IMPORTANT NOTICE:
This Publication may contain
SAFETY NOTICES or WARNING PAGES
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AUSTRALIAN AIR PUBLICATION
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7001.048
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DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM MANUAL
Original Date of Issue:
04 Sep 12
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AL Status : 8
GN Davies, AO, CSC
Air Marshal
Defence Aviation Authority
Issuing Authority Date: 15 Jul 16
Sponsor: DACPA
File Reference: AB19145340
RESPONSIBILITIES OF DISTRIBUTEE
AMENDMENTS TO PUBLICATIONS
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1.
This publication, although issued as an Australian Air Publication (AAP), is authenticated by the Defence
Aviation Authority because the content has Departmental significance and authority. The single Service markings
have been replaced by their Departmental equivalents as part of the formation of a proper, structured, binding Defence
Publication System for airworthiness, aircraft, aircraft related equipment and other ‘air’ matters under the authority of
DI(G) ADMIN 20-31.
2.
Procedures for the management, control and amendment of AAPs are outlined in AAP 5030.001 Defence
Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems and Specifications Manual.
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Intellectual Property Protection
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3.
This publication is protected by Commonwealth of Australia Copyright. The contents of this publication may
also be protected by other Intellectual Property Protection mechanisms, Government to Government Agreements
and/or Third Party Transfer restrictions; such as Original Equipment Manufacturer’s Copyright and/or International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
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Notice to Contractors
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4.
This publication is issued to Contractors for information only and is to be returned intact on completion of
contract to the relevant Commonwealth Contracting Authority.
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Special Publication Instructions (SPI) Promulgated Publication Sponsor Changes
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SPI promulgated publication sponsor changes are to be recorded in the table below:
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PUBLICATION MANAGEMENT
COPYRIGHT COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
UNCLASSIFIED
AO 011
Revised 20 Apr 16
Publication Improvement Report and Reply
Instructions
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Refer AAP 5030.001 Section 6, Chapter 3
Originator
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Date of issue
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Volume, Topic or Part number
Section number
Chapter or WP number
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Brief summary of deficiency and suggested amendments
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Defending Australia and its National Interests
www.defence.gov.au
20 Apr 16, 14:48:27
AO 011 - Page 1 of 2
1.7.4
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Registered by
Date received
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Appointment
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Defending Australia and its National Interests
www.defence.gov.au
20 Apr 16, 14:48:27
AO 011 - Page 2 of 2
UNCLASSIFIED
AAP 7001.048
Change Status Page
CHANGE STATUS PAGE
NOTE
•
When amended, the Defence written portion of the text affected by an AL is
identified by amendment indicators detailed in AAP 5030.001, Section 4, Chapter 2.
Page No
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PRELIMINARY PAGES
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Notes to Readers
Amendment Certificate
Foreword
Table of Contents
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BODY MATTER PAGES
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SECTION 1
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CHAPTER 1
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CHAPTER 4
CHAPTER 5
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CHAPTER 7
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CHAPTER 6
CHAPTER 7
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SECTION 4
CHAPTER 1
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AAP 7001.048
Change Status Page
COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE
Certified that the publication has been page checked in accordance with the details on this page and the relevant List
of Effective Pages.
100% correct
✔

or with the following configuration errors
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Elizabeth Low
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AAPCP AMSPO
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and Unit or Section
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PUBLICATION INSPECTION RECORD
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15 Jul 16
Date...............................
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Certified that an annual inspection has been carried out and any anomalies reported to the Publications Manager in
accordance with AAP 5030.001, Section 7, Chapter 6.
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AAP 7001.048
Notes to Readers
NOTES TO READERS
This AAP is managed in accordance with AAP 5030.001 - Defence Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems
and Specifications Manual. Reference is to be made to this publication for Unit management of AAP.
Media
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This publication is only available in soft copy on the AAP On-Line Library website. Printed versions are not provided.
Any printed copies that might be made are uncontrolled and will have a printed warning automatically printed as part
of the print process to ensure awareness.
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 8
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Major change
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- Sect 2 Chap 2
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MILAVREG 2.1b and 2.1c deleted. All content has been moved to OAREG 5. (PIRR 14-7034 /
AB22520067)
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- Sect 2 Chap 5
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MILAVREG 5 content moved to OAREG 5. Included in this is guidance material from Sect 5, Chap 1. (PIRR
14-7034 / AB22520067)
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MILAVREG 8 content moved to OAREG 8. Included in this is the guidance material from Sect 5, Chap 4.
(PIRR 15-7806)
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up side bars’.
- Glossary
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New or revised definitions of note are: Above Obstacles, Crowd Line, Flight Simulation Training Device
(FSTD) Flight Test, Flying Display, Height Above Obstacles Within, Includes, May, Minimum Separation
Distance, Must, Negative training, Opposition Manoeuvre, Should, Significant Change, Sponsor, Suitability
for Flight, Qualification.
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Deleted terms are: Synthetic Training Device, Single Aircraft Handling Display, Formation Handling Display,
Aircraft Operational Display
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- List of Abbreviations
Removed Abbreviations:
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New Abbreviations: AO, FSTD, HAOW, MSD
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Notes to Readers
Previous Amendment Lists
Previous amendment lists are provided for change tracking and situational awareness of regulatory development.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 7
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- Sect 1 Chap 1
Para 36 and new Annex B – Enforcement Policy added (AB24515865).
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- Sect 1 Chap 1
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Deleted Annex B – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual – Content and structure Figure 1-B-1 as TOC
and bookmarking provides equivalent information.
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- Sect 5 Chap 2 Annex A
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Deleted. All content has been moved to the relevant OAREG 6 sub-regulations (GM in S9C1) or the DASP
Master Glossary.
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- Sect 5 Chap 2 Annex B
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New terms1: Air Traffic Advisory (ATA), Aerodrome Apron Areas, Aerodrome Manoeuvring Areas,
Aerodrome Movement Areas, Aerodrome Rescue And Fire Fighting (ARFF), Aircraft Captain, Aircraft
Oxygen System, Alerting Service, Autonomous Aircraft, Autonomous Operation, Battlefield Airspace
Control (BAC), UAS Command And Control (C2) Link, Defence Practice Area (DPA), Fast Jet, Flight
Authorisation Officer, Flight Information Publication (FLIP), Flight information service (FIS), Foreign Object
Debris (FOD), Forward Air Control–Airborne, Maritime Control Service (MCS) (PIRR-15-7017 /
AB24978978), Meteorology (MET), Non-Defence Flight Test, Periodic Health Examination (PHE), Primary
runway, RPA Observer, Safety Management System (SMS), Significant Change, Supplemental Oxygen,
Switchover, Type Rated, UAS Command and Control (C2) Link, Competency, UAS Flight Termination
System (AB24904795 for all new/modified UAS terms).
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Modified terms: Air Traffic Control (ATC), Air Traffic Service (ATS), Air Vehicle Operator (AVO),
Aircraft altitude, Aircraft Controller, ASOR Appointing Authority, Aviation Accident Investigation Team,
Aviation Incident Investigation Team, Aviation Safety Audit, Aviation Safety Committee (ASC), Confidential
Incident Report (CONFIR), Detect and Avoid, Flight Authorisation, Flight Test, Flight Test Permit,
Generative Safety Culture, Hazard Report, Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA), Incident, Operational Hazard
(OPHAZ) Report, RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM), Remote Pilot (RP)—replaced with ICAO
term, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS)—replaced Ground Control
Station with Remote Pilot Station (RPS), Serious Incident, Sponsor, Substantial Change, Temporarily
Medically Unfit For Flying (TMUFF), Terminal Attack Control (TAC), Unmanned Aircraft, Unmanned
Aircraft System (UAS). (AB24904795).
Deleted terms: Temporarily Medically Unfit For Control Duties (TMUCD).
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Deleted terms—DDAAFS sponsored2 (AB24748974 / AB24719537): Comcare, Dangerous Incident,
Environment, Ergonomics, Hierarchy of Controls, Impairment, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),
Probability, Project Manager, Rehabilitation, Risk Control, Risk Identification, Risk Management, Serious
Injury or Illness, Stress, Stressor, Thermal Stress, Toxic, WHS Act, WHS Incident, Work Health and Safety
Duty, Workplace, Workspace, Workstation.
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Not all terms are actually new. Many have been absorbed from the relevant AAP chapters to afford improved useability. Where a definition has
been placed in the glossary, it is no longer spelled out in AAP text.
These terms are available in WHS publications
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AAP 7001.048
Notes to Readers
Edits
Typos, formatting, outdated references, name changes, etc as required. Edits are not identified with
amendment list ‘mark up side bars’.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 6
Major changes
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- Defence State Register renamed Defence Register throughout the document (PIRR–14–7033 /
AB22691634)
TOC
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Sect 1: C1, C4
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Sect 4: C1, C1a, C2, C4
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Sect 5: C1, C3
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Glossary (modified): Application Identifier (AI), Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC), Aviation
Systems, Defence Standard (DEF STAN) 00-970, Defence Register, Defence Registered Aircraft,
Non Defence Registered Aircraft, Service Release (SR), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC).
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MILAVREG 1.5, 1.7 and 1.8 – OAA, TAA and FTAA responsibilities expanded to include provision of
safety information to DASP Agency staff (PIRR–15–7009 / AB23822779).
- Sect 2 Chap 7 Annex A
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Defence AA exemption for CAT 4 UAS operations within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome or above 400 ft AGL
added to GM for Defence UAS Categories (PIRR–14–7010 / AB22283236).
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Glossary (new terms): Aviation Medical Certificate, Aviation Physiology Training Officer (APTO),
Decompression illness (DCI), Dental Officer, Hypoxia, RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine, Senior
Aviation Medical Officer (SAVMO), Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA), Specialist
Employment Stream Annual Health Assessment (SESAHA), Sub-atmospheric DCI.
TOC.
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- Deleted annexes and appendices providing examples/proformas (PIRR 15-7013 / AB22637273). Readers
referred to the ACPA website in lieu.
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Sect 3 Chap 4 Annex A – Example AMTC, TCDS, STC and Service Release.
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Sect 3 Chap 6 Annex A – Example Airworthiness Directive for Defence involvement in
Original Equipment Manufacturer flying activities.
Sect 4 Chap 1 Annex A App 1 – Example Defence Airworthiness Directive.
Sect 5 Chap 1 Annex C App 1 – Ramp Inspection proforma.
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AAP 7001.048
Notes to Readers
- Sect 1 Chap 2
Moved content from this ‘The Defence Register’ chapter to Sect 2 Chap 2 (Intro paras 1 and 3), MILAVREG
2, 2.2, the Glossary, Sect 3 Chap 1 (para 7), Sect 3 Chap 2 (paras 9–12, 19–22 and 26), Sect 4 Chap 1 (paras
11–12) (PIRR-15-7015 / AB23683219).
TOC amended accordingly
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para 20 – AAC purpose revised to include provision of advice on topics not yet regulated but in need of
clarity (PIRR-15-7016 / AB23683736).
- Sect 5 Chap 1
para 19.c – Additional GM for ‘Approval to Operate’ term (PIRR/AB23988736).
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Glossary (modified terms): Approval to Operate, Aviation Medical Officer (AVMO), Air Vehicle Operator
(AVO), Noteworthy Risk.
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 5
Major changes
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- Sect 1 Chap 1
para 8 – DASP Master Glossary introduced (PIRR 14-7032 / AB21399105).
