammunition and guns seized by
American authorities during the embargo had to be released
2
Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), p. 6; Kenneth J. Grieb,
"The Lind Mission to Mexico," Carribbean Studies 7 (January
1963), p. 25; "The Tragedy of Mexico," North American
Review 202 (September 1915), p. 321; Kendrick A. Clements,
"Woodrow Wilson's Mexican Policy, 1913-1915," Journal of
Diplomatic History 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 116-118.
140
to the rebels.
3
The War Department opposed lifting the embargo for
fear that if the United States later invaded Mexico munitions purchased from Americans would be used against United
States troops.
Since March 1912 American troops had been
assisting in the enforcement of the neutrality laws.
With
the embargo lifted, their duties lessened; troops were
withdrawn from the riverfront, despite officers' concern
about possible raiding.
With Huerta apparently fairly well entrenched in
power through the first of 1913, he seemed to strengthen
his position further when he negotiated a $50 million loan
from European bankers and an increase in arms imports.
Wilson's decision to intervene in Mexican affairs and
thereby secure the ouster of Huerta arose in April 1914.
A detachment of sailors sent to purchase fuel in Tampico
was seized by government troops.
In the story which
3
P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention:
The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 127-128; Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 447-448; President Wilson and the Mexican
Embargo," The Outlook, 14 February 1914, p. 330; "Lifting
the Embargo on Arms," The American Review of Reviews, p.
266; Clements, "Wilson's Mexican Policy," p. 22; Floyd
Ford Ewing, "Carranza's Foreign Relations: An Experiment
in Nationalism" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas,
1952), p. 30; Garna Loy Christian, "Sword and Plowshare:
The Symbiotic Development of Fort Bliss and El Paso, Texas,
1949-1918" (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University,
1977), p. 323; Laredo Weekly Times, 3 February 1914, p. 10;
15 February 1914, p. 2; Brownsville Daily Herald,
3 February 1914, p. 1.
141
reached the American public, American "marines" had been
insulted.
The honor of the nation had to be upheld."^
On
April 21, 1914 President Wilson ordered the military occupation of Veracruz to prohibit a shipment of arms aboard
the Ypiranga, a German vessel, from reaching the Mexican
^ 5
port.
Despite President Wilson's request that Carranza
issue a statement in support of the use of armed force to
"the redress of a specific indignity," the Constitionalist
leader insisted that American forces withdraw from Mexico.
Carranza later warned that if the American forces moved
beyond Veracruz, the Carrancistas stood ready to fight
both the Americans and Huerta.
As a show of seriousness
Carranza ordered all his generals on the border to prepare
for any eventuality with the United States.
The generals
already were apprehensive that an American force would
Haley, Revolution and Intervention, pp. 129-131;
Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 448-449; Robert E. Quirk, An
Affair of Honor, Woodrow Wilson and The Occupation of
Veracruz (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press,
1962), p. 40; Quirk's book is the best published account
of the incident.
Francisco Bulnes, in The Whole Truth About Mexico
(New York: M. Bulnes Co., 1916), suggested that Wilson's
actions in Veracruz sought to force Huerta to divide his
forces: "It had no other object than that of protecting
Villa's attack in the north by obliging Huerta to divert
his forces to the east, and of preventing the German boat,
Ypiranga, from unloading at Veracruz, the arms and ammunition, she was to bring over to Huerta," p. 28 6.
142
invade northern Mexico from Texas.^
When it appeared the affair might degenerate into
an ugly situation, the governments of Argentina, Brazil
and Chile (ABC powers) offered to mediate.
Venustiano
Carranza opposed a conference that also proposed to deal
with the internal affairs of the republic.
The conference
met, however, in Niagara Falls, Canada, from May 20 to
June 24, 1914, but, without the Carrancistas, the negotiations were futile.
Within a month after the conference
adjourned, Huerta resigned.
In September Wilson announced
the withdrawal of American forces, who left Veracruz on
November 23, 1914.
The military efforts to remove Huerta came from
the Mexicans, especially Carranza.
During the crucial
days after Huerta assumed power, Carranza did not have the
funds to organize resistance, but he negotiated financial
upport while he kept Huerta at bay.
Carranza also needed
time to allow his military followers to withdraw closer to
the border and away from federal forces.
With financial
support in hand and his forces out of danger. Governor
6
f
Luis Fernando C'Amaya, La goberna Convencion
Revolucionaria, 1914-1916 (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial F.
Trillas, S.A., 1966), p. 361; Brownsville Daily Herald,
22 April 1914, p. 1; Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 480;
Haley, Revolution and Intervention, p. 136.
7
Haley, Revolution and Intervention, pp. 142, 194;
Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 516-518.
143
Carranza demanded Huerta's resignation.
would cease their activities.
In return, rebels
Huerta rejected Carranza's
demands.3
By the first week of March the anti-Huerta revolution in Coahuila spread to Chihuahua, Sonora, Sinaloa and
later in the month to Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.
Huerta
ordered federal forces in the north to establish control.
This forced Carranza to abandon Saltillo and move to
Monclova where he declared himself First Chief of the
Constitutionalist Army.
On March 26, 1913, Carranza issued
the Plan de Guadalupe in which he outlined his revolutionary program emphasizing the return to constitutional government.
From Monclova Carranza moved his headquarters to
Piedras Negras where he issued a plea for American
9
sympathy and support.
p
James Daniel, Mexico and the Americas (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 164; Charles C Cumberland,
Mexican Revolution, The Constitutional Years (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1972), pp. 16-20; Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 726-723; Luis G. Zorrilla, Historia de
las Relaciones entre Mexico y Los Estados Unidos de Ame"rica,
II (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Porrua, S.A., 1966), p. 243;
Ewing, "Carranza's Foreign Relations," pp. 16-17; Michael
C Meyer, Huerta: A Political Portrait (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), pp. 83-86.
9
*
f
Emilio Portes Gil, Autobiografia de la Revolucion
Mexicana: Un Tratado de Interpretacion Historia (Mexico,
D.F.: Institute Mexicana de Cultura, 1964), pp. 130-131:
Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and
Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 22; Josefina E.
de Fabela, Documentos Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana,
I (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Jus, S.A., 1970), pp. 22-23;
144
Wilson did not necessarily approve of Carranza, but
he most certainly disapproved of Huerta.
Carranza's origi-
nal call for a return to constitutional government had impressed Wilson.
Probably for that reason, the United States
eventually took the action that favored the rebels, namely
the lifting of the embargo.
Even before that, Wilson had
suggested to Carranza that he would permit the passage of
arms if the First Chief guaranteed protection of American
property and premised to hold free elections.
The Constitu-
tionalist leader had no quarrel with guaranteeing American
property, but refused to allow the United States to interfere in the political affairs of the republic.
continued to ponder his options.
Wilson then
He decided to aid the
rebels indirectly, by lifting the embargo and by occupying
Veracruz, which in turn led to the resignation of Huerta.
The Constitutionalists' efforts to remove Huerta
took seventeen months.
By theft and ambush the impover-
ished army of irregulars, bandits, guerillas and volunteers prevented a federal offensive and slowly pushed the
federals southward.
By mid-1914 the Carrancistas had
driven government forces from the north.
On July 15,
Huerta presented his resignation to the Mexican Congress;
Zorrilla, Relaciones Entre Mexico y Estados Unidos II, pp.
239-245; Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 721, 734, 784; Grieb,
United States and Huerta, pp. 32-35; Daniel, Mexico and
the Americas, p. 164.
Ortiz, "Carranza y el Armamento Norte-Americano,"
145
five days later he sailed for Europe.
Francisco Carvajal,
the former president of the Supreme Court whom Huerta
appointed Minister of Foreign Relations, ascended to the
presidency and began the futile task of negotiating with the
Constitutionalists.
On August 1, Carrancista forces entered
the city and a week later the First Chief took possession of
the National Palace.
This second revolution, fought mostly
along the Mexico-United States border—especially along the
Texas frontier line, the struggle had not been easy.
As in the Madero, Orozco and Reyes revolutions,
each Mexican frontier city played an important role in
the intrigue of the war.
Border towns stood to benefit
whomever held them, since they stood opposite American
cities.
It was the Constitutionalists who realized the
most from the American border.
It became vital to the
success of their cause.
The first major place to suffer the agony of war
became Matamoros.
The Felix Diaz family had large land
holdings in the Matamoros area.
Thus the city declared
its support for the Diaz-Reyes uprising on February 17,
p. 2.53; Arthur S. Link, Wilson, the New Freedom (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, '1956), pp. 338-393,
•^•^Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism, p. 23; Cumberland,
The Constitutional Years, pp. 112-122, 142-143; Portes
Gil, Autobiograf la de la" Revolucion, p. 137; William Carol,
"The North and South War m Mexico," The World's Work
(January 1914), pp. 304-306; Laredo Weekly Times, 18 May
1913, p. 2; Meyer, Huerta, pp. 208-209.
146
1913.
Military and civil officials who had denounced
Madero then bledged their support for Huerta when it became apparent that he would be the one to govern Mexico. "'"^
Matamoros was important to the Carrancistas as a
port of entry.
The border city had rail lines linking it
with all major cities in northern Mexico and more important
with two supply centers in the United States, San Antonio
and New Orleans.
Supplies from New Orleans or New York
also could be unloaded at Bagdad near Matamoros.
The campaign to capture Matamoros began when rebel
General Lucie Blanco moved north early in April 1913,
capturing several towns before reaching the frontier.
Once en the river, he occupied Guerrero, Mier, and Camargo,
then moved en Reynosa and Rio Bravo, all northwest of
Matamoros.
Federal forces either abandoned these munici-
palities or, as in the case of Mier, went over to the
Carrancistas.
Most of the federals fled their positions
and sought refuge in the United States.
Reynosa fell to
the Constitutionalists on May 10, when the federal garrison
12
'^
Giro R. de la Garza-Trevino, Tamaulipas: Apuntos
Historicos (Ciudad Victoria, Tamp.: Universadad de
Tamaulipas, 1956), p. 30; Brownsville Daily Herald, 24 May
1913, p. 1; Juan Barragan Rodriguez, Historia del Ejercito
Constitutionalista (Mexico, D.F.: Tallares de la Editorial
Stylo, 1946), p. 123.
13
Department of State, Records Relation to the
Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910, 1929, Jesse H. Johnson
to Secretary of State, 7 April 1913, RDS, 312.00/7129.
147
crossed the river to Hidalgo, Texas.
Both sides destroyed
several hemes, businesses, railroad lines and bridges.
The rebels captured Rio Bravo two days later when the small
federal force evacuated the town.
By the end of May the
rebels controlled all border cities in the area opposite
the Lower Rio Grande Valley except Matamoros."^^
By April Lucie Blanco reached the outskirts of the
border town, forcing the federal garrison in the city under
Major Esteban Ramos to prepare to defend the plaza.
A call
went out to Matamerenses to defend the city from American
aggression, implying that the Constitutionalists were elements of that aggression.
On May 12 the civilian population
of Matamoros fled to Brownsville when a rumor spread that
14
« * * . * •
Giro R. de la Garza-Trevino, La Revolucion
Mexicana en el Estado de Tamaulipas, Tomo II, (Mexico,
D.F.: Liberia de Manuel Porrua, S.A., 1973), p. 24, 167;
A. Garza, Consul en Brownsville to Secretary of Foreign
Relations, 13 May 1913, Archivo General de la Secretaria
de Relaciones Exteriores de Mexico (AREM), Mexico D.F.
Citation refers to group title, "Revolucion Mexicana
durante los anes de 1910 a 1920," L-E-750; Weekly Report,
10 May 1913, RDS, 812.00/7606. Early in May 1913 military
personnel stationed in the border began to send weekly reports concerning revolutionary activity in their sector.
The reports were sent to the commanding General for the
Southern District of Texas who compiled the various reports
and submitted a lengthy report to the Secretary of War,
who in turn sent a copy to the Secretary of State. In the
RDS records the copy sent to the Secretary of State has
been recorded. The reports are simply titled "Weekly
Reports"; thus, I will use the same title in my citations
followed by the date sent and the document number; Brownsville Daily Herald, 12 May 1913, p. 1; Fabela, DHRM, XIV,
p. 227; "Jesse Perez Memoirs," p. 50 (Archives: University
of Texas, Austin, Texas).
143
Blanco might attack the town.
Most returned several days
later, only to retreat to Brownsville on May 24."''^
From Rio Bravo, on May 20, General Lucie Blanco
demanded the surrender of the city.
He informed American
Consul Jesse H. Johnson that all foreigners should leave
the city and not allow their homes or business places to
be used by the federals because they would be in danger of
destruction.
Blanco also asked Johnson to supervise the
evacuation of non-combatants from the city.
The attack on
the plaza began on June 1, and lasted four days until the
federal garrison abandoned the city and crossed to Brownsville.
Many of the wounded, both federal and rebel, sought
medical aid on the Texas side of the border.
Blanco
quickly reinstated city officials who had been elected
during the Madero regime.
16
Matamoros became a storehouse for Constitutionalist
operations in northern Mexico.
Tons of military supplies
and food poured into the city to be resdistributed to
other sectors in northern Mexico.
Thousands of soldiers
came to the city where they regrouped and went on to
15
"*
Garza-Trevino, Tamaulipas, pp. 30, 161; Johnson
to Secretary of State, 24 May 1913, RDS, 812.00/7760;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 16, 19 May 1913, p. 1; "Jesse
Perez Memoirs," p. 51.
Rodriguez, Ejercito Censtitucionalista, pp. 122128; Brownsville Daily Herald, 20^ 24 May 1913^, p. 1;
3, 4 June 1913, p. 1; Garza-Trevino, Revolucion Mexicana
en Tamaulipas, pp. 26-29, 175-180.
14 9
campaign along the border.
The Huerta government made no
effort to retake the city.
The only harassment occurred
when a federal gunboat shelled a rebel camp near the river
in mid-summer.
The city remained quiet for the remainder
of the time Huerta was in power.
17
On August 6, 1913, General Blanco announced that
he would implement in Tamaulipas the article on agrarian
reform of the Plan de San Luis Potosi and the Plan de
Guadalupe.
Blanco confiscated 1,300 acres in the Hacienda
de los Borregos, owned by Felix Diaz, eight miles south of
Matamoros.
On August 30, Blanco divided the land among
thirteen families who had tilled the soil for the Diaz
.
., 18
family.
Piedras Negras, like Matamoros, was quickly targeted by
the Carrancistas forces.
On February 23, 1913,
the Huerta garrison abandoned Piedras Negras.
A 400 man
rebel force led by Jesus Carranza quickly took over the
city.
The little town was the first port of entry to fall
to the revolutionists.
Its value lay in the use of the
city to introduce arms into northern Mexico from the
Rodriquez, Ejercito Censtitucionalista, p. 123;
Garza-Trevino, Tamaulipas, p. 30; Brownsville Daily Herald,
28 July 1913, p. 1; 21 January 1914, p. 1.
•''^Portes-Gil, Autobiograf ia de la Revolucion Mexicana, p. 135; Garza-Trevino, Tamaulipas, pp. 39-40;
Weekly Report, 12 September 1913, RD£, 812.00/3894;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 1 September 1913, p. 1.
150
United States.
The Carrancistas. short of funds, forced
leans from foreign, especially Spanish, merchants in
Piedras Negras.
Local merchants also had
to make money
and supplies available to the rebel army.''"^
When the federal garrison evacuated the city, army
officers and residents fled to Eagle Pass.
In mid-March
the Carrancista authorities barricaded the Mexican side
of the international bridge when they heard that refugees
across the river planned to attack Piedras Negras.
A lack
of arms and leadership served to discourage the participants
Once the rebel army restored confidence among the local
population, the town returned to normal.
Through the
summer of 1913 there were only a few skirmishes with
federal patrols in the surrounding area. 20
The situation changed drastically for the citizens
of Piedras Negras in the fall of 1913.
By early September
forces under General Joaquin Maas began to regroup near
Monclova to launch an offensive in Coahuila.
19
G. J. Geyer to Secretary of Treasury, 11 March
1913, RDS, 312.00/6727; Fabela, DHRM, XIV, pp. 80-82, 108110; Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 751.
^^Fabela, DHRM, XIV, pp. 109-110, 116-117; Laredo
Weekly Times, 16 March 1913, p. 9; ibid., 24 August 1913,^
p. 5; Ricardo S. Bravo, Consul at Eagle Pass to Secretaria
de Relaciones Exteriores, 12 Marzo de 1913, AREM, L-E-765;
Weekly Report, 19 April, RDS, 312.00/7333; 16 May, RDS,
312.00/7606; 29 May 1913, RDS, 812.00/7760; 7 June 1913,
RDS, 812.00/7869; 14 June 1913, RD£, 812.00/7884; 26 July
1913, RDS, 812.00/3212; Weekly Report, 30 August 1913,
RDS, 312.00/8809.
151
Cuatrocienegas fell to government troops.
By late Septem-
ber rebel forces in Piedras Negras prepared for a government
attack.
The 2,000 man rebel garrison repulsed the assault,
inflicting great losses on the federal force.
Huerta
ordered reinforcements rushed to the border and in the
second assault, rebel officers abandoned the city.^"^
Rumors quickly spread that the Carrancista army
had orders to destroy much of the city before allowing it
to fall into government hands.
Eagle Pass Mayor E. H.
Schmidt intervened on behalf of Mexican and American businessmen who feared tremendous losses.
Carrancista officers
promised Mayor Schmidt not to destroy the city.
The rebel
forces reoccupied the city briefly, but fled when the
Huerta army moved in on October 6, 1913.
occupied the plaza with 1,800 men.
General Maas
He quickly issued a
plea to the 3,000 residents of the city who had sought
refuge in Eagle Pass to return.
The rebels took to the
22
hills and harassed government patrols.
Weekly Report, 6 September 1913, RDS, 812.00/8854;
13 September 1913, RDS, 312.00/9041; 20 September 1913,
RDS, 812.00/9044; 27 September 1913, RD£, 812.00/9154;
Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 10 October 1913,
RDS, 312.00/9035.
22
El Paso Morning Times, 1, 4 October 1913, p. 1;
R. S. Bravo to Serrano, 30 September 1913, AREM, L-E-84 9;
Weekly Report, 4 October 1913, RDS, 312.00/9245; 11 October
1913, RDS, 812.00/9335; 14 October 1913, RD£, 312.00/9245;
18 October 1913, RDS, 312.00/9492; 25 October 1913, RDS,
812.00/9535; Brownsville Daily Herald, 7 October 1913,
p. 1.
152
Once government troops established control over the
area, Piedras Negras remained free of revolutionary activity
for the next year.
The Carrancista force in the sector
lacked the strength to attack the garrison of 1,000 men.
Federal forces used the city as a point for launching small
military incursions to Las Vacas and other nearby towns.
Federal officials forcefully extracted loans from wealthy
local residents to pay their men.
Otherwise the city
23
ended the year with a period of calm.
Revolutionary activity did not revive at Piedras
Negras until late January 1914 when a Constitutionalist
force began to raid near the city to extract tribute from
nearby ranches and to recruit forcefully from the sector.
As a result, federal reinforcements entered the city.
When fighting intensified in southcentral Mexico, most of
the newly-arrived soldiers were recalled.
The town re-
mained quiet until April, despite rumors that a rebel army
was gathering to drive the federal garrison from Piedras
24
Negras.
Weekly Report, 14 November 1913, RDS, 312.00/
9338; 28 November 1913, RDS, 812.00/10204; 12 December 1913,
RDS, 312.00/10237; 2 January 1914, RD£, 812.00/10386;
William Blocker to Secretary of State, 24 November, RDS,
812.00/9904; 1 December 1913, RDS, 812.00/10000; 4 December
1913, RDS, 812.00/10063.
^^Weekly Report, 23 January 1914, RDS_, 812.00/
10710; 29 January 1914, RDS, 312.00/10785; 20 February 1914,
RDS, 812.00/10991; 12 March 1914, RDS, 812.00/11197; 20
March 1914, RDS, 812.00/11266; 24 April 1914, RDS, 812.00/
11785.
153
When American troops occupied Veracruz, Mexican
government officials feared an American invasion of
Piedras Negras and ordered an evacuation on April 21, 1914.
Several days later a Carrancista force moved into the city.
Rebel General Joaquin Murgia wanted to show his good will
towards the United States by raising the American flag and
firing a twenty-one gun salute.
The Constitutionalist
consul in Eagle Pass advised against it, however, because
diplomatic relations between the two nations had been
severed.
Conditions remained calm for the remainder of
the period that Huerta was in power. 25
The federal garrison over at Nuevo Laredo, like
the Matamoros garrison, abandoned Madero once the Decena
Tragica began.
The federal soldiers announced their sup-
port for Pascual Orozco, Jr.
When Orozco joined Huerta
they also allied themselves with Huerta.
A month later
on March 17, a force of 300 Carrancistas under General
Jesus Carranza attacked the plaza.
But the 250 federals
under Colonel Geronimo Villarreal repulsed the assault,
compelling the rebels to withdraw as far south as Mier.
The badly beaten Carranza force made no further attempt
to take the city.
But with the town heavily protected.
Weekly Report, 2 May 1914, RD£, 812.00/11387;
9 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/11942; 9 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/
11942; 15 May 1914, RD£, 812.00/12604; 18 June 1914,
RDS, 312.00/12324; 24 June 1914, RDS, 812.00/12391.
154
the rebels reverted to harassing federal scouting parties.
A Constitutionalist force did battle the federal garrison
at Columbia near Nuevo Laredo, but it, too, met defeat.
The federals killed 50 rebels and captured 160, while many
more fled to the American side of the river.
Despite persistent rumors of an impending rebel
attack, Nuevo Laredo experienced little revolutionary
action during the summer of 1913.
Several bands of men
in the area created a few tense moments for the rural population.
A group of bandits raided ranches stealing goods,
cattle and whatever they could get.
harass and destroy rail lines.
Rebel patrols did
The Constitutionalists
stayed away from Nuevo Laredo because of the massive
federal buildup in the city that had begun in mid-June.
In Late July the border town became headquarters for the
Division of Northern Mexico under the command of General
Joaquin Tellez.
With at least 10,000 troops stationed in
the city, the Mexican government hoped to make Nuevo Laredo
the launching point for its offensive in the north, which
27
did not succeed.
Garza-Trevino, Revolucion Mexicana en Tamaulipas,
pp. 152-158; Garrett to Secretary of State, 18 March 1913,
RDS, 812.00/6846; Weekly Report, 31 May 1913, RDS, 812.00/
7822; Fabela, DHRM, XIV, pp. 135-136, 248; Laredo Weekly
Times, 27 April 1913, p. 1; J. B. Wilkinson, Laredo and
the Rio Grande Frontier (Austin: Jenkins Publishing Co.,
1975), p. 336.
27
Laredo Weekly Times, 15 June 1913, p. 6; 29 June
155
Nevertheless, through the fall conditions remained
normal, despite continued rumors of rebels raiding nearby.
The situation changed the last week in December.
Carranza
forces under General Pablo Gonzalez made preparations to
attack Nuevo Laredo.
They took Guerrero on December 29,
followed by San Ignacie, fifteen miles south of Nuevo
Laredo.
On January 1, 1914, the attack began, but two
days later the force of 2,700 rebels withdrew after the
federal garrison of 2,000 repelled the assault.
The rebels
had lest the fiercest battle that had been fought in northern Mexico.
The Carrancista forces retreated to Matamoros,
leaving small units to harass the federals.
Government
patrols cleared the immediate area of rebels. 28
In February and March 1914 federal forces launched
their first major offensive in the northeast.
General
Gustavo Guardiola y Aguirre with 1,000 men moved south to
attack Matamoros.
It was necessary for him to take
1913, p. 5; Wilkinson, Laredo, p. 386; Garrett to Secretary
of State, 30 July 1913, RDS, 812.00/8198.
28
.. *
.
Garza-Trevino, Revolucion Mexicana en Tamaulipas,
pp. 109-112, 232, 233-240; Fernando Serrano, Consul at San
Antonio, Texas, to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores,
4 December 1913, AREM, L-E-788; Weekly Reports, 13 September 1913, RDS, 312.00/9041, 1 November 1913, RD£, 812.00/
9694; 15 November 1913, RDS, 812.00/9947; 20 December 1913,
RDS, 812.00/10453; "The Pablo Gonzalez Archives," Reel 2,
pp. 122-124, 136-137 (Nettie Lee Benson Latin American
Collection, The University of Texas at Austin, Texas);
Brownsville Daily Herald, 22 October 1913, p. 1; Laredo
Weekly Times, 2 November 1913, p. 12; 11 January 1914,
pp. 2, 4, 6; 20 January 1914, p. 3.
156
Guerrero first.
The Constitutionalists held the city which
forced Guardiola y Aguirre to retreat to Nuevo Laredo.
Government troops made three separate unsuccessful attempts
to move beyond Guerrero.
29
doned their efforts.
On March 26, the federals aban-
Government control of Nuevo Laredo came to an
abrupt end in April 1914 when federal officials faced three
problems.
When Huerta officials could not pay their
soldiers, over 300 men deserted to the American side to
work in the fields.
Then a Constitutionalist force cap-
tured San Ignacio and threatened to attack Nuevo Laredo.
Suddenly on April 23, General Teodoro M. Quintana, who
commanded the government garrison, ordered an evacuation.
He also decreed the destruction of the municipal building,
the United States consulate, the customhouse, the post
office and the international bridge.
This was because he
expected the United States to invade Mexico as a result of
the American occupation of Veracruz.
A Constitutionalist
force moved into the city and restored order.
Officials
who had been elected under the Madero government resumed
their offices.
29
•^
*
•
Garza-Trevino, Revolucion en Tamaulipas, p. 204;
Weekly Report, 5 March 1914, RDS, 812.00/11123; Brownsville
Daily Herald, 14, 17 February 1914, p. 1; 5, 24 March 1914,
p. 1; Laredo Weekly Times, 1 March 1914, p. 1; 19 March
1914, pp. 1, 8, 9.
30
Laredo Weekly Times, 5 April 1914, pp. 5-6;
157
North of Nuevo Laredo the situation was less tense.
Up the river. Las Vacas experienced little revolutionary
activity immediately after Madero was assassinated.
The
federal garrison evacuated the city on February 25, 1913.
A Constitutionalist force from Piedras Negras occupied
the plaza until autumn.
Most of the fighting occurred to
the south in the Monclova area.
Because of the tranquility
in the sector, a fifty man garrison maintained peace in
the city.
Then in September and October federal and rebel
forces skirmished near Las Vacas.
When a federal force
from Piedras Negras neared, the Carrancistas garrison
abandoned the city; however, the federals turned back and
the rebels returned.
The Carrancistas reinforced the gar-
rison at Las Vacas but were forced to collect tribute from
local merchants to sustain the new troops.
31
remained peaceful until late November.
Conditions
14 April 1914, p. 10; 26 April 1914, p. 12; 3 May 1914,
pp. 4, 3; Fabela, DHRM, II, p. 62; Secretary of War to
Secretary of State, 25 April 1914, RDS, 812.00/11691;
Garrett to Secretary of State, 23 April 1914, RD£, 812.00/
11649; 26 April 1914, RD£, 812.00/11716; 7 May 1914, RDS,
812.00/11853.
"^•'•Fabela, DHRM, XIV, pp. 81-82; Weekly Report,
19 April 1913, RDS, 132.00/7333; 10 May 1913, RDS, 812.00/
7606; 9 June 1913, RDS, 812.00/7822; 29 August 1913, RDS,
8670; 6 September 1913, RD£, 812.00/3809; 26 September
1913, RDS, 812.00/9044; 16 October 1913, RDS, 812.00/9335;
23 October 1913, RDS, 812.00/9492; 6 November 1913, RDS,
812.00/9694; 20 November 1913, RDS, 812.00/9947; Brownsville Daily Herald, 11 October 1913, p. 1.
153
When a 400 man federal force from Piedras Negras
moved towards Las Vacas and occupied the city on November
24, the rebel garrison withdrew.
Las Vacas remained in
government hands until April 1914.
Government officials
also extracted tribute from local businessmen to pay their
men.
Persons crossing the international bridge were re-
quired to carry a passport with a photograph.
Tensions
increased several times when rebels came near, but the
32
Constitutionalists never attempted to take the city.
When the Americans moved against Huerta in Veracruz, the
federal garrison evacuated Las Vacas.
A 200 man rebel
force quickly moved in and maintained quiet during the
summer.
Beyond Las Vacas in the northwesternmost city which
borders Texas, Ciudad Juarez, city officials quickly declared their support for Huerta on February 25, 1913, and
disarmed a pro-Madero volunteer force of at least 400 men.
A 900 man federal force controlled the city peacefully
into the fall of 1913.
This large border city became a
storehouse for northwestern Mexico, as Matamoros had become
for the northeastern sector.
Trains constantly arrived
and left Juarez loaded with provisions and troops.
No
fighting occurred in the immediate area, although rebel
32
Blocker to Secretary of State, 24 November 1913,
RDS, 812.00/9904; 28 November 1913, RDS^, 312.00/9958;
1 December 1913, RDS, 812.00/10000.
159
bands occasionally harassed federal patrols along the
river. 33
Conditions changed in November when Francisco
Villa took the city, after a diversionary attack on Ciudad
Chihuahua.
He led government forces to believe that he
was going to attack the state capital, but in reality he
passed around the city and continued north to Ciudad
Juarez.
Federal forces in the state had been massed in
Chihuahua to defend the capital.
in the border city.
Only 400 federals remained
On November 15, 1913, Villa swooped
down upon the city and captured it with minimum bloodshed.
The 400 man federal garrison fled to El Paso.
On November
24, a 7,000 man federal force attempted to recapture Juarez.
With 5,500 disciplined troops. Villa defeated the Huertistas
near Tierra Blanca, twenty-five miles south. 34
The northwestern border city, like other frontier
cities captured by the Constitutionalists, remained quite
peaceful.
Villa raised money from the sale of stock
through Juarez, for Chihuahua was the most important
33
Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. 114-116;
Weekly Report, 20 June 1913, RD£, 312.00/7834; 6 September
1913, RDS, 3309; 16 October 1913, RDS, 812.00/9335;
Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 316.
^Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. 117-118;
Cumberland, The Constitutional Years, pp. 50-51; El Paso
Morning Times, 15 November 1913, p. 1; Weekly Report,
14 November 1913, RDS, 812.00/9333; 21 November 1913,
RDS, 812.00/9447; 4 December 1913, RDS, 312.00/10190.
160
cattle state in Mexico.
Villa imported or smuggled guns
and other war munitions through the border city.
He out-
fitted his army with arms, gunpowder, ammunition, dynamite,
clothing, blankets, uniforms and other military equipment
/
35
at Juarez.
At the time of the American occupation of
/
V e r a c r u z , C i u d a d J u a r e z briefly became tense.
Local o f f i -
cials took some p r e c a u t i o n s to p r e v e n t any anti-American
36
outbreaks.
U n l i k e o t h e r b o r d e r c i t i e s , Ojinaga remained
under
federal c o n t r o l u n t i l M a r c h 2 6 , 1 9 1 3 , when a rebel force
occupied t h e city after the garrison fled to P r e s i d i o ,
Texas.
D e s p i t e r e b e l c o n t r o l o f the c i t y , government
troops r e m a i n e d in t h e area and harassed the revolutionists.
The r e b e l s s k i r m i s h e d w i t h Huerta patrols but no serious
fighting o c c u r r e d until a large government force recaptured
the c i t y .
On D e c e m b e r 1 7 , 1 9 1 3 , the federal garrison in
the state c a p i t a l e v a c u a t e d , and moved to Ojinaga to be
near s a n c t u a r y in the United S t a t e s .
37
Weekly Report, 4 December 1913, R D S , 812.00/
1 0 1 9 0 ; 19 D e c e m b e r 1 9 1 3 , R D S , 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 1 0 3 6 0 ; E s t r a d a ,
"Border R e v o l u t i o n , " p p . 1 1 9 - 1 2 5 .
•^^Edwards to Secretary of S t a t e , 24 A p r i l 1 9 1 4 ,
RDS, 312.00/11685.
•^^Fabela, D H R M , X I V , p p . 1 3 6 - 1 3 8 ; W e e k l y R e p o r t ,
10 M a y 1 9 1 3 , R D S , 3 1 2 . 0 0 / 7 6 0 6 ; 9 J u n e 1 9 1 3 , R D S , 8 1 2 . 0 0 /
7822; 23 A u g u s t 1 9 1 3 , R D S , 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 8 8 4 7 ; 12 September 1 9 1 3 ,
RDS, 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 3 5 4 ; 3 O c t o b e r 1 9 1 3 , R D S , 3 1 2 . 0 0 / 9 1 5 4 ; 15
N o v e m b e r 1 9 1 3 , R D S , 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 9 9 4 7 ; "The C o n f l i c t in M e x i c o , "
161
With the approach of federal forces, the
Carrancistas abandoned Ojinaga early in December.
dents moved to Presidio.
took the city.
On December 12 government forces
Immediately, federal officials began to
fortify the town with 5,000 soldiers.
the rebels prepared their assault.
22, 1913.
Resi-
In the meantime,
It began on December
Several hundred demoralized government troops
deserted and crossed to the American side of the river.
By January 2, 1914, the Constitutionalists surrounded the
city on all sides except the river.
Fighting resumed on
January 5 and General Villa arrived three days later to
launch a full scale assault on the town.
Facing certain
defeat at the hands of the brutal Villistas who now
totaled 10,000, General Salvador Mercado ordered the
evacuation of Ojinaga on January 10.
Over 5,000 federals
fled to the United States, including General Mercado.
The
Carrancistas under Villa now controlled all of northern
Mexico.
Conditions remained peaceful until Huerta
, 33
resigned.
The Outlook, 20 December 1913, pp. 816-817; "Shot and
Shell, the Fall of Ojinaga in 1914," Voice of the Mexican
Border 1 (September 1933), pp. 14-16.
•^^Herrera, Cuando Villa, p. 34 3; "Shot and Shell,"
pp. 14-16; Weekly Reports, 19 December 1913, RD£, 812.00/
10360; 11 April 1914, RDS, 812.00/11507; 9 May 1914, RDS,
312.00/11942; 15 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/12604; 3 July 1914,
RDS, 312.00/12445; El Paso Morning Times, 30 December 1913,
p. 1; 10 January 1914, p. 1; Laredo Weekly Times, 11 January
1914, p. 5; 13 January 1914, p. 3; Brownsville Daily Herald,
12 January 1914, p. 1.
162
Just as the Maderista and anti-Madero movement had
an impact on the
Texas side of the border, so did the
Carrancista resistance.
Texas border towns became
embroiled in revolutionary activities because of events
in the Mexican towns across the Rio Grande as well
decisions on international
ton and in Mexico City.
as
relations made both in Washing-
Troops rushed to the river to
protect American lives and property.
Arms were transported
into Mexico, sometimes legally, most of the time illegally.
Refugees flocked
to border cities; rebels and federals
crossed the frontier line on numerous occasions.
Fear either of a Mexican invasion or of a Mexican
American uprising gripped American officials, especially
during the Veracruz incident.
Concern centered on the
fact that Mexicans and Mexican Americans outnumbered the
Anglo population along the border.
Furthermore, the
refugees in Texas border towns were not concerned about
American security.
Most young Mexican Americans had strong
attachments to Mexico, though not necessarily to Huerta.
Much of the Mexican and Mexican American population along
the border had arms.
In 1913 El Paso had a Mexican
American population of 17,8 00 compared to an Anglo population of 35,680; Eagle Pass 4,240 to 1,292; Laredo 13,600
39
to 2,400; and Brownsville 9,354 to 3,500.
"^^Governor Colquitt to President Wilson, 25 July
163
Militarily speaking, however, the border appeared
quite peaceful during the Constitutionalist drive to remove
Huerta from the presidency.
The revolutionary intrigue
that existed during the Madero period and the counterrevolution in Northern Mexico did not materialize to the
same magnitude during the Carranza revolt.
It may be
recalled that Madero needed to use the border as a shield
from the Diaz military in circumstances in which his revolutionary movement had grass roots organization, whereas
Carranza simply needed the loyalty of former revolutionists.
Madero did not control any border town until Ciudad Juarez
fell in May 1911, but the Carrancistas held the most important border cities by the end of 1913.
Without much
doubt most Mexicans (and Mexican Americans) along the
Texas frontier line sympathized with the rebels.
The
Huertistas enjoyed support primarily around Laredo and
40
El Paso.
Thus the element of intrigue was minimized .
The situation changed drastically when Carranza assumed
the presidency of Mexico and President Wilson refused to
grant him recognition.
Conditions in Texas border cities remained normally
quiet with occasional moments of excitement when rumors of
revolutionary activity circulated.
All border towns
40
General Tasker Bliss to Adjutant General,
19 April 1913, RDS, 312.00/7256.
164
experienced a tense moment when Madero was overthrown in
February 1913.
