November 2011 (work in progress)
Democracy, Development and Globalisation
Lars Rudebeck∗
What key meanings can be discerned in present-day theoretical and politico-ideological discourse
on the concept of ‘development’? This is the first question raised in the present essay. In the
second part, the concepts and realities of democracy/democratisation are similarly discussed and
then, in the third part, brought together with development. In the final part, the issue of
globalisation is introduced and a tentative answer to the question of globalisation's implications
for democracy and development is suggested. Although the tasks of conceptual and historical
analysis are intertwined, my emphasis here is on currently existing concepts and their use rather
than on tracing the inclusion or substitution of new meanings over time. The over-riding question
of the essay is about the national and global development (sometimes non-development) of societies
on the one side, and, on the other side, the role of politics, in particular democracy, in this. How do
they connect? As a political scientist, with an analytical point of departure in politics, I put
democracy first in the heading. As a social scientist in the broader sense, I begin the analysis by
raising the issue of development. In regard to democracy and development, the answer
conceptually specified in the text is that the two are related to each other, but not any democacy
and not any development, nor all of the time. The issue of power is crucial. In regard to
globalisation, the introduction of the globalisation perspective makes the significance of
democracy, for development, stand out even more strongly.
∗
Professor of
Political Science, Centre for Sustainable Development (CSD), Uppsala University.
The present text is a substantially revised and extended version of an earlier Swedish-language
essay on the same theme (Rudebeck 2008). As shown in my references, it has benefitted from a variety
of inputs. Earlier elaborations by the same author of parts and aspects of the theme are found for
instance in Rudebeck (1991, 1998, 2002, and 2003). This is an attempt to sum it all up concisely. In a
recent article the argument is concretised through a diachronic case study of Guinea-Bissau, including
one particular village (Rudebeck 2010).
[email protected] Development
All realize that development is about some kind of change.1 But beyond that, things
become more difficult. As early as in 1888, the Swedish novelist and playwright
August Strindberg wrote among other things as follows in a text on "the secrets of
flowers" (Strindberg 1957, p. 275):2
What is development, and what is perfection? The path from the simple and
undifferentiated to the composite and differentiated, says the evolutionist. Therefore
the labiates and the composites come last in the chain of creation of the plants, because
they are the most complex, but do they therefore stand highest in perfection? Is the
daisy more perfect than the rose? What does that mean? Is it better at enduring the
struggle for survival than the rose? – No answer!
Perhaps development is nothing but movement, forward or backward, indifferent
change! And the laws of nature only subjective perceptions by our order-loving brains,
who want to trace a purpose everywhere.
Long before such notions as ‘developing countries’ or ‘the third world’ or anything like
that had become commonplace, Strindberg did in the quoted lines evoke the key
dimensions encountered in the modern theoretical and politico-ideological discourse on
societal ‘development’ as a concept. The only aspect he did not touch upon, at least
indirectly, is post-modern rather than modern – namely the thought that the word as
such would have become corrupted and thus unusable by expressing, in practice,
occidental hegemony in regard to the task of defining the essence of development. The
observation on hegemony is certainly relevant. But the conclusion on the uselessness of
1
The following argument on development presupposes that development is a process rather than a
fixed state or "level". It is true of course that the word is also used, illogically, about that which comes
out of the process. In the context of ‘development’ as discussed here, such usages can be seen as
abbreviated expressions for "that which results from development". Development in that static sense
is usually defined statistically, as a level of GNP per capita, as a certain position along the UNDP index
of "human development" (HDI) or by some other similar measure. The only way of linking such
measures to development as a process, however, is by referring to GNP growth or movement along the
HDI scale, as will be analysed below.
2
Quote translated from the Swedish original into English by Lars Rudebeck.
2 the word, or the term, does not follow automatically. All depends upon how the word is
used.3 What concept, or version of a concept, does the term refer to? What are various
participants in the discourse actually talking about, when talking about development?
As so many other similar discourses, the one on development can be roughly boiled
down to two dimensions and a few combinations of these, brought together for
instance in a four-field table, as shown below.
The first dimension referred to by Strindberg is about distinguishing between
"indifferent" (neutral), non-normative conceptualisations of development and
normative (non-indifferent) ones: "Is the daisy more perfect (more developed /my
comment/) than the rose? What does that mean?" Is the rose not really more
wonderful? This comes out as the horisontal dimension of the table.