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para 35 – DASP Regulatory Change Process introduced (AB20565663).
Annex A – DASP RCP incorporated (AB20565663).
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MILAVREG 1.10.b. (4) – DACPA as regulation approval authority for Minor and Edit changes
(AB20565663).
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All terms from AAP 7001.048, AAP 7001.053, AAP 8000.010, and AAP 6734.001 consolidated in the new
DASP Master Glossary (AB20565663).
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New or revised definitions of note are: acceptable level of safety, acceptable means of compliance, adequate
aerodrome, Air and Space Interoperability Council, aircraft controller, aircrew, aviation medical officer,
aviation medicine, crew, dangerous goods, Defence aircraft, exemption, flight crew, foreign register, guidance
material, low flying, mission crew, mission essential passenger, operational clearance, segregated airspace,
separation assurance, state aircraft (clarification note added), waiver, other edits.
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Deleted terms are operational contingency loading, contingency loading and supplementary crew.
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To afford recognition of terms that are being introduced in this AL that are not sourced from another DASP
publication, terms that have been imported from the eTAMM or DASM Glossaries are not marked with an
AL bar, unless the definition has been amended.
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Minor changes
- Foreword
Updated for historical content.
- Sect 1 Chap 1
para 3 – last sentence ‘risk’ replaced with ‘safety’.
para 6 – last sentence ‘risk’ replaced with ‘safety’.
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- Sect 4 Chap 1
AAP 7001.048
Notes to Readers
para 15.i – DDAAFS role clarified.
para 16.a– 3rd line ‘under DACPA’s direction’ added.
para 16.b – 3rd line ‘under DGTA’s direction’ added. Last sentence is new.
para 16.c – 3rd line ‘under DDAAFS’s direction’ added. DDAAFS provided general updates, such as ASMS
term.
para 17 – 2nd line ‘with acceptable risk’ changed to ‘ALoS’.
para 22 – 1st line ‘functions’ replaced with ‘hazards’.
para 37.d – GM provided as relates to OAA and OAAR delegations when reading regulation.
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para 38.d – GM provided for the use of the word ‘should’.
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para 18 – 2nd line ‘involving aircraft and any systems which impact the safety of aircraft’ replaced with ‘that
may compromise aviation safety’.
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para 41 – how to obtain information, clarification and formal advice amended.
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- Sect 1 Chap 2
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para 15 – Introduction of generic term used for disposal agency (PIRR 14-7011).
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- Sect 1 Chap 4
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para 6 – 2nd line added ‘and continuing airworthiness management’ (PIRR 14-7022).
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para 7 – completely revised by DGTA-ADF (PIRR 14-7022).
para 8 – para title added ‘authorisations and approvals’; rewritten by DGTA-ADF (PIRR 14-7022).
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para 9 – rewritten by DGTA-ADF (PIRR 14-7022).
para 10 – 4th line ‘The TAR publishes minimum airworthiness design requirements in’ inserted (PIRR 147022).
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para 17 – 1st line ‘preferred’ changed to ‘minimum’ (PIRR 14-7022).
para 20 – 5th line ‘preferred’ changed to ‘minimum’ (PIRR 14-7022).
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MILAVREG 3.1.a (2) TCDS guidance (PIRR 14-7023).
- Sect 2 Chap 4
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MILAVREG 4.3.c – AwB recommendation for an Aw Instrument clarified (PIRR 13-023).
MILAVREG 4.3.d (1) – TAA changed to TAR (PIRR 13-023).
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- Sect 2 Chap 6
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MILAVREG 6 – Transition Responsibilities added (AB15096810).
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- Sect 3 Chap 4
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para 63 – Guidance amendment regarding who may amend or lift a SR limitation (PIRR 14-7024).
- Sect 3 Chap 7
para 14.e – Guidance added regarding potential for OAAR recommendation (PIRR 14-7028).
- Sect 4 Chap 3
para 14 – Guidance amendment regarding who may amend or lift a SR limitation (PIRR 14-7024).
- Sect 5 Chap 1
para 17 – Defence AA ACFS Light Sports Aircraft (LSA) exemption added to GM (AB20419230).
para 18 – Defence AA AAFC exemption added to GM (AB20744164).
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AAP 7001.048
Notes to Readers
- Sect 5 Chap 2
para 5 – MILAVREG 6 Transition Responsibilities added (AB15096810).
- List of Abbreviations
revised list of abbreviations includes: ALoR, ALoS, AMC, ASIC, DGTA, DGTA-ADF, EASA, GM, SFARP.
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Summary of Changes
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Section 2 Chapter 3 – New MILAVREG 3.7 - Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP).
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Amendment List 4
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Section 2 Chapter 4 – MILAVREG 4.2 – Airworthiness Board Conduct revised to incorporate AwB requirements for
non-Defence registered aircraft, AvSS and category 3 UAS.
Section 2 Chapter 7 – Revised Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) regulation supporting the introduction of
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a four tier categorisation scheme for the airworthiness management of Defence UAS.
Section 2 Chapter 7 Annex A – Revised Defence UAS Categories.
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Section 3 Chapter 4 – Additional guidance for UASOP.
Section 5 Chapter 3 – Revised guidance chapter for UAS.
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Section 5 Chapter 3 Annex A – New annex for UAS categorisation and risk management.
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Section 5 Chapter 3 Annex A Appendix 1 – New appendix of an example initial operational risk analysis for a
potential category 2 UAS.
Section 5 Chapter 3 Annex B – New annex for the history and philosophy of UAS airworthiness.
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Glossary
Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) and Remote Pilot (RP) added to reflect the changes from MILAVREG 7.
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Section 1
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DEFGRAM Number 630/2013 – Dissolution of the Aviation Safety Policy Review Committee (ASPRC) formally
promulgated the dissolution of the ASPRC with effect from 31 November 13. Section 1 has been amended to reflect
this change.
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Section 2
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MILAVREG 1.11 – MILAVREG to detail the Defence AA requirements for the aviation safety program appointment
of Director Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS).
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Annex A to Section 2 Chapter 1 has been amended to include the aviation safety program management qualification
and competency criteria for DDAAFS.
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MILAVREG 2.4 – Clarification for the issue of airworthiness instruments.
MILAVREG 4. Annex A to Section 2 Chapter 4 has been amended to include the Defence AA Airworthiness Board
requirements for Synthetic training Devices.
MILAVREG 5.6 – Defence member changed to Defence personnel IAW with the DI(G) OPS 02-2 - Defence Aviation
Safety Program.
MILAVREG 8.3 and MILAVREG 8.4 – Clarification of STD recommendations from the OAAR and DAR.
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AAP 7001.048
Notes to Readers
Glossary
A number of changes within the glossary to reflect MILAVREG 6 changes, MILAVREG 7 terms and CH47 COI
requirements.
List of Abbreviations
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A number of changes within the glossary to reflect MILAVREG 6 and MILAVREG 7 terms.
Amendment List 2
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General
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The use of Amendment Bars has mostly been restricted to those amendments which change the intent of a regulation
or significantly alter guidance material. Minor changes, made to improve readability, presentation, and layout and to
satisfy the requirements of AAP 5030.001(AM1) and DEF(AUST) 5629B may or may not be identified by
amendment bars. Significant changes resulting from this amendment are reflected in the following paragraphs.
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Airworthiness Policy Review Committee (APRC)
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DMO representation has been included on the APRC. Army and Navy APRC representatives have been amended.
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Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM)
State Register administration responsibilities
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Inclusion of detail regarding NPRM as the recognised process for making regulatory change.
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Many of the State Register administration responsibilities have been delegated from the ADF AA to DACPA-ADF.
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Suspension and resumption of ADF flying operations
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Airworthiness Advisory Circular 002/2007 has been incorporated providing additional guidance on the notification
process for suspension of operations, terminology and non-state registered aircraft.
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Recommendation for issue of STD Installation Operating Permits (IOP) has been delegated from DGTA to the
relevant Design Acceptance Representative. Clarification that ‘Procedural Trainer’ simulators are not covered by the
MILAVREGs and shall be managed at a local level.
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AMTC, TCDS and Service Releases
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Additional guidance has been provided regarding the acquisition process and introduction to service. Airworthiness
Directive 019/2009 has been incorporated detailing the revised SOI endorsement and approval process.
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Certificates of Airworthiness (CoA)
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Airworthiness Directive 002/98 has been incorporated removing the requirement for aircraft in service with the ADF
prior to 13 Mar 98 to have a CoA.
List of Effective Pages (LOEP)
The LOEP has been updated to identify the changes resulting from this amendment.
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AAP 7001.048
Notes to Readers
Other changes
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Other amendments associated with AL 2 are minor in nature. These include spelling/grammar
corrections, updated references and minor re-formatting changes.
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AAP 7001.048(AM1)
Amendment Certificate
AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE
It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned Amendment Lists have been incorporated in
this copy of the Publication:
Date of Issue
1
4 Dec 12
Pauline Clevett
P.Clevett
2
18 Sep 13
Elizabeth Low
Elizabeth Low
3
30 Jun 14
Pauline Clevett
P.Clevett
4
17 Sep 14
Elizabeth Low
Elizabeth Low
5
27 Apr 15
Elizabeth Low
Elizabeth Low
6
8 Sep 15
Pauline Clevett
P.Clevett
7
30 Nov 15
Pauline Clevett
P.Clevett
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15 Jul 16
Elizabeth Low
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18 Sep 14
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Amendment Certificate
Amendment List
No
Amended By
Date of Issue
Printed Name
Signature
Date
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AAP 7001.048
Foreword
FOREWORD
HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY
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1.
In early 1998, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) appointed the Chief of Air Force (CAF) as the single
ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF AA). This appointment flowed from decisions following the Army Black Hawk
accident (June 1996) and also the Defence Reform Program (April 1997). CDF also tasked CAF to undertake a formal
review of systemic and organisational issues within the ADF aviation environment with a particular emphasis on
safety management (COSC Minute 2/98 refers). The Review of ADF Aviation Safety Management (RAASM) was
conducted during 1998 and the Teams report was considered by COSC in early 19991. The RAASM report
recommended an ADF airworthiness structure based on the following concept:
a single Airworthiness Authority
b.
development of a framework of regulations to regulate operational and technical airworthiness
c.
conduct of Defence aviation activities in accordance with the new framework
d.
retention of an independent aviation safety and accident investigation body.
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In addition, the RAASM team proposed a safety management system that included additional components to
address a number of specific airworthiness management functions:
the Directorate of Flying Safety (DFS–ADF), later retitled the Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air
Force Safety (DDAAFS)
b.
the flight test authorities of AOSG and AMAFTU
c.
the cargo loading and cargo handling authority of AMTDU
d.
the airspace management organisations of Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Air Defence Ground
Environment (ADGE), later retitled Air Traffic Management and Air Battle Management (ABM)
e.
selected aircraft simulators that were designed and acquired specifically to support the training of
aircrew and tactics development.
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The RAASM report also made a number of observations and recommendations with respect to the specific
appointments responsible for operational and technical airworthiness regulation and management. Unlike
arrangements for technical airworthiness, the report identified considerable confusion over extant arrangements and
responsibilities of the three single service Operational Airworthiness Authorities (OAA) for both regulation and
management, and also their precise relationship to the ADF AA. The RAASM report proposed the creation of new
appointments for an Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR) and Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR).
