A HOME FOR EVERY FAMILY IN PERU: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
Zoe Elena Trohanis, Catalina Marulanda, Angelica Nunez, Van Anh Vu Hong,
Vanessa Velasco Bernal, Luis Triveno, Luis Tagle, Guillermo Fernandez, Lucia
Ledesma, Haydee Yong, Ariel Cuevas, Jorge Ramirez
Paper prepared for presentation at the
“2016 WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON LAND AND POVERTY”
The World Bank - Washington DC, March 14-18, 2016
1
Copyright 2016 by author(s). All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies
of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this
copyright notice appears on all such copies.
Abstract
Peru, like most other countries in the region, urbanized quickly in the second half of
the twentieth century, going from just over 50 percent urban in 1965 to almost 80
percent urban today. The urban population in Peru is divided among a system of 32
cities. With rapid urbanization and city growth, citizens’ demand for more affordable
housing, employment, urban infrastructure and social services rises. This creates
technical and financial challenges for national and local governments. This study
utilizes the housing value chain as a framework to review bottlenecks and benchmark
global best practice to develop a series of recommendations at the macro level for the
housing sector, along with specific recommendations related to urban planning, land
use, and increasing the supply of affordable housing.
Key Words:
Affordable Housing, Cities, Urban Development
2
1. Introduction
Peru, like most other countries in the region, urbanized quickly in the second half of the
twentieth century, going from just over 50 percent urban in 1965 to almost 80 percent urban
today. Peru’s urban population continues to grow at a rate of 1.72% per year, slightly higher
than the Latin American average of 1.49% per year.i The urban population in Peru is divided
among a system of 32 cities. Despite the high concentration of urban population in
Metropolitan Lima (about 50 percent of urban dwellers and 30 percent of the total
population), about ten million urban dwellers are distributed across smaller cities. As a result
of the rapid urbanization over the past decades, much of it unplanned and informal, cities
across the country are facing significant constraints and challenges in transforming into
livable and productive places. With urbanization and city growth, citizens’ demand for more
affordable housing, employment, urban infrastructure and social services rises. This creates
technical and financial challenges for national and local governments.
Despite its significant efforts to promote the supply of new housing, for example through
direct subsidies and housing loans, Peru still has one of the largest housing deficits in Latin
America (surpassed only by Nicaragua and Bolivia). According to World Bank estimates,
while the national government has invested USD 3.3 billion on its housing programs between
1999 and 2014, the estimated value of the 1.3 million new housing units needed to close the
housing gap in Peru (without considering the qualitative deficit) is USD 30 billion. This
demand represents both a public policy challenge for national and local governments and an
enormous potential to leverage the existing construction industry and financial institutions to
generate additional housing and spur market growth.
This report applies a housing value chain analytical framework to identify and analyze the
bottlenecks behind the lack of formal affordable housing in Peru. Using the example of Peru
and drawing upon good practices in other countries, we argue that there is plenty of room to
increase the impact of housing policies by using the methodology utilized in this report to
improve their design and implementation.
The methodology applied includes a literature review, interviews with key public and private
stakeholders, legal and institutional analysis, data compilation and analysis, workshops with
national government officials in the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation
(MVCS) and private sector representatives, and field work in the metropolitan areas and
districts of four cities (Lima, Chiclayo, Huancayo, and Moyobamba) selected on the basis of
diversity of population size and geographic location.
3
In the first section of the paper we describe the analytical framework we used for the
identification of the main bottlenecks affecting the production of formal affordable housing in
Peru. In the next section we describe the main findings of our diagnostics and we suggest
possible ways of using the housing value chain analytical framework to improve the design
and implementation of housing policies.
2. Methodology: The formal housing value chain analytical framework
For the purposes of this study, we refer to formal housing units as those that have (i) clear,
secure and transparent property rights that make the real estate assets fungible (for example,
allowing them to be pledged as collateral for a mortgage loan); and (ii) sound structure that
has been built in compliance with local planning standards and construction codes and
permits.
The formal housing value chain summarizes the coordination required between the public and
private sector in seven interdependent steps required in order to produce formal housing units.
This breakdown is particularly useful considering the complex reality behind the housing
production system. For example, we found that in Peru the housing value chain involves the
active participation of 40 types of actors (private and public) within the rules set by 52 pieces
of legislation cutting across different levels of government (district, city, province, national).
The seven interdependent steps of the value chain are: planning, land availability, urban
infrastructure, project appraisal and licensing, urbanization, edification and marketing and
