Pakistan
Annual Research
Journal
Vol. 51, 2015
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PAKISTAN’S U-TURN ON AFGHAN
POLICY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
Dr. Muqarrab Akbar*
____________________________________________________________________
Abstract
Pakistan has never enjoyed cordial relationship with Afghanistan with
an exception during Taliban’s rule on Afghanistan. Both neighbouring states
have many contesting issues such as Durand line and Pashtunistan. During
Taliban reign, Pakistan extended full support to Afghanistan hence, at the
minimum, successful in mitigating, if not complete resolving, the bilateral
issues of Pashtunistan and Durand line. Pakistan faced immense pressure
from international community and from some fractions within the society,after
September 11 attacks on United States, to support war against terrorism. This
paper explores the factors that compelled Pakistan to take famous U-turn
regarding its Afghan policy towards Taliban. Moreover, it critically analyses
how Pakistan played a pivotal role in eliminating Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan.
Keyword:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, September 11, Taliban, Al-Qaeda
Dr. Muqarrab Akbar, Assistant Professor, Department of International
Relations, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan.
*
122
The September 11, 2001 attacks produced similar effects in the US as
those which had been produced by the attacks on Pearl Harbour by Japan in
1941.1 The US blamed a radical network of terrorists under the command of
bin Laden for these attacks just after the incident and decided to pursue
terrorism by all possible means.2 Pakistan’s geostrategic location, religious
ties, ethnic bonding and its close relations with the Taliban made it the first
choice as an ally for the US to hunt al Qaeda and the Taliban.
By relying on policy of realpolitik and politics of interests,3
Washington pressurised Pakistan to join hands with them against the
terrorists.4 Resultantly, Pakistan performed a now-famous policy U-turn by
withdrawing its long standing support for the Taliban and instead supporting
the war against terrorism.5 This was a marriage of convenience, because the
US made some ‘ludicrous’6 demands from Pakistan and threatened to bomb it
back to the stone ages in the case of non-cooperation.7 Colin Powell, the US
Secretary of State (a position equivalent to Foreign Minister in many other
states), called Pakistan’s President Musharraf and stated: “you are either with
us or against us.”8 Musharraf took this as an ultimatum, as there was no grey
area or middle ground.9 Pakistan tried its best to avoid confrontation by
sending a delegation to Afghanistan led by the (state security) ISI chief to
convince the Taliban to hand over bin Laden to the Americans, but this action
was in vain.10 One of the closest aides of Musharraf disclosed the inside story
of the talks on the condition of anonymity:
“Pakistan, due to immense pressure from the US, asked Mullah Omer
to hand over bin Laden to the US but Mullah Omer claimed that even
if he handed over bin Laden to the US, they would make another
excuse to invade Afghanistan. Mullah Omer called Pakistan
“Majboristan” (a state that is in a helpless condition) and told
Pakistan to do what they saw as being in their national interest.”11
Christina Rocca, the US Assistant Secretary of State, asked Lodhi,
Pakistan’s ambassador to US, to keep diplomatic channels with the Taliban
open until the U.S. invasion was completed.12
123
No single theory of International Relations can explain the behaviour
of US foreign policy in the War on Terror. It was based on a combination of
realism, liberalism, constructivism and pragmatism paradigms.13 The US
adopted the theory of liberalism to gain support public at home and abroad
against the Taliban, by highlighting issues of human rights and individual
freedom for the people of Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Moreover, the US,
as a unipolar power, behaved according to a realist paradigm14 to secure its
national interest by using its military power.15
The September 11 attacks challenged the US’s status of hegemony and
the US reacted quickly to maintain its status and to ensure its survival, which
can be explained with reference to the framework of defensive realism and
offensive realism.16 The US acted according to the theory of offensive realism
by pressurising Pakistan.17 Schweller points out that in offensive realist
strategy, big powers always deploy an offensive realist strategy to maximise
their power and achieve hegemony by exploiting weaker states.18 The US can
act like this due to the absence of any higher power in the international system
which is able to check the power-seeking behaviour of state governments.19
The involvement of the United Nations in the War on Terror can be