A call for troops went to Washington, D . C ,
while Governor Oscar B. Colquitt overreacted by calling
out the state militia.
There was no need for much of the
alarm.
After conditions in Matamoros returned to normal
in late February 1913, Brownsville for the most part remained tranquil, since only a few rumors of rebels crossing
the river in the Valley came to the attention of the
authorities.41 The entire situation changed, however, as
Constitutionalist forces edged north towards Matamoros.
During April rebel elements reportedly met in most
Valley cities and sent men, supplies and guns across the
river.
Rumors had Carranza agents operating as far north
as Alice in order to recruit Mexicans working in the fields
as well as in every Valley town.
Despite all the excite-
ment, an investigation by United States Marshal Casimiro
/
. ^
42
Perez-Alvarez found no evidence to sustain the rumors.
As we have seen, over 5,000 refugees fled to
F. de la Barra to Mexican Embassy, USA, 25 February 1913, AREM, L-E-732.
^^Fabela, DHRM, XIV, pp. 154-159, 180-181; Arturo
M. Elias, Consul at Laredo, Texas to Secretari'a de Relaciones Exteriores, 15 April 1913, AREM, L-E-761; Arturo
Leal; Consul at Rio Grande City, Texas to Secretaria de
Relaciones Exteriores, 17 April 1913, AREM, L-E-747;
Elias to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 23 April
1913, AREM, L-E-761.
165
Brownsville from the Matamoros-Reynosa area as the battle
for that sector began.
Rebel leaders sent agents to re-
cruit among the refugees.
Revolutionaries from the Texas
side of the river met daily with rebel leaders moving on
Matamoros.
Matamoros officials accused members of the
Brownsville Police Department of aiding the rebels by
furnishing them with arms and ammunition.
An investiga-
tion by Brownsville Mayor A. B. Cole and Brownsville Chief
of Police, Ralph Tucker failed to reveal any truth to the
charges.
During the battle of Matamoros in June, Browns-
ville residents became apprehensive when not only refugees
but also federal soldiers sought safety in the city.
Both
sides transferred thousands of rounds of ammunition during
the fighting.
Stray bullets struck several people watching
the fighting from the American side of the river.
Wounded
soldiers from both sides sought medical attention in the
city.
Shortly after the battle, a number of Carrancistas
visited in Brownsville or passed through the city on their
way to Matamoros or to San Antonio.
At the same time
federal sympathizers sought to recruit an expedition
43
against the rebels m Matamoros.
^^Fabela, DHRM,^ I, pp. 77-78; XIV, pp. 264-265,
313; Elias to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 7 May
1913, AREM, L-E-761; 31 July 1913, AREM, L-E-774; Weekly
Reports, 10 May 1913, RDS, 812.o0/7606; 23 May 1913, RDS,
812.00/7743; 9 June 1913, RDS^, 812.00/7322; 13 June 1913,
RDS, 312.00/7869; Brownsville Daily Herald, 12 May 1913,
p. 1; 21 May 1913, p. 1; 3 June 1913, p. 1.
166
Conditions in the Brownsville district remained
normal for most of the summer and autumn.
A change came
when the dispute flared up because Wilson refused to
recognize Huerta.
Brownsville civic leaders showed signs
of concern because of the large Mexican-American population
whose loyalty they doubted.
A request for additional
troops failed to convince the army headquarters in San
Antonio of any crisis.
Conditions remained calm from
October through February 1914, probably because of the
serious flooding caused by heavy rains in October which
made the river impassable for weeks.
In the meantime, a
number of federal troops being held prisoners at Fort
Brown escaped.
Even Huerta agitators in the district
became less active.
Fernando Serrano, Huerta consul in
San Antonio, wrote the Foreign Ministry, "It is sad and
painful to admit it, but even within the federal element
sympathizers to the Mexican government a lack of spirit
is very evident."
Finally, several persons trying to
smuggle war supplies to the rebels were apprehended in
the city. 44
44
Weekly Report, 26 July 1913, RDS, 812.00/8212;
Brownsville Mayor A. B. Cole to Sen. C Culberson, 1
August 1913, RDS, 812.00/8294; Asst. Secretary of War to
Secretary of State, 1 August 1913, RDS, 812.00/8218; Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 29 September 1913, RDS,
312.00/9047; Weekly Report, 10 October 1913, RDS, 812.OOT"
9245; 16 October 1913, RDS^, 812.00/9335; 28 November 1913,
RDS, 812.00/10204; 2 January 1914, RDS^, 812.00/10386; 15
January 1914, RDS, 812.00/10565; 13 February 1914, RDS,
812.00/10922' FaEela, DHRM, XIV, p. 396.
167
The situation changed in the spring of 1914.
On
March 12, General Pablo Gonzalez filed a complaint with
American consul Johnson charging that Mexican patrols along
the river had been fired on by American soldiers.
Local
and Matamoros officials suspected Huertistas as the culprits
A week later Brownsville officials received reports that
several bands of federal sympathizers had been organized
to raid Carrancista positions across the river from the
city.
Customs inspectors confirmed a report that twenty
federals had crossed the river into Mexico.
At the same
time. Governor Colquitt ordered two Texas Rangers to duty
at Raymondville, north of Brownsville.
Local citizens had
sent the governor a desperate appeal for protection from
an increased number of depredations in the area.
There
had been two robberies which resulted in murders—one of
an Anglo storeowner and the other of a Mexican citizen. 45
Conditions in the Brownsville district reached a
crucial point in April.
The American occupation of Vera-
cruz caused concern in the area, but not as much as experienced by the small river town of Madero, three miles from
Mission, Texas.
A group of about sixty Carrancistas
crossed the river and rep6rtedly shot up the little town.
Brownsville Daily Herald, 12 March 1914, p. 1;
20 March 1914, p. 1; Weekly Report, 27 March 1914, RDS,
312.00/113.69; El Paso Morning Times, 16, 21 March 1914,
p. 1.
163
Immediately wild rumors flew and the population in the
Valley cried for military protection.
Yet an investiga-
tion by G. V. Smith, a mounted customs guard, showed only
that a group of drunks, probably Carrancistas, had
attempted to purchase more beer.
little shooting.
There had been very
Also in April Eufrario Perez, Huerta
consul in Brownsville, requested $10,000 from the Mexican
Foreign Ministry to recruit a 300 man army for the Mexican
government.
He could find men who were willing to go to
Laredo and cross the river to join the federal garrison
at Nuevo Laredo. 46
Only a few incidents along the river occurred before the fall of Huerta.
Early in May a Mexican was caught
attempting to blow up the San Benito pumping plant.
ities never established his identity.
Author-
Later in the month,
a small band of Mexicans crossed the river at Progreso and
held up a store taking with them $500.
Summer rains in
early June forced the river to overflow its banks, again
making roads along the border impassable.
When road condi-
tions improved early in July, there were numerous reports
Brownsville Daily Herald, 8, 9, 10 April 1914,
p. 1; Elias to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 8 April
1914, AREM, L-E-792; Adjutant General Papers, "Ranger
Force Correspondence," Report of Captain Hughes, 30 April
1914, Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas; the true facts
of the incident never became known because the Mexican
American population refused to give information to American
officials; R. Perez to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores,
10 April 1914, AREM, L-E-733.
169
of roving bands of Mexicans.
Subsequent investigations
failed to confirm any actual crossings.
After Huerta left
Mexico, calm prevailed in the Matamoros-Brownsville area.
People came and went across the river unconcerned at the
turn of events in the nation's capital, and probably
welcomed the prospect of peace.
47
S i n c e P i e d r a s N e g r a s , like M a t a m o r o s , q u i c k l y fell
into t h e h a n d s o f r e b e l f o r c e s . E a g l e Pass w a s o n e of the
first A m e r i c a n b o r d e r t o w n s to feel an impact from the
Carranza revolt.
Y e t P i e d r a s N e g r a s lacked m a j o r i m p o r -
tance; revolutionary influence was minimal there.
Much of
the c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n of P i e d r a s N e g r a s had sought refuge
in E a g l e P a s s w h e n the f e d e r a l g a r r i s o n a b a n d o n e d the city
in F e b r u a r y 1 9 1 3 . E x c e p t for t h e strongest H u e r t a s u p p o r t e r s , m o s t r e t u r n e d a f t e r the C a r r a n c i s t a s took i t .
In m i d - M a r c h r e p o r t s c i r c u l a t e d in Eagle Pass o f an
a t t e m p t b y t h e e x i l e d H u e r t a e l e m e n t to o r g a n i z e an attack
on t h e r e b e l g a r r i s o n a c r o s s t h e river.
A m e r i c a n army
o f f i c i a l s s e n t o u t a n u m b e r o f p a t r o l s to i n t e r c e p t the
48
e x p e d i t i o n a r y force a n d p r e v e n t it from c r o s s i n g the r i v e r .
\eekly Report, 9 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/11942;
15 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/12604; 27 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/
12677; 18 June 1914, RDS, 182.00/12324; 3 July 1914, RDS,
812.00/12.00/12445; 21 July 1914, RDS, 812.00/12777.
^^Brownsville Daily Herald, 12 March 1913, p. 1;
Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 11 March 1913, RDS,
312.00/6639; R. S. Bravo to Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores, 13 April 1913, AREM, L-E-786.
170
In a letter to Secretary of State William J. Bryan,
Texas Governor Colquitt observed that:
At present Eagle Pass and vicinity have about 1,300
to 2,000 strange Mexicans, who are strong partisans and
they represent practically every faction in Mexico, and
they make no pretensions in concealing who they are for,
and they are taking active interest in their various
sides.
The Mexican element of Diaz, across the river from
Eagle Pass are over here in large numbers. Most of them
seem to be in favor of the Huerta government, while the
American Mexicans who live here are strongly against
the Huerta government.
There- is no doubt but what both sides are smuggling
arms across the river below this place. The people residing along the river say that they are crossing all
of the time practically, and it seems they are not ^g
molested any from the number of reports that I have.
For most of the year conditions in Eagle Pass as
in Piedras Negras remained very quiet.
Reports of occa-
sional crossings and the smuggling of large quantities of
ammunition in the area by both sides could not be confirmed.
Eagle Pass became an important point for the importation
of cattle.
Several thousand head of cattle crossed the
river from this point for markets in Texas and other places
in the United States.
Chihuahua had an abundance of wild
cattle, because many had been left unbranded in the course
of the revolution.
Without a doubt, most of the cattle
that crossed into Eagle Pass probably had been stolen or
taken in tribute by the rebels.
Because of the sparsely
populated areas in the district, guns and ammunition
49Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 877.
171
smuggling led to several clashes between American officials
50
and would-be smugglers.
As a federal force neared Piedras Negras, the
Constitutionalists abandoned the city on October 1, 1913.
Over 5,000 people crossed to Eagle Pass where Mexican
American families cared for most of the refugees.
A report
reached American officials that rebel soldiers had been
ordered to burn the city and destroy the international
bridge before evacuating the plaza.
American troops stood
guard by the birdge with orders not to permit its destruction.
51
With the federals in control, calm returned to the
area, despite constant reminders that a war was being
fought.
Citizens in Eagle Pass became apprehensive of
federal attitudes in Piedras Negras.
Shortly after govern-
ment troops assumed control, anti-American feelings among
local citizens began to increase.
They resulted from the
Elias to Bravo, 22 August 1913, AREM, L-E-782;
Fabela, DHRM, XIV, pp. 282-283; Weekly Report, 30 May 1913,
RDS, 31270^7760; 9 June 1913, RDS, 312.00/7322; 21 July
I9T3, RDS, 812.00/12777; 19 September 1913, RD£, 812.00/
9041; Cobb to Secretary of State, 24 July 1914, RDS,
812.00/12601; Secretary of War to Secretary of State,
15 September 1913, RDS, 812.00/3366.
^•^El Paso Morning Times, 1 October 1913, p. 1;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 1 October 1913, p. 1; Bravo to
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 30 September 1913,
AREM, L-E-342; Secretary of War to Secretary of State,
IToctober 1913, RDS, 312.00/9035; Weekly Report,
10 October 1913, RDS, 312.00/9245.
172
decision by Eagle Pass officials not to permit federal
soldiers to visit the city.
Several weeks later, Piedras
Negras officials demanded that all persons entering the
city carry a photograph in their passport.
Up the river
Carrancistas made several crossings to harass federal
patrols, then returned to Texas. 52
When the federals abandoned Piedras Negras, citizens in Eagle Pass, most of whom sympathized with the
rebels, welcomed
the change.
With Carrancista officials
going out of their way to be courteous to Americans, relations between the river cities improved.
Yet sporadic
reports surfaced of federal troops moving along the river
and threatening to cross and destroy American property to
punish Americans for their support of the rebels.
With
the withdrawal of most Constitutionalist troops from the
area, government troops became bolder and American patrols
had to be increased to stop the raiding.
Unlike Matamoros and Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo
remained in government hands throughout the Huerta period
despite several attempts by the rebels to take the city.
Weekly Report, 16 October 1913, RDS, 812.00/9335;
4 December 1913, RDS, 312.00/10190; 9 January 1914, RDS,
812.00/10453; 16 January 1914, RDS, 10616; 20 February
1914, RDS, 812.00/10991.
^•^Weekly Report, 9 May 1914, RD^, 812.00/11942;
23 May 1914, RD£, 312.00/12677; 18 June 1914, RD£, 812.00/
12324.
173
Therefore, Laredo, Texas experienced more rebel activity
than the Brownsville area.
With the Mexican and Mexican
American community in Laredo a large one. Constitutionalists periodically distributed propaganda there.
In mid-
April the rebels held a mass meeting attended by 5 00 persons to hear Carrancistas make a number of speeches.
Rebels crossed from the Laredo sector into Mexico and
attacked federal patrols from Nuevo Laredo.
In Laredo, as in all other border cities, Anglos
became apprehensive because of the large Mexican American
population whose loyalty was unclear.
The mass meetings
in Nuevo Laredo to denounce President Wilson cast doubts
on the loyalty of all Mexicans in the vicinity.
Calls for
more troops were sent to General Tasker Bliss in San
Antonio, but the military commander doubted the need.
Furthermore, conditions remained quiet through
the summer
and autumn with only occasional reports of armed Mexicans
crossing the river.
The rains in October caused flooding
55
in the area and helped to settle the situation.
Suddenly in mid-November Consul Alonzo B. Garrett
Laredo Weekly Times, 27 April 1913, p. 6; Bliss
to Adjutant General, 16 April 1913, RDS, 812.00/7244;
Weekly Report, 19 April 1913, RDS, 312.00/7333; 9 June
1913, RDS, 312.00/7322.
^^Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 19
August 1913, RDS, 812.00/3347; Weekly Report, 19 September
1913, RDS, 312.00/9041; 10 October 1913, RDS, 812.00/9245.
174
in Nuevo Laredo telegraphed the Secretary of State of an
impending federal attack on Laredo, Texas.
A Mexican
army officer confidentially told the consul that something
extraordinary was in the making.
Mexican military officials
had been stocking food stuffs, extra patrols had been sent
out two days before, and there had been a noticeable increase in anti-American rallies in the previous week.
Consul Garrett prepared himself for the worst.
Since, in
his opinion, Mexican Americans in the Laredo sector shared
a strong loyalty to Mexico, Garrett feared that a plot
had been developed to invade Laredo and destroy it by a
military attack and by internal sabotage.
Military offi-
cials quickly denounced Garrett's assertions.
Fort Mcintosh had sufficient troops.
In any case.
Patrols along the
border failed to come up with any evidence of an impending
attack and after a few days conditions returned to normal.
Even in November when a report reached Laredo that a band
of rebels had crossed to the American side near San
Ignacio, army patrols failed to confirm the report.
In
reality, the Carrancista commander in the vicinity had
given strict orders to his men not to cross the river
^ 56
under any circumstances, but the rumors persisted.
56
Governor Colquitt to Secretary of State, 11 November 1913, RDS, 312.00/9540; 12 November 1913, RDS,
312.00/9679; Weekly Report, 14 November 1913, RDS, 812.00/
9838; 20 November 1913, RDS, 312.00/9947; Governor Colquitt
175
Laredo braced itself for an attack on Nuevo Laredo
early in January 1914.
Troops took positions at the river-
front to guard the international bridge.
Stray bullets
entered Laredo wounding several people, none seriously.
Hundreds of Americans rushed to the riverfront to watch
the battle, causing military officials more concern than
the actual fighting across the river.
A number of wounded
soldiers and refugees crossed the bridge to Laredo before
and during the fighting.
The rebel withdrawal angered a
number of persons from San Antonio and Corpus Christi who
had traveled to Laredo to see the fighting.
to its normal routine after a few days.
Life returned
As usual, rumors
of rebels crossing the river to attack federal patrols and
then returning to Texas came to the attention of American
officers.
The Mexican government strengthened its garrison
in Nuevo Laredo and regained full control over the sector
57
to minimize rebel activity, on both sides of the river.
Late in March conditions again worsened in Laredo
when military patrols captured several Mexicans attempting
to cross the river near Zapata.
Federal deserters also
to Secretary of State, 21'November 1913, RDS, 812.00/9863;
28 November 1913, RDS, 812.00/10204; 4 December 1913, RDS,
312.00/10190; 2 January 1914, RDS, 812.00/10336.
^^Laredo Weekly Times, 4 January 1913, p. 3;
11 January 1913, pp. 7-8; Brownsville Daily Herald,
5 January 1914, p. 1; Weekly Report, 15 January 1914,
RDS, 812.00/10565; 23 January 1914, RDS, 812.00/10710.
176
caused problems for military officials who constantly
found them camped along the river.
A number of the
federals refused to return to Mexico, preferring instead
CO
to remain on the American side and work.
American troops increased their river patrols during the tensions that followed the American occupation of
Veracruz.
The federal troops, fearing an invasion of
Nuevo Laredo, abandoned the city, burning much of it as
they left.
United States Cavalry patrols watched the river
for any crossing of federals into the United States.
local militia guarded the streets.
The
Authorities placed an
intra-boundary locomotive with a powerful headlight on the
international bridge to keep it under surveillance and
forestall any attempt to destroy it.
Mexicans exchanged
fire with American infantrymen who patrolled the river.
American officials also placed troops at strategic points
in case the Mexican government troops were causing a diver59
sion to allow an invasion of Laredo.
Once the Constitutionalists took control of the
city in May, conditions returned to normal.
About 2,000
citizens from Laredo participated in a week long Feria
^^Weekly Report, 20 March 1914, RDS, 812.00/11266;
27 March 1914, RDS^, 812.00/11369; Laredo Weekly Times,
22 March 1914, p. 3; 29 March 1914, p. 2; Brownsville
Daily Herald, 26 March 1914, p. 1.
^^Laredo Weekly Times, 26 April 1914, p. 12.
177
/
(fair) to welcome Jesus Carranza late in May. 60
By comparison. Las Vacas, like Piedras Negras,
made only a limited contribution to the military operations
of the revolution.
The federal army abandoned the border
town when Madero was killed.
Rebels held the city until
October 1913 with only a fifty man garrison because conditions remained relatively quiet.
Carrancistas recruited
at least 150 young Mexicans and Mexican Americans in Del
Rio.
A noticeable increase in the smuggling of guns and
ammunition developed.
In July several rumors surfaced of
61
rebels organizing bands in the Del Rio sector.
Pro-Constitutionalists held a rally in Del Rio in
mid-August for Raul Madero, brother of the slain president.
To encourage increased support in the Del Rio area, the
younger Madero spoke on behalf of the Carranza movement.
When rumors of American intervention began to be heard,
American officials developed reservations about the attitude of the Mexican population (about 4,000) in Del Rio.
Many local citizens feared that if Wilson did not recognize Huerta, a military clash in Del Rio-Las Vacas would
^°Ibid., 21 June 1914, p. 4; Weekly Report, 28 May
1914, RDS, 312.00/12677.
^"^Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 27 March 1913,
RDS, 312.00/6966; Weekly Report 19 April 1913, RDS, 812.
00/733; 9 June 1913, RDS, 812.00/7322; 20 June 1913, RDS,
812.00/7334; Blocker to Secretary of State, 13 August 1913,
RDS, 812.00/8452.
178
62
be inevitable.
In early October the Constitutionalists abandoned
Las Vacas for a few days, causing the civilian population
to cross to Del Rio.
Most returned when the situation
calmed, only to find themselves again in Del Rio when the
federals returned to occupy Las Vacas late in November.
Local Mexican Americans sheltered many of the refugees.
During the government occupation of Las Vacas, smuggling
of arms increased in the Del Rio sector.
No doubt both
sides imported ammunition and war supplies for their
cause. 63
In December 1913 various incidents produced concern in Del Rio.
The Mexican population at Del Rio cared
for a number of wounded rebels brought over from a battle
near Las Vacas.
Several of the rebels fled across the
river and were captured by American troops.
In mid-
December anti-American feelings increased in Las Vacas
when Del Rio officials sealed the border after the discovery of a number of smallpox cases in the city.
Huerta
officials labeled the quarantine as a pro-Carranza tactic.
Reports by Huerta consuls mentioned a number of crossings
Blocker to Secretary of State, 13 August 1913,
RDS, 812.00/8452; Weekly Report, 29 August 1913, RDS,
312.00/3670.
^•^Ibid., 16 October 1913, RD£, 312.00/9335;
25 October 1913, RDS, 312.00/9694; 23 November 1913, RDS,
812.00/10204.
179
made by rebels from the Del Rio district, none of which
could be confirmed by American of f icials. ^'^
When Constitutionalist forces increased in the
Las Vacas area early in 1914, incidents in Del Rio became
more frequent.
Short of supplies, rebels roamed along the
Mexican side of the river raiding ranches and stealing
cattle.
The increased depredations caused Del Rio citizens
to worry that the rebels would cross and commit similar
brigandage in Texas.
Carrancistas did cross as govern-
ment troops increased their patrol of the area.
The
Carrancistas increased their recruiting in the area early
in 1914.
A 250 man federal force drove a 45-man rebel
patrol to the river, forcing the Carrancistas to cross to
the Texas side.
The federals killed fifteen rebels as they
swam the river.
An American patrol watching
the incident
signaled the government force to cease firing when the
Constitutionalists reached the American side of the river.
V7hen Mexican troops refused, the continued firing threatened the lives of the American soldiers.
The Americans
opened fire on the federal force to provide cover for the
rebels still struggling to safety.
All United States
troops in the district were ordered to the border to avoid
^ Ibid., 4 December 1913, RDS, 812.00/10190; Juan
Castillo, Consul at Del Rio to Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores, 16 December 1913, AREM, L-E-74 7; Weekly Report,
13 December 1913, RDS, 812.00/10237; 19 December 1913,
RDS, 812.00/10360.
180
further trouble with Mexican troops.
Military officials
quickly endorsed the decision by the American officer to
return the fire.
General Tasker Bliss had repeatedly
warned Mexican commanders along the frontier against
shotting across the border.
to return fire if shot at.
He had instructed his officers
Del Rio citizens worried that
the incident would erupt into a shooting affray between
other American and Mexican patrols, but it did not.^^
The federal garrison abandoned Las Vacas shortly
after American forces occupied Veracruz.
The evacuation
caused little excitement in Del Rio, for a fiesta was held
to raise funds for a hospital only a month after the
Carrancistas had taken control of Las Vacas.
Americans
visited the city during the festivities and were warmly
treated.
Later in the summer Americans visited Las Vacas
Creek to enjoy the excellent fishing.
On every occasion
Americans were courteously received.
Because El Paso had a larger concentration of
people, more excitement occurred there than in Del Rio.
Although most of the Mexican population in El Paso favored
Weekly Report, 23 January 1914, RDS, 812.00/
10710; 29 January 1914, RDS, 812.00/10785; 20 February
1914, RDS, 312.00/10991; El Paso Morning Times, 24 March
1914, p. 1; Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 23 July
1914, RDS, 812.00/11245; Blocker to Secretary of State,
23 July 1914, RD£, 312.00/11247.
^^Weekly Report, 27 May 1914, RDS^, 812.00/12677;
13 June 1914, RDS, 812.00/12324.
181
the Constitutionalists, Huertismo was so deeply entrenched
in Ciudad Juarez that a challenge to it did not occur until
November 1913.
No fighting occurred near Juarez because
the Carrancistas could not muster a force large enough to
attack the 900 man garrison.
Despite the peacefulness of
the area, several incidents aroused local officials.
In
mid-March 1913 Brigadier General E. Z. Steever, commander
in Fort Bliss, ordered the arrest of all Mexican military
personnel in El Paso, both federal and rebel, armed or
unarmed, in uniform or dressed in civilian clothes.
It
seemed that suddenly a large number of Mexicans had been
appearing in El Paso streets.
On April 23, 1913, Huertista
soldiers, who had sought refuge at Naco, Arizona arrived
in El Paso enroute to Juarez.
Three months later a plot
to assassinate General Francisco Castro, Huertista commander in Juarez, was uncovered.
planned in El Paso.
The conspiracy had been
67
Officials at Fort Bliss became worried in August
1913 when anti-American feelings escalated in Juarez over
the failure of President Wilson to recognize Huerta.
Federal authorities in Ciudad Juarez reportedly stated
that Huerta would not wait for the United States to declare
Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. Ill, 116;
El Paso Morning Times, 26 April 1913, p. 1; M. Diebold,
Consul at El Paso to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores
15 March 1913, AREM, L-E-766.
182
war.
Instead he would act himself to unite the Mexican
citizens against the Americans.
El Paso had been targeted
as one of the first American cities to be attacked.^^
On September 7, 1913, Lieutenant F. Acosta from
the federal garrison at Juarez crossed the international
bridge for the purpose of "killing a gringo."
Before he
got far. United States Custom Inspector F. F. Jonah and
United States Immigration officer T. N. Heitrin fatally
shot the soldier, after he opened fire on the Americans.
Troops hurried to the riverfront to respond to any outbreak
that might occur.
All military personnel in Fort Bliss
1
^ 69
went on alert.
Several El Paso cattlemen received a letter from
Maximo Castillo, a bandit in Chihuahua, threatening to
hold every American who entered Mexico responsible for any
harm that came to his jefe (chief), Braulio Hernandez,
being held prisoner at Fort Bliss.
The bandit expressed
concern that Hernandez might be extradited
where he would be executed by the federals.
to Mexico,
70
/
In mid-November Villa captured Ciudad Juarez,
Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 16
August 1913, RDS, 812.00/84 92; Weekly Report, 23 August
1913, RDS, 312.00/8347.
El Paso Morning Times, 7 September 1913, p. 1;
Inspector of Customs at El Paso to Collector of Customs,
George E. Schick, 12 September 1913, RDS, 812.00/8916.
El Paso Morning Times, 11 October 1913, p. 1.
183
sending El Paso into an upheaval.
El Paso, wounding one person.
Stray bullets hit
Wounded rebels and govern-
ment troops sought medical attention in El Paso.
The
entire garrison at Fort Bliss positioned itself along the
river.
Three Americans were killed in the fighting at
Juarez.
During the battle. Major Robert E. L. Michie,
acting commander of the Second Cavalry Brigade, sent a
message to both factions warning them not to fire into
El Paso.
He advised them that if American lives and
property continued to face danger he would order "effective measures" taken. 71
Once the battle ended, conditions returned to
normal.
El Paso Mayor C
E. Kelly visited with Villa and
regular traffic resumed between the two cities.
Conditions
became exceptionally quiet after Francisco Villa took command.
He realized the value of El Paso, the American
border city from which he expected to outfit his entire
army.
El Paso merchants granted the rebel over $3 million
dollars in credit to purchase
for his men.
shoes, blankets and clothing
After the United States embargo was lifted
in February, Villa purchased from El Paso merchants millions of rounds of ammunition and thousands of rifles.
He also bought coal to operate his trains that transported
Christian, "Sword and Plowshare," p. 307; El Paso
Morning Times, 15, 16 November 1913, p. 1; Secretary of War
to Secretary of State, 15 November 1913, RDS, 312.00/9753.
184
supplies and men to the different theaters of the war.
Villa exported through El Paso several hundred thousand
dollars in hides. 72
Federals in the El Paso area made an attempt to
attack Juarez in February 1914.
Twenty-five Mexican govern-
ment troops were captured near Ysleta with 400 horses, a
great number of bridles, blankets and other equipment.
The band of armed Mexicans had been waiting for 400 federal
sympathizers from the El Paso area who planned to attack
Juarez.
The American army rushed troops to Ysleta to pre-
vent any crossing.
One of the captured men claimed that
Huerta Consul Manuel Diebold had outfitted the group.
Other rumors circulated that Huertistas crossed the river
in El Paso.
Army patrols sent to intercept men crossing
the river failed to make contact with armed Mexican groups.
On one occasion a large band of Mexicans raided an American
ranch, but even then the army failed to make contact with
uu
73
the group.
El Paso, with its large Mexican and Mexican American
Weekly Report, 20 November 1913, RDS, 812.00/
9947; 13 December 1913, RDS, 312.00/10237; 24 April 1914,
RDS, 312.00/11785; Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. 121127, 130.
El Paso Morning Times, 12, 18 February 1914,
pp. 1, 4; Secretary of V7ar to Secretary of State, 14 February 1914, RDS, 312.00/10381; Edwards to Secretary of State,
6 February"T5*14, RDS, 812.00/10810; Secretary of War to
Secretary of State, 5 March 1914, RDS, 812.00/11055.
185
population, worried American officials at the time of the
Veracruz incident.
Units of infantry and cavalry patrolled
the streets of "Chihuahuita," the Mexican district in El
Paso, to prevent any demonstrations or disorders by the
Mexican population.
Bliss.
All leaves were cancelled at Fort
Nothing happened until three days later when a
powder plant near Ysleta was blown up by a band of Mexicans.
A cavalry patrol forced the raiders to cross the river back
into Mexico.
A number of crossings came to the attention
of American officials who could not confirm the reports.
Approximately 600 Mexican Americans met immediately after
the American occupation of Veracruz, however, and pledged
their cooperation to city officials.
Conditions remained
74
generally quiet for most of the summer m 1914.
Down the river from El Paso, conditions remained
strained in Presidio.
This border town, across from
Ojinaga, was a safety valve for refugees fleeing the fighting and for gun smugglers in the Big Bend area.
The fed-
eral garrison abandoned Ojinaga in March 1913, giving
control of the city to the rebels who held it until December.
The occupation of Ojinaga benefited the rebels because
of the ammunition that was introduced from the Big Bend
^
A
Christian, "Sword and Plowshare," p. 336; El Paso
Morning Times, 21, 29 April 1914, p. 1; Weekly Report,
9 May 1914, RDS, 312.00/11942; 27 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/
12677; 21 July 1914, RDS, 812.00/12777.
186
district.
On s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s A m e r i c a n and M e x i c a n
glers clashed near Presidio.
tions remained unchanged
smug-
Militarily, though, condi-
for m o s t of 1913."^^
P r e s i d i o b e g a n to take in a growing number of
r e f u g e e s in m i d - D e c e m b e r , as a g o v e r n m e n t force
Ojinaga.
approached
On t h e A m e r i c a n side of the r i v e r , m i l i t a r y
o f f i c i a l s p r e p a r e d to d e f e n d P r e s i d i o in the event that
the force o f 5,000 f e d e r a l s turned its guns on the A m e r i c a n
border t o w n .
A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n s from Presidio left the
city for M a r f a to a v o i d t h e d a n g e r of an attack.
The
situation b e c a m e t e n s e w h e n a M e x i c a n patrol fired at an
American patrol.
W i t h the a r r i v a l of federal and
later
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t f o r c e s , i n c i d e n t s between A m e r i c a n and
Mexican patrols increased.
Shells fired by the r e b e l s
fell o n the A m e r i c a n side d u r i n g an attack on O j i n a g a ,
forcing A m e r i c a n s o l i d e r s g u a r d i n g the r i v e r f r o n t to r e treat to s a f e t y .
M a j o r M c N a m e e q u i c k l y informed
rebel
G e n e r a l O r t e g a o f t h e i n c i d e n t , telling h i m that if it
o c c u r r e d a g a i n , h e w o u l d be c o m p e l l e d to stop i t .
p r o m i s e d to s e e t h a t it d i d n o t h a p p e n a g a i n .
Ortega
76
75
El Paso Morning Times, 26 March 1913, p. 1;
Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 2 9 September 1913,
RDS, 312.00/9007; Weekly Report, 30 May 1913, RDS, 812.00/
7760.
-g
El Paso Morning Times, 12 December 1913, p. 1;
1 January 1914, p. 1; Weekly Report, 13 December 1913, RDS,
312.00/10237; 19 December 1913, RDS, 812.00.10360; 2 January 1914, RDS, 312.00.10386; Secretary of War to Secretary
of State, 19 December 1913, RDS, 812.00/10561.
187
When
the C a r r a n c i s t a s m a d e their final a s s a u l t ,
federals ran to safety in P r e s i d i o .
Over 5,000 refugees
crossed the r i v e r , and A m e r i c a n patrols spent several days
rounding up the r e f u g e e s .
M e d i c a l supplies and food had
to be rushed to Presidio to care for the M e x i c a n s . ^"^
A f t e r a four-day m a r c h through the Big Bend country,
the e x i l e s arrived at El Paso in mid-January.
attempts to r e l e a s e them failed.
They were
Legal
transferred
to F o r t W i n g a t e , N e w M e x i c o in May 1914 and finally were
released to the Carranza government in September 1 9 1 4 .
78
Once the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s took control of Ojinaga
and the r e f u g e e s w e r e sent to El P a s o , concerns in the
area centered around rumors of Mexicans crossing the river
to raid A m e r i c a n r a n c h e s .
Mexicans fired on an American
patrol near Terlingua late in January.
A band of Mexicans
crossed the river in F e b r u a r y , followed in April by a
second band w h i c h stole a number of horses near V a l e n t i n e ,
Texas.
N u m e r o u s reports of crossings continued until July
W e e k l y R e p o r t , 9 January 1 9 1 4 , R D £ , 8 1 2 . 0 0 / 1 0 4 5 3 ;
16 J a n u a r y 1 9 1 4 , R D S , 8 1 2 , 0 0 / 1 0 6 1 6 ; 23 January 1 9 1 4 , R D S ,
812.00/10710.
"^^George R. Cole,, "Brushfire Was 1916 S t y l e " (M.A.
t h e s i s , L o u i s i a n a State U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 6 2 ) , p . 4 4 ; "Shot
and S h e l l , " V o i c e , p p . 1 5 - 1 7 ; in Lona Teresa O'Neal W h i t t i n g t o n , "The Road of S o r r o w : Mexican Refugees W h o Fled
Pancho V i l l a T h r o u g h P r e s i d i o , T e x a s , 1 9 1 3 - 1 9 1 4 , " Studies
in H i s t o r y 6 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , o n e can find a brief account of the
incident; "The M e x i c a n W a r : Presidio R e f u g e e s , " The O u t l o o k , 24 January 1 9 1 4 , p . 1 4 7 ; "The F t . Bliss C a m p , " The
O u t l o o k , 31 January 1 9 1 4 , p . 2 2 5 .
188
when heavy rains made fording impossible.^^
The loyalty of the 800 Mexicans and Mexican Americans who lived in the Presidio area worried local officials after the news of the American occupation of Veracruz
reached the city.
Two months later officials became
fearful of the local "Mexican" population when two Texas
Rangers allegedly killed Carlos Morales Wood in Marfa,
Wood, a newspaperman in Valentine, Texas, questioned the
killing of another Mexican by the lawmen.
Rangers Ira
Cline and H. L. Robertson moved to arrest Wood on charges
of inciting the local Mexican population to riot.
The two
Rangers shot Wood, claiming the suspect resisted arrest
and went for his gun.
Local authorities mobilized for
fear that the "Mexicans" would demonstrate, but they did
not.
Several Mexicans testified to the Mexican consul
that Carlos Morales Wood never drew his pistol; that the
Rangers, hiding behind a car, called to Carlos and gunned
him down.
The same Mexicans refused, however, to testify
in court against the Rangers for fear "a recibir la muerte
80
en manos de los rangers" (of being killed by the rangers).
El Paso Morning Times, 20 April 1914, p. 1;
Weekly Report, 22 February 1914, RDS, 812.00/11042; 24
April 1914, RDS, 812.00/11785; 28 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/
12677; 26 June 1914; RDS, 812.00/12391; 3 July 1914, RDS,
312.00/12445.
80
F. Serrano to V. Margin, Consul at El Paso,
24 June 1914, AREM, L-E-772; Weekly Report, 15 May 1914,
RDS, 312.00/12604.
189
Some revolutionary activities which were common
to all border regions deserve further attention.
These
include refugee problems, smuggling, arrests and executions
of United States citizens for their
part in such activi-
ties, and United States military reactions.
One of the major concerns along the border that
worried United States officials was Mexican refugees who
crossed the Rio Grande.
Outcasts fleeing the suffering of
the revolution found safety in crossing the river.