finance. Below is a brief description of the activities included in the value chain:
a) Planning includes policies, strategies and planning instruments, housing programs,
and urban regulations particularly related to zoning and land management, the model
defined to guide the development of the city, the information systems that support the
city planning activities, the location of social housing projects, the definition and
compliance of building standards among others.
b) Land availability includes the identification of available land according to the
existing urban standards, the assessment of their value and the identification of their
ownership, based on the estimated demand for land for housing projects. It also
includes management, acquisition, regularization, titling and registration of such land.
c) Urban infrastructure includes the planning and construction of basic urban
infrastructure (roads, water pipes, sewerage, and electricity) required to develop a
part of the city that incorporates social housing projects.
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d) Project appraisal and licensing includes meeting the requirements and obtaining the
permits and licenses needed to develop a real estate project, as well as performing the
financial analysis to determine its feasibility.
e) Urbanization includes the preparation of the land for construction, the installation of
the infrastructure connections for the project, the budgeting for the construction and
the delegation of the supervision roles.
f) Edification includes the construction of the housing units.
g) The marketing and finance includes marketing and project financing for developers
and for end-users (e.g. construction finance and mortgage financing).
The production of formal housing units is adequate when, along all the steps of the housing
value chain, there are: (i) clear and enforceable rights and obligations for all agents involved,
(ii) balanced incentive mechanisms for market participation both form buyers and sellers and
(iii) active coordination and cooperation mechanisms between all levels of government and
the private sector.
When these elements are not in place, either in part or throughout the whole housing value
chain, two major developments take place:
First, the production of formal housing units is scarce and the houses that are constructed tend
to be far too expensive for most people. According to our estimates, the formal annual supply
of housing can only serve 30% of the demand of housing generated by the new households
that are formed in the country every year. In addition to that, given current market
conditions, only 45% of the households in Peru (with both family members working) have the
income levels necessary to be able to obtain a mortgage to buy the cheapest housing unit
available in the market. This means that in practice, only the high-income segments of the
population have access to formal housing units, while the majority of families end up finding
a solution to their housing needs in the informal market, exposing themselves to many risks in
their transactions with land-traffickers. According to our estimates, 8 out of 10 of the new
houses that are built in urban areas can be classified as informal as they do not comply with
existing regulations. This, however, is not a recent phenomenon and thus, as shown in Figure
1, the share of existing housing units with a property title in the country is substantially low
even after conducting a large formalization program in the nineties.
5
Figure 1: Housing units with property title
Total
36%
V
56%
IV
46%
III
26%
II
25%
I
17%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
By quintile of income
Source: INEI (2009).
Second, the effectiveness of public interventions around housing (for example, those related
to the provision of public services, urban infrastructure and other services such as education,
health, security and waste management) is significantly diminished. As a result, the costs of
accommodating the urban growth and the housing gap continue to increase. Table 1 below
illustrates the informal housing value chain and the actions taken at each step, which can be
contrasted with the formal housing value chain used in this study.
Table 1: The informal housing value chain
Components of the formal
Description of how each component of the housing value
value housing value chain
chain operates in the informal world
Planning
Limited. Informal housing units then to be located at the
urban periphery, sometimes even in risk areas.
Land availability
Frequently related to an illegal occupation, informal housing
units are often subject to insecurity of tenure due to the lack
of legal title.
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Urban infrastructure
Poorly serviced by infrastructure networks and public
services such as roads, power, piped water, sewage /
drainage, among others.
Project appraisal and
Lack of compliance with regulations but overall a cheaper
licensing
alternative for households.
Urbanization
Lack of coordination with local authorities regarding
conditions for mobility and livability.
Edification
Self – designed, self – built and incrementally improved
over a long period of time.
Marketing and finance
Households generally finance the acquisition or construction
of their informal dwellings through family / group savings
and / or loans from informal lenders.
3. The housing challenge in Peru
We applied the formal housing value chain analytical framework to the case of Peru using
secondary data and by conducting field-work in 4 cities of different sizes (Lima, Huancayo,
Moyobamba and Chiclayo) to draw general conclusions at the national level and formulate
specific proposals to improve the production of formal housing.
We found the reality in Peru to be consistent with that of other developing economies in Latin
America, Asia and Africa:

The production of formal housing is insufficient to eliminate the quantitative and
qualitative deficits, let alone to supply housing solutions to the new households that
are being formed in the country every year.

While the quantitative deficit is centralized (9 regions concentrate 80% of the
quantitative deficit), the qualitative deficit is more decentralized (81% of the
qualitative deficit is concentrated in 14 regions).

The data indicate a geographic bias in the supply of housing—and housing finance—
across the country. While some regions are overrepresented like Lima, La Libertad
and Ica, others are underrepresented, such as Piura and Junín.
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
While the demand for housing is high, the financial capacity of the population is low
(even considering the government subsidies available through MiVivienda or Techo
Propio). Only 55% of the households that would like to purchase a housing unit can
actually afford one, providing that they can finance it through the formal market.
However, 70% of the income of these households is either informal or irregular,
which complicates further the access of the families to long-term traditional housing
finance products.

For the developers, building housing units for the higher income segments is 125%
more profitable than targeting the lower-income segments of the population.

The absence of adequate urban planning and regulation policies is generating urban
sprawl instead of promoting urban renewal and densification, and thus increasing
dramatically the cost of service provision for local governments.
The production of sufficient and affordable formal housing units could be improved in Peru
by taking on board a series of general and specific actions across the following legal,
institutional, financial and operational areas of the housing sector.
a. General actions

Creation of actionable knowledge to inform the housing sector. In Peru, as in
many developing countries, for most households, purchasing or building a house is
their single largest investment and the preferred method of intergenerational wealth
transfer. Despite its importance for citizens’ well-being, there is very little consistent
and reliable data and knowledge about the housing sector.
Determining the size of the housing gap in a country is in itself a complicated task;
the absence of data makes the challenge even harder. In Peru as in most developing
countries, the housing gap estimates vary depending on the type of deficit being
discussed (quantitative or qualitative, formal or informal) and on a compendium of
different sources of data held by different public and private actors.
According to the IADB, Peru’s housing deficit is ranked third in the LAC region1,
behind Nicaragua and Bolivia (Figure 1). According to our estimates, the requirement
for new housing units in Peru is approximately 1.3 million units when factoring in the
1
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. (2012). Un Espacio Para El Desarrollo: Los Mercados de Vivienda en
América Latina y el Caribe. Washington, D.C.
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quantitative deficit from the 2007 census data and the estimation of the formation of
new households through 2015. This figure does not include the existing qualitative
deficit in the country.
Figure 1: Families without adequate housing
Costa Rica
18%
Chile
23%
Uruguay
26%
Venezuela
29%
Argentina
32%
Brasil
33%
México
34%
Colombia
37%
Paraguay
43%
Ecuador
50%
Perú
72%
Bolivia
75%
Nicaragua
78%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (2012).
Note: The Inter-American Development Bank uses a definition that includes both quantitative and qualitative
deficit to determine the percentage of the population with adequate housing.
Without adequate land registries that are connected with the national registry, local
governments cannot manage the urban expansion of their districts, let alone increase
their property tax collection. Without an inventory of state-owned real estate assets,
the government cannot assign the best use to its assets or make them available to the
promotion of social housing programs. Finally, without a system of information
regarding the housing market (for example, tracking housing prices, housing starts,
etc), the government cannot prioritize and determine the effectiveness of their
policies; and businesses and people cannot make investment decisions consistent with
their risk preferences.