understood via the framework of Neo-Liberalism through which America
focused on the role of the international organization in addressing the issue of
terrorism.20 The American War on Terror can also be seen from the theoretical
perspective of Marxism.21 William has pointed out that US adopted an
expansionist policy in order to access new markets, in search of raw materials
and investment opportunities.22 The US can therefore be argued to have
invaded Afghanistan to contain the economic progress of China, gain access to
the Central Asian States and to capture the resources of Afghanistan23 such as
vast reserves of minerals and Natural Gas.24
The Bush administration announced that it would use economic
instruments,25 in other words greater economic benefit for states, in return for
their support in the War on Terror.26 In the post- Cold War era following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States, like other international powers
124
heavily relied on economic instruments of statecraft in addition to its military
and political strength27 to reach its fresh foreign policy objectives, because
these are often more useful and more credible instruments than military
statecraft due to their lower cost.28 Washington not only lifted its previously
imposed economic sanctions from Pakistan but also provided aid totalling
billions of dollars and rescheduled its loans as well.29 Pakistan rushed to make
a deal with US due to its own self-interests, by fulfilling US demands and in
turn receiving ‘carrots’ in the shape of military and economic assistance,
including the vote of the United States granting final approval of IMF loans to
Pakistan.30
The US demanded that Pakistan stop Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan
and end its logistical support to them, as well as providing the United States
with blanket flight and landing rights to conduct its military operations,
territorial access for the United States including air bases, naval ports and at
strategic locations on borders, intelligence to the United States to prevent
further attacks, and a promise to curb all domestic support against the US and
to condemn the terrorist attacks of September 11. Lastly, the US demanded
that Pakistan cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban, broke its diplomatic
relations with the Taliban and offered its support for the United States against
Al-Qaeda.31
Pakistan’s response to US demands was prompt and unequivocal. It
changed the foreign and security policy towards Afghanistan it had pursued
for almost a decade as President Musharraf accepted all the above-mentioned
demands unconditionally.32 Musharraf met with different stakeholders to
defend his decision.33 Ahmad34 called the decision to change policy a grave
mistake and warned of a split in the army as a result. Moreover, Sami ulHaq35
stated that: “America is not the power of God. God himself is. We don’t need
anyone else’s help.”36 Musharraf tried to convince the nation by proclaiming
that cooperation with the US was for reasons of integrity, economic revival
and the nuclear security37 of Pakistan and to secure its national interests.38 He
further added that the Kashmir issue, an Indian offer39 and the incapability of
125
Pakistan to counter the US had compelled him to make the alliance in the War
on Terror.40 Moreover, India had also offered logistic support to America,41
taking advantage of the circumstances by declaring Pakistan to be a sponsor
and harbourer of terrorism,42 while Pakistan wanted to secure its position over
the Kashmir issue as a top priority.43 So, this strategic decision of partnership
was also in consideration of India.
Policymakers in Pakistan could not be certain that the US would not
target the country’s nuclear assets44 in the case of non-cooperation in
GWOT.45 Moreover, Pakistan could no longer afford to go it alone by denying
the condition set out by Washington. Ayoob points out that the political,
social, economic and institutional weaknesses and shortcomings in third world
states (like Pakistan) can be exploited by developed states (like the US).46 So,
Pakistan took the decision to make the best out of difficult circumstances by
following the doctrine of offensive realism.47 Pakistan was already under
immense pressure from the international community due to its prior relations
with the Taliban. The dramatic change from the pro-Taliban policy of Pakistan
was a result of a tactical decision based on a rational calculation of the state’s
strategic and national interests in order, above all, to avoid isolation48 and to
gain opportunities which would have been at risk in the case of noncooperation.49
The post-September 11 world effected and transformed the parameters
and directions of Pakistan’s foreign policy by presenting difficult and
unpleasant choices to the Pakistani policy makers and military establishment.