The second dimension is about the operationalisation of the concept. What are we
actually looking for, when looking for development: "What is development...?"
(emphasis here). In my interpretation this is about the difference between a
statistically descriptive conceptualisation and a structural one. This is the vertical
dimension of the table.
Table 1. Two dimensions of development Non-normative
Normative
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Statistically descriptive
1
2
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Structural
3
4
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
3
The observation on the frequent hegemonical use of the concept of development has given rise to
extensive writings, the analysis of which would be a different task from the one undertaken here. See,
for instance, Lepenies (2008) for a significant recent contribution.
3 As far as the horisontal dimension of the table (non-normative versus normative) is
concerned, it can be safely stated, in the context of ‘development’, that the concrete
manifestations of this dimension are basically normative. In actual theoretical and
political practice, analyses of societal change are very rarely about what Strindberg
called indifferent change. Almost all who enter the specific modern ‘development’
discourse we are concerned with here clearly refer to some more or less specific type
of change. Almost all, furthermore, have desirable change in mind, i.e. a movement
from worse to better.
In actual fact, therefore, the concept of development of ‘developing countries’ is
overwhelmingly normative. The non-normative version (fields 1 and 3) stands out as a
philosophically interesting ideal type, but largely fictitious in the concrete sense.
Thinkers and practitioners who enter the ‘development’ discourse while claiming to
be neutral or even ‘objective’ in regard to values, such as mainstream modern
economists or classical marxists claiming objectivity for historical materialism, still in
practice usually do end up on the normative side. For the remaining part of this
essay, we are thus going to largely ignore the two "non-normative" fields of the table,
concentrating instead on the normative side (fields 2 and 4).
Thus leaving fields 1 and 3 aside, in its normative version the vertical descriptiveversus-structural dimension of the table captures most actually existing and
theoretically applied notions of ‘development’. It groups them according to the
crucial distinction between, on the one hand, viewing development in terms of
measurable growth to be described statistically and, on the other hand, viewing it in
terms of bridging an existing structural gap or contradiction between needs and
possibilities.
Note the conceptual implication of ‘underdevelopment’ for the structural view,
according to which ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘development’ are conceptual twins.
The larger the gap to be bridged between needs and possibilities, the more ‘under’ or
below the potential and the greater consequently the contradiction to be transcended
by development.
Proceeding then to looking more closely at the normative version of the vertical
dimension of the table, it should be noted firstly that some statistically descriptive
4 definitions of development (field 2) are more subtle than others. Many mainstream
analysts who pronounce themselves on development are content to equalise it, more
or less explicitly, with straight GNP growth.4 This still happens frequently,
particularly in more or less popularised discourse. But there are also descriptive
measures to be found that are more complex and subtle. The most well known and
easily understandable of these is perhaps the aggregate measure of "human
development" which, according to the Human Development Index (HDI) worked out
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), comprises not only rising
incomes (based on growth) but also longer lives, higher levels of literacy and more
education.5 Using this measure, ‘development’ is operationalised as the process of
improving a country's HDI value (cf. note 1 above).
Both GNP and HDI are statistically descriptive measures. But in regard to broadly
viewed human development, the latter has a lot more validity than the former. Both
appear most often in normative contexts, the former usually less openly than the
latter in the sense that the ‘goodness’ of high GNP tends to be taken for granted in
mainstream development economics and thus not in need of much support through
arguementation. "Human development", on the other hand, is usually held out as an
explicit value premise, as by the UNDP. Regardless of whether we value straight
GNP growth or rising values along the "human development" scale most highly, we
still apply a normative-descriptive operationalisation of development – in other words
a descriptive operationalisation of desired change (field 2). This is very common. For
various purposes, it may also be quite useful, not least for the purpose of measuring
levels of structurally defined underdevelopment or development, to the
conceptualisation of which we are now proceeding.
Moving, thus, vertically within the normative space of our table, along the second
dimension from a descriptive, statistically operationalised definition of development
to a structural one, we end up with a normative-structural concept of development
(field 4), linking needs to possibilities/existing resources.
