Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: A Security Analysis
Adam Leake
Abstract
The situation of Palestinian refugees represents one of the longest-running refugee
situations in the world and the conditions faced by those living in the camps in Lebanon
are often understood to be the most severe of those faced anywhere by Palestinian
refugees. Drawing on Critical Security Studies (CSS) notions of security as emancipation,
this paper will demonstrate how the actions of a range of actors affect the security of
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This paper will provide an analysis of the Lebanese
state, UNRWA and the PLO before turning its attention to the actions of religious groups
and grassroots community groups to demonstrate how they each advance or inhibit the
emancipatory potential of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
Introduction
The 1948 war between Israel and surrounding Arab states resulted in the displacement of more than
700,000 Palestinian refugees, most from their homes in the emerging State of Israel. These refugees
travelled to surrounding areas including the Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Over
the years, due to natural population growth and other factors including wars such as the 1967 ArabIsraeli war, the first Gulf War, and the ongoing war in Syria, the refugee population in these
countries has swelled, resulting in over-population of the refugee camps, a strain on resources and
deterioration of the living conditions of thousands of refugees. In Lebanon, an estimated 100,000
refugees initially sought refuge and this number has now grown, with an estimated 450,000
Palestinians registered in the country (UNRWA, 2014a) as well as thousands who remain
unregistered and the recent Palestinian secondary refugees from Syria. The situation of the
Palestinians in Lebanon is often described as the most difficult of all Palestinian refugee
communities and this essay seeks to provide an analysis of their security situation. The notion of
security is one that is frequently disputed by scholars. Since the 1980s academics have increasingly
challenged the traditional understanding of security which is grounded in international realist theory
and places the state and military threat at the heart of the study. One of the main challenges to
these realist notions of security comes from the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies (CSS) which
challenges the state-centric nature of the traditional concept of security. This state-centrism
presents obvious problems to our analysis of refugee security with traditional understandings of
security placing the protection of the state as the priority.
Throughout this essay, however, the protection of refugees will be the focus. Additionally, CSS
equates the idea of security with the notion of emancipation. It is this notion that will form the heart
of our analysis of refugee security and through the analysis of various agencies and actors the
potential for security through emancipation will be explored. This essay aims to demonstrate how
the application of traditional notions of security in the case of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is
flawed. It will demonstrate the extent to which the state and quasi-state actors provide
emancipatory potential for the Palestinian refugee but how there are ultimately a number of
difficulties in achieving this. Following a brief outline of the unique context of the refugee situation
in Lebanon and highlighting the theoretical framework of both traditional security and Critical
Security Studies, this paper will demonstrate how the relationship between the refugees and other
actors enhance or threaten their security and, in particular their potential for emancipation.
First, this paper will outline the relationship between the Lebanese government and the refugees,
which has been strained from the moment of their arrival. Highlighting how the demographic
makeup of the country has led to increased tensions between a number of Lebanese groups and the
Palestinians, this essay will show how this has resulted in the rise of militia groups which ultimately
threaten the security of the Palestinians in a more traditional way. Additionally, we will examine how
the politics of the country has led to the rise of discriminatory policies against the Palestinian
community, especially with regard to education,
employment, property ownership and the freedom of movement. Following this, the paper will
analyse how two actors have risen to take the place of the largely absent Lebanese state for the
Palestinians. First, since it began operating in 1950, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestinians in the Near East (hereafter UNRWA or the Agency) has provided a number of services
that have increased the emancipatory capacity of the Palestinians. This paper will assess whether
the services provided go far enough in providing emancipatory potential for the Palestinians given
the lack of participation of the refugees in the governance of the Agency and the problems of
identity that arise from the Agency’s existence. Second, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)
is seen by many to have more legitimacy among the Palestinians in Lebanon. Its community
engagement increased the emancipatory capacity of the refugees, however, throughout its
operation, much of which was carried out during the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war, the security of
the refugees in the traditional sense was severely
damaged.
Given the problems both caused by and faced by these stand-in states, the final chapter will
demonstrate how emancipatory potential is created by alternative groups. The focus will first be on
the rise of religious representation in the refugee camps, namely through Hizbollah and Hamas.
Following this it will also examine how grassroots participation in community projects can ultimately
provide greater scope for emancipation. Drawing on participatory community projects that have
taken place among Palestinian refugee community in other countries, the chapter will assess the
possibilities and limitations of their actuality in Lebanon.
The Palestinian refugee situation has been ongoing for over 65 years. The analysis of their security
situation would be more concentrated and perhaps more detailed if the focus was on one particular
timeframe, however, the nature of the security problems faced by the Palestinians has changed over
time and it is therefore necessary to demonstrate these changes. The actors analysed throughout
this paper have played roles of differing significance throughout the 65 years of their presence and
to reduce this to one time period would detract from our analysis.
The Context of Palestinian Refugees
The Palestinian refugee situation has its origins in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War which resulted in the
displacement of an estimated 700,000 Palestinians (UNRWA, 2014b), mainly to Syria, Jordan, Gaza,
the West Bank and Lebanon. As a result of the huge numbers of refugees, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted Resolution 302 to establish the UNRWA, a temporary organisation with
the mandate of providing temporary relief and work for the displaced Palestinian population until a
permanent solution is found. A permanent solution has not been found and the number of displaced
Palestinians has continued to rise, especially following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent
Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.
As such the temporary mandate has been constantly renewed. The founding of UNRWA has had
significant implications for the Palestinian population. Michael Dumper (2008) suggests that the
establishment of UNRWA is one of main reasons for the Palestinian refugee situation being a unique
case. This is because the Palestinians are the only refugee population who have their own dedicated
United Nations agency; all other refugees come under the mandate of the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), whose work is underpinned by the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees (hereafter the 1951 Convention) and the 1967
Refugee Protocol. The 1951 Convention, which provides a number of legal protections to the
refugee populations, “does not apply to those refugees who benefit from the protection or
assistance of a United Nations agency other than the UNHCR, such as refugees from Palestine”
(UNHCR, 2010: 4). It must be noted that Lebanon, like Jordon, the West Bank, Gaza and Syria, has
not ratified the 1951 Convention and as such, would not be bound to uphold the legal requirements
even if the Palestinians were not excluded. It could be suggested, however, that the very existence
of UNRWA gave Lebanon, and all of the other Palestinian refugee host countries, little impetus to
sign the 1951 Convention.
Not being represented by the remit of the 1951 Convention means that the Palestinians are
excluded from a number of legislative protections that could serve to enhance their security
considerably. With regard to the impact on Palestinian refugee security, this essay has identified
such three exclusions that will be addressed. The first is the right to employment, which the
Convention stipulates should be equal “to the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a
foreign country” (UNHCR, 2010: 22). Second, Palestinian refugees are not covered by the 1951
Convention educational stipulations which call for “the same treatment as accorded to nationals
with respect to elementary education” (UNHCR, 2010: 24).
Finally, the 1951 Convention declares that states “shall accord in its territory the right to choose
their place of residence and to move freely within its territory” (UNHCR, 2010: 27). Given that the
1951 Convention does not cover Palestinian refugees, the Lebanese state would be under no
obligation to provide these services even if it was a signatory of the Convention. This places pressure
on other agencies to provide for the Palestinian refugees and, as will be examined below, this has
implications for the security of the Palestinians, especially since UNRWA operates in collaboration
with the host country. These complications make the security situation of the Palestinian refugee a
precarious one, especially when tensions between the host country, the refugee population and the
service providers increase.
Traditional Security, Critical Security and Emancipation
The concept of security, it is often stated, is a contested one (Buzan, 1983) and from the 1980s
onwards academics began to challenge the notion. No longer is it accepted that the focus of security
is “the phenomenon of war” (Walt, 1991: 212) but instead the debate has been deepened and
broadened (Booth, 2007) to analyse the political theory from which security studies derives and to
challenge the focus of security studies. The purpose of this chapter is not to explore the details of
this debate, although key points will be highlighted. Instead this chapter will outline a critical
understanding of the notion of security and explain why this understanding is more useful
analytically in the case of refugee populations and particularly in the case of the Palestinian refugee
population in Lebanon.
