Canada and the Korean War
Fifty Years On
Denis Stairs
J
n S e p te m b e r 1998, th e C a n a d ia n
W ar M u s e u m in itia te d a v is itin g
sp e a k e r series to m a k e available to the
g e n e r a l p u b lic th e la te s t re se a rc h ,
d e b a te a n d opinion on C anadian a n d
international military history. Like the
M u seu m 's highly popular film series,
the ta lks w ere u su a lly held on w e e k
nights a n d carried no a d m issio n fe e .
T hey h a ve proven highly su ccessfu l, both w ith
M u se u m visito rs a n d in v ite d s p e a k e r s . The
la tt e r h a v e in c lu d e d e m i n e n t C a n a d ia n
historians like Terry Copp, D avid B ercuson a n d
Bill M cAndrew , a n d international scholars like
J o h n K eegan, P aul Gough, a n d C hristopher
P ugsley. In the a u tu m n o f 2000, the M useum
will w elcom e w orld-renow ned First World War
scholar J a y W inter a n d Pulitzer Prize w inner
J a m e s M cPherson.
The M useum sta g e d one o f th e se e v e n ts to
c o in c id e w ith th e 5 0 th a n n iv e r s a r y o f th e
o u tb re a k o f th e K orean War. In a d d itio n to
hosting several h u n d red Korean War veterans
n th is v e ry d a y 5 0 y e a rs , five h o u r s
a n d four m in u te s ago, L ester B. P e a rs o n ’s
p erso n al secretary, M ary M acdonald, tu n e d her
radio to the CBC. It w as 2:00 pm — tim e to settle
b a c k in h e r cottage on Lac G au v reau to listen,
a s w as h e r c u sto m , to th e weekly new s ro u n d ­
u p , C apital Report. The a n n o u n c e r’s lead w as
m ore dram atic th a n u su al. Fighting, he said, h ad
broken out on the K orean peninsula. The United
N a tio n s S e c u rity C o u n c il w a s a t t h a t very
m o m e n t convening in em ergency s e ssio n to
c o n s id e r how to re s p o n d . C a n a d a ’s a c tin g
p e rm a n e n t rep re sen ta tiv e to th e UN, J o h n W.
H olm es, h a d b e e n d e sp a tc h e d to observe its
proceedings, even th o u g h C a n a d a w as n o t th en
one of th e C ouncil’s m em bers.
O
d uring th e a n n iv e r s a r y w e e k e n d o f
J u n e 24-25, updating its Korean War
p e r m a n e n t ga llery, a n d m o u n tin g a
travelling exhibit o f contem porary w ar
p h o to g r a p h s , th e M u s e u m in v ite d
D alhousie U niversity p ro fe sso r D enis
S ta ir s to c o m m e n t o n C a n a d a 's
diplom atic role in the crisis fr o m the
p ersp ective o f 50 years. This, in effect,
a m o u n t e d to a r e c o n s id e r a tio n o f th e
arg u m en ts f ir s t p re se n te d in Professor Stairs'
se m in a l work, T he D iplom acy of C o n strain t,
w hich, tw en ty-five yea rs after its publication,
r e m a in s th e s t a n d a r d w o r k in th e f i e l d .
S p e a k in g on S u n d a y , 25 J u n e 2000, f i f t y years
to th e d a y a fte r N o rth K o re a n f o r c e s f i r s t
c r o s s e d th e 3 8 t h p a r a lle l to in v a d e th e
A m erican-supported R epublic o f Korea in the
south, the text o f his a d d re ss fo llo w s. Like the
m onograph on w hich it com m ents, the article
c o n stitu te s a critical com ponent o f C an a d a 's
Korean War literature, a tour d e fo r c e by one
o f C anada's m o st g ifted scholars.
At th is p o in t th e fig h tin g in K orea h a d
actually been underw ay for nearly 24 h ours. B ut
in th e O ttaw a of 1950 reactio n s cam e a t a m ore
le is u re ly p a c e t h a n th e y do now . A nd on
w eekends, th ey cam e a t a s n a il’s pace. In th eir
h a b ita ts of re s t a n d recreatio n , even th e m ost
su b sta n tia l of th e notables of governm ent lacked
telephones. M ary M acdonald, a ttu n e d to th is as
to so m u ch else, surm ised th a t the Acting U nder­
secretary , E scott Reid, m ight n o t have h e a rd the
new s. Nor Mr. P earson, either. Since Reid h a d a
farm n e a rb y on Lac G auvreau, too, sh e decided
to pop over to tell h im th e tale. As it h a p p e n ed ,
he w as o u t row ing on th e w ater w ith h is son,
w ho w as celeb ratin g h is b irth d a y . So sh e took
po ssessio n of a n o th e r b o a t an d p u rsu e d the two
© Canadian Military History, Volume 9, Number 3, Summer 2000, pp.49-60.
49
of them on th is high se a of th e G atineau Hills —
h e r arrival alongside n o t being reg a rd e d by th e
A ctin g U n d e r - S e c r e ta r y a s a p a r t i c u l a r l y
welcome intrusion at a tim e of family conviviality.
Having no telephone in h is co u n try hom e, a n d
having no desire either to re tu rn to O ttaw a before
th e evening, Reid b ro u g h t th e g en iu s of th e
dip lo m at to th e ta s k of resolving th e conflict
betw een his du ty to th e sta te a n d his d u ty to his
son. M acdonald, it w as soon agreed, w ould drive
the 16 m iles it w ould ta k e to get to th e P e a rso n
cottage, and inform the M inister. And so sh e did.
P e a r s o n h a v in g n o te le p h o n e e ith e r , s h e
tra n s p o rte d him yet a n o th e r two m iles to the
n e a re s t p ublic booth, in Larrim ac, w here he
c a lled th e D e p a rtm e n t. In th e lig h t of th e
intelligence he th en received, h e p u t th ro u g h a
second call, this time to the Prime Minister, Louis
St. L a u ren t, in St. P atrice. The two m en agreed
th a t the resp o n se to th e invasion w ould depend
entirely on the A m ericans, since in the w e stern
w orld of 1950 only th e U n ite d S ta te s h a d
s ig n if ic a n t m ilita ry fo rc e s a t its d is p o s a l.
C ertainly th e UN itself h a d n o n e to deploy. B ut
in the u nlikely event th a t a m ilitary resp o n se
did en su e, they hoped it w ould be u n d e r U nited
N ations a u sp ic e s. O therw ise, th ere w as a risk
th a t a local conflict in Korea w ould t u r n into a
global conflagration betw een the com m unist and
a n ti- c o m m u n is t p o w e rs. In th e m e a n tim e ,
however, th ere w as no need to h u rry b a c k to
O ttaw a, sin ce th ere w as n o th in g of s u b s ta n c e
t h a t C a n a d a a t t h is p o in t c o u ld d o. T h e
Departm ent of External Affairs — or th a t very
sm all p a rt of it, a t a n y ra te , th a t w as now alert
to th e a ctio n on th e w eekend cables — w ould
keep a b re a s t of developm ents well enough un til
M onday m orning.
S u c h w as the initial resp o n se of th o se in
O ttaw a ’s h ig h e st places to th e o u tb re a k of the
w ar in Korea. Their rea c tio n even th e n gave
testim o n y to two e n d u rin g c h a ra c te ristic s of
C a n a d a ’s d iplom acy in th e p o litic o -se c u rity
co n tex t — th e first of th em a m an ifestatio n of
geopolitical reality, th e second a n expression of
stra te g ic practice. T he geopolitical reality w as
th a t in the context of any truly significant security
con fro n tatio n , the m o st c en tral d e te rm in a n t of
th e C a n a d ia n re s p o n s e w a s th e A m e ric a n
resp o n se. The definition of th e C an a d ian policy
p ro b le m , in o th e r w o rd s, w a s u ltim a te ly a
fu n c tio n of how , in re a c tin g to c ris is , th e
A m ericans decided to behave. The ex pression
of strategic practice w as the desire to ensure th a t
the substantive Am erican reaction, if substantive
rea c tio n th ere w as to be, w ould be c o n d u c te d
u n d e r m u ltila te ral a u sp ic e s — a u sp ic e s th a t
w ould give o th er players (C anada am ong them )
an entitlem ent to join in the policy-m aking game.