4 GNP (Gross National Product) = the total market value of all goods produced and services provided in a given country or number of countries, within a given period, usually one year. 5
The Human Development Index (HDI) was first presented in 1990. It has since been refined but still
comprises the same basic indicators for wealth, health and education. See Human Development Report
2009 (2009), and preceding reports. The 2009 report, pp. 171 ff., offers HDI for 2007. For further recent,
critical, discussion of the concept of growth, see in particular Jackson 2009.
5 In this view, development is conceptualised as a desirable process of structural
change. Through that process, the gap is bridged, partly or wholly, between on the
one hand existing needs and on the other hand existing and un- or under-utilised
possibilities to meet those needs in non-destructive ways. In the ‘development’
discourse, the needs in question are generally thought of as needs for betterment
shared by most (or sometimes even all) people, within and beyond national borders.
The possibilities in question consist of material resources as well as human
knowledge and creativity, which are "unfolded".
Unfolding, furthermore, is probably the etymologically most literal and thus original
meaning of the word development – the unfolding of inherent potential (cf. German
Entwicklung, Swedish utveckling). While not overinterpreting this observation, it is
nevertheless true that the original meaning of a word or a term continues most often
to carry a relevant message.
The normative-structural concept of development is understood most simply and
elementarily by thinking of the contradiction between on the one hand, hungry or
starving human beings – a clear need – and on the other hand, unused agricultural
land or unused supplies of food – clear possibilities to meet that need. An even more
elementary example may be rainwater just trickling away without watering the
dried-out earth. ‘Development’, in that case, would mean channelling the water for
sustainable use.
By his entitlement approach to the analysis of relations between persons and resources
needed for those persons to meet their needs, the Nobel prize-winning economist
and philosopher Amartya Sen stands out as a significant representative of what I call
the normative-structural view of development (Sen 1981). Entitlement implies
legitimate access in a given (type of) society to given resources. In his 1981 work, Sen
focuses specifically upon "the ability of people to command food" in order to
overcome starvation and famine (pp. 45 ff.). This can be extended to be more
generally about the entitlements required for people to have legitimate access to key
developmental resources, significantly to overcome poverty (cf. Rudebeck 1998 and
6 2002). As will be shown, too, this kind of argument opens up directly for an
analytical link between development and issues of power and politics.6
Significantly, furthermore, viewing development in terms of bridging a structural
gap in society between needs and possibilities implies not only the existence of those
needs but also their recognition as legitimate. Some needs are seen by most of us as
self-evident and therefore unquestionably legitimate – such as air to breathe, water to
drink, a daily meal, clothes for our bodies, a roof over our heads, perhaps also a
minimum of human dignity and compassion, a future for our children. It is easy to
accept the UNDP's integrated human development measure (HDI) as a valid or
reasonable statistical approximation of those most basic needs. But the more
numerous and the more complex the needs we have in mind, the more difficult
becomes the task to choose and prioritise between them, and also the more politically
momentous. Power, politics and thereby democracy enter the picture, inescapably.
We are faced with an obvious link between the concept of development and the
concept of democracy.
Thus the normative-structural approach to development raises a series of crucial
questions, all about power, ranging from purely empirical to theoretical, normative
and political ones. Who has, in fact, in various given contexs, the power and the right
to define and determine the legitimacy of developmental needs, beyond the most
obvious ones – locally, nationally, globally? How does this distribution of political
power and ideological influence affect the process of development? Who, in a
politically normative or philosophical perspective, ought to have the power and the
right we are talking about?
‘Sustainable’ development
Inserting the qualifying attribute "sustainable" in our example on rainwater above is
not by chance. Just letting the water trickle away for non-renewable purposes would
have little to do with ‘development’ in the normative-structural sense outlined here.
6 In
later writings, Sen conceptualises "development" more widely as the expansion of "substantive
freedom(s)" (Sen 1999). As far as my own argument on the normative-structural concept of
development is concerned, the straightforward matching of needs and possibilities found in Sen's 1981
work remains, however, a key point of reference.
7 This brings us to the issue of sustainable development, famously popularised and
defined by the Brundtland Commission in 1987 as "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs.”7 Obviously, in its shortest formulation, this seemingly simple
definition does beg innumerable questions about the character and levels of those
needs to be met,8 and how to agree on them and to avoid compromising them. Given
its high level of abstraction, the Brundtland definition still has the great merit of
undodgeability and cutting through to the heart of the matter.