Design and implementation of an articulated housing strategy that provides
citizens with housing options that are superior to informality. Despite substantial
investments in demand-side housing programs, which have mostly been implemented
through up-front subsidies (Techo Propio) and credit programs operated by Fondo Mi
Vivienda, the programs have had only a limited ability to promote affordable housing
9
90%
construction; there is an apparent disconnect within the public agencies that
implement housing-related State programs. In addition to that, while the success of
housing policies depends highly on the performance of local governments, the
interaction and coordination mechanisms between the national and local governments
are not operating properly. We have identified the following five components that
could be further developed to contribute to the articulation of a successful strategy for
housing promotion.
-
The definition of clear national guidelines and the development of tools to
assist local authorities to manage the growth of their cities. Gaps in these
tools and guidelines have de-facto left the definition of city growth and
expansion to the private sector (both formal and informal).
-
The clarification of roles of the various state actors who have a part to play in
the value chain of formal housing production. Currently, some of these roles
are inconsistent, incomplete or redundant, which affects the consistency and
efficiency of the actions of the national government.
-
The definition of the rights and obligations of the private actors involved in
the housing market that would allow cities to take advantage of modern
financing mechanisms, such as land value capture, to improve their urban
infrastructure.
-
The streamlining of the incentives that the government provides for the
construction and purchase of homes to increase their effectiveness to
stimulate the involvement of the private sector in the construction of housing
units for the low-income segments of the population.

Technical and financial empowerment of city governments. The effectiveness of
Peru’s housing policies is also constrained by the existing legal and institutional
framework and the decentralization process. Most of the existing norms were
designed to support the decentralization policy of the early 1990s, with the first
efforts on land administration. The framework established the distribution and
hierarchy of roles and responsibilities between the national, regional and municipal
levels, with planning instruments designed to align municipal and regional actions
with national directives. However, in practice, when the competencies related to land
administration were officially transferred to the regions and local governments
(between 2009 and 2013), the change was made without mechanisms in place to
ensure the regions and local governments were technically and financially ready to
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take on these new competencies. In addition, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
were not established prior to the transition. As a result, Peruvian cities cannot
leverage the (re)development of residential districts, public infrastructure, transport
assets, and access to lower cost public service delivery to support the sustainable
development and growth. Without land management tools and policies, local
governments lack the financial and technical capabilities and the incentives to plan
the growth of their cities, based on the expected demand for housing and the
investment in the accompanying infrastructure required.
b. Specific actions
Planning

The national government could introduce incentives and targeted programs
to support the efforts of local governments related to urban planning. With a
better definition of the roles and pattern of interaction between the national and
local governments, based on a typology that recognizes the heterogeneity of their
technical and financial capacities in urban planning and management, it would be
possible to harmonize urban policies, respecting the autonomy of local
governments as envisaged in the decentralization law. Currently, while it is
possible to find small cities in Peru like Moyobamba with a population of 56,000
that have updated planning instruments, there are large cities like Chiclayo that
are still operating with the city planning instruments from 1992 (see Figure 2).
-
Figure 2: Planning instruments in Peru
Chiclayo is an intermediate city with a population of
600,000. The updated planning instruments developed in
2010-2011 have not been officially approved and thus the
province still operates with planning instruments from 1992.
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Moyobamba is a small city with a
population of 56,000. The city has
updated planning instruments.
Instead of neglecting previous
efforts, the new administration is
building on the efforts of the
preceding one.
Source: World Bank, 2015

Some products or instruments that the national government could offer the local
governments are:
-
Partial or total funding for the elaboration of urban planning
instruments.
-
Technical assistance and / or certifications in both urban planning
and control and collection of property tax.
-
Conditional funding for investment on urban infrastructure and/or
housing programs like the HOME program created in 1990 in the
U.S by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This
program, that was originally designed to promote social housing
supply in a decentralized context, has a budget of USD 1 billion that
could be accessed by local governments upon the completion of
certain conditions related to the provision of social housing.

The introduction of an obligation or incentive to include a minimum
percentage of social housing in the construction of new housing projects
could boost the production of social housing. Due to the high cost of serviced
land for housing development and other factors, developers opt to build housing
for higher income segments in order to maximize their profitability. The
introduction of obligations and incentive mechanisms for the construction of
social housing, such as the minimum quota in real estate projects, transfers of
land, compensation with edification rights, among others, could be used to
address this issue. These approaches have been successfully utilized in several
countries, including Colombia, the United States, and Mexico, among others.