A m ericans doing it w ith o th ers were m ore likely
to be sen sib le th a n A m ericans doing it alone.
Now, a s you have h e a rd , I indulged in a wee
b it of ru m in a tin g on th is su b je c t a q u a r te r c e n tu ry ago, a n d D ean Oliver h a s a sk e d m e to
revisit my argum ents again tonight, and to report
in p a rtic u la r on how I th in k they sta n d u p in the
light of s u b s e q u e n t s c h o la rsh ip a n d la tte r-d a y
perspectives. A flattering request, I flatter m yself
to think! B ut also a dangerous one. Most average
m o rtals, afte r all, do n o t tak e w arm ly to the
th o u g h t of confessing th eir errors in public. And
on m a tte r s t h a t to u c h u p o n th e ir v a n ity ,
acad em ics are lesse r m o rta ls by far th a n even
th e average! T h a t I h a d no a c ce ss th en , as
sc h o la rs have enjoyed m ore recently, to the
classified files of the D e p a rtm e n t of E xtern al
Lester B, Pearson was Minister of External Relations
at the outbreak of the Korean War.
Affairs m ay provide a m e a su re of defence, if
defence is required, b u t only a m o d est one. A
book, after all, w as one of the vehicles th ro u g h
w hich m y p reju d ices were conveyed to a sm all
a n d u n s u s p e c tin g public. P a rt of th e co st of
p u b licatio n w as m et by th e Social S ciences an d
H u m an ities R e se a rc h C ouncil of C a n a d a , a n d
hence u ltim ately by the taxpayer. T h a t being so,
I certainly h a d an obligation to get the basic story
basically right!
C a n a d a jo in ed th e posse. On th e su rface, an d
on th is som ew hat legalistic account, the UN was
w o rk in g in p r e c is e a c c o r d w ith b o th th e
p u rp o se s a n d p ro c e d u re s of C h a p te r VII of its
Charter.
The Argument
B u t th e real politics of th e e n te rp rise, as
o p p o se d to its te c h n ic a l form , h a d a m ore
a m b ig u o u s look. In p a rticu la r, th ey seem ed to
have less to do w ith “collective se c u rity ” th a n
w ith “c o n t a i n m e n t ” — th e d o c t r i n a l
m a n ife sta tio n in th e p o st-w a r p erio d of th e
p r in c i p le of c o u n te r v a i l in g p o w e r. M ore
c o n c re te ly , th e N o rth K o re a n a t t a c k w a s
perceived in the west, a n d with special conviction
in the United States, as a n aggression authorized,
if n o t actually initiated, by the Soviet Union, and
th e p r e c e d e n t t h a t c a m e im m e d ia te ly to
P re sid e n t T ru m a n ’s m in d as h e a s se s s e d its
im plications w as H itler’s challenge to Neville
C h am b erlain a t M u n ic h .1 A ppeasem ent as a
policy h a d n o t w orked th en . Hence it w ould not
be tried again now. T here w ould be no w hetting
of a u to c ra tic a p p e tite s . A m ilitary re sp o n se
w ould therefore be la u n c h e d , a n d to legitim ize
it, th e s u p p o rt of th e Security C ouncil w ould be
p u r s u e d , a n d c o n tr i b u ti o n s fro m p o w e rs
sim ilarly opposed to a c ts of m ilitary aggression
th ere b y o b tained. B u t of co u rse th e “pow ers
sim ilarly opp o sed ” were for th e m o st p a rt allies
of th e U nited S ta te s (the two “n e u tr a ls ” am ong
them — India a n d Sw eden — ultim ately confined
them selves to th e provision of m edical units).
C ertainly they included no representative of the
S in o - S o v ie t w o rld . T h is w a s a c o ld w a r
confrontation dressed u p as a collective security
police action.
y core a rg u m e n t w en t som ething like this:
C a n a d ia n forces osten sib ly fought in the
K orean War u n d e r th e a u sp ic e s of th e U nited
N ations, a n d in fulfilm ent of th e p rinciple of
collective secu rity . After all, one s ta te ac to r
(N o rth K o re a ), a lt h o u g h n o t u n iv e r s a ll y
recognized as a legitim ate sovereign power, h a d
w ith o u t w a rn in g la u n c h e d a c o n v e n tio n a l
m ilitary invasion of its neighbour. The neighbour
being u n ab le to m o u n t a successful defence, the
m a tte r h a d been b ro u g h t before the UN S ecurity
Council. The Council h a d im m ediately called for
th e re sto ra tio n of peace a n d th e w ith d raw al of
th e invading forces. W hen th e in v ad ers refused
to comply, a n in ternational posse w as called out,
a n d th e U nited S ta te s w as a sk e d to lead it.
From the C a n a d ian point of view, this m ight
n o t have m a tte re d very m u ch . H appy, after all,
is th e c o u n try th a t c a n identify its se cu rity a t
hom e w ith a peaceful order in the world a t large.
S uch a circum stance allows the cosm etic politics
of form a n d th e p ra c tic a l politics of action to be
conveniently aligned. B u t in th is p a rtic u la r case
th e a lig n m en t cam e w ith a cost a n d a risk. The
cost w as th e obligation to c o n trib u te to th e
c o n d u c t of th e h o stilities — a n obligation th a t
W ashington su ccessfu lly triggered a s soon as it
w en t to th e UN for su p p o rt. The risk w as th a t
th e A m ericans, as th e leading ch am p io n s of the
w e ste rn c a u se in th e cold w ar context, w ould
becom e excessively excited a n d overplay th eir
h a n d . T here w as a need, therefore, to keep a
In sp ite of th e high risk of e m b a rra ssm e n t,
however, I will do my b est, a n d I will begin w ith
a b rief o u tlin e of th e c e n tral a rg u m e n t of my
in te rp re ta tio n , so very long ago, of C a n a d ian
policy. I will th e n r u n qu ick ly th ro u g h th e
e s s e n tia ls of th e d ip lo m a tic ta le , from th e
C a n a d ia n p o in t of view, a s a m e a n s of draw ing
o u t th e evidence th a t I th o u g h t serv ed well
en o u g h to e s ta b lis h m y case. T h a t evidence
c e n tre s on a se q u en c e of issu e s, or decisionp o in ts, to w hich th e C a n a d ia n foreign policy
e sta b lish m e n t h a d to resp o n d as th e diplom atic
gam e unfolded in ta n d e m w ith th e w ar itself.
In the light of all th is, I will th e n a tte m p t to
take fair note of new findings a n d countervailing
interp retatio n s. The latter, I think, have m ore to
do w ith th e expectations of the w riters th a n w ith
th e facts of th e case, a n d th e form er (I like to
think) do not m a tte r very m uch. B u t th e se are
d o u b tle s s s e lf-s e rv in g o p in io n s, a n d I will
therefore rely on th e q u e stio n e rs a t th e e n d to
b rin g my vanities to heel.