Following COSC consideration of the proposed revised arrangements, the ADF AA formally appointed DCAF as the
OAR, and DGTA as the TAR. The TAR appointment would be combined with the earlier appointment of DGTA as
the ADF Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA) post COSC consideration of Agendum 1/98 in January 1998.
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4.
The RAASM report also recognised the important earlier developments within Air Force with respect to
creation of the Airworthiness Board (AwB) as an independent executive board of review2 and also creation of a
technical airworthiness regulatory framework that flowed from the major review of RAAF Engineering (Blue Print
2020) in 1993. As a result, the RAASM report noted that the development and implementation of a technical
airworthiness regulatory framework for the conduct of design and engineering support activities were already very
mature. However, regulations for the conduct of maintenance and production/modification activity were still in
development. Nevertheless, the RAASM report noted that a mature framework had already been established for the
ongoing development and management of technical airworthiness regulations and the conduct of audit activity that
could be applied across all ADF aviation and also provide a model for development of a similar operational
airworthiness regulatory and audit framework.
5.
The RAASM report also endorsed development of a single ADF Airworthiness Manual. The initial issue of
AAP 7001.048 was titled the ADF Airworthiness Manual, and was authorised in 2001 through DI(G) OPS 02–2—
ADF Airworthiness Management and promulgated details of the ADF airworthiness management framework and
airworthiness management processes. In October 2004, the extant Operational Airworthiness Policy Review
Committee (OAPRC) endorsed development of a more usable tiered-document structure for ADF airworthiness
1
2
COSC Agendum/Minute 8/99.
The first AwB was held in May 1991.
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Foreword
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In July 2006, the OAPRC recommended ADF AA approval and issue of significant MILAVREG
amendments. These amendments were initially promulgated in Issue 2 of this manual. The original guidance material
on acquisition and in-service airworthiness management was substantially revised to integrate the requirements of the
MILAVREG and the operational and technical regulations as they apply to higher level Defence airworthiness
management. Policy governing the regulation of aviation safety within Defence will continue to evolve with updates to
both the DI(G) OPS 02–2 and this manual. The TAREG promulgated by the TAR remained separate in AAP
7001.053—Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM).
s
regulations. This tiered structure was to consist of high level Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREG), supported
by Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREG) and the extant Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREG).
Draft new OAREG were approved by the OAPRC in May 2005 and initially issued within this manual. Subsequently
the OAREG were removed from this manual and published separately in a new document, the AAP 8000.010 — ADF
Operational Airworthiness Manual, renamed in 2011 as the Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual.
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In September 2011, DI(G) OPS 02-2 was reissued under the revised title of the Defence Aviation Safety
Program (DASP) to reflect a single integrated policy that addresses both the Airworthiness Management System
(AMS) and the Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS). With incorporation of the ASMS into DI(G) OPS 02–2,
the appointment of the ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF AA) was retitled to the ‘Defence Aviation Authority’
(Defence AA) to better reflect the revised focus of this appointment as having a broad aviation safety responsibility
that is relevant to, but also specifically limited to, the DASP. CAF responsibilities as the Defence AA do not extend
beyond the DASP. Other significant changes associated with reissue of DI(G) OPS 02-2 included formally expanding
the scope of the DASP to include non-Defence registered aircraft that are engaged by Defence and a number of
Aviation Support Systems (AvSS). Subsequently, the AAP 7001.048 — ADF Airworthiness Manual was retitled the
‘Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual’.
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8.
The re-issue of MILAVREG 6 AvSS in October 2013 adopted better practice regulation (BPR) principles,
which emphasised use of outcome-based regulation that specifies a required outcome; but does not prescribe ‘how’ the
outcome must be achieved. Outcome-based regulation promotes flexibility for the application of airworthiness
management by operational and technical stakeholders as it recognises the importance of a framework to support
airworthiness decision making. Other significant regulatory reform in 2013 included the dissolution of the Aviation
Safety Policy Review Committee with the maturation of the ACPA Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM)
process.
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per MILAVREG 6, outcome based regulation was used to afford flexibility for the regulated community. Continuing
improvement processes saw the NPRM process evolve into the DASP Regulation Change Process (RCP) as endorsed
by the Defence AA at AB20565663. The RCP ensures future regulation and aviation safety policy is developed,
consulted, approved and documented in an appropriate manner.
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Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION TO AIRWORTHINESS AND AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT
DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM POLICY, STRUCTURE AND
REGULATION
Introduction
Scope and purpose
Definitions
Defence Aviation Safety Program
Defence Aviation Safety Program Policy
The Airworthiness Management System
Aviation Safety Management Systems
Defence Aviation Safety Program Regulation
Additional Information or Clarification
Annex A – DASP Regulation Change Process
Annex B - DASP Enforcement Policy
CHAPTER 2
RESERVED
CHAPTER 3
OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION
Operational airworthiness
Responsibilities
Operational Airworthiness Regulations
Relationship of the regulatory elements
Implementation
The role of ACPA in operational airworthiness
Additional information or guidance
CHAPTER 4
TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION
Technical Airworthiness
Technical Airworthiness Regulation
Technical Airworthiness Authority
Airworthiness code
Technical airworthiness concepts and terms
Designs not affecting technical airworthiness
CHAPTER 5
AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT
To be issued
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SECTION 2
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MILITARY AVIATION REGULATIONS
DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Military Aviation Regulation 1
MILAVREG 1.1 – Applicability
MILAVREG 1.2 – Exemptions and exclusions
MILAVREG 1.3 – Appointment of authority
MILAVREG 1.4 – Operational Airworthiness Regulator
MILAVREG 1.5 – Operational Airworthiness Authorities
MILAVREG 1.6 – Technical Airworthiness Regulator
MILAVREG 1.7 – Technical Airworthiness Authority
MILAVREG 1.8 – Flight Test Approval Authority
MILAVREG 1.9 – Airworthiness review responsibility
MILAVREG 1.10 – Director Airworthiness Coordination and
Policy Agency
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Table of Contents
DEFENCE REGISTRATION AND OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT
Military Aviation Regulation 2
MILAVREG 2.1 – Determination of registration
MILAVREG 2.2 – The Defence Register
MILAVREG 2.3 – Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type
MILAVREG 2.4 – Operation of Defence registered aircraft
MILAVREG 2.5 – Change of operational status of a Defence registered aircraft
MILAVREG 2.6 – Suspension of flying operations
MILAVREG 2.7 – Removal from the Defence Register
MILAVREG 2.8 – Reinstatement to the Defence Register
MILAVREG 2.9 – Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register
Annex A - Requirements for an Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan
CHAPTER 3
AIRWORTHINESS INSTRUMENTS
Military Aviation Regulation 3
MILAVREG 3.1 – Australian Military Type Certificates
MILAVREG 3.2 – Supplemental Type Certificates
MILAVREG 3.3 – Service Release
MILAVREG 3.4 – Special Flight Permits
MILAVREG 3.5 – Flight Test Permits
MILAVREG 3.6 – Airworthiness Directives
MILAVREG 3.7 – Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit
CHAPTER 4
DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW
Military Aviation Regulation 4
MILAVREG 4.1 – Airworthiness Board membership
MILAVREG 4.2 – Airworthiness Board conduct
MILAVREG 4.3 – Airworthiness Board outcomes
Annex A - Defence AA Airworthiness Board requirements for review of
in-service airworthiness management of Defence Registered
aircraft
Annex B - Defence AA Airworthiness Board requirements for review of SFP,
AMTC, STC or Service Release of Defence Registered aircraft
CHAPTER 5
NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT AND FOREIGN MIILTARY AIRCRAFT
AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Introduction
AvSS Determination
Military Aviation Regulation 6
MILAVREG 6.1 – AvSS Conformance to other Regulations
MILAVREG 6.2 – AvSS Acquisition and In-service Management
MILAVREG 6.3 – AvSS Authority to Operate
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MILAVREG 1.11 – Director Defence Aviation and Air Force
Safety
Annex A - Aviation Safety Program management qualification and competency
criteria
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CHAPTER 7
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
Introduction
Military Aviation Regulation 7
MILAVREG 7.1 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Annex A – Defence Unmanned Aircraft Systems Categories
CHAPTER 8
FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICES
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Table of Contents
CHAPTER 9
SECTION 3
AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Military Aviation Regulation 9
To Be Issued
ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS AND AVIATION SAFETY
AIRWORTHINESS AND AVIATION SAFETY DURING THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
Fundamental concepts
Aim of airworthiness management
Defence Registration
Appointment of key personnel
Acquisition airworthiness strategy
The Type Certification process
Service Release
Role of the Defence AA Airworthiness Board
Introduction to service
Fleet addition and new models of an existing Aircraft Type
CHAPTER 2
DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF AIRCRAFT TYPE REGISTRATION
Determination of Registration
Configuration and role
Aircraft ownership and duration of operation
Application for Defence registration
Addition, removal and reinstatement to the Defence Register
Requirement for an aircraft to be registered
Addition of new aircraft to the Defence Register
Removal and reinstatement of aircraft on the Defence
Register
Removal from the Defence Register
Changes to configuration and role during non-Defence registration
Reinstatement to the Defence Register
Additional information and guidance
CHAPTER 3
ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS - AUTHORITY AND MANAGEMENT OF
DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
Overview
Acquisition airworthiness management planning
Delegation of authority
Acquisition organisational structure
Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plans and strategies
Involvement of DGTA-ADF, ACPA and OAA staff
Additional information and guidance
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TYPE CERTIFICATION AND SERVICE RELEASE OF DEFENCE REGISTERED
AIRCRAFT
Overview
Key concepts
Relationship between Type Certification and Service Release
Relationship between Type Certification and Design Acceptance
Determining Type Certification requirements
Statement of Operating Intent
Recognition of prior certification
Concurrent certification by recognised airworthiness authorities
Compiling the Certification Basis Description
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Endorsement of the Statement of Requirement
Finding compliance with Certification Basis requirements
Establishing a support network
Making compliance findings
Technical versus operational compliance findings
Finalising compliance findings
Managing airworthiness issues
Airworthiness Issue Papers
Resolving airworthiness issues
Preparing for Service Release
Requirements for Service Release
Issue of an AMTC/STC and Service Release
Defence AA requirements for an AMTC or STC
Defence AA requirements for Service Release
Obtaining OAA and TAA recommendations
Defence AA Airworthiness Board executive review
Issue of Airworthiness Instruments by the Defence AA
Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit
Additional information and guidance
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ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST
The role of flight test
Acquisition flight test planning
The role of the FTAA
Identifying the required scope of testing
Implementing the test strategy
Aircraft–stores compatibility certification
Acceptance testing
Additional information and guidance
CHAPTER 6
OPERATION PRIOR TO SERVICE RELEASE
Flying operations prior to Defence registration
Defence involvement in foreign OEM fight test
Operational airworthiness management of OEM flight test
Defence involvement in foreign flying training
Defence involvement in OEM flying activities within Australian
airspace
Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP)
Flying operations prior to Service Release
New aircraft undergoing acquisition development
Major changes to Type Design
Special Flight Permits (SFP)
Flight Test Permits (FTP)
OEM flight test on Defence Registered Aircraft
Additional information and guidance
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DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW
Role of the Defence AA Airworthiness Board
Preparing for Defence AA Airworthiness Board review
Requirements for an Executive Review
Preparing the Airworthiness Board submission
Obtaining a TAA recommendation
Obtaining an OAA recommendation
Airworthiness Board submission for an SFP
AAP 7001.048
Table of Contents
CAPABILITY ACCEPTANCE INTO OPERATIONAL SERVICE OF DEFENCE
REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
Key concepts
Airworthiness management of introduction to service
Issue of Certificate of Airworthiness
Airworthiness management of Production Acceptance Flight Tests
Annotation of the Defence Register
Acceptance into operational service
Demonstrating capability
Airworthiness management of AIOS-related test and evaluation
Conduct of OT&E
Additional information and guidance
CHAPTER 9
FLEET ADDITION AND NEW AIRCRAFT MODELS
Determination of airworthiness requirements
Airworthiness management of fleet addition
Application for fleet addition
Defence registration of fleet addition aircraft
Acquisition Airworthiness Strategy
Consistent configuration and operational history
Inconsistent configuration and operational history
Additional information and guidance
IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE REGISTERED
AIRCRAFT
In-service airworthiness management
The purpose of in-service airworthiness management
Airworthiness management appointments and authority
Specialist organisations
Basis of operations
Changing the basis of operations
Change of operational status
In-service flight test
Other operations outside the established basis
Suspension of flying operations
Defence AA Airworthiness Board executive review
Airworthiness Advisory Circulars
Additional Information and guidance
Annex A - Defence Airworthiness Directives
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Airworthiness Board conduct
Airworthiness Board outcomes
Additional information and guidance
Annex A - Preparation of an Accomplishment Summary
CHAPTER 2
DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL
CHANGES OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
Initiation and classification of changes
Initiation of changes
Classification of technical changes
Classification of operational changes
Management of technical and operational changes
Major versus Substantial changes
Impact of technical changes on operational airworthiness
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Impact of operational changes on technical airworthiness
Additional information and guidance
SUSPENSION OF FLYING OPERATIONS
Suspending flying operations
Suspension mechanisms
Circumstances requiring suspension of operations
Communication of airworthiness issues
Commencement of operations following suspension
Commencement of operations following cancellation or
limitation to Airworthiness Instruments
Non Defence registered aircraft
Additional information and guidance
CHAPTER 4
IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW OF DEFENCE REGISTERED
AIRCRAFT
Key concepts
In-service airworthiness management
The role of the Airworthiness Board
Scope of the Airworthiness Board review
Airworthiness Board conduct
Requirements for organisations and systems under review
Further information and guidance
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Table of Contents
SECTION 5
AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
RESERVED
CHAPTER 2
AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
AvSS guidance
AvSS management process flow chart
CHAPTER 3
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
MILAVREG 7 Guidance
Annex A – UAS Categorisation and Risk Management
Annex A Appendix 1 – Example Initial Operational Risk Analysis for a Potential Category 2
UAS
Annex B – History and Philosophy of UAS Airworthiness
CHAPTER 4
RESERVED
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DASP MASTER GLOSSARY
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 1 Chap 1
DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM
POLICY, STRUCTURE AND REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
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1.
