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Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
NATO AFTER 2014
REPORT
Jadwiga ZAKRZEWSKA (Poland)
Rapporteur
Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations
www.nato-pa.int
22 November 2014
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
II.
NATO’S ROLE IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT................ 1
A.
THE CHALLENGE POSED BY RUSSIA....................................................................... 2
B.
THE CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN ............................................. 3
C.
THE THREATS TO STABILITY IN THE MENA REGION ............................................. 3
D.
ENERGY SECURITY ................................................................................................... 4
E.
CYBER SECURITY ...................................................................................................... 5
F.
THE NEED FOR INCREASED CO-OPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS ........................................................................................................ 5
III.
THE CONTINUING ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE IMPACT ON NATO ... 6
IV.
STRENGTHENING NATO CAPABILITIES ............................................................................ 8
A.
SMART DEFENCE AND CONNECTED FORCES........................................................ 8
B.
MISSILE DEFENCE ..................................................................................................... 9
C.
EXPANDED EDUCATION AND TRAINING .................................................................. 9
V.
THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP .............. 10
VI.
CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 13
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I.
INTRODUCTION
1.
2014 is a major inflection point for the Alliance as it ends the combat mission in Afghanistan
and is confronted with a serious security crisis in Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea by the
Russian Federation and the resulting and continuing instability of Ukraine have changed the
Euro-Atlantic security environment fundamentally. This new and drastic development has
refocused the Allies on NATO’s ‘core mission’ – the defence of its member states
against an attack – reiterated by all Allies in the Wales Summit Declaration.
2.
Post-2014, NATO’s operational tempo is likely to diminish and this will require a change in
focus for the Alliance. At the same time, NATO still needs a full-spectrum capability ready to deal
with the whole range of possible threats to its interests and security, whether in NATO’s own
neighbourhood or beyond. However, retaining and sustaining its operational edge will be difficult
as Allies continue to struggle with the adverse consequences of the financial crisis and its impact
on Allied defence budgets. NATO now has to decide how to ensure the viability of the Afghan
state, maintain its operational edge in the time of austerity, and reinforce its partnership policy.
3.
In addition, new and emerging security challenges and global trends such as shifts in
economic and military power, demographics, and increasing demand for scarce resources will
require NATO to revisit its strategy for the future as well as its roles, missions, and functions.
NATO needs to continue developing new capabilities to effectively counter emerging security
threats, such as cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare. Moreover, a continuing transatlantic gap in
defence investment and the over-reliance on American assets is unsustainable in the long term,
especially as the United States rebalances to Asia and grapples with fiscal challenges of its own.
The continued underinvestment in defence by US Allies poses a serious challenge to the cohesion
of the Alliance.
4.
This short report provides a snapshot of the issues NATO needs to address as it prepares to
shape “Future NATO”. It will build on previous reports adopted by the NATO PA and draws on the
results and implications of the Wales Summit. In a first section, the report will provide a brief
analysis of the current international security environment and the geopolitical challenges the
Alliance is facing in 2014. In a second section, attention will be given to the impact of the
continuing financial and economic crisis on NATO. A third part of the report reviews possibilities to
strengthen NATO capabilities and, in a final step, this paper will outline some policy
recommendations for a united and capable NATO after 2014. In essence, this report calls upon all
Allies to follow up on the agreements of the Summit in Wales by providing the necessary
resources as well as political leadership, both of which is crucial if NATO wants to remain the most
effective and reliable security organisation in the world.
II.
NATO’S ROLE IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
5.
2014 is an inflection point for the Alliance marked by several important developments,
including the end of NATO’s combat mission in Afghanistan, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and
its intimidating approach towards Ukraine and the emergence of the so-called “Islamic State” (IS).
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine represents a historic turning point and demonstrates that
the European security environment is both fragile and unpredictable. At the same time, Russia’s
approach to the Ukraine crisis also demonstrates the characteristics of a new form of warfare,
‘hybrid’ warfare, a mixture of unorthodox and varied techniques that can include economic
pressure, cyber-attacks, unmarked special forces, information warfare, intelligence operations,
and the potential use of conventional force without open military conflict. All of this takes place
against the backdrop of the continuing financial crisis, which has generated a mismatch between
limited resources and the continuing, and possibly increasing, demand for NATO’s engagement.
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6.
The security environment continues to evolve dramatically as technological innovation,
especially in information technology, allows both state and non-state actors to extend their reach
and impact. Combining different forms of warfare, these challenges blur the distinction between
peace and war, fighters and non-combatants. In addition, local conflicts may no longer be limited
by geography; they can inspire, enrage, and indoctrinate people to the effect that the battlefield
can extend across the globe. The actions of the IS that presents itself as a “state” and not only a
terrorist group serve as an example for this development.
7.