Singling out ‘sustainable development’ as a particular form of ‘development’ springs
from the insight that some needs, even several basic and ‘human’ ones, can in the
short term undoubtedly be met most efficiently by over-using or even depleting
available resources. Such development would thus be unsustainable. But would it
then be ‘development’ at all? This is a key question in the context of conceptual
definition.
The logical answer would seem to be that using finite resources for short-term gains,
while undermining future and long-term possibilities and potential, certainly
contradicts the notion of development as bridging the gap between legitimate needs
and un- or under-utilised possibilities to meet those needs in non-destructive ways.
‘Development’, according to the normative-structural view as outlined here, may
therefore be held to be sustainable by definition. If so, unsustainable development
would be a contradiction in terms. An alternative conclusion, however, might be to
accept ‘unsustainable development’ as a serious concept, taking into account then,
firstly, that unsustainability may sometimes be a pre-stage to sustainability and,
secondly, that development as such has to be a learning and even experimental
process where everything cannot be known in advance.
Returning briefly to development descriptively conceptualised as statistical growth,
it should be obvious that this cannot be sustainable, if what is conceptualised as
growing, such as conventional GNP, is based on or connected with either the use of
7
World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), 1987, chapter 2,
first paragraph, http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm.
Some might prefer (!) to think of those needs as preferences. See Neill (2009) for a recent and highly illuminating discussion of the conceptual as well as practical complexities involved in welfare analysis. 8
8 finite resources or the production of dangerous and undestructible waste, or even the
utilisation of given space. Thus, in the case of growth, sustainability or not – or to
some extent – simply depends on what is actually thought to be growing. In reality,
it is in any case hard to see that any growth unless immaterial could be sustained
indefinitely in the literal sense, taken for granted that materially and biologically we
live in a non-limitless world.9
The observation on growth and sustainability now made serves furthermore to
underscore, again, the significance of distinguishing between, on the one hand,
descriptively operationalised material growth, and, on the other hand, development
conceptualised as structural change or transformation linking possibilities to needs.
The former can hardly escape limits and thus cannot be conceived of as indefinitely
sustainable. The latter, on the contrary, does not necessarily depend on the utilisation
of material resources and can in principle therefore be thought of as sustainable. It
should be added, though, that even the sustainability of structural change is only a
theoretical possibility. It depends strongly upon what kinds of opportunities or
potentials are linked to what kinds of needs. Most probably it can be expected to
materialise only by varying degrees or to some extent, rather than indefinitely or
without limits. Sustainability, in other words, is better conceptualised in terms of
degrees than dichotomously, in terms of yes or no.
However conceptualised, the issue of sustainability remains inescapably crucial to the analysis of development. Necessarily also, it bears heavily on the question of how development and democracy are related to each other. This will be seen further on in the text, but only after the section on democracy and democratisation which now follows. 9
Cf. United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), where development is stated in the
introduction to aim at "the constant (emphasis here) improvement of the well-being of the entire
population and of all individuals". (Thanks are due to Lars Löfquist, Centre for Sustainable
Development, Uppsala University, for drawing my attention to this particular aspect of the UN
conceptualisation of development at a CSD seminar in November 2010.) On second and more careful
thought, constant (indefinite, limitless) growth of well-being for all is close to non-conceivable as a
general notion; theoretically possible, certainly, for immaterial kinds of well-being but more or less
impossible for most other kinds, in particular those based on the use of finite material resources.
9 The twofold meaning of democracy and democratisation
There is a fundamental and persisting dilemma in democracy theory springing from the
tension between, on the one hand, democracy conceptualised as a form of rule
characterised by universal suffrage, regular elections and basic civil rights and, on the other
hand, democracy conceptualised as political equality in actual practice.
The first type of definition or conceptualisation, the one most often applied by modern
political scientists, is often called the minimalist one, because it is an operational
definition limiting democracy to its most essential institutional – constitutional,
procedural – manifestations. The second type, however, is at least two-dimensional. I
suggest that it be called substantialist. 10
Both types of conceptualisation of democracy are found in the relevant literature,
although the minimalist type, as mentioned, is predominant in modern political science.