The study of security that developed in the context of the Cold War became conceptualised within
the context of international realism and, as such, the security of the state against external threats
became the primary focus. This notion of security, advanced by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz
(1979) and referred to throughout this paper as traditional security studies, is often criticised for
being too narrow. Indeed, this traditional approach to security studies proves to be of little use in
our analysis of the security of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon because the ultimate reference point
for traditional security studies – the sovereign state – does not exist for this group. Furthermore,
although the refugee community has faced a significant number of military threats over the past 65
years, the majority of these occurred during the 1975-1990 civil war, a point when the Lebanese
state had virtually collapsed and would have been unable to provide security even if it felt compelled
to do so. In 1983, Barry Buzan’s People, States and Fear challenged the narrow understanding of
traditional security studies which he argued formed a separate and distinct area referred to as
strategic studies (Buzan, 1983). In his challenge of traditional notions of security, Buzan widened the
scope of security beyond military security to include the environment, crime, and the economy as
threats (Buzan, 1983; Buzan 1991). Furthermore, Buzan broke from the traditional view that the
state is at the top of a hierarchy in the provision of security and that, contrary to traditional
understandings of security, the state can prove to be as much of a threat to security as it is an
enforcer (Buzan, 1983). Although Buzan attempted to widen the scope of security studies and
despite placing emphasis on “the survival of collective units” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 26)
as its focus, he continues to view the state as the primary unit of reference through which this
widened understanding of security can be achieved for collective units (Buzan, 1983; 1991). It is for
this reason that Buzan is often criticised: for failing to break away from the traditional notion of
security. With this in mind, this paper will use this understanding of security to demonstrate its
limitation with regard to the security of the Palestinians refugees in Lebanon. Due to the absence of
a sovereign state that Buzan would argue is the ultimate reference point, this paper will look at the
traditional security provided by other ‘quasi-state’ actors in Lebanon, namely the PLO and the
UNRWA.
In the past two decades, the study of security has become more contested with the Welsh School of
Critical Security Studies (CSS) challenging the concept of security at a fundamental level to the point
where they have been criticised for “dedefining rather than redefining the concept” (Ayoob, 1997:
129). Seeking to anchor the concept of security and end the claims that it is an essentially contested
concept (Buzan, 1983), Booth outlines three elements of security that he believes are uncontested:
“the existence of a referent object”; the existence or belief of “impending or actual danger”; and “a
desire to escape harmful possibilities” (Booth, 2007: 100). Reviewing the traditional view of security
studies, it can be seen that these uncontested elements are applicable. Indeed it is accepted by a
number of critical security scholars that traditional security studies has a place in contemporary
studies of security as a sub-field – that of international strategic studies. Strategic studies in its most
extreme form places the state as the referent object, the danger as another state, and the removal
of the harmful possibilities as diplomacy or military intervention. For the purpose of this essay, an
understanding of security based purely on this notion, as previously outlined, would be of little
value. Throughout this paper the application of the three uncontested elements of security can be
seen as follows: First, the identification of the referent object is relatively straightforward and can be
understood as the refugee population, both on a community level and on an individual level,
although it must be stressed that within each referent group there will always be subgroups which
should not be generalised or neglected. Second, the impending or actual danger faced by the
refugee population is the perpetual conflict, desolate living conditions, and lack of political
participation caused by their residency within a hostile state. Finally, the desire to escape harm
would normally be addressed through their right to return home and a guarantee of their safety and
autonomy upon their return. This analysis would require a discussion of the wider Palestinian
refugee situation and the Israel- Palestine conflict, something that goes beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead, given that the concept of security is a relative one (Booth, 2007), this paper will
analyse the security of Palestinians within their current status as refugees in Lebanon. In order to
address the dangers faced by the Palestinians within this context and their ability to escape harm,
this analysis will draw upon an understanding of the link between the concepts of security and
emancipation, which
provides the ultimate source of security (Booth, 1991; 2007) as understood by CSS.
The relationship between security and emancipation is central to the CSS understanding of security.
Booth originally described the relationship between security and emancipation as “two sides of the
same coin” (Booth, 1991: 319) with emancipation as “the freeing of people (as individuals and
groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would
freely choose to do” (Booth, 1991: 319). Readdressing this statement, however, he stresses the nondualistic nature of the two concepts, proposing security as a means to achieving emancipatory ends
while at the same time highlighting the importance of emancipatory potential to achieve security
(Booth, 2007). Additionally, it is through the emancipation that the conditions that give rise to
conflict are dismantled (Ruane and Todd, 2005: 237). Emancipation, like security, is a relative
concept and the means of emancipation should be analysed with this in mind. In our analysis of the
emancipatory potential of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon it should be remembered that their
emancipation would involve the end of their status as refugees. This paper however, will address the
potential for relative emancipation within the context of their refugee status. Although seeking to
highlight the scope for emancipatory potential, it will not stop short of highlighting the potential
difficulties in applying the concept and the interaction between various actors and the refugee
population will be used to demonstrate certain limitations.
The Lebanese State and Palestinian Security
The relationship between refugees and the host country is often strained for a number of reasons,
with one of the most commonly cited being the potential pressure placed on the economy, health
and education services and infrastructure. In Lebanon, this pressure is framed against a background
of a precariously balanced political system which, some would argue, has been disrupted by the
presence of the Palestinians (Dumper, 2009). The relationship between the Palestinians in Lebanon
and the Lebanese government needs to be examined within the context of the demographic fragility
of the state. This chapter will briefly outline the political system that has been in place in Lebanon
since 1943 and how this has led to the reduced security of the Palestinian population through the
restrictions of a number of civil and political rights. Finally, analysing the current situation, the paper
will ask whether the increased political interaction between the state and the Palestinians has
increased their security and whether this security is now at risk due to the recent influx of Syrian
refugees.
The current political framework in Lebanon is built on an unwritten agreement of 1943 known as the
National Pact which is based on the 1926 French-designed constitution. Under this agreement, posts
are reserved in accordance to the demographic makeup of the country. In line with the 1932
constitution, the Maronite Christians, being the largest section of the population at the time, were
reserved the post of President, while the post of Prime Minister was to be held by a Sunni and the
Speaker of the House was reserved for a Shi’a. This framework, although suitable for the time,
quickly became outdated and was not readdressed until the signing of the Ta’if Accord, marking the
end of the 15 year civil war in 1990. The Ta’if Accord recognised the changed demographics of the
country and reflected this by giving an equal number of seats to Christians and Muslims in the
Chamber of Deputies and redefining the powers of the President, Prime Minister and the Speaker to
ensure that no group had a monopoly on power. Until the signing of the Ta’if Accord, the uneven
balance of power coupled with the presence of the Palestinian refugees caused a number of
complications in
Lebanese politics. Rebecca Roberts, for example, believes that the system of governance “has
prevented the development of a unified Lebanese identity because it encourages individuals to
identify first with their religion” (Roberts, 2010: 73). The primary identification with religion rather
than the nation caused animosity between the Sunni population and the Christian population in
particular. With the Sunni constituency underrepresented in the Chamber of Deputies it could be
argued that the Sunni elites sought to assert their power by appealing directly to their religious
constituency. Tom Najem observes that “in an attempt to retain the support of their clients, Sunni
elites paid lip service to popular pan-Arab causes, particularly the armed Palestinian presence in
Lebanon” (Najem, 2012: 30). In contrast to the apparent Sunni support, the relationship between
the Palestinians and the Christians was highly volatile with the increased presence of Palestinian
militia in the camps following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war provoking the rise of Christian Phalangist
militias (Roberts, 2010).