As the security challenges evolve, NATO needs to maintain and develop capabilities “tailored
to the complex 21st century threat environment,” which include terrorism, intensive information
warfare, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), ethnic and religious conflicts, cyber
warfare, the rise of emerging powers, and fierce competition for resources. At the same time, the
continuing crisis in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and Moscow’s
strong military posture on its western borders offers a stark reminder that Cold War thinking
(where any “loss” for NATO is a “gain” for Russia) still seems to be prevalent among Moscow’s
political and military elite. At the Wales Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government
recognised the need for the Alliance to adapt to this changing security environment. As former
NATO Secretary General Rasmussen declared at the Summit “in these turbulent times NATO
must be prepared to undertake the full range of missions and to defend Allies against the full
range of threats”. Therefore, while the Alliance adapts to a changing security environment
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the defence of NATO Allies’ territorial security have thus
been put back on top of the agenda.
A.
THE CHALLENGE POSED BY RUSSIA
8.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea has demonstrated that the risk of military conflict in Europe is
not as remote as was widely believed. Russia’s actions undermine not only the security of
Ukraine; but they also have serious implications for the stability and security of the entire EuroAtlantic area. Indeed, Russia’s violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia in
2008 and Ukraine in 2014 challenges the territorial status quo on the continent. Moreover, the
Kremlin’s increased assertiveness in what it considers Russia’s “near abroad” has caused
significant concern among NATO Allies, particularly the Baltic states.
9.
In recent years Russia has improved its military capabilities on its Western border.
Provocations of Baltic member states, primarily through incursions of Russian military aircraft into
the air space of Baltic member states, have significantly increased. Over the previous two years
Russia has conducted at least 10 snap exercises demonstrating its ability to assemble up to
20,000 troops on NATO borders within 24 hours. These exercises served as a cover to put
pressure on Ukraine as part of the hybrid warfare approach and as a cover to smuggle soldiers
into Ukraine. Russian armed forces have been engaged in direct military operations in Ukraine
as Russia continues to supply weapons to militants in the eastern part of the country and
maintains thousands of combat-ready troops on its border with Ukraine. At the Wales Summit
the Alliance condemned Russia’s escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine in the
strongest terms and reiterated that it will not recognise the illegal and illegitimate annexation of
Crimea.
10. Reacting to the challenges posed by Russia, NATO has been implementing reassurance
measures and increasing the Alliance’s visibility in Eastern European States. Several Allies,
including France, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom, have sent additional
planes to support the policing of Baltic airspace. At the Wales Summit, NATO Heads of State and
Government agreed on a “Readiness Action Plan” (RAP) which provides ‘continuous air, land, and
maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance’ of NATO
forces on a rotational basis. A “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force” (VJTF) has been created
within the NATO Response Force (NRF). The VJTF consists of 4,000 to 6,000 troops that can be
deployed at two to five days’ notice and thus will significantly improve NATO’s ability to respond
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quickly to a crisis. To ensure the effectiveness of the VJTF, NATO plans to preposition equipment
and invest in infrastructure on the territories of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania.
Moreover, Allies have established trust funds to support Ukraine, focussing on rehabilitation for
injured troops, cyber defence, logistics, and command and control and communications.
11. However, although the measures the Alliance has undertaken strengthen the credibility of
Article 5 guarantees for member countries, the strategic consequences for regional as well as for
Euro-Atlantic security remain to be seen. While the trust funds for Ukraine will help the country in
the long run, they will not make much of a difference in the short run. Moreover, the tensions
between Russia and Ukraine also impact on the security of Transnistria and on the
South Caucasus and will require NATO to closely monitor the developments in these regions.
NATO needs to support these countries by helping them to develop capacity to self-defence to
resist pressure from Russia and chose their own path, based on each country’s national interests
and policies.
B.
THE CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN
12. Although the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will conclude on
31 December 2014, NATO and its partner nations remain committed to an enduring partnership
with Afghanistan. Following tedious negotiations over almost six month, a new Afghan government
with Ashraf Ghani as President and Abdullah Abdullah as Chief Executive Officer was formed at
the end of September 2014. The signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the United States as well as
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between and NATO and GIRoA shortly thereafter is of
particular importance as they pave the way for the new NATO-led mission “Resolute Support”
which will start on 1 January 2015. Unlike ISAF, Resolute Support is a non-combat mission that
aims to assist and advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), especially on the
ministerial and military and police HQs level.
13. The post-2014 mission is designed to comprise about 12,000 NATO troops, of which
between 1,200 and 1,400 will train the ANSF. The bulk of the troops will be provided by the
United States, which has committed up to 8,000 soldiers to Resolute Support; additionally close to
2,000 US Special Operations Forces will continue counter-terrorism missions against al-Qaeda
and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan such as the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba. At
the 2014 Summit in Wales NATO Allies and partner nations also renewed their commitment to
help sustain the ANSF through substantial financial support until at least 2017. It remains the
Alliance’s long term goal to transform Afghanistan from a centre of operations to a fully
independent NATO partner state. The continued commitment of the Allies and the international
community to Afghanistan, particularly Resolute Support is important to prevent the country from
sliding back into chaos and apply the lessons learned from Iraq. To that end, NATO Allies need to
monitor the developments in Afghanistan constantly, and should be prepared to re-evaluate their
plans with regard to the duration of Resolute Support and the number of troops committed.