The introduction of land management instruments could allow local
governments to promote densification and at the same time generate
resources to fund the provision of services and/or the additional urban
infrastructure required. Currently, as shown in Table 2, the densities in Peru,
and even in Lima, are low according to international standards. By encouraging
the use of zoning and mixed uses as land management tools, it would be possible
to increase the profitability of real estate projects and encourage the production of
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social housing. In addition, this approach would help reduce the high costs of
provision of basic infrastructure and economic and social segregation that occurs
when low-income families choose to settle in areas far from urban centers
because the peri-urban expansion areas are the only affordable option for
housing. Higher densities could also decrease the demand for new land for
housing projects. According to our estimates and the ranges of densities defined
by the Reglamento de Acondicionamiento Territorial de Desarrollo Urbano
(RATDU), closing the housing gap could require from 8,831 hectares (with high
density) to 47,310 hectares (with low density) across Peru’s cities (Table 3).
Table 2: Densities in Latin America
City
People per sq. km. in
urban areas
México D.F., México
13,221
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
10,928
Santiago, Chile
8,681
Quito, Ecuador
4,059
Lima y Callao, Peru
3,538
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (2015), INEI (2015).
Table 3: Demand for land in selected cities
City
New housing
Land required (in
units required
hectares with a density of
120 housing units per
hectare)
Lima
519,023
3,460
La Libertad
82,294
549
Piura
60,195
401
13
Arequipa
58,569
390
Callao
51,968
346
Total
772,049
5,146
Source: World Bank (2015).
Land availability and urban infrastructure

In order to increase the availability of public land for social housing
purposes, the country would benefit from the use of a broader and
unique definition of available land earmarked for housing. While for
some institutions, it is sufficient to find a plot of land legally owned by the
State, others require evidence that the public services, such as water and
sanitation, are able to be connected to the proposed plot. Finally, the minority
of institutions look for plots of land that have both clear ownership and the
public services already connected to the plot; however, these factors increase
the price of land and therefore increase the price of the housing units being
constructed. For example, during the field work we carried out in the case
study cities, we found that one plot of serviced land could cost up to 7 times
more than one without services within a 6 km. radius.

The institutional setting in Peru could be improved to increase the
government’s ability to manage land efficiently. For example, the
government cannot perform the following functions under its existing legal
framework: to act as a land bank that is legally empowered to acquire or
manage by delegation public and/or private land for housing projects; to act
as a real estate bank that is able to acquire private properties for the
development of urban regeneration or housing projects; to act as a real estate
developer capable of partnering with private companies for developing
housing projects and administering the public housing stock, articulating
them with the subsidies program. Such institutional framework could be
implemented either at the national or local level or through a combination of
both. The Korean and Colombian experiences are both good examples of the
creation of agencies at the national level to perform these functions. Some
examples of local agencies that perform these functions at the local level
could be found also in Colombia. In addition to that, the institutional setting
14
does not have appropriate rights of preference and acquisition mechanisms
that could be used by the State to acquire private land in areas that have been
declared to be of interest for housing projects. A similar set of institutional
arrangements and competencies are also needed for local governments to be
able to perform these functions locally.

The legal framework for local governments could be improved by
introducing the tools they need to generate revenue from the serviced
land that exists in consolidated urban areas to help them finance the cost
of basic service infrastructure. Some municipalities or State-owned
agencies own limited amounts of land, which they can strategically sell or
develop in order to generate resources they can then use to finance
infrastructure. In other cases, not much land is owned by the State but still the
capacity of planning and regulating land use within their administrative
boundaries remains the responsibility of the local governments. In these
cases, land value capture instruments such as changes of land use (through
land use conversion or change in zoning and property taxation) or
development rights (authorization for higher densities or greater floor area
ratios) could be tools that the local governments could use to generate
revenues that could finance urban infrastructure.

Within the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation,
improvements could be achieved through better coordination of its
functions with a view to generate and manage serviced public land. On
one hand, the provision of basic services to identified plots of lands
designated for housing projects could be managed more efficiently. On the
other hand, an improved allocation system for investments of the Ministry
could introduce incentives that facilitate the alignment of local government
actions to national priorities and help stimulate the production of more
affordable housing to meet the demand.
Feasibilities and Licenses, Construction, Marketing and Finance

The roles of the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation and
Fondo MiVivienda (FMV) in the design, implementation and monitoring
of housing policy could be clarified. This would minimize duplication of
efforts and / or contradictory actions.
15