Most
boundary communities found themselves engulfed with thousands of refugees at one time or another.
On several occa-
sions, Mexican troops, mostly federals but sometimes rebels,
fled to the American side of the river seeking safety from
enemy fire.
During the Madero revolt, Mexican soldiers
who fled to the United States found their way back into
Mexico through towns held by their forces.
The American
policy of returning troops to Mexico changed in May 1913
when the Secretary of War ordered the detention of all
Mexican soldiers crossing the river.
When Matamoros fell
to the rebels in 1913, 117 government troops sought refuge
in Fort Brown where they were detained until late 1914.
With Nuevo Laredo changing hands, Laredo found itself
housing both
rebels and federals.
The most dramatic
exodus occurred at Ojinaga-Presidio.
In January 1914,
5,000 crossed to Presidio when the Constitutionalists
defeated a federal force in Ojinaga.
Because of the
190
exceptionally large number in Presidio, army officials
decided to move them to Fort Bliss.
At one point or another during the battles fought
in Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, Piedras Negras and Las Vacas,
the entire civilian population moved to the sister American
border town.
Most came with all the household goods they
could carry on their backs, while the lucky ones carried
them in wagons.
homes.
Many feared that troops would loot their
Americans had mixed feelings about the refugees.
As a rule, Mexican Americans and merchants welcomed their
compadres.
Coffee and cookies came from the Mexican
American population.
them.
Some refugees brought groceries with
Public buildings housed them.
Others sought shelter
in boxcars. Some Mexican Americans families made room for
their neighbors.
Many pitched tents in the cities' plazas
on the Mexican side of towns.
On the other hand, among
many Anglos and the local authorities, the exiles were
unwanted.
City officials feared that they would become
agitators and foment dissatisfaction among the local
Mexican American citizenry.
The most serious concern,
however, centered around fears that the Mexicans brought
81
Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 67; Wilkinson, Laredo, p. 385; Laredo Weekly Times, 4 January 1914,
p. 3; 18 January 1914, p. 6; Secretary of War to Secretary
of State, 3 May 1913, RDS, 312.00/7351; Texas Rangers
Archives, "Monthly Reports" from J. J. Sanders, 30 April
1914, located in the Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas.
191
with them numerous diseases and criminal elements.
Some
of the refugees expressed a desire to stay in Texas and
work in the fields. 82
The
traffic in arms across the Rio Grande border
to both Huerta and Carranza also presented a serious concern for the United States government from February 1913
to February 1914.
Early in 1913 Huerta had been allowed
to import war munitions through the ports of entry which
he controlled along the border.
Carranza protested the
American policy which helped Huerta.
Not until August 4,
1913, did Wilson suspend the sale of arms to Huerta.
On
the other hand, the rebels had to smuggle in many of their
war supplies at the beginning of the war.
The rebels'
success resulted largely from the sympathy given them by
the border Mexican American population.
Most Mexican
Americans were nortenos (northerners), who supported the
Carranza revolt as a northern movement.
Wilson did not
demand a strict enforcement of neutrality laws since he
desired the removal of Huerta.
Thus Huerta's demands for
enforcement of the laws fell on deaf ears.
The Constitu-
tionalists demanded more than the mere prohibition of sale
82
Bravo to Serrano, 30 September 1913, AREM, L-E842; Laredo Weekly Times, 26 April 1914, p. 4; Brownsville
Daily Herald, 12 May 1913, p. 1; Christian, "Sword and
Plowshare," pp. 316-322; Laredo Weekly Times, 22 March
1913, p. 4; 15 June 1913, p. 1; El Paso Morning Times,
10 October 1913, p. 1; Elias to Mexican Embassy, Washington, D . C , 5 October 1913, AREM, L-E-753.
192
of arms to Huerta; they hoped to move Wilson to lift the
Taft embargo.
Wilson had reservations about going that
far for fear the day might come when United States weapons
would be used by Mexicans to resist an American invasion of
Mexico.
As previously noted, a change of policy did occur
in February 1914 when Wilson lifted the embargo.
The re-
strictions had helped Huerta, who was able to import arms
from Europe while the rebels held no seaport. 8 3
Every sector of the border reported numerous
instances of smuggling operations.
In El Paso alone by
the end of 1913 at least 15 million rounds of ammunition
and 20,000 weapons had been transported to Juarez.
Attempts
to stop the flow of arms presented an impossible task to
the border patrols.
Military commanders never had enough
troops on the riverfront to patrol the border adequately.
Customs officials patrolled the river during the day, leaving their posts vacant at night.
Smugglers used every
device conceivable to get the ammunition across:
in cans,
bales of hay, coal cars, cans of lard and many other
4-u ^
84
methods.
03
Grieb, United States and Huerta, pp. 60-61; Ortiz,
"Carranza y el Armamento Norte-Americano," pp. 253-257;
Harold Eugene Holcombe, "United States Arms Control and the
Mexican Revolution, 1910-1924" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Alabama, 1968), p. 64; Foreign Relations, 1913, pp.
65, 330-881; Eric Tanner, "The Texas Border and the Mexican
Revolution" (M.A. thesis, Texas Tech University, 1970), pp.
30-31.
^^Christian, "Sword and Plowshare," pp. 305-306;
193
Many merchants handled the trade of war munitions
because they saw tremendous profits in the revolution.
But there were businessmen on the north side of the river
who sympathized with the rebels and helped them acquire
weapons.
Almost without exception most of the merchants
selling arms were owners of "hardware stores."
Macedonio
r
J. Garcia and Cafferelli Bros., Inc., both merchant firms
in Brownsville, bought large quantities of arms and ammunition for the warring factions in Mexico.
A. Davila in Del
Rio sold war munitions to Mexican factions, while near
Marfa the Murphy Walker Company traded in military supplies
to the rebels.
Numerous hardware stores in El Paso, among
them Loudon Hardware, sold immense amounts of war munitions
to Mexico.
Every border town had a large number of agents
for both sides who made the arrangements for the purchases.
Many of the agents not only made the purchase but also
handled the smuggling.
To avoid detection by American
officials some agents shadowed customs officials and reported their whereabouts to other agents who made the
crossing safely elsewhere.
Brownsville Daily Herald, 16 September 1913, p. 1; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 29 May 1913, RDS, 812.00/
7644; Weekly Report, 6 February 1914, RD£, 312.00/10850;
21 August 1913, RDS, 812.00/8821.
^^Laredo Weekly Times, 17 May 1914, p. 2; Brownsville Daily Herald, 27, 28 January 1914, p. 1; "Pablo
Gonzalez Archives," Roll 49, Felipe Martinez to Pablo
Gonza'lez, 30 June 1914; Weekly Report, 19 April 1913, RDS,
194
The sale of arms and munitions soared after President Wilson lifted the Taft embargo.
From 1913 to mid-1914
Villa imported $606,9 35 in ammunition through El Paso alone,
In a single day one million rounds of ammunition crossed
the river to the rebel camp across from Brownsville.
On
February 5, 1914, eighteen wagons formed a parade line as
they prepared to cross the bridge.
Two weeks later every
movable vehicle was rented in Brownsville and Matamoros to
transport ammunition and other war supplies out of Matamoros.
By March, approximately 200,000 rounds of ammuni86
tion crossed the border weekly.
Numerous clashes between would-be smugglers and
American officers occurred all along the border.
In
September 1913, a band of fifteen armed Mexicans left
Crystal City with a wagon load of supplies destined for
Mexico.
A posse organized and pursued the Carrancistas,
overtaking them at Carrizo Springs.
A fight ensued in
which the Mexicans inflicted heavy casualties on the posse,
capturing two deputies.
Colonel F. W. Sibley in Eagle Pass
812.00/7333; 20 June 1913, RDS, 812.00/7884; 26 July 1913,
RDS, 812.00/8212; 21 August 1913, RDS, 312.00/8521; 1 Novimber 1913, RD£, 812.00/9694; 13 November 1913, RDS^, 312.
00/9833; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 6 May 1913, RDS,
312.00/7447; Blocker to Secretary of State, 9 August 1913,
RDS, 812.00/8351.
^^Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. 126-127;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 5, 18 February 1914, p. 1;
Laredo Weekly Times, 15 March 1914, p. 4.
195
dispatched troops down the Rio Grande to intercept the band
and keep it from crossing the river.
When trapped, the
would-be smugglers gained their freedom by releasing the
87
two hostages.
Many American citizens became involved in the
intrigue of revolutionary activity
along the border.
They engaged in smuggling, recruiting, selling horses or
spying for
the different factions.
Several Americans
were caught by Mexican officials and subsequently jailed
or executed.
Clemente Vergara, believed to be a dealer in
stolen horses, became a victim of the revolution when
federals killed him near Laredo.
Vergara, who frequently
sold horses for government soldiers, but sympathized with
the rebels, crossed the river to claim horses he believed
had been stolen by federal soldiers.
He argued with Cap-
tain Apolonio Rodriguez who ordered him executed.
Governor
Colquitt demanded that the culprits be punished and that
88
Vergara's body be returned to Texas.
The governor
/
offered a $1,000 reward for the capture of Rodriguez and
El Paso Morning Times, 12 September 1913, p. 1;
Blocker to Secretary of State, 12 September 1913, RDS,
812.00/338 3; Secretary of'War to Secretary of State,
12 September 1913, RDS, 312.00/3369.
^^Wilkinson, Laredo, pp. 390-391; Laredo Weekly
Times, 15 February 1914, p. 4; "The Case of Bergara," The
American Review of Reviews, April 1914, pp, 408-409; Bravo
to Diebold, 10 March 1914, AREM, L-E-308; Weekly Report,
12 March 1914, RDS, 312.00/11197.
196
the four soldiers with him at
the time of the crime.
Mexican government officials denied knowledge
affair.
of the
When Colquitt failed to get Washington to assist,
he threatened to send Texas Rangers to return the body and
to bring Rodriguez to Texas.
The governor hesitated, how-
ever, when Secretary of State Bryan warned that such action
would constitute an act of war.
The governor also learned
/
that Webb County Sheriff Amador Sanchez had made the
arrangements for Vergara to cross into Mexico to retrieve
the alleged stolen horses.
Colquitt, suspicious of
Sanchez's role in the affair, disassociated himself from
the incident. The Vergara family paid Juan Garza $500 to
39
recover the body.
Perhaps the most famous case involved William S.
Benton, a British subject and wealthy cattle owner in
Chihuahua killed in February 1914. Villistas raided his
ranch and stole some stock.
Villa refused to allow Amer-
ican officials to investigate because Benton was a British
subject.
Despite pressure from V7ilson on Carranza to force
"Mexico: View From Texas," The Literary Digest,
14 March 1914, pp. 535-537; El Paso Morning Times, 27, 28
February 1914, p. 1; Laredo Weekly Times, 29 March 1914,
p. 5; B. P. Looney, Attorney General to Governor Colquitt,
26 February 1914, Walter Prescott Webb Collection, Eugene
C Barker Texas History Center, Austin, Texas; Texas
Rangers Archives, "Monthly Reports," from J. J. Sanders,
31 March 1914, Texas State Archives; Charles H. Harris III
and Louis R. Sadler, "The 1911 Reyes Conspiracy: The Texas
Side," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 83 (April 1980),
p. 345.
197
Villa to account for the death of Benton, the rebel did
90
not yield.
Other Americans also were victims of the revolution
Juan B. Alamia from Edinburg, Texas faced execution at the
hands of the Constitutionalists near Rio Bravo on charges
of spying for government troops.
Federals executed
Porfirio Laurel from Laredo, Texas on similar charges.
J. R. Carrillo, Fred Perez, C
H. Rippetan, R. A. Geye and
Joe Jennings were released after having been arrested by
Mexican officials. 91
The men killed or arrested had allegedly engaged
in some aspect of the revolution.
Vergara, Benton, Laurel,
and Jennings dealt with both sides selling horses and
cattle.
Juan Alamia reportedly smuggled guns to the
federals; and Fred Perez to the rebels.
Rippetan and Geye
faced charges of spying for the federals, while Carrillo
was'known to be sympathetic to the rebels.
The number of
arrests made by Mexican officials worried President Wilson
90
Cumberland, The Constitutional Years, pp. 231232; "The Thickening Mexican Situation," The Independent,
16 March 1914, p. 367; El Paso Morning Times, 24 March
1914, p. 1.
91
*
"Jesse Perez Memoirs," p. 51; Brownsville Daily
Herald, 12 May 1913, p. 1; 23 June 1913, p. 1; 4 September
1913, p. 1; 20 September 1913, p. 1; Laredo Weekly Times,
5 April 1913, p. 8; 2 November 1913, p. 5; Weekly Report,
29 August 1913, RDS, 812.00/3670.
198
who ordered an increase of troops along the border.^^
Conditions on the border necessitated a military
response by the American government.
At first General
Tasker H. Bliss, Commander of the Southern Department of
the United States Army, headquartered in San Antonio, Texas,
refused to become excited by rumors and would not increase
the numbers of troops on the border.
When towns were
threatened by fighting, however, American troops were
rushed to the border.
American soldiers had to guard
border crossings to prevent their destruction and to arrest
military as well as civilian refugees.
During a visit to
the border in April 1913, local merchants convinced General
Bliss of the need to send more troops to the area.
The
military situation also became more tense in August when
the issue of non-recognition flared up.
Brownsville Mayor
A. B. Cole wired Texas senators Charles Culberson and
Morris Sheppard requesting more troops for the town.
In
his dispatch he called attention to the fact that the
Mexican American population greatly outnumbered the Anglo
Americans in the city.
He also expressed fear that the
small American detachment could not provide adequate pro93
tection from the huge rebel force m Matamoros.
City
^^"The Vergara and Benton Cases," The Independent,
27 March 1914, pp. 400-401.
^\ilkinson, Laredo, p. 335; Brownsville Daily
199
officials in Laredo, Eagle Pass, Del Rio, Presidio, and
El Paso expressed similar concerns.
Consequently, Presi-
dent Wilson ordered troops to the border and warned Mexican
officials that they would be held responsible for any injury inflicted on Americans or their property along the
frontier.
Military buildups occurred twice in 1914, first
as a result of the increased killings and arrests of Americans in Mexico and second in response to the concerns
voiced by Americans living along the border after the
American occupation of Veracruz.
Over 18,000 troops were
ordered to Texas, most of whom were stationed in Texas City
and San Antonio.
Yet the troops on the border did not have
to fight because the Mexican Americans did not rise up in
94
arms.
Although American troops on the border experienced
no military engagements, they did deal with the illegal
arms trade and the increase in depredations late in 1914.
Dissatisfaction with the military presence quickly surfaced,
with American civilians accusing the soldiers of being as
"lawless as the roving rebels who cross the line."
Most
Herald, 13 May 1913, p. 1; 11 August 1913, p. 1; 31 December 1913, p. 1; Laredo Weekly Times, 5 October 1913, p. 5;
4 January 1914, p. 2.
Garrett to Secretary of State, 9 August 1913,
RDS, 312.00/8287; Weekly Report, 12 August 1913, RDS,
812.00/8679; El Paso Morning Times, 12 March 1914, p. 1;
Brownsville Daily Herald, 12 March 1914, p. 1; 25 April
1914, p. 1; 4 May 1914, p. 1.
200
of the demands for the withdrawal of troops came from
merchants who, no doubt, engaged in the gun-smuggling
trade.
City officials insisted that troops be retained,
however, for fear that if they were removed, Mexican
raiders would cross the line and commit depredations.
The American occupation of
Veracruz created ex-
citement on both sides of the border.
On the Mexican side,
in cities under rebel control—Matamoros, Ojinaga and
Ciudad Juarez—only a few residents expressed fear of an
American invasion.
The federals at Nuevo Laredo, Piedras
Negras and Las Vacas caused panic, however, by abandoning
and partially destroying those cities because they feared
an attack from the American army in Texas.
On the Texas side of the river, the situation
alarmed Americans.
Upon receiving requests for more
troops from all of the border towns. Secretary of War
Lindley M. Garrison ordered soldiers to every community
on the Mexican frontier.
Anglo Americans in most border
cities feared an internal uprising by the Mexican American
population.
Yet not a single city had any trouble with
96
its Mexicans.
In Austin Governor 0. B. Colquitt
"The Army of Protection," The Outlook, 18 July
1914, pp. 651-654; Brownsville Daily Herald, 6 February
1914, p. 1; 1 March 1914, p. 1; 20 June 1913, p. 1.
^^Christian, "Sword and Plowshare," pp. 325-326;
Laredo Weekly Times, 26 April 1914, p. 9; 3 May 1914, p. 4;
Cobb to Secretary of State, 23 April 1914, RDS^, 812.00/
11656.
201
overreacted to pleas for troops from border citizens.
The
governor ordered the state militia to the border.
Within
four days 1,200 troops came to Brownsville alone.
Colquitt
refused to withdraw the militia until sufficient American
servicemen were there.
The governor also directed Texas
Rangers to organize home guards to patrol in their local
vicinity.
For organizational purposes three border dis-
tricts were established.
Ranger Captain John R. Hughes
took command of the Brownsville district. Captain J. J.
Sanders, Laredo, and Captain J. M. Fox, El Paso. 97
The Mexico-Texas border experienced only a limited
amount of activity during the Madero Revolution.
The con-
flict reached the border more fully after Madero was
assassinated.
Maderistas who had envisioned a new Mexico
moved quickly to resist the dictatorship of Huerta.
Venustiano Carranza took the lead.
Unlike
the earlier
rebellions, the Carranza revolt had its first victories
on the border.
At one time or another every frontier city
experienced revolutionary activity.
The revolutionary movements on the frontier line
had an impact on the people living on both sides of the
river.
Mexicans fearing for their safety crossed the
river and sought refuge in Texas.
The proximity of the
Brownsville Daily Herald, 23 April 1914, p. 1;
El Paso Morning Times, 24 April 1914, p. 1; Weekly Report,
2 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/11883.
202
fighting to the American border caused United States citizens to become apprehensive.
Cries for protection went to state and federal
officials.
The border became a militarized zone, an area
for intrigue which involved the crossing of filibustering
expeditions, the stealing and smuggling of cattle and
horses, the trading of arms and war munitions, and the
activities of agents for both sides.
American citizens
became involved in the intrigue and those who were caught
paid the price.
The Carranza revolt, a northern movement with which
Mexicans and Mexican Americans along the border identified,
gave the people in the north a sense of direction.
When
General Lucio Blanco portioned the first land to peasants
in Matamoros, the revolution became meaningful to the
peasant-soldier from the north.
The large number of mili-
tary actions in northern Mexico stimulated a military
response in Texas and made border clashes inevitable.
Historical antagonisms revived in the summer of 1914.
The
American occupation of Veracruz further increased tensions.
The full impact of the Carrancista movement on the
Mexico-Texas border surfaced late in 1914, peaked in the
summer of 1915 and declined by 1916.
CHAPTER V
CARRANCISMO ALONG THE RIO GRANDE, 1914-1915
No comet, no volcanic eruption or earthquake forewarned the residents of Mexico City that on August 20,
1914, another revolutionist would enter their city.
With
Venustiano Carranza in control of the Mexican government,
a general feeling prevailed that Mexico was nearing the
peace which had been shattered the year Halley's Comet
appeared in the sky.
But, the hope of peace soon became
despair when Francisco Villa broke with Carranza two weeks
after the Constitutionalists had gained control of the
capital.
Besides having to overcome the Villa challenge
through the Convention of Aguascalientes, Carranza had
to gain the respect and recognition of President Woodrow
Wilson.
Both burdens presented an enormous drain of energy
from Carranza's efforts to pacify the country.
An examina-
tion of Carranza's obstacles is necessary in order to
understand why the revolution continued even after the
defeat of Victoriano Huerta.
Just as the Madero, Reyes,
and Orozco revolutions had utilized the United StatesMexico border, so Carranza made use of the Rio Grande.
There would be no peace in Mexico for several years
203
204
until Carranza consolidated his power and eliminated his
rivals.
Villa began a march south with his 40,000 man
Division of the North.
The most influential generals sup-
ported Carranza, but in the early going Constitutionalist
forces were no match for the Villista army.
evacuated Mexico City on November 20.
Thus Carranza
The Constitutional-
ists controlled most of southern Mexico and the area from
Queretaro to Veracruz, as well as the border ports of
Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo across from Texas and Agua
Prieta across from Arizona.
Villa controlled all other
border points and most of northern Mexico."^
Before 1915 the Carrancistas did not attempt to
challenge Villa in the northernmost states. Monterrey and
Saltillo belonged to him.
General Alvaro Obregon decided
to move against Villa in the states immediately north of
the capital.
He defeated Villa at Celaya in April, 1915.
The coup de grace came on July 10 when Obregon defeated
Harold Eugene Holcombe, "United States Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Alabama, 1968), pp. 95-96; Charles
C Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: The Constitutional
Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), pp. 133,
193-209; Clarence C Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The
United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (London:
The Macmillan Company, 1969), pp. 178-179; Luis G. Zorrilla,
Historia de las Relaciones entre Mexico y Los Estados
Unidos de America (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Porriia, S.A. ,
1966), Tomo II, p. 279; Daniel James, Mexico and The
Americas (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 177;
Ronald Atkin, Revolution!: Mexico 1910-1920 (New York:
The John Day Company, 1970), pp. 238-240; Brownsville
Herald, 20 November 1914, p. 1.
205
Villa again in the Battle of Aguascalientes.
Villa no
longer posed a serious challenge to Carranza.
For all
practical purposes the most violent phase of the revolution had ended.
By October 1915, when the United States
granted de facto recognition to Carranza, Villa had
retreated to Chihuahua to reorganize and prepare for his
next campaign.
To gain legitimacy from abroad, especially from
the United States government, became Carranza's second
major task.
Wilson informed Carranza, soon after the
Constitutionalists took control of the Mexican government,
that he would not be recognized unless the First Chief
3
complied with traditional criteria for recognition.
Robert Lansing, who became Secretary of State on
June 23, 1915, brought to the Wilson Administration stronger
support for recognition of Carranza.
Lansing favored a
2
James, Mexico and the Americas, p. 177; Cumberland, The Constitutional Years, pp. 182, 200, 209; Eric
C Tanner, "The Texas Border and the Mexican Revolution"
(M.A. thesis, Texas Tech University, 1970), p. 33;
Clendenen, Blood on the Border, pp. 134-186; Atkin, Revolution, p. 233; Zorilla, Mexico y Los Estados Unidos, p.
271; Laredo Weekly Times, 10 January 1915, p. 2.
»
•^Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 414-415;
James, Mexico and the Americas, p. 176; Louis G. Kahle,
"Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Venustiano Carranza,"
Hispanic-America Historical Review 38 (August 1953), p.
356; Holcombe, "Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution,"
p. 102; "Towards Peace in Mexico," The Nation, 23 September
1915, pp. 373-374.
206
quick and positive solution to the Mexican situation, not
only because Mexico bordered the United States, but because
he feared Germany would incite trouble between the United
States, Mexico, and the rest of Latin America.
The United
States decided that the most honorable way to grant
Carranza recognition would be through a conference of
Latin American countries. 4
The conference met from August 5 to October 19 when
agreement was reached to grant Carranza de facto recognition.
After American recognition of Carranza, President
Wilson ordered an embargo on war munitions to Mexico,
other than supplies going to the Mexican government.
The
action in effect became an embargo against the government
of the Convention of Aguascalientes and the Francisco Villa
revolutionary forces.
4
Mark T. Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution: U.S.Mexico Relations under Wilson and Carranza (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977), p. 29-31; Kahle, "Robert
Lansing and the Recognition of Carranza," pp. 353-354, 361362; P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The
Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with xMexico, 1910-1917 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 196 9) , pp. 180-181; "The Mexican
Problem," The Independent, 30 August 1915, p. 287; "Carranza Rejects Conference Plan," The Independent, 20 September 1915, pp. 386-387.
De jure recognition was granted on August 31,
1917. Richard M. Estrada, "Border Revolution: The Mexican Revolution in the Ciudad Ju£rez-El Paso Area, 19061915" (M.A. thesis. University of Texas at El Paso, 1975),
p. 130; Josefina E. de Fabela, Documentos Historicos de la
Revolucion Mexicana (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Jus, 1966),
XX-I, p. 240; Larry D. Hill, Emissaries to a Revolution
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973) ,
207
The Carrancista revolution and Villa's counterrevolt brought continued turmoil, suffering and tension to
Mexican border cities.
Military action, however, seems to
have been less than during previous revolutionary movements.
The major battles between the Constitutionalists and the
Villistas armies occurred around the core of Mexico—Celaya,
Aguascalientes, Leon and Queretaro.
Yet the Ciudad Chihua-
hua, Saltillo and Monterrey sectors did experience some
warfare.
Early in 1915 Villa occupied Monterrey and Sal-
tillo; but both were in government hands by the summer of
that year.
By May 1915 Tamaulipas had been cleared of
Villa's forces.
Because the Constitutionalists viewed the
area around Mexico City as more important than the northern
frontier, Carrancista forces held only tenuous control of
the border south of Del Rio in the summer and fall of 1914.
Villa, on the other hand, held the border cities of his
home state. Chihuahua.
An examination of border towns
p. 363; Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916-1932 (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 30-82; Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States
(Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, 1922),
1915, pp. 772-773; Haley, Revolution and Intervention, p.
132; Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, p. 32; Kahle,
"Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Carranza," pp. 366363; Holcombe, "Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution,"
pp. 110-112, 116; "Recognition of Carranza," The Independent, 18 October 1915, p. 1; for an excellent account
of the Carranza Doctrine see Maria Eugenia L6pez de Roux,
"Relaciones Mexicano-Norteamericanos (1917-1918),"
Historia Mexicana 14 (Enero-Marzo, 1965), pp. 447-451.
208
reveals the impact of this stage in the revolution.^
Matamoros continued to be a storehouse for the
Carrancista army and in 1914 faced constant threats from
counterrevolutionary elements.
Late in August Matamorenses
celebrated with speeches, festivals and a tremendous displaying of flags—both American and Mexican—the entrance
of Carranza into Mexico City.
Once the festivities ended.
Constitutionalist officials launched an aggressive recruiting program, which enlisted a large number of men into the
Mexican army.
At the same time, officials in Matamoros
charged that Brownsville had become a center for counterrevolutionists, among them supporters of Huerta.
The
charge could not be substantiated in 1914.
Threats of a Villista attack north of Matamoros
near Reynosa worried government officials later in the
year.
Early on December 5 a small battle occurred between
a Constitutionalist patrol and a band of filibusters, who
f
crossed the Rio Grande from Texas south of Reynosa.
6
"
The
*
Giro R. de la Garza-Trevino, La Revolucion
Mexicana en el Estado de Tamaulipas, Tomo II (Mexico, D.F.:
Libreria de Manuel Porrlia, S.A., 1973) , p. 171; Richard
Marcum, "Fort Brown, Texas: The History of a Border Post"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University, 1964), p. 280;
Clendenen, Blood on the Border, p. 179; U.S. Department of
State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico,
1910-1929, RDS, Weekly Reports, 26 January 1916, 812.00/
17239; Brownsville Herald, 11 January 1915, 21, 29 May 1915
7
Jesse H. Johnson, American Consul at Matamoros, to
Secretary of State, 3 September 1914, RD£, 812.00/13141;
Weekly Report, 22 August 1914, RDS, 812.00/13071.
209
Carranza force killed three rebels and summarily executed
the seven men captured.
Rumors of numerous bands of men
crossing the border to organize a resistance movement
against government troops between Matamoros and Reynosa
prompted Carrancista officials to order the execution of
any armed person who crossed the river.
A few miles up
the Rio Grande at Mier, the government garrison mutinied,
killing the alcalde, an immigration official, and the commander of the garrison.
A government force retook the
city and executed the mutineers.
On December 29, 1914,
in an effort to check anti-government activity. General
Emiliano P. Nafarrate revoked all passports and ordered
that all persons wishing to cross the bridge apply for
g
permits from military officials.
From January to March 1915, the Matamoros area
including Reynosa prepared for a possible Villista assault.
With the Constitutionalists having taken control of
Tampico, the Villista generals, desiring a port of entry
in the east, decided that the Matamoros garrison was weak
and made an attempt to seize the port city.
The move
against Matamoros began in mid-January when 100 Villistas
defeated a Carrancista patrol near Reynosa.
In mid-January
General Nafarrate began to receive and deploy 6,000 troops
Weekly Report, 5 December 1914, RD£, 812.00/
14024; Brownsville Herald,. 19 September 1914, p. 1;
1, 10, 11, 29 December 1914, p. 1.
210
to patrol the river.
Suspecting Villistas and other
counterrevolutionists in Brownsville of spying, Nafarrate
closed the Mexican side of the bridge and suspended operations of the ferry boats while his troops prepared defense
lines.
In late March and early April a battle for Matamoros occurred:
A 7,000 man Villista force from near
Monterrey occupied Mier and Camargo before moving on
Reynosa.
Villista generals Jose Rodriguez and Absaul
Navarro led the attack against Matamoros on March 27.
Constitutionalists under General Nafarrate held the city
and inflicted about 1,000 casualties on the enemy forcing
him to withdraw to el Rancho de Las Rucias thirteen miles
away.
Nafarrate succeeded through the use of fifteen ma-
chine guns that had reached the city enroute to Veracruz.
^Ibid., 16 January 1915, RD£, 812.00/14278;
Brownsville Herald, 14, 18 January 1915; 17 March 1915.
Giro R. de la Garza-Grevino, Tamaulipas (Apuntos
Historicos) (Ciudad Victoria: Universidad de Tamaulipas,
1956), pp. 131, 144-145; Garza-Trevino, Historia de
Tamaulipas: Anales y Efemerides (Ciudad Victoria: Universidad de Tamaulipas, 1954) , pp. 220-221; Garza-Trevino,
Revolucion Mexicana en Tamaulipas, ^ . 140, 148-15 3; Juan
Barragan Rodriguez, Historia del Ejercito Constitutionalista (Mexico, D.F.: Talleres de la Editorial Stylo,
1946), p. 25; "Pablo Gonzalez Archives," Roll 1, p. 319
(Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, The University of Texas at Austin); Johnson to Secretary of State,
23 March 1915, RDS, 812.00/14715; Brownsville Herald,
20, 22, 23, 24 March 1915, p. 1.
211
Sporadic fighting occurred for the next few days.
Matamorenses worried when word reached the city that a
Villista aeroplane piloted by H. M. Rhinehart, an American
from the Wright Factory in Dayton, Ohio, had been readied
to drop bombs over the city.
Rhinehart, however, secretly
/
left the Villa camp for Houston, Texas.
General Rodriguez
could not find another aviator, despite the attractive
salary of $100 per day with a thirty-day contract.
sides nursed their wounds.
an artillery assault.
Both
On April 13, Villistas launched
The Carrancistas responded with a
successful drive against the rebel camp forcing the
Villistas to withdraw to Monterrey.
tions had normalized.
By mid-April condi-
Leaders in Matamoros named Emiliano
Nafarrate "Hijo Benemerito de Tamaulipas" (Meritorious Son
of Tamaulipas) for his heroic defense of the city.
The Villa revolution had been dealt a severe blow.
While General Rodriguez lost to Nafarrate, Villa himself
suffered a devastating defeat by General Obregon at Celaya.
For all practical purposes, the Villista eastern theater had
been a failure. The Constitutionalist forces had complete
12
control of the situation in most of northeastern Mexico.
11
'^
. '^
Garza-Trevino, Tamaulipas, p. 146^ Garza-Trevino,
Historia de Tamaulipas, p. 224; Garza-Trevino, Revolucion
Mexicana en Tamaulipas, pp. 156-157; Brownsville Herald, 1,
2 April 1915; Laredo Weekly Times, 4 April 1915, p. 2.
12
Clendenen, Blood on the Border, p. 179.
212
With a few exceptions, conditions remained quiet
during the summer of 1915 in the Matamoros area.
Early in
May officials at Reynosa arrested and executed twenty-one
Villista sympathizers.
Later that month, officials in
Matamoros removed the fity cent tax that had been levied
on persons wanting to cross the bridge during the siege of
the city.
Passports, however, still had to be obtained.
Later in June refugees and wounded Carrancistas arrived
>
from other areas of the state.
Many of the refugees had
come to the border town in search of food and jobs.
Be-
cause of the large number, health conditions worsened.
A
13
typhus fever epidemic spread.
In July Carrancista offi-
cials undertook a massive recruitment drive to organize a
home guard.
A circular appeared in a Matamoros paper.
El Democrata, appealing for recruits.
To the people of Matamoros: The traitors of
Villista factions have been conquered, but not annihilated. For this reason we ought to make an effort
to obtain its complete destruction following the first
chief of the Constitutionalist, Venustiano Carranza
and at the same time comply with our duty as Mexican
patriots.
So we have decided with full permission from the
military commander of the city to organize a new army
of men, the name of which will be given afterwards,
and whose duty it will be to defend the city in case
•^\eekly Report, 1 May 1915, RDS, 812.00/15012;
5 June 1915, RD£, 312.00/15228; Brownsville Herald
25 March 1915, p. 1; 24 May 1915, p. 1; 2 June 1915,
p. 1; 15 June 1915, p. 1.
213
of attack, though remote, by the reactionaires and
other enemies of the Constitutionalists.
The book is ready for enlistment of citizens who
wish to join the army and the office is temporarily
at the Dem6crata.l4
With a home guard organized and conditions very much
improved, military officials removed most of the troops
from the. city, leaving a 600 man garrison. 15
A month after American recognition, Venustiano
Carranza visited the first border town to join the Constitutionalist cause in 1913.
On November 28, the First
Chief arrived at Matamoros to a hero's welcome.
Carranza
expressed his gratitude for the loyalty that Matamorenses
had shown him in his struggle to restore Constitutional
government to Mexico.
After Carranza left the port city,
conditions remained quiet until 1916 when Villa raided
16
Columbus, New Mexico.
Nuevo Laredo enjoyed more peace than did Matamoros
although a number of incidents did occur.
Nuevo Laredo
seemed to have welcomed the overthrow of Huerta, but not
necessarily the rise of Carranza.
Apparently, Villa had
a sizeable following, probably because of the treatment
•'•'^Brownsville Herald, 9 July 1915, p. 4.
"'•^E. S. Puig, Vice-consul in Matamoros to Secretary of State, 14 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/15889.
"'•^Garza-Trevino, Historia de Tamaulipas, p. 231;
Brownsville Herald, 29 November 1915, p. 1.
214
given the border town by the Constitutionalists for most
of the period before the summer of 1915.
not
have
Nuevo Laredo did
the same strategic value as Matamoros had.
Nonetheless, Nuevo Laredo remained under very tenuous
Carrancista control.
Periodically, troops arrived at the
border point, but most of the time they made up detachments
being sent on relief for hospital duty.
Through most of November and December 1914 citizens
of Nuevo Laredo heard rumors that raids were being organized by filibustering groups from Texas.
Early in Novem-
ber American authorities discovered an apparent plot calling
for several hundred raiders to cross into Nuevo Laredo and
drive government troops out of the area.
The plot had been
scheduled to take place on November 8 when recruits from
Texas would join a Villista force on the Mexican side of
the river.
One source alleged that as many as one thousand
men had been recruited.
The Mexican government sent 1,800
men to reinforce the sector.
Late in December a Carran-
cista force engaged a Villista patrol near Guerrero forcing
the rebels to disperse, probably to Texas where they had
originated.
•^"^Weekly Report, 3 October 1914, RDS, 312.00/13462;
Laredo Weekly Times, 27 September 1914, p. 2; 25 October
1914, p. 2.
^^Ibid., 5 December 1914, RDS, 312.00/14024;
Laredo Weekly Times, 1 November 1914, p. 9; 3 November
1914, p. 12; Brownsville Herald, 22 December 1914, p. 1.
215
Nuevo Laredo, like Matamoros, became the target of
a Villista assault in the spring of 1915.
Early in Febru-
ary rumors of an impending attack prompted government
officials to move the customhouse archives to Laredo,
Texas.
With a 2,000 man Villista force making its way
down the river, reinforcements were rushed to the border
town.
A barbed wire fence connected to the electric plant
awaited a
charge by the Villistas.
In a battle fought at
Lampazos, the Villista army overpowered government forces
sent to stop the rebel advance on Nuevo Laredo.
The fight-
ing resumed on April 12, a few miles south of Nuevo Laredo
at a railroad station, Huizachito.
Generals Oreste Pereyra
and Pedro Bracamontes led the Villista army, while Generals
Alfredo Ricaut and Maclovio Herrera commanded the Carranza
forces.
After a two day battle the defeated Villista
force retreated rapidly towards Monterrey.
Carrancista
soldiers gave no quarter to rebel forces, making the
battle a bloody one.
General Herrera died from a wound
inflicted in a mistaken attack by his own troops.
By mid-
April, Villa had suffered a third defeat after those at
Celaya and Matamoros.