C.
THE THREATS TO STABILITY IN THE MENA REGION
14. NATO members face an array of challenges at their borders in the south, as several crises
continue to rage in the Middle-East and the North Africa region (MENA). The upheavals which
became known as the “Arab Spring” have put the political and social order of large parts of the
region into question, generating continued instability and insecurity. The underlying issues for the
volatility are primarily economic and social. Many Arab countries cannot afford to continue paying
fuel and food subsidies to low-income populations and in the long term they risk violent unrest if
they cut these subsidies. Scarcity of resources, including water and food, is worsening and there
is no feasible near-term solution without outside assistance. More generally, weak governance,
the absence of the rule of law, and arms trafficking in large parts of the MENA region are a perfect
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breeding ground for extremists and criminal groups. Insecurity and instability of the MENA region
have a direct impact on Allied member states, therefore NATO must continue to monitor the
multiple threats to regional stability.
15. Of particular concern for the Alliance is the civil war in Syria which has entered its third year.
Regrettably, there are no signs that conflicting factions are any closer to reaching an agreement or
that the fighting will be abating soon. Instead, the violence continues and the humanitarian crisis
within the country is becoming even worse. Hopes for a political solution were dashed after
another round of diplomatic talks in Geneva was eclipsed by the Syrian government’s persistence
in holding presidential elections that excluded all meaningful opposition. While NATO Allies have
sharply criticised the Assad regime for its brutal suppression of its own people they have been
wary that greater military assistance to the rebels could empower hard-line jihadi fighters at the
detriment of the moderate opposition. However, recent events in Syria and Iraq, particularly the
territorial advances and displays of violence of al-Qaeda breakaway extremists under the banner
of the IS have led to a policy change. In response to a request from the Iraqi government a US-led
international coalition which includes NATO Allies and regional partners has engaged in military
measures to help Iraq recapture lost territory and to stave off further IS expansion.
16. The IS is both a terrorist organisation and a new type of actor, as it has been able to
conquer and hold on to territory in Syria and Iraq. Its rapid expansion has raised the question of a
possible dissolution of order in the Middle East which would have wide-spread ramifications for
stability and security. In addition, its ability to radicalise Islamists and recruit jihadi fighters poses a
threat to the homelands of NATO countries both in Europe and North America. NATO member
country Turkey, in particular, is directly affected by the rapidly deterioration security in Iraq and in
Syria. NATO needs to develop contingency plans if the security of Turkey is threatened.
Moreover, the Alliance also should consider what role it could play in containing and eventually
defeating the IS. In an important step at the Wales Summit, the Alliance emphasised partnerships
with the Iraqi government and Jordan as part of the Defence and Related Security Capacity
Building Initiative. This new project envisions the improvement of partner countries military
capacities and institutions with the help of all Allies as an element of long-term crisis prevention.
D.
ENERGY SECURITY
17. Russia’s actions in the Ukraine crisis have equally underlined the importance of energy
security. The Alliance cannot neglect the challenges that member states face from potential
disruptions in energy supply, including threats to energy infrastructure and terrorist attacks.
Energy is a strategic good; the implications of using energy as a foreign policy tool were
demonstrated in 2006, 2009 and in June 2014 when Russia cut of gas supplies to Ukraine.
Furthermore, the possibility that controlling access to energy will become a trigger for future
military conflicts cannot be ignored. Member states should therefore consider having more
frequent discussions, including on the North Atlantic Council (NAC)-level, on global energy
developments, the diversification of gas and oil supply, and their security implications for the
Alliance, supported by enhanced intelligence sharing and strategic analysis. Moreover, Member
states could contemplate if and how NATO’s role in energy security could be expanded beyond
the guiding principles laid down in the report “NATO’s role in Energy Security” agreed upon at the
2008 Bucharest Summit.
18. During the Wales Summit the Allies reiterated that NATO will continue to “enhance
awareness of energy developments with security implications for Allies and the Alliance; further
develop NATO’s competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and
continue to work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces”. The
establishment of the Energy Security Section in the Emerging Security Challenges Division at
NATO Headquarters in 2010 and the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania in
2012 were major milestones in these endeavours.
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E.
CYBER SECURITY
19. In the wake of cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, in Georgia prior to the conventional
stage of the war in 2008, and most recently against Ukraine, securing cyberspace became an
important objective for Allies. Cyber-attacks can take on many different forms, ranging from cyber
espionage targeted at obtaining intellectual property and national security information to attacks on
critical civilian infrastructure. In the future, conflict between nation states will likely include some
form of cyber activity, potentially featuring cyber-attacks conducted in conjunction with kinetic
military operations. NATO first recognised cyber security as an agenda item at the 2002 Prague
Summit. In 2014, NATO adopted a new Enhanced Policy on Cyber Defence, declaring the
protection of communications systems owned and operated by the Alliance a top priority.