Some policy makers favoured President Musharraf’s decision to join the war,
seeing it as rational, realistic and pragmatic, and in the national interest,
calling it an ‘inevitable decision,50 based on ‘global consent.’51 Meanwhile,
others criticised and condemned it as an idealistic and personally opportunistic
decision, calling it damaging to the national interest,52 ‘an ad hoc decision
based on the arbitrary nature of the decision making process’,53 ‘bad
bargaining’ and a ‘diplomacy failure.’54 It was denounced as the ‘worst
decision’55 made by one man or few individuals of one institution56 that did
126
not reflect public opinion as representative of the people of Pakistan.57
According to Gul, it showed the president’s lack of wisdom and that he did not
even take the deterrence of nuclear weapons into account.58 The critics of
Musharraf’s decision were exemplified by Turkey, who refused to provide
bases to the US for the War on Terror and also refused an offer of £10 billion
to participate in the war against Iraq.59 A similar division, with simple
majority approval, towards Musharraf’s decision can be observed within the
Pakistani public in the empirical research conducted by the researcher. In
response to the question of whether Pakistan had no other option to join the
War on Terror, 54.3 per cent of the Pakistani public agreed, hence the majority
supported the decision of Musharraf, whereas 35.5 per cent did not agree.60
Fig. 1
Although Pakistan joined the alliance against the Taliban, many of its
policy makers and intelligence sources were convinced that a pro-Pakistan
government in Kabul would be helpful to Pakistan in general and against
Indian hegemonic designs in particular.61 Other Pakistani policy makers felt
that by backing the US-led War on Terror, they could only reap trivial
benefits.62A deep analysis of the decision shows that it was neither a
completely personal and opportunistic decision, nor could it be pronounced
completely rational, because many other financial and political benefits could
be reaped.63 The truth was probably somewhere in between these two
opposing perspectives.64
127
The decision by Musharraf to align with the US can be seen in the light
of Barry Buzan’s argument, which emphasises that security entails both the
internal and external threat.65 Likewise, Musharraf mentioned that Pakistan
was facing an existential threat both from internal extremism and the external
Indian threat, in a country who tried her best to alienate Pakistan.66 Similarly,
this decision can be seen in the light of Ayoob’s idea of security-insecurity in
relation to vulnerabilities to both external and internal threats.67 The Taliban
were becoming more of a liability than an asset, which is why Musharraf
disclosed in his address to nation that he gave top priority to the defence of
Pakistan. The defence of any other country comes after that.68 The internal
sectarian disturbance and killings also had their external roots in Afghanistan,
as that country was providing the culprits with sanctuary.69Hussain described
this shift by pointing out that, “Pakistan‘s policymakers realized that the Jihad
Triangle that had emerged since the 1980s, with Pakistani volunteers training
in Afghanistan to fight in other conflicts like Kashmir, Chechnya, Xinxiang,
Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, was no longer sustainable.”70
Theoretically, Pakistan’s decision to join the War on Terror can be best
explained in the light of Allison’s models of decision making. This theory
presents three models of decision making: the Rational Actor Model, the
Organizational Process Model, and the Governmental Politics Model, also
known as the Bureaucratic Model.71 President Musharraf, who was also Army
Chief, the most stable institution in Pakistan, took his core commanders on
board in making this decision. This was exemplified as the Organisational
Process and the Bureaucratic Model. The decision was also based on the
Rational Actor Model, because it was taken after analysing the different policy
options for Pakistan and a cost-benefit analysis of possible alliance with the
US.72 One anonymous source (insisting on the condition of anonymity)
disclosed that, “Musharraf made three committees: a Civilian Committee, a
Strategic Committee and a Military Committee, to recommend a decision
based on national interest. I was a member of one Committee and all three
128
Committees were convinced that Pakistan should join the War on Terror for its
own national interest.”73
In terms of the cost-benefit analysis which was carried out, the Indian
offer, domestic militancy, the US threat, and Pakistan’s economic weakness
were the major factors which contributed to the decision to secure Pakistan’s
strategic assets, to safeguard the Kashmir cause, and to prevent Pakistan from
being declared a terrorist state.74 In addition to this, the decision put Pak-US
ties back on track, avoided any American anger or retribution, got sanctions
lifted, prevented the emergence of an Indo-US nexus against Pakistan, gained
international legitimacy for the military regime of Musharraf, and enabled the
emergence of Pakistan as responsible state.75 Musharraf’s government’s
support for the War on Terror required them to ignore the large anti-war
demonstrations going on across the country, particularly by religious factions
of the society and by religious political parties.76 Empirical evidence of a