Herbert Tingsten (1945) and Samuel Huntington (1991) are highly representative. David
Held (1995) and Amartya Sen (1981, 1999) offer prominent examples of the more
inclusive, substantialist type. The living political science classic Robert Dahl (1982 and
1989) has a creative relationship to both types of conceptualisation.
My own striving is to make the the two-dimensional view of democracy and
democratisation historically and sociologically tangible (see Rudebeck 2002:a). The task is
accomplished by combining democratic constitutionalism (according to the minimalistic
political science definition of democracy) with a sociological notion of somewhat equally
distributed citizen autonomy. 11 Thereby, democratic constitutionalism and generalised
10
Using the term substantialist for a non-minimalistic and two-dimensional view of democracy is by
inspiration from Olle Törnquist (2002, pp. 29 and 31), summing up concisely as follows: “Substantial
democracy ‘only’ means that the conventional democratic rules of the game... are both fair and applied
in vital sectors of society...” (p. 29). In current democracy discourse the two terms "substantial" and
"substantive" are used more or less interchangeably, with the latter tending to be more frequent in
recent decades although without any discernible systematic difference of meaning between the two.
Partly for etymological reasons and partly to avoid getting close to the dichotomy formal/real, which
has a different connotation, I have decided until otherwise convinced to stay with "substantial".
11
In this I have been encouraged through the mentioned works by Held and Sen (in particular 1981) as
well as by constant exchange with Olle Törnquist. More indirectly, Mahmood Mamdani's historical
and sociological analysis of the complexity of democratisation in post-colonial Africa (1996) has been
significant to my effort to conceptualise democracy as a form of power. Cf. on this Rudebeck (2009,
pp. 88-91).
10 citizen autonomy are seen as distinct but linked dimensions of actually existing
democracy and ongoing processes of democratisation. The more of both in conjunction,
the more substantial the democracy in question.
Autonomy, as used here, is a sociological ideal type concept for self-governing capacity –
individual or collective power of one's own – either individually over matters of only
individual concern, or together over matters of common concern. Without autonomy, no
power of one's own. Power delegated downwards in a hierarchy has, on the contrary,
little to do with autonomy.12
Just like the minimalist one, the substantialist definition holds democracy to be about the
institutionalisation of political equality and basic freedoms. But it does not stop there.
According to it, democracy can be meaningfully grasped and conceptualised only in the
context of its own realisation in actual practice. Questions such as the following ones are
raised about practice and power:
•
Does the political system work according to its own prescribed norms?
•
Who is represented in what ways by the leadership?
•
Do citizens have autonomy in the system?
•
How is political power – including power over the use of developmental resources
– distributed and exercised in actual practice?
Questions such as these are integral and not external to the substantialist type of
conceptualisation.
As far as actually existing democracy is concerned, historical and present experience all
over the world indicates very convincingly that both democratic constitutionalism and a
measure of citizen autonomy in society as a whole, even beyond the constitutional political
system narrowly defined, are required for democracy as a functioning form of rule to
become legitimate and enduring – and thus sustainable.
The following, second, four-field table sums up the argument:
See in particular David Held's notion of equal autonomy and his "principle of autonomy" for citizens
(Held 1995, pp. 71 and 145), linked by Held himself to Amartya Sen's notion of entitlements (cf. above
and note 6).
12
11 Table 2. Two dimensions of democracy Citizen autonomy
yes
no
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
yes
Democratic constitutionalism
1
2
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
no
3
4
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The full extent of combination (4), i.e. nothing or little of both democratic
constitutionalism and citizen autonomy, stands obviously for the ‘ideal type’ of zero
democracy – in other words strongly authoritarian or dictatorial rule. Historically, such
rule has sometimes been durable for very long. It has never been interminable, though,
and sometimes, as for instance in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1980s or
recently in Tunisia and Egypt 2010-2011, surprisingly vulnerable.