20. Establishing cyber defence as an element of collective defence at the Wales Summit, the
Allies furthermore recognised that cyber-attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and
Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability and consequently can be treated as the equivalent
of an armed attack. The Wales Summit Declaration affirms this policy, pointing to the
North Atlantic Council’s Authority to decide over the invocation of Article 5 with regard to
cyber-attacks ‘on a case-by-case basis’. Thus, the Alliance maintains ‘strategic ambiguity’ over the
threshold that triggers a collective defence response and the specific measures of retaliation to be
considered in such a case. Crucially, NATO’s new Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy includes a
strong commitment to the application of international law in cyberspace and the intensification of
NATO’s co-operation with industry actors.
F.
THE NEED FOR INCREASED CO-OPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS
21. The instability at the Alliance’s borders may well increase the demand for NATO’s
engagement as no other international organisation is able to muster military forces as effectively
as the Alliance. Due to their lack of certain military capabilities, particularly key enablers like
helicopters and transport aircraft, the United Nations and organisations like the African Union (AU)
look to NATO to assist in stability operations, including those for humanitarian purposes. NATO
has provided support to UN-sponsored operations, including logistical assistance to the
African Union’s UN-endorsed peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan, and in Somalia; support
for UN disaster-relief operations in Pakistan, and escorting merchant ships carrying
World Food Programme humanitarian supplies off the coast of Somalia. In May 2014, NATO and
the AU have further institutionalised their co-operation, signing an agreement, which formalises
the status of the NATO liaison office to the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. At a time when the
aftermath of NATO’s Libya Operation clearly demonstrates the importance of a comprehensive
approach to crisis management, both NATO and the AU can profit from a partnership that focuses
on increasing the interoperability of multinational forces, planning shared exercises and learning
from past operations.
22. An additional factor underlining the value of co-operating with other international
organisations in the security realm is that the experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere
have made NATO Allies, and their publics, weary of military engagements. Additionally, tight
financial constraints further limit the willingness and ability of NATO Allies to undertake new
military engagements. In short, there is a fundamental paradigm shift with regard to warfare as
prolonged military conflict or engagement has proven to be both expensive and ineffective.
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III.
THE CONTINUING ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE IMPACT ON NATO
23. The decline of Allied defence budgets is one of the most important challenges NATO is
facing today. Since 2001, the defence expenditures of European NATO Allies in terms of real GDP
decreased from 1.93% to 1.58%. Since 2008, most European countries have cut defence budgets
by 10 to 15% on average; some Allies have lowered their military spending by even more than
20%. Apart from depriving NATO from the possibility to respond more effectively to security
challenges continued underinvestment in defence limits NATO’s ability to set the international
security agenda especially as emerging powers, China in particular, expand their military
capabilities. Indeed, defence spending in the People’s Republic of China grew by 43.2% between
2008 and 2013 and, over the same period, defence spending in the Russian Federation increased
by 31.2%. With more than €230bn cumulative military spending, Asian countries surpassed their
European peers in 2013. According to the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends Report,
Asia is likely to surpass North America and Europe together in terms of global power —based
upon GDP, population size, military spending, and technological investment—within the next
15 years.
24. The strain that the financial crisis has put on member states' budgets has led most Allied
governments to prioritise debt reduction and economic growth over defence and security
investments. This approach is affecting NATO’s military capabilities, particularly those of the
European Allies. Defence cuts are making smaller member states increasingly dependent on
larger ones to contribute assets to joint military missions. At the same time, even larger European
Allies like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom are finding it increasingly difficult to act as
"framework-nations" in multinational engagements.
25. These cuts, which follow insufficient investment in defence in previous years, do not only
have implications for Europe's collective defence capabilities. Gaps in military capabilities limit the
strategic choices of NATO Allies, and lower defence budgets curb the Alliance's ability to respond
to emerging security challenges.
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26. As most governments continue to cut defence budgets, NATO is under tremendous
pressure to do more with less. For example, European member countries managed to increase
their participation in operations over the last 15 years, even though they reduced defence
spending in the same period. This, however, has a negative impact on future capabilities, as a
smaller share of defence budgets was spent on investments. This trend is compounded by the fact
that weapons systems are increasingly expensive and that inflation for military equipment is
generally higher than that of civilian goods.
27. It is not just the continued decline of Allied defence budgets that undermines NATO
capabilities but also the lack of early consultation and co-ordination of defence cutbacks among
member states. Unco-ordinated defence cuts pose a real danger for the effectiveness of NATO.
Unco-ordinated cuts not only reduce national capabilities, but they also affect and weaken the
whole of the Alliance. They will also intensify conflicts over burden sharing, both within Europe and
across the Atlantic. The United States, which is facing similar budgetary pressures, continues to
shoulder a disproportionately high defence burden. The United States accounts for almost
three-quarters of military spending within NATO; it spends 4.8 % of its GDP on defence, while
currently only the United Kingdom, Estonia and Greece meet NATO's target of 2 % of GDP among
European allies.