Slowly Carranza moved to take full
control of the northern sector.
On May 25, 1915, the
first train from Monterrey since 1914 arrived in Nuevo
Laredo, signaling that the region's long isolation had
ended and that Villismo no longer posed a threat.
Rumors
of rebel activity surfaced periodically, but Nuevo Laredo
216
never feared an attack during the rest of the year.
The
number of troop movements excited local residents, but most
were only to resupply armies in the southern district. "^^
In Nuevo Laredo events across the border continued
to cause occasional excitement.
In September military
officials guaranteed the American consul that anti-American
demonstrations would not be permitted during the "16 de
Septiembre" celebration.
General Ricaut doubled all
patrols and stationed troops outside the city for that
day.
The following month Carranza received American recog-
nition, prompting a spontaneous celebration.
A band played
the national anthems of both nations in front of the American consulate.
A member of General Ricaut's staff visited
Consul Garrett to express the military's gratitude.
month later Carranza visited the city.
A
Officials ordered
a thorough cleaning and repairing of city streets.
All
residents had to clean and trim their yards and officials
distributed disinfectants.
The First Chief arrived in the
city on November 19 and on the twenty-third visited with
American officials from Laredo, Texas including Texas
19
Laredo Weekly Times, 14 February 1915, p. 5;
21 February 1915, p. 2; 21 March 1915, p. 2; 11 April 1915,
pp. 3, 9; 25 July, p. 1; Garza-Trevino, Revolucion Mexicana
en Tamaulipas, pp. 153-159; Weekly Report, 10 April 1915,
RDS, 812.00/14899; A. B. Garrett to Secretary of State,
16 April 1915, RDS, 312.00/14924; 1 May 1915, RDS, 312.00/
15012; Garrett to Secretary of State, 15 August 1915, RDS,
812.00/15769; 2 September 1915, RDS^, 312.00/16060.
217
Governor James Ferguson. 20
Conditions in Nuevo Laredo remained calm after
autumn in 1915.
Trade with Monterrey and Saltillo improved
and even exceeded 1914 sales.
By the end of 1915 the city
and region seemed on the way to a healthy recovery from
the effects of the war.
early in 1916.
Conditions changed drastically
A number of troops in the local garrison
mutinied early in February, but loyal ones suppressed the
outbreak after a small skirmish.
A week later. Consul
Garrett complained of rampant lawlessness.
He cited a
growing number of murders and robberies, including many
caused by the large number of refugees from southern Mexico
who had come to the border in search of food and jobs, but
who had not been able to cross to the American side.
In
order to control the refugee crisis, officials ordered
1,500 to 2,000 men, women and children shipped to San Luis
* 21
Potosi.
Piedras Negras experienced even less revolutionary
activity.
Conditions remained quiet for most of 1914,
although a few minor occurrences disturbed the tranquility
Garrett to Secretary of State, 14 September 1915,
RDS, 312.00/16216; 10 October 1915, RDS, 812.00/10438;
Garza-Trevino, Revolucion Mexicana en Tamaulipas, pp. 207203; Laredo Weekly Times, 31 October 1915, p. 8; 23 November 1915, p. 6.
^•^Laredo Weekly Times, 26 December 1915, p. 12;
20 February 1916, p. 12; El Paso Morning Times, 9 February
1916, p. 1; Weekly Report, 19 February 1916, RDS^, 812.00/
17335.
218
of the sector.
Carrancista officials busied themselves
recruiting from surrounding ranches.
Over 1,200 men were
recruited, mostly from the refugees who arrived from Fort
Wingate, New Mexico to be repatriated to Mexico by way of
Piedras Negras.
Carrancista officials worried over the
growing sympathy for Villa that seemed to be expressed by
the local populace.
By early December, a strong pro-Villa
element had surfaced in the city despite Carrancista control
of the local government.
In order to contain the doubts
surrounding Carranza's intentions. General Eduardo Hay,
commander of the local garrison, addressed a crowd of citizens to explain why the First Chief would not abide by the
decisions of the convention.
According to Hay the welfare
of the people concerned Carranza most.
His speech seemed
to have been received with some reservations.
Later in
December a filibustering force of twenty-five armed men
crossed from Eagle Pass to attack Piedras Negras. Carrancista patrols skirmished with the group, killing two.
The rest headed into the mountains.
Thirty government
soldiers who planned to join the filibusters were exposed
22
and subsequently executed.
Piedras Negras remained calm early in 1915, but by
^Weekly Report, 29 August 1914, RDS, 312.00/13127;
9 October 1914, RDS, 312.00/13410; 5 December 1914, RDS,
812.00/14024; 9 Dicember 1914, RD£, 812.00/14002; 19 December 1914, RDS, 312.00/14073; Blocker to Secretary of State,
21 December 1914, RDS, 812.00/14135.
219
mid-March it became obvious that the city would be attacked
by Villistas.
Early in March, the Carrancista forces left
a token fifty man garrison behind and moved to engage the
oncoming Villistas.
After a battle near Sabinas, the
Constitutionalists abandoned the district and withdrew
south to Nuevo Laredo.
General Maclovio Herrera, who com-
manded the Piedras Negras garrison, planned to burn and
destroy government buildings before evacuating the city.
Maverick County and Eagle Pass officials and businessmen
persuaded him not to, by threatening to impose a smallpox
quarantine so that no Mexican could take refuge in their
23
city when the Villistas moved in.
Villista General Rosalie Hernandez took the city
on March 11, 1915, with his 1,000 man force.
This gave
Villa full control of the border from Piedras Negras north
f
24
along the Rio Grande.
the border town.
From March to July Villistas held
For much of the time their patrols
chased harrassing government parties.
The rebels took few
prisoners, executing most Carrancista soldiers unfortunate
enough to fall into their hands.
By late July, however,
the Constitutionalists had begun to move against Piedras
^•^Laredo Weekly Times, 14 March 1915, p. 2; Weekly
Report, 6 March 1915, RDS^, 812.00/14603.
^Seekly Report, 6 March 1915, RDS, 312.00/14603;
13 March 1915, RDS, 812.00/14659; 20 March 1915, RDS,
812.00/14737; Blocker to Secretary of State, 22 March
1915, RDS, 312.00/14706.
220
Negras.
The local Villa garrison made every effort to stop
the Carrancista advance, but to no avail.
On September 7
the city fell into government hands when the rebel garrison
fled to the mountains.
Government troops met no resistance
the fifth time that Piedras Negras had changed hands since
25
1913.
Though peace returned with the ouster of the Villa
force, a few incidents later in the year engendered tense
moments.
On September 13, 1915, Texas health officials
ordered the closing of the international bridges at Eagle
Pass to all male inhabitants of Piedras Negras.
Texas
officials had issued a quarantine from Laredo to Brownsville because of the growing number of smallpox cases in
South Texas.
The quarantine did not include Eagle Pass,
but officials in the city had erroneously believed that it
did.
The Carrancista authorities in the border town then
prohibited incoming traffic.
Anti-American feeling began
to surface throughout the city.
The bridges soon opened,
however, and tensions declined.
The mood among citizens
in the city changed in mid-October when the United States
announced its plan to recognize Carranza.
Soldiers and
25
Brownsville Herald, 8 September 1915, p. 1;
Weekly Report, 1 May 1915, RDS, 812.00/15012; 12 June
1915, RDS, 812.00/15273; Blocker to Secretary of State,
28 AprIT"l915, RDS, 812.00/15384; 26 July 1915, RDS,
812.00/15550; 6 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16026;
7 September 1915, RDS, 312.00/16157.
221
townspeople celebrated the good news.
By the end of the
year conditions had clearly improved, for no anti-American
mood could be detected and food had become plentiful.^^
The Las Vacas and Ojinaga districts experienced
little revolutionary intrigue during the period when
Carranza struggled to take full control of the nation.
This can be attributed to the worthlessness of the sector
to both sides.
The Carrancistas regarded the region as
too distant to supply easily or to use for the importation
of many American goods.
Chihuahua.
Furthermore, Villa controlled
Nevertheless, Carranza maintained a flimsy
garrison in the areas throughout 1914.
The situation
began to change early in 1915 when Villa elements became
more active.
Seven Carrancista soldiers mutinied at Las
Vacas, causing a riot in the city.
Government officials
regained control of the situation and executed the mutineers.
A series of skirmishes occurred in the Las Vacas-
Ojinaga areas during the spring and summer months until
Villista forces took full control of the region.
The
rebel troops spent much of their time during the brief
occupation of the border fighting outlaws.
Early in
September a Carrancista force reoccupied Las Vacas after
26
Blocker to Secretary of State, 13 September 1915,
RDS, 812.00/16144; 25 September 1915, RD£, 16229; 12 October 1915, RD£, 812.00/16448; 17 November 1915, RDS^, 812.00/
16341.
222
a brief assault on the town which ended when the Villa
garrison mutinied, forcing loyal troops to flee across
the river.
Ojinaga fell into government hands early in
November when the Villista garrison abandoned the border
^ 27
post.
To the north Ciudad Juarez enjoyed relative calm.
Juarez became the heart of the Villa army.
From El Paso
through Ciudad Juarez, Villa raised revenue to maintain
his Division of the North.
The city also served as a
place of rest and recreation for his troops who came to
enjoy the city's gambling cabarets, barrooms, brothels and
flourishing horse races.
Villa's financial support came
from El Paso bankers and merchants who offered the rebels
credit.
•^
Villismo, like Huertismo, before it, entrenched
-.4= •
-r '
28
itself m Juarez.
Militarily, Villistas in the Juarez district spent
much of their time trying to root out brigandage in the
region.
Troops constantly patrolled and skirmished with
outlaws who committed depredations along both sides of the
border from Ojinaga to just west of Juarez.
In July 1915
reinforcements arrived to provide added protection from
Weekly Report, 16 January 1915, RD£, 812.00/
14273; 3 April 1915, RDS, 812.00/14866; 24 July 1915, RDS,
812.00/15632; 11 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16256;
18 September 1915, RDS, 312.00/16319; 6 November 1915,
RDS, 812.00/16803.
^^Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. 117-128.
223
outlaws in the vicinity.
Citizens in Ciudad Juarez became
concerned in September when rumors reached the city that
the recognition of Carranza appeared imminent; local residents worried that Villa would launch an invasion of El
Paso from their city.
While at Juarez early in October,
however. Villa stated that recognition of Carranza would
signal the beginning of a new revolution, not an end.
But
by the time Carranza received American recognition. Villa's
strength had begun to shrink.
had left him.
Many of his strong supporters
Felipe Angeles purchased a ranch near El Paso
with the intention of retiring, while Rodolfo Fierro
drowned on October 18 near Villa Ahumada.
Villista offi-
cials abandoned their positions in Ojinaga and sought
asylum in Presidio; General Tomas Ornelas, the Villista
commander at Juarez, crossed to El Paso late in October
and Villista soldiers deserted their camp in growing
29
numbers every day.
Border Villismo temporarily ceased on December 21
when General Manuel Banda, in charge of the Villa garrison
at Ciudad Juarez, called 200 of his officers and told them
Mardee de Wetter, "Revolutionary El Paso" (M.A.
thesis, Texas College of Mines and Metallurgy, 1946), pp.
134-135; Weekly Reports, 15 May 1915, RDS, 812.00/15074;
14 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/15903; 9 October 1915, RDS,
312.00/16526; 23 October 1915, RD£, 312.00/16667; 6 November 1915, RDS, 812.00/16303; Cobb to Secretary of State,
23 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16264; Laredo Weekly Times,
15 April 1915, p. 5.
224
to surrender to Carrancista officials.
Troops not wishing
to surrender evacuated the city when General Obregon
arrived.
Before the transfer could occur, a riot broke
t
out m
Juarez on the twenty-first.
The violence occurred
when a group of people stoned the international streetcar
coming from El Paso.
Military officials gained control
of the situation the next morning, but not before eleven
people had been killed, including one American.
Villismo
appeared to have been brought under control as the year
^ ^ 30
ended.
Revolutionary events in Mexico continued to disturb
the Texas side of the Rio Grande.
Though the battles of
the revolution during this period occurred in areas away
from the border, Mexican border towns did experience
several attacks.
Therefore, residents of the American
side of the border had to deal with a number of occurrences
that brought the excitement of the revolution to their
region:
the Huerta-Orozco plot, the Villa-Scott meetings,
the shootings and arrests of Americans, the flood of Mexican refugees, the illicit trade of arms and munitions of
war, filibustering expeditions and the deployment of
American troops along the border to keep the peace.
Most
Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. 137-138;
De Wetter, "Revolutionary El Paso," p. 136; Weekly Report,
1 January 1916, RD£, 812,00/17378; Laredo Weekly Times,
26 December 1915, pp. 3, 5, 9.
225
important, it was in this period that the revolution had
its greatest ideological impact in Texas.
Mexican Americans
and Mexican nationals, influenced by hopes and aspirations
of the revolution, launched a movement in the Lower Rio
Grande Valley which showed the direct influence of events
in Mexico.
Brownsville experienced a handful of incidents
resulting from the revolution.
The peacefulness that pre-
vailed in September 1914 was shattered by an extensive set
of rumors of massive recruitments by Huertistas.
Many of
the old conservative families who held land in Matamoros
moved to Brownsville and schemed to get their lands back.
When the cotton season closed, Mexican recruiters offered
$1.50 to laborers being laid off.
As a result of the
split between Villa and Carranza, military patrols which
had been lax after Carranza's victory had to be beefed up
again, with filibustering expeditions ready to challenge
the Constitutionalist rule in northern Mexico.
From Sep-
tember through December reports reached American authorities that bands of from 35 to 150 men, and one of possibly
3,000 men were gathering to cross the river.
United
States officials cound never confirm the large size of the
forces but they occasionally encountered groups of four to
31
to ten men trying to cross the river.
31
'
Archivo General de la Secretaria de Relaciones
226
Even in the early months of 1915 reports that filibustering expeditions had crossed the river from the Brownsville area worried local officials, who seemed to lack the
manpower to stop the crossings.
Early in February 1915
Jesus Saldana, a Mexican national and a Huertista, but a
two year resident of Brownsville, came under fire from a
Mexican patrol.
Saldana had gone to fish in the river.
The same week a three man American military patrol exchanged fire with a Mexican patrol.
Numerous reports of
Mexicans firing across into Texas could not be confirmed.
By March conditions took a turn for the worst. 32
As the Villista army attacking Reynosa and Matamoros neared the river, Americans from Brownsville to
Hidalgo complained that large numbers of men roamed the
Valley recruiting and gathering war munitions for the
rebels.
Villista officers crossed to Pharr, Texas where
Deodoro Guerra, a McAllen merchant, and McAllen City
Marshal Everett Anglin entertained the officers.
Guerra,
Exteriores de Mexico, D.F. Citations refer to group title,
"Revolucion Mexicana Durante los Anos de^l910 a 1920," AREM,
Jose Z. Garza to Isidro Fabela, Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores, 2 October 1914, AREM, L-E-788-R; Weekly Report,
19 September 1914, RDS, 312.00713333; 26 September 1914,
RDS, 812.00/12410; 7 November 1914, RDS, 312.00/13892;
23 November 1914, RDS, 812.00/13961; 5 December 1914, RDS,
312.00/14024; 19 December 1914, RDS, 812.00/14078.
"^^Ibid., 16 January 1915, RDS, 812.00/14278;
13 February 1915, RD£, 812.00/14436; 20 February 1915,
RDS, 812.00/14470.
227
Anglin and Deputy Sheriff Tom Mayfield helped Villistas
purchase supplies from Texas and transport them to the
rebel camp at Las Rucias.
These prominent Valleyites
feared Carranza's nationalistic attitude which threatened
American financial interests in Mexico.
They, probably,
also made tremendous profits from the sale of munitions
to the rebels.
Mexican government officials protested that Las
Rucias was not a port of entry, so supplies sent across
there constituted a breach of American neutrality.
Major
General Frederick Funston, visiting the point opposite
Las Rucias, agreed to order a ban on the sale of supplies
to rebels and restricted the crossing of rebel soldiers
to Texas.
The embargo lasted until April 10 when supplies
33
again crossed the river to the Villa camp.
Food and
forage had been transferred despite the embargo and several
Americans actively and openly supported the rebel cause,
while others supported the Carrancista side.
Local resi-
dents so openly showed their support that State District
Judge W. B. Hopkins charged a state grand jury
to see to
it that Valley residents should conduct themselves with
^^Ibid., 20 March 1915, RD£, 812.00/14737; 27
March 1915, RDS, 812.00/14791; 3 April 1915, RDS, 812.00/
14866; 10 April 1915, RD£, 812.00/14899; Francisco Arredondo to James Bryan, 31 March 1915, AREM, 17-10-284;
El Paso Morning Times, 2 April 1915, p. 1; Brownsville
Herald, 6 April 1915, pp. 1-2.
228
more restraint in lining up with revolutionary factions.
At this particular time, all along this border,
and particularly here in Brownsville and Cameron
county, it becomes necessary that our citizenship
should arise to the occasion and gird on the armor
of true manhood with a view of restoring harmony and
good will, instead of sowing the seed of discord and
strife, and while we sympathize with that war stricken
country, yet it is an affair with which, as a people,
we have nothing to do, and our citizens should exercise caution and prudence in expressing their views
on the subject. I am told that many of the people of
Brownsville have 'lined up' with one or the other of
the factions in Mexico and have become strong partisans
of one side or the other, and that this partisan feeling runs nearly as high on this side of the river as
on the other side. Such a condition is deplorable and
should not be encouraged, for it can not possibly produce any good, but much harm may result from it. We
have enough bickering and discord amongst ourselves,
without borrowing trouble from another country, with
whose affairs we ought not to meddle, and in my judgment, the least partisanship displayed by us for
either faction, the better it will be for all concerned. . . .34
During the battle of Matamoros, Brownsville came
under fire.
Bullets showered the city striking homes and
wounding several people.
An American army aeroplane
observing the situation along the river came under fire
from a Carrancista patrol which mistook the plane for a
Villista aircraft.
Wounded Villista soldiers, who
had
sought medical assistance in the city, had to be sent to
Eagle Pass for transfer to Villista officials.
Finally,
during and immediately after the fighting, filibustering
•^^Brownsville Herald, 6 April 1915, pp. 1, 2
229
expeditions crossed the river into Mexico at several
points. 35
After the fighting at Matamoros, life returned to
normal in Brownsville.
The United States
army continued
to use aeroplanes to scout the border and reduce its military patrols.
The
only event related to the revolution
in the summer occurred when several thousand head of cattle
were imported to raise revenue for the Constitutionalist
36
army in Matamoros.
The situation at the border remained extremely
quiet during the early months of 1916 in Brownsville with
one exception.
On January 26, 1916, four soldiers sta-
tioned up river at Progreso swam into the river, only to
be caught by Mexicans who detained two of them.
ican patrol
An Amer-
which crossed into Mexico in search of their
compatriots failed to find them but engaged a Mexican
patrol.
Four of the soldiers who crossed into Mexico
drowned as they returned to the American side.
Matamoros
officials freed the two Americans captured earlier on the
river. 37
•^^Ibid.; Weekly Report, 17 April 1915, RDS, 812.00/
14932; 24 April 1915, RDS, 812.00/14971.
•^Seekly Report, 8 May 1915, RDS, 812.00/15029;
26 June 1915, RDS, 812.00/15448; 31 July 1915, RDS,
312.00/15730.
•^^Brownsville Herald, 27, 23 January 1916, p. 1.
230
Laredo, Texas enjoyed a relatively peaceful period
after Carranza assumed power.
As long as the Constitu-
tionalists controlled the rail line from Nuevo Laredo to
other areas, business in Laredo prospered.
But when rebels
periodically destroyed bridges or rail lines, merchants
suffered losses.
At times businessmen from Laredo worried
that their property would be confiscated by either side.
In August 1914 Laredo growers, happy over the prospects of
a bumper crop, recruited over 1,000 Mexican Americans and
Mexican nationals to work the cotton fields in the area.
Also in August businessmen in the city learned that Colonel
Reynaldo Garza, the commander in Nuevo Laredo, had announced
that foreign property confiscated earlier by the government
would be returned.
Colonel Garza promised Americans in
38
the city that he would protect their property.
Local officials occupied themselves trying to keep
the lid on revolutionary elements in the area.
Customs
officials relaxed the river guard after Carranza ousted
Huerta, but reinstated it after the Carranza-Villa split.
Later in the year, authorities busied themselves trying
to control recruiting efforts of both factions.
In Novem-
ber Carrancistas recruited over 200 men who had been
picking cotton near the city.
The same week Villistas
•^^Laredo Weekly Times, 2 August 1914, p. 5;
9 August 1914, p. 7; 16 August 1914, p. 12.
231
recruited from among unemployed persons a force estimated
at 1,000 men to launch a filibustering expedition from
Laredo into Nuevo Laredo on the morning of November 8.
The arrest of the four organizers in Laredo thwarted the
plot.
The unemployed Mexicanos could find jobs only with
ainnies of the two sides.
Reports of continued filibuster-
ing reached Americans, prompting an increase in the number
of patrols along the river. 39
Early in January 1915 a pro-Constitutionalist group
tried to hold a mass meeting in the Laredo city hall.
Mayor Robert McComb refused to permit the gathering to
use city property.
The mayor reminded citizens in Laredo:
The United States has assumed an attitude of
neutrality in the matter of foreign strife, and
Laredo is a part of the United States and that stand
of the national government is going to be respected
here and violators are going to be punished.40
Despite the stress on neutrality by city and military officials men continued to be recruited by both sides.
Citizens of Laredo experienced tense moments during
the unsuccessful attempt by Villistas to take Nuevo Laredo
on April 28 even though the Mexican town itself was not
attacked.
Nonetheless, Consul Garrett warned both sides
Ibid., 1 November 1914, p. 9; 3 November 1914,
p. 12; Weekly Report, 12 September 1914, RDS, 812.00/
13235; 7 November 1914, RDS, 812.00/13792; 19 December
1914, RDS, 312.00/14073.
40
Laredo Weekly Times, 10 January 1915, p. 5.
232
that they must conduct their operations in such a way that
Laredo would not be menaced.
Consequently, Laredo felt
almost no effect from the fighting, other than treating
wounded for both factions.
Furthermore, the town became
an important center for Red Cross relief, in the form of
both food and medical supplies, sent to northern Mexico.
The city received thousands of cattle from northern Mexico
throughout most of the summer, an important source of
revenue for the Mexican government. 41
When rumors of anti-American sentiment surfaced in
Nuevo Laredo in connection with preparations to celebrate
"el 16 de Septiembre," Americans in Laredo became apprehensive.
Probably because of an increase in patrols, no
violence erupted.
Conditions in Laredo settled down after
President Wilson granted de facto recognition to Carranza.
Only the visit of Carranza to Nuevo Laredo late in October
served to
remind Laredo residents of the trouble in Mexico,
Texas Governor James Ferguson met with Carranza at the international bridge in Laredo where the discussion centered
on the "bandit" problem in South Texas.
Yet border condi-
tions remained quiet until Villa broke the peace in March
42
1916.^
Ibid., 11 April 1915, p. 3; 26 June 1915, p. 3;
27 June 1915, p. 3; Weekly Report, 28 August 1915, RDS,
812.00/16054; 11 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16256.
^^Laredo Weekly Times, 19 September 1915, p. 10;
24 October 1915, p. 8; 26 November 1915, p. 1.
233
North of Laredo, conditions remained tranquil in
the border cities of Eagle Pass and Del Rio, a reflection
of the limited importance given Piedras Negras and Las
Vacas by the warring factions.
In 1914 only the repatria-
tion through Eagle Pass of refugees being held by Americans
at Fort Wingate, New Mexico, reminded local residents of
the revolution.
From October through November scattered
reports came to the attention of officials in Eagle Pass
and Del Rio of men being recruited and sent to launch
assaults against government troops.
No serious skirmish
occurred.
The Villista attack on Piedras Negras in March
1915 caused officials in Eagle Pass to take strict measures
to protect their financial interests in the Mexican town.
To deter Constitutionalist officers from burning the city,
officials threatened to prevent refugees from seeking
shelter in Eagle Pass. 44 Wounded soldiers, abandoned by
the Carrancistas, sought refuge in the city.
Eagle Pass
officials granted them safety, as it was common knowledge
that Villistas captured wounded soldiers.
The reoccupation of Piedras Negras by government
troops in September 1915 caused little concern in Eagle
Weekly Report, 26 September 1914, RDS, 812.00/
13410; 10 October 1914, RDS, 312.00/13545; 7 November 1914,
RDS, 812.00/13792; 19 December 1914, RD£, 312.00/14078.
^^Ibid., 6 March 1915, RDS, 812.00/14603.
234
Pass.
State health officers closed Eagle Pass to all .-lale
residents in Piedras Negras in September 1915, after military officials had ordered a smallpox quarantine from
Laredo to Brownsville.
Carranza authorities in Piedras
Negras feared the closing of the bridge foreshadowed an
invasion of Mexico, but Eagle Pass officials soon reopened
the border.
Conditions remained calm in Eagle Pass for
the rest of the year. 45
Up river at Del Rio even less activity came to the
attention of authorities.
Not until late summer and early
fall in 1915 did residents in Del Rio react to the revolution across the river.
Las Vacas, garrisoned by very few
soldiers, fell to Villistas in mid-summer, only to be
recaptured by government forces in September.
Both times
garrison troops crossed the river to Del Rio for safety.
Area officials detained the fleeing soldiers. 46
In the Big Eend district United States troops kept
busy chasing outlaws and filibustering expeditions.
During
August and September 1914 reports of outlaws stealing
cattle and horses continuously reached American officials.
American custom officials fought a two hour battle with a
Ibid., 4 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16175;
13 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16144; 25 September 1915,
RDS, 312.00/16229.
^^Ibid., 10 July 1915, RDS, 812.00/15517;
18 September 1915, ^ S , 812.00/16319.
235
band of outlaws near Pilares in November.
The following
month, Mexican officials at Ojinaga executed Juan Musquiz,
a Mexican American, prompting residents from Presidio to
organize a punitive expedition.
Quick action by military
officials prevented the crossing of the vigilante group.
Pro-Carranza elements recruited in the Big Bend to launch
a filibustering force against the Villa garrison at Ojinaga
early in March.
Attempts by American officers to hamper
the recruiting failed, largely because of the vast territory
. .
.
47
involved, although officials made occasional arrests.
In the summer of 1915 both outlaws and HuertistaOrozquista elements made crossings in the Big Bend country,
at one point with the intent to launch an attack against
the Villista garrison at Ojinaga.
In September conditions
calmed; but they heated up again late in October when the
Villista garrisons at Ojinaga and upriver at Bosque Bonito
abandoned their posts and crossed to the Texas side seeking
refuge. By November Carrancistas controlled the border,
^ J- ^ • .u 48
bringing peace to the Big Bend district.
^^Ibid., 5 September 1914, RDS, 812.00/13182;
7 November 1914, RDS, 812.00/13792; 19 December 1914, RDS,
812.00/14078; 6 March 1915, RD£, 812.00/14603, 13 March
1915, RDS, 812.00/14659, 17 April 1915, RDS^, 812.00/14932;
Office of the Adjutant General, Walter Prescott Webb Collection (Archives, University of Texas, Library, Austin,
Texas).
"^^Ibid., 24 July 1915, RDS, 312.00/15632; 31 July
1915, RDS, 312.00/15730; 14 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/15908;
236
El Paso reacted to the Carranza stage of the revolution in ways similar to the other border towns.
Juarez
went through little action until late in 1915 because the
port city served as the stronghold of Villismo.
Both
factions respected El Paso because of the large American
military presence at Fort Bliss.
El Paso served as a meeting place for two conferences in 1915.
In January, General Hugh L. Scott arrived
from Washington, D.C. to confer with General Francisco
Villa and Carrancista General Benjamin Hill over the firing
into American tertitory at Naco, Arizona.
1915, Villa and Scott met again in El Paso
On August
10,
to discuss
Mexican rebel demands for a $300,000 advance on taxes from
the Mine and Smelters Operators Association in Chihuahua.
The mining industrialists refused to pay the money, but
feared that Villa would extract a forced loan or confiscate
their property at a special meeting in Ciudad Chihuahua to
which operators had been summoned by him.
Scott talked
Villa into leaving the mining operators alone after they
"voluntarily" offered Villa one thousand tons of coal.
Scott also tried to use the occasion to mediate the dispute
between Villa and Carranza.
Villa agreed to a conference.
23 October 1915, RDS, 812.00/16667; 13 November 1915, RDS,
812.00/16342; 18 December 1915, RDS, 812.00/17030;
19 February 1916, RDS, 312.00/17IT5.
237
but the Constitutionalists refused.^^
All through 1915 military officials in El Paso had
to react to reports of counterrevolutionary elements in
the district planning a number of filibustering expeditions
against Ciudad Juarez.
Men recruited in El Paso would
comprise the main body of the army.
The most dramatic
counterrevolutionary movement to confront El Paso centered
around the activities of Pascual Orozco and Victoriano
Huerta.
Orozco's movements had been observed by American
officials since his escape from Mexico in 1913.
In 1914
and 1915 Texas Rangers searched the Big Bend looking for
the rebel leader.
His organization could not develop
momentum without his own presence.
When Huerta arrived
in New York early in 1915, Orozco felt that the former
president could give his group new strength and hope.
On
J\ine 27, 1915, as Huerta arrived near El Paso, American
authorities there arrested both him and Orozco on charges
of conspiracy to foment a revolution in the United States
49
James W. Harper, "Hugh Lenox Scott y La Diplomacia de los Estados Unidos hacia La Revolucio'n Mexicana,"
Historia Mexicana 27 (Enero-Marzo, 1978), pp. 436-439;
de Wetter, "Revolutionary El Paso," pp. 1240132; Atkin,
Revolution, pp. 239-240; Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 289290; "Mexico-Border Agreement," The Independent, 18 January
1915, p. 34; Clarence C Clendenen, The United States and
Pancho Villa; A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 135-133; El Paso
Morning Times, 7, 9, 10 August 1915, p. 1; Scott to
Secretary of State, 10 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/15719.
233
against a friendly government.^^
Orozco eluded federal guards who watched his every
move and
revolt.
headed for the Big Bend country to continue his
On August 28, Orozco and four
Love Ranch near Sierra Blanca.
men raided the Dick
A posse followed, caught up
with them and after a brief battle Orozco died in the hail
of bullets-
The killing of Orozco aroused Mexicans and
Mexican Americans in El Paso who gathered into an angry
crowd to meet the train bringing the revolutionist's body
to the city.
Mayor T. Lea, fearing a riot, had the body
taken off the train a few miles outside the city.
Over
3,000 Mexicans and Mexican Americans attended the funeral.^"^
Huerta remained in custody at El Paso.
Late in
August General John J. Pershing placed military forces in
El Paso on alert when rumors of a plot to release Huerta
came to his attention.
and into Chihuahuita.
He deployed troops
to the bridges
Every Mexican found in the streets
had to submit to a thorough search by military policemen.
Military officials detained Huerta in Fort Bliss after
Weekly Report, 16 April 1915, RDS, 812.00/14899;
9 June 1915, RDS, 812.00/15178; 12 June 1915, RDS, 812.00/
15279; 26 June 1915, RDS, 312.00/15448.
Jack Shipman, "Orozco's Last Ride," Voice of the
Mexican Border 1 (2) (October 1933), pp. 84-36; C A. Raht,
Romances of Davis Mountains and the Big Bend Country
(Private Printing, 1919), p. 349; Grieb, United States and
Huerta, pp. 189-190; de Wetter, "Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution," p. 133; Meyer, Pascual Orozco, pp. 129-133
239
El Paso expressed fear that the city might be a target of
Mexican soldiers trying to rescue the former Mexican
president.
Huerta, a heavy drinker, developed a severe
case of cirrhosis of the liver while in confinement.
Released from custody early in November, Huerta died on
January 13, 1916, at his home in El Paso, still under house
^ 52
arrest.
The charges against Huerta had
he became ill.
been dropped when
The United States government, however,
probably did not have enough evidence to secure a conviction against Huerta.
He had been arrested on "suspicion."
Earlier American officials had refused to arrest Madero
and several other revolutionists without substantial evidence.
For the second time, Huerta had been defeated by
53
his antagonist President Woodrow Wilson.
City officials continued to be concerned through
the fall of 1915 over the conditions in Ciudad Juarez.
Apprehension prevailed over the "16 de Septiembre" celebrations both in Juarez and Chihuahuita, with city officials
in El Paso fearful that the Mexican American population
would use the occasion to riot or launch a rebellion.
On
October 18, on the eve of American recognition of Carranza,
Christian, "Sword and Plowshare," pp. 343, 351;
Grieb, United States and Huerta, pp. 13 3, 191; de Wetter,
"Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution," p. 133.
^^Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 190.
240
Mayor Lea and General Pershing, afraid of retaliation from
f
the Villa garrison in Juarez, agreed that all Villistas as
well as other "undesirables" in the city had to be
expelled. 54
Militarily, the situation became quiet after the
Carrancistas occupied Juarez late in December.
In October
Villista commander. General Tomas Ornelas, sought asylum
in El Paso; in December, General Manuel Banda also fled to
the city after surrendering the Juarez garrison to Obregon.
When residents in Juarez rioted after abandonment of the
city, Americans in El Paso worried about the consequences.
Peace prevailed for the remainder of the year and into
early 1916.^^
At first President Wilson seemed to have favored
Francisco Villa over Venustiano Carranza.
But the defeat
of Villa at Celaya and the influence of the new Secretary
of State, Robert Lansing, who worried over the war in
Europe and the need for a quick solution to the Mexican
problem, moved the American President to grant Carranza
de facto recognition.
Since Villa supplied his army from
American sources, the embargo against all factions in
^"^De Wetter, "Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution," p. 135; Secretary of War to Secretary of State,
10 September 1915, RDS, 312.00/16113.
^^Ibid., Christian, "Sword and Plowshare," pp.
353-354; Weekly Report, 16 October 1915, RDS, 312.00/
16600.
241
Mexico, except government forces, gave him a strenuous
blow.
Only venganza (revenge) could quench his anger.
Villa met Carranza on his own terms in Chihuahua despite
the fall of Juarez to Obregon.
Villa's anger against the
United States plus his desire to embarrass or disgrace the
Constitutionalist government took the form of depredations
against American citizens, first at Santa Isabel, Chihuahua
56
and later at Columbus, New Mexico.
As early as mid-December 1915 Villa had shown indications of hostility toward Americans in Chihuahua when he
threatened to kill twelve Americans in Ciudad Guerrero,
Chihuahua if they did not leave Mexico.
He made good his
threat on January 10, 1916, at Santa Isabel when he executed seventeen Americans who worked for the Cusi Mining
Company near Ciudad Chihuahua.
Villista rebels stopped a
train and greeted the Americans with shouts of "IViva
Villai" and "iMueran GringosI"^"^
56
Floyd Ford Ewing, "Carranza's Foreign Relations
An Experiment in Nationalism" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas at Austin, 1952), p. 108; Holcombe, "Arms
Control and the Mexican Revolution," p. 115; Christian,
"Sword and Plowshare," p. 368.
57
'
Zachary L. Cobb to Andres G. Garcia, 15 January
1916, AREM, L-R-810; George R. Cole, "Brushfire War, 1916
Style" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University,
1962), pp. 67-68; Zorrilla, Relaciones entre Mexico y Los
Estados Unidos, p. 286; Clendenen, Blood on the Border,
pp. 196-198; El Paso Morning Times, 12 January 1916, p. 1
242
The massacre at Santa Isabel had a profound impact
on El Paso.
in the city.
Most of the slain Americans were well-known
When the bodies of the men arrived, El Paso
experienced an anti-Mexican riot.
A group of about 300 to
400 civilians and military personnel moved into Chihuahuita
to "clean up" the area.
Hundreds of Mexican Americans were
beaten, before General Pershing ordered troops into El Paso
to restore order.
Mayor Lea called every policeman to duty
with orders to arrest anyone threatening the peace.
The
mayor also warned Villistas and other Mexican military
officials to leave the city immediately to avoid any
trouble.
A
He threatened to arrest for vagrancy those who
refused to depart.
To aggravate the situation further over 500 Americans prepared a filibustering expedition to invade Mexico
and seek out the murderers.
Secretary of State Lansing
quickly warned that such action would constitute a violation of the neutrality statutes of the United States.
To
help quiet the situation in El Paso and along the border,
Carranza issued a decree authorizing any Mexican citizen
to execute on sight Villa and any of the men involved in
the massacre.
Carranza further dispatched more troops to
58
Christian, "Sword and Plowshare," p. 369;
de Wetter, "Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution,"
p. 142; Cole, "Brushfire War," p. 69; Weekly Report,
15 January 1916, RDS, 812.00/17152.
243
western Chihuahua to deal with the bandit problem.