Where significant elements of both dimensions of democracy are present (1), we are
facing deep, broad, ‘substantial’ democracy. This can be expected to be sustainable,
durable and legitimate, not least by making it possible for citizens to assume
responsibility for their own country’s development. It is the kind of democracy that is
clearly linked to development.13
Democratic constitutionalism with little or no citizen autonomy (2) is a frequent
combination. It is precisely what is found in so many so-called ‘developing’ or ‘third
world’ countries today, where democratic institutions have been introduced or enforced
partly from outside or above, or with popular support that has later been eroded by
authoritarian leaders, thus without being combined with any meaningful citizen
13
See Törnquist (i.a. 2009), in connection with research based democracy promotion in Indonesia, for
continued path-breaking work on an integrated framework for the analysis of non-minimalistic
democracy, although now with less specific use than in 2002 of the term"subtantial" as such. In my
judgment, however, Törnquist's framework until today remains clearly ‘substantialist’ regardless of
terminology.
12 entitlements to the fulfillment of basic needs and rights. This, as we know, is a highly
vulnerable or shaky combination. Countries found in this category are usually, in actual
practice, very far from being substantially democratic. Such ‘democracies’ are therefore
likely to be or to become illegitimate. Their democratic features will be non-sustainable
unless strengthened.
The opposite combination (3) stands for situations where popular influence and control
may momentarily be strong, but where the institutions necessary to handle common
concerns are not in place and where the rule of law is not respected. In such situations
popular rule is often quickly undermined and followed by military or other forms of
authoritarian or dictatorial rule. This happened historically in many former colonies,
after decolonisation and juridical independence had been brought about through the
struggles of popularly based movements, with or without the use of military means.
The relationship between democracy and development
Let us return now to our initial question of how the two concepts of democracy and
development, and the realities they refer to, are related to each other.
The first point to be noted is that if statistically descriptive definitions as discussed above
are applied, then there is no necessary connection at all beween democracy and
development, whether conceptually or empirically. Both past and present history
provide ample evidence that democracy and socio-economic development according to
measurable indicators do not necessarily go hand in hand. Western capitalistic
development had for instance advanced far in Great Britain, Scandinavia, the United
States or other western countries, long before democracy was introduced. Nor did the
kind of industrialisation and modernisation taking place in the Soviet Union and allied
countries before the fall of the Berlin wall result in democracy, as long as the regimes in
question lasted.
It is obvious also that several other kinds of historical development are not systematically
related to democracy. The relationships that do exist, both positive and negative ones,
clearly appear to be historically specific.
13 If, on the other hand, the normative-structural conceptualisation of development is
employed as discussed above, then the links to politics and thereby the possibility of
democracy in the substantialist sense are obvious, both conceptually and empirically.
The normative-structural concept of development cannot be put into effect, as it were,
until the needs to be satisfied have first been articulated. Is this done with or without the
participation and consent of those concerned? Do those concerned have access to
decisions about the use of available resources needed for development purposes? If the
answer is yes, then the chances are greater that their needs will be considered than if not.
Thus, if development is supposed to be about needs shared by the majority of a
people, or even entire countries or peoples, for instance very ordinary welfare needs,
then the chances that development actually happens will be greater if those needs are
democratically determined.14 There are never any guarantees in life or history. All we
can say with fair certainty is that the chances will be greater, if those concerned by
the process of development are also able to take part in the process of formulating
their developmental needs and having them recognised as legitimate, than if they are
not able to take part.
If this happens, or in other words, if majority-needs-based development takes place
thanks to democratisation, then the legitimacy and survival capacity of democracy will
be strengthened. If, on the other hand, the democratic form of rule turns out not to be
substantial and not resulting in the satisfaction of basic needs, then it will run a great risk
of being undermined.
It is of course also entirely possible, even under substantial democracy, that needs are
articulated which in order to be met require unsustainable use of resources. In meeting
such needs, the unsustainable process will continue until stopped by political means or,
in the extreme case, by ecological breakdown. Whether the one or the other will occur,
cannot be known in advance. Assuming, however, that accountable power is more likely
than non-accountable power to result in well-informed politics, then we may perhaps
also dare assume that chances to stop unsustainable resource use will be greater under
substantial democracy than under authoritarianism and autocracy.
14 If
development were thought instead to be primarily about the needs of powerful minorities, it
would more probably be linked to non-democratic forms of politics. If it were thought instead to be
just about any needs, it would be linked just generally to politics.