general anti-war attitude was shown in a survey conducted by the US
Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research just after
September 11, in which the support for Mullah Omer’s regime in Afghanistan
had increased to 46% from a level of 38% in June 2001.77 Similarly, in a Pew
Global Attitude opinion survey conducted a year after September 11, 45% of
Pakistanis opposed the US-led War on Terror and only 20 percent were in
favour of it.78 Moreover, Islamic political parties ran their 2002 election
campaign on anti-war and anti-Americanism manifestos.79Mutahida Majlis-iAmal (MMA), an alliance of Islamic political parties, won an unprecedented
52 of 272 seats (19%) in the national election of 2002, assuring an Islamic
broker role in central government while also gaining complete control in
NWFP (Now KPK), a region adjacent to Afghanistan.80 This was the first time
in the history of Pakistan that Islamic parties had reached those numbers in
parliament, and it could be argued to have happened not because the public
voted from a love for Islamic parties but, rather, as an anti-war protest. The
empirical research of the researcher shows that people did not support the War
on Terror. In response to the question of whether the American decision to
129
wage a war against terrorism after September 11 was justified, 59 per cent
respondents disagreed, while 28.3 per cent agreed.81
Fig. 2
The empirical research of the researcher shows that one of the reasons
that the Pakistani public did not support the decision to join the war was the
absence of solid evidence connecting al-Qaeda with Sept. 11 attacks.82The
empirical research of the researcher shows that 56.4 percent people considered
September 11 incident as a conspiracy whereas 35.6 percentconsiderd it as
terrorist acitivity and 3.8 percent saw it a legitimate reaction by
Islmasits.83Morover, in response to the question of whether Al-Qaeda had
planned the September 11 attacks, 42.6 percent of respondents disagreed
whereas 26.5 percent agreed and 30.9 percent were uncertain.84
Fig.3
130
Despite all the difficulties and public pressure involved, Pakistan lined
up with a comity of nations to condemn terrorism and fight against it with full
vigour and every available means85 by providing logistic and intelligence
support to US and ISAF forces.86 Washington relied heavily on Pakistan to
hunt and eliminate the Al-Qaeda terrorists who were suspected to be operating
from the Pak-Afghan border region, and within Pakistan. Pakistan emerged as
a trusted friend and non-NATO ally from its previous status as one of the
most-sanctioned states. Musharraf emerged as a strong strategic ally, 87 a great
leap from his previous image of a dubious dictator.88The democracy-related
sanctions and post-nuclear tests sanctions were removed from Pakistan after
September 11 to enable Pakistan to join in combating terrorism. 89
America offered Pakistan a mixture of “carrots and sticks” to reach its
own foreign policy objectives, and Pakistan accepted these to secure its own
goals, as mentioned above. This constructive strategic partnership soon
brought positive results with the fall of the Taliban regime and the
establishment of the Washington-backed Karzai government in Afghanistan.90
Pakistan was declared a major non-NATO ally because of its challenging and
pivotal role in this success, gained by hunting the Al-Qaeda and Taliban
forces’ remnants.91 Moreover, the government’s decision to fight against terror
and her services in doing so were recognised and appreciated on a global
scale.92Baofu, a South Asian specialist at the Chinese National Defence
University, praised General Musharraf for his “clear cut attitude towards
fighting against international terrorism.”93
However, Pakistan also faced increased internal insecurity due to
participation in the War on Terror as an after-effect of the change in its policy
in the shape of suicide bombings and armed attacks on civilians, police, the
army, paramilitary forces, intelligence offices, funeral processions and
military installations.94 Pakistan therefore faced disastrous consequences in
terms of deteriorations in its geo-strategic and socio-economic conditions due
to the US-led War on Terror.95 No other state has been as damaged and
131
affected by the drastic effects of the War on Terror in terms of human and
economic loss.96 The Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership flew into the Pakistani
FATA region and this area soon became a battlefield97 and a hotbed of
terrorism and extremism.
Conclusion
Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have never been cordial throughout
the history with the exception of Taliban rule. But Pakistan took a U-turn on
its Afghan policy particularly towards Taliban after September 11 attacks.
Pakistan had no other option but to join United States in the war on terror
against terrorism. Public opinion, policy makers and other stake holders were
divided on the issue of supporting the war against an Islamic state. The global
consent and pressure in addition to American threat compelled Pakistan to join
the global campaign against terrorism. Pakistan’s policy of supporting war
against its old friends applauded globally but with repercussions for Pakistan
in terms of domestic upheaval and instability. Pakistan turned into a war torn
state from a front line ally as a result of this war.