28. Underinvestment in military capabilities over many years has led NATO to be
disproportionately dependent on the United States for critical capabilities, including surveillance
drones, air-to-air refuelling tankers, heavy transport planes, and electronic warfare capabilities.
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29. In the face of budgetary pressures, the United States is asking European Allies to take on
more responsibility for their own security, especially as Washington is shifting its security focus to
Asia. European Allies have been willing to take on a more active role for security in Europe and
the European neighbourhood. The bombing campaign against Libyan government forces in 2011
and the French military interventions in Mali and in the Central African Republic (CAR) serve as
examples of such endeavours. However, NATO’s campaign in Libya also demonstrated
shortcomings of European Allies’ military forces in key areas.
30. The strategic plan that NATO adopted in 2010 called for increased spending on capabilities,
including cyber-warfare, intelligence, and surveillance. However, there have been countless
discussions about European defence co-operation but very little real progress. Recent conflicts in
Libya and Mali underlined just how far European Allies are from matching their economic weight
with military might. There is no European strategic lift, no harmonised air-to-air refuelling, no
surveillance and reconnaissance sharing, no joint military satellite capability, no European attack
helicopter, and no medevac capability. The European Summit in December 2013 particularly
identified drones, air-to-air refuelling, cyber defence, and satellite communications as critical
shortfalls. The Wales Summit produced some progress in addressing the capability shortfalls of
NATO member countries. In this context it is worthwhile to mention that, reflecting a general
agreement that the trend of declining defence budgets must be reversed, NATO Heads of State
and Government agreed to “aim to move towards the existing NATO guideline of spending
2% on GDP defence within a decade”. Moreover, Allies also agreed to increase annual defence
spending on major new equipment, including related Research and Development, to 20% of total
defence expenditures over the same time period. Another promising development is the decision
of NATO Allies at the Wales Summit to create three new ‘framework-nation’ collectives. The first,
led by Germany, will concentrate on capability development in logistics support, protection from
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, deployable headquarters, and delivery of
firepower. A second group, under the United Kingdom’s leadership, aims to establish a
Joint Expeditionary Force for full-spectrum operations. Italy leads the third group, which is set to
work on capabilities for stabilisation and reconstruction.
IV.
STRENGTHENING NATO CAPABILITIES
A.
SMART DEFENCE AND CONNECTED FORCES
31. NATO Allies will be forced to make difficult choices in their defence spending and they will
have to adapt, focus, specialise, and prioritise. Austerity offers an opportunity to encourage more
co-operation on defence. The Smart Defence initiative and the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)
are key to achieving the goal of “NATO Forces 2020”, agreed upon at the Chicago Summit. NATO
Forces 2020 aims to generate a coherent set of deployable, interoperable, and sustainable forces
equipped, trained, exercised, and commanded to operate together and with partners in any
environment. NATO’s “Smart Defence” and the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing” initiatives provide
frameworks to collectively develop the needed capabilities. Both concepts involve greater
co-operation among nations through pooling equipment and sharing tasks to cut costs and reduce
wasteful duplication. Unfortunately, the 2014 Wales Summit did not produce remarkable new
developments in the domain of NATO-EU co-operation. Thus, there remains a need for better
synergy between the NATO defence planning process, the European capability process, and the
national capability processes to enhance the institutional co-operation of both organisations as
strategic partners.
32. The Smart Defence initiative has produced some successes. To promote prioritisation,
specialisation, and multinational approaches to acquisition NATO’s Smart Defence initiative
agreed on a package of 22 Smart Defence projects at the Chicago Summit. In 2012, the
procurement contract was signed for Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS), Allies endorsed an
initiative on Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR), improvements were
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made to NATO's cyber defence capabilities, and Allies declared an interim NATO ballistic missile
defence capability. In 2013, Allies completed two Smart Defence projects, broadened the scope of
projects already underway, and made considerable progress on a range of other joint projects.
More specifically, the first NATO AGS aircraft was produced, JISR concepts were refined and
improved, NATO's Computer Incident Response Capability was improved, and the command and
control structures for NATO's missile defence system were enhanced.
33. Despite recent successes, genuine co-operation in the development and procurement of
defence capabilities has improved only marginally, particularly with respect to integration among
European member countries. There remains a high degree of military and industrial fragmentation
among European Allies. European Allies maintain six times as many weapon systems as the
United States. At present, 76.6% of military equipment procurement in Europe and 87.3% of
research and development efforts are conducted on a purely national basis. These figures only
underline the need for closer co-operation. Progress in this area will not be achieved by default,
rather it requires strong political will as difficult choices must be made and competing interests
reconciled.
34. The Connected Forces Initiative is the second key programme to achieve “NATO Forces
2020.” The CFI is designed to sustain and enhance the high level of interconnectedness and
interoperability Allied forces have achieved in ISAF and other operations. NATO’s readiness and
combat effectiveness will be maintained through expanded education and training, increased
exercises, and more effective use of technology. Within the framework of CFI, Allies have begun
to implement plans to expand NATO's exercise programmes.