Australia, as a contracting State of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Convention on
International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), has an international obligation to establish systems whereby
aviation operations are conducted in a safe and orderly manner. The Chicago Convention, including associated
amending protocols, is set out in the Schedules to the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Clth), and further implemented
through the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Clth), (the Act).
2.
Consistent with Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, Section 4 of Part I of the Act states that references to
aircraft or air navigation in the Act do not include references to State aircraft or air navigation by State aircraft. This
explicitly excludes Defence Aviation from governance by the Act.
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As a consequence the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary of Defence, through DI(G) OPS 02-2 Defence Aviation Safety Program, have directed that Defence implement self-regulation of its aviation practices to
meet the objective of Defence Aviation being conducted safely.
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Defence is also bound by the provisions of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Clth) (the WHS Act). The
safety policy for Defence is issued by CDF and the Secretary in DI(G) PERS 19-18 – Defence Work Health Safety
Manual.
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Additionally, Defence is bound by a duty of care for members participating in aviation activities, in the course
of their duties, in aircraft that are not regulated by Defence.
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SCOPE AND PURPOSE
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DI(G) OPS 02–2 requires Defence to implement and maintain a Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) to
meet the objective of Defence Aviation being conducted at ALoS.
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This manual describes the philosophy, processes and framework of regulations comprising the DASP, and
applies to all Defence Personnel and External Service Providers who are involved in Defence Aviation.
DEFINITIONS
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8.
The DASP Master Glossary provided within this publication applies to all aspects of Defence Aviation and
provides the authoritative source material for use by the ADF Online Glossary and other Defence aviation documents
for aviation related terms. The Glossaries of AAP 8000.010 – Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual,
AAP 7001.053 – electronic Technical Airworthiness Manual (eTAMM) and AAP 6734.001 – Defence Aviation Safety
Manual either reproduce in full or synchronise with the DASP Master Glossary as contained in this manual.
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9.
Whereas the DI(G) OPS 02-2 definitions of ‘aircraft’ and ‘airworthiness’ include both manned and unmanned
machines or craft, for the purposes of regulation these two classes of air vehicles are treated separately.
DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM
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10.
The DASP supports safe operation based on the premise of military aviation being safe by operating aircraft
where risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as reasonably practicable. The DASP provides the framework
for making judgements relating to managing risk, underpinning decisions by Service Chiefs and Group Heads
regarding operational suitability and operational effectiveness. While the DASP is broad and has many activities, it
acknowledges that required operational outcomes must be weighed against the potential for harm to people and/or
property.
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DASP Philosophy. Defence has adopted a unified approach to airworthiness and aviation safety
management. The Airworthiness Management System (AMS) and Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS) have
been included under DASP policy framework. Both systems are complimentary, and neither is considered subordinate
to the other. Instead the two systems are co-dependent; both benefit from a healthy level of consultation and
interaction.
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Sect 1 Chap 1
Technical airworthiness management is concerned with the aspects of the design, construction and
maintenance of aircraft.
b.
Operational airworthiness management is concerned with ensuring that aircraft are operated in
approved roles, with correct mission equipment, by competent and authorised operators, according to
approved procedures and instructions, under a system of supervision and monitoring.
c.
Aviation safety management is concerned with the capability, attitude and professionalism of
personnel in maintaining an awareness of aviation safety requirements and risk management, in
addition to the independent investigation of aviation safety occurrences.
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12.
Due to their close relationship, distinction between airworthiness management (both technical and
operational) and aviation safety management may be confusing at times:
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13.
No aspect of the DASP can be treated in isolation. The management of either technical or operational
airworthiness must be in full cognisance of the impacts on the other aspect of airworthiness. Aviation safety is
dependent upon the effective implementation of both technical and operational airworthiness measures, and the
manner in which flying operations are conducted.
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DASP Functional Elements. A diagrammatic representation of the DASP functional elements and their
relationship at the Program level and System level is at Figure 1-1.
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Figure 1-1 DASP Structure
AAP 7001.048
Sect 1 Chap 1
KEY DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM APPOINTMENTS
15.
The application of the DASP is controlled and supported by appointment of key individuals who perform
aviation safety/airworthiness functions at various levels within the system through DI(G) OPS 02–2. The key DASP
appointments are:
Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA). Chief of Air Force (CAF) is appointed the Defence
AA. The Defence AA is accountable to the CDF and Secretary for establishing and managing the
DASP. The Defence AA must also be responsive to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for airworthiness
and aviation safety matters affecting aviation capability under their command.
b.
Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR). Deputy Chief of Air Force (DCAF) is appointed
the OAR. The OAR is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the operational
airworthiness element of the AMS.
c.
Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR). Director General Technical Airworthiness (DGTA)
is appointed the TAR. The TAR is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the
technical airworthiness element of the AMS.
d.
Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA). An OAA is accountable to the Defence AA and
responsible to the relevant Service Chief and Group Head for:
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determinations regarding the operational airworthiness of aircraft subject to the AMS
(2)
determinations regarding operational aspects of Aviation Support Systems (AvSS)
(3)
making informed decisions on the treatment of risks.
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Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA). DGTA is appointed the TAA. The TAA is
accountable to the Defence AA and responsive to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for:
(1)
determinations regarding the technical airworthiness of aircraft subject to the Defence AMS
(2)
determinations regarding technical aspects of AvSS
(3)
communicating technical risks to the relevant OAA.
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Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA). A FTAA is accountable to the Defence AA and
responsible to the relevant Service Chiefs and Group Heads for:
the airworthiness management of nominated flight test and evaluation activity
(2)
determinations regarding an aircraft’s suitability for flight under specific flight test
configurations and conditions
(3)
determinations regarding the extent of testing necessary to demonstrate that an aircraft can be
safely operated in its intended configuration, role and environment.
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(1)
Director Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (DACPA). DACPA is accountable
to the Defence AA and OAR for representing them on matters concerning airworthiness management
and operational airworthiness management respectively. DACPA is also accountable to the Defence
AA for maintaining the Defence Register.
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Airworthiness Board (AwB) members. AwB members are accountable to the Defence AA for
reviewing Defence Aviation elements as directed and providing recommendations regarding aircraft
airworthiness and AvSS outputs.
Director Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS). DDAAFS is accountable to the
Defence AA for the establishment of aviation safety policy, monitoring the effectiveness of the
Defence Aviation Safety Management System, and acting as directed as the principle representative of
the Defence AA on matters concerning Defence aviation safety management.1 DDAAFS is also
responsible to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for the independent investigation of aviation safety
occurrences.
The management of aviation safety is a command responsibility.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 1 Chap 1
DASP AGENCIES
Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (ACPA). ACPA performs the dual role of
representing the Defence AA and the OAR on matters concerning Defence airworthiness management
and operational airworthiness respectively. In both roles, under DACPA’s direction, ACPA staff
develops policy, conducts safety assurance, coordinates airworthiness review board activities and
maintains the Defence Register.
b.
Directorate General Technical Airworthiness – ADF (DGTA–ADF). DGTA–ADF is the
sponsoring organisation of the Technical Airworthiness Management Framework. Both the TAR and
the TAA function are vested within this organisation. Under DGTA’s direction, DGTA–ADF staff
develop technical airworthiness policy, prescribe and interpret airworthiness design standards and
regulate technical airworthiness.
c.
Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS). DDAAFS is the
sponsoring organisation for aviation safety policy, including policy for the Defence Aviation Safety
Management System. Under DDAAFS’s direction, DDAAFS staff also provide advice, services and
tools to support commanders and their subordinates in the implementation and management of their
Aviation Safety Management Systems (ASMS)2. DDAAFS maintains a specialised investigation
capability for the investigation of Defence aviation accidents and may also investigate other
occurrences that would benefit from a specialised investigation.
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DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM POLICY
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17.
Risk Management. The outcome of effective aviation safety risk management is that aircraft are operated
in their intended roles and environments safely. The level of risk authorised for military operations, even during
peacetime, may exceed that allowed by civil authorities, and during conflict is a variable to be managed in light of the
military situation.
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18.
Relationship to Other Defence Regulatory Systems. The DASP includes within its scope all Defence
activities that may compromise aviation safety. The responsibilities for the technical integrity of other Defence
equipment and processes are delineated in DI(G) LOG 4-5-012—Regulation of technical integrity of Australian
Defence Force materiel.
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THE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
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SCOPE OF THE AMS
19.