132
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1
President Bush proclaimed in a joint session of the Congress on September 20, 2001 that,
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Musharraf, In the line, 201.
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2000-2006, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2007), 13.
10
11
Unrecorded conversation with top military official of Musharraf regime.
Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, (Islamabad: Vanguard
Books, 2007), 37.
12
For a detailed analysis, see Frank Gadinger, Practices of U.S. foreign policy: a processoriented analysis of the “war on terror”, paper prepared for presentation at the panel
“Competing Explanations of the Bush Administration Decision on Iraq and Terrorism”, at the
50th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), February 15th -18th
2009,
http://www.politik.uni13
133
mainz.de/cms/Dateien/Gadinger_ISA_Paper_2009_final_Practices_of_US_foreign_policy.do
c.pdf, accessed on November 12, 2010; Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign
Policy 145 (2004): 52-62.
For a detailed analysis, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948); Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2002).
14
Snyder claims that the US’s prompt response to the terrorist attack through the use of its
military might clearly illustrated how old-school realism still pervades the modern world of
globalization. Snyder, One world, 55-56.
15
Hang Thi Thy Nguyen, “Theories of US Foreign Policy: An Overview,” World Journal of
Social Sciences 1, no.1 (2014): 22.
16
For a detailed analysis, see Peter Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between
geopolitics and power,” Journal of International Relations and Development 8 (2005): 381–
408; U.S. threatened to bomb Pakistan over war on terror: Musharraf, CBC News, Sep 21,
2006.
17
Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for profit: Brining the revisionist state back In,”
International Security 19, no.1 (1994): 72-107.
18
US is the only state in the history of the world that has achieved the status of hegemonic
power and pursuing the offensive realism since the end of the 2nd World War. For a detailed
analysis, see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of great Power politics, (New York: Norton,
2001).
19
Newmann Bill, A Brief Introduction to Theories on International Relations and Foreign
Policy, http://www.people.vcu.edu/~wnewmann/468theory.htm.
20
Marxists emphasise that the domestic economic structure of states determines their actions,
rather than political factors.
21
William Apple man Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Norton,
1972), 31.
22
Many interviewees with author pointed it out as one of the major reasons for the US
invasion of Afghanistan.
23
Michel Chossudovsky,““The War is Worth Waging”: Afghanistan’s Vast Reserves of
Minerals and Natural Gas,” Global Research, June 16, 2010, http://www.
globalresearch.ca/the-war-is-worth-waging-afghanistan-s-vast-reserves-of-minerals-andnatural-gas/19769, accessed on Oct. 12, 2010.
24
Economic statecraft can be positive, such as in the area of economic engagement, by
promoting trade, providing foreign aid, rescheduling loans and promising investment, or
negative, such as in relation to economic embargoes, economic sanctions, economic boycotts
and the suspension of foreign aid.
25
BessmaNomani, The IMF, the U.S. war on terrorism, and Pakistan, Asian Affairs, an
American Review 31, no. 1 (2004): 42.
26
Leslie Gelb, “GDP Now Matters More than Force: A US Foreign Policy for the Age of
Economic Power,” Foreign Affairs 89 (2010): 35-43; Momani, “The IMF,” 42.
27
David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985),
107.
28
In 2002, Pakistan received almost $624.5 million in development assistance and via the
Economic Support Fund (ESF). U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients, by Thomas Lum, CRS Report
29
134
RL31362 (April 10, 2002), 2, http://fas.org/sgp/ crs/row/RL31362.pdf ; Shabana Fayyaz, “A
Break from the Past: Trends in Pakistan’s Security Policy After 9/11,” SASSU Research Paper
2 (August 2005): 7; Zhang Guihong, U.S. Security Policy Toward South Asia After September
11th and Its Implications for China: A Chinese Perspective (The Henry L. Stimson Center,
January
2003),
11,
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/
secpolsouthasia.pdf, accessed on Oct. 12, 2010.
30
Nomani, “The IMF,” 41.
Woodward, Bust at, 58-59; R.S. Litwak, R. S., Regime Change: US Strategy through the
Prism of 9/11, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007), 40;Musharraf, In the
Line, 204-205; Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism (New York: M. E. Sharpe,
2005), 217.