The
Constitutionalist commander in Juarez ordered the immediate
execution
of any bandit captured in his district.^^
Less than two weeks after the Santa Isabel incident. El Paso shook from another atrocity.
On January 21,
1916, Mexican cattle thieves killed Bert L. Akers, an
American ranchman living near Ysleta on the Mexican side
of the river.
Residents of El Paso vented their wrath
against Mexican officials.
Only the quick action of
Carrancista authorities pacified them.
Within days two
Mexican brothers, Bernardo and Federico Duran, faced a
'
60
firing squad in Ciudad Juarez for the crime.
The Mexican Revolution brought to the border other
problems besides military campaigns.
Several American
citizens who became involved in plots to assist the different factions fell into the hands of Mexican authorities
and faced prosecution in Mexico.
On the other hand, thou-
sands of Mexican refugees crossed into the United States.
Most of the refugees were non-combatants seeking
shelter
from the fighting; on other occasions soldiers fleeing the
enemy also sought sanctuary in Texas.
The sale of arms
and supplies to both sides by Americans along the river
Weekly Report, 22 January 1916, RDS^, 312.00/
17194; El Paso Morning Times, 14, 15 January 1916, p. 1;
"Mexican Savagery," The Outlook, 2 February 1916, p. 24 9.
El Paso Morning Times, 22, 23, 24 January 1916,
1.
244
became big business.
Because of the large number of
refugees and the ease with which arms could be purchased,
Mexican rebels organized filibustering expeditions in
Texas.
The United States government responded to the
crisis by deploying troops to the troubled areas.
Several other Americans besides Bert Akers suffered
the consequences of revolution in Mexico, though not all
paid with their lives.
Most merely suffered the uncer-
tainty of detention at the hands of unpredictable warriors.
Late in September 1914 Carrancista officials at Matamoros
arrested Francisco Martinez, who had openly supported
Huertista elements in the area.
Martinez, a Brownsville
resident, had gone to visit friends at Matamoros.
In mid-
July, 1915 Carrancista officials executed Francisco Yturia
and Gustavo Hernandez, Mexican Americans from Donna, Texas.
The two men allegedly crossed from Hidalgo with a filibustering expedition trying to attack Reynosa.
caught with several wagon loads of rifles.
Both men were
Several Amer-
icans suffered light wounds during the fighting at Matamores including Mrs. Luciano Hinojosa and Jose M. Lopez.
Mexican soldiers fired on several other Americans.
Among
them was a party of newspaper reporters carrying an American
flag who wanted to
visit the Villa camp near Las Rucias.
Brownsville Herald, 26 September 1914, p. 1;
13 January 1915, p. 1; 27 March 1915, p. 1; 6, 9, 10 April
1915, p. 1; El Paso Morning Times, 17 January 1915, p. 1.
245
Up the river in Laredo, General Ricaut arrested
three men, William White, his son William Burris, and
Terell Bebo, en charges of smuggling cattle from Mexico
to Texas.
Governor Ferguson, concerned over the fate of
the men, warned that they should net be shot.
General
Ricaut promised the Texas governor that the men would
receive a speedy trial and, if found guilty, would not be
executed.
Mexican officials invited Texas authorities to
attend the trial.
All three men were found not guilty and
set free.
At El Paso in 1915, Private William B. Warwick
died of a bullet wound inflicted from the Mexican side of
the river.
Villista officials investigated, but found no
evidence of any shooting from the Mexican side during the
time that Warwick was killed.
Carrancista soldiers near
El Paso in May 1915 killed Preciliano Medina, a Mexican
American who owned a ranch on the Mexican side. The reason
63
for the killing was never established.
Americans who
were involved in revolutionary activity, willingly or not,
found themselves at the mercy of Mexican officials when
apprehended.
Although they were not all executed, some
died for their activities'.
As in previous revolutionary periods, refugees
62
El Paso Morning Times, 14, 17, 20 January 1915,
p. 1.
^^Ibid., 30 January 1915, p. 1; 11 May 1915, p. 1.
246
continued to be a concern for American officials in Texas.
On September 18, 1914, the War Department released all
enlisted Mexicans interned at Fort Wingate, New Mexico, as
a consequence of the Ojinaga exodus.
The government ordered
their repatriation to Carranza officials through Eagle Pass
and Piedras Negras.
Refugees held elsewhere crossed into
Mexico by way of Laredo. 64
Brownsville became a sanctuary for wounded soldiers
and civilians during the fighting at Matamoros in 1915.
Over 230 wounded Villistas crossed to Brownsville from
Las Rucias after Nafarrate defeated Rodriguez.
Immigra-
tion officials sent the rebels across the river as rapidly
as they recovered.
Those who remained after the Villistas
abandoned the area had to be transported to other points
under Villa's control—Eagle Pass and El Paso.
The Amer-
ican Red Cross Society cared for the wounded, though most
of the expenses were paid by Villista consuls.
American
authorities ordered the Brownsville bridge closed to any
wounded of either faction after April 12, 1915.
Noncom-
batants also fled to the Texas side as Villista forces
approached their town.
the border.
Hundreds of peasants daily crossed
Military officials quartered some refugees
in tents in city parks, while others took shelter in the
Laredo Weekly Times, 27 September 1914, p. 2;
T. A. Bliss to Secretary of State, 31 August 1914, RDS,
312.00/13082; Weekly Report, 19 September 1914, RDS,
812.00/1333.
247
home of friends.
Laredo also had its problems with refugees.
For
the benefit of hundreds of Mexican exiles the citizens of
Laredo organized a band concert to celebrate "el 16 de
Septiembre" in 1914.
In 1915 Nuevo Laredo received thou-
sands of refugees from northern Mexico, many of whom
planned to cross to Texas in search of jobs.
When it
appeared that Nuevo Laredo would be attacked by a Villista
force
in April 1915, Laredo began receiving refugees.
But Carrancista officials placed a one dollar tax on anyone
leaving or entering the Mexican port.
Since Nuevo Laredo
was not attacked, no mass exodus occurred.
Through the
summer of 1915, thousands of Mexicans continued to converge
on Laredo, forcing city officials to provide for the hungry
persons who walked the streets begging for food.
In August
many of the refugees did find jobs in the cotton
fields
of South Texas.
Eagle Pass, like Brownsville, received a large
Joe Robert Baulch, "James B. Wells: South Texas
Economic and Political Leader" (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas
Tech University, 1974), p. 317; Border Harriman,
"Matamoros—War Film," Harper's Weekly, 22 May 1915, p. 4 96;
Brownsville Herald, 31 March 1915, p. 1; 9 April 1915, p.
4; 12 April 1915, p. 1; 22 April 1915, p. 4; 26 April 1915,
p. 3.
^^Laredo Weekly Times, 13 September 1914, p. 12;
20 September 1914, p. 3; 17 January 1915, pp. 5-6; 11 April
1915, p. 3; 1 August 1915, p. 12; 15 August 1915, p. 5;
Brownsville Herald, 9, 14 June 1915, p. 1; Weekly Report,
16 January 1915, RDS, 312.00/14544.
243
number of wounded Carrancistas in March 1915, when government troops abandoned Piedras Negras.
American officials
allowed only severely wounded soldiers to be brought
across.
The Carrancista consul made the necessary arrange-
ments to provide doctors and nurses to care for the wounded
Late in September, when it became the Villistas turn to
evacuate Piedras Negras, they also made arrangements with
American authorities to transfer thirty-two wounded.
Non-
combatants also sought refuge in Eagle Pass during the
change of commands. Many refugees also came to Eagle Pass
67
in search of jobs.
El Paso became home for as many as 23,000 refugees.
By October 1915 exiles had become a serious problem for
health officials, who worried over the large number dying
of starvation or about the several cases of diphtheria
reported each month.
As many as 335 Mexicans died each
week from all types of diseases in the city.
Hipolito
Villa, brother of Francisco, slaughtered his own cattle
to feed Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans in El Paso.
Refugees coming to El Paso sought permanent residence, unlike those sheltered in Brownsville and Laredo
who primarily sought to escape from the fighting.
El Paso
Weekly Reports, 6 March 1915, RDS, 812.00/14603;
Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 3 March 1915, RDS,
812.00/14544; 25 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16293; Blocker
to Secretary of State, 12 November 1915, RDS, 312.00/16306.
249
also attracted intellectuals as well as
leaders.
revolutionary
These included General Felipe Angeles and Jose
Vasconcelos.
The foremost Mexican novelist, Manuel Azuela,
while living in El Paso in 1915 wrote Los de Abajo
(The
U n d e r d o g s ) , one of the most famous literary works on the
brutality of the Mexican revolution.^^
The large number of visitors posed health problems
for state o f f i c i a l s .
Many of the people fleeing Mexico
carried contagious d i s e a s e s , the most common of which was
smallpox.
For that reason Governor James Ferguson p r o -
claimed a quarantine along the border in April 1915.
Health officials turned back hundreds, while others
entered illegally.
Laredo Mayor Robert McComb ordered
city police officers to assist custom officials in stopping
the flow of Mexicans with contagious diseases.
In December
1915 and early 1916 typhus worried state health
officials
along the b o r d e r .
Governor Ferguson ordered Texas Rangers
to assist border guards in checking the spread of the
infectious d i s e a s e .
Persons entering the state had to
subject themselves to vaccinations and their luggage to
fumigation.
69
Most of the refugees who crossed the Rio Grande
68
Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. 131-135.
^^Weekly Report, 27 February 1915, RDS, 312.00/
14526; Laredo Weekly Times, 23 March 1915, p. 1; BrownS'
ville Herald, 24 March 1915, p. 1; 1, 18 December 1915,
p. 1; 29 February 1916, p. 1.
250
sought temporary sanction.
Some were welcomed by the
agricultural interests who hired them during the harvest
period.
Many returned to Mexico either as recruits for
the different factions, or after the fighting had ceased.
The largest number of refugees came from the lower class,
although a few wealthy exiles settled in border towns.
American authorities faced two problems with the exiles.
First, many of them became easy victims for agents of the
different factions wanting to recruit.
Second, the large
number posed health problems for American citizens.
Because
the United States favored the Constitu-
tionalist faction. President Wilson permitted arms and war
munitions to cross into Mexico.
Millions of rounds of
ammunition and thousands of rifles passed through Brownsville, Laredo, and El Paso weekly from 1914 to 1915.
When
World War I began in Europe, Mexico could no longer rely
on European sources for war supplies.
The United States
became the arsenal of Mexico, and in essence the promoter
of continued fighting.
Wanting to end the war, Wilson
moved to favor the Constitutionalists in September 1914
by removing the embargo of April 23, 1914.
This relieved
American troops of the responsibility of patrolling the
border.
With the split between Villa and Carranza, muni-
tions crossings increased tremendously all along the
border.
By 1915 Villa alone had spent over two million
dollars for war supplies at El Paso.
Both sides imported
251
approximately a quarter of a million rounds of ammunition
and over one thousand rifles a week.'^^
During the battle
of Matamoros, both sides imported large amounts of munitions.
A coalition of several prominent citizens in the
Rio Grande Valley helped the Villa faction acquire their
supplies.
Among those reportedly working to arm the
Villistas were Deodoro Guerra, a wealthy doctor from
McAllen, Texas, A. Y. Baker, Sheriff of Hidalgo County,
deputy sheriffs Tom Mayfield and Isidro Valli and McAllen
City Marshal Everett Anglin.
George F. Walker from Walker
Brothers Hancock Company, a hardware store in Brownsville,
allegedly outfitted the Carrancista garrison at Mata71.
mores.
The entire border area sustained numerous filibustering expeditions during the Carranza-Villa conflict.
In
November 1914 Brownsville authorities kept their eyes on
a number of Huertistas in the city and in McAllen who
sought to organize a 150 man filibustering force to
70
Estrada, "Border Revolution," pp. 126-128;
Tanner, "The Texas Border," p. 33; Holcombe, "Arms Control
and the Mexican Revolution," pp. 107-108; Weekly Reports,
2 May 1914, RDS, 812.00/11883; 17 October 1914, RDS, 812.00/
13586; 30 January 1915, RDS, 812.00/14366; 27 FeEFuary
1915, RDS, 812.00/14626; Laredo Weekly Times, 13 September
1914, p. 1; 26 September 1915, p. 5; 14 November 1915,
p. 12.
"^ G. F. Walker to Pablo Gonzales, 30 June 1914,
Paglo Gonzalez Archives Reel 32; Holcombe, "Arms Control
and the Mexican Revolution," p. 101; Weekly Report, 30
January 1915, RDS, 812.00/14366.
252
assault Reynosa.
Another group trying to cross the river
fell into the hands of an army patrol early in December,
though sixteen of the twenty-five armed men escaped into
Mexico.
Two weeks later authorities near Rio Grande City
learned that a filibustering force was being prepared to
assault Camargo and Mier.
From December until the Villa
assault on Matamoros in April 1915, military officials
continuously tried to confirm reports of groups organizing
72
for one faction or the other.
Laredo authorities also had to deal with groups of
men trying to use Texas as a base of operations against
Mexico.
United States authorities broke up a planned
invasion of Nuevo Laredo in 1914 when up to 1,000 men had
been recruited for the expedition.
Later the same month
United States Marshal Allen Walker arrested four men for
plotting to invade Mexico.
Two weeks later Carrancista
officials in Nuevo Laredo dispatched a force to intercept
a band which had crossed into Mexico from just north of
Laredo.
On December 20, 1914, government troops fought a
brief battle with a group of men who had crossed from Texas.
A skirmish between Villistas coming from Texas and government troops occurred early in 1915.
Later in the year
Marshal Walker arrested Manuel de Icaza, Villa consul in
72
Eliseo Arredondo to Secretary of State, 27 January 1915, RDS, 812.00/14300; Brownsville Herald, 3 November
1914, p. 1; 3, 16 December 1914, p. 1.
253
Laredo, for organizing a filibustering expedition.
73
the man was exonerated.
Later
Up river from Laredo armed Mexicans crossed from
Texas to raid Mexican towns.
The Carrancista garrison at
Piedras Negras captured and executed two leaders of a filibustering group late in December 1914.
The following year,
a band of men crossed from Texas north of Del Rio and
raided ranches in the area.
Villista soldiers south of
Ciudad Juarez killed six armed Mexicans who had crossed
from El Paso in mid-November, 1914.
Reports of men cross-
ing the river frequently came to the attention of authorities m
Texas through the summer of 1915. 74
Filibustering expeditions posed a continuous mili-
tary problem for American officials.
Rumors abounded that
men had been organized to invade Mexico.
American offi-
cials could not confirm the frequent allegations of men
crossing into Mexico from Texas.
During the Carranza revolt fewer troops were
deployed along the river than had been there when Madero
73
Laredo Weekly Times, 22 November 1914, p. 9;
6 December 1914, p. 4; 14 February 1915, p. 3; 1 August
1915, p. 9; Brownsville Herald, 19 November 1914, p. 1;
El Paso Morning Times, 23 December 1914, p. 1.
'''^Attorney General to Secretary of State, 9 July
1915, RDS, 812.00/15360; Cobb to Secretary of State,
1 August 1915, RD£, 812.00/15604; F. Funston to Secretary
of War, 24 September 1915, RDS, 312.00/16303; El Paso
Morning Times, 17 November 1914, p. 1; 20 December 1914,
p. 1; 5 June 1915, p. 1; October 1915, p. 1.
254
rebelled against Diaz in 1910.
Nevertheless, American
soldiers did perform numerous functions in the borderland.
They had the task of preventing filibustering expeditions
from being launched from Texas.
More importantly, they
had to patrol the riverfront to prevent the violation of
American neutrality laws.
Troops also provided protection
to American cities during fighting across the river.
The Rio Grande border sustained minor revolutionary activity during the Carrancista period.
Most of the
fighting between Villa and Carranza occurred in southern
Mexico, because both sides considered it much more important than the border downs.
Nevertheless, Villistas
did at times challenge government control of all border
points.
While Villistas and Carrancistas exchanged pos-
session of Piedras Negras, Las Vacas and Ojinaga, Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo remained under government control.
Ciudad Juarez remained under Villa's influence until the
last week in December 1915.
On the Texas side, border
towns from Brownsville through Laredo to El Paso reacted
to the revolutionary activities in their Mexican counterpart communities.
American officials had to deal with
various elements of the revolution.
Counterrevolutionists
surfaced all along the border, with the Huerta-Orozco plot
causing much concern in El Paso.
A number of Americans
became victims of the fighting across the river while
others were victims of their own intrigue.
The border
255
continued
to be used by all factions to import arms
other war munitions, both legally and illegally.
and
It seems
that American exporters stood to make enormous profits
from the sale of war supplies since both sides, desperate
for the munitions, were prepared to pay whatever the asking
price required.
The Texas side of the river became a haven
for thousands of refugees excaping the fighting in Mexico.
Filibustering expeditions continued to be organized in
Texas to raid into Mexico.
American troops deployed to
the border could never, effectively, control the situation.
CHAPTER VI
THE MEXICANO "SOCIAL BANDITS," 1915
The Mexican American along the Mexico Texas border
where so much revolutionary activity occurred sought to
benefit from revolutionary Mexico.
For a brief moment in
1915, the despair of being "Mexican" in the United States
changed to hope as Mexican-American "social bandits," influenced by the ideology of the revolution, sought to
redress the suffering experienced by generations of Mexican
Americans.
Like European social bandits, the bands of
raiders in 1915 were expressing frustrations with the
social conditions in their locale.
Though called crimi-
nals by the authorities, they were championed and admired
as heroes, much like Catarino Garza, Gregorio Cortez and
Jacinto Trevino had been by the peasant society along the
border.
Since the Mexican Revolution was a movement of
the campesino for equality and recognition, lower and
middle class Mexicanos attacked members of the predominant
Anglo American upper class which oppressed them.
Also the
Mexican American "social bandits" assaulted symbols of
modernization, such as railroads and irrigation pumping
stations, which upset traditional patterns of life.
256
In
257
the rural Rio Grande Valley where political consciousness
was not well developed among most Mexican Americans, young
"social bandits" gathered in 1915 to avenge injustice.^
Anglo Americans first came to settle in the Lower
Rio Grande Valley after the American war against Mexico in
1348.
In the nineteenth century Anglos remained few in
number, mostly ranchers and land speculators who purchased
land very cheaply, often with the intention of selling it
at inflated prices.
Land speculators realized the agricul-
tural potential of the Valley once an irrigation system had
been created.
By 1909 the Valley had become a huge farming
and citrus-producing sector of the country.
Thousands of
midwestern Anglo Americans came to farm in the Valley.
At
the same time, from 1903 to 1913, thousands of Mexicans
moved to the Valley to provide the labor needed for agricultural development.
Mexican peons worked the land for
new masters, whom they often disliked.
more money in Texas than in Mexico.
Mexicanos earned
Nonetheless, some
Mexicanos became dissatisfied with their wages.
Many had
become resentful because their patron mistreated, beat and
ran off workers without pay.
Not all Anglo employers
abused their workers, however; many were fair with their
laborers.
When at the end of 1913 drainage and irrigation
canals had been completed, it was necessary to discharge
Eric J. Hobsbawn, Bandits (London:
Press, 1969), pp. 13-29.
Delacorte
258
hundreds of workers.
Every revolutionary faction had sup-
porters among both the unemployed and the remaining labor
force whose unrest quickly became a rallying point.
The
Anglo American ranchers and farmers knew little of their
workers' revolutionary involvement.
the Mexicano worked.
They only knew that
Frequently word reached an employer
that some Mexicanos had quarreled and shot each other,
that others simply left their jobs without reason, and
still others held secret meetings, but the employer regarded these events as none of his business and viewed them
as reflections of the Mexican character.
viewed with
The Mexicano
considerable suspicion most Anglo Americans,
whose contemptuousness of Mexicans clearly showed.
The
two groups generally lived apart; Mexican barrios had been
located far from Anglo American homes.
The Mexicans had
"their own" stores and moving pictures as well as a higher
tuberculosis rate.
'
A dormant discontented class lived
2
along the Rio Grande.
In contrast, an older generation of Anglo Americans,
2
Frank C Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier: A Brief
History of the Lower Rio Grande Valley (Menasha, W i s e :
George Banta Publishing Company, 1917—reprinted in 1962),
pp. 32-33; Virgil Lott, "The Rio Grande Valley" (unpublished manuscript in the Archives, University of Texas
Library, Austin, Texas), pp. 7-10; "On the Mexican Border,"
The New Republic 4 (49) (October 9, 1915), pp. 256-257;
Proceedings of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House
m the Investigation of the Texas State Ranger Force, pp.
857-358; George Marvin, "The Quick and the Dead on the
Border," The World's Work 33 (January 1917), p. 299.
259
who had come to the borderland years before, seemed to
have developed an amiable relationship with a number of
Mexicanos.
Many of the early Anglos came to the Valley
as merchants to service military garrisons.
They quickly
learned, however, that the Mexicans offered a greater trade
market.
In addition to the discontent among the working
class, the border for years had been the home of a lawless
element which sustained itself by smuggling, cattle and
horse theft and murder.
Law officers either lacked the
desire to enforce the law or engaged in the depredations
themselves.
ators.
Mexico had been a sanctuary for lawless pred-
To deal with the lawless element, Texas Rangers
came to the border.
Citizens from almost every town in
the area petitioned that a Ranger company be situated there.
Farmers and ranchers by mid-summer in 1915 began to administer "swift punishment" to any captured thief.
As Mexicans saw them, Texas Rangers had a long
record of acting criminally while supposedly defending the
law.
The constant conflict between Rangers and Mexicanos
3
Department of State, Records Relation to the
Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929 (RDS) Samuel Spears,
Judge, Rio Grande City to Attorney General, 9 August 1915,
RDS, 812.00/15814; J. J. Sanders to Henry Hutchings,
Adjutant General, 1 March 1915, and 24 October 1915,
Office of the Adjutant General, Walter Prescott Webb Collection, Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin,
Texas; Marvin, "Quick and Dead," p. 298; Laredo Weekly
Times, 15 August 1915, p. 10; Brownsville Herald, 24 July
1915, p. 1.
260
had been displayed in several incidents in
period:
the 1900-1910
the killing of the Cerda brothers by Ranger A. Y.
Baker, the chase of Gregorio Cortez who was charged with
killing several law officers, the gunfight between Jacinto
Trevino and a number of officers near San Benito, and the
lynching of Antonio Rodriguez who was accused of murdering
a white woman near Rock Spring, Texas.
When one Ranger
captain stationed in the Valley learned that Mexicanos had
applied for Special Ranger commissions, he wrote, "Hate
them and I believe would kill either of them first opportunity."
Some law officials believed that "a Mexican
cannot understand the necessity of enforcing or obeying
American laws by everybody."
Furthermore, lawmen felt
little fear in killing a Mexican, for there seemed to be
no penalty.
No Anglo jury would convict a white man, much
less a Texas Ranger, for clearing the border of another
Mexican, who possibly doubled as a worker and bandit.
Most Mexicanos were contemptuous of both Anglo Americans
and those Mexican Americans, like Jesse Perez, Jose
Longoria and Carlos Esparza who served as lawmen, as well
as Mexican American landowners who supported the dominant
Anglos.
Thus, Mexicans and Mexican Americans on the eve
of the Mexicano uprising had witnessed several killings of
acquaintances.
Each group stood ready to assist the other
261
in avenging old grudges.
The seeds of "social banditry" in 1915 had been
rooted in the previous sixty years along the border.
The
living Mexicano generation had witnessed the exploitation
of the laboring class and had heard stories told around
the table of when grandparents lost their lands to Anglo
speculators.
A pistol seemed to offer the most effective
protection for many peaceful families.
Madero had been
the first to offer hope in time of despair to Mexicanos;
but in 1915, the Carranza revolt and the tenuous control
of the border by the Constitutionalists seems to have
encouraged Mexican Americans on the American side.
Mexi-
cans living in Tamaulipas had been impressed by the land
distribution in Matamoros by Carrancista officials.
Fur-
thermore, much of the fighting during the Carrancista
period occurred away from the border, leaving Constitutionalist soldiers along the northern frontier free to
engage in border intrigue.
Also, most of the Constitu-
tionalist soldiers stationed along the border were
nortenos (northerners).
Many had relatives living on
the Texas side of the river.
4
H. L. Ransom to Henry Hutchings, 11 October 1915
and George B. Hufford to Henry Hutchings, 23 January 1915,
General Correspondence, Office of the Adjutant General,
Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas; Investigation of the
Texas State Ranger Force, pp. 364-365.
262
The fight for justice took the form of a movement
against oppression among Mexicano "social bandits" living
along the border from Brownsville to near Laredo, with
the greatest activity in Cameron, Willacy and Hidalgo
counties.
Support for this "primitive form of social pro-
test" came from the broader Mexican American peasantry as
well as from Mexican nationals, both civilian and military.
Numerous raids took place that were aimed at the governing
class in South Texas, including both Anglo Americans and
Mexican Americans.
Raids, which had been occurring since early 1915,
became quite frequent by May.
Few understood the motive.
Reports from ranchers and farmers losing cattle, horses,
goats and saddles reached American officials daily.
Mili-
tary officials began to notice more activity among the
Mexicanos in the Valley, but no one could offer an explanation.
On May 30, a large band of heavily-armed Mexicanos
appeared at el Rancho de los Indies.
The ranch, located
near a shallow place in the river, seems to have been a
favorite crossing point for the raiders.
A month later
on June 25, a group of marauders crossed the river and
killed Cameron County Deputy Sheriff Carlos Esparza, who
allegedly had a reputation of mistreating local residents.
5
Allen Gerlach, "Conditions Along the Border—1915,
The Plan de San Diego," New Mexico Historical Review 4 3 (3)
(July 1963), pp. 199-200; Weekly Reports, 15 May 1915,
RDS, 312.00/15074; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, p. 90.
263
Eight incidents of lawlessness occurred in the
Rio Grande Valley during July, 1915.
On July 5, a band of
fifteen to twenty Mexicanos made separate raids at Lyford,
San Benito, Harlingen, Raymondville and the Los Indies
ranch, stealing horses, arms and ammunition.
Cameron County
Sheriff W. T. Vann, who chased the marauders, had no idea
who the raiders were or what they wanted.
On the twelfth,
eleven Mexicanos stole horses from ranches near Santa Maria
and robbed the Nil Peterson store at Lyford.
At the San
Martin ranch, near the northwestern Hidalgo-Cameron counties line, a group of raiders kidnapped and terrorized, but
later released, a Mexican American ranchman.
stole the man's horse and saddle.
The Mexicanos
On the 17th a band of
marauders approached Bryan K. Boley, who was working in a
ranch, near Raymondville.
When Boley and two Mexican
American workers reached for their weapons, the Mexicanos
responded by shooting and killing the Anglo American.
A
posse led by Cameron County Sheriff W. T. Vann, Hidalgo
County Sheriff A. Y. Baker, and Willacy County Sheriff
Clint Atkinson failed to make contact with the group after
a two-day search.
On the twenty-fifth, raiders cut tele-
graph wires and burned a railroad bridge near Sebastian.
Raiders killed Jose M. Benavides, a Mexican national, at
Los Indies on July 31, 1915.
^Weekly Reports, 10 July 1915, RDS, 812.00/15517;
Brownsville Herald, 7, 3 June 1915, p. 1; W. T. Grimes to
264
The situation intensified in August when approximately twenty-five raids took place.
incidents were reported.
On August 2, three
Several Mexicanos shot at a
party of surveyors near Port Isabel and another group robbed
a man of his horse near Brownsville.
More important, a
posse and military patrol chasing a band of raiders came
to the Los Tulitos Rancho early in the morning of August
], 1915.
The posse, led by a local farmer, Jeff Scribner,
who had feuded with the owner, Aniceto Pizana, opened fire
on the Pizana family.
Law officers had been informed that
the raiders had taken refuge in the rancho.
When the
smoke cleared, the Mexicanos had escaped but the posse had
wounded the twelve-year-old son of Pizana and captured his
mother and brother.
The boy, Guadalupe, who gave the alarm
that raiders approached, lost his leg in the affray.
The
suffering of the child made Aniceto a bitter man and triggered his immediate decision to organize a para-military
group to drive the Anglos out of the Valley.
Aniceto
escaped and by September had become the leader of the
Henry Hutchings, 13 July 1915, Office of the Adjutant
General; Brownsville Herald, 13, 19, 20, 26 July 1915,
p. 1; Report of J. J. Sanders, 27 July 1915, "Ranger
Force Correspondence," Adjutant General Papers, Texas
State Archives, Austin, Texas; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 39-90; it was later rumored that Boyle's
killing was a personal matter and not related to the
raids; but at the time, Valleyites regarded this murder
as the first serious raid.
265
"social bandits."^
The following day a group of fifteen to twenty
Mexicanos stole twelve horses from a ranch near Brownsville.
Another band, believed to number as many as forty, fought
a battle with a posse near Harlingen.
Three cavalry men
and a customs guard suffered wounds while the marauders
lost one man killed and two captured.
On the fourth,
raiders cut communications between Brownsville and the rest
of the world.
Seven armed Mexicanos stole seventeen head
of cattle from the W. H. Griggs ranch near Brownsville.
On
the same day a locomotive engineer reported that someone
had taken several shots at his train about thirty-five miles
north of Brownsville.
The next day marauders set fire to
o
the rail line near Lyford.
7
.
.
Interview with Mrs. Aniceto Pizana, 14 June 1980,
Matamoros, Mexico. Mrs. Pizana is very much alive and living in self-imposed exile. Since that fateful day in August
when the family was forced to abandon their home in Cameron
County, Mrs. Pizana has not touched United States soil.
Mrs. Pizana stated that the fighting that began at about
5:30 A.M. raged on for two hours. Her husband and the rest
of the family had just risen and were tending the animals.
Before the attack on his home, Pizana's^name never surfaced
as a raider or cattle thief. Mrs. Pizana simply stated that
that "americanos" wanted to drive them off the land. Giro
R. de la Garza-Trevino, Tamaulipas: Apuntos Historicos
(Ciudad Victoria, Tamp.: Universidad de Tamaulipas, 1956),
pp. 122-125; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, p. 90; San Antonio Express, 4 August 1915, p. 1; Weekly Reports, 31 July
1915, RDS, 312.00/15730; Brownsville Herald, 2 August 1915,
p. 1.
o
San Antonio Express, 3, 5 August 1915, pp. 1-3;
Laredo Weekly Times, 3 August 1915, p. 5; H. L. Ransom to
Henry Hutchings, 4 August 1915, Office of the Adjutant
266
One of the most brutal murders occurred in Sebastian, Texas on August 5.
Twelve Mexicanos entered the
Alexander Store to rob it.
They took A. L. Austin, his
son Charles and a worker as prisoners.
A short distance
from the store the Austins were executed.
A. L. Austin
had served as president of the Sebastian Law and Order
League, an organization established to help law officers
preserve peace.
The League recently had expelled certain
Mexicans from the county.
Austin "was of a fiery temper
and on occasion used the toe of his boot a little too
freely on those he considered laggardly in their field
work . . . "
enemy.
Everytime he kicked a Mexican, he made another
A posse chased the raiders and managed to kill one
and wound four in an exchange of fire.
An Anglo suffered
minor wounds whenMexicanos opened fire while he was driving
his car near Los Fresnos on August 6, 1915.
The next day
a band of raiders shot and wounded the night watchman at
a gin company in Lyford.
General; Weekly Reports, 21 July 1915, RDS, 812.00/15730;
Brownsville Herald, 4, 5 August 1915, p. 1; Sheriff Vann
recovered sixteen of the seventeen cattle.
^Testimony of Mrs. Nellie F. Austin in "Investigation of Mexican Affairs," Senate Document 235, 66 Cong.,
2nd sess. (1919-1920), Vol. I, pp. 1312-1315; Lott, "Rio
Grande Valley," pp. 39-44; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier,
p. 91; H. L. Ransom to Adjutant General, August, 1915,
"Ranger Force Correspondence"; H. L. Yates to Henry
Hutchings, 5 August 1915, Office of the Adjutant General,
August 1915, "Ranger Force Correspondence," Office of
the Adjutant General; Brownsville Herald, 6 August 1915,
p. 1.
267
Raiders moved their operations north on August 8,
when a band of sixty heavily armed Mexicanos led by Antonio
Rocha and Desidario Morado attacked the Las Norias station,
sub-headquarters of the King Ranch.
The engagement became
one of the major skirmishes of the disturbance.
The sta-
tion had just been reinforced by eight soldiers and seven
deputy sheriffs who had been informed of an imminent raid
in the area.
In the one hour gun battle five raiders were
killed and many wounded, while only two Americans suffered
wounds.
The next week marauders turned on the United States
Cavalry.
On August 9, Mexicanos opened fire on an American
patrol near Mercedes.
During the skirmish, one raider died.
The next day the band killed a soldier in another engagement along the river.
On the fifteenth one hundred raiders
surrounded a cavalry patrol at Progreso Ferry Crossing near
Mercedes.
Two days later, another American patrol came
under fire near the same spot.
This time one United States
soldier was killed and two wounded.
Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 91-92; Lott,
"Rio Grande Valley," pp. 45-4 8; testimony of Caesar Kleberg,
Senate Document 285, I, pp. 1284-1235; Brownsville Herald,
9 August 1915, p. 1; Charles Askins, Texans, Guns, and
History (New York: Winchester Press, 1970), pp. 208-210.
"'••''H. L. Ransom to Henry Hutchings, August 1915,
"Ranger Force Correspondence"; Funston to Secretary of
State, 16 August 1915, RDS, 312.00/15289; 13 August 1915,
RDS, 812.00/15803; W. R. Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico Relations,
1913-1916: Revolution, Oil and Intervention" (Ph.D.
268
Seven incidents occurred in late August.
On the
twentieth, raiders crossed the river near Mercedes prompting Sheriff Baker of Hidalgo County and a ten man posse to
give chase.
When they caught up with the band the next
day at Madero, Texas, nine Mexicanos lost their lives in
the fight and the remaining four crossed to Mexico.
On
the twenty-third ten Carrancista deserters crossed near
Mission, skirmished with a posse near Monte Cristo and
returned to Mexico.
Two days later, a military patrol
near Progreso chased a band of raiders and exchanged shots,
wounding four.
When twenty marauders crossed to Texas near
the same point on the twenty-sixth, soldiers gave chase,
but lost them in the thick brush.
On the twenty-seventh,
Mexicanos rode near Donna and later Edinburg seeking recruits.
Three days later the St. Louis, Brownsville and
Mexico Railway bridge north of Brownsville was set on fire.
On the 31st, twenty-three Mexican Americans gathered in
downtown Brownsville and proclaimed that it was "time to
kill the gringos."
All were arrested.
The situation had
reached a critical stage by the end of the month; not only
were civilians attacked, but American military troops had
dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1971), p. 385;
Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, p. 92; Lott, "Rio Grande
Valley," pp. 50-51; Brownsville Herald, 11, 16, 17 August
1915, p. 1.
269
12
become constant targets.
Conflict intensified in September when twenty/
three incidents occurred despite the rising Rio Grande.
On September 1, the river rose more than nine feet, making
it dangerous to cross.
Yet raiders executed two Americans,
Earl Donaldson and J. T. Smith, near the Fresno Pumping
Station.
A third American named Dodd was spared when one
of the raiders recognized him as the man who had saved his
life during the Villista attack in Matamoros.
Aniceto
Pizana was believed to have led the marauders.
Troops
chased the band and killed one raider before the rest
escaped in the thick brush along the river.
the railroad bridge at San Benito was burned.
The next day,
Fourteen
miles from Brownsville, Mexicanos shot at a car occupied
by two Americans.
Five raiders shot at American troops in
the Nopalitos farm also near Brownsville.
A sheriff's
posse and cavalry patrol gave chase to the raiders causing
them to abandon one hundred pounds of dynamite.
A marauder
was killed by the posse in a skirmish before the Mexicanos
became lost in the brush.
Officials, however, did not
believe that the raiders had come from Mexico since the
12
Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 92-93; Lott,
"Rio Grande Valley," pp. 51-54; Brownsville Herald, 23,
27 August 1915, p. 1; Laredo Weekly Times, 29 August 1915,
p. 9; San Antonio Express, 27 August 1915, p. 1; Eric
Carroll Tanner, "The Texas Border and the Mexican Revolution" (M.A. thesis, Texas Tech University, 1970), p. 46.
270
river was too high for mounted men to cross it.
On the
second, a military plane flying over the river also came
under heavy fire from raiders.
It could not be determined
if the firing had come from the Texas or Coahuila side
of the river. 13
Raiders stole saddles, rifles and ammunition from
a store at el Ojo de Agua near Mission on September 3.
Sheriff Baker and army troops chased the group to the river
but the raiders escaped to Mexico.
The sheriff and posse,
who suspected that the marauders would cross back, camped
near the Cavazos crossing.