The AMS, as defined by DI(G) OPS 02-2, applies to all Defence Aviation, specifically the design,
construction, maintenance and operation of:
any aircraft owned, leased, hired or chartered by Defence
b.
any aircraft operated Exclusively for or on behalf of Defence
c.
any aircraft for which Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has placed statutory airworthiness
responsibilities on Defence
d.
any Aviation Support System (AvSS).
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The AMS does not apply to the following:
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20.
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a.
Defence Personnel or External Service Providers travelling as passengers on Australian or foreign
public air transport
b.
Defence Personnel or External Service Providers acting as crew or travelling as passengers on foreign
military flights which are not exclusively for Defence use
c.
Defence Personnel or External Service Providers participating in recreational flying.
21.
The circumstances in paragraph 20 have been specifically excluded from the scope of the AMS; however, this
does not relieve Defence or Defence Commanders and Managers from their responsibilities to exercise ‘duty of care’
over those Defence Personnel and External Service Providers under their command or management. As required, the
CDF and Secretary, or subordinate authorities, may choose to issue Defence policy covering the above circumstances
2
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16.
In addition to the DASP appointments listed above, the three DASP Agencies that manage aspects of the
DASP are:
The management of aviation safety is a command responsibility.
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Sect 1 Chap 1
where the AMS may not apply. Such policy may be informed by outcomes from the AMS; however, the policy would
be established independent of the AMS.
AUDIENCE LEVELS AND AIRWORTHINESS FUNCTION
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22.
Airworthiness regulations are used as the mechanism through which airworthiness hazards are controlled and
monitored. The regulations are directed at different audience levels within the Defence AMS. The audience level and
structure of the key appointments is shown in Figure 1– 2 – Levels of Airworthiness Function. Defence airworthiness
management, as described in this manual, is largely performed at Levels 1 and 2; however, some functions performed
by acquisition and flight test organisations are also controlled by this manual. Some Level 2 functions and most
Level 3 functions are controlled through separate, though interrelated, operational and technical airworthiness
management systems.
RELATIONSHIP TO COMMAND
Level 1
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23.
Airworthiness management does not affect the command of Defence aviation systems. Each Service Chief
and Group Head remains responsible to the CDF for ensuring effective air operations and that airworthiness
management of aviation systems under their respective command complies with the regulatory framework established
under the authority of the Defence AA.
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Defence
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Level 2
OAA x 3
TAR / TAA
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Acquisition
Organisations
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Management of
Defence state
registered aircraft
and AvSS
Technical
Management
of aircraft
and AvSS
Management of
Flight Test
activity
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Management
ofnon-Defence
registered
aircraft
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FIGURE 1–2 – LEVELS OF AIRWORTHINESS FUNCTION
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Sect 1 Chap 1
AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Preservation of the human and materiel resources of Defence aviation in order to maintain capability,
improve quality and enhance readiness to perform the organisation’s mission.
b.
Reduction in the rate of aviation accidents and serious incidents resulting from human, organisational
and systemic deficiencies to zero3.
c.
Establishment and maintenance of an effective hazard identification, reporting, investigation and
management system, which eliminates, or reduces so far as reasonably practicable, aviation risks
within Defence Aviation.
d.
Establishment and maintenance of a generative aviation safety culture.
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25.
An ASMS is based on 12 elements and comprises written policies, procedures and plan, coupled with the
attitude, beliefs, values and practices of the organisation that converge to promote aviation safety (see Figure 1–3 –
Aviation Safety management System.
FIGURE 1–3 –
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AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
3
While a zero aviation accident rate may not be achievable, every accident is individually preventable. It is the continued commitment to aviation
safety that will ensure a strong, resilient, and generative aviation safety culture, with the purpose of driving the accident rate to as close to zero as
possible.
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24.
Service Chiefs and Group Heads comply with the DASP through the auspices of an ASMS. The purpose of an
ASMS is to preserve human and materiel resources and enhance the well-being of its members through continuous
improvement in safety management. The specific goals of an ASMS to achieve this purpose are:
AAP 7001.048
Sect 1 Chap 1
SCOPE OF AN ASMS
26.
An ASMS is applied to all Defence Aviation activities, Defence Personnel and External Service Providers
who may detect, contain or eliminate hazards in Defence Aviation. All Defence Personnel and External Service
Providers regardless of employment or specialisation may be involved with aviation to varying degrees and therefore
have a role in the associated ASMS.
DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM REGULATION
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
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27.
In regulating airworthiness, the Defence AA provides flexibility to allow operational commanders to conduct
operations with an acceptable level of safely and simultaneously exploit capability to the maximum possible extent.
This is achieved through establishing the following core principles on which the regulations are based.
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28.
Aviation System Equipment. The design, construction and maintenance of aviation systems must be
certified to specified standards based on user defined operating requirements. The certification process ensures that
aviation system equipment limitations, methods of operation, and operator qualification and training requirements are
known and documented:
Organisations and Processes. The organisations which conduct operations, engineering, and
maintenance of aviation systems must have an established structure of authority, processes and
manning to ensure there are sufficient resources and practices in place to support the airworthy
operation of the system. The accreditation or recognition of organisations as competent provides the
confidence that the aviation system will be adequately supported and operated when providing the
expected capability.
b.
Personnel. The people who design, construct, maintain and operate aviation systems must be
appropriately trained, qualified and authorised to conduct the required tasks to provide the intended
capability. Setting training and competency standards, authorising individuals and ensuring standards
are met provides the confidence that personnel will make sound decisions regarding the operation of
the system, and processes affecting the operation of the system.
c.
Data. Information and data used to aid the design, construction, maintenance and operation of aviation
systems must be accurate and applicable for the intended use. Control over the source, currency, and
authority of data ensures the decisions made by personnel involved in aviation activities are based on
valid information and data.
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These principles allow capability decisions made by commanders to be supported by a known and sustainable
state of airworthiness of their aviation systems.
30.
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FORMAT AND CONTENT OF THE DASP REGULATIONS
The DASP regulations are divided into three main groups:
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Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREG). MILAVREG are established by the Defence AA to
implement and control the DASP. They provide a framework through which all military aviation
activities by Defence registered aircraft, non-Defence registered aircraft, AvSS, unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS), synthetic training devices (STD) and members of Defence are managed. MILAVREGs
reside in this manual.
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b.
c.
Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREG). OAREG are established by the OAR to
govern the operation of aviation systems in approved roles within established limitations and
instructions by competent and authorised operators. The operational airworthiness regulatory system is
described in AAP 8000.010—Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual.
Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREG). TAREG are established by the TAR to govern
the design, construction and maintenance of Defence Aviation systems by authorised individuals
acting as part of a competent organisation and using approved processes and data, whose work is
certified as correct. The technical airworthiness management framework is described in AAP
7001.053—electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (eTAMM). Though not
regulatory, the framework is supported by airworthiness design standards contained in AAP
7001.054—electronic Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (eADRM).
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Sect 1 Chap 1
31.
The relationship between MILAVREG, OAREG and TAREG is shown at Figure 1 – Hierarchy of DASP
Regulatory Elements, which also identifies the main elements of the regulatory system.
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32.
Defence airworthiness regulations will generally be developed from the philosophical perspective that the
implementation of safety and airworthiness regulations should be devolved to the lowest appropriate command or
management level to preserve operational flexibility. Delegation of this responsibility will be supported through
provision of appropriate Defence strategic regulation and coordination, while Service operational airworthiness
authorities will determine operational instructions, including a rigorous system of assessing and managing operational
and technical risks for implementation by subordinate Commanders.
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MILITARY AVIATION REGULATIONS (MILAVREGS) – AAP 7001.048
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MILAVREG 1 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Management
MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration and Operation of Aircraft
MILAVREG 3 – Airworthiness Instruments
MILAVREG 4 – Defence AA Airworthiness Board Review
MILAVREG 5 – Non-Defence Registered Aircraft and Foreign Military Aircraft
MILAVREG 6 – Aviation Support Systems
MILAVREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems
MILAVREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Devices
MILAVREG 9 – Aviation Safety Management (to be issued)
TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS
(TAREGS) – AAP 7001.053
OAREG 1 – Operational Airworthiness Authority
OAREG 2 – Conduct of Flying Operations
OAREG 3 – New Aircraft and Modification
OAREG 4 – Flight Test
OAREG 5 – Non-Defence Registered Aircraft and
Foreign Military Aircraft
OAREG 6 – Aviation Support Systems
OAREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems
OAREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Devices
OAREG 9 – Aviation Safety Management (to be
issued)
TAREG 1 – Application of the Regulations and
Procedural Rules
TAREG 2 – Type Certification, Service Release and
Design Acceptance
TAREG 3 – Authorised Engineering Organisations
TAREG 4 – TAR Approved Maintenance Organisations
TAREG 5 – Aircraft Maintenance and Management
Procedures
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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS
(OAREGS) – AAP 8000.010
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FIGURE 1–4 – HIERARCHY OF DASP REGULATORY ELEMENTS
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33.
An overview of the operational and technical airworthiness management systems is contained in Section 1,
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. MILAVREG are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.
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Sect 1 Chap 1
Focus of the MILAVREG
34.
The intent of each MILAVREG is:
MILAVREG 1 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Management. This regulation defines the
applicability, exemptions and responsibilities within the DASP. The regulation includes the
qualifications and competencies necessary for appointment as a DASP airworthiness authority.
b.
MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration and Operation of Aircraft. This regulation prescribes
the requirements for management of the Defence Register of aircraft types, and operation of such
aircraft. This includes requirements to determine the registration and acquisition strategy for a new
aircraft type or major modification, and the airworthiness requirements to manage the introduction of
the capability.
c.
MILAVREG 3 – Airworthiness Instruments. Airworthiness Instruments are the mechanism
through which the Defence AA authorises or limits the operation of Defence aviation systems. This
regulation defines the applicability of, and requirements for airworthiness instruments.
d.
MILAVREG 4 – Defence AA Airworthiness Board review. This regulation describes
requirements for the membership and conduct of an Airworthiness Board.
e.
MILAVREG 5 – Non-Defence Registered Aircraft and Foreign Military Aircraft. This
regulation prescribes minimum operating requirements for non-Defence registered aircraft operated by
or on behalf of Defence. This includes the application of the DASP to such aircraft.
f.
MILAVREG 6 – Aviation Support Systems. This regulation contains requirements for the
application of the DASP to Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).
g.
MILAVREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This regulation contains requirements for the
application of the DASP to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operated by or on behalf of Defence.
h.
MILAVREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Devices. This regulation contains requirements for
Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD) operated as part of the training regime for a Defence
aircraft.
i.
MILAVREG 9 – Aviation Safety Management. To be issued.
DASP Regulation Change Process
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35.
By virtue of the changing nature of Defence technology and its operations, airworthiness processes,
regulations and aviation safety policy will be subject to continual review and amendment. The DASP Regulation
Change Process (RCP) ensures all future DASP regulation and aviation safety policy is developed, consulted,
approved and documented in an appropriate manner. Interested parties may petition the Defence AA to repeal, modify
or propose regulations IAW the DASP RCP. Such applications must be made to DACPA/DDAAFS/DGTA as
appropriate in the first instance. The RCP is provided in Annex A.
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DASP Enforcement Policy
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36.
A key element of an effective regulatory framework is ensuring that regulated entities have a clear
understanding of when, why and how Regulatory Authorities may take action in the event of regulatory breaches or
unresolved aviation safety performance issues. The Enforcement Policy in Annex B outlines the overarching
philosophy being adopted by DASP Regulatory Authorities in securing compliance with aviation safety regulations.