14 A third four-field table may be helpful in order to clarify how democracy and
development can be thought to relate to each other, conceptually as well as empirically:
Table 3. Democracy and development No in the table = no necessary relationship; yes = firm relationship.
Democracy
minimalist
substantial
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
descriptive
Development
no
no
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
structural
no
yes
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
The idea is simply to pinpoint four possible ways of combining two kinds of democracy
with two kinds of development. In three of the combinations, democracy and
development may or may not be related to each other, depending upon historical
circumstances. Minimalist democracy may or may not correlate with development
defined either descriptively or structurally as discussed earlier. Substantial democracy
may or may not correlate with development defined descriptively. Empirical, context
specific, examples pointing in either directions are easily found.
One of the combinations, however – the lower right-hand field marked yes – is different.
It represents a firm relationship between democracy and development, in the sense that
development according to the normative-structural view presupposes concrete political
recognition and legitimation of developmental needs. If the needs in question are basic
majority needs, such development will be most likely to take place under substantial
democracy. The very definition of this includes citizen access both to the formulation of
15 developmental needs and to decision making on the use of available possibilities to meet
those needs.15
The firm relationship between majority-needs-based development and substantial
democracy may even cause some to confuse or confound the two concepts. In order to
avoid this, we need to remind ourselves that development is a process, while democracy
is a form of rule and a structure of power. Democratisation, on the other hand, is of course a
process. In a politically normative context, where general welfare and substantial
democracy are highly valued, democratisation could consequently be seen as
synonymous with ‘political development’, if such a concept were to be found useful.
Thus, to sum up, democracy and development are related to each other – but not any
democracy and not any development, nor all of the time.16
Democracy and development in globalisation
Globalisation is a contested concept, just like democracy and development. It is much
more recent, however, dating back only to the second half of the nineteen-eighties as a
commonly used concept. Nonetheless, the literature on globalisation is already very
extensive.17
In a systematic review of the academic discourse on globalisation, the two political
scientists David Held and Anthony McGrew distinguish between two competing views:
15
Cf. Human Development Report 2002, which in its very foreword (p. v) states boldly: "Sustained
poverty reduction requires equitable growth – but it also requires that poor people have political power
(my emphasis)."
16 Cf. the observation by Thomas Carothers in a recent overview of the discourse on democracy aid and development aid (2010, p. 24), that "few (development economists) share the faith common among democracy promoters that democracy advances development." 17
See, for example, Held (1995), Sassen (1996) and Held and McGrew (2002). Among these three, Held
deals most systematically with the question of how globalisation and democracy relate to each other,
historically as well as theoretically. Sassen analyses among other things how state sovereigny relates
to territory, and also the taking over of sovereignty, by non-state institutions and agencies. Held's and
McGrew's joint book is most of all a very useful summary of the general discourse on globalisation,
but it also presents a "globalist" point of view of its own.
16 one held by "globalists" and the other one by "sceptics" (Held and McGrew 2002, pp. 2-3
and the entire book). The distinction was formulated around the turn of the millenium. It
remains valid, however, although the voices of the "sceptics" have probably weakened
since then. Note that it is about distinct views on the significance of globalisation as a
concept and as a phenomenon – but not about the goodness or badness of the
phenomenon as such, to the extent that it is held to exist. The "globalists" hold that
globalisation is a very real phenomenon. The "sceptics", on the contrary, are either
hesitant about the validity of the concept or reject it outright. According to them, the
concept is largely artificial or fictitious, or the significance of what it refers to at least
quite exaggerated.
It is noteworthy, that the thrust of analyses offered by globalisation "sceptics" is usually
not about the globalisation of production or political power but about the size of foreign
trade and of capital flows between countries, arguing that the world economy was in that
sense more open or integrated between 1870 and 1914 than it is today.18
My own position is clearly "globalist", in the sense that I share with many the view that
real and decisively "globalising" changes in the overall social, economic and political
structure of the world have occurred and continue to occur since around 1975. These
changes give us reason to regard globalisation as a very real phenomenon of
considerable significance for, among other things, democracy. The politically most
relevant of the changes can be summed up in the following four points:
•
More issues and more important issues than before are settled by decisions made in
formal and informal inter-, trans- and supranational institutions and organs.