From a traditional security perspective, the sectarian divisions in Lebanon, the support of the Sunnis
for the Palestinian cause, as well as the increased conflict between the Christians and the
Palestinians were major destabilising factors that damaged the security of the state and ultimately
led to the outbreak of the civil war. However, with regards to the Palestinian population in Lebanon,
and in particular with regards to their emancipatory potential though political and religious
representation, it could be argued that support for an armed Palestinian presence helped to pave
the way for the signing of the Cairo Accord in 1969. This agreement between the PLO and the
Lebanese government gave the PLO the authority to exist both politically and militarily within the
refugee camps without Lebanese interference, the implications of which will be analysed in the
following chapter. Despite the rhetoric of the Sunni population in support of the Palestinians, the
situation post-Ta’if Accords has shown that the cause was one that was simply appropriated by the
Sunni elites in an attempt to strengthen their position and did little to directly improve the security
situation of the Palestinians.
Following the redistribution of power under the Ta’if Accords there was no longer the same
expressions of support from the Sunni elite, with commentators noting that “opposition to
[Palestinian refugee] settlement in Lebanon is one of the few issues that unites the Lebanese
government and public opinion across most of the sectarian communities” (Sayigh, 1995: 37).
Additionally, the new balance of power has seen the Christian population lose out to the Sunni
population. This, perhaps, has only served to increase hostilities between the Christians and the
Palestinian refugees as many of the former “fear naturalisation of the refugees… would tilt the
demographic balance decisively in favour of (Sunni) Muslims” (International Crisis Group, 2009: 14).
This fear has seeped into political lexicon, particularly with parties such as the Free Patriotic
Movement, making policies regarding the status of the Palestinian refugees a toxic issue.
Since Ta’if, “the government has moved to gradually re-establish its authority over the Palestinians”
(Sayigh, 1995: 42) and although this reasoning is in line with traditional notions of security and seeks
to address the role played by the refugee camps throughout the civil war, the impact it is having on
the security of the Palestinians is profound. It is commonly observed that the Palestinians in Lebanon
are in a worse situation than in any other country (Dumper, 2007; Roberts, 2010),with Palestinians in
Syria, until recently, largely helped and accepted by the government and those in Jordan offered full
citizenship and formally enjoying many of the same rights as Jordanians (Dumper, 2007: 47). In
contrast, the successive Lebanese governments have worked to prevent the suitable conditions for
Palestinian tawteen, which is the permanent resettlement – or naturalisation - of the refugee
community in its host country and is something feared by the refugees and host citizenship alike
(Nasrallah, 1997). Some academics go as far as to claim that the Lebanese government’s fear of
Palestinian settlement has resulted in a situation where, “throughout the 1990s, the Lebanese state
proceeded to institutionalize and legalize discrimination against the Palestinian refugees” (Hanafi,
2009: 145). As such, Palestinian refugees are denied access to a number of basic social and political
rights. One key feature of the restrictions placed on Palestinians is the limited access they have to
jobs. Officially, they are barred from over 20 professions (UNRWA, 2014b) and this severe restriction
on employment not only damages the internal economy of the camps but limits interaction between
the Palestinians and the rest of the population which only serves to increase antagonism between
them, as well as enhancing the idea of an ‘us’ and ‘them’, especially through the suggestion that
Palestinians are a threat to the employment of Lebanese citizens (International Labour Organization,
2014: 62). Additionally, the restrictions on employment contribute significantly to the already high
levels of poverty and it is in these conditions that illicit activity thrives, undermining security as
understood in its traditional form.
The neglect of the economic and social security of the Palestinians by the Lebanese state and its
actions in restricting the ability of the Palestinians to enhance their own economic and social
security has encouraged the rise of groups who attempt to achieve greater economic security
through other means. In 2007 the rise of one such group, Fatah al-Islam, culminated in the
destruction of Nahr al-Bared refugee camp. Leading up to the event, members of Fatah al-Islam
were suspected of conducting a bank robbery and, upon being confronted by the security services,
opened fire. As the armed group took refuge in Nahr al-Bared, the army sent in troops and the
resulting conflict resulted in the majority of the camp being destroyed. It is stated that this short
conflict, which lasted just three months, had devastating consequences on the relationship between
the Palestinians and the Lebanese population with the International Crisis Group (ICG) stating that
“many Lebanese blamed the *refugees+ for the *armed group’s+ emergence” (ICG, 2009: 12). The
focus here is how the security of the Lebanese state was threatened by the rise of the armed group
and, although this threat is not one to be neglected, with refugee security as our focus, it is the state
that should be seen as the threat. This is because it was the Lebanese policies which contributed to
increased levels of
poverty and overcrowding in the camps, and through the restriction of employment opportunities
they created the conditions in which illicit activities and informal employment of refugees through
groups such as Fatah al-Islam could thrive.
Despite the relapse in the relationship between the Lebanese and the Palestinians caused by the
2007 conflict in Nahr al-Bared there has been significant progress made by the Lebanese
government following the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. In post-civil war Lebanon, Syria
played an important role in maintaining the stability of the state. As will be examined later, the
presence of the Syrians ensured that the PLO only played a marginal role. However, upon their
withdrawal, the PLO and specifically Fatah were able to engage more actively with the camps and
this led to the development of more normalised relations between the Lebanese and the Palestinian
refugees.
According to the ICG, “one of the clearest manifestations of a change in relations between Lebanon
and its Palestinian population was the cabinet’s decision to create an inter-ministerial consultative
body, the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee” (ICG, 2009: 9-10). The Lebanese-Palestinian
Dialogue Committee (LPDC) was created in 2005 with the mandate of “providing Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon with the conditions to live in dignity, prosperity, security and harmony with
their environment until they are able to enforce their right of return” (Lebanese Republic LPDC,
2014). The creation of this committee is the most promising step made by the Lebanese in improving
the security of the Palestinian population. First of all, the LPDC includes representatives from a
number of ministries, including the ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Social
Affairs, Labour, Public Health, Interior, and Energy and Water, which allows for a greater
understanding of the connection between security and these areas, expanding on the understanding
of security. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the LPDC recognises the importance of working
in collaboration, not only with the UNRWA and the PLO but with politically active representatives
from each of the camps (Lebanese Republic LPDC, 2014). As highlighted in the previous chapter, the
understanding of security as emancipation in the case of Palestinian refugees could include the
Palestinian’s right to return, the actualisation of which the Lebanese government is unable to aid
with. Although the LPDC recognises that in recent years the communication between itself and key
Palestinian actors has been irregular, its existence and acknowledgement of the need for
communication mechanisms is vital for providing the Palestinians with the ability to actualise near-
term strategic goals in the form of civil society development and autonomy. In terms of providing
actual improvements to the Palestinians, the LPDC has sought to “address the status of almost 5000
refugees (known as non-ID refugees) who lacked official status, were considered aliens and virtually
barred from exiting the camps” (ICG, 2009: 10) and this has improved the security of these
individuals by allowing them to live under less restrictive terms.
Although, there has been progress in some areas, especially with the establishment of the LPDC, the
ongoing conflict in Syria is threatening the security of the current Palestinian refugees. By April 2014,
over 53,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria had registered with UNRWA in Lebanon (UNRWA,
2014c). Not only does that put additional pressure on the current camps but it puts additional strain
on the fragile confessional system, risking potential violence between the Lebanese and Palestinian
population, both new and old (ICG 2013; International Rescue Committee, 2013). Again, although
this may be viewed as a traditional security threat in that it is a threat to security of the state, the
additional tension in society could affect the progress, however slight, made by the Lebanese
government in addressing the broader security threats faced by Palestinians. Additionally, the arrival
of the Palestinian refugees from Syria will also have an impact on the identity of the Palestinian
refugees already in Lebanon whose identity has been fostered in different conditions.
Overall, the Lebanese state has, throughout the majority of the Palestinians’ residency in Lebanon,
failed to provide security for the refugee population. Although it cannot help them achieve their
emancipatory ideal of a right to return, the actions the state has taken have impeded the refugees’
ability to achieve any near-term goal of self-governance and have effectively impeded their
emancipatory potential. As has been shown, the main reason for this has been the confessional
system of government which was based on outdated demographics, the repercussions of which
were felt by the Palestinian population in particular as tensions mounted between the Sunni and
Christian population in the build up to the civil war. As power became more evenly distributed
following the Ta’if Accord, all sections of society sought to blame the Palestinians by way of
restricting their civil and political rights. Although major progress has been made in providing
security with the establishment of the LPDC, this could potentially come under increased strain due
to the current influx of Syrian Palestinian refugees, as tension in society begins to mount again.