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Guidance to the Regulations
a.
Section 3 – Acquisition Airworthiness and Aviation Safety Management. This Section
contains detailed guidance on the management of the process through which aircraft are added and
removed from the Defence Register. Addition and modification of aircraft to the Defence Register
largely occurs as a function of the materiel acquisition process. Therefore guidance on the
airworthiness requirements and considerations for new aircraft and modifications are a significant
inclusion in this Section.
b.
Section 4 – In-service Airworthiness and Aviation Safety Management. This Section
contains guidance on the continuing airworthiness management of Defence registered aircraft. This
includes an overview of the application of operational and technical regulatory requirements,
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37.
Sections 3–5 of this manual contain guidance material to aid users of this publication. Guidance sections
cover the following content:
4
Defence AA Decision Brief - Promulgation of DASP Enforcement Policy of 12 Oct 15 (AB24515865).
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 1 Chap 1
consideration of changes to aircraft design or role, suspension of operations and ongoing airworthiness
review requirements.
Section 5 – Application of the Defence Airworthiness and Aviation Safety Management
Framework. This Section contains guidance on the application of the DASP framework to Aviation
Systems which require tailoring of the regulations, such as AvSS, UAS and non-Defence registered
aircraft.
c.
Rules of Interpretation
s
words importing the singular include the plural
b.
words importing the plural include the singular
c.
words importing the masculine gender include the feminine
d.
where an airworthiness authority may delegate responsibility, the reader should assume this has
occurred. For example, where text states ‘the OAA must…’ the reader may assume ‘the OAAR must...’.
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In these regulations the words:
a.
‘must’ is used in the imperative sense. Use of other commonly used imperatives such as ‘shall, is to or
will’ should not occur. Adopted European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR) may use the
words shall or will in place of must.
b.
‘shall’ is used in some EMAR and is analogous to the word must.
c.
‘may’ is used in the permissive sense to state authority or permission to do the act described, and the
words ‘no person may…’ or ‘a person may not’ mean that no person is required, authorised or
permitted to do the act described.
d.
‘includes’ means ‘includes but is not limited to’.
e.
‘should’ is used to imply an act or process identified for inclusion in a desired outcome is complied
with, unless sound reasoning may determine otherwise. The word should is not used in regulation text.
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In these regulations the terms:
a.
‘Guidance material’ (GM) is used to provide non-binding explanatory and interpretation material on
how to achieve the requirements contained in the regulation. It contains information, including
examples, to assist the user in the interpretation and application of the regulation.
b.
‘Acceptable means of compliance’ (AMC) is used to provided a non-binding compliance method that
can serve as a means by which the requirements contained in the regulation can be met.
c.
Alternative AMC. Airworthiness authorities / commanders may elect to show compliance with the
regulation using an alternative AMC. Should alternative AMC be used, notification to the Defence
AA/OAR (through DACPA) or the TAR as appropriate will afford appropriate oversight of regulatory
outcomes and also assist continuous improvements of the relevant regulations.
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Precedence. Within these regulations, where any conflict occurs, a regulation always precedes AMC or GM.
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39.
In these regulations, unless the context states otherwise:
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR CLARIFICATION
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42.
Clarification of the intent or applicability of a MILAVREG may be directed to ACPA regulations staff via
[email protected]. ACPA regulations staff may only provide informal advice. If formal advice is
required this should be included in the request for information to ACPA staff, who will seek formal advice via
DACPA IAW MILAVREG 1.10.
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Annexes
A.
B.
10
DASP Regulation Change Process
DASP Enforcement Policy
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Annex A to
Sect 1 Chap 1
DASP REGULATION CHANGE PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
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1.
When developing policy and regulation 1 that underpins DI(G) OPS 02–2 Defence Aviation Safety Program
(DASP), clear and unambiguous guidance from DASP Leadership (Defence AA, OAR and TAR) along with a
coordinated approach to regulation development by the three DASP agencies is essential to ensure satisfactory
aviation safety outcomes for the regulated community.
2.
The continued evolution and development of DASP regulation is critical to ensure policy remains relev ant
and appropriately directs the treatment of Defence aviation hazards and associated safety risks.
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3.
A co-ordinated approach to DASP regulation amendment and development is critical to ensure that the suite
of DASP documents is functional and work together. Figure 1 shows the DASP regulation relationships.
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4.
Defence AA, OAR or TAR regulatory intent is critical to ensure regulation development is focused and meets
DASP requirements.
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DI (G) OPS 02-2
MILAVREG
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Jointly developed by DACPA
(OAR) and DGTA (TAR) with
DDAAFS visibility
TAREG
Developed by DGTA with DACPA /
DDAAFS visibility
Aviation Safety Policy
Developed by DDAAFS with
DACPA / DGTA visibility
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OAREG
Developed by DACPA with DGTA /
DDAAFS visibility
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Figure 1 – DASP Regulation Relationships
1
Differences exist between regulation and aviation safety policy. Aviation safety policy, for example the DASM, is
not regulation, but can have a similar effect upon the regulated community when proposing new policy and
procedures. To simplify the RCP and avoid confusion, the term regulation is used to refer to regulation,
guidance material and aviation safety policy.
2
DI(G) OPS 02–2 is a combined DASP Agency development sponsored by DACPA.
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Annex A to
Sect 1 Chap 1
5.
The DASP Regulation Change Process (RCP) facilitates the timely development, review and publication of
DASP regulation through a coordinated and consultative approach. The RCP is a disciplined process and enables
regulation changes by assigning clear responsibilities and accountabilities at all stages. All regulation changes will be
supported by documented decisions, made by DASP Agency Heads (Change Sponsors) and approval authorities. The
end state is delivery of well drafted regulation with a documented and auditable trail of reviews, comments and
decisions.
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The DASP RCP initiator may be a Publication Improvement Report and Reply (PIRR) 3 or other suitable
format that includes an initial assessment and categorisation of the proposed change, conceptual desig n, regulation
drafting, approval and publishing processes followed by a structured implementation of the regulation. Throughout the
process relevant consultation, endorsements and approvals are gained.
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DASP REGULATION CHANGE PROCESS
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Categories of Regulation Change
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DASP regulation change is modelled on the System of Defence Instruction (SoDI) Business Process and all
changes are categorised as either:
major
b.
minor
c.
editorial.
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8.
Each category is treated differently within the RCP to reflect the differing levels of risk, work, consultation
and approval required. The categorisation of regulation changes will necessarily require some judgement and where
doubt exists, the process for the higher change category should apply.
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Major Change
9.
Major changes bring significant DASP regulation change with a corresponding change to compliance
requirements for the regulated community. A major change would typically be an amendment to:
b.
Amplify treatment to existing hazards where policy is ineffective
c.
Fundamentally change the approach or intent of existing regulation
d.
Remove regulation where hazards are already treated via alternative policy
e.
Remove regulation where there is no benefit to aviation safety.
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Address previously unrealised hazards to aviation safety
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a.
The DASP RCP for major change is depicted at Figure 1.
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Minor Change
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Minor changes should improve the regulation, but not change intent. A minor change should not impose new
regulation. A minor change would typically be an amendment to:
Improve clarity of regulatory requirements
b.
Improve guidance material supporting a regulation
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Remove guidance material where content is covered in other regulation or policy.
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c.
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12.
Minor changes do not require the same process overheads as major changes. The DASP RCP for minor
change is depicted at Figure 1.
3
Web form AO 011 - Publication Improvement Report and Reply (PIRR).
1A–2
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Annex A to
Sect 1 Chap 1
Editorial Change
13.
Editorial changes make editorial corrections to regulations and would typically address:
revised terminology
b.
organisational change where name changes are required
c.
formatting errors
d.
grammatical errors
e.
punctuation errors
f.
spelling errors
g.
internal document structure/reference errors (eg. broken hyperlinks, table of contents or index)
h.
other minor errors of an editorial nature.
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14.
Editorial changes do not require the same process overheads as major or minor changes. The DASP RCP for
editorial change is depicted at Figure 1.
15.
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RESPONSIBILITIES
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The key appointments and responsibilities that apply to this instruction are:
Defence AA: MILAVREG and DASM.
(2)
OAR: OAREG.
(3)
TAR: TAREG.
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(1)
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Approval Authority. The individual who will approve regulation changes as follows:4
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a.
Regulated Community Heads. Represent the regulated community and may initiate regulation
change, provide feedback on proposed concepts and provide endorsement as required for changes.
Regulated community Heads include Service Chiefs, OAA, TAA, CJOPS and other Group Heads.
c.
Change Sponsor. The DASP Agency Head responsible for the management and implementation of a
change under the RCP as follows:
DACPA: DI(G) OPS 02–2, MILAVREG, and OAREG.
(2)
DGTA: TAREG.
(3)
DDAAFS: DASM.
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Change Manager. The DASP Agency lead tasked by the Change Sponsor to manage the RCP.
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4
DACPA is delegated approval authority under MILAVREG 1.10 for minor and editorial changes to MILAVREG
and OAREG.
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1A–3
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 1 Chap 1
DASP REGULATION CHANGE PROCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
DASP Regulation Change Process
MINOR
Step 1
CHANGE
INITIATOR
EDITORIAL
Step 2
ASSESS REGULATION CHANGE
(Change Sponsor)
MINOR
MAJOR
s
MAJOR
EDITORIAL
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Step 3
CONCEPT
DEVELOPMENT
(Change Sponsor)
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Step 4
CONCEPT
ENDORSEMENT
(Change Sponsor)
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Step 6
INITIAL DRAFT REGULATION
(Change Sponsor)
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Step 5
APPROVAL
Step 7b
DASP AGENCY
CONSULTATION
(Change Sponsor)
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Step 7a
DASP AGENCY
CONSULTATION
(Change Sponsor)
Step 8
EXTERNAL
CONSULTATION
(Change Sponsor)
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CONTINUOUS
IMPROVEMENT
Step 10
FINAL DRAFT REGULATION
(Change Sponsor)
Step 11
FINAL DASP
CONSULTATION
(Change Sponsor)
Step 12
FINAL DRAFT
ENDORSEMENT
(Change Sponsor)
by
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Step 9
EXTERNAL
FEEDBACK
(Change Sponsor)
Step 13a
APPROVAL
Step 13b
APPROVAL
Step 14
PUBLISH REGULATION
(Change Sponsor)
Step 15
IMPLEMENT / PROMOTE / EDUCATE
(Change Sponsor)
Figure 1 - DASP RCP
1A–4
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CHANGE
REQUIRED
Step 13c
APPROVAL
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 1 Chap 1
Step 1 – Regulation Change Initiation
16.
A variety of circumstances may lead to the requirement for DASP regulation change. Accordingly, an
auditable trail of change initiation requests is essential. The RCP will be initiated by the Change Manager after receipt/
or production of a change initiator form.5 This form should be retained in an enduring manner.
Step 2 – Regulation Change Assessment
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17.
Upon receipt of a change initiator, the Change Manager will undertake a regulation change assessment to
determine the validity of the change request and the change category. Once assessed, for major and minor changes the
Change Manager should seek Change Sponsor endorsement of the assessment. If a change is endorsed as a major
change, proceed to Step 3 – Concept Development. If a change is endorsed as minor change, proceed to Step 6 –
Initial Draft.
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18.