The next day the raiders crossed
and fired on the Americans, starting a battle which dragged
on until the fifth when both sides withdrew.
It was clear
that Carrancistas had participated in the exchange.
One
American was wounded, while forty raiders reportedly were
wounded, and eleven were killed.
On the third, Mexicanos
fired on an army patrol near Harlingen.
The next day tele-
graph wires were cut again between Harlingen, San Benito
and Brownsville.
Someone fired several shots at Sam
Robertson near San Benito on the ninth, probably because
Testimony of S. S. Dodd, Senate Document 28 5, I,
pp. 1250-1253; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 93-94;
Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," pp. 53-54; W. T. Vann to Henry
Hutchings, 2 September 1915, Office of the Adjutant General; Funston to Attorney General, 2 September 1915, RDS,
812.00/16013; 2 September 1915, RDS, 312.00/16009; Weekly
Reports, 11 September 1915, RD£, 812.00/16256; Laredo
Weekly Times, 5 September 1915, p. 3; Brownsville Herald,
1, 2, 4 September 1915, p. 1.
271
he had successfully persuaded local Mexican Americans to
surrender their guns to city officials.
The next day
twelve Mexicanos attacked a ranch near Lyford and fought
a pitched battle with Anglo American and Mexican workers.
Two raiders died in the fight, as did one Mexican worker.
On the tenth, ten to fifteen marauders entered the Young
Ranch in Hidalgo County looking for Americans to kill.
The raiders informed Mexican ranch hands that if they made
no attempt to interfere with the search for Americans they
14
would not be harmed.
In mid-September, officials contin-
ued to express concern over the raiding, especially since
they had identified the leaders of the so-called "revolutionary movement."
Raiding continued in the last two weeks of September.
On the thirteenth a Mexican American mail carrier
suffered neck wounds at the hands of five raiders near
Edinburg.
An American soldier died and two suffered severe
wounds when raiders attacked their nine-man position in
the Turner Ranch near Santa Maria on September 13.
Other
•'•^A. Y. Baker to Henry Hutchings and J. J. Sanders
to Henry Hutchings, 4 September 1915, Office of the Adjutant General; Weekly Reports, 4 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/
16175; Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," pp. 55-61; Virgin Lott,
"Brief Outline of Ojo de Agua Fights Sept. 3rd. 1915 and
Oct. 21, 1915" (Unpublished manuscript in Archives, Rio
Grande Valley Historical Society, Public Library, Harlingen, Texas), n.d., n.p.; Laredo Weekly Times, 12 September
1915, p. 10; Brownsville Herald, 9, 10, 11 September 1915,
p. 1.
272
troops along with a posse gave chase, but after a daylong
search they failed to locate any raiders, leading local
officials to believe that local Mexican Americans had
harbored the marauders.
Civil officers searched all houses
in the area and seized arms from suspected Mexicanos.
Two
days later, another army patrol dodged fire from across the
river.15
Most civil and military officials expected a general uprising of the Mexican population on September 16,
Mexican Independence Day.
Troops went on alert status and
patrolled most Valley towns, but no uprising took place.
An army patrol opened fire and scattered a band of twenty
Mexicanos near the Los Fresnos irrigation camp, but lost
the group after a two hour chase.
On the seventeenth
troops patrolling the river west of Brownsville drew fire
from the Mexican side.
Carrancista soldiers in the vicin-
ity received the blame for an affray that left one Mexican
wounded.
Upriver near Donna, fifty raiders attacked a
ten man outpost at a crossing point called "Casa Colorado."
It was reported that at least fifty Carrancista troops
reinforced the raiders by giving them covering fire from
the Mexican side.
At least seventeen raiders died in the
Funston to Adjutant General, 13 September 1915
RDS, 812.00/16159; 13 September 1915, RDS, 312.00/16160;
Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," p. 60; Brownsville Herald, 13
15 September 1915, p. 1.
273
fighting and many suffered wounds.
Raiding slackened for
the next week when the river rose making crossing risky. "^^
As soon as the river dropped, the raiders renewed
their activity.
Three marauders tried to steal a horse
from the Young Ranch in Hidalgo County on the twenty-second,
Two days later twenty Mexicanos stole horses, mules, saddles, rifles and ammunition from the Talpa Ranch near Mission, Texas.
The next day a military patrol was ambushed
near Progreso.
One soldier died in the fighting, another
suffered wounds, and a third became a prisoner of the
raiders, who robbed the Saenz store at Progreso and were
leaving when the patrol arrived.
In Mexican territory the
band executed its prisoner, cut off his ears, decapitated
him and displayed his head along the bank of the river.
It seemed clear again to military officials that Carrancista soldiers entrenched at the Progreso crossing had
participated in the affray.
General Funston sent a battery
of artillery to Progreso to prevent the crossing of five
hundred Carrancistas who had gathered in the vicinity when
work of the fighting spread to Reynosa.
On the same day,
Mexicanos assaulted the San Juanito Ranch owned by James
Garrett to Secretary of State, 15 September 1915,
RDS, 312.00/16159; Funston to Adjutant General, 16 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16199; Secretary of War to Secretary
of State, 1 October 1915, RDS, 812.00.16369; Weekly Reports,
18 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16319; Lott, "Rio Grande
Valley," pp. 61-62; Brownsville Herald, 15, 16, 20 September 1915, p. 1.
274
B. McAllen.
McAllen and his cook killed five raiders in
the hour long skirmish.
A brief lull followed in the
raiding."
On September 27, troops at the La Feria Pump Station drew fire from a band of Mexicanos.
The next day
Grace Carter suffered a minor hand wound when two men
attacked her near her home in Harlingen and stole a horse.
Her relatives reportedly had been involved in the killing
of "bad Mexicans" in the area.
The last raid occurred on
the twenty-ninth when a party in four cars received fire
as they passed near Mercedes.
trace of the culprits. 18
Troops failed to find any
The river began to rise again and another lull
followed.
The Brownsville Herald on September 28, reported
that McAllen citizens believed the worse to be over and
^that life had begun to return to normal in Hidalgo County.
A free moving picture at the Columbia Theater in McAllen
drew many people.
Officers hoped to get the people's
minds off the troubles by giving them free entertainment.
17
Askins, Texans, pp. 211-213; Ford Green, "The
Infamous Plan of San Diego," Old West, 12 (2) (Winter,
1975), p. 14; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 64-65,
94-95; Lott, "Rio Grande," pp. 6 3-65; Funston to Adjutant
General, 24 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16302; Brownsville
Herald, 22, 24, 25 September 1915, p. 1; Laredo Weekly
Times, 26 September 1915, p. 1; El Paso Morning Times,
29 September 1915, p. 1.
18
Brownsville Herald, 28, 29 September 1915, p. 1.
275
On the same day a huge baile honoring the wedding of Mr.
and Mrs. Jose G. Barreda also seemed to shift attention
19
away from the forays.
Yet raiding would not end until
the following month, despite the hope of officials in
South Texas.
Valley residents became jubilant when Carranza
announced that Brigadier General E. P. Nafarrate, Carrancista commander in Matamoros and an alleged raider sympathizer, had been transferred.
General Eugenic Lopez
replaced Nafarrate, while General Alfredo Ricaut arrived
with his own troops from Coahuila.
Unlike Nafarrate, who
had a distrust of Americans, Lopez and Ricaut were considered to be moderates.
Despite the change in command,
raiding continued.
Ten raids occurred in October, beginning on the
fourth when six Mexicanos ambushed an American cavalry
patrol near La Feria.
No casualties were reported.
No
further raids occurred until the eighteenth, leading officials to believe that the troubles were over.
patrols reported absolute calm.
Military
Texas Rangers moved to
Alice, Texas, approximately 150 miles from the border.
Most officials believed that the raiders had been driven
into the interior of Mexico by the new Mexican military
Ibid.
^°Ibid., 2, 3, 4 October 1915, p. 1
276
officers.
The pause ended on October 18th, however, when
one of the most serious raids occurred.
Sixty raiders
derailed the St. Louis, Brownsville, and Mexico train.
They boarded it and killed five passengers, wounded two,
and robbed all Anglo passengers without molesting any
Mexican Americans.
Although the marauders cried "I Viva
Carranzal", "TViva Luis de la Rosal", and "i Viva Aniceto
Pizanal', Jose M. Benavides and Adrian Mejias, actually
led the raid. 21
Three days later another serious attack occurred
when one hundred Mexicanos ambushed an eighteen man patrol
at Ojo de Agua, a wireless station near Mission, killing
three soldiers and wounding eight.
Cavalry reinforcements
from nearby Penitas reached the scene and chased the
raiders off, killing five including one whose hat bore a
21
Ibid., 4, 19 October 1915, p. 1; San Antonio
Express, 3 October 1915, p. 1; Laredo Weekly Times, 10
October 1915, p. 8; J. J. Sanders to Henry Hutchings,
9 October 1915, Office of the Adjutant General; Testimony
of John I. Kleiber, Senate Document 285, pp. 1270-1276;
Askins, Texans, p. 213; Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," pp.
66-69; when I interviewed Mrs. Pizana she recalled that a
box of papers belonging to her husband had been stored in
the family castana (trunk). I searched through the
castana and found a letter from Pizana to Mexican historian.
Giro R. de la Garza-Trevino dated March 17, 1933. In the
letter Pizana tells Garza-'Jrevino that the attack on^ the
train was committed by Jose Benavides and Adrian Mejia and
twelve other men. The original letter is now in the
Esparza Collection of Carlos Larralde at Long Beach,
California. I have a xerox copy of the letter.
277
ribbon with the inscription, "iviva la Independencia de
Texas 1" Valley officials quickly concluded that Carrancistas
had committed the attack, since dead raiders wore Constitu22
tionalist uniforms.
This was the last major raid of the
period until June 1916.
Five skirmishes took place in late October.
On
the twenty-first a group raided a ranch near Sebastian and
fought a small battle with a posse that had given chase;
no one was hurt.
On the twenty-third a patrol stationed
near Mercedes exchanged fire with men on the Mexican side
of the river without injuries.
The following day a de-
tachment of soldiers guarding the train wreckage came under
fire from a band of Mexicanos.
affray.
One soldier died in the
The same day, raiders fired on two soldiers and
one civilian fishing in the Arroyo Colorado near Harlingen.
The raiders scattered when the soldiers returned the fire.
On the twenty-sixth, five raiders ambushed Sam Robertson
near the San Pedro ranch.
Robertson was not injured, but
blood stains in the general area where the raiders had
attacked suggested that some of them had been hurt.
"Jesse Perez Memoirs" (Archives, University of
Texas Library, Austin, Texas), p. 56; Funston to Adjutant
General, 22 October 1915, RDS, 812.00/16567; Giro R. de la
Garza-Trevino, La Revolucion Mexicana en el Estado de
Tamaulipas, Tomo II (Mexico, D.F.: Libreria de Manuel
Porriia, S.A. , 19773), p. 206; Weekly Reports, 23 October
1915, RDS, 812.00/16667; Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," pp.
72-76 and "Brief Outline"; Pierce, Texas'Last Frontier,
pp. 97-98.
273
Finally, on the twenty-ninth, marauders attacked soldiers
stationed at Capote, near Hidalgo, Texas.
Again there were
no injuries in the skirmish. ^"^
For the most part, raiding in November took the
form of isolated firing at American patrols along the
river.
On the first, a military patrol came under fire
along the river near Mission.
Mexicanos stole two horses
and saddles on the fourth from a ranch three miles east of
Brownsville.
The next day, raiders fired on another cavalry
patrol near Mercedes.
On the ninth, a military patrol near
La Feria became a target for a band of Mexicanos.
On the
twelfth, five ambushed Pancho Esparza, a Mexican scout for
the army.
Raiders fired at a patrol near iMercedes on the
twenty-first, the last incident reported in 1915.
Conditions returned to normal and farmers began to
plant their crops as a result of events in Mexico.
Mexican
officials in Reynosa organized a force of 108 Rurales,
divided the area into eighteen districts and assigned one
officer and five men to each district.
Their mission was
Brownsville Herald, 21, 25, 26, 29 October 1915,
p. 1; El Paso Morning Times, 25 October 1915, p. 1; H. L.
Ransom to Henry Hutchings, 25 October 1915, Office of the
Adjutant General; Memo by H. L. Ransom, October 1915,
probably to Adjutant General, "Ranger Force Correspondence";
Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," p. 70.
Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 98-99; Brownsville Herald, 4, 5, 9, 21 November 1915, p. 1; Weekly
Reports, 13 November 1915, RDS, 812.00/16842; 20 November
1915, RDS, 312.00/16890.
279
to stop the crossing of Mexicano raiders.
In one day
fourteen raiders were apprehended, two were shot, seven
sent to Matamoros for trial and the rest held in Reynosa.^^
After at least seventy-three raids, peace came to the Valley.
The Mexicanos had tried to resist the trend toward
Anglo modernization and domination.
While those goals could
not be achieved, the movement did serve as a catalyst to
motivate the disenchanted lower class.
Many young Mexicanos,
who had witnessed their parents or grandparents lose their
26
lands, rode with the raiders.
Some of them hoped one day
to regain their lost lands in the area between the Nueces
River and Rio Grande.
Other captured raiders claimed that
their motive was "to take all the land back that you Gringos
27
stole from us before the Constitution of 1857 [sic]."
The movement also sought to redress oppression of
the lower class Mexican American.
The basic cause of the
revolt was the absence of civil liberties and rights for
J. H. Johnson to Secretary of State, 17 November
1915, RDS, 812.00/16838; Secretary of War to Secretary of
State,"T7 November 1915, RD£, 812.00/16872.
^^Interview with Eliseo Paredes, 26 March 1974,
Matamoros, Tamaulipas.
^^Juan Gomez-Quinones, "Plan de San Diego Reviewed,"
Aztlan: Chicane Journal of the Social Sciences and the
Arts (1) (Spring, 1970), p. 127; Charles Spears to Attorniy^General, 6 August 1915, RD£, 812.00/15814; Brownsville
Herald, 10 August 1915, p. 1; Testimony of Lon C Hill,
Senate Document 235, pp. 1262-1263.
230
28
Mexican Americans along the border.
The Mexican Revolu-
tion, as a movement of the masses for equality and recognition, encouraged Mexicanos to assert their rights and demand
respect.
American officials searching Mexicanos' homes in
the outlying ranches discovered circulars that appealed to
the local population to "rise in favor of Carranza and of
independence because at the rate we are going here we soon
will be living as slaves of the Americans."
Men who under
normal circumstances would be law-abiding citizens, took
to the gun as a vehicle of redress. The raiders operating
on "home grounds," had the support of most local citizens. 29
In the course of the forays, it became apparent
that some of the marauders from Mexico had lived in Texas
and had gone into exile across the river, since they were
fugitives from the law in this country.
A former Browns-
/
ville policeman, Carlos Garcia, who apparently commanded
one of the raiding bands, had escaped from the Cameron
County jail in August 1913, while serving a two year
28
f
^
Cayetano Gonzalez-Perez to Venustiano Carranza,
9 Agosto de 1915, Carpeta 47, Legajo 5265, p. 1, Archivo
de Carranza, Mexico, D.F.
^^Cumberland, "Border Raids," p. 28 6; San Antonio
Express, 3 September 1915, p. 1; Clifford B. Casey, "Soldiers. Ranchers and Miners in the Big Bend," U.S. Department of Interior, National Park Service: Office of
Archeology and Historical Preservation, Division of History
(Washington, D . C : Government Printing Office, September,
1969), p. 44; Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico Relations," p. 370.
281
sentence for assault.
Procopio Elizondo, an officer in
Nafarrate's Tampico Army Corps, had been indicted in 1902
for the murder of Texas Ranger W. E. Roebuck.
Alberto
Cabrera, probably the leader of another band of raiders,
had been indicted in Starr County for the murder of Federal
30
Judge Stanley B. Welch in 1906.
Luis de la Rosa had been
arrested by Texas Rangers for allegedly stealing cattle in
Cameron County.
Aniceto Pizana frequently was harrassed
for minor things by Rangers and on July 21, 1915 had been
arrested for carrying a pistol in Brownsville.
Many fugi-
tives had gone to live in Matamoros with relatives who
sympathized with them.
Consequently, many Matamorenses
were bent on revenging the death of a cousin, uncle,
brother, or friend.
«««
Adolfo Munoz, who was lynched in July,
had a brother living in Matamoros who was a city policeman.
Many of the troops stationed in the Matamoros-Reynosa
vicinity were residents of the immediate area who had
relatives in Texas.
Probably some of these soldiers used
their free time to avenge a friend or could not find it
in themselves to stop a friend from using the river as a
sanctuary after raiding in Texas.
Brownsville Herald, 12, 31 August 1915, p. 1;
J. J. Sanders to Henry Hutchings, 4 April 1915, Webb Collection, XIX.
^•""Ciro R. de la Garza-Trevino, El Plan de San Diego
(Diudad Victoria, Tamp.: Universidad Autonoma de Tamaulipas, Noviembre de 1970), pp. 37-45; Senate Document 285,
282
Revenge against law officers, especially Texas
Rangers, became an obsession with many Mexicanos.
Texas
Rangers had a reputation of applying la ley fuga (shot trying to escape) rather than bringing in Mexican prisoners.
Many Mexicans, some of whom were probably innocent, had
died at the hands of the Rangers.
Such actions along the
border gave many relatives of a victim of Ranger injustice
the motivation to join the raiders.
Other officers also
had the reputation of applying their own justice.
Sheriff
Baker reportedly burned the home of a Mexican who had been
blamed for a crime in Karnes County, after he refused
Baker's order to leave Hidalgo County.
The man's son
Manuel Estapa, later joined the raiders.32 In September
1915, postcards showing Texas Rangers dragging the bodies
of raiders killed at the Las Norias affray circulated in
South Texas.
Many Mexicans became angry over the cruelty
displayed by the cards.
The Constitutionalist commander
at Matamoros suggested to American military officials that
peace could best be served if Rangers did not appear at the
I, pp. 1271-1317; San Antonio Express, 3 September 1915;
20 October 1915, p. 1; Brownsville Herald, 25 August 1915,
p. 1; 19 November"1915, p. 1; Funston to Adjutant General,
21 October 1915, RDS^, 312.00/16545; Weekly Reports, 26 June
1915, RD£, 312.00715448.
"^^Testimony of R. B. Creager, Investigation of the
Texas State Ranger Force, p. 380; Senator Morris Sheppard
to Secretary Lansing, 3 November 1915, RDS, -312.00/16778;
"Jesse P^rez Memoirs," pp. 56-57.
283
riverfront.
In September Carrancista soldiers along the
river yelled at American soldiers that they would not be
fired upon.
Yet the Carrancistas reserved the right to
fire upon any Texas Ranger, sheriff or civilian who
appeared on the riverbank.
General Funston wired Governor
Ferguson requesting that Rangers and law officers not be
permitted to go near the riverfront.
Mexicanos seem to have selected victims who could
be identified as symbols of the Anglo American dominance
in the Valley.
Sam Robertson, who had disarmed Mexican
Americans, experienced two attacks by the raiders.
The
Norias raid struck at the most vivid example of Anglo
34
American dominance, the King Ranch.
James B. McAllen,
another prominant Valleyite, had his ranch attacked.
A. L.
Austin, president of a "law and order" league in Sebastion,
was killed.
The raiders destroyed irrigation pumping sta-
tions, symbols of Anglo American exploitation of the land
and the working class.
The rail lines, another symbol of
American modernization, were constant targets.
They
^Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico Relations," p. 38 4; Lie.
Felix Acuna to Gov. of Tamaulipas, n.d.. Archive General
de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de Mexico,
Mexico, D.F. (AREM), 16-16-165; Brownsville Herald,
7 September 1915, p. 1; El Paso Morning Times, 10, 13
September 1915, p. 1.
^^Brownsville Herald, 24 September 1915, p. 1; A
rumor surfaced among the Anglo community that members of
the King family had been placed on a Mexican "blacklist"
to be killed.
234
represented prosperity to a poverty-stricken people who had
not shared in the prosperity.
Poverty along the border probably contributed to
the raids.
Mexicans in northern Mexico suffered from
sporadic shortages of food in the first half of the year.
Military officials in Mission reported early in the year
that they feared a general uprising of Mexicans because of
a "lack of food and work" in the vicinity.
In April 1915,
reports reached officials in Hidalgo that Mexicans in and
around Reynosa faced starvation as a result of a severe
food shortage.35 No crops had been planted. By the first
week of June, hundreds of refugees from the interior of
Mexico reached the border searching for food.
Military
officials in Monterrey provided free transportation to
wanderers wanting to come to the border for relief.
Texas
Ranger Captain J. J. Sanders charged that many of the
refugees crossed into Texas to steal cattle or horses and
eventually joined the raiders.
In mid-June Brownsville
city fathers met to find a solution to the high rate of
36
unemployment among the exiles in the city.
On August 5,
Johnson to Secretary of State, 22 February 1915,
RDS, 312.00/14448; Weekly Reports, 20 February 1915, RDS,
812.00/14470; Brownsville Herald, 19 April 1915, p. 1.
•^^Funston to Secretary of State, 3 June 1915, RDS,
312.00/15130; San Antonio Express, 9 June 1915, p. 3;
Brownsville Herald, 14 June 1915, p. 4.
235
1915, El Provenir, a Spanish language daily in Brownsville,
received a letter signed by "the people," which threatened
death to certain wealthy persons in the city unless they
gave work to the poor.
The letter said:
To those who can give employment, if it is not
given by the 8th or 10th, the people will have to
mutiny against those who have means of employing us
and we have a list of them. It will make no difference if they go to Matamoros, as some of them wish
to do, as they think they would be more secure with
Nafarrate. So, dear sir, tell your friends to open
up some work for the people, otherwise it will go bad
with them. So now you know what is to be done and if
it be not done you will see what will happen to you
for not making this known, and to your friends for
not giving employment. You will see. We are going
to kill, yes, sir, we are going to kill.3 7
Some upper and middle class Anglo Americans and
Mexican Americans also contributed to the disturbance along
the border by their attitudes toward the Mexican Revolution.
They feared Carranza's nationalistic attitude would diminish
American interests in Mexico.
Thus, a number of Americans
aided Villistas and other anti-Carranza factions in the
district.
Among those identified as selling war munitions
and allegedly recruiting for Villa were Deodoro Guerra, a
McAllen merchant; Dr. Andres Villarreal, a McAllen physician; A. Y. Baker, the Hidalgo County Sheriff; Tom Mayfield,
a deputy sheriff in Hidalgo County; Everette Anglin, McAllen
37
Ibid., 12 August 1915, p. 1; Johnson to Secretary
of State, 18 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/15310; in this report
Consul Johnson writes that the food situation had improved
by mid-August from June.
286
City Marshal and Isidro Valli, another deputy sheriff in
38
Hidalgo County.
These men profited from the selling of
arms to the anti-Carranza factions.
After the embargo
against Mexican groups other than Carranza, Villistas had
to purchase munitions from local merchants illegally.
One
hundred rounds of ammunition which had sold for $4 0 to $50
now sold for $6 7 or more.
Many law and order people
opposed Carranza because they saw his tenuous control of
the border as a mockery of order in comparison to the days
'
39
of Porfirio Diaz.
State officials did not help matters.
On several
occasions Carrancista officials and later General Funston
charged that state officers purposely exposed themselves
along the river front to provoke Carrancista soldiers into
a fight.
On other occasions. General Funston ordered his
troops to guard captured Mexicanos from indiscriminate
30
Charles C Cumberland, "Border Raids m the
Lower Rio Grande Valley—1915," Southwestern Historical
Quarterly 57 (January 1954), pp. 309-310; General
Alfredo Ricaut to Candido Aguilar, 30 April 1916, AREM,
793-10; Weekly Reports, 30 January 1915, RDS, 812.00/
14366.
•^^C H. Moore to F. S. Elias, 29 June 1915, Archivo
Carranza 4 3-4740, Docs. 2-3; Harold Eugene Holcombe,
"United States Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution,
1910-1924" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Alabama,
1963), p. 113; Testimony of John A. Vails, Senate Document
235, p. 1200; "Renewed Fighting in Mexico," The Independent,
4 October 1915, p. 11.
237
lynching by state and local law officers. "^^
In the past, the Valley raids have been explained
in terms of the Carranza regime's desire for recognition,
German intrigue aimed at embarrassing the United States,
and the famous episode of the Plan of San Diego, a separat41
ist scheme.
Although the San Diego Plan was publicized
in 1915, groundwork had been laid as early as the fall of
1914.
On September 19, 1914 at San Benito two Mexicans
visited the store of Don Alberto Guzman.
about the Mexican population in the area.
They inquired
The men identi-
fied themselves as members of a junta that had met at San
Diego, Texas in August to plan a revolution to reclaim
territory lost by Mexico.
They claimed to have an army
from Brownsville to Rio Grande City, augumented by regulars
from the Constitutionalist forces which was prepared to
Funston to Adjutant General, 16 September 1915,
RDS, 312.00/16193; Brownsville Herald, 23 September 1915,
p. 1; Cumberland, "Border Raids," pp. 309-310.
For articles on the Plan de San Diego consult
the following: William M. Hager, "The plan de San Diego,
Unrest on the Texas Border in 1915," Arizona and the West
5 (Winter, 1963) ; Allen Gerlach, "Conditions Along the
Border—1915, the Plan de San Diego," New Mexico Historical Review 43 (3) (July 1963); Juan Gdmez-Quinones,
"Plan de San Diego Reviewed," Aztlan: Chicane Journal of
the Social Sciences and the Arts, I (1) (Spring, 1970);
James A. Sandos, "The Plan of San Diego, War and Diplomacy
on the Texas Border, 1915-1916," Arizona and the West 14
(1) (Spring, 1972); Charles H. Harris, III and Louis R.
Sadler, "The Plan of San Diego and the Mexican-United
States War Crisis of 1916: A reexamination," Hispanic
American Historical Review 53 (3) (August 1978).
288
strike.
From Don Guzman they sought support, especially
financial contributions.
Don Guzman agreed, since they
threatened to kill him, but he quickly informed a United
States Customs Inspector, Don Antonio Ysnaga, who related
the information to Frank Robb, Collector of Customs in
Brownsville, Robb dismissed the affair as a scheme to
extort money from Mexican merchants.
But the September
incident took on a new meaning on January 15, 1915, when
a Mexican seeking support for a revolutionary movement in
Texas approached Dr. Andres Villarreal, an exile who supported anti-Carrancista elements in McAllen.
Villarreal
went to Deodoro Guerra, who then informed Hidalgo County
authorities of the plot.
Basilic Ramos, Jr. was arrested
for attempting to solicit recruits in the United States.
When officers searched Ramos, they discovered in his possession detailed plans of a scheme to foment a revolution
42
against the United States government in the Southwest.
The documents revealed that on January 6, 1915, a
provisional directorate had been organized by several men
jailed in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon by Carrancistas.
A seven
man committee had sent Ramos to Texas to organize juntas
Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," pp. 25-28; Randolph
Roberts to Secretary of State, 3 October 1919, RDS^, 812.00/
23116; Testimony of Capt. E. Anglin, Senate Document 285,
p. 1303; Hager, "Unrest on the Texas Border," p. 330-331.
Ramos had been born in Nuevo Laredo, his parents in 1915
were living in Laredo, Texas, and he had worked in San
Diego, Texas.
289
and rally support for the plan, which called for an uprising
on February 20, 1915.
On that day, Mexican Americans in
Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California and Colorado would
launch a revolution and proclaim their liberty from the
United States.
A liberation army for all races and people
would do the fighting and kill all Anglo males sixteen
years and older, as well as "traitors to our race."
Docu-
ments captured from Ramos suggested that General Nafarrate
might be interested in the plot.
nullified the plan.
great issue.
The arrest of Ramos
What the episode involved became a
A federal judge dismissed an indictment for
sedition, describing the whole incident as ludicrous, since
Ramos failed to recruit anyone. 43
When raiding increased in the late summer and
early fall, it appeared to many people that the plan had
not been the work of lunatics.
Consequently, the "social
banditry" has been attributed to the Plan de San Diego.
A number of raiders who were taken prisoners confessed to
fighting for the same ideas expressed in the plan.
It has
been suggested that the de la Rosa and Pizana movement
represented a second phase of the Plan de San Diego, which
43
Memo found in Webb collection dated 6 January
1915, Vol. XIX, no names; Sandos, "War and Diplomacy on
the Texas Border," p. 9; Hager, "Unrest on the Texas
Border," pp. 328-329; Copy of plan in Senate Document 28 5,
p. 1205; Giro R. de la Garza-Trevino, El Plan de San Diego,
pp. 33-34.
290
differed from the original only in that Texas would be
freed first, followed by the other states in the Southwest.
Perhaps, however, the plan simply gave impetus to an idea
long awaiting a catalyst.
It is doubtful that the average
raider understood the ideology of the plan; but he did
understand from experience the abuses by the dominant
group.
During the disturbance, raiders never tried to
occupy a town, or any ranch.
The raids simply sought to
destroy property and to kill certain persons who symbolized
the dominant classes in the Valley. 44
German intrigue also has been suggested as the
moving force behind the raiding in 1915.
Germany had trade
interests in Mexico which it wanted to protect from American encroachment.
More important, Germany worked to
divert American aid from the Allies by provoking American
intervention in Mexico.
German agents told Mexicans along
the border and probably Mexican exiles that Germany did
not have racial discrimination, or lynching of minorities.
After the October raids German spies appeared in northern
Mexico attempting to revive the separationist movement by
providing financial aid and encouraging anti-American
Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," p. 48; Sandos, "War
and Diplomacy on the Texas Border," pp. 9-10, 13; Harris
and Sadler, "War Crisis of 1916," p. 386; Gerlach, "Conditions Along the Border," p. 199; Hager, "Unrest on the
Texas Border," pp. 334-335; Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico Relations,"
pp. 363, 363-369.
291
propaganda.
During the disturbances along the border,
raiders were reported to have asked Dodd and Donaldson if
they were Germans.
executed.
They said no and were subsequently
At Santa Maria, Texas, raiders did not molest
a German family which displayed a German flag in its front
yard.
Yet an examination of the sources fails to provide
any hard evidence of direct German involvement in the Plan
de San Diego and subsequently in the Mexicano uprising. "^^
The Plan de San Diego failed to accomplish its
purpose, probably because it had no real organization.
The raiders came from South Texas and the sporadic leadership of Pizana and de la Rosa cannot with
the existing
data be connected to the San Diego plotters.
In later
investigations by a United States Senate committee. Valley
officials testified that they never saw Pizana or de la
Rosa in any of the raids.
Because many officials did not
even know what the men looked like, they carried pictures
of them.
Venustiano Carranza has received most of the blame
for the disorders along the border.
In Mexican territory
adjacent to Texas and controlled by Villa there were only
five incidents of lawless activities during the summer and
45
Hager, "Unrest on the Texas Border," pp. 327-33 2;
Sandos, "War and Diplomacy on the Texas Border," pp. 10-13,
1920; Gerlach, "Conditions Along the Border," p. 201;
Harris and Sadler, "War Crisis of 1916," pp. 403-405.
292
fall of 1915.
Yet in the Mexican territory adjacent to
Texas and controlled by Carranza, raiders ran free.
Carranza exercised a very tenuous control over his field
commanders, especially Nafarrate.
To a large degree, most
commanders operated as law unto themselves.
Their armies
approximated a guerrilla force, expert in hit and run tactics, assassinations and brigandry.
During the revolt
against Huerta, the Constitutionalists had simply worn down
the federalists' army through ambush, sabotage and harassing
tactics.
Once Villistas had been driven off the border,
idle Carrancista soldiers became restless and many joined
raiders in a search for action.
Others joined the raiders
for loot, since the Constitutionalist government did not
pay its soldiers adequately.
Carranza's failure to control
his army in the north contributed much to the border disorders, as did the refusal of his officers to move strongly
against the Mexicanos.
46
The raids of 1915 occurred in Texas territory
adjacent to Mexican territory under the control of General
E. P. Nafarrate, a norteno from Sonora with a reputation
^^Sandos, "War and Diplomacy on the Texas Border,"
pp. 16-17; Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: The Political
Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-194 0 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), pp. 36-37;
Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico Relations," p. 359, 371-372; J. B.
Wilkinson, Laredo and the Rio Grande Frontier (Austin:
Jenkins Publishing Co., 1975), p. 402; Sandos, "War and
Diplomacy on the Texas Border," p. 13; Holcombe, "United
States Arms Control," pp. 119-120.
293
for being a violent man who hated Americans.
Even Carranza
Consul Jose Z. Garza called for the removal of Nafarrate
from his border command because of the general's prejudice
against Americans.
Nafarrate is reported to have been an
associate of Pizana and de la Rosa.
Yet the Constitution-
alist commander repeatedly asked American officials for
evidence that both Pizana and de la Rosa were in fact the
leaders of the uprising, suggesting that he did not have
close contact with Pizana.
General Nafarrate reminded
Americans that when Mexico tried to have Madero arrested
early in 1910, United States officials refused until Mexico
submitted evidence that Madero had violated American
statutes.
Mere hearsay would not do.
Such was now the
case, he asserted, with Pizana and de la Rosa.
Nafarrate
refused to arrest and extradite the alleged leaders. When
it became clear that Carrancista soldiers had participated
in some of the raiding and firing at American patrols,
Nafarrate either could not or would not control his men.
On several occasions he promised to prevent the raids, but
failed to follow through.
It was alleged that Nafarrate
profited from the cattle and horse thievery along the
border.
Furthermore, Basilic Ramos had in his possession
a pass through Constitutionalists lines signed by Nafarrate
Carranza's failure to restrain the Matamoros commander led
294
many people to believe that he approved of the raiding. "^"^
Carranza's failure to stop publication of antiAmerican and especially pro-Mexicano propaganda in Mexico
has also led to his being charged with complicity in the
movement.
Late in August, newspapers in Matamoros, Tampico,
Monterrey, Veracruz and Mexico City described the raids as
a success, and stated that 5,000 revolutionists had captured several Texas towns including Brownsville, and
concluded that American forces defending the border had
been forced to withdraw.
According to the publications,
the failure of American forces to defend the border made
it obvious that the veteran Mexican army would have little
problem in overrunning Texas.
Among the articles was a
call for all Mexicans to join the revolutionists in Texas,
signed by Luis de la Rosa and Aniceto Pizana.
Without a
doubt, the newspapers could not have carried their stories
without the approval of the Constitutionalist government.
Once Carranza had been recognized by President Wilson, he
decided to stop publication of anti-American propaganda.
47
Testimony of J. Z. Garza, Investigation of the
Texas State Ranger Force, p. 1078; R. Giro Garza-Trevino,
Historia de Tamaulipas: Anales y Efemerides (Ciudad
Victoria: Universidad de Tamaulipas, 1954), p. 230;
Roberts to Secretary of State, 3 October 1919, RDS, 812.00/
23116; Secretary of War to Secretary of State, 26 September
1915, RDS, 312.00/16416; Secretary of War to Secretary of
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States (Washington, D . C : Government Printing
Office, 1924), 1915, pp. 315-316; Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico
Relations," p. 375.
295
Early in November 1915, he ordered an editorial change in
the El Democrata. the official Carranza paper in Matamoros.
General Ricaut ordered all papers on the frontier to cease
their vicious attacks on the United States.^^
Local officials believed that they were pawns in
Carranza's quest for legitimacy.
V7hen it became obvious in
October that Carranza would be recognized, the raids decreased and Carranza announced the removal of Nafarrate
from his border command.
After recognition on October 19,
Carranza became anxious to terminate the Texas rebellion
and Ricaut did just that.
Military officials at Reynosa
and Matamoros warned Pizana and de la Rosa that they could
no longer remain in their sector.
Moreover, Carranza gave
both de la Rosa and Pizana $50,000 to cease their revolt.
He also rewarded de la Rosa with a regular commission in
the Mexican Army and gave Pizana a piece of land at
/^
El Encino, near Ciudad Victoria. Pizana refused the pension offered him by the Mexican government for his service
to the republic. 49
Harris and Sadler, "War Crisis of 1916," pp. 386333; A. Garrett to Secretary of State, 26 August 1915, RDS,
812.00/15929; 27 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/15937; 28 August
1915, RDS, 812.00/15946; Brownsville Herald, 28 August 1915,
p. 1; IT"November 1915, p. 1; 4 December 1915, p. 1.
49
El Sol de Tampico, 3 Marzo de 1957, p. 1 (Copy in
Esparza Collection); El Paso Morning Times, 14 August 1915,
p. 1; Harris and Sadler, "War Crisis of 1916," p. 4 05;
Sandos, "War and Diplomacy on the Texas Border," pp. 18-19;
Holcombe, "United States Arms Control," pp. 110-111; Edwards,
"U.S.-Mexico Relations," pp. 375-376, 398-400, 405.
296
Yet other evidence raised doubts about Carranza's
complicity in the raids.
September.