M
c lo se eye o n t h e ir b e h a v io u r , a n d w h e re
n e c e ssa ry to m o d erate it. T his could only be
done by acting together w ith o th er powers of like
m ind a n d sim ilar p u rp o se — a p ro sp e c t th a t
becam e som ew hat m ore feasible as soon a s the
U nited N ations was invoked a s th e organization
th ro u g h w hich th e w e ste rn re sp o n se w ould be
p ro ce sse d a n d legitim ized. P u t in o th e r term s,
th e a d v a n ta g e to th e A m erican s of w orking
th ro u g h th e UN w as th a t it forced co u n tries like
C a n a d a to p u t th e ir r e s o u rc e s w h ere th e ir
m o u th s h a d been. The d isa d v a n ta g e to th e
A m ericans w as th a t th ey w ould th e n have to
g ra n t th e ir political a n d m ilitary s u p p o rte rs
a b ro a d a t le a s t som e e n title m e n t to m eddle in
decisions th a t W ashington w ould really have
preferred to m ake entirely on its own. (Indeed,
for a t le a s t one experienced A m erican observer
a n d p ra c titio n e r of foreign policy, George F.
K e n n a n , th is d is a d v a n ta g e o u tw e ig h e d th e
p o litic a l r e t u r n ; h e th e r e fo r e w o u ld h a v e
p referred to ignore th e UN entirely, a n d m o u n t
a pu rely u n ila te ra l re s p o n s e .2)
In th is general context — or so my a rg u m e n t
w ent th e n , a n d still, in essen ce, goes now —
C anadian diplom acy d u rin g the Korean War can
be in te rp re te d very largely a s a m an ifestatio n of
th e a t t e m p t to s u p p o r t t h e c o re , w h ile
sim u lta n e o u sly co n ta in in g th e extrem ities, of
A m erican policy, a n d to e n s u re th a t m ilitary
fo rc e s o p e r a tin g u n d e r UN a u s p ic e s , b u t
delegated to US com m and, were prevented from
b ein g d ra w n in to a la rg e r A sian war. F rom
O ttaw a’s p o in t of view, after all, the E u ro p e a n
theatre, a n d the North A tlantic com m unity m ore
generally, seem ed to m a tte r a w hole lot m ore. I
em phasize h e re my u se of th e term “a tte m p t.”
As I w arned m y read ers long ago, the C an ad ian s
“m et w ith only m arg in al s u c c e s s — they w ould
say now th a t they did a s well a s co n d itio n s
allowed, a n d th a t in any case a sm all advance is
b e tte r th a n no n e a t a ll.” B u t su c c e ssfu l or not,
th e effort itself w as c e n tra l to th e ir diplom acy,
a n d h en ce it becam e c e n tra l also to m y own
th esis.3
Issues and Decision-Points
ie specific item s of evidence u p o n w hich I
founded th is som ew hat sweeping, if happily
econom ical, a n a ly sis c a n get a little ted io u s in
the telling, so I am going to keep th e telling brief.
T
My recitation will am o u n t, in fact, to only a trifle
m ore th a n a b a re -b o n e s list, a n d the list itself
will be selective. This will be m u c h k in d e r to
you. (Critics, no d o u b t, will a s s e rt late r th a t it
h a s also b e e n k in d e r to m e, since th ey will
a ssu m e I have selected the evidence th a t c au ses
my a rg u m e n t th e least inconvenience. D on’t we
all!)
I begin my list w ith a rem inder of w hat I have
told you already, w hich is th a t P earso n a n d St.
L a u re n t ag re e d a t th e very o u ts e t th a t an y
substantive response to the North Korean attack
sh o u ld ideally be conducted thro u g h the U nited
N ations. T his m ay have b een p a rtly a reflection
of their in terest in s u sta in in g the UN experim ent
itself, b u t by 1950 there were very few in External
Affairs w ho still th o u g h t th ere m ight be som e
real stuffing in the collective security model. The
m ore im p o rtan t consideration w as th a t th is w as
th e m o st p ro m isin g w ay of dep o sitin g G ulliver
in Lilliput,4 a n d hen ce of giving th e L illiputians
a t le a s t so m e o p p o rtu n ity to lim it the dam age
h is m ovem ents m ight otherw ise cau se. O ttaw a
w as th e re fo re h a p p y to s u p p o r t th e in itia l
S ecurity Council resolution, p a sse d on th a t first
S u n d a y a fte rn o o n in New York, calling on the
invaders to w ithdraw .
H aving sa id th a t, however, n e ith e r P earso n
n o r St. L a u ren t, n o r for th a t m a tte r th e ir m o st
influential foreign service advisers (am ong them ,
H um e W rong in W ashington a n d J o h n H olm es
in New York), thought it likely th a t the Am ericans
w ould a c tu a lly do a n y th in g th a t w ould really
m atter, a n d th ey were probably a s su rp rise d as
th e N o rth K o re a n s a n d th e S o v ie ts w h e n
P re sid e n t T ru m a n began to tak e m ilitary ste p s
to intervene. As soon a s h e did so, C a n a d ia n
p re o c c u p a tio n s becam e a t once very visible.
More specifically, the P resident late on M onday,
J u n e 26, o rd ered G eneral M acA rthur in Tokyo
to give co m b at a ir a n d n av al s u p p o rt to the
re tre a tin g S o u th K oreans, a n d to m ove th e
S e v e n th F le et in to th e F o rm o sa S tra it (the
p u r p o s e of th e la tte r b e in g to p r e v e n t a n
o u tb re a k of p a ra lle l h o s tilitie s b e tw e en th e
F orm osans a n d the m ainland Chinese). The plan
w a s to a n n o u n c e t h e s e i n i t i a t i v e s in a
p re sid e n tia l rad io b ro a d c a s t a t 12:00 noon on
T uesday, a n d th e n to have th em approved p o s t
fa c to in th e S ecurity Council a t its next m eeting,
w hich w as sc h ed u le d to begin two h o u rs later,
a t 2:00 pm .
Prime Minister Louis S t Laurent (with hand on hat) preparing to leave on a
US Army helicopter following a visit to the 25th Field Dressing Station in Korea.
P e a rso n w as in fo rm ed of all th is by th e
A m e ric a n a m b a s s a d o r in O tta w a (S ta n le y
Woodward) early on T uesday m orning, a n d after
r e f le c tio n h e te le p h o n e d H u m e W ro n g in
W ashington to com plain a b o u t th e tim ing of the
P re sid e n t’s public a n n o u n c em e n t, arguing th a t
it w ould be b e tte r if it cam e after, r a th e r th a n
before, the decision to intervene h a d received
S ecu rity C ouncil a u th o riza tio n . I w as u n a w a re
w h en I did my original work, b u t have since
le a rn e d from th e E x te rn a l Affairs d o cu m en ts,
th a t he w as also co n cern ed a b o u t som e of the
in f la m m a to r y r h e t o r ic in th e te x t of th e
P r e s id e n t’s a d d r e s s (it m ad e refe re n c e , for
exam ple, to “C o m m u n ist im p e ria lism ”), a n d
a b o u t th e decision to intervene in th e F orm osa
S tra it (which in his view h a d the effect of tu rn in g
F o r m o s a in to a “U .S . p r o t e c t o r a t e , ” th e
im plication p re su m a b ly being th a t th is w ould
in tro d u c e d a n g e ro u s a n d u n n e c e s s a ry
com plications to a n already volatile situ a tio n ).5
At an y rate, th e c e n tral p reo ccu p atio n of senior
C an ad ian policy-m akers w as already very clear.
They w an ted th e A m ericans to sto p actin g — or
a t le a s t to sto p appearing to a c t — u n ilaterally,
a n d th ey w ere also co n cern ed n o t only to lim it
th e scope of th e conflict, b u t also to tre a t it as
su i g e n e ris, a n d th erefo re con tain ab le, ra th e r
th a n a s generic to th e cold w ar a s a whole.
None of th is h a d m u c h p rac tic a l effect. The
P re sid e n t’s b ro a d c a s t w en t a h e a d a s p lan n ed ,
a n d th e collective se cu rity resp o n se w as duly
a u th o riz e d (in th e fo rtu ito u s a b se n c e of the
Soviet U nion from th e S e c u rity C ouncil) on
T uesday afternoon.