Despite this slight progress, the Lebanese state has proved itself to be more of a security threat to
the Palestinians than an enhancer and in its place other actors have emerged to provide security
where it is unable to.
UNRWA and its Security Paradox
Due to the fact that over half the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon reside in the camps
(ICG, 2009: 1) and the fragility of the Lebanese state, as outlined above, it is often observed that
UNRWA, established as a temporary service provider in 1949, has in effect become “a substitute for
the absent Lebanese state” (ICG, 2009: 23). As such, an analysis of how it has provided security for
the Palestinian population would be akin to a more traditional state-centric security analysis.
However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the interaction between the referent group and
various other agencies such as the state cannot be ignored, due to the relativity of the security
analysis in this context. With this in mind, this chapter will provide an evaluation of the changing
nature of the services provided by UNRWA; from education, employment and health services to the
unofficial advocacy role it has adopted in recent years. Following this, there will be a detailed
analysis of the security implications of UNRWA’s existence and the politics of the assistance that it
provides.
Since its establishment in 1949 and the beginning of its operations in 1950, UNRWA has grown from
providing emergency assistance to providing an array of services within the 12 camps. These include
infrastructure and maintenance, health services, educational services (including schools and
vocational training centres), women’s programme centres and community centres, and the Agency
has made impressive achievements in key areas, “including the spread of literacy throughout the
entire refugee population [and ensuring] the absence of epidemics [in the camps+” (al Husseini,
2010: 6). As well as providing access to vital services, UNRWA also provides the largest number of
employment opportunities for the refugee community including over 2,000 in the education sector
alone (UNRWA, 2014a). Considering the employment restrictions enforced by the Lebanese
government, the refugees’ employment by UNRWA provides vital opportunities for the
enhancement of security and the chance to increase autonomy - although it should be highlighted
that the existence of jobs is very much dependent on the funding provided by donors in the
international community and this simply increases feelings of dependency within the refugee
population.
Of all the services provided by UNRWA, education is the largest, with 1,020 USD and 1,927 USD
spent per elementary and preparatory pupil respectively, more than in any other region of its
operation with the exception of the West Bank (UNRWA, 2014a). In addition to the provision of
these educational services, which cover the ages between 6 and 14, UNRWA in Lebanon also
provides secondary education services, once again serving as a replacement for the absent Lebanese
state through which it is difficult for Palestinian refugees to access secondary education (UNRWA,
2014d: 4). For UNRWA, the provision of a quality education is vital in helping “refugees to achieve
their full potential, both individually and as a member of the local and global community, towards
active and productive participation in social, political, economic, and cultural life” (UNRWA, 2013: 1).
The Agency’s capacity for enabling refugees to achieve this, however, must be questioned. First,
although UNRWA provides the schools, teachers and equipment necessary for the functioning of an
education system, the curriculum adopted is based on that of the host country. As such, Shuayb
(2014) claims that “being forced to learn the Lebanese curriculum contributes to a process of
‘acculturation’ of Palestinian youth” (Shuayb, 2014: 26), which disrupts the process of identity
creation and instead “tends to inspire loyalty to an existing system of state authority” (Bocco, 2009:
245). In the past, in what could be seen as an attempt to counter this acculturation, the PLO targeted
UNRWA schools “as a place to instil nationalist tradition in refugee children” (Bocco, 2009: 245).
Additionally, it is observed by al- Husseini that UNRWA schools have been “staffed largely by
teachers who subscribed to the PLO’s nationalist agenda” (al-Husseini, 2000: 54), Although the PLO
presence and the views of the teachers may act to counter the identitydamaging effects of the
Lebanese curriculum, they could also result in a biased Palestinian nationalist identity which could be
equally damaging.
The formation and recognition of identity is vital to emancipatory notions of security in that it
provides the very basis of social cohesion from which autonomy is fostered. In essence, the provision
of education is a necessary means to enabling the development of an emancipatory community,
providing the building blocks with which social, economic, political and cultural communities can be
built. However, if a community plays no part in the creation of its own curriculum, it is being denied
an important aspect of identity creation and its security in terms of emancipation is undermined
from the beginning.
In addition to the problems of adopting the curriculum of the host country, there are additional
problems faced by the Agency when it comes to the education of refugees as it finds its service
provision undermined by a high dropout rate from its schools. The reasons for this vary but it is
understood that “family and economic issues are more prominent in Lebanon than in other fields”
(UNRWA, 2013: 4) with the Lebanese government’s employment restrictions resulting in negative
coping strategies which “include taking children out of school to go to work in menial jobs” (UNRWA,
2011a: 5). Other reasons for the high dropout rate include overcrowded classrooms, poorly trained
or untrained teachers and an archaic education system (ICG, 2009), all of which create a difficult
environment for children to work in.
Additionally, as previously stated, the restrictions on refugee employment imposed by the Lebanese
authorities mean that “regardless of how well *refugee students+ do academically, they will not have
a professional career in Lebanon” (Shuayb, 2014:27). Here, it is clear that when a community’s
existence is reliant on other providers, whether this is the state or agencies that act as a quasi-state,
in which they have no role in the structure or running of, this community cannot be secure as it will
never be able to facilitate the creation of its own community building blocks. Economic strains on
families and poor classroom facilities are not the only reasons for high levels of school dropout.
There are also cultural reasons with UNRWA highlighting that among girls who drop out of school, 25
percent quote early marriage as a reason, equating to two per cent of all girls in Lebanese schools
(UNRWA, 2013: 4). The fact that this disproportionately affects females is important in highlighting
that community security should not focus on a single community, with the assumption that that one
community has a singular identity. The refugee community, despite being the focus of this analysis,
should be understood as a collection of multiple identities and UNRWA can only go so far in
addressing all these identities adequately, rather than the single refugee community.
In Lebanon, perhaps more than in any other host country, refugee unemployment in camps is a
major problem (UNRWA, 2014b) and the reasons for this and the consequences it has on the school
attendance levels have been detailed above. In an attempt to stimulate employment among the
refugee communities in the camps, UNRWA has, for over two decades, had in place a Microfinance
Programme. This programme, active across all host countries, has over the past 20 years awarded
over 140,000 loans worth around 150 million USD (Abu Zayd, 2009: 227). Despite former UNRWA
Commissioner General Karen Abu Zayd opining that the self-sustaining nature of the Microfinance
Programme is “a tribute to the industry and entrepreneurial acumen of the Palestinian people” (Abu
Zayd, 2009: 227), the impact of a loan system to start a business in an country where one is severely
restricted in terms of movement and property ownership should be questioned. There is no doubt as
to the importance of economic self-sustainability in helping foster emancipatory security in a
community but in the conditions experienced by the Palestinians in Lebanon this can only be
achieved to a limited extent.
Despite its limitations, UNRWA has done an impressive job in providing for and enhancing the
education of the Palestinians and providing essential services, which are in themselves empowering
(Hanafi 2014: 134). Our security analysis, however, must go beyond provision of services. The
implications, both negative and positive, of UNRWA’s mere existence and the politics of the
assistance it provides should not be overlooked. First, UNRWA has often been criticised for its
structure and organisation which is viewed by many to be top-down and paternalistic (al Husseini,
2010:11), resulting in programs being “carried out for rather than with the beneficiaries (al Husseini,
2010: 11: original emphasis). Where the Agency has encouraged refugee participation, especially in
the early years of its existence, it has been claimed that this was simply a “barely-concealed attempt
to facilitate a de facto resolution [of the refugee situation] through economic reintegration of
refugees in the region” (Rempel, 2009: 417) and as such “there was a failure of acknowledging that…
voiceless victims desire to become emancipated subjects” (Hanafi, 2014: 130).