Recognition was imminent by mid-
Secretary Lansing and the Pan American conferees
moved to support Carranza, after he defeated his most formidable opponent. Villa.
By mid-1915, Lansing realized
that Carranza had to be recognized in order to neutralize
German intrigue in Mexico.
Carranza probably understood
the circumstances in which the United States found itself,
therefore, he did not need the raiders as a vehicle of
recognition.
Carranza remained neutral in World War I, at
times showing favoritism toward Germany, and restored
domestic order rather slowly.
It appears that at times the Constitutionalist
government tried to defuse the explosive situation along
the border.
Immediately after the raiding began. General
Nafarrate offered to cooperate with American military
officials at Fort Brown to quell the disorders.
The Con-
stitutionalist general also requested reinforcements from
Carranza.
This increased his border patrols by the end
of September to 1,500 men.
Constitutionalist Consul T. R.
Beltran reported that after a two month investigation by
his office, he was convinced that the rebels operated from
Louis G. Kahle, "Robert Lansing and the Recognition of Venustiano Carranza," Hispanic American Historical Review 33 (August 1958), p. 367.
297
within Texas and not from Mexico or with Mexican sanction. ^"^
On several occasions Carranza informed Matamoros
officials that they would be held accountable for any
trouble that arose with the United States growing out of
the raids along the river.
Early in October, Consul Garza
at Brownsville invited American officials in the city to
advise him and Nafarrate when they should move against
raiders along the river front with Carrancista soldiers.
The evidence, even in the more recent accounts, still leave
doubts as to the actual role that Carranza played in the
'^ .
controversy. 52 United
States Consul Jesse H. Johnson m
Matamoros wrote to the Secretary of State in mid-September:
. . . the Carrancista people are most anxious to
have these troubles (raids) stopped and I believe
they are trying to do all they can to help do it. I
am very much inclined to believe that the enemies of
the Carranza faction are to blame for most of the
trouble in the Rio Grande Valley. This, of course,
is confidential.53
Johnson to Secretary of State, 30 September 1915,
RDS, 812.00/16393; San Antonio Express, 5 August 1915, p.
1; Brownsville Herald, 7 August 1915, p. 3; Laredo Weekly
Times, 22 August 1915, p. 9; El Paso Morning Times,
29 September 1915, p. 1.
San Antonio Express, 1 October 1915, pp. 1, 5;
Laredo Weekly Times, 12 September 1915, p. 1; Harris and
Sadler, "War Crisis of 1916," p. 388; Testimony of Tom
Mayfield, Senate Document 285, p. 1294; John A. Vails,
pp. 1203-1204; Capt. W. L. Hanson, pp. 1226-1227.
^^Johnson to Secretary of State, 21 September 1915,
RDS, 812.00/16289.
298
By early October, the Constitutionalists had enough
men to move against the raiders.
a new set of problems.
They did, but it created
The increased number of Carrancista
soldiers along the river led to more incidents of shooting
between American and Mexican soldiers.
On October 4, word reached American officials that
Carranza had ordered General Nafarrate replaced at Matamoros.
The Constitutionalist government stated that:
While there was nothing to show that Nafarrate
himself was in any way implicated with the acts of
subordinate officers or soldiers, nevertheless his
failure to put an end to the trouble required his
r e m o v a l . . . . 54
Nafarrate's temporary replacement. General Eugenic Lopez,
came from Torreon and brought with him nearly one hundred
Tehauntepec Indian soldiers who had the reputation of being
good brush fighters.
The raiders had been good at this.
One of the problems facing Nafarrate had been that many of
his troops were native Tamaulipecos who had relatives
living in Texas.
Soon after Lopez assumed command, he
moved against the marauders.
On October 30, 1915, Lopez's
troops fought a battle near Matamoros with a band of
55
raiders, killing fifteen.
54
David Lawrence to Secretary of State, 1 October
1915, RDS, 312.00/16343^5.
Brownsville Herald, 4 October 1915, p. 1; El Paso
Morning Times, 5 October 1915, p. 1; Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico
Relations," p. 403.
299
During Carranza's tour of the border, he repeatedly
informed Texas Governor James Ferguson, civil officials and
military officers that he had ordered the arrest of Pizana,
de la Rosa and any other raider crossing into Mexico.
Carranza even offered to allow American troops "hot pursuit"
of raiders into Mexico, with reciprocal arrangements.
Secretary Lansing refused the offer for he feared a bloody
encounter if Mexican troops appeared in South Texas counties.
Carranza also banned the carrying of arms along the
border.
He dispatched Mexican secret service agents to
assist military authorities in locating and punishing the
marauders.
By November the forays had ended and Carran-
cista officials had successfully driven the raiders off the
border.
In December General Alfredo Ricaut took charge of
the military zone from Matamoros to Piedras Negras. Amer56
leans along the border regarded Ricaut as pro-American.
It is doubtful that Carranza instigated the raids.
As a norteno, a fronterizo from Coahuila, he was in a
^^Joe Robert Baulch, "James B. Wells: South Texas
Economic and Political Leader" (Ph.D. dissertation, Texas
Tech University, 1974), p. 318; Sulliman to Secretary of
State, 3 November 1915, RDS, 812.00/16686; Secretary of
State to Sen. Henry R. Ashurst, 3 November 1915, RDS,
312.00.16323; Johnson to Secretary of State, 7 December
1915, RDS, 312.00/16939; Gerlach, "Conditions Along the
BorderT^p. 204; Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico Relations," pp.
396, 513; Brownsville Herald, 28 October 1915, p. 1; 3,
12 November 1915, p. 1; 3 December 1915, p. 1; Laredo
Weekly Times, 23 November 1915, p. 5.
300
position to understand, sympathize with, and even appreciate the retaliation being carried out by the Mexicano
revolutionists.
Carranza's apparent decision to end the
raiding, however, suggests that he had made no commitment
to the Plan de San Diego plotters or the Mexicano raiders.
It is doubtful that Carranza or any Constitutionalist
official ever dreamed of taking Texas back for fear of an
invasion from the United States.
Obviously Carrancista
soldiers did participate in some of the forays.
But they
probably did so for "family" reasons—revenge for an
atrocity committed against a relative in Texas.
Carranza
in Veracruz and Mexico City failed to exercise effective
discipline over his officers, much less his soldiers.
The
fact that Carranza controlled newspapers printing antiAmerican propaganda does not clearly implicate the Constitutionalist government in a plot to foment a revolution in
the United States.
Their role is vague at best.
For
instance, two of the most serious raids, the train wreck
and the Ojo de Agua affray, occurred two weeks after
Nafarrate and his command had left the border—suggesting
that even Nafarrate's role needs more study.
The Carranza
government probably did not plot the unrest along the
border.
At times Constitutionalist officials tried to
smother the turmoil, especially as American recognition of
Carranza neared.
This is not to say that Carranza did not
welcome the raids as a means to speed American recognition.
301
The raids grew out of the hope and desperation of a people
who viewed themselves as oppressed. ^"^
From Anglo Americans came strong opposition to
the raids, this often led to violent excesses against the
Mexicanos in the Lower Rio Grande Valley.
in South Texas lived in constant fear.
Mexican Americans
Because every Latin
became a suspect, either as a raider or sympathizer; law
officers offered no quarter to either.
Many residents in
South Texas did not understand the raiding and became
panic-stricken, fearing an invasion from Mexico.
In
response, they unleashed their frustrations, fears and
later vengeance on the Mexicano population.
Border officials met on several occasions to develop
a plan to deal with the raiders.
Early in August, peace
officers from Cameron and Hidalgo counties met secretly
with Sam Robertson, Lon C
Hill and other prominent Valley
citizens, both Anglo and Mexican American, to draw up a
plan for action against the marauders.
Most officials were
57
.
.
'
/
Emilio Portes Gil, Autobiografia de la Revolucion
Mexicana: Un Tratado de Interpretacion Hist6rico (Mexico,
D.F.: Insti^tuto Mexicano de Cultura, 1964), p. 218; de la
Garza-Trevino, Revolucion Mexicana, p. 36; Gerlach,
"Conditions Along the Border," pp. 200-202.
58
Moises Gonzalez-Navarro, "Zenofobia y Zenofilia
en la REvolucion Mexicana," Historia Mexicana 18 (AbrilJunio, 1969), p. 579; Testimony of Lon C Hill, Senate
Document 235, p. 1254; Wesley Hall Looney, "The Texas
Rangers in a Turbulent Era" (M.A. thesis, Texas Tech
University, 1971), p. 15.
302
at a loss as to what was happening and did not feel prepared to handle the increasing raids.
They did, however,
decide to inflict summary punishment on any bandit or supporter who was captured.
The following month the mayors of
San Benito, Harlingen, Lyford, Mercedes, Mission, Pharr
and Edinburg met at the request of Mercedes Mayor E. E.
Evans to appeal to President Wilson for assistance.
however, regarded the matter as a local affair,
Wilson,
San Benito
Mayor J. H. Lyons ordered every male twenty-one to sixty
years old to register with city officials and to stand by
for police duty.
He also ordered all citizens in the city
to register their arms.
Merchants and citizens in Browns-
ville asked city fathers to enforce vagrancy laws rigidly.
Most Valley communities organized law and order leagues to
protect their property by driving out undesirable Mexicans.
After the train wreck in October, 200 Valleyites met in
Brownsville to appeal for increased federal and state
assistance.
The raids, however, had subsided by then.
A
Valley delegation visited Governor Ferguson in Austin to
request 500 volunteer Rangers to guard the border.
Ferguson
declined, citing the enormous cost in maintaining such a
large state force. 59
59
Stephen M. Vassberg, "The Mexican Bandit Activities in the Sebastian, Cameron County Texas Vicinity of
1915" (Unpublished graduate paper. History Department,
Professor Gilberto R. Cruz, Pan American University,
303
Governor Ferguson had requested federal assistance
as early as March, 1915 to increase the number of Rangers
on the border.
When the federal government denied the
request, Ferguson asked the state legislators for $10,000
to increase the Ranger force.
By the summer of 1915,
Ferguson had increased the number of Rangers in the Valley
by thirty.
Later in August the number increased to fifty.
Unfortunately many of the persons who applied for the Ranger
positions expressed their hatred for Mexicans and promised
to clear the border of them if they were given a commission.
The governor offered a $1,000 reward for the apprehension
of Pizana and de la Rosa, dead or alive.
The reward,
posted late in October, was too little and too late since
the raids had all but ended.
President Wilson and General Funston initially
considered the forays to be purely local affairs in which
Mexicanos committed acts of brigandage.
The task of
stopping them rested with state officials, not the federal
government.
President Wilson did not want a clash with the
Constitutionalist government at a time when German intrigue
seemed to have intensified in Mexico.
Wilson and Funston
Edinburg, Texas, 1977), p. 3; San Antonio Express, 6 August
1915, p. 1; Brownsville Herald, 5 August 1915, p. 1; 8,
9 September 1915, p. 1; 20, 23, 28 Ocotber 1915, p. 1.
^^Brownsville Herald, 6, 24 March 1915, p. 1; 10
June 1915, p. 1; 23, 29, 30 October 1915, p. 1; Claude A.
Adams to Henry Hutchings, 6 September 1915, Office of the
Adjutant General.
304
committed troops to the border only after military patrols
came under direct fire from the raiders and it appeared that
a general uprising might occur. ^"''
In order to contain the violence along the border,
law officers restricted the Mexican population.
In mid-
September Cameron County Sheriff Vann ordered every baile
or public dance ground closed.
Bailes had the potential
to erupt into scenes of fights and shootings.
Most city
officials in the Valley required Mexicans to get a pass
before leaving their jurisdiction.
State officials used
a health department order in June to prohibit Mexican males
capable of bearing arms from crossing to Texas, unless they
had proof of legitimate business.
Funston ordered military
62
officials to help state officials enforce the ban.
Anglo-Americans organized into vigilante groups
called Socios
by the Mexican population.
Car caravans
spread throughout the Valley with fully arm^ed men in search
61
Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 806; Wilkinson,
Laredo, p. 406; Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico Relations," p. 389;
San Antonio Express, 8 August 1915, p. 1. Local citizens
and the Brownsville Herald denounced General Funston's
statement saying that the general did not understand the
attempt to put into effect the Plan de San Diego.
^^Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 810; Laredo Weekly
Times, 13 June 1915, p. 2; Brownsville Herald, 12 August
1915, p. 1; 14, 22 September 1915, p. 1; the Brownsville
City Commission already had banned dances within the
city limits.
305
of raiders.
63
The Brownsville Herald on September 3, 1915,
published an editorial which, under such tense circumstances,
probably inflamed feelings and stimulated desires for vengeance.
The article could have been misread by persons as
a call to suppress the Mexican population, rather than a
call to aid law enforcement.
The time has come when every law-abiding citizen
on this border must come forward and give assurance
that he is ready to do his part towards the suppression
of this reign of disorder and crime. The Herald is
assured that a very large proportion of those citizens
of this section who are of Mexican blood—probably the
majority of them—abhor the crimes that have been committed by these marauders. Those also should align
themselves on the side of the law. There can be no
middle ground. Every man who is on the side of law
and order here must show himself as such. It is not
enough to keep quiet and merely condemn. It is time
to act. Let those who are on the side of law come out
and prove it. Let them come forth and help to stamp
out this outlawry.
This is no political embroglio. This is a question
in which every upright citizen will prove where he
stands. Let every citizen of this state residing in
this section realize that he must be either for law
and the punishment of crime, or he is against it.
Let them realize that any man who protects or
gives shelter to those murderers is as guilty as they
are.
Remember, THE TIME HAS COME'64
Answering the call to law and order, the following month,
McAllen residents asked Governor Ferguson for immunity
from prosecution if they crossed the river and secured
stolen horses.
Many citizens in the Valley served as
63Brownsville Herald, 3 August 1915, p. 1.
64
Ibid., 3 September 1915, p. 2.
306
special deputy sheriffs during the disturbance, dealing
out their own form of justice.
Home rifle clubs organized
to protect city residents.^^
Local officials and vigilante committees searched
homes of Mexican American families.
With soldiers standing
guard outside, state officers knocked down doors when
people did not respond to knocks and ransacked houses
searching for arms.
In Lyford, Texas Rangers frightened
women by breaking into their houses at night to search for
arms.
A gun in the possession of a Mexicano in the rural
areas often resulted in death to the possessor, as he was
suspected of being a raider.
Furthermore, a blacklist of
Mexican Americans suspected of aiding the raiders circulated throughout the Valley.
Anyone could place a Mexican
on the blacklist, thus many persons who wanted to rid their
sector of Mexicans did just that.
raiders were burned.
Homes of suspected
Many Mexican Americans on the list
disappeared, others had to move to the towns where they
could be watched, and still others sought refuge in
66
Mexico.
Ibid., 23 October 1915, p. 1; Lott, "Rio Grande
Valley," p. 22; J. F. Huston to Governor J. Ferguson,
6 September 1915, Office of the Adjutant General.
^^Brownsville Herald, 16 August 1915, p. 1; 13, 14
September 1915, p. 1; W. T. Vann, Investigation of Texas
State Ranger Force, pp. 577-578; R. B. Craeger, p. 355;
Cumberland, "Border Raids," pp. 300-302.
307
One citizen, Robert J. Kleberg from Kingsville,
reportedly, proposed a plan to deal with the violence.
He suggested that martial law be declared and that all
Mexicanos along the river from Rio Grande City to Brownsville should be gathered in concentration camps.
There
they could be given employment in clearing a zone one mile
wide from the river and constructing a road along the edge
of the zone, since most of the raiders had disappeared
into the brush along the river to escape pursuit.
The
67
plan never received serious consideration.
Local officials and citizens took a vengeful retaliation against the Mexican population.
During the counter-
raids, twenty-five Americans (including Mexican Americans)
lost their lives.
At least two hundred twenty-two Mexi-
canos were killed and at least sixty-five others were
wounded.
Approximately 65 percent of the Mexicanos who
died in the raids were killed in gun battles with the
authorities; around 20 percent were victims of illegal
lynchings or executions of different types, and 15 percent
died victims of overt citizenry reaction to the crisis.
The brutality of the reaction requires a careful account.
Although only four Mexicanos died in July, the
number increased significantly by August.
A ranch employee
in Willacy County killed two Mexicanos he suspected of
67
Brownsville Herald, 27 November 1915, pp. 1, 6.
308
being bandits on July 8.
On July 24 Mercedes police offi-
cers killed two brothers, Lorenzo and Gorgonio Manriques,
whom they believed to be raiders.^^
During the attack on the Tulitos Ranch, one Mexicano died, although some reports suggested that as many as
fifteen had been killed.
A posse chasing the marauders
who killed the Austins shot one and wounded four.
On
August 6, a posse pursuing another band wounded three
Mexicanos, killed three more and arrested twenty.
During
the Norias raid, five Mexicanos were killed and several
were wounded.
On the ninth a Hidalgo County posse killed
three raiders caught stealing cattle near Monte Cristo.
Two days later, eight Mexicanos died at different points
in the Valley in clashes with Rangers, posses and a cavalry
patrol.
On the twelfth three marauders were killed in a
gun battle with Texas Rangers near Mercedes.
The next day
a farmer riding near Mercedes killed a Mexicano found
sleeping by a tree.
On the same day a posse shot a Mexi-
cano who tried to escape from its custody near Lyford.
On
the fifteenth ten Mexican Americans lost their lives to
posses in Cameron and Hidalgo counties.
The next day Texas
Rangers removed six Mexicanos suspected of aiding the bandits from the county jail in Brownsville and lynched them.
68
Cumberland, "Border Raids," p. 300; "Jesse Perez
Memoirs," pp. 57-58; Weekly Reports, 31 July 1915, RDS,
312.00/15730.
309
Also on the sixteenth a posse near Mercedes shot three
presumed bandits and lynched another.
On the nineteenth
"unknown parties," taking advantage of an absent jail guard,
released and executed two Mexicanos charged as members of
the band that had killed the Austins.
The next day a posse
led by Sheriff Baker fought a battle with a band of raiders
near Madero and killed nine.
On the twenty-fifth two
raiders died and five were wounded in an exchange of fire
with troops near Progreso.
Five days later another Mexicano,
believed to have been involved in the Austin murders, met
death at the hands of a deputy sheriff from Cameron County.
Further north at Las Norias, a Mexican prowler lost his
right arm when he approached a Ranger camp and the officers
opened fire on him.
On the same day American officials
reported that they had killed forty-seven raiders who
attacked the Las Norias ranch.
Retributive justice con^ 69
tinued to take its toll the following month.
Approximately sixty Mexicanos died in September
raids.
On September 1, a cavalry patrol chased the band
Yates to Henry Hutchings, 3 August 1915, Office
of the Adjutant General; Testimony of Lon C Hill, p. 1257;
Testimony of S. S. Dodd, p. 1250, Senate Document 235;
Weekly Reports, 14 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/15903;
21 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/15985; Lott, "Rio Grande
Valley," pp. 45-54; Tanner, "Texas Border," pp. 44-45;
San Antonio Express, 3 August 1915, p. 3; 11 August 1915,
p. 1; Laredo Weekly Times, 15 August 1915, p. 3; El Paso
30 August 1915, p. 1; Brownsville Herald, 3, 7, 9, 11, 13,
16, 19, 26, 30 August 1915, p. 1.
310
of raiders who killed Smith and Donaldson, fought a skirmish and killed one raider.
The next day a posse, searching
for raiders who burned a railroad bridge near San Benito,
gave chase to a gang of Mexicanos and killed one in the
pursuit.
Six Mexicanos died in a skirmish with a posse
70
and a cavalry patrol in Cameron County on the third.
In
Hidalgo County the next day a posse and soldiers killed
eleven raiders and wounded at least forty near the Cavazos
Crossing.
On the same day, a cavalry patrol killed a
Mexicano near Harlingen.
Three days later two Mexicanos
were killed near San Benito by a posse.
A patrol near
Mercedes shot one Mexicano on the fifth.
the tenth ranch hands killed two raiders.
Near Lyford on
The following
day, Texas Rangers in Edinburg, killed two Mexicanos believed to be raiders.71 On the thirteenth a farmer near
San Benito killed four Mexican Americans when he caught
them ransacking his home.
At San Benito, the next day,
three Mexicanos tried to escape from the city jail and
were shot, according to officers.
The bodies of three
70
W. T. Vann to Henry Hutchings, 2 September 1915,
Office of the Adjutant General; Bro\msville Herald, 3, 4
September 1915, p. 1; Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," pp. 5560.
"^•^Report to H. L. Ransom, "Ranger Force Correspondence," August 1915; Weekly Reports, 4 September 1915,
RDS, 312.00/16175; 11 September 1915, RD£, 312.00/16257;
Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," p. 61; Brownsville Herald,
11 August 1915, p. 1; 3, 11, 13 September 1915, p. 1;
10 October 1915, p. 1.
311
Mexicanos were found on the same day, two near Mercedes, and
a third floating in the river tied to a tree trunk.
On the
seventeenth, during a twenty minute fracas near Brownsville,
a patrol killed one Mexicano and wounded five.
At Donna,
ten troopers killed seventeen of fifty raiders who ambushed
the patrol near the river.
James McAllen and his cook
killed five Mexicanos on the twenty-third. 72 The killings
continued the next month.
At least fifty-two Mexicanos died in October,
despite a decrease in the number of raids.
On the second.
Mission peace officers killed four Mexicanos believed to
be raiders.
The same day, the decomposed bodies of four-
teen men were found near Donna.
Most of them had worn
ordinary working overalls, suggesting that they were
laborers, not bandits.
No one claimed the bodies for fear
they would be branded as accomplices of the dead men.
After the October 1915 train wreck, Texas Rangers and
73
Sheriff Vann executed four suspects.
Texas Ranger Captain Ransom justified the killings because "very few
Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, p. 95; Weekly
Reports, 13 September 1915, RDS, 812.00/16319; San Antonio
Express, 15 September 1915, p. 1; Laredo Weekly Times,
19 September 1915, p. 5; Brownsville Herald, 13, 15, 25
September 1915, p. 1; 2 October 1915, p. 1.
^•^Brownsville Herald, 2 October 1915, p. 1; Testimony of W. T. Vann, Investigation of Texas State Ranger
Force, p. 562; Looney, "The Texas Rangers," p. 56.
312
Mexicans had been convicted of crimes in the County."
A
deputy sheriff promised to "get 19 Mexicans for every
American touched on the raid."
Eleven unarmed Mexicanos
working in a nearby field, none of whom had any possible
connection with the attack on the train, became victims
of the deputy sheriff's promise.
Texas Rangers, a sheriff's
posse, and a citizens group killed ten Mexicanos suspected
of being involved in the train wreck.
On the twenty-first
American troops killed five raiders who attacked the Ojo
de Agua outpost.
Two days later a party near San Pedro
killed two men attempting to wade the river near Mercedes.
No one can be sure how many Americans and Mexicanos
died in the upheaval.
In 1915 the killings of Mexicans
along the border became such a common occurrence that many
of the dead were never reported—thus the recorded deaths
of 222 Mexicanos and woundings of 65 others probably falls
well below the actual numbers.
State and local officials
and newspaper reporters showed more concern for, and
received more accurate reports on, the deaths of Anglo
Americans.
When asked how many Mexicanos had been killed,
a Texas Ranger replied that deer hunters would report in
the fall.
Historians have estimated that between 3 00 and
74
/
Marvin, "Quick and Dead," p. 299; "Jesse Perez
Memoirs," p. 56; Lott, "Brief Outline," n.p.; Cumberland,
"Border Raids," p. 300; Weekly Reports, 30 October 1915,
RDS, 812.00/16752; El Paso Morning Times, 20 October 1915,
p. 1; Brownsville Herald, 19, 21, 25 October 1915, p. 1.
313
5,000 Mexicans lost their lives in the turmoil.^^
In an
effort to suppress the raids, American officials and citizens oftened turned to lawless action and killed hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of Mexicanos.
Some were shot trying
to escape or resisting arrest; others were simply lynched.
Many were innocent of any complicity with the raiders, but,
as Mexicans, were suspected of being bandits or at least
sympathizers.
Frequently, when a Mexicano was discovered
to be a raider, not only was he killed, but his brothers
and brothers-in-law also were assumed to be guilty and
arrested or killed.
Even his cousins were carefully
watched.
Not all Mexicanos who fell into the hands of military or law officers faced death.
Military officials at
times used troops to protect prisoners.
For a while it
appeared that troops had been sent to the Valley, not to
protect Americans from raiders, but rather to save the
Mexicanos from being killed by Americans.
Thirty persons
^^Walter Prescott Webb, The Texas Rangers: A
Century of Frontier Defense (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1965, second edition), p. 478; Green, "Infamous
Plan," p. 15; Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," p. 85; notation
in Investigation of the Texas State Ranger Force, p. 17;
Testimony of R. B. Craeger, Investigation of the Texas
State Ranger Force, p. 355; San Antonio Express, 15
August 1915, p. 1.
^^Brownsville Herald, 27 November 1915, p. 6;
Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," p. 87.
314
were indicted for acts of brigandage during the raiding.
County officials arrested and tried only twelve, however,
of whom only five were convicted.
An appellate court
overturned one conviction, two served fifteen years in
prison, and two, Jose Buenrostro and Melquiedes Chapa,
77
were hanged in May 1916 in the Cameron County courtyard.
Indictments against all other persons charged with acts of
banditry were dismissed in later years, since the men
never were apprehended.
General Funston had the difficult, if not impossible,
task of bringing a sense of order to a situation replete
with violence.
With 20,000 troops he could only try to
reassure Americans on the border, rather than deter the
raiders.
At the beginning of the forays, Funston refused
to commit his soldiers to a situation that was a state
obligation, since the raiders were local Mexican Americans,
not Mexican troops violating American sovereignty.
Later
in August, after military personnel had been killed and
wounded, and documents had been captured which suggested
that a general uprising was in the making, Funston decided
to commit troops, not only against the raiders, but also
because he feared a general blood bath resulting from the
T. R. Beltran to H. Perez-Abreu, 9 May 1916,
AREM, L-E-301, R. leg. 36; Harris and Sadler, "War Crisis
of 1916,"p. 392.
315
"vengeful feeling that exists among the Americans."''^
By t h e first week in September, 4,000 troops
o c c u p i e d the Diamond of T e x a s , an area bordered to the
n o r t h by the N u e c e s R i v e r , to the w e s t by Starr County,
to the south by the Rio Grande and to the east by the
Gulf o f M e x i c o .
W i t h the increase in t r o o p s , Funston
o r d e r e d the army to assume full responsibility for securing the r i v e r f r o n t from any crossing to or from T e x a s .
Local and state o f f i c e r s were to police the interior.
79
To p r o v i d e further p r o t e c t i o n , Funston issued
orders t o :
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
prohibit the crossing of livestock from Mexico
in the United States except at official crossing
points.
prohibit crossing of any person except at official
crossing points.
prohibit the crossing into the country of any male
capable of bearing arms who could not satisfactory
explain his purpose for coming.
prohibit crossing into the state of any armed
person.
required all military personnel to avoid unnecessary exposure along the riverfront.
required state Rangers and sheriff posses to keep
from the international boundary, except when in
pursuit of raiders.
required that when fire was exchanged between
7S
George Marvin, "Invasion or Intervention," The
World's Work 32 (May, 1916), p. 59; Harris and Sadler,
"War Crisis of 1916," p. 33 9; Sandos, "War and Diplomacy
on the Texas Border," pp. 13-14; Funston to Adjutant
General, 30 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/16002; Cumberland,
"Border Raids," pp. 292-296; Brownsville Herald, 9 August
1915, p. 4.
^^Brownsville Herald, 6, 8 September 1915, p. 1.
316
Mexicans and Americans along the river, the senior
military officer present was to assume control of
the situation.80
The situation did not improve, however, and by the end of
September, American military officials began to watch with
concern the growing number of raiders gathering in Mexico
and the increasing animosity developing among Carrancista
soldiers.
Funston ordered a battery of artillery to the
riverfront at Progreso to intimidate Carrancista soldiers
and raiders entrenched across the river.
After the attack
on the train and the assault at the Ojo de Agua military
post, more troops came into the Valley.
By mid-November
81
troop strength reached about 20,000 in South Texas.
Raiding ceased, but not necessarily because of the large
number of troops in the region.
As a result of the turmoil from both the banditry
and the reign of terror, perhaps 50 percent of the Mexican
American population, as well as some Anglo American families, left the Valley.
Thousands of terrified Mexicanos
abandoned their homes, taking with them only those household goods that would fit in a cart; others sold their
^^Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 810-811; El Paso
Morning Times, 13 September 1915, p. 1.
^•'•Funston to Adjutant General, 27 September 1915,
RDS, 312.00/16313; El Paso Morning Times, 29 September
1915, D. 1; Testimony of William G. B. Morrison, Investigation^ of Texas State Ranger Force, p. 24; Looney, 'Texas
Rangers," p. 19; Cumberland, "Border Raids," p. 305.
317
homes for almost nothing; and all abandoned their employment.
The exodus began in mid-August and steadily increased
until by mid-September at least 2,500 persons had fled.
The
migration continued despite pleas and assurances by military officials that the army would provide protection.
By
early November over 7,000 Mexicanos had crossed at the port
of Brownsville and the sub-port of Hidalgo.
Immigration
officials acknowledged that thousands more had crossed at
illegal points.
The exodus to Mexico reversed itself in
the week ending December 11, as eight families emigrated
to Mexico, while twenty-seven immigrated to Texas.
During
the last week in December, the figures showed two families
moving to Mexico and 134 coming to Texas. 8 2
The violent response by Texas Rangers and other
law officers to the raids seems to have been the principal
factor causing the exodus.
Brownsville Mayor Albert Browne
tried to convince the Mexican American residents that they
were safe, but fears of lawmen overcame the Mayor's pleas. 83
32
Clarence C Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The
United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (London: The
Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 187; Testimony of John Kleiber
Senate Dociiment 235, p. 1279; Testimony of Lon C Hill, p.
1159 and James B. Wells, p. 691, Investigation of Texas
State Ranger Force; Weekly Reports, 4 September 1915, RDS,
812.00/16175; 16 October 1915, RD£, 812.00/1600; 11 Decemer 1915, RD£, 312.00/16970; 1 January 1916, RD£, 812.00/
17078; Brownsville Herald, 11, 15 September 1915, p. 1;
3 November 1915, p. 1.
83
Weekly Reports, 30 October 1915, RDS, 812.00/
16752; Testimony of Louis Brulay, p. 536 and James Wells,
p. 687, Investigation of Texas State Ranger Force.
318
G e n e r a l N a f a r r a t e explained the e x o d u s :
M a n y w o m e n have told our authorities sad stories
o f t h e w a y in w h i c h their m e n have been treated on the
T e x a s s i d e . N e a r l y everyday M e x i c a n families cross to
t h i s side from Texas with their b e l o n g i n g s . They are
n o t p o l i t i c a l r e f u g e e s . Some of them are American
b o r n or n a t u r a l i z e d , and they have come across because
they say they h a v e been r o u g h l y , treated by the
R a n g e r s , or their husbands have been killed.84
V a l l e y c i v i l o f f i c i a l s , despite differing opinions from
m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , claimed that the greater number of
r e f u g e e s simply wanted to end self-imposed exile.
Late in
A u g u s t C a r r a n z a had issued a general amnesty to all e x i l e s ,
g u a r a n t e e i n g their safety if they returned.
General
N a f a r r a t e issued a similar proclamation in his military
district.
Some A n g l o A m e r i c a n families also moved
from the V a l l e y .
temporarily
A n g l o s living in rural areas moved their
families to the c i t i e s .
Others moved in with n e i g h b o r s ,
determined to battle any m a r a u d e r s planning to steal their
stock.
Some families simply left South Texas and took up
brief residency in the areas north of the Valley.
86
84
B r o w n s v i l l e H e r a l d , 7 September 1 9 1 5 , p . 1.
85
B r o w n s v i l l e H e r a l d , 7 September 1 9 1 5 , p . 1;
16 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 1 5 , p . 4; W e e k l y R e p o r t s , 30 October 1 9 1 5 ,
RDS, 812.00/16752.
86
J. J. S a n d e r s to Henry H u t c h i n g s , 22 July 1 9 1 5 ,
Office of the A d j u t a n t G e n e r a l ; A s k i n s , T e x a n s , G u n s , and
H i s t o r y , p . 2 1 0 ; B r o w n s v i l l e H e r a l d , 23 A u g u s t 1 9 1 5 ;
13 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 1 5 , p . 1.
319
The "social banditry" did not spread beyond the
Diamond of Texas.
The area from Brownsville to Laredo had
the largest concentration of population along the border—
especially from Brownsville to Rio Grande City.
From
Starr County to Laredo and farther northwest along the
river, the prominent and powerful landowners included
descendants of the original Spanish settlers with very few
Anglo developers.
The relationship between the landowners
and the working class minimized frictions.
Beyond Eagle
Pass, Del Rio and into the Big Bend country, the number of
people living along the river dropped drastically, as did
the number of targets for raiders.
The climate, the
geography, and the revolutionary situation where Villa
controlled much of the border from north of Del Rio to
El Paso, all combined to limit raiding far more than in
South Texas.
In El Paso, the presence of a large military
87
force deterred any raids.
The Mexicano movement did not develop at other
points along the Mexico-Texas border or in the Southwest.
Unlike the Plan de San Diego that called for a revolution
from Texas to California, the Mexicano "social bandits"
in 1915 sought to change conditions only in South Texas.
Yet other border points did experience a few tense moments
Lott, "Rio Grande Valley," p. 83; Tanner, "Texas
Border," p. 43; Wilkinson, Laredo, p. 4 05; William Blocker
to Secretary of State, 20 January 1916, RD£, 812.00/17126.
320
as raiders occasionally appeared and rumors of impending
conspiracies also sprang up periodically.
Some Laredoans became concerned with border conditions despite the relative tranquility of the district.
In late July and early August, the large number of Mexican
refugees who congregated in the Nuevo Laredo-Laredo district made it a potential breeding place for revolutionists.
Yet over a thousand Mexicans found employment in cotton
fields from Laredo to Corpus Christi.
little time to fight causes.
Working men have
Consul Garrett in Nuevo
Laredo expressed concern when the Mexican daily paper
printed "incendiary articles" fomenting anti-American
sentiments.
Late in August, reports reached American offi-
cials that bands of Mexicans were roaming the countryside
around Laredo.
Large numbers of horses seemed to have
been stolen and fears of an invasion of Texas surfaced.
Early in September several Mexicans, said to have been
Carrancista soldiers from Guerrero, crossed to Zapata,
Texas and robbed a store of its stock.
Army troops gave
chase but the raiders crossed into Mexico.
On the fifteenth
the small town of Simon, about twenty miles upriver from
Laredo, became the target of a fusillade from persons who
presumably were Mexicans.
A search of the area by American
troops produced evidence that the culprits had crossed into
Mexico.
Upon learning of the shooting. General Ricaut sent
321
a d e t a c h m e n t o f fifty c a v a l r y m e n to search for the raiders.^^
L a r e d o o f f i c i a l s gave G e n e r a l R i c a u t c r e d i t for the
tranquility of the area.
R i c a u t q u i c k l y responded to any
r u m o r t h a t m a r a u d e r s c r o s s e d o r planned to c r o s s the river
in h i s d i s t r i c t .
He refused to p e r m i t any a n t i - A m e r i c a n
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in N u e v o L a r e d o on the "16 de S e p t i e m b r e , "
the d a y t h a t m a n y T e x a n s feared a g e n e r a l uprising of
Mexicanos.
C r e d i t m u s t a l s o b e given to the quick r e s p o n s e s
of military officials at Fort Mcintosh.
As a result, while
V a l l e y i t e s r e q u i r e d o v e r 4,000 troops to keep the p e a c e ,
p e o p l e in L a r e d o g e n e r a l l y w o r r i e d little about the Plan
de San Diego. 3 9
Eagle Pass and Del Rio were barely touched by the
Mexicano "bandits."
The only incident there occurred late
in August when a Mexican, Domingo Pena, attended a picnic
at the Dominic Ranch, a few miles north of Eagle Pass,
where he explained the objective of the Plan de San Diego
and attempted to recruit for the revolutionary army.
appears that he failed to enlist anyone.
It
Mexicans on both
sides of the river expressed indignation toward the United
88
Garrett to Secretary of State, 14 August 1915,
RDS, 312.00/15722; 17 August 1915, RDS^, 812.00/15304;
2r~August 1915, RDS, 312.00/15926; 15 September 1915, RDS,
312.00/16137; Brownsville Herald, 25 August 1915, p. 1;
Laredo Weekly Times, 31 July 1915, p. 12; 5 September
1915, p. 6.
89
Garrett to Secretary of State, 14 September 1915,
RDS, 312.00/16216; Laredo Weekly Times, 9, 12 September
1915, pp. 5, 10.