B u t th ere w as soon to be a n o th e r ro u n d .
More specifically, a s th e hostilities esca late d a t
th e en d of the week, a n d a s it becam e clear th a t
a m ajo r m ilitary cam p aig n w ould have to be
m o u n ted , th ere w as a n u rg en t need to estab lish
a n official UN m ilitary com m and. In the absence
of a w orking co m m an d s tru c tu re w ithin th e UN
organization itself, an d in a context in which only
th e A m ericans w ere in a p osition to m ake a
decisiv e m ilita ry c o n trib u tio n , th e ob v io u s
so lu tio n w as to delegate th e ta s k to th e U nited
S ta te s . For th is p u rp o s e , a n o th e r S e c u rity
C o u n c il r e s o lu tio n w a s r e q u ire d , a n d th e
d raftin g w as led by th e S ta te D e p a rtm en t. This
im m e d ia te ly m a d e it th e t a r g e t of a llie d
rem o n stratio n s — C anadian rem o n stratio n s not
le a s t am ong them . T he latter, indeed, w ere so
Private John Hoskins, 2nd Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry, during an advance on Hill
419, Korea, 24 February 1951.
re ta in in g h is m u c h larger role as
co m m an d er of A m erican forces in
th e e n tire P acific a re a . At one
p o in t it w as even su g g e ste d th a t
th e field of UN o p e r a tio n s be
defined in the proposed resolution
by
p re c is e
g e o g ra p h ic a l
coordinates, the principal pu rp o se
of w h ich w ould be to e s ta b lis h
v e ry e x p lic itly t h a t m il it a r y
o p e r a tio n s a r i s in g o u t of th e
C h in a p ro b le m w ould n o t be a
p a rt of th e UN m an d a te. O n th is
one, H um e W rong actually balked,
believing th e initiative w ould not
fly, a n d th in k in g in any case th a t
it w as too in tric a te a p ro p o sal to
be ad vanced a t so late a stag e in
th e gam e.
Once again, n one of th is h a d
m u c h p r a c tic a l effect, b u t th e
point of C a n a d ian policy w as clear
enough, a n d in retro sp e c t it could
be argued th a t it w as im pressively
far-sig h ted . B u t I will com e b ack
to th a t in a m om ent.
plentiful a n d so in siste n tly rep e a te d th a t they
eventually exasperated even Hum e Wrong, whose
unenviable ta sk it was to convey them to harried
A m e ric a n o ffic ia ls. T h e re w e re to o m a n y
references in th e p ro p o sed reso lu tio n , O ttaw a
th o u g h t, to th e “U nited S ta te s ” a n d too few to
the “U nited N a tio n s.” C reeping u n ila te ra lism
u n d e r m u ltilateral cover w as n o t w h a t it h a d in
m ind. The geographic scope of th e o peration,
moreover, w as not sufficiently well-defined. This
w as b e c a u s e th ere w as too m u c h u se of th e
p h ra s e “in th e a re a ” — a p h ra s e th a t h a d first
cropped u p in th e reso lu tio n of J u n e 27, a n d
one th a t failed (among other things) to g u aran tee
th a t th e UN w ould n o t get c a u g h t u p in a w ider
fracas involving the two C hinas. “M ission-creep”
w as n o t th en , as it is now, a term th a t ro u tinely
s u r f a c e d in th e v o c a b u la ry of d ip lo m a tic
discourse; b u t O ttaw a feared it n onetheless, not
least because G eneral M acA rthur would becom e
the w orking co m m an d er of UN forces while still
In th e m eantim e, th ere w as th e q u e stio n of
w h at co n trib u tio n C an ad a m ight usefully m ake
to th e c o n d u c t of th e h o stilitie s them selves.
T h e n , a s now , th e e a s y s tu f f c a m e e a sily
e n o u g h . T h re e C a n a d ia n d e s tr o y e r s w ere
d e sp atc h ed to th e w estern Pacific on Ju ly 5 an d
w ere s u b s e q u e n tly a ssig n e d to M a cA rth u r’s
com m and. Airlift su p p o rt w as sim ilarly provided
by th e RCAF, a n d la te r a u g m e n ted by civilian
c h a rters from C anadian Pacific Airlines. B ut the
rea l is s u e s c e n te re d on g ro u n d forces. The
g o v ern m en t’s first fear w as th a t th ere w ould be
a n ad v erse rea c tio n in Q uebec, b u t th a t soon
d issip a te d as it becam e clear th a t Q uebecois in
g e n e ra l (th e re w ere a few e x cep tio n s) w ere
broadly supportive of the UN initiative. The m ore
im p o rta n t problem , therefore, tu rn e d o u t to be
a practical one. It resu lted from th e fact th a t the
g o v ern m en t h a d no c o m b a t-re ad y forces a t its
d isp o sal to se n d — not, a t least, forces th a t it
w as p re p a re d to d e s p a tc h to a th e a tre in Asia.
U ltim a te ly it d e a lt w ith th is p r o b le m by
a n n o u n c in g on A u g u st 7 the re c ru itm e n t of a
C a n a d ia n A rm y S p e c ia l F o rc e fo r s e rv ic e
overseas. T h a t service m ight well be in Korea,
b u t if the fighting w as over by th e tim e th e Force
w as read y to go, th e troops w ould be s e n t to
E u ro p e instead.
From the point of view of m y ow n argum ent,
th e m o st in te re stin g fea tu re of all th is w as th a t
th e decision w as ta k e n so m ew h at relu ctan tly ,
a n d very largely u n d e r p re s s u re from th e UN
S ecretary-G eneral, Trygve Lie, w ho in tu r n w as
reactin g to th e q u ite u n d e rs ta n d a b le A m erican
view th a t it w as high tim e th e allies s ta rte d
p u ttin g up. They were not, after all, sh u ttin g up!
B u t in paying th e ir d u es, th e C a n a d ia n s once
a g a in s o u g h t to u s e th e c u rr e n c y of th e ir
c o n trib u tio n as a source of diplom atic leverage.
In p a rtic u la r , P e a rs o n in s is te d , firs t, t h a t
C a n a d ia n troops n o t be com m itted to th e front
u n til th e ir own officers th o u g h t th em read y for
com bat, an d second, th a t they w ould n o t in any
c irc u m sta n c e s be a ssig n e d to th e defence of
F orm osa, an en te rp rise th a t w as n o t p a rt of the
UN C o m m an d ’s m a n d a te in th e field. T hese
g u a ra n te e s w ere forthcom ing, a n d th e first of
th em eventually proved very u sefu l to C anadian
forces in Korea itself, w h en the ord ers reflecting
t h e m h a d to b e u s e d by th e C a n a d i a n
com m ander to fend off th e b lan d ish m e n ts of his
A m erican su p e rio rs, w ho w a n te d to deploy his
tro o p s to th e fro n t th e m o m en t th ey arrived in
th e th e a tre , a n d b efo re th e ir tra in in g w as
complete. The preoccupation w ith separating the
K orean a n d F o rm o sa n iss u e s w as, of course,
re c u rre n t, a lth o u g h in th e e n d it w as to be
o v erru n by o th er events.
Before then, however, th ere were to be other
dip lo m atic e n g a g e m e n ts of relev an ce to my
in te r p r e ta t io n of th e ta le . T h e s e c a m e In
Septem ber-O ctober 1950, w hen there w as heavy
A m erican p re s s u re on th e UN to ex p an d the
scope of th e K orean operation. T his p re s s u re
cam e n o t from m ilitary failure, b u t from m ilitary
success. S outh K orean a n d A m erican forces h ad
m an ag ed d u rin g th e sum m er, a n d a t great cost,
to b rin g the N orth K orean advance to a h a lt a t a
defensive p e rim ete r a ro u n d th e p o rt of P u sa n .