B.
MISSILE DEFENCE
35. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology constitutes
a serious and increasing threat to NATO Allies and international security writ large. The number of
countries which are capable of launching ballistic missiles is growing. Therefore, a functioning
ballistic missile defence system is part and parcel of NATO’s defensive and deterrence capability.
At the Wales Summit, NATO leaders stressed the deployment of Aegis Ashore in Romania. Upon
its completion in 2015, the project will constitute a significant increase in NATO’s ballistic missile
defence (BMD) capability. Moreover, NATO should continue to field theatre BMD systems
designed to protect deployed forces, the territory and populations of all member states of the
Alliance. BMD also provides an opportunity for more frequent and substantial transatlantic
co-operation in the armament sector as the required technology involves a host of North American
and European resources.
C.
EXPANDED EDUCATION AND TRAINING
36. Expanded education and training focuses on key requirements for education and training of
Allied forces, harmonising existing efforts while addressing any gaps. Building on individual
training efforts of Allies, NATO will identify areas for collaboration and potential synergies.
Increasing the number of exercises enables forces to practise tactics, techniques, and procedures,
and improves interoperability. Exercise and training programmes will cover the whole range of
combat operations and include large-scale, high-intensity exercises. For 2015 the Alliance has
already planned a major live exercise called “Trident Juncture 2015” involving a significant number
of land, maritime, and air forces, taking place simultaneously in Italy, Portugal and Spain. From
2016 onwards, NATO will conduct such major live exercises on a regular basis, with a broader
scope, covering the full range of Alliance missions. Better use of technology will increase
connectivity and interoperability among Allied and partner forces, allowing them to work together
more effectively. The NATO Reaction Force (NRF) plays an important role for the implementation
of CFI by providing a vehicle to demonstrate operational readiness.
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V.
THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP
37. There is no shortage of security challenges in the post-2014 world. The difficulty for Allies is
to anticipate which of the potential challenges will materialise and impact NATO member states
directly. To that end, the Allies need a functioning intelligence network that is capable of adapting
to the evolving security environment. As the threats evolve NATO needs to constantly evaluate if
the existing system of intelligence exchange is sufficient to meet the challenge. Moreover, NATO
Allies need an appropriate mechanism for political consultation on emerging security challenges.
In this context, initiatives to streamline and adapt internal decision making processes to the speed
at which twenty-first century security challenges occur, are highly important and should be
strengthened. However, existing prerogatives of national parliaments in the realm of foreign and
security policy must not be abolished. The Rapporteur supports the idea that the Allies, at the level
of the North Atlantic Council, can raise all issues relevant to the security of NATO and its member
states.
38. Another challenge for NATO Allies will be how to address future security threats with limited
means. Although there are signs that the effects of the financial crisis are abating, the time of
austerity will continue in the foreseeable future. As resources are limited, the need for
prioritisation will be key, particularly with regard to capability development and specialisation
among Allied member states and partners willing to co-operate more closely with NATO.
39. In the view of the rapporteur, NATO already has the right tools at its disposal to deal with the
challenges of the post-2014 world: the New Strategic Concept is comprehensive and covers the
main security issues for which the Alliance needs to prepare, even if Russia’s military intervention
in Ukraine raises question of if and how the NATO-Russia partnership will develop in the future.
Among other areas where, in the view of the rapporteur, NATO should to take on more
responsibility is cyber defence as this issue will become a dominant feature of the future security
environment. Cyber-attacks will increasingly pose dangers to critical infrastructure and to Allied
countries’ economies and national security. Therefore, Allies need to commit sufficient resources
to cyber defence, especially through increased co-operation between the public and private
sectors. This is particularly relevant as roughly 85% of cyber assets in Western countries are in
the hands of the private sector, making cyber security fundamentally different from traditional
state-dominated security fields. Moreover, greater co-operation between NATO and the EU could
generate synergies between NATO's military and defence work and the EU's more civilian focus
on fighting cybercrime.
40. Moreover, the Smart Defence and the Connected Forces initiatives are well designed to
achieve the goal of (NATO Forces 2020). Thus, there is no need to re-invent NATO; any change
will be evolutionary, not revolutionary. Rather, there is the need to continue NATO’s adaptation
process and underpin it with sufficient financial resources and political support. This is the real
challenge: to make sure that Allies invest in new and relevant capabilities to conduct the mission
they have agreed upon. Unfortunately, most Allies are failing at this. So far, there have been
many declarations but, too little financial support to follow up on the declarations. The initiatives
agreed upon in Chicago have not been implemented. This is partly due to the constraints the
financial crisis imposes on the majority of budgets of member states. However, the fundamental
challenge is that there is simply not enough national level political engagement by Allies on NATO
issues. More political leadership is needed to break this pattern and to garner the necessary public
support for sustained investment in defence. Without sufficient financial contributions NATO Allies
will not be able to make the necessary investments in capabilities. And they remain absolutely
essential to guarantee the security of Allied territories and populations in the future - even more so
as the New Strategic Concept embraces a comprehensive approach to security.