As a result, rather than providing them with emancipatory capabilities, it inhibited their ability to
form a coherent identity. The need for structural change in a number of its operational areas has not
gone unnoticed by UNRWA and since 2007 it has put in place a number of reforms to address the
lack of coordination with the refugee community. The reforms suggested and currently being
initiated are far-reaching. With regard to health services, reforms focus on community engagement
and include the implementation of a Family Health Team approach which serves the needs of a
defined population “in a community setting that is close to the client” (UNRWA, 2011b: 5). The
emphasis in this new approach is to limit the hierarchical structure in which the Agency provides for
the refugee population but instead to create “a partnership between the provider, the patient and
the patient’s family” (UNRWA,
2011b: 5).
In addition to criticism of its organisational structure, UNRWA’s very creation was initially a
contentious issue, greeted with suspicion by many Palestinians who viewed “UNRWA’s services as
organically linked to their right of return” (al Husseini, 2010: 9). In the camps, the gradual
replacement of tents with permanent structures and even the employment of refugees in early relief
and works programmes were seen as attempts to resettle the refugees and deny their right of return
(Rempel, 2009). As a result, such activities were often met with “various forms of resistance,
including refusal to participate, attacks on UNRWA’s local staff and ‘anti-resettlement’
demonstrations” (al Husseini, 2010: 8). These attacks and demonstrations stem from the refugees
fear of tawteen, which, as highlighted above is not something desired by either the refugees or
Lebanese citizens or government. Although UNRWA’s formation as a temporary organisation should
indicate that it is only there for as long as the Palestine-Israel conflict endures, it has still had to
address claims that it seeks to relocate the refugee population in the host countries permanently.
Although integration with the host country was an initial aim UNRWA has always denied that
permanent resettlement is the goal and recently reiterated this in an interview, emphasising that
“Palestinians are entitled to a just and lasting solution to their plight.
In the absence of –and pending the realisation of – such a solution, it stands to reason that their
status as refugees will remain” (UNRWA, 2011c). The complexity of the relationship between
UNRWA and the refugees can be seen in how, despite the hostility faced by the Agency and its staff,
it is now an essential part of Palestinian history and “has been instrumental in forging [a Palestinian]
sense of identity as refugees” (Bowker, 2003: 2). This is because UNRWA serves not only a practical
purpose for the refugee community but also a symbolic one, serving as a reminder of their political
rights and enforcing the memory of what was lost when they left their homes (Bowker, 2003). While
the Agency’s education services can be criticised for adopting the curriculum of the host country and
thereby inhibiting the development of identity among the young, one could say that, since “the
history of UNRWA and the history of the Palestinian refugees are… inseparable” (Bocco, 2009: 236),
its existence serves to help enhance another form of identity. Additionally, while UNRWA is
undergoing an intentional shift in its operational practices in education, social provision and health,
it has also undergone a gradual change, whether intentional or not, in terms of the services it
provides, with the Agency now adopting an additional symbolic role (Bartholomeusz, 2009; Khouri,
2009). Brynen (2014) proposes that, in its new symbolic role, UNRWA has become an avatar for the
international responsibility for the Palestinian refugees, for Palestinian refugee advocacy on the
international stage and for perpetuation of the conflict. This, once again, contributes to the creation
of the refugee identity and, combined with the shared history between the refugee community and
the Agency, serves to provide the foundations around which social cohesion vital for the formation
of an emancipatory community can be built.
Overall, it can be seen that the relationship between UNRWA and the refugees in Lebanon is a
complicated one. The security it provides would appear to be the traditional, paternal security that
serves as a replacement for the absent Lebanese state. Here, just as the role of a state can damage
the security of its citizens, it can be seen that the role of UNRWA was not initially seen as increasing
the security of the Palestinian refugees, with its presence instead creating an increasingly hostile
environment. However, with increased genuine participation of the refugees in various programmes,
and with the increasingly symbolic position of UNRWA, the security it provides is a changing one,
enabling the refugee community to establish a stronger identity. The ability of the refugee
community to further enhance its security could be made possible if it were to take a more active
role in the formulation of the education curriculum; however, this would result in extreme pressure
from particular states such as the United States and Israel who would envisage a dangerous identity
developing (Dumper, 2008). Although UNRWA increased certain capabilities of the Palestinian
refugees, as a non-political and outside entity, it is not in a position to truly allow emancipatory
security within the context that exists. Below, our analysis turns to Palestinian actors and how their
engagement in the refugee camps has allowed for greater autonomy, thereby offering the possibility
for increased emancipatory capabilities.
The PLO and its Emancipatory Potential
The absence of the Lebanese state allowed UNRWA to serve as a substitute in terms of services and
support. However, despite its more prominent role as an advocate of Palestinian rights on the
international stage and its inevitable entanglement with Palestinian politics, it has been unable to fill
the political void faced by Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This chapter will analyse the operation of
the PLO, one of the main actors which has provided the refugees in Lebanon with what many see as
the closest they have come to autonomy and self-determination (Weighill, 1997: 298). Despite the
apparent increased emancipatory capacity of the Palestinians during the PLO’s presence in Lebanon,
the difficulties that came about as a result of the organisation’s presence and the problems it caused
in terms of traditional security cannot be overlooked. The PLO, founded in 1964 as an umbrella
organisation for the many often fractious Palestinian groups, became increasingly prominent in
Lebanon following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war which saw the occupation of the West Bank –
previously their main area of operation - by Israel. Using the refugee camps as bases for their
operation, the armed wing of the PLO became involved in frequent clashes with Maronite militia
throughout 1968 and 1969. The increased violence led to the PLO and the Lebanese government
signing the Cairo Accords in 1969 in which the PLO agreed to recognise and respect the sovereignty
of the Lebanese territory. With regard to the Cairo Accords, Shiblak (1997) believes that “of greater
consequence… was the fact that for the first time there was an attempt [by the Lebanese
government] to address the civil, social and economic rights of the Palestinians” (Shiblak, 1997: 267),
by reducing restrictions on refugee movement and by granting the PLO autonomy within the camps.
Although the increased civil, social and economic rights may have been a result of granting the PLO
autonomy in the camps, the concern of the Lebanese government was more likely to be the
increasing damage the PLO was inflicting on Lebanese infrastructure and the economy, and the
growing strain the supporters of the Palestinians were placing on state cohesion (ICG, 2009). This
demonstrates that the dominant attitude was a concern with traditional security and highlights the
difficulty of being an emancipatory actor within this environment, with its presence simultaneously
causing a loss of emancipatory potential due to the increase in armed conflict and an increase in
emancipatory potential through the provision of relative autonomy and self-determination. In
addition to the 1969 Cairo Accords, in 1970, the rapid rise in fighting between Palestinian militia in
Jordan and the Jordanian army led to the PLO’s relocation from Jordan to Lebanon. Once it had
officially relocated it built on its status as the authority of the Palestinian camps and “enhanced its
political, social and educational institutions, building an impressive network that improved refugees’
lives” (ICG, 2009: 5). The services that were provided by the PLO were similar to services provided by
the UNRWA: improvements to camp resources through, for example, the digging of wells and the
provision of electricity (Shiblak, 1997), and the growth of nurseries, health clinics and training
centres that was “due almost exclusively to the transfer of the PLO leadership from Jordan to
Lebanon” (Hanafi, 2009: 137-138). Additionally, the PLO worked to provide jobs for the refugees,
with Hudson claiming that the PLO and its institutions were responsible for creating 10,000 jobs
directly and 30,000 jobs indirectly (Hudson, 1997: 254) which resulted in the Palestinian economy
within Lebanon contributing to 15 per cent of Lebanese Gross Domestic Product (Hudson, 1997:
154). Whereas the services provided by UNRWA, while undoubtedly beneficial in terms of survival
for the refugees, have been criticised for reducing the Palestinian refugees “from being citizens and
holders of rights to objects of development and beneficiaries of international charity” (Rempel,
2009: 418), the services provided by the PLO were seen as empowering. Rather than being an
outside agency providing services to the Palestinians, the PLO were Palestinians providing for
Palestinians, which helped remove the feeling of dependency from their collective identity.