T his sta b iliz atio n of th e fro n t w as a cru cial
development, because it gave General M acA rthur
th e tim e he needed to m a rsh a l th e su p p lies an d
reinforcem ents th a t a n effective counter-offensive
w o u ld r e q u i r e . W h e n h e w a s r e a d y , h e
la u n c h e d a tw o-pronged a s s a u lt a g a in st h is
N orth K orean a d v e rsa rie s — b rea k in g directly
th ro u g h th e P u s a n pe rim ete r in th e so u th e a s t,
while sim u ltaneously lau n ch in g a n am phibious
a tta c k b e h in d enem y lines a t th e p o rt of Inchon
in th e n o rth w est. T his m anoeuvre — a classic
of its k in d — w as a n a s to u n d in g su c c e ss, a n d
in 11 days it led to th e d e stru c tio n a n d c a p tu re
of th e b u lk of th e N orth K orean arm y. The
c a p ita l city, S eoul, w as in th e h a n d s of UN
forces by the end of Septem ber, a n d very shortly
th e re a fte r th e re m n a n ts of th e N orth K orean
arm y — less th a n 10 p e rc e n t of th e original
to ta l — w ere d riv e n b a c k a c ro s s th e 3 8 th
p a ra lle l (w hich h a d b e e n th e d iv id in g line
b etw een th e two K oreas in th e first place).
T his m ilitary victory w as th e im m ed iate
s o u r c e of a p o lic y p r o b le m . O n a s t r i c t
i n te r p r e ta t io n of th e o rig in a l i n te n t, a n d
consistent w ith a m inim alist view of the collective
s e c u rity principle, it could be a rg u e d th a t the
UN’s m ission h a d b een successfully com pleted.
The ag g ressio n h a d b e e n repelled, th e victim
lib e r a te d , a n d th e s ta tu s quo a n te b e llu m
resto re d . B u t if th e a p p e tite s of th e ag g resso rs
h a d b e e n dulled, th e a p p e tite s of th e defenders
— Am erican a n d S o u th Korean alike — h a d been
sh arp en ed . The UN h a d been on record for som e
tim e a s favouring th e peaceful reu n ificatio n of
K orea u n d e r dem ocratic au sp ices. The m ilitary
cap acity of th e N orth w as now in d isa rra y . The
S o u th K oreans a n d th e UN C om m and w ere in
the ascendant, or could easily become so. In such
c irc u m sta n c e s, it w as h a rd ly s u rp risin g th a t
S y n g m a n R hee a n d G eneral M acA rthur (the
la tte r w ith s u p p o r t from W ash in g to n ) w ere
u n ite d in w an tin g to drive th e victory hom e by
tak in g th eir forces acro ss the 3 8 th parallel. This
w o u ld allow th e m to c o m p le te th e t a s k of
u n ific atio n w hile th e ir own iron w as hot, a n d
w hile th e ir enem y’s w as cold.
At firs t, th e r e w a s so m e s u g g e s tio n in
W ashington th a t the phraseology of th e J u n e 27
a n d J u ly 5 re so lu tio n s of th e S ecu rity C ouncil
w as sufficiently loose to w a rra n t their proceeding
in th is w ay w ith o u t fu rth e r au th o rity . N orth
Korea, after all, could be said to be “in th e a re a ”
(although P earson’s own view h a d b een th a t “the
a re a ” in q u e stio n sh o u ld be ta k e n to en d a t the
4 0 th p a ra lle l — t h a t is, no m ore th a n 120
n a u tic a l m iles n o r th of th e p r e - h o s tilitie s
border). O th er m em b ers of th e UN, however,
C anada included, took the view th a t crossing the
parallel in order to unify Korea by forces of a rm s
w ould a m o u n t to a co n sid erab le e sca latio n of
purpose, a n d could lead to a dangerous response
from th e Soviet Union, a n d p e rh a p s also from
C h in a . T h is w a s p r e c i s e l y th e s o r t of
developm ent th a t the C anadians h a d feared from
th e very b e g in n in g , a n d som e of P e a rs o n ’s
colleagues u rg ed h im to o p p o se it. B u t th e
A m ericans were su c c e ssfu l in p e rs u a d in g th e
B ritish a n d o thers to su p p o rt th eir position, a n d
th is m ade c o n tin u e d oppo sitio n b o th difficult
a n d p o in tle s s . P e a rso n did su g g e st t h a t a n
a tte m p t be m ad e before th e re s o lu tio n w as
actu ally p u t to a vote to op en u p n eg o tiatio n s
w ith th e N orth K orean regim e, sin ce it w as
conceivable th a t Pyongyang w ould a c ce p t th e
defeat an d reconcile itself to a peaceful resolution
of the underlying political problem . B ut th e idea
fell on d e a f e a rs. V ario u s o th e r d ip lo m atic
initiatives were sim ilarly a tte m p te d — som e of
th e m a im e d a t r e d u c i n g th e f re e d o m of
m an o eu v re th a t India, in p a rticu la r, feared th e
A m ericans w ere giving to th e ir irre p re ssib le
th e a tre com m ander. The L illiputians, in sh o rt,
were still w orking h a rd to co n tain th eir Gulliver.
E ventually, however, P e a rso n h im se lf gave
way, a lth o u g h only after se c u rin g w h a t h e took
to be a n inform al A m erican co m m itm en t n o t to
allow UN tro o p s to advance beyond th e n a rro w
w aist of th e K orean p e n in s u la , a b o u t half-w ay
betw een the 3 8 th parallel a n d the Yalu River. The
u p sh o t w as th a t yet a n o th e r resolution (this one
in the G eneral Assembly, since the Soviet Union
h a d re tu rn e d in A ugust to th e S ecu rity C ouncil
a n d h a d g ro u n d its b u s in e s s to a h alt) w as
p a s s e d w ith C a n a d a ’s r e lu c ta n t s u p p o rt on
O c to b e r 7. In e ffe c t, it a u th o r i z e d a UN
C o m m a n d a d v a n c e in to N o rth K orea a s a
p relu d e to th e e s ta b lis h m e n t of a unified a n d
dem ocratically elected g o vernm ent th ro u g h o u t
the p en in su la.
The A m erican u n d e rta k in g n o t to ad v an ce
b eyond th e p e n in s u la ’s n a rro w w a ist — a n
u n d e rta k in g ren d ered by th e S ecretary of State,
D ean A cheson, a t a tim e w hen h e w as u n a w a re
of certain co n trary developm ents in W ashington
— w as only p a rtly a t o d d s w ith P re s id e n t
T ru m a n ’s a c tu a l in s tru c tio n s to M acA rthur,
w hich enjoined him n o t to allow UN forces to
p e n e trate K orea’s n o rth e rn m o st provinces. B u t
it w as com pletely a t odds w ith the G en eral’s
own in te n t, a s h is s u b s e q u e n t advance to th e
Yalu River a n d the b o rd er w ith C hina readily
d e m o n stra ted .
As we all know , th is la s t offensive — th e socalled “Hom e by C h ristm a s ” offensive — w as to
be ru d ely in te rru p te d by th e C hinese, w ho h a d
show n u p in th e th e a tre h ere a n d th ere a s early
as th e en d of O ctober, b u t who now in terv en ed
in m assive n u m b ers a t the end of November. This
m ade it all too evident th a t u n itin g Korea u n d e r
w estern auspices was not a n objective th a t could
be reconciled w ith Peking’s view of w hat C h in a’s
se cu rity req u ired — a s th e C hinese a n d th e
In d ian s h a d tried repeatedly to m ake clear over
the p reced in g m o n th s, a n d a s th e C a n a d ian s,
a m o n g o th e rs, h a d h a lf-su s p e c te d from th e
beginning. As a C a n a d ia n h isto ria n observed
som e 53 y e a rs ago, C h in a w as “as unw illing to
adm it s u c h a p lan for Korea as the United S tates
m ight have b een if United N ations forces, m ostly
Chinese, h a d been about to arrange for a people’s
dem ocracy of M exico.”6
The C a n a d ia n a n d A m erican re sp o n se s to
th e C hinese in terv en tio n w ere s ta rk ly a t odds.