•
Political decision-makers all over the world are increasingly dependent upon the
world market and the conditions it poses for the exhange of goods, labour, capital
and currencies.
•
The political pressure exerted by the market comes much more rapidly than only a
few decades ago, resulting often in worldwide, immediate and implacable chain
reactions.
18
See, for an illustrative example, Lewin (2007, pp. 66 ff).
17 •
Through the explosively rapid development of international communication
technology, the preconditions for political consciousness and action are changing
worldwide. Processes, mechanisms and effects are complex and difficult to predict,
but certainly of fundamental signifiance, as shown for instance during the 2011
"Arab spring".
Globalisation, in this sense, affects very concretely the preconditions for substantial
democracy, from the most local to the supra-state levels. It is for instance a fact that
several juridically sovereign states, not least in the formerly so-called third world,
absolutely lack autonomy in the international system. Even if the internal structures of
such states were perfectly democratic, their leaders and citizens would still be lacking the
power to decide on matters of decisive importance for their own development, simply
because those decisions are made and those functions performed beyond the reach of
those single states.
The observation just made carries general significance, beyond the category of most
vulnerable ‘developing countries’. But the negative consequences for the autonomy of
states are greater the weaker the states are, for example if the major part of the
investment budget of a specific country is financed by a small number of international
‘donors’. The structural adjustment rationalisations of the nineteen-eighties and nineties
are illustrative. The decisive decisions to implement those tough reforms were made in
the ‘international community’, far out of reach for the citizens of the countries
concerned.19
So far, there is no known historical example of supranational or supra-state democracy
functioning on a larger scale. All known cases of fully institutionalised democracy are
either single states or more local levels within such states – understandably so, as the
very concept of democracy historically presupposes the existence of a ‘people’ (demos)
organised within a state. Globalisation, therefore, confronts citizens worldwide with an
historically new situation in regard to democracy, by necessitating supra-state action in
crucial areas such as environment, migration, human rights, poverty reeduction and the
19
See, for instance, Olukoshi (1998), for an analysis of the relationship between structural adjustment
and democracy in Africa of the nineteen-nineties.
18 struggle against international crime. This brings us back to the issue of democracy. Could
it ever be even imagined to function at the global level?20
By what kinds of institutional arrangements could democratic control and acountability
be made to work all the way up to continental and global levels? What can be learnt from
examples such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the World
Trade Organization, the World Bank, and from efforts made to introduce international
jurisdiction even to the extent of supra-state interference with the violation of human
rights by sovereign states within their own borders?
For our present purposes, let it only be pointed out that awareness of the force of
globalisation need not necessarily lead to resignation as far as existing democracy and
democratisation in existing states are concerned. It is, on the contrary, not improbable
that the growth of substantial democracy within the various existing states may also
improve the chances for democratisation of inter- and supra-state relations.21
Final note
The point of departure for this essay was the question of how to conceptualise and
formulate the role of politics, in particular democracy, in the development of societies.
The overriding conclusion is that substantial democracy and majority-needs-based
development ("human development") are conceptually and empirically linked, while
other forms of democracy and development may or may not correlate with each other. In
other words, thus, the more firmly democratic the form of rule, the greater on average
the chances that ordinary people's developmental needs will be considered and
prioritised.
20
Interestingly, even an avowed globalisation "sceptic" such as Lewin (2007, p. 89), in discussing the theme
of globalisation and democratic accountability, ends up by noting that it "may be that politicians are in
some measure trapped by globalisation. "Are there, thus, any ways out of the trap?
21
Cf. the following remark by former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld addressing the
Indian Council of World Affairs (New Delhi) on 3 February 1956, long before the term ‘globalisation’
had ever come into use (quoted from Melber 2011, p. 7): "Through various developments which are
familiar to all, world solidarity has, so to say, been forced upon us. This is no longer a choice of
enlightened spirits, it is something which those whose temperament leads them in the direction of
isolationism have also to accept."
19 This relationship between democracy and development is certainly complicated by
globalisation but not fundamentally changed or upset. On the contrary, the introduction
of the globalisation perspective into the analysis makes the significance of democracy
stand out even more strongly. For how would it be possible at all, at least in the longer
run, to deal meaningfully with global needs without the involvement in actual practice of
those concerned?
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