The PLO’s presence in Lebanon was important in providing Palestinian refugees with greater security
in terms of securing Palestinian autonomy over the camps and Palestinian populated areas, as well
as through improving the quality of life within the camps by providing the refugees with the agency
to create work and foster a sense of community. However, the connection between an
emancipatory view of security and a traditional understanding of security cannot be overlooked in
this situation. While autonomy and self-dependence may, to a certain extent have been increase
due to the presence of the PLO, they were simultaneously
undermined. First, following the signing of the Cairo Accords, the violence between the Palestinian
militias and the Maronite Phalangist militias continued unabated. Apart from the strain the
Palestinian presence was having on the country’s fragile demographics, reasons for the increased
violence include the growth of the Palestinian infrastructure which “began to encroach on Lebanese
state authority” (Hudson, 1997: 253) and the fact the growing strength of the PLO, which was
associated with the development of an embryonic Palestinian state, was having a detrimental effect
on the Lebanese economy due to the increased airstrikes from Israel (Najem, 2012: 27). The violence
between the militias continued to escalate and it is often cited as one of the key causes of the
outbreak of the civil war in 1975. From a traditional security perspective, the civil war was disastrous
for the security of the Palestinian refugees. If the PLO had come to be seen as a quasi-state,
however, it constantly failed to protect the Palestinian population, leaving them in a state of
desperate insecurity. Following the outbreak of the civil war, which is often understood to have
been triggered by the murder of 27 Palestinians on a bus by Maronite militia, the Palestinian
communities were targeted by the Lebanese Christian right. This included attacks on camps and
populations in East Beirut as well as a siege on the Tel al-Za’atar camp which left hundreds dead
(Roberts, 2010: 83).
When Israel entered the war, the Palestinians faced further destruction both from the Israeli
Defence Force (IDF) and the South Lebanese Army (SLA) which acted as an Israeli proxy army. In
1978, the IDF launched a major advance into south Lebanon and in 1982 they went further and
advanced on Beirut. The advances saw the widespread destruction of PLO civilian and military
infrastructure with the 1982 advance seeing the Ein el-Hilweh camp completely destroyed and 70
percent of homes in the Rashidieh camp demolished (Roberts, 2010: 84). Furthermore, following
cease-fire brokered by the United States and PLO’s withdrawal in 1982, a series of events led to the
Phalangist forces entering the camps of Sabra and Shatila, resulting in the slaughter of around 2,400
Palestinian refugees. The death and destruction at Sabra and Shatila were not the only
consequences of the PLO withdrawal. Between 1985 and 1991, the so-called war of the camps
ensued between remaining Fatah loyalists and Syrian-backed Shi’a militia Amal, resulting in the
death of thousands of Palestinians (Roberts, 2010).
Despite the devastation faced by the Palestinians throughout the civil war, and the obvious loss of
security from a traditional perspective, the conditions faced by the Palestinians after the war suggest
that the PLO improved their emancipatory capacities significantly in the time period in which they
were present. As already stated, the withdrawal of the PLO elites from Lebanon in 1982 had
disastrous consequences for the Palestinians. Not only did it leave them open to the extreme
violence discussed but it removed their political voice and damaged their capacity for autonomy,
leaving many feeling abandoned. Following the war, this “immense sense of abandonment and
neglect” (Besson, 1997: 346) deepened as Yasser Arafat withdrew funding for PLO institutions in
Lebanon (Roberts, 2010: 117) which, combined with the Lebanese government’s moves to reestablish control over the Palestinian population through building and movement restrictions
(Sayigh, 1995: 43), left the Palestinians with little financial or political support. Additionally, the
feelings of neglect were further ingrained at the Oslo Accords where the refugees in Lebanon felt
they were not represented and, without their contribution, two major agreements were made. First,
the PLO agreed that the status of refugees should be left as a final status issue and second, the
Palestinian Authority was created as a new autonomous authority for Gaza and the West Bank
legitimised by elections. The creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in particular left refugees
outside of the PA’s jurisdiction feeling side-lined and, subsequently, the confidence and autonomy
they had enjoyed throughout the PLO’s residence crumbled. The establishment of the PA was met
with wide-spread discontent which culminated in the majority of refugee camps in Lebanon holding
a general strike in protest to the 1996 Palestinian Authority elections (Rubin, 1999: 158).
Despite the Palestinians’ feeling of neglect, the PLO presence in Lebanon did have a lasting impact
as, although the Cairo agreement formally came to an end in 1987, a precedent was established in
terms of camp autonomy (Hanafi, 2009) and the Lebanese military refrained from entering the
camps until 2007. The security provided by the PLO to the refugees in Lebanon is problematic. Many
opine that during the relatively short time that the organisation was based in the country, the rights
of the refugees were improved and their autonomy increased (Shiblak, 1997; Weighill, 1997; Hanafi,
2009). In Booth’s understanding this would represent an improved security condition as their
emancipatory capacity was increased relative to their condition before the arrival of the PLO. The
emancipatory security of the refugees cannot, however, be isolated from traditional notions of
security as “no security concept should dismiss the danger of war *or+ the importance of military
power” (Booth, 1991: 318). If we consider the PLO as an emancipatory actor - a consideration that is
not without problems – then it is the very existence of this emancipatory actor that gave rise to the
death and destruction of thousands of Palestinian lives throughout the civil war which brings into
question the extent to which the refugees can be considered emancipated. Despite this, there is
evidence to suggest that the increased autonomy did serve to improve the lives of the Palestinian
refugees to the extent that during camp interviews conducted by Latif (2012), she found the phrase
“it was better during the war” often repeated (Latif, 2012) with interviewees reasoning that “the
community had been united during the war, that people had cared for one another” (Latif, 2012:
37). Without the hegemonic presence of the PLO the community in the camp has become fractured
and this has given rise to a number of other actors, including religious actors. The extent to which
this has increased the emancipatory capacity of the refugees will be examined below.
Emancipatory Potential in the Community: Religion and Grassroots Participation
So far, following an analysis of the insufficiencies of the Lebanese state in providing security in any
form for the Palestinian refugees, this paper has concerned itself with actors that have played a role
in filling the void left by the state: UNRWA and the PLO. This section directs its attention away from
the quasi-state entities and provides an evaluation of the emancipatory potential of communitybased groups. First of all, this will involve looking at the role of religious actors in the camps and the
extent that they provide emancipatory potential for the Palestinians. Following this, this paper will
look at examples, including those from outside Lebanon, of how the communities in various camps
have come together to participate and empower themselves at individual and community levels.
Hizbollah, Hamas and religious community: As highlighted in previous chapters, throughout the civil
war the dominant representative of the Palestinians in Lebanon was the secular PLO. However,
following the removal of the PLO and the withering of the remaining Fatah fighters
towards the end of the war, “there has been a gradual shift from secular authorities to religious
authority” (Hanafi, 2009: 143) and it is now widely perceived by camp members that Islamism has
become a powerful force within the camps over the past decade (Hanafi, 2009: 155). Of the Islamic
political groups that operate with support from the camps there are five of Lebanese and two of
Palestinian origin (Knudsen, 2005). Of the Lebanese Islamic groups, Hizbollah would appear to have
the most support in the camps (Knudsen, 2005). This may be due to the fact that the party, founded
in 1985, stood in opposition to Amal during war of the camps and has played a significant role in
fighting for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, a goal which was finally
achieved in 2000. Both of these aspects, along with the group’s maintenance of a well-armed and
organised militia, mean that Palestinians would do well to ensure cooperation with the Shi’a group.
The military strength of Hizbollah, however, is not the most important aspect of their relationship
and not one which appears to provide any sort of real emancipatory potential. The reasons for the
popularity of Hizbollah in the camps - despite it being a Shi’a group and the majority of the camps
being Sunni – are twofold. First of all, like the quasi-state actors looked at already, the group
provides camp residents with welfare assistance. For example, “in the dilapidated Shatila refugee
camp… Hizbollah provides residents with potable water and supplies of diesel” (Knudsen, 2005:
224). Perhaps more importantly, however, its success in Lebanese elections has enabled it to
advance Palestinian aspirations in Lebanese political forums from which the Palestinians are barred.