If the Change Manager assesses the change as an editorial change the Change Manager may proceed to Step –
10 Final Draft without seeking Change Sponsor endorsement.
What is the hazard the change intends to address?
b.
Why is Defence action needed?
c.
What are the policy options available?
d.
What is the likely net benefit of each option?
e.
Who should be consulted?
f.
What is the best option being presented?
g.
How will the option be implemented?
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a.
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19.
Regulation Impact Statement (RIS). A RIS is a decision making tool that helps ensure Defence is compliant
with Government requirements regarding regulation. The RIS helps determine if change is required in the first
instance, or to ascertain if non-regulatory options might be a better outcome. The RIS is achieved by answering the
following 7 RIS6 questions (adapted for Defence aviation):
20.
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Completion of a RIS will support the concept development of Major regulation change.
5
The DASP RCP change initiator may be Web form AO 011 - Publication Improvement Report and Reply (PIRR) or
another suitable document.
6
The RIS questions provided in this SI are an extract from the Australian Government Regulation Impact Statement
(RIS) (www.cuttingredtape.gov.au), which provides broad guidance for RIS assessments.
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1A–5
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 1 Chap 1
Step 3 – Regulation Change Concept Development
Affected regulation
b.
Scope of the regulation change (product of concept development)
c.
Reason for regulation change (product of concept development)
d.
Outcome sought from regulation
e.
Summary of RIS questions
f.
Priority of change:
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21.
Major change should undergo development and endorsement of a regulation change concept. The regulation
change concept will define the conceptual design for the new or revised regulation and address desired outcomes,
including limitations and constraints. The concept development for a major change should include a Regulation
Impact Statement (RIS). The Change Sponsor should determine the level of external consultation required during this
phase acknowledging that significant knowledge and expertise resides in the regulated community. Concept
development should include:
High: Aviation safety / airworthiness critical regulation is published ASAP
(2)
Medium: Aviation safety / airworthiness significant regulation is published <6 months
(3)
Low: Resource / capability impact improvement is published <12 months
(4)
Routine: General regulation improvement is published <24 months
Implementation schedule
h.
Other affected regulation, policy and/or publications.
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(1)
22.
Unless allocated high or medium priority, a major change may take a substantial period of time to complete;
therefore, the concept development and endorsement process can ensure that intent is not lost over time.
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Step 4 – Regulation Change Concept Endorsement
–
23.
Once the change concept is developed the Change Sponsor will send the concept to DASP Agency and
relevant regulated community heads for concept endorsement.
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Endorsement of the regulation change concept is critical in achieving major DASP regulation change and it
assures the regulated community is expectant of change and formally engaged at concept development stage. Where
concept is not endorsed the Change Sponsor may:
negotiate with the applicable authority to refine the scope of the concept, or
b.
elevate the decision to the approval authority where the aviation safety implications of not
implementing change outweigh the disagreement.
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Step 5 – Regulation Change Concept Approval
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25.
Once the regulation concept has received endorsement the Change Sponsor will seek approval from the
approval authority to develop the major regulation change.
1A–6
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AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 1 Chap 1
Step 6 – Regulation Drafting
26.
Draft regulation change should be developed in line with:
The DASP 10 Ways to Better Aviation Regulation Handbook
b.
The Australian Government Guide to Regulation
c.
The Office of Parliamentary Council (OPC)7 regulation development tools, such as the OPC Plain
English Manual
d.
The Defence Writing Manual (DWM).
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27.
Draft regulation should involve relevant working level stakeholders in the first instance, both internal and
external. In this manner, the regulation change process is likely to be more successful as significant issues will have
already been identified and negotiated by the Change Manager.
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Step 7 – DASP Agency Consultation
29.
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28.
A DASP Agency internal consultation phase is critical to ensure inter-agency agreement of major (Step 7a)
and minor (Step 7b) regulation draft change is reached prior to commencing external consultation with the regulated
community.
Step 7a. The DASP Agency internal consultation phase for major change is as follows:
The Change Sponsor proposes a timeline for review/outputs 8 and distributes the regulation pack
(Forms at Appendix 1 & 2 may be used) to the other two DASP Agency Heads . The regulation pack is
documented, tracked and filed IAW respective DASP Agency internal processes .
b.
DASP Agency Heads will conduct an internal review of the regulation pack and provide written
feedback to the Change Sponsor, including advice if the Agency is not affected by the change and
therefore has no comment.9
c.
The Change Sponsor will consider and incorporate changes to the draft regulation as appropriate.
d.
A Summary of Responses Report (Form at Appendix 3 may be used) is then provided with a revised
draft to the DASP Agency Heads for endorsement, unless a Head has endorsed already. The revised
regulation should be returned to the Change Sponsor within ten working days 10 indicating endorsed or
not endorsed.
e.
Depending on the internal DASP Head positions advised, the change may:
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a.
re-enter the DASP agency consultation process
(2)
be provided to the regulated community as part of the external consultation phase 11
(3)
be directed to the next suitable authority for arbitration should the DASP Heads be unable to
reach agreement.
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f.
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The DASP internal consultation phase process should be completed before formal external
consultation occurs.
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30.
Step 7b. The DASP Agency internal consultation phase for minor change is an informal process that affords
flexibility regarding levels of consultation. It enables regulation SME input without increasing oversight unnecessarily
before Final Drafting (Step 10).
7
http://www.opc.gov.au/
A representative timeframe for review is 10 working days
9
This ensures a closed loop feedback process.
10
As the document will have already received required attention during the initial review phase, ten days is
reasonable.
11
Should a DASP Head not endorse the change, this should not automatically prevent the change from being
distributed to the regulated community for comment as issues that exist may be resolved via this process.
8
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AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 1 Chap 1
Step 8 – External Consultation
With respect to external consultation, the following aspects should be considered:
Regulation change may require key DASP stakeholder inputs such as HASD, DMO and CDG
b.
Each OAA, TAA, FTAA and Group Head will determine the level o f engagement required within their
organisation for obtaining proposed change feedback
c.
Feedback may drive significant change to the initial draft, such that a further round of external
consultation may be required before seeking approval to publish the reg ulation.
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33.
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32.
Once the DASP internal consultation phase is complete, the Change Sponsor will provide the draft regulation
to the regulated community and request feedback. The entire regulated community may provide change feedback
direct to the Change Sponsor, but any ‘indirect’ feedback obtained should be provided to the relevant OAA, FTAA,
TAA or Group Head so this feedback may be moderated as part of the formal reply(Forms at Appendix 1-3 may be
used).
tio
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34.
The majority of engagement will occur via correspondence. Additionally the bi-annual AwB convocation
provides a regular forum for each OAR, TAR, OAA, FTAA, TAA, DACPA and other key stakeholders to discuss
regulation development or associated concerns if required. Where necessary DACPA will ensure regulation
development is an agenda item at convocations.
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Step 9 – External Feedback
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35.
While all feedback may be considered by the Change Sponsor, only the feedback that has been moderated by
the OAA, FTAA, TAA or Group Head must be formally responded to by the Change Sponsor.
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Step 10 – Final Draft Regulation
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36.
The Change Sponsor will ensure final draft regulation is produced after considering the change feedback
received.
Step 11 – Final DASP Consultation
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37.
The process is as per Step 7 and is the final DASP Agency opportunity to apply aviation safety and regulation
SME advice and endorsement to the Final Draft Regulation. Should the feedback from Step 7 DASP Agency
consultation not include any negative comments o f substance, the Change Sponsor may elect to skip Step 11. If so, the
Change Sponsor should advise the DASP Heads of this decision.
Step 12 – Final Draft Endorsement
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38.
The Change Sponsor will send the draft regulation to the relevant OAA, TAA, FTAA or Group Head seeking
endorsement prior to seeking approval to publish. Should the feedback from Step 8 External consultation not include
any negative comments of substance, the Change Sponsor may elect to skip Step 12. If so, the Change Sponsor should
advise the relevant authorities of this decision.
by
Steps 13a, 13b and 13c – Approval
ed
39.
The Change Sponsor will request approval to publish and implement the regulation from the appropriate
approval authority.
ed
Step 14 – Publish Regulation
The Change Sponsor will publish the regulation after receiving written approval from the approval authority.
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1A–8
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31.
Prior to formal external consultation, it is expected that informal consultation will have occurred with relevant
stakeholders.
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 1 Chap 1
Step 15 – Implement Regulation
41.
The Change Sponsor will implement the regulation change by ensuring:
An implementation transition strategy is advised
b.
Promotion and education of the regulation change is provided for the regulated community
c.
An oversight and enforcement strategy is advised
d.
Regulation review schedule is planned.12
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Continuous Improvement
42.
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Once a regulation is published it is subject to continuous improvement.
12
Major changes may require a review after a defined period to con firm that they are having the desired effect. This is
likely to be the case when introducing regulation for a new capability.
AL 5
1A–9
AAP 7001.048
Annex B to
Sect 1 Chap 1
DASP ENFORCEMENT POLICY
1.
DI(G) OPS 02-2 Defence Aviation Safety Program places responsibility on the Defence Aviation Authority to
establish and maintain the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) to assure the safe and effective generation of
Defence aviation capability. This is achieved in part through implementation of a regulatory framework consisting of
Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREGs), Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREGs) and Technical
Airworthiness Regulations (TAREGs).
eg
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2.
A key component of an effective regulatory framework is ensuring that regulated entities have a clear
understanding of when, why and how DASP Regulatory Authorities may take action in the event of regulatory
breaches or unresolved safety performance issues. The DASP Enforcement Policy supports compliance with Defence
aviation regulations through application of a consistent enforcement framework and has been developed with due
consideration of the Defence aviation environment and associated Commonwealth legislation.
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The DASP Enforcement Policy communicates the enforcement approach taken by DASP Regulatory
Authorities to securing compliance with aviation safety policy and regulation.1
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4.
The term Enforcement pertains to all activities that may be undertaken by DASP regulatory authorities to
address regulatory breaches or remedy identified safety issues. This policy is applicable to all regulated entities (both
Defence and External Service Providers) operating under the DASP.
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5.
Compliance date. Finalisation of DASP Regulatory Authorities' enforcement artefacts, templates and
subordinate processes to support full implementation of this policy is anticipated by Jun 16.
Principles. The DASP Enforcement Policy is founded on the following principles:
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6.
Principle 1: Enforcement action may be taken in the event of regulatory non-compliance.
Principle 2: Enforcement action shall be fair and proportionate.
–
b.
The decision to take enforcement action will give due and equitable consideration to distinguish
consistent or premeditated non-compliance from unintentional errors or deviations.
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(1)
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a.
Full details of the nature of non-compliance will be given.
(2)
The response to non-compliance will be proportionate to the identified breach and the
underlying safety risk(s).
(3)
Enforcement action will relate directly to the non-compliance and associated risks.
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(4)
Principle 3: Enforcement action shall be graduated.
(1)
Enforcement action shall commence at the lowest level possible and should escalate only when
necessary to secure compliance.
(2)
Decisions on the speed of escalation are to be made cognisant of underlying safety risk(s) and
an organisation or individual’s motivational stance, prior interaction and capacity to meet the
regulations.
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c.
In the interests of procedural fairness regulated entities will be afforded the opportunity to
review and respond to identified non-compliance(s) prior to enforcement action being initiated.