31
32
Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 59.
President Musharraf convinced civil society, politicians, and corps commanders by
convening different meetings on this issue. Musharraf stated that, “Our nuclear facilities
would have been in jeopardy and the economy would be completely down the drain to
safeguard our nuclear program, we must back the United States without reservations. If we
don’t support the United States, we ourselves won’t survive. Nor will Islam. It is my
responsibility to safeguard our national security; I did not compromise with the United States.
It was a matter of Pakistan’s survival.” “UPI told Musharraf cooperating with US to ensure
Pakistani
survival,”
United
Press
International,
September
17,
2001,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/ 525854/posts, accessed on Oct. 12, 2010.
33
Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of Jama'at-i-Islami (one of the biggest religious political party
of Pakistan).
34
35
36
One of the closet friends of bin Laden, and a religious leader
“UPI told Musharraf,” United Press International.
India planned to attack Pakistan’s nuclear facility in the late 1980s. Brigadier Feroz Hassan
Khan, “Pakistan‘s Nuclear Future”, in South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and
Alliances,
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Michael
R.
Chambers(November
2002),
162,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB108.pdf, accessed on Oct. 12, 2010.
37
38
Musharraf, In the Line.
Musharraf disclosed, “if we are not prepared to help, India is. So if you want to commit
suicide, I do not.” “UPI told Musharraf,” United Press International.
39
President Musharraf categorically stated in his address to nation that, “at this juncture I am
worried about Pakistan only.” The News, 20 September, 2001; Pakistan President General
Pervez
Musharraf
Speech
to
the
Nation
September
19,
2001,
http://www.patriotresource.com/wtc/intl/0919/pakistan.html, accessed on Oct. 12, 2010.
40
India offered logistics facilities to the US for air operations against Afghanistan.
Washington Post, September 17, 2001; India Offers Three Air Basis for US Aircraft, People’s
Daily, September 19, 2001.
41
Musharraf also calculated that in the case of non-cooperation by Pakistan, India would avail
itself of the opportunity to marginalise Pakistan and to establish closer links with Washington.
By deciding quickly to join hands in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Pakistan undercut
any US temptation to use Indian support against Afghanistan.
42
43
Washington Post, September 28, 2001; Musharraf, In the Line, 202.
The US has always been sceptical about Pakistan’s nuclear quest. For further details, see
Brig (retd) Feroz Hassan Khan, “The United States, Pakistan and the War on Terrorism:
44
135
Enduring Allies or Uncertain Partners?,” in Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications,
Remedial and Countermeasures, ed. Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad: IRS, 2006), 357
– 382.
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Pakistan Nuclear Weapons
Proliferation and Security Issues, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, CRS Report
RL34248 (February 23, 2010),10-15, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf, accessed on
Dec. 21, 2010.
45
For a detailed analysis of Ayoob’s idea, see Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security
Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1995).
46
Offensive realism emphasises that weaker states tend to ‘bandwagon’ by aligning
themselves with threatening states or stronger powers, to gain benefit or to escape fear.
Nguyen, “Theories of US,” 22.
47
48
Musharraf, In The Line, 201.
Leon, T. Hadar, “Pakistan in America’s War against Terrorism, Strategic Ally on Unreliable
Client?,” Policy Analysis 436, May 8, 2002. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa436.pdf,
accessed on Dec. 21, 2010.
49
Dr. Rasheed Khan, Dean, Faculty of Social science, University of Sargodha, Interview with
author, Sargodha, Feb. 25, 2013.
50
The decision to wage war against terrorism was based on global consent and Pakistani
think-tanks were also in favour of that decision. Dr. Ashraf Khan, Chaiman, Dept. of Mass
Coomunication, BZU, interviews with author, Multan, Feb 17, 2012.
51
Abdullah, Director of the Conflict and Monitoring Center, criticised the decision by
pointing out that, “This decision has damaged Pakistan’s national interest. Pakistan’s Western
border was safe and there were no soldiers on this border. Before September 11, Afghanistan
was like a province of Pakistan.” Abdullah Khan, Director, Conflict and Monitoring Center,
interviews with author, Islamabad, Dec. 11, 2012.
52
Shamshad Ahmed, “Foreign Policy of Pakistan and Policy Making Process,” in Foreign
Policy Making: A Case Study of Pakistan, ed. MoonisAhmer (Karachi, Department of
International Relations, 2009), 63.