This clientele-like relationship is referred to by Knudsen (2005) as a ‘strategic alliance’. The idea of a
strategic alliance between a political party that is the mouthpiece for the
disenfranchised Shi’a population of Lebanon and the Palestinians who are unable to repay Hizbollah
with votes in elections may at first seem like a flawed notion. Cammett (2014), however, explains
that although political organisations would normally expect political support, this support may not
always be in the form of electoral support and may also consist of extra-state participation including
confrontational forms of mobilisation such as protests and riots (Cammett, 2014: 13).
This would suggest that Hizbollah’s reasoning for providing services to the Palestinians is not to
empower them but to increase their own position of influence and develop their own mobilisation
resources. This position is one advanced by Sayigh (2001) who observes that Hizbollah’s leader,
Sayyad Hassan Nasrallah, often voices support for Palestinian civil rights but fails to commit
Hizbollah to achieving this goal (Sayigh, 2001). The possible reasoning for this façade of support is
the risk the party faces of alienating the Lebanese Shi’a population – the core of its support – and
demonstrates the limitations of advancing the emancipatory potential
of a group it does not represent.
Of the two Palestinian groups operating in the camps, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Hamas has the
greater support base which it has gained through the provision of its “trademark social services and
welfare support” (Knudsen, 2005: 227). Like Hizbollah Hamas provides a variety of welfare services
to those residing in the camps. Unlike Hizbollah, however, as a Palestinian and Sunni party, Hamas
can claim it represents the interests of the Palestinians. Once again however, it could be suggested
that the welfare and extensive services provided to the refugee camps are not simply for the
purpose of empowering the Palestinians with emancipatory potential but to use the refugee support
to maintain a ‘strategic rivalry’ and use the camps to create a ‘strategic clash’ (Knudsen, 2005),
specifically against the secular PLO and particularly following the 2006 elections in Gaza and the
West Bank and the war that followed. According to Hanafi (2008), rather than the presence of
secular nationalist movements and conservative religious movements in the camps nurturing a
distinct Palestinian identity, the presence of the different groups has “produced an un-docile urban
identity rather than a national one” (Hanafi, 2008: 95).
Although it could be said that both Hamas and Hizbollah increase the emancipatory potential of the
Palestinians through the provision of social and welfare services, the fact that this provision is used
as a means of coercion (Worrall, 2013: 245) undermines this potential. Additionally, with reference
to Hizbollah, Worrall (2013) also highlights the difficulties of an actor which champions the creation
of an Islamic state as one of its ultimate goals having emancipatory potential. As highlighted above,
the pragmatic shift of the group has created a number of similarities between themselves and CSS
notions of emancipation. Despite this, the creation of an Islamic state by a Shi’a group would create
a situation of repression for some members of the community that clashes with Booth’s universal
ideas of emancipation, especially for the Palestinians, the majority of whom are Sunni. The same
argument can also be presented as to why Hamas is limited as an emancipatory actor, with the faith
it presents conflicting with CSS notions of emancipation.
Aside from the growth in popularity of religious political parties within the camps, there has also
been a revival in conservative Sunni Islam. This has not only taken place in the camps but also in the
main cities in Lebanon, as well as across much of the Middle East. Due to the close proximity of
many of the camps to the cities, this has resulted in the mingling of Sunni Palestinians with Sunni
Lebanese where the different communities have come together in schools, mosques and community
centres (Hanafi, 2009). It could be suggested that rather than the Islamic parties such as Hamas and
Hizbollah, it is through these smaller religious communities that emancipatory potential is created.
Hanafi (2009) observes that “by welcoming camp residents into their midst socially and by accepting
Palestinians into their religious colleges… these *Lebanese+ actors have provided many Palestinians
with new frames of reference to discuss their situation” (Hanafi, 2009: 153). Although there are still
the same difficulties in reconciling aspects of religion and the emancipation envisaged by CSS, this
kind of action enables the camp residents to develop their identity without the influence of external
actors who may be seeking to involve themselves for their own gain. It is through this kind of
community-level religious community that emancipatory potential is achieved.
Community, Camp Governance and Participation:
The presence of religion in the camps has mixed consequences for the residents. Although it can
increase their emancipatory potential by helping with the development of their identity, ultimately it
is limited in providing them with a means to participation within the camps. The participation it does
enable is limited to welfare distribution and societal roles. This participation of the refugees in the
camps is one area in which their security could be increased by enabling their emancipatory
potential.
There have been a number of attempts to increase the participation of refugees and the systems of
governance active in the camps are in place to try and achieve this. Governance takes place through
a number of committees including the Popular Committees and their associated Security
Committees, Neighbourhood Committees, Armed Struggle Committees, and separate follow-up
committees for both the north and the south. In each camp, the Popular Committees, with the input
of the other committees, govern under the supervision of the PLO ambassador from whom many
Palestinians in Lebanon already feel alienated. Although Hanafi (2009) observes that “these
committees rarely come to any consensus on important issues *and+ fail to coordinate activity”
(Hanafi, 2009: 139), this in itself should not be considered a problem as the existence of a forum of
debate is more important than the outcome when considering the success of participation. The main
problem with the governance in the camps, other than the supervision by an organisation from
which the residents feel isolated, is that the members of the Popular Committees are appointed
rather than elected and as such are unrepresentative (Hanafi, 2009). This results in many residents
and especially the youth regarding both the committees and the political class within the camps as
“largely illegitimate” (Hanafi, 2009: 141). True emancipation within the camps must involve refugee
participation in the governing of their lives and society, and in the development of their identity. AlNammari (2014) highlights how community empowerment has been achieved through participation
in camp improvements at the Talbiyeh camp in Jordan. Here, in 2008, there was an open forum for
discussion on how best to use and improve land within the camp. The discussion, organised by the
local assembly and facilitated by UNRWA, was open and attended by representatives from schools,
nongovernmental organisations, clinics, sports clubs and Camp Services Committees as well as a
range of others. Together, they discussed the needs of the different groups, the challenges faced
and the possible solutions that might be found. As well as agreeing on improvements for local
schools, health centres and camp infrastructure the group also agreed on creating an urban space
which would meet the needs of women and children who were the main users of the camp during
the day (Al- Nammari, 201: 212). Throughout the process, there were a number of challenges and
disagreements along the way. These disagreements, however, are a part of the participatory process
and are of greater value to the security of the refugees than the implementation of camp
improvements by an external organisation through which they have no input.
The example of camp improvements at Talbiyeh camp is not unique. Another example of where a
refugee participatory approach has been utilised is with the Neirab Rehabilitation Project in Syria,
where the refugee population was mobilised and involved in project planning and implementation
(Gabiam, 2014). In examples such as these, however, the countries in which the camps are located
play an important role in terms of facilitation and legislation. In Lebanon, the implementation of a
project that includes open public spaces, for example, would be difficult due to planning restrictions.
Although there have been efforts to overcome the hostility between the Lebanese state and the
refugee camps with the establishment of the
Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committees discussed above, there remain limitations to its
approach. With regard to camp improvements, for example, between 2006 and 2009 the LPDC and
UNRWA undertook major camp improvements with the Camp Improvement Initiative which hoped
to address ‘critical’ and ‘essential’ needs of many of the camps (UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, 2009).
Like the improvements in the Talbiyeh camp these improvements included camp infrastructure,
schools, health clinics, youth centres and community centres (UNRWA Lebanon Field Office, 2009).