41. “Future NATO” also means working with partners and maintaining and improving
co-operation with them. In fact, strengthening security partnerships with other nations and actors
is a very effective way to increase collective security and stability. Partners are force multipliers;
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while they can add critical capabilities to NATO-led operations, they can also contribute politically
and diplomatically as they enhance the legitimacy of NATO-led operations. On the operational
level, several partner countries, such as Finland, Sweden, and Ukraine are contributing to the NRF
and Georgia pledged to make forces available to the NRF in 2015. At the Wales Summit, both
Finland and Sweden signed Host Nation Support agreements that facilitate the temporary
deployment of NATO troops on their territory. Another promising area for closer co-operation with
partner countries, especially with ‘Partners across the Globe’, is maritime operations, particularly
anti-piracy operations. Moreover, partner countries can make meaningful contributions to crisis
management missions, which call for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian, and
military instruments. In short, partners have become more relevant for the Alliance to establish,
extend, and enhance dialogue with selected countries.
42. Although NATO embraces a comprehensive approach to security, its contributions remain
primarily military and political. Military forces cannot build economic capabilities or develop
political institutions, which are needed to support a democratic process. As experiences in
Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, nation building is a difficult, complex, and
time-consuming task and no single country of the Alliance has been able to successfully
implement a holistic approach. As a result, NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan have given way to
“sanctuary management,” which denies extremist groups a safe haven from where they can pose
a threat to the Allies and the international community. NATO Allies, and the international
community at large, need to place greater emphasis on crisis prevention – which is both cheaper
and more effective than crisis management. In addition, focusing on crisis prevention is likely to
reduce demand for military intervention during a crisis. This is important as Western governments
and their publics have become weary of military interventions.
43. A sensible approach that has been followed by NATO is capacity building, which provides
the opportunity to promote stability without projecting force. For example, NATO can engage with
fragile states, like Libya, to aid security sector reform and related institution building. NATO can
also provide training and assistance in areas where it has expertise, for example, in dealing with
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). NATO is already increasing its levels of co-operation with
more partners. Focusing on crisis prevention and capacity building is also more effective as
organisations like the UN and the AU are increasingly requesting NATO to provide the military
capacities they are lacking themselves. NATO can be more ambitious in this area particularly as
security challenges in Africa impact European security, for example refugee flows often are
directed towards Europe. Capacity building would be even more effective if there would be closer
co-ordination between NATO and the EU, as the latter disposes of a broad set of economic,
political, and security tools which can help in the stabilisation of fragile states. However, while
there is potential for a more active role of the Alliance in capacity building there are many of the
member states of both the UN and the AU which are reluctant to engage in closer co-operation
with NATO.
44. NATO has three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and co-operative
security. In today’s security environment these tasks can no longer be separated, and are linked
to each other. NATO’s ability to defend member states’ territories and populations against threats
allows Allies to conduct high-intensity operations beyond their borders in order to tackle security
challenges before they can threaten Allied homelands. At the same time, the interoperability
gained from missions abroad increases NATO’s ability to work with partners, thus contributing to
co-operative security. The Enhanced Opportunities Programme, agreed upon at the
Wales Summit is a step forward in the right direction. The programme currently includes Australia,
Finland, Sweden, Jordan and Georgia and is open to other partner countries in the future.
45. The Russian aggression towards Ukraine has emphasised the need for NATO countries to
refocus on collective defence and deterrence. NATO’s most important task is to deter and
dissuade potential aggressors from attacking the territory or population of any member state of the
Alliance. NATO needs to regain its ability to conduct high intensity, joint combat operations, an
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ability which suffered some attrition in recent years due to a prolonged focus on large-scale
stability operations. In fact, NATO’s ability to deter is closely linked with the credibility of our
collective defence, which, in turn, is crucial for public support and the willingness of Allies to
continue to invest in the Alliance. Cohesion among NATO Allies has been challenged by numerous
issues, such as national caveats, differences in defence spending among Allies, and divergent
views on the need for military engagement among Allies. However, Alliance cohesion will be put to
the test on a much higher level if the Allies cannot agree on the necessary focus on collective
defence.
46. NATO’s response to the Russian violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity was, in the view of
the rapporteur, appropriate. Moreover, the rapporteur supports former NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen’s call for Russia “to stop destabilising Ukraine, pull back its troops from the borders
and make clear it does not support the violent actions of well-armed militias of pro-Russian
separatists.” Several NATO Allies have decided to increase their contributions to Baltic Air
Policing. Moreover, NATO Allies are reviewing defence plans to reassure the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe about collective defence and are considering a “regular NATO presence” in
Central European NATO member states. NATO needs to affirm its support of Central and Eastern
European member states by strengthening its military presence in the region.