53
54
Dr. Shahzad, interviews with author, Multan, Feb. 19, 2013.
In an interview with the researcher, Orya Maqbool Jan, a renowned journalist, commented
that, “This was the worst decision. Our Western border was safe and saving us from any
Indian threat. By helping the US in the war we not only made our western border insecure but
also made the Taliban our enemy. The Tribal area is providing them with a human force and
we have lost more than 5000 soldiers due to this policy.” Orya Maqbool Jan, interviews with
author, Lahore, Jan. 3, 2013.
55
In an interview with the researcher, Naseem Zahraa, the Director of Current Affairs at
Capital TV in Pakistan, described that, “this decision could be called one man’s decision or
the decision of a few individuals of one institution. This was similar to the decision regarding
the 1979 Afghan war. It was not a good decision to ally completely with the US. As a result of
this decision, Pakistan created new enemies in its own country. If there was a democratic
government, the decision could have been different.” Naseem Zahraa, interviews with author,
Islamabad, March. 9, 2013.
56
Air Commodore Ghulam Mujaddid criticised the decision, saying, “It was not the right
decision. It was said to be a decision of Pakistan. In fact, it was not a decision of Pakistan. The
ruler was not a genuine representative of the people of Pakistan, so his decision did not reflect
57
136
public opinion. The decision was based on personal interests rather on national interests.”
Interview with Air Commodore Ghulam Mujaddid, Islamabad.
58
Interview with General (retd.) Hameed Gul, former ISI Chief.
Interview with Air commodore Hanif, Islamabad, Pakistan; Harry de Quetteville, “US
troops pack up and go as Turkey refuses any help,” The Telegraph, March 24, 2003,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1425507/US-troops-pack-upand-go-as-Turkey-refuses-any-help.html, accessed on Dec. 21, 2010.
59
The result is based on the survey conducted by the author from 900 people across Pakistan
in 2013.Referred as Survey 2013.
60
ZahidHussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam (Islamabad: Vanguard
Books, 2007), 37.
61
Chintamani Mahapatra, “Pakistan’s Role in War against Terrorism: Costs and Benefits,”
Institute
of
Peace
and
Conflict
Studies,
November
26,
2001,
http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/pakistans-role-in-war-against-terrorism-costs-andbenefits-647.html, accessed on Dec. 21, 2010; Nomani, “The IMF.”
62
Fakhar Imam, the former Speaker of the National Assembly, described that Pakistan had no
other option but that Musharraf could negotiate better terms with America, such as writing off
loans and supplying more military equipment. This decision showed poor negotiating skills.
interview with Fakhar Imam, Multan.
63
In an interview with the researcher, Saleem Safi, a renowned journalist and expert on PakAfghan Affairs, commented, “The decision was a compulsion for Pakistan, as Pakistan had
no other option. If Qazi Hussain Ahmad or General Hameed Gul were the ruler, the decision
would have been the same. It was difficult for Pakistan to join the camp against the US, but
the US also had no alternate option but to align Pakistan in this war. However, Pakistan could
have reaped much greater benefit by good bargaining. Musharraf, as a dictator, could not get
much more for Pakistan but got personal recognition as a ‘best buddy’ of the US. He could
have gained for the Pakistani people; instead he gained for himself.”
64
For a detailed analysis, see Barry Buzan, People States & Fear: The National Security
Problem in International Relations (UK :Wheat sheaf Books Ltd, 1983); Barry Buzan,
“Rethinking Security after the Cold War,” Cooperation and Conflict 32 (1997): 5-28.
65
India offered logistics facilities to the US for air operations against Afghanistan.
Washington Post, September 17, 2001; “India Offers Three Air Basis for US Aircraft,”
People’s Daily, September 19, 2001.
66
67
For a detailed analysis, see Ayoob, The Third.
President General Pervez Musharraf, Address to the Nation on September 19, 2001, The
News, September, 20, 2001.
68
One top military official disclosed that, “It was revealed to us during an interrogation of a
person who was involved in sectarian killings that the Taliban were providing sanctuary and
training to such elements in Afghanistan. It worried both policy makers and military in
Pakistan.”; Unrecorded interview with one military official in Pakistan.