The existing subsidies programs, FMV and Techo Propio, could be
merged and calibrated to improve their efficiency and ability to reach
the target population. Currently the two subsidies programs operate with
different legal, institutional and operational frameworks although they pursue
the same objective. For example, seven pieces of legislation govern the
operations of MiVivienda while other eight different pieces of legislation
apply to Techo Propio. Given these conditions, neither of these programs has
been successful in reaching the lowest income population segment. Table 4
below illustrates the targeting of subsidies and the differences in the subsidy
amounts by program and by income quintile.
Table 4: Income and subsidies in Nuevos Soles
Income
quintile
Average family income
Bono del Buen Pagador
de MiVivienda*
Bono del Fondo Habitacional
de Techo Propio*
1
790.2
17,000
19,250
2
1266.8
17,000
15,400
3
1685.5
16,000
15,400
4
2098.0
16,000
N.A.
5
3668.2
14,000
N.A.
*/ Both programs include subsidies for the first installment. In addition to that, MiVivienda offers a
subsidy to the interest rate.
Source: MVCS.

The regional and municipal governments’ engagement as strategic
partners in the promotion of social housing is still at an early stage. With
clearer roles, the provision of relevant technical assistance and conditional
funding for investment on urban infrastructure or housing projects, an
improved coordination and cooperation between the national and local
governments could be achieved.

The platform for innovation in the housing sector could be improved.
New housing solutions (different from the traditional purchase with a
mortgage – such as rental or leasing options) and building techniques and use
of new materials (different from the traditional brick and cement block) need
to be introduced in the market. Currently, only 6.6% of the occupied housing
units are rented in Peru, far below the regional average (16.9%) and the EU
16
average (26.5%). In addition to that, new financing products for real estate
developers should be developed in order to avoid forcing the families to
finance the housing projects through higher initial payments or interest rates.
Currently, families fund the developers through higher costs, equivalent to a
13.9% increase in the monthly payment of their mortgage due to the existing
regulations defined by the financial regulator.
Concluding Remarks
The housing deficit in Peru mainly affects the poor and contributes to the proliferation of
illegal settlements in urban areas, which are generally located in unplanned neighborhoods,
lack titling, and have limited access to basic services and reasonable connectivity with the
economic centers. This paper has described some of the constraints to the supply of
affordable housing that were identified, including cumbersome and inefficient regulation, lack
of access to land, infrastructure (for new housing), and infrastructure and construction
finance.
Our analysis suggests three strategic actions the Government of Peru could take to support its
efforts to strengthen the housing market and better enable the production of social housing,
including the need for: (a) establishment of a national housing policy to align public and
private actors under a common framework; (b) creation of robust information systems to
inform decision-making with regard to the sector – such as transparent information on the
housing sector, national inventory of land, and functioning cadasters - to improve the
effectiveness of government interventions and targeting of programs; and (c) decentralization
of government housing programs, subsidies and efforts to build capacity for urban planning
and land management at the local level, with support from the national government.
Additional challenges to urban planning and land use include limited capacity at the local
level and the ineffective use of planning instruments and ad-hoc urban development,
primarily due to economic and political pressures. Very few district-level municipalities have
the capacity to develop and implement urban development plans, and the existing plans are
often obsolete or inconsistent.1 There are overlapping spheres of authority amongst local and
national government agencies regarding critical components of urban land development
especially for land use planning (or legal approvals, regulatory oversight, and timing and
amount of capital funds), dispersed decision-making, opaque approval processes, etc. As a
result, cities grow in an uncontrolled and unplanned way with difficulties in providing
services and housing adequately and proportionately to the different segments of the
17
population. The current framework is insufficient for cities to advance their local economic
development initiatives effectively. Furthermore there is a lack of alignment of incentives
between the sectors, the municipalities and developers (and investors), and therefore missed
opportunities of leveraging this type of alliance for mixed land use and increasing the supply
of affordable housing.
To articulate national urban policies and housing in a decentralized environment, it is critical
to gradually incorporate local governments in implementing policies of both urban planning
and land management and promotion housing and create incentives for decision-making in
line with national policy. In such a context, the role of the national government should
gradually converge to one which predominantly sets general policy guidelines and transfers
partial functions and powers of enforcement, supervision and coordination of national policy
to local authorities (eg, regional committees). In the medium term, the national government
could consider transferring funds directly to cities that have high housing deficits to
implement the national programs locally. In addition, incentives aimed at activating the
investment decisions of the private sector should be adapted to local realities in order to be
more effective.
References
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