47. The Ukraine crisis has been a wake-up call that military conflict is still possible in Central
Europe and that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty remains the cornerstone of the Alliance.
Consequently, there is now greater recognition among Allied governments and the general public
of the need for military capabilities necessary for Article 5 missions. In addition, Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine and its intimidation of its neighbours emphasises the importance of the
transatlantic link and the continued US military presence in Europe. In that sense, the
developments in Ukraine can be an opportunity for strengthening the transatlantic security
relationship – provided the United States’ NATO Allies step up to the plate and make a plausible
cause for increased defence investments in a time of continued financial duress. NATO has been
viewed critically in recent years as many US officials have criticised European Allies for not
investing enough in defence and for hollowing out their defence capabilities.
48. The crisis in Ukraine may help Allies to focus on the necessary investments in defence.
Latvia and Lithuania, which had reduced defence spending after the financial crisis to 0.9% and
0.8% of GDP respectively, became the first European countries to announce important increases
in their military spending following the annexation of Crimea. All member states, especially those
in Europe, need to clearly demonstrate that they are willing to invest in NATO’s security.
European countries cannot expect the United States to invest in European security when they are
not willing to make necessary investments themselves. At the same time, “Coalitions of the willing”
cannot be an alternative to joint action among transatlantic Allies as they have less legitimacy and
much less history of common doctrine, interoperability, and training that NATO has. The provision
of forces and capabilities to NATO-led operations and missions is a meaningful demonstration of
Alliance solidarity. Despite budget cuts, contributions to NATO operations remain strong.
European Allies in particular have taken the lead in a number of operations and missions,
including in Kosovo and Libya. European Allies have also consistently contributed the bulk of
forces comprising the NRF and Baltic air policing, as well as the majority of air surveillance and
interception rotations in Iceland. Working together in a multilateral organisation can be difficult
and, at times, frustrating. However, over time, NATO facilitates political cohesion by forming
common approaches and building military capability.
49. Burden sharing encompasses more than the level of defence budgets. Europe needs to
take a greater share of the political burdens. In this context, Europe needs to demonstrate a
greater understanding and willingness to address US security concerns, not just those relevant to
Europe. The developments in the Asia Pacific are not only of consequence for the
United States—they have global repercussions. US engagement in this part of the world is
important for international stability.
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50. The United States’ rebalance to Asia, which foresees a stronger diplomatic, economic, and
security focus on the Asia-Pacific, has raised apprehensions that Washington may be less willing
to engage in a strong transatlantic relationship. However, the rebalance is an opportunity, not a
threat, for stronger transatlantic co-operation. In fact, reductions in US forces stationed in Europe
started after the end of the Cold War: the number of troops has declined from 400,000 in 1989 to
about 50,000 today. Both North America and Europe share a strong interest in Asia’s
development, as there are strong economic and financial interconnections with Asia. Thus, all
Allies have a vested interest in the security and stability of the region. The challenge posed by
North Korea, maritime and territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, and the lack of a
regional security architecture highlight the fragile security environment in Asia. While European
states lack both the capabilities and the will for a stronger military presence in the Asia Pacific
region, they can provide valuable contributions in the diplomatic and economic realms.
VI.
CONCLUSIONS
51. The transatlantic relationship remains a source of stability in a changing world. It does not
only provide security for its member states, but also contributes to global stability. The need for a
transatlantic security partnership – based on common values, norms, and principles – is as great
as ever if not even more so as the dramatic developments in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq testify.
52. What makes NATO truly unique – and sets it apart from all other alliances and organisations
– is the combination of its integrated military structures and its permanent political decision-making
mechanisms. NATO’s capabilities must be maintained and developed further in the post-2014
security environment. To that end, former NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen's dictum that the
Alliance must develop "from a deployed NATO to a prepared NATO" has to be filled with
substance and supported by all member states – not just rhetorically. Strong and stable public
finances are essential underpinnings of national and Alliance security; while the economic and
financial crisis has constrained Allied governments’ funding for defence, the crises at NATO’s
eastern and southern borders provide convincing incentives for reversing the trend to lower
defence budgets. We must not forget that security does not come for free.
53. In the view of the rapporteur, NATO’s New Strategic Concept identifies the main security
threats of the future. Moreover, with Smart Defence Initiative and Connected Forces Initiative, the
Alliance has the right tools that can help to maintain its military capabilities and develop new ones
in a time of austerity. These tools have been further developed by the initiatives agreed upon at
the Wales Summit. However, Smart Defence and Connected Forces Initiative are meaningless if
member states lack the political will to invest in defence. The governments of NATO member
states must therefore demonstrate political leadership in order to obtain continued public support
for adequate defence spending. Parliaments have an eminently important role to play here as well,
as they can help explain to the broader public why maintaining current and developing future
military capabilities are crucial for national security and the security of the Alliance. That being
said, there are choices to be made as NATO member states cannot devote sufficient resources to
account for all potential future security challenges. Therefore, NATO should focus on Article 5 –
the defence of member states against an attack – and on crisis prevention.
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