69
Mushahid Hussain, “Apt finale to a year of foreign policy U-turns, Gulf News,” January 7,
2004, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/mushahid-hussain-apt-finale-to-a-year-offoreign-policy-u-turns-1.310294, accessed on Dec. 21, 2010; For a detailed analysis, see
Joshuat White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan’s
North-West Frontier, (Center on Faith & International Affairs (CFIA), 2008), 23-46.
70
For a more detailed analysis, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missiles Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).
71
137
Musharraf described this decision as dispassionate, and made on the basis of pros and cons;
Musharraf, In the Line, 201.
72
73
Unrecorded interview with one of the Committee members.
Quoted in Ahmed Farauqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan (UK: Ashgate
Publishing Ltd, 2003), xviii-xix.
74
RizwanZeb, “US Interest in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan,”Margalla
Papers (2004): 73.
75
76
Dawn, September 20, 2001.
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford, Jr. to Secretary of
State Colin Powell, “Pakistan - Poll Shows Strong and Growing Public Support for Taleban,”
November
7,
2001,
unclassified,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/35.pdf, accessed on Dec. 21, 2010.
77
Robert G. Wirsing, “Precarious Partnership: Pakistan’s Response to US Security Policies,”
Asian Affairs, an American view 30, no. 2 (2003):73.
78
Ashutosh Misra, “Rise of Religious Parties in Pakistan: Causes and Prospects,” Strategic
Analysis 27, no. 2 (2003), 192.
79
80
81
Wirsing, “Precarious Partnership,” 73; Misra, “Rise of,”187.
Survey 2013.
Similarly, despite the complete absence of any solid evidence, the US invaded Iraq. Robert
M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11,”
Political Communication 20, no. 4 (2003): 426.
82
83
84
Survey 2013.
Survey 2013.
Touqir Hussain, “U.S.-Pakistan Engagement,” United States Institute of Peace Special
Report 145 (August 2005), 5, http://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/ sr145. pdf.
85
86
Woodward, Bush at, 59.
The US House of Representatives passed a resolution to appreciate Musharraf’s steps in
cooperation with the United States to combat terrorism and his fortitude in confronting
extremism and promoting democracy in Pakistan. House of Representatives Resolution 285,
107th Congress, 2001.
87
Muqarrab Akbar, “Pakistan at Crossroads: War against Terrorism,” The International
Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences 6, no.3 (2011):156.
88
The US removed three major sanctions from Pakistan which had been imposed as a result of
the Symington Amendment (1978), the Pressler Amendment (1990), and the Glenn
Amendment (1998) to reward her for her support in the War on Terror.
89
Taj Hashmi, “The Destiny of Pakistan and Pak-US Relationship,” Journal of South Asian
Studies 1, no.1 (2013): 19.
90
President Bush declared that, “I hereby designate the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as major
non-NATO ally of the United States for the purposes of the Arms Export Control Act.”;
Sheikh 2001, p.191; Wirsing, “Precarious Partnership,” 70; BBC News, 17 June 2004,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3814013.stm, accessed on Feb. 12, 2012.
91
138
Blair praises Pakistan's decision, CNN, October 5, 2001, http://edition.cnn. com/
2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/10/05/ret.blair.musharraf/index.html.
92
W. Baofu, “No Winner in Indian-Pakistani Conflicts,” Beijing Review (February 28,
2002):13.
93
94
Nadia Mushtaq Abbasi, Impact of terrorism on Pakistan, Strategic Studies (2013):34.
Umbreen Javaid and Zulfiqar Ali, “War on Terror Partnership: Problems and Prospects for
Pakistan,” Journal of Political Studies20, issue 1 (2013),51.
95
96
Ismail Khan, Pakistan most terror-hit nation, Dawn, Feb 23, 2014.
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Islamists Militancy in the
Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and the U.S. Policy, by K. Allan Kronstadt and Kenneth
Katzman,
CRS
Report
RL34763,
(November
21,
2008),
2-3,
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34763.pdf; Brian Glyn William, “The CIA's Covert Predator
Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign,” Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 33: no 10 (2010), 873-874; Bill Roggio, “Pressuring Pakistan,” The
Long
War
Journal,
March
1,
2007,
http://www.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/pressuring_pakistan.php#.
97
139