322
States and especially Anglo Americans after the San Antonio
Express published pictures showing Texas Rangers carrying
off dead Mexicans tied to ropes, probably after the raid
at Las Norias.
Del Rio never experienced any raiding.
In
mid-August, however, rumors circulated in the city that
the Mexicano population had organized to resist American
intervention in Mexico.
At Langtry, near Del Rio, Carran-
cista troops crossed the river and burned a rail line
bridge.
The same force apparently killed the postmaster
and his family at Polvo, Texas.
That was the extent of
the troubles in the area.
Neither the Plan de San Diego
nor the Mexicano uprising spread to the district. 90
The Big Bend country experienced numerous acts of
banditry, but most were without an ideological content.
Both Mexican Villista and Carrancista troops and American
forces fought the bandits, who committed depredations on
both sides of the river, unlike the raiders in South Texas
whose targets were only north of the river.
A revolution-
ary movement did surface in the Big Bend-El Paso area,
however, at the same time the Mexicanos in South Texas
revolted.
The counterrevolutionary movement of Huerta and
on
Edwards, "U.S.-Mexico Relation," pp. 381, 514;
Weekly Reports, 14 August 1815, RDS, 812.00/15908; Blocker
to Secretary of State, 9 September 1815, RDS, 812.00/16011;
Garrett to Secretary of State, 26 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/
15941; 26 August 1915, RDS, 812.00/15947.
323
Orozco kept El Pasoans troubled.
In August, as the raids
intensified, the Huerta-Orozco plot reached its peak.
It
appears to some recent historians that the Plan de San
Diego was a diversionary part of the larger Huerta Revolt.
Those historians believe its aim was to divert the attention of American officials away from the Chihuahua-Texas
border.
The possibility that Ramos and the original
plotters of the Plan de San Diego in Monterrey might have
been Huertistas suggests that the counterrevolutionists
might have sought to cause a disturbance in the area away
from their base of operations. 91
Hints of a Mexicano uprising appeared in other
parts of Texas and the southwestern United States.
Rumors
surfaced late in August at Kingsville that Mexicano
marauders planned to raid the city, prompting citizens to
organize a local militia.
In Corpus Christi, officials
arrested Andres Esquivel on August 19, 1915, and charged
him with sedition.
From Robstown near Corpus Christi,
A. P. Aule wrote Carranza on August 23, 1915, that Mexicans
in the area whom he had contacted claimed that if they had
arms they would revolt.
He suggested to Carranza that
Mexicanos in the state could reconquer Texas as far north
^•'"Michael C Meyer, "The Mexican-German Conspiracy
of 1915," The Americas 23 (July 1966), pp. 80, 121; Harris
and Sadler, "War Crisis of 1916," p. 403; Gerlach, "Conditions Along the Border," pp. 196-193, 204.
324
as the Brazos River with the assistance of Black Texans.
Officers found papers on Esquivel revealing a Plan of
Calallen, calling for Mexicanos in Nueces County to rise
up in arms on September 5.
in the city.
Nothing of consequence occurred
In September 1915, police officers arrested
twenty-six Mexicanos in San Antonio and charged them with
attempting to incite the Mexican American population of the
city to riot in favor of the San Diego Plan.
On October 28
authorities in San Angelo, Texas jailed four Mexicanos
working at a local ranch and charged them with threatening
"revolution."
Aniceto Pizana and Luis de la Rosa received
financial support from Mexicanos living in Houston, Texas.
In Pueblo, Colorado on August 14,. Rudolph Herler, "an
emissary from Mexico," tried to incite 500 Mexican workers
to join the South Texas revolution.
Authorities arrested
him when it appeared that his motives were linked to the
92
Plan de San Diego.
By the end of 1915 the Mexicano "social banditry"
had not spread to other areas of the state nor had it
brought the massive uprising people expected.
Yet tension
^^A. P. Aule, Robstown to V. Carranza, 23 August
1915, ARchivo de Carranza, XXI, Carpeta 50, Leg. 5476,
Dec. I, pp. 1-2; Wilkinson, Laredo, p. 402; "No Progress
In Mexico," The Independent, 13 September 1915, p. 355;
El-Paso Morning Times, 31 August 1915, p. 1; Laredo
Weekly Times, 15 August 1915, p. 1; 5 September 1915,
p. 7; 31 October 1915, p. 1; Brownsville Herald, 14, 19,
20 August 1915, p. 1; 30 October 1915, p. 1.
325
along the border did not cease completely; in 1916 the
situation intensified following a number of raids in the
Big Bend, Laredo, San Ygnacio and San Benito.
Most of the
raids in 1916 were not reflective of either a Mexican
national revolution or "social banditry" in Texas.
They
were a product of the explosive situation created by
Francisco Villa's incursion into Columbus, New Mexico; the
American punitive expedition force in Mexico; and the
clashes between American and Mexican forces at Parral and
Carrizal. 93
On March 9, 1916, a Villista force raided Columbus,
New Mexico creating a new crisis along the border.
Over
6,000 American soldiers pursued Villa in Mexico from March
1916 to February 1917. Another 111,000 American troops
served border patrol assignments from Brownsville to El Paso,
also until mid-1917, as a show of force to protect American
military forces in Mexico.
As the United States force moved
into Mexico, resentment and distrust of each other increased
in both nations.
Mexicans along the border prepared for
an American invasion of their country; Americans readied
for a Mexican invasion of Texas.
Neither occurred despite
Carranza's warning to Mexicans to be prepared for an
Michael Tate, "Pershing's Punitive Expedition:
Pursuer of Bandits or Presidential Panacia?" Americas 32
(July 1975), p. 61; George R. Cole, "Brushfire War 1916
Style" (M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1962),
pp. 145-146.
326
engagement with the United States. ^"^
To avert war, American and Mexican representatives
met at El Paso from April 30 to May 11, 1916.
General Hugh
Scott, representing the United States, asked for Mexico's
cooperation in the hunt for Villa and stressed that the
presence of American forces in Mexico did not constitute
.
.
/
.
an act ot aggression.
Alvaro Obregon, representing Carranza,
demanded an immediate withdrawal of American forces from
Mexican territory.
The mediators agreed on a plan whereby
Mexican troops would greatly strengthen their border
patrols and American troops would begin a gradual withdrawal
from Mexico.
The May 5, 1916, raid at Glenn Springs sent a
second punitive expedition into Mexico; Obregon demanded
that a date be set for the total withdrawal of all American
forces in Mexico.
As President Wilson moved to mobilize
the entire American military forces, the conference ended
94
Clendenen, Blood on the Border, pp. 200-210;
Baulch, "James B. Wells," p. 323; P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson
with Mexico, 1910-1917 (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press,
1970), p. 197; Wilkinson, Laredo, p. 416; Harris and
Sadler, "War Crisis of 1916," p. 393; Florence C Lister
and Robert H. Lister, Chihuahua: Storehouse of Storms
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1966), pp.
2'00-201; Robert Bruce Johnson, "The Punitive Expedition:
A Military, Diplomatic, and Political History of Pershing's
Chase After Pancho Villa, 1916-19171" (Ph.D. dissertation.
University of Southern California, 1964), p. 510; Holcombe,
"United States Arms Control," p. 123; Herbert Mallory
Mason, The Great Pursuit (New York: Random House, 197 0),
pp. 66-67.
327
without an agreement.
The Glenn Springs raid further strained relations
between the two countries and influenced the inflexible
position taken by Obregon in El Paso.
On May 5, 1916,
Mexican outlaws raided Glenn Springs in the Big Bend country.
The marauders killed three American soldiers and one
civilian, and took two hostages into Mexico, after looting
most of the stores in the town.
A small American punitive
expedition led by Major George T. Langhorne chased the
bandits into Mexico for ten days before it was recalled.
The American force freed the hostages, recovered most of
the loot, killed several raiders and captured five of the
96
bandits.
When it appeared the situation had deescalated,
raiders struck again.
On June 11, Mexican marauders
crossed the river near Laredo, Texas and stole eighty
horses from a nearby ranch.
American troops gave chase
95
'
Jose de la Luz Valdez, Carranza (Artega, Coahuila
Colecion de Escritores Coahuilenses, 1959), pp. 77-86;
Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 533-534, 555; Haley, Revolution and Intervention, pp. 200-210; Johnson, "The Punitive
Expedition," pp. 513-520; George Marvin, "The First Line of
Defense in Mexico," World's Work, August 1916, pp. 422-423.
Ismael M. Vasquez to T. R.^ Beltran, 13 May 1916,
AREM, L-E-301, R. Leg. 35; R. Beltran to Secretaria de
Relaciones Exteriores, 19 May 1916, AREM, L-E-8 01, R. Leg.
38; Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 544; El Paso Morning Times,
8 September 1916, p. 1; Ronnie C Tyler, "The Little Punitive Expedition in the Big Bend," Southwestern Historical
Quarterly 78 (January 1975), pp. 271-281, 237.
328
to the bandits who recrossed the river but abandoned the
97
horses.
Four days later another band of twenty-four
Mexicans entered Texas near San Benito.
An American mili-
tary patrol discovered the band and forced it to recross
the river.
General James Parker ordered the third punitive
expedition into Mexico on June 17. American soldiers killed
four of the raiders in a skirmish near Matamoros.
troops withdrew on June 13.
The
During the twenty-four hour
occupation of Mexican Territory, General Ricaut evacuated
all military and civilians from Matamoros.
The situation
cooled with the withdrawal of American troops from Mexico. 93
At San Ygnacio on June 15, 1916, Mexican bandits killed
three Americans and wounded seven soldiers in an attack on
an army patrol.
foray.
Six Mexicans died in the thirty minute
Unlike the incidents at Laredo and San Benito where
Carrancista officials did not cooperate. Colonel Jorge
Gutierrez organized a Carrancista force and chased the
99
bandits, killing four of the raiders.
^"^Wilkinson, Laredo, pp. 409-410; Brownsville
Herald, 12 June 1915, p. 1.
^^Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, pp. 100-101; GarzaTrevino, Historia de Tamaulipas, p. 233; Funston to Adjutant General. 17 June 1916, RDS, 812.00/19355; Lott, "Rio
Grande Valley," p. 82; Brownsville Herald, 15, 17, 18 June
1916, p. 1.
^^Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 573; J. H. Johnson
to Secretary of State, 15 June 1916, RDS^, 812.00/18437;
Funston to Adjutant General, 15 June 1916, RDS, 812.00/
18443; Pierce, Texas' Last Frontier, p. 102; Virgil N.
329
The Constitutionalists took extraordinary precautions to guard against overreaction by the United States to
the May and June raids.
On May 19, 1916, Carranza directed
his field commanders along the border to oppose any new
invasion of Mexican territory.
The First Chief ordered
30,000 troops to the frontier.
In June Carranza conscripted
men from ages fifteen to thirty.
He also ordered a step up
in military efforts to contain the raiders.
States mobilized for war in 1916.
The United
After the Villa raid in
New Mexico, United States officials sent approximately
19,500 troops to the border.
Following the Glenn Springs
raid. President Wilson activated the Texas, New Mexico and
Arizona national guard; after the American skirmish with
Mexican troops at Carrizal and the June raids, the entire
American national guard was mobilized, approximately
111,000 men.
The guard remained on the border until mid-
1917 after the Pershing expedition had withdrawn from Mexico
early in February 1917.
Lott and Mercuric Martinez, The Kingdom of Zapata (San
Antonio: Naylor Co., 1953), p. 121; Brownsville Herald,
16 June 1916, p. 1.
^^^Garza-Trevino, Revolucion Mexicana en Tamaulipas,
p. 221; Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 552-563; Brownsville
Herald, 23 May 1916, p. 1; 24 June 1915, p. 1; Laredo
Weekly Times, 25 June 1916, p. 4.
Haley, Revolution and Intervention, p. 197;
Wilkinson, Laredo, p. 416; Baulch, "James B. Wells," p.
323; Cole, "Brushfire War 1916 Style," pp. 154-155;
Lister, Chihuahua, pp. 200-201; El Paso Morning Times,
18 June 1916, p. 1.
330
Culpability for the raids in South Texas in the
summer of 1916 was placed on Luis de la Rosa.
Aniceto
Pizana had been held in house arrest since early in the
year and had retired from border intrigue.
Luis de la
Rosa moved to Monterrey, however, and apparently sought
to organize a second Mexican-American uprising in June 1916
De la Rosa reportedly directed the San Benito, San Ygnacio
and Laredo forays.
Threats of American intervention forced
Carranza to arrest de la Rosa and hold the rebel in Monter102
rey late in July 1916.
The raids in 1916 did not have the momentum of the
1915 forays nor does there appear to have been support for
the raiders.
The raids, also, were not the results of the
revolutionary movement in Mexico.
The conditions that
produced the tension were the strained relations between
the United States and Mexico over the Villa raid and the
presence of an American force inside Mexico.
The presence
of over 111,000 troops along the border and a Mexican
buildup across the river contributed to the stress on the
frontier.
The clashes between American and Mexican forces
at Parral and Carrizal fueled the fears of residents along
^^^Garza-Trevinb, Historia de Tamaulipas, p. 27 2;
Garza-Trevino, Plan de San Diego, pp. 44-45; M. H. Johnson
to Secretary of State, 15 June 1916, RDS, 812.00/18426;
Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 567-569; Harris and Sadler,
"War Crisis o£ 1916,'* pp. 394, 402; Sandos, "War and
Diplomacy on the Texas Border," p. 21.
331
the borderland.
1915 raids.
There was no repetition of the extensive
The situation began to settle by the fall of
1916, as the United States turned its attention to the
Presidential election and in early 1917 to the war in
Europe.
The Mexican Revolution, a force of hope for Mexicans, became the catalyst which moved Mexican Americans in
the Rio Grande Valley to rebel against the dominant class,
mostly Anglo Americans.
from their lands.
The latter had displaced Mexicanos
They controlled the law officers who
helped make that displacement permanent.
The uprising had
been gathering momentum for generations.
While it is
popular to see the incidents as the implementation of the
Plan de San Diego, it may not be historically accurate to
do so.
Poverty, the personal gains to be made by individ-
uals trading with Mexican factions, and the Carrancista
need for American recognition all were factors contributing
to the uprising.
Charges that Carrancista troops comprised
some of the raiders, though accurate to some degree, are
inaccurate if they are extended to include all.
Carranza's
contribution to the forays came in the unofficial support
he gave the marauders by allowing them to take sanctuary
in Mexico.
Most of the participating Carrancistas probably
10 3
Holcombe, "United States Arms Control," p. 144.
332
did so to avenge a "family member.
Mexicanos released much
frustration in the uprising; for Anglo Americans it conjured
up tense fears.
De la Rosa, Pizana and their followers chose open
confrontation because they had been victims of American
injustice.
They realized that there was little hope for
relief or retribution through legally^sanctioned or
socially-approved channels.
It was their strength, courage
and ever increasing frustration that propelled them into
the life of "social bandits."
The Mexican American working class in the Valley
viewed the 1915 raiders as men who struggled for an
oppressed people to assert themselves and defend what they
felt was rightfully theirs.
To law enforcement officials
they were criminals to be grouped with men who attacked
and robbed payrolls.
torians can.
The law cannot differentiate.
The raiders were "social bandits."
His-
That is,
peasant outlaws, championed by the peasantry who suffered
from excessive poverty and oppression.
They used banditry
as a form of social protest.
The seventy-three raids proved less dangerous to
life and property than the excitement would have led one
to believe.
The raiders probably killed twenty-five
Americans and brought the economic growth of the Valley
to a standstill for about one year.
They disturbed but
did not destroy most Anglo American ranches, railroads.
333
bridges and irrigation pumps.
Counterviolence by law offi-
cials resulted in the death of at least 222, but perhaps
thousands, of Mexicanos, including many who were innocent.
Many lost their ranches and other property.
Still others
lived in fright from the terrifying acts by some law
officers.
Perhaps half of the Mexican American population
in South Texas—thousands of people—emigrated to Mexico.
The uprising in South Texas had little effect elsewhere.
It did, however, stir the sympathy of Mexican
Americans in various sections of Texas and the Southwest.
While no revolutionary movements directly tied to the
Mexicano uprising can be identified outside the Valley,
Mexicans and Mexican Americans throughout the Southwest
did demand a better chance in life.
The tension along the border in 1916 erupted from
different forces.
The Villa incursion into New Mexico led
to increased military action along the frontier.
Tension
worsened when American and Mexican forces clashed in Mexico.
The situation eased later in 1917 when American troops were
withdrawn from Mexico and from the border.
By 1917, Amer-
ican attention was primarily focused on events occurring
in Europe.
In Mexico, Americans welcomed the election of
Carranza in March 1917 and the adoption of a new constitutional government.
While Americans continued to show
concern with Mexico, this now centered around American
334
financial interests in petroleum and the growing German
intrigue.
The focus had moved away from revolutionary
movements in Mexico's northern provinces that had affected
the borderlands.
CHAPTER
VII
CONCLUSION
The topography on both sides of the Rio Grande,
which separates the Republic of Mexico and the United
States of America, is complementary in the immediate
borderlands.
Although a political boundary has existed
between the two nations since 184 8, it is possible that
not until the beginning of the twentieth century did
residents of the borderlands accept the legality of the
division.
They regarded the Rio Grande merely as a water-
way that had to be crossed to get from a point in Mexico
to one in the United States.
Spanish pioneers and missionaries, who constantly
traversed the area on their way to points farther north
in Texas, first settled along the Rio Grande.
Ranching
developed as the primary occupation of inhabitants on
both sides of the river.
A dramatic change in the lives
of residents came after Anglo Americans moved to the
border following the American war against Mexico.
The
first Anglo American settlers came to service the newly
established military forts along the Rio Grande.
Slowly,
the same American merchants developed lucrative trade
335
336
markets with both local Mexican Americans and Mexicans in
northern Mexico.
Brownsville, followed by Laredo and
El Paso, developed as major trading markets with Mexico.
As the borderlands developed after the American
war against Mexico, Mexico and the United States began to
experience disputes arising from their common boundary.
An increase in the availability of goods in the area led
to a profitable smuggling trade.
Besides mercantile goods,
livestock was smuggled across the river.
Each government
accused the other of not adequately patrolling its side
of the boundary.
Beating the gringo custom laws became a
part of the life of area residents.
Raiding along the
Rio Grande by bandits and later Indians worried both sides.
American troops saw action along the border on numerous
occasions when the need arose to chase marauders into
Mexico.
Approximately two-thirds of the population along
the Texas side of the border were either Mexican Americans
or Mexican nationals.
Except for the few wealthy Mexicano
landowners and merchants who shared political and social
prominance with the Anglo Americans, most Mexicans were
lower class, and many viewed themselves as being oppressed
by the landowners and entrepreneurs.
Although some of the
first Anglo settlers seemed to have developed an amiable
relationship with most Mexicans, Anglo settlers arriving
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
337
brought with them racial prejudices.
Subsequently, as the
new arrivals gained power, Mexicanos became hostile toward
most of them.
Law officers, in particular Texas Rangers,
became the most disliked element in Anglo-dominated South
Texas.
By the eve of the Mexican revolution several
Mexicanos had risen to challenge the ruling order.
Among
the challengers were Catarino Garza, who in the early 1890s
fought for justice and equality for Mexicanos; Gregorio
Cortez, whose clash with the Anglo judicial system was
viewed as a struggle for all Mexicanos in Texas; and
Jacinto Trevino, who refused to be intimidated by the Texas
Rangers in 1910.
These precursors of "social banditry"
set the tone for an uprising of Mexicanos in South Texas
in 1915.
Just as Mexicanos in Texas cried for relief from
their suffering, Mexicanos in Mexico moved to bring a
change in their lives.
In 1911 the thirty-four year rule
of Don Porfirio Diaz came to an abrupt end.
Diaz had
brought modernity to Mexico at the expense of most of its
people.
As early as 1903 Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magon
organized a revolutionary movement against the aged dictator.
Despite raids along the border, their movement did
not cause serious concerns in Mexico.
In 1908 Diaz
announced that he would tolerate opposition to his candidacy in 1910.
Francisco I. Madero challenged Diaz, who
responded by jailing his opponent.
Failing to bring change
338
to Mexico through the democratic process, Madero took the
path of revolution.
From exile in Texas Madero called for an armed
insurrection against Diaz.
Don Porfirio did not take the
challenge seriously at first; by the time he realized the
gravity of the situation, it was too late.
Rebels oper-
ating from Texas captured Ciudad Juarez in May 1911 and
forced Porfirio Diaz to resign.
Most of the Madero revolt occurred in northern
Mexico, across from Texas.
Consequently, the Texas side
of the border sparkled with rebel activity.
It was from
Texas that Madero launched his revolutionary program,
el Plan de San Luis Potosi.
In Texas, rebels purchased
most of their arms and ammunition, and recruited men for
the revolutionary army.
Border Mexicanos who did not
join Madero generally sympathized with his revolution.
From Brownsville to El Paso Mexicanos held meetings to
demonstrate their support for the changes that Madero
promised.
Madero's succession did not bring peace to Mexico.
Several counter revolutions broke out against his government.
Madero contained the conspiracies until early 1913
when he was toppled from power by Victoriano Huerta.
The
Texas side of the Rio Grande experienced periods of unrest
as a result of the revolutionary movements of Pascual
Orozco and Bernardo Reyes, both of whom used the border
339
as a base for their operations.
Orozco gathered his forces
in Chihuahua and armed his men from supplies purchased in
Texas.
Reyes launched his counterrevolution from San
Antonio.
Both men had supporters from among upper class
landowners and merchants.
American officials responded to the tension along
the border militarily.
Troops were deployed and redeployed
to the border in 1912 and 1913. Most military officials
did not believe the situation to be serious.
Army officers
repeatedly stated that the 4,000 troops stationed along
the border could contain any serious development.
Texas
Governor Oscar B. Colquitt adamantly disagreed and sought
to protect the border with Texas Rangers.
Few clashes
occurred between Mexicans and Americans during the Madero
period.
Conditions changed both in Mexico and along the
border when Huerta assumed power.
He immediately faced a
challenge from Venustiano Carranza, a norteno from Coahuila
who demanded a return to constitutional rule.
Carrancista
forces operating from the north successfully ousted Huerta
in July 1914, but not without the assistance of President
Woodrow Wilson.
The American president refused to recog-
nize Huerta's right to govern Mexico.
In April 1914 after
an incident at Tampico involving American and Mexican
troops, Wilson ordered the occupation of Veracruz and
greatly aided the Constitutionalists" effort to expel Huerta
340
When the Constitutionalists moved against Huerta,
the border again flourished with revolutionary intrigue.
The Carrancista revolution was a norteno movement.
Since
Huerta controlled both sea coasts, the rebels depended
totally on importing their armaments from Texas.
Most
Mexican border towns quickly fell into rebel hands.
Mata-
moros became the storehouse for military operations in the
northeast; El Paso became the storehouse for operations in
northwestern Mexico.
Despite Carranza's control of border
points, Huerta forces periodically harassed the border.
On the Texas side of the Rio Grande, Carrancista
agents recruited men and organized filibustering expeditions
Arms and ammunition were sent across both legally and illegally.
American border towns became apprehensive when
Mexican sister cities were attacked first by the Constitutionalists and later when Huerta forces threatened to
retake the cities.
United States troops, as during the
Madero period, were deployed to the border to protect
American lives and property.
The United States border
was heavily reinforced during the American occupation of
Veracruz.
Local residents feared a Mexican invasion of
the Texas border in retaliation for the American incursion
in Mexico.
As tensions intensified because of the American
presence in Mexico and the increasing number of United
States citizens who became directly-involved in revolutionary intrigue, skirmishes between American and Mexican
341
troops increased.
When Carranza occupied Mexico City in the summer
of 1914, Mexicans prayed that peace had finally come to
Mexico.
Francisco Villa shattered those hopes when he
denounced Carranza and launched another revolution.
Villa's Division of the North failed to topple the Constitutionalists' government.
By April 1915, the rebel forces
had been driven away from the core of Mexico and into
Chihuahua.
Most of the military activity occurred away from
the Texas border.
Matamoros was the only border site to
experience an intensive Villista attack; but it failed to
dislodge the Carrancista garrison.
Villa remained en-
trenched in Ciudad Juarez until December 1915. With
Villista forces occasionally threatening attack, border
towns elsewhere along the Rio Grande experienced minimal
turmoil.
On the Texas side, border towns underwent different degrees of revolutionary activity.
Brownsville remained
on constant alert because of the frequent activity occurring
in Matamoros.
When Villista forces attacked the Mexican
garrison, Brownsville residents became worried.
Filibus-
tering expeditions were organized near Brownsville; arms
and ammunition constantly flowed to both factions, legally
to the Constitutionalists, and illegally to the Villistas.
The city became home to thousands of refugees, both
342
non-combatants and deserting or wounded Mexican soldiers
from both sides.
Citizens in Laredo did not experience
prolonged periods of concern.
Because rail lines to
Monterrey were in repair, business prospered.
On occasion
Villistas threatening Nuevo Laredo caused concern in Laredo
The sector from Eagle Pass to the Big Bend country went
through little revolutionary activity because it offered
little to either side.
Nonetheless, at times reports of
large bodies of men crossing from Texas to Mexico came to
the attention of American officials.
tranquil.
El Paso remained
This was because Villismo was well entrenched
at Ciudad Juarez, and the Constitutionalists did not dare
challenge it until late in November 1915 after Villa had
suffered tremendous losses elsewhere.
The major concern
facing El Pasoans came in the summer of 1915 when Pascual
Orozco and Victoriano Huerta attempted to launch another
counterrevolution against Carranza.
When Orozco was killed
and Huerta apprehended, the plot failed.
The struggle of Mexicans to gain equality and
recognition also influenced Mexican Americans (Mexicanos)
living along the border to assert themselves.
Many Mexi-
canos viewed themselves as excessively oppressed by the
newly arrived Anglo American settlers.
On an increasing
scale in the early twentieth century, law officers, especially Texas Rangers, severely mistreated the native
population.
Several Mexicanos had risen to resist "gringo
justice."
343
The combination of smuggling, cattle and horse
stealing, the new demands of revolutionary Mexico, and, on
the American side, the increasing contempt for Anglos, produced conditions along the border that by 1915 seemed ripe
for a Mexican American uprising.
Anglo Americans
a "Mexican Revolt."
frequently had expressed fear of
During the Madero revolution, as well
as during the Reyes, Orozco, Huerta, Carranza and Villa
revolts, Anglo Americans living among the predominantly
Mexican population constantly requested the stationing of
large numbers of troops in their area to check any uprising
of local Mexicanos.
For a brief moment in the summer of
1915 desperation turned into hope.
At that moment, Mexi-
canos, joined by idle Carrancista soldiers, and relatives
living in northern Mexico, rose in rebellion.
Organized into bands ranging from ten to fifty men
and on occasion up to probably one hundred,
Mexicanos
raided throughout the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas
from August to November in 1915.
In that period marauders
made a total of seventy-three forays against targets representing Anglo American dominance, such as railroads and
irrigation pumps.
Most of the Anglos who were attacked
and killed had abused Mexicanos or had played an important
role in exercising control over the native population.
Raiders also struck at Anglo American o\\med ranches that
at one time had belonged to Mexicanos, as shown by the
344
attack on the McAllen ranch and the King Ranch at Las
Norias.
Other targets included irrigation pumping stations,
railroads, and the stores of prominent Anglos.
It appears
that the raiders sought to destroy the Anglo dominance of
the area, which seems to have magnified from the turn of
the century on.
Most of the raiders were border Mexican Americans
living in Texas or in exile in Mexico.
were fugitives from Texas law.
Many of the exiles
Some of the raiders sought
revenge for an old grudge against Anglo Americans or prominent Mexican families who sided with Anglos. Mexican
nationals who had lost a relative to the judicial system
in Texas or who had witnessed the persecution of a relative
joined the raiders.
Many of the Constitutionalists who
assisted the raiders were native Tamaulipecos.
The raiders apparently were organized and directed
by two prominent Mexicanos from Cameron County, Aniceto
Pizana and Luis de la Rosa.
Both men came from well-to-do
families, but had suffered at the hands of local law officers.
Neither of them was actually seen leading a raid.
They were, however, accused of organizing the forays.
For
instance, victims of the October 18 train robbery heard the
marauders shout, "IViva Luis de la Rosal" and "IViva Aniceto
Pizanal"
Thus, both men were charged with the raid,
although later evidence suggests that neither was among
the raiders.
345
The raiders acted alone, using Mexico as a sanctuary.
The lower border has had a history of resistance.
Residents of the area had launched their resistance movements in years past:
in 1840, an attempt was made to
establish the Republic of the Rio Grande; in 1851 Jose
Maria Carvajal organized a northern rebellion; and in
1859 Juan N. Cortina moved to drive all gringos from South
Texas.
Aniceto Pizana and Luis de la Rosa, like their
predecessors, were rugged individuals, who did not depend
on outside support, these men were typical South Texans—
uniquely independent.
They fought to end the privations of
the Mexican Americans of South Texas, not to establish an
Aztlan.
Historians should view the 1915 raiders as "social
bandits":
criminals to the state, but heroes to peasant
society.
Law officers can continue to regard the men as
outlaws, but they are not privileged to historical interpretation.
Although the foundations for the "social
banditry" date to the disturbance caused by the arrival of
Anglo Americans on the border, the Mexican Revolution of
1910 was the spark that set the flame in South Texas in
1915.
It was the winds of revolutionary Mexico that
enflamed the United States-Mexico borderlands.
Most historians fuse the "social banditry" movement
with the Plan de San Diego, which called for a massive uprising of Mexicans, Blacks and Indians in the southwestern
and southern United States.
Yet the available evidence
346
fails to substantiate the connection.
tvhile Pizana and
de la Rosa did issue a call for all Mexicans to free themselves from American rule, they never attempted to occupy
any part of South Texas.
The raids were merely destructive
in nature.
German intrigue also has been suggested as a motive
for the forays.
Germany had important interests in Mexico
which it did not want disturbed by Americans.
The Germans
also wished to direct the attention of American officials
away from the European theater.
Yet the evidence again
fails to support the charge of German involvement in the
social uprising.
Finally, the most popular historical explanation
has been to accuse Venustiano Carranza of being behind the
frontier turmoil.
Without a doubt, the single most impor-
tant impact of the Mexican Revolution on the border, especially during the Carranza period, was to foment the
Mexicano uprising, but this was not because Carranza
plotted the forays.
Most historians of United States-Mexico
relations charge that Carranza used the raids to pressure
President Wilson into recognizing his government.
The
charge stems from the obvious fact that once Wilson granted
de facto recognition the forays ceased.
Furthermore, docu-
ments captured from Basilic Ramos suggested that General
Emiliano Nafarrate, the Carrancista commander at Matamoros,
could be counted on to support the plot.
Finally, Carranza
347
did nothing to stop the publication of exaggerated newspaper stories on the success of the raiders.
It cannot be denied that the rebels operated out
of Mexican territory controlled by Carranza.
However,
Carranza exercised only a tenuous control in northern
Mexico, especially among his generals in the field.
It
appears that General Nafarrate was quite independent.
As
nortenos, both Carranza and Nafarrate sympathized and
appreciated the Mexicano uprising.
It is doubtful, how-
ever, that Carranza had anything to do with the implementation of the raiding.
Once the raiding broke out, Carranza
no doubt welcomed it as a possible tool for pressuring
Wilson into recognizing his government.
At worst, he can
be accused of being lax with his northern command.
In his
defense, however, it must be noted that Constitutionalist
troops stationed on the Mexican side of the border were
Tamaulipecos, many of whom had relatives living in Texas—
relatives who probably rode with the raiders. Furthermore,
it was difficult to ask a Mexican soldier to aid in the
capture of a family member.
The extreme closeness of the
Mexican family would not permit that.
When local and state officials aided by vigilante
committees proceeded to assail Mexicanos, a reign of terror
was let loose on South Texas.
Most Mexicanos were sus-
pected of being either raiders or sympathizers with the
marauders.
Fearing the "Mexican Bandits," Anglo Americans
348
organized law-and-order leagues to administer swift punishment to Mexicanos taken prisoner.
The Mexicano population
was restricted to living in the cities, was prohibited
from having dances, and from carrying arms, and, was
expected, if leaving the jurisdiction of a city, to obtain
permits.
Vigilante committees searched homes for Mexicanos
and issued a blacklist of persons considered to be persona
non grata.
Relatives of raiders who were killed found
themselves also hunted by officials.
twenty-five persons.
The raiders killed
On the other hand, about 222 Mexicanos
officially died at the hands of officials.
This figure is
misleading, for it represents only the number of Mexicanos
actually counted by officials.
Hundreds, possibly thou-
sands, of Mexicanos who died were never counted.
Historian
Walter P. Webb suggests that from 500 to 5,000 Mexicans may
have died in the frontier turmoil.
Numerous clashes occurred between raiders and military patrols.
At first. General Funston refused to commit
troops to the area.
He felt that the troubles were the
state's, not the federal government's, concern.
After
army troops fell as victims of the raiding, Funston changed
his mind, and soldiers were sent after the raiders.
In
September Funston had 4,000 troops in South Texas, by
December that number had increased to 20,000.
As a result of the retributive justice administered
by officials, approximately half of the Mexicano population
349
departed from the Valley.
Despite assurances from local,
state and military officials that peaceful citizens had
nothing to fear, thousands of Mexicanos packed their
wagons with most of their household goods and crossed
the river to Matamoros.
Some took their entire household
belongings and abandoned their homes.
dwellings for whatever they could get.
their work.
Others sold their
All abandoned
Once in Mexico many of the refugees charged
local officials and Texas Rangers with mistreating families and killing their men.
Mexican Americans.
Most of the refugees were
There were some Mexican nationals,
however, who accepted the general amnesty offered by
Carranza to all Mexicans in exile.
Several Anglo American
families left South Texas to avoid violence.
The "social banditry" did not spread beyond South
Texas.
Much of the discontent between Mexicanos and Anglos
seems to have been concentrated in the Valley.
In the area
from Brownsville to Starr County most of the border Mexicanos had lost their land to Anglo settlers.
In the Laredo
area most of the land remained in Mexican hands.
Beyond
Laredo, as far as El Paso, the area was sparsely populated.
Land transfer does not seem to have been a serious issue
in the El Paso vicinity.
The presence of a large military
garrison near the city also discouraged an uprising.
In-
frequently, a taint of the Mexicano uprising appeared in
areas outside South Texas.
Skimpy sympathy for the revolt
350
surfaced in San Antonio, Corpus Christi, and elsewhere in
Texas and the Southwest.
The Mexicano uprising ended abruptly in November
1915.
When Carranza transferred General Nafarrate from
Matamoros to Tampico, Aniceto Pizana and Luis de la Rosa
lost their protection in Mexico.
The new commanders,
generals Eugenic Lopez and Alfredo Ricaut, replaced most
of the Tamaulipecos and moved out against the raiders.
Carranza apparently offered land, military commissions,
and money to Pizana and de la Rosa to cease their revolt,
although Pizana refused.
In 1916, relations between the United States and
Mexico deteriorated rather than improved as a result of
the actions of Francisco Villa and other rebels.
In early
1916 Villista forces killed Americans and Chihuahua and in
Columbus, New Mexico.
The United States ordered a punitive
expedition into Mexico to capture Villa.
Venustiano
Carranza, a staunch nationalist, protested American invasion of Mexican territory.
The First Chief ordered a
military buildup along the Rio Grande.
On its side, the
United States dispatched 111,000 troops to the border.
Eventually, clashes between the two occurred.
Consequently,
tensions along the border remained high.
As a result of the uncertain conditions in northern
Mexico in 1916, several more raids occurred in South Texas.
In May 1916 bandits raided Glenn Springs, Texas, taking
351
with them two American hostages.
A second American punitive
expedition chased the marauders into Mexico.
The following
month a band of Mexicans crossed the river and attacked an
American patrol near San Benito, Texas.
force crossed into Mexico.
A third punitive
In June raiders also struck
north of Laredo and at San Ignacio, Texas.
Military
patrols chased the marauders back into Mexico.
Although
several historians have tried to link the forays in 1916
to a rebirth of the Plan de San Diego, it is doubtful that
such was the case.
The raiding seems to have been an
expression of the tension that Villismo had brought to the
borderlands.
By mid-1917 conditions grew calm along the border.
Early in 1917 a new Constitution was drawn up for Mexico.
In March, Carranza won election as president of the
republic.
American forces withdrew from Mexico in mid-1917.
Furthermore, American concerns were now focused on Europe.
From 1910 to 1916 the borderland along the Rio
Grande experienced its most turbulent period since 1848.
The 1910 Mexican Revolution had disturbed the lives of
border residents.
Mexican nationals in the northern fron-
tier became victims of the violence, while Mexican Americans and Anglo Americans on the Texas side became involved
in the intrigue of the revolution.
situation had became less turbulent.
By 1916, however, the
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