For the A m ericans — still b ru ised by the success
of M ao’s revolution, deeply influenced by the
sw ay of the C hina Lobby, convinced in an y case
th a t c o m m u n ism w as b o th a m onolithic a n d a
darkly m enacing th reat to their security an d their
c iv iliz a tio n , a n d n o w s u ffe rin g s ig n ific a n t
c a su a ltie s a t th e h a n d s of a Red Army — th ere
was only one possibility. An illicit an d oppressive
Chinese regime h a d come to th e aid of a n equally
illicit a n d oppressive aggressor in the com m unity
of n ations. T h at m ade the governm ent in Peking
a n a g g re s s o r, too, a n d it left n o ro o m for
accom m odation. It h a d to be labelled for w h at it
w as, a n d su b je c te d to a h a rd m ilitary lesson.
No w e a k n e ss could be show n. C ertain ly no
rew ard could be given. A tough line was required.
For th e C an ad ian s, by c o n tra st, there w as a
n a tu ra l ten dency to conclude th a t the course of
events h a d proven th e ir h e s ita tio n s rig h t all
along. E x p a n d in g th e o b jectiv es of th e UN
C om m and to in clu d e th e forcible u n ificatio n of
Korea h a d b een a m istak e. The C hinese m ight
be m isbehaving, b u t th e ir m isbehaviour, in the
circum stances, w as easily understood. The need
now w as to lim it the dam age — in effect, to
co n tain th e hostilities by de-escalating them .
Photo by Paul E.
Tomelin, NAC PA
115496
Sherman tanks of “B” Squadron, Lord Strathcona’s Horse,
completing a tour ojfront-line duty in Korea, 16 July 1952.
In varying degrees, th e C a n a d ia n view w as
widely s h a re d am ong o th er UN pow ers — allies
a n d n e u tra ls alike. The re s u lt w as a com plex
series of inform al exchanges in New York a n d
elsew here focussing on th e q u e stio n of w h eth er
diplom atic o v ertu res o u g h t to be m ad e directly
to th e Peking governm ent. The U nited S ta te s
clung to the view th a t an y s u c h initiative w ould
be ill-advised u n til s u c h tim e a s UN forces h a d
regained the u p p e r h a n d a t th e front, b u t in the
en d th ey relu c ta n tly agreed to a lim ited r u n a t
th e ta r g e t, o n th e u n d e r s t a n d in g t h a t a n
ag g resso r reso lu tio n w ould be b ro u g h t before
th e G eneral Assem bly if the a tte m p t were to fail
(as th e y w ere c o n v in c e d it w ould). In th e
m eantim e, the diplom atic initiative w as to be led
by a C ease-F ire G roup com posed of N asrollah
E n te za m of Iran , S ir B enegal R a u of India, a n d
L ester P earso n of C an ad a.
The details of w h a t followed are too intricate
to w a rra n t dissectio n here. Suffice it to say th a t
som e of the resulting exchanges w ith the Chinese
a p p e a re d prom ising, b u t th e ta lk s u ltim ately
foundered on the question of w hether the Peking
r e g im e w o u ld b e g r a n t e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l
recognition as the sole governm ent of all of C hina
— a n issue th a t w ould affect am ong other things
th e m a tte r of w ho in fu tu re w ould occupy the
“C h in a ” s e a t a t th e UN — in ad v an ce of any
su b sta n tiv e d isc u ssio n of a cease-fire in Korea.
T he A m erican s w ere a d a m a n tly o p p o se d to
m a k in g a n y s u c h c o n c e ssio n . Som e of th e
p la y e rs involved, in c lu d in g th e C a n a d ia n s ,
th o u g h t th ere w as still room for m anoeuvre, b u t
in the end the United S ta te s in sisted on bringing
f o rw a r d its c o n d e m n in g r e s o l u ti o n . T h e
C a n a d ian s, fearing th a t c o n tin u e d opposition
w ould a lie n ate th e A m ericans en tirely while
disrupting the all-im portant unity of the w estern
alliance, a t th a t poin t th re w in th e towel. While
describ in g th e reso lu tio n a s “p re m a tu re a n d
unw ise,” they nonetheless voted in its favour, an d
the reso lu tio n w as p a sse d on F e b ru ary 1, 1951.
It b ro u g h t to a n end an y im m ediate p ro sp e c t of
a negotiated ce ssa tio n of hostilities.
There were other diplom atic engagem ents of
a sim ila r sort, som e of th e m ore im p o rta n t of
th e m c e n tr in g on a c o n tr o v e rs y o v e r th e
rep atriation of Chinese a n d N orth Korean POWs
in th e final p h a s e s of th e war. B u t th e gen eral
p a tte rn by th en h a d been firmly established. The
C a n a d ia n s w ere c e rta in ly s u p p o rtiv e of th e
w estern cause, an d were d eterm ined to n u rtu re
the u n ity of th e w e stern play ers. At th e sam e
tim e, th ey w orked q u ite h a rd to c o n s tra in th e
b e h a v io u r of A m erican policy-m akers, w hich
th e y r e g a r d e d a s o c c a s i o n a l l y g iv e n to
counterproductive extrem es. T heir strategy w as
to act as m uch as possible in diplom atic coalition
w ith o th e r m em b ers of th e U nited N ations, a
s tr a te g y t h a t u ltim a te ly d e p e n d e d o n th e
w illin g n e ss of th e A m e ric a n a u th o r itie s to
o p e ra te u n d e r UN a u s p ic e s . U ltim ately , of
course, C a n a d a ’s diplom atic capabilities, like
those of th e o th er c o n trib u to rs to th e war, were
lim ited by a t le a st one u n d e rly in g reality. The
A m ericans were paying m o st of th e p ip e r’s bill.
It followed th a t they w ere calling m o st of th e
p ip e r’s tu n e s . To sw itch th e m etap h o r, C a n a d a
could nibble a t th e m argins of A m erican policy,
b u t n o t a t th e core.
Countervailing Views
S
u c h w as th e essen ce of m y a rg u m e n t m ore
th a n a q u a rte r-c en tu ry ago, a n d self-serving
though you m ay th in k m e for saying so, it seem s
to me to be hanging in there reasonably well even
today. So sh a m e le ss am I, in fact, th a t I c a n n o t
re s is t q u o tin g from w h a t is p ro b ab ly th e m o st
c o m p le te a n d s c h o l a r l y a c c o u n t o f th e
in te rn atio n a l h isto ry of th e K orean War to date.