Unlike the improvements at the Talbiyeh camp and Neirab camp, however, there is no evidence of
whether the camp residents were included in discussion of what was needed, what improvements
they would have like to have seen or what problems they believe to exist. This comes despite the
reforms to UNRWA outlined in previous chapters which seemed to demonstrate that the Agency had
a commitment to mainstreaming stakeholder participation (Rempel, 2014: 156). It is possible that
the Camp Improvement Initiative may have been developed prior to the widespread UNRWA
reforms and, as such, it serves to highlight previous weaknesses in the Agency’s operations with
regard to refugee participation. It is likely that many of the improvements proposed and undertaken
would be similar to those that would have been suggested by the refugees. In failing to provide a
space for these discussions the Camp Improvements Initiative failed in increasing the participatory
capacities of the refugee camp residents and, as such, proved restrictive in enabling their
emancipatory potential. In addition to participation in governance mechanisms and camp
improvement schemes within the camps, a certain level of refugee emancipation can be achieved
through informal political means such as through mobilisation and protest. An example of a group
which increases the emancipatory potential of the refugee community in this way is Association
Najdeh. This independent Lebanese organisation was established in 1978 to help support Palestinian
refugee women with an income. As the organisation has grown, so has its role and it now works to
empower women who represent the most disadvantaged section of the Palestinian refugee
community in Lebanon (Association Najdeh, 2014). The group operates 26 centres across the camps
and focuses on vocational training, addressing domestic violence, mother and child services and
social affairs programmes (Association Najdeh, 2014). More recently, it has become increasingly
involved in advocating for the right of Palestinian refugees to work in Lebanon and in 2005
established the Right to Work campaign (Bianchi, 2014: 169) which culminated in the March for Civil
Rights of Palestinian Refugees in 2010 (Bianchi, 2014: 169). Although Association Najdeh is a
Lebanese organisation, its involvement with the Palestinian community and with Palestinian women
in particular, empowers the refugees through targeted, interactive and participatory services as well
as through mobilisation. These actions greatly increase the emancipatory capacity of the Palestinian
refugees, giving them a greater voice, the chance to play an active and meaningful role in their
community and apply pressure to change their circumstances through informal means. The lives of
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are not solely dependent on the actions of the Lebanese state,
UNRWA or the PLO. This chapter, in two sections, demonstrates how the presence of other
organisations in the camp can increase the emancipatory capacity of the refugees, thereby
increasing their security as understood by CSS. There are, inevitably, a number of problems with
religious organisations as emancipatory actors, especially when these actors declare an Islamic state
to be their goal. This declaration clashes with Booth’s understanding of universal rights and shows
the limitations of a CSS approach where different values of universalism and restrictive religious
values meet. Additionally, there are problems with the religious organisations that were looked at in
that both Hizbollah and Hamas are also political parties that do not represent the camps
legitimately. Despite these problems with religion in the camps, the growth of community based
religion which crosses the boundaries of the camps and the surrounding cities, offers the chance for
emancipatory potential through identity creation. Overall, it can be seen that community level
engagement is a necessity if the refugees are to be empowered with emancipatory potential. The
current systems of governance within the camps seem to lack this as do attempts to improve the
camp infrastructure, which, unlike the examples drawn from Jordan and Syria, still seem to be
implemented from the top down. There are, however, reasons to be optimistic with regard to
participation.
Through empowerment of particular sections of the refugee community, groups such as Najdeh can
help increase the potential for emancipation among the refugees and ultimately help increase their
security situation, according to CSS, as far as it can be in the context that the Palestinian refugees
find themselves in.
Conclusion
The security situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is one of deep complexity and a case
study that presents a number of unique challenges to the application of a security analysis.
Traditional security studies places the state as the referent object of security and for this reason
proves problematic in our analysis of refugees. Throughout this paper it has been demonstrated that
both states and quasi-state actors have faced a number of difficulties in providing security through a
more traditional understanding. Instead, this paper has sought to analyse the extent to which a
range of actors have increased the security of the refugees in the CSS understanding of the concept:
through increasing the emancipatory potential of the Palestinian refugees.
First, we saw that the Lebanese state has, since the arrival of the Palestinian refugees, failed to
provide security in either the traditional or CSS notion of the word. This has mainly been due to the
fragile demographic makeup of the state which meant that the state saw the refugees as a threat
and, as such acted in a hostile manner, especially through the restriction of their civil, political and
economic rights. Although its attitude towards the refugees and the camps is largely a cause of
insecurity for the refugees, there have been recent improvements with the Lebanese government
attempting to work alongside the Palestinians on a number of matters through the LebanesePalestinian Dialogue Committee.
Following an analysis of the Lebanese state, our attention turned towards two actors who have
become state-like in the absence of a state for the Palestinian refugees. Both UNRWA and the PLO
have provided a number of services for the Palestinian refugees that have served to increase their
emancipatory potential. For UNRWA, this has particularly been the case with regard to education,
health and employment. There are, however, limitations with providing emancipatory potential
through education due to the fact that the curriculum of the host country is used, affecting the
development of a collective Palestinian identity. Despite the service UNRWA provides, its structural
organisation has come under criticism as it limits the participatory potential of the Palestinians.
Recently, however, the Agency has sought to address these criticisms through a number of wideranging reforms which would serve to engage the refugees and change the role of the Agency into
one of a facilitator as well as a provider. Additionally, UNRWA has developed a more informal
advocacy role in the past two decades which has seen it become something of a representative for
Palestinian refugee rights on the international stage. This has meant that the Agency has now
become a key part of Palestinian refugee identity and, as such, is an important actor in providing
emancipatory potential.
The presence of the other quasi-state actor, the PLO, has been problematic for the security of the
refugees. While it is widely believed that the presence of the organisation throughout the 1970s and
into the 1980s increased the autonomy of the refugees in the camps and helped reaffirm their sense
of identity, its presence in the camps is also cited as a key reason for the build-up of tension leading
to the Lebanese civil war which caused a great amount of insecurity for the refugees. Following the
departure of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982 and especially since the signing of the Oslo Accords,
many Palestinian refugees have expressed a sense of abandonment and the ability of the PLO to
increase the emancipatory potential within the camps has since decreased significantly.
As the essay addressed community engagement, it could be seen that the presence of other actors
has had a mixed impact on the emancipatory potential of the refugees. It is unlikely that religious
organisations such as Hamas or Hizbollah will increase the emancipatory potential of the refugees
because of the difficulty of aligning the aspirations of an Islamic state desired by these two groups,
with the needs of the Palestinians. This could only be possible at the cost of excluding certain
sections of society, which of course would contravene CSS’s understanding of
universal rights as an important factor for general emancipation. At a community level, however, the
increased level of interaction between Lebanese Sunnis outside the camps and Palestinian Sunnis
inside the camps has helped to break down cultural barriers and could play an important role in the
creation of identity. This community level engagement is not limited to religion and it can be seen
that the participation of the refugee community in camps in Jordan and Syria serve as examples of
where participation can increase the emancipatory potential. This may, at times, rely on the state,
though, it is important to observe that grassroots organisations provide the means to participate
through more informal means. Based on our analysis of these groups, it can be seen that, despite
calls to move away from state-centrism when providing a security analysis, it is not possible to do so
in the case of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon because of the impact the state and quasi-state
actors have on the emancipatory capabilities of the refugees. An analysis of the emancipatory
potential of the refugees must involve an analysis of all actors involved. Overall, the emancipation of
the Palestinians is possible through their ability to participate in key decisions regarding their lives,
especially through education, employment and identity. In their current situation there are a
number of factors which inhibit their ability to achieve this although this, although grassroots
community groups and UNRWA (following its structural reforms) may help in facilitating
emancipatory potential. Aside from the solution of the Palestine-Israel conflict and the return of the
refugees to their home, the best hope of security lies in the growth of grassroots, community based
actors that encourage refugee participation.
In order to provide an overall picture of the refugee security situation in Lebanon, this paper has
covered a large number of actors and has often generalised in its analysis of the refugee population.
A deeper analysis through primary research within the camps that focuses on the emancipatory
potential of specific groups within the refugee community and explores the multifaceted aspects of
different lives would be more insightful and more useful in contributing to our understanding of the
security challenges faced. Overall, however, this paper has provided a useful introduction into the
security situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and how the concept of emancipation is
useful in addressing this situation. Simultaneously, it has highlighted that in order for relative
emancipation to be achieved, there are certain situations where the state and other state-like actors
must be utilised and more traditional notions of security must be acknowledged as they can prove a
threat to the emancipatory potential of a community.
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