W ritten by th e A m erican h is to ria n , W illiam
S tu e c k , on th e b a s is of h is a n a ly s is of th e
p e rtin e n t diplom atic files in a wide a rra y of
n a tio n a l archives, a n d p u b lish e d in 1995 by
P rin c e to n U n iv e rsity P re s s , it offers in its
in tro d u c tio n th e following observation:
A s e c o n d th e m e [of th is book] c e n te rs o n th e
role of th e U n ite d N atio n s, w h ic h o th e r sc h o la rs
h a v e w ritte n off a s little m ore th a n a n in s tru m e n t
o f U .S. policy. To b e s u r e , th e in te rn a tio n a l
o rg a n iz a tio n o fte n p la y e d t h a t ro le, b u t j u s t a s
often it p ro v id ed th e se ttin g for allied a n d n e u tra l
p r e s s u r e o n th e U n ite d S ta te s , a n in s titu tio n a l
fra m e w o rk w ith in w h ic h w e a k e r n a tio n s c o u ld
c o o rd in a te th e ir effo rts to in flu e n c e th e w o rld 's
g r e a t e s t p o w e r. S u c h e ff o rts f r e q u e n tly
s u c c e e d e d , in p a r t b e c a u s e m a n y of th o s e
n a tio n s h a d c o n trib u te d fo rces to K orea. T he UN
role in th e K o rean W ar m e rits a tte n tio n n o t only
a s a n a g e n c y o f c o lle c tiv e s e c u r ity a g a in s t
“a g g re s s io n ,” b u t a s a c h a n n e l of r e s tr a in t o n a
s u p e r p o w e r t h a t o c c a s i o n a ll y f lir te d w ith
ex cessiv ely ris k y e n d e a v o rs .7
I could h a rd ly have said it b e tte r myself!
B u t of course I ca n n o t get aw ay so lightly as
all th a t, a n d a t th e m o st gen eral level it is n o t
difficult to m o u n t a counter-interpretation, m uch
less flattering (some m ight feel) to th e C an ad ian
position. For a s ta rt, it is a b so lu te ly clear th a t
all th e m ajo r decisions on th e “UN” side in th e
K o rean W ar w ere u ltim a te ly m ad e by, a n d
dep en d en t u pon, the U nited S tates. Even w here
the A m ericans were actively opposed by th e ir
allies, th ey alm o st alw ays w on th e day in the
end. C a n a d a h a d no influence over the J u n e 25
d e c is io n c a llin g on th e N o rth K o re a n s to
w ithdraw . Nor did it have any significant im pact
on e ith e r th e tim ing or th e s u b s ta n c e of th e
r e s o lu tio n of J u n e 27, w h ic h in v o k ed th e
collective s e c u rity p rin c ip le . T he A m erican
decision to intervene w ith n av al a n d a ir forces
w as m ade in W ashington a n d p u t into p ractical
effect on a u n ila te ra l b a sis. The U nited S ta te s,
moreover, w as in complete control of UN m ilitary
o p erations, a n d for som e of th e m o st im p o rta n t
p h a s e s of th e w ar (including m o st p a rtic u la rly
th e a d v a n c e in to N o rth K orea), “A m e ric an
co n tro l” did n o t m ea n control by th e P re sid e n t
a n d Jo in t Chiefs of Staff, b u t by the increasingly
u n c o n tro lla b le th e a tre c o m m an d er, G en eral
M acA rthur. W hen the A m ericans decided th a t
they sh o u ld seize the o pportunity to unify Korea
b y fo rce of a rm s , th e y c e r ta in ly r a n in to
opposition. B u t th e n th ey r a n over it. C a n a d a
a n d som e of th e o th er pow ers were su c ce ssfu l
in delaying th e c o n d e m n a tio n of th e Peking
regim e following th e C hinese in terv en tio n , b u t
only for a relatively s h o rt tim e. Here, too, the
A m ericans h a d th eir way in the end, a n d O ttaw a
a t th a t p o in t s u p p o rte d them , even if it did so
while publicly holding its nose. All th is being
so, it is n o t im possible to m ake th e case th a t
C a n a d a w as a c tin g a s a loyal, a n d clearly
subordinate, m em ber of an A m erican-dom inated
coalition. To deny th is, it could be said, is to
deny th e essence. E verything else — minor, an d
u su a lly futile, displays of tactical disag reem en t
w ith W ashington included — is sim ply clutter.
This k ind of in terp retatio n — although m ore
freq u en tly m o u n te d la te r in rela tio n to th e w ar
in V ietnam th a n to th e w ar in K orea — w as
certain ly a t th e root of m u c h of th e criticism of
C an ad ian foreign policy on the political “left” (as
well a s in n a tio n a lis t circles m ore generally)
d u rin g th e 1960s a n d into th e early 1970s. On
su c h a view, C anada w as not a truly autonom ous
pow er a t all, b u t a n A m erican satellite — a n d
th e g in g e r a p p r o a c h t h a t O tta w a to o k in
c a lc u la tin g how m u c h re sista n c e to A m erican
preferences it could display w ithout ru n n in g the
risk of being co u n te rp ro d u c tiv e told th e whole
story.
O n som e a c c o u n ts, too, th e im p licatio n s of
t h i s s e n s i t iv i ty to th e im b a la n c e in th e
d istrib u tio n of pow er betw een C a n a d a a n d the
U nited S ta te s w ere com p o u n d ed fu rth e r by a
fu n d a m e n ta l sim ilarity betw een C a n a d ia n a n d
A m erican views of th e cold w ar itself. C a n a d a
h a d been one of th e diplom atic a rc h ite c ts of the
N orth A tlantic Alliance, a n d th ere w as n o th in g
in C a n a d ia n lib e ralism th a t w ould g e n e ra te
sym pathy for the Soviet experim ent. If there were
genuine differences w ith the United S tates, these
h a d m ore to do w ith strateg ies a n d tactics th a n
w ith basic p u rp o se s. C a n a d ian s knew very well
w h ich side they w ere on. In seeking to qualify
th e a rg u m e n t I h a d m ade, therefore, R obert S.
Prince w rote a s follows in a n article p u b lish e d
in th e w inter of 1992-93:
...T o be s u r e , C a n a d a w a n te d to r e s tr a i n th e
U n ite d S ta te s ; a t tim e s , C a n a d ia n d ip lo m a ts
believed t h a t th e y h a d to c a rp a t th e flaw s in US
policy in o rd e r to p re s e rv e w o rld p e a c e . B u t
C a n a d a w a s its e lf c o n s tra in e d b y th e c o s ts of
o p p o sitio n — th e ris k of c a u s in g a d a n g e ro u s
s p l i t in t h e W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e t h a t m i g h t
p e rm a n e n tly s o u r C a n a d ia n -A m e ric a n re la tio n s
— a n d a lso b y th e b a s ic sim ila rity of C a n a d ia n
a n d A m e ric a n p e rc e p tio n s of th e C o ld W ar.
D esp ite th e re a l a n d co n sid e ra b le s tra in th a t th e
K o re a n W ar p la c e d o n C a n a d ia n - A m e r ic a n
d ip lo m a c y , th e r e w e re s u c h tig h t lim its o n
C a n a d a 's a b ility a n d in c lin a tio n to r e s tr a in th e
U S t h a t a t tim e s d u rin g th e early w a r p e rio d th e
sim ilarity of C a n a d ia n a n d A m erican a p p ro a c h e s
to K o rea o u ts h o n e th e d iffe re n c e s.8
It is difficult to re sp o n d very vigorously to
th is s o rt of challenge, however, b e c a u se I agree
w ith it entirely. If th ere is a difference betw een
u s, it is n o t a difference over th e facts, b u t over
w hich of the facts are interesting. The question,
in o th e r w ords, h a s to do w ith w hich facts are
w orthy of e m p h a sis, a n d w hich of th em ca n be
ta k e n (more or less) as self-evident. Writing from
th e v an tag e p o in t of th e late 1960s a n d early
1970s, it hardly seem ed necessary to argue th a t
th e w e ste rn pow ers, C a n a d a a n d th e U nited
S ta te s in cluded, w ere fu n d am e n ta lly agreed in
th in k in g th a t th e Sino-Soviet w orld rep resen ted
a b it of a th re a t to th e liberal West. Nor did it
seem n e c essa ry , either, to em phasize th a t the
A m ericans h a d th e biggest battalio n s a n d hence
were b o u n d to have the largest say. W hat seem ed
m u c h m ore s u rp risin g w as th a t anyone else in
th e w e stern cam p h a d p re su m e d to have any
say a t all. H ence I m ade a g rea t deal of th e fact
th a t the C anadians, am ong others, h a d said quite
a lot. R obert Prince, by c o n tra st, m ad e a great
deal of th e fact th a t they h a d failed to say more,
a n d th a t they h a d h a d relatively little im p act in
saying w h a t th ey did say. This is a difference
th a t probably says som ething respectively about
D. S ta irs a n d R. Prince, b u t it is n o t in itself a
difference in our accounts of C anada’s diplomacy
in th e context of th e K orean War.
Having sa id all th a t, I m u s t concede as well
th a t th e o p en in g u p of th e E x te rn a l Affairs
d e p a rtm e n t’s records for the period h a s brou g h t
to lig h t m a n y n e w d e ta ils of w h ic h I w as
previously unaw are. I have not been th ro u g h the
files m yself, b u t th e w ork of th o se w ho have,
along w ith th e selectio n s th a t have b e e n m ade
available th ro u g h th e D e p a rtm en t’s D ocum ents
o n C a n a d ia n E x te r n a l R e la tio n s s e r i e s
(especially Vols. 16-19) have to g eth er filled in
the gaps. Greg Donaghy, for example, h a s show n
th a t there w as very extensive discussion over the
s u m m e r of 1950 of th e possibility of exploiting
th e o p p o rtu n ity c re a te d by th e K orean W ar to
establish a standing United Nations international
force th a t w ould c o n tin u e long after th e m a tte r
in K orea h a d b een reso lv e d .9 Of th is , I w as
com pletely un aw are. Sim ilarly, it a p p e a rs from
his account, as well as from th a t of Robert Prince,
t h a t w i n n i n g C a b i n e t a p p r o v a l fo r th e
recru itm en t of the C anadian Army Special Force
w as a far m ore difficult challenge th a n I h a d
previously u n d e rsto o d it to be. Again, Steven
H ugh Lee h a s d e m o n stra te d th a t th e te n sio n s
th a t developed w ith th e A m ericans over th e
reso lu tio n of th e POW re p a tria tio n issu e in th e
final m o n th s of th e w ar w ere far m ore volatile
a n d com plex th a n I w as able in 1974 to re p o rt.10
C h e ster R onning h a d a llu d ed briefly in a 1966
article to C a n a d a ’s hav in g played a n im p o rta n t
role in cajoling th e A m ericans into accep tin g a
p ro p o sal th a t led to th e final se ttle m e n t of th is
i s s u e , " b u t I w a s u n a b le t h e n to o b ta in
ad ditional inform ation.
It goes w ith o u t saying th a t the h isto ric a l
record is m u ch improved as a resu lt of im portant
studies of this kind, an d certainly those who wish
to a s s e s s th e ro le s p la y e d re s p e c tiv e ly by
particu lar individuals in the political leadership,
as well a s in th e foreign service, can n o t perform
th eir ta s k s effectively w ith o u t them .
B u t a t a m ore general level of analysis, I still
th in k C an ad ian policy-m akers h a d a reasonable
r u n a t tying G ulliver down. The fact th a t he
e v e n tu a ll y b r o k e fre e , a n d d id a lo t of
u n n ecessary dam age in spite of us, simply spoke
th en , a s it still sp e a k s now, to th e fact th a t h e
w as, a n d is, a trifle bigger th a n all th e o th e r
in h a b ita n ts of Lilliput.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
See H arry S. T ru m a n , M em oirs. II: Years o f Trial a n d
H o p ei New York-. S ig n et B ooks, 1965), p p .3 7 8 -3 7 9 .
George F. K ennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little,
Brow n, 1967), p.4 9 0 .
D enis S ta irs, T h e D iplom acy o f C onstraint: C anada,
th e K orea n War, a n d th e U n ited S ta te s (T o ro n to :
U niversity ofT o ro n to P ress, 1974), p.xi.
A m erican a n a ly s ts, too, h av e o ccasio n ally th o u g h t of
th e ir c o u n try as a G ulliver c o n stra in e d by L illip u tian
th read s. See, for exam ple, S tanley H offm ann, Gulliver’s
Troubles, Or th e Settin g o f A m erica n Foreign Policy
(New York: M cGraw-Hill for T he C ouncil o n Foreign
R elations, 1968).
5.
G reg D onaghy, ed., D ocum ents on C a n a d ia n E xternal
R ela tio n s: Volum e 16 - 1 9 5 0 (O ttaw a: M in iste r of
S u p p ly a n d S ervices C a n a d a for th e D e p a rtm e n t of
Foreign Affairs an d In te rn a tio n a l T rade, 1996). p p .2 2 ­
23.
6. W.E.C. H arriso n , C a n a d a in World A ffa irs, 1949-1950
(Toronto: O xford U niversity P re ss for the C a n a d ia n
In s titu te of In te rn a tio n a l Affairs, 1957), p.293.
7. W illiam S tu e c k , T he K orean War: A n In tern a tio n a l
H istory (Princeton: P rin ceto n U niversity P ress, 1995),
p.4.
8. R obert S. Prince, “The Lim its of C on strain t: C an ad ian A m erican R elatio n s a n d th e K orean War," J o u rn a l o f
C a n a d ia n S tu d ie s, Vol. 27, No. 4 (W inter 1992-93),
p. 130.
9. See Greg D onaghy, “The R oad to C o n stra in t: C a n a d a
a n d th e K orean War, Ju n e -D e c e m b e r 1 9 5 0 ,” in J o h n
H illiker a n d May H alloran, eds., Diplomatic D ocum ents
a n d T h e ir U s e r s ( O tta w a : H is t o r ic a l S e c ti o n ,
D ep artm en t of Foreign Affairs an d In tern atio n al Trade,
1995), p p .189-212.
10. Steven H ugh Lee, “A Special R elationship? C anada-U .S.
R e la tio n s a n d th e K o rean A rm istice N eg o tiations,
J a n u a ry -J u ly 1 9 5 3 ,"Ibid., p p .213-228.
11. C h ester A. R onning, “C a n ad a an d th e U nited N ations,”
in J. King G ordon, ed., C a n a d a ’s Role a s a M iddle
P ow er (Toronto: C a n a d ia n In s titu te of In te rn a tio n a l
Affairs, 1966), p p .37-50. See especially p p .41-2.
C u rren tly M cCulloch P rofessor in Political
Science a t D alhousie University, Denis Stairs
is a fo rm e r P re s id e n t of th e C a n a d ia n
Political Science A ssociation, a n d w as th e
founding D irector of D alh o u sie's C entre for
Foreign Policy S tu d ie s from 1970 to 1975.
He served as C hair of h is D e p a rtm en t from
1 9 8 0 to 1 9 8 5 , a n d a s V ic e -P r e s id e n t
(A cadem ic a n d R e se a rc h ) from 1988 to
1993. A F ellow of th e R oyal S o ciety of
C an ad a, h e specializes in C a n a d ia n foreign
a n d defence policy, C an ad a-U .S . relatio n s,
a n d sim ilar su b je c ts. He w rote th e p osition
p ap er on “C ontem porary Security Issu es” for
th e Special J o in t C om m ittee of the S e n a te
a n d of th e H ouse of C om m ons Reviewing
C a n a d ia n Foreign Policy in 1994. R ecent
p u b lic a tio n s w ith a focus on m ilitary a n d
se cu rity affairs include “The m edia a n d the
m ilitary in C anada: reflections on a tim e of
tro u b le s ,” International Journal, Vol. LIII,
No. 3 (S um m er 1998), pp. 5 44-553, a n d
“C a n a d a a n d th e s e c u r i t y p r o b le m :
im p lic a tio n s a s th e m ille n n iu m t u r n s , ”
In te r n a tio n a l J o u r n a l, Vol. LIV, No. 3
(S um m er 1999), pp. 3 86-403.