1
This policy articulates the approach to be adopted by DASP Regulatory Authorities in response to identified regulatory non-compliances or
unresolved aviation safety issues. Enforcement action taken by DASP Regulatory Authorities is not a replacement for, and must not be confused with,
disciplinary or administrative processes that may be utilised by the command chain where Defence personnel have committed offences or
demonstrated significant professional failings
AL 7
1B–1
AAP 7001.048
d.
Annex B to
Sect 1 Chap 1
Principle 4: Independent and evidence based decisions.
(1)
Enforcement decisions must be independent, transparent and based upon objective evidence.
(2)
Enforcement decisions must not be influenced by personal, political or financial considerations.
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7.
Breaches of regulations and safety performance shortfalls may occur for a variety of reasons ranging from a
genuine misunderstanding of the regulations through to a consistent and deliberate disregard for aviation safety. A
graduated and proportionate approach to enforcement recognises and takes account of relevant compliance motivators
when determining the type of enforcement action to be taken in response to identified breaches.
s
Enforcement Actions
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8.
DASP Regulatory Authorities have a range of enforcement options available to effectively address
regulatory/safety obligations dependent upon the context and circumstances. Enforcement actions may include:
Provision of support and education to assist entities who demonstrate a genuine commitment to
resolving regulatory breaches or safety deficiencies.
b.
Use of formal and/or corrective measures to secure compliance where entities lack a genuine
commitment to resolving regulatory breaches or safety deficiencies.
c.
Variation, suspension or cancellation of approvals/authorisations where entities consistently and
deliberately fail to meet regulatory or safety obligations.
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Figure 1–B–1: DASP Enforcement Triangle
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9.
The DASP Enforcement Triangle (Figure 1–B–1) details the suite of enforcement options that may be taken in
response to regulated entity compliance attitudes and performance.2
2
Serious breaches involving recklessness or gross negligence may result in a criminal investigation that falls outside DASP jurisdiction. Such action
would not prejudice DASP Regulatory Authority ability to take enforcement action where appropriate.
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1B–2
AAP 7001.048
Annex B to
Sect 1 Chap 1
10.
Imposing a sanction that suspends or removes an organisational permission may not always be in the interests
of the Service. However this must remain a real and credible course of action as part of a graduated response to serious
and/or continuing non- compliances. If DASP Regulatory Authorities are considering limiting, suspending or
removing an organisational certificate/approval, the relevant Service Chief and/or capability manager will be
consulted as the action may impact operational output(s).
Enforcement Action and Commercial Organisations
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11.
The requirement for commercial service providers to comply with DASP policy and regulatory requirements
and maintain relevant organisational certifications/approvals is generally secured through contractual provisions.
Where DASP Regulatory Authorities are considering taking enforcement action against a commercial service provider
that may impact contractual agreements, the relevant Defence contract management authority will be consulted.
eg
Administrative Action
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12.
Disciplinary proceedings or administrative action may be taken by the command chain where Defence
personnel have either committed offences or demonstrated significant professional failings. Whilst such action does
not constitute part of the DASP Enforcement Policy, it is envisaged that the DASP Regulatory Authorities may, in
appropriate circumstances, be required to provide documentation and/or data in support of command initiated
administrative processes.
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Coordination with External Regulatory Authorities
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13.
In certain circumstances DASP Regulatory Authorities may identify a regulatory breach or safety concern that
falls under the jurisdiction of an external National or Military Aviation Authority. Where this occurs, DASP
Regulatory Authorities will coordinate and consult with external agencies as necessary to ensure that appropriate
enforcement/remedial action is undertaken.
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DASP ENFORCEMENT POLICY APPEAL PROCESS
Standards for Handling Appeals
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The standards for handling appeals against DASP enforcement action are as follows:
Appeals will be accepted in writing by email or letter.
b.
Appellants will be treated fairly and courteously.
c.
Appeals will be dealt with promptly:
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If an accountable person3 subject to formal enforcement action wishes to appeal an enforcement decision, the
appellant may do so in writing to the appropriate DASP Regulatory Authority in accordance with the process outlined
below.
The relevant authority will acknowledge initial receipt of a written appeal within 5 working
days of receipt.
(2)
The relevant authority will send a full response within 20 working days of receipt.
(3)
If the relevant authority cannot respond fully within 20 working days of receipt, an explanation
why will be provided to the appellant together with the date by which the full reply will be
provided.
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(1)
16.
1988.
The appellant’s personal information will be handled in accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act
3
An accountable person may include 1) The Senior Executive of an approved organisation; or 2) Holder of a delegated operational Authority (OAA;
OAAR; FTAA).
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1B–3
AAP 7001.048
Annex B to
Sect 1 Chap 1
2 Stage Appeal process
Stage 1 – Initial Review. The appellant should write to the appropriate Regulatory Authority:
Stating their appeal (providing the detail of the enforcement action they are appealing).
b.
Providing details of who issued the DASP enforcement action.
c.
Including any documents or correspondence in support of the appeal.
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On receipt of the written appeal, the relevant DASP Regulatory Authority will identify an independent
member of their organisation with suitable authority to review the case and they will be directed to contact the
appellant to discuss their concerns and commence an independent review of the enforcement action. In line with the
principle of addressing issues at the lowest possible level it is anticipated that most appeals will be resolved at this
stage.
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19.
Stage 2 – Further Review. If the appellant is dissatisfied with the result of the Stage 1 – Initial Review, the
appellant may choose to seek a further review of the DASP enforcement action. Upon receipt of a written submission
explaining why the initial appeal has failed to resolve the matter, the relevant Regulatory Authority will submit the
appeal for further review to the appropriate DASP appointment as detailed in Table 1–B–1:
tio
Table 1–B–1: Reviewing Authorities for Stage 2 Reviews
Appeal reviewed by4
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Certificate/Approval Removal
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Defence AA
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OAR/TAR
OAR/TAR
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Advisory Letter
Defence AA
4
Removal of an operational certificate or organisational permission is undertaken by the Authority who issues the original certificate/permission.
Where an appeal relates to enforcement action undertaken by the Defence AA, the appeal will be reviewed by an independent Senior Officer
appointed by the Defence AA.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 1 Chap 2
RESERVED
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 1 Chap 3
SECTION 1
CHAPTER 3
OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
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1.
The intent of the operational regulatory framework established by the OAR is to ensure that Commanders
have the greatest flexibility to exploit the capability of their Aviation Systems, while assuring the airworthiness of
aircraft under their command or management. Noting this objective and the disparate operating environments within
which Defence aircraft systems must operate, the operational airworthiness regulations promulgated in
AAP 8000.010—Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual represent the minimum requirements to assure
operational airworthiness and allow flexibility in meeting the intent to suit local or service specific operating
requirements. The responsibility for implementation and safe operation of aviation systems primarily rests with the
Operational Airworthiness Authorities (OAAs) and their delegates. Accordingly, the regulations provide a framework
through which commanders can achieve operational capability in a safe and effective manner. The Defence AA
requirements with respect to operational airworthiness management by the OAR, OAAs and Flight Test Approval
Authorities (FTAAs) are contained in MILAVREG 1.
PURPOSE
2.
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APPLICABILITY
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This chapter outlines the operational airworthiness regulatory framework.
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3.
This chapter is applicable to all Defence flying operations, or operations involving Defence Personnel in the
course of their duty.
OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS
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RESPONSIBILITIES
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4.
DCAF is appointed the OAR through DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation Safety Program and is responsible
for establishing the regulatory framework within which operational airworthiness processes and procedures are
implemented.
OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS
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5.
Airworthiness is a management concept supporting determinations by airworthiness authorities that an aircraft
is suitable for flight. Airworthiness regulations are rules regarding the design, construction, maintenance and operation
of Defence aircraft that are intended to ensure the airworthiness of that aircraft type.
by
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6.
Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREG) prescribe a framework according to which operational
airworthiness is managed, so as to ensure that Service Chiefs and Group Heads have the greatest flexibility to exploit
the capability of their Aviation Systems within a management system that preserves the airworthiness of aircraft under
their command or management.
ed
7.
The OAREG elements are derived by audience and operational airworthiness function. The main audience
groups are:
OAAs.
Each OAA is responsible for management and regulatory assurance of operational
airworthiness of Aviation Systems as directed by their respective Service Chief or Group Head. Each
OAA must manage operational airworthiness aspects of aviation systems under their command or
management in a manner to be compliant with the regulations in this manual and in AAP 8000.010.
b.
OAARs and flying organisations. OAARs and flying organisations are responsible for the
operational airworthiness management system within their command, as delegated by OAAs.
c.
OAAR Acquisition (OAAR(Acq)) and acquisition organisations.
OAAR(Acq)s and
acquisition organisations are responsible for the operational airworthiness management of acquisition
activities, as delegated by OAAs.
d.
FTAAs and flight test organisations. FTAAs and flight test organisations are responsible for
the operational airworthiness management of flight test activities and recognition of competent
organisations to conduct flight test. They exercise authority to ensure the impact of aircraft designs on
airworthiness is appropriately assessed and that flight test operations are conducted in a safe manner by
qualified and competent aircrew and systems specialists.
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a.
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1
AAP 7001.048
Sect 1 Chap 3
Relationship of the regulatory elements
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8.
While the OAREGs are focussed respectively at the audiences listed in paragraph 7, in reality aspects of each
OAREG element are applicable to each audience and organisation. For example, an FTAA is required to comply with
aspects of OAREG 2 tailored to the flight test environment. The relationship between the audiences and the OAREG
elements is shown in Figure 3–1.
D
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Figure 3–1 Relationship between OAREG elements
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Implementation
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The OAREGs are built on the premise that Aviation Systems must be certified to approved operating
requirements, operated to approved rules and limitations, within an established Flying Management System (FMS) by
appropriately trained and qualified operators.
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The Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The SOI is the overarching document which defines the
roles and operating environment for an Aviation System. The SOI is intrinsically linked to the Type Certification and
Service Release of an aircraft type as it defines the applicable operating requirements for which the Certification and
Service Release has been, or will be, achieved. The SOI is established or amended through the new aircraft acquisition
or modification process and is managed in-service by the applicable OAA (and/or OAAR) and the TAR (and, as
delegated, the Design Acceptance Representative (DAR)).
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11.
In-service operation. In-service flying organisations have established FMS which include processes and
procedures for, among other things, management of the SOI, flight authorisation, competency management,
management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP), aviation safety management, and aviation risk
management (AVRM). The flying organisation operates to approved rules and limitations in the form of flight
manuals, Service Release limitations, authoritative flight information documents and OIP governing low flying, role
limitations etc. Minimum training and qualification requirements are stipulated for general aviation operations, such as
basic flying training, Crew Resource Management (CRM), aviation safety and AVRM.
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12.
New aircraft, modifications and flight test. New aircraft, or changes to the type design, role or
environment of existing aircraft, must undergo processes to ensure the operational airworthiness of the type is known
and documented. Typically, this is achieved through a process of design and test with close cooperation between
operators, engineers, logisticians and flight test specialists. The assessment of aircraft systems, and compliance with
design standards, is established by the specialist application of test techniques by suitably qualified and experienced
operators. During this process the limitations and operational airworthiness management arrangements required to
operate the system according to the SOI are established and documented. This then forms the basis of decisions by the
Defence AA to Type Certify and Service Release new systems for operational use.
13.
Individual Service implementation. Each of the three Services has developed policy and instructions
regarding operational airworthiness management. The RAAF has a range of Defence Instructions (Air Force) which
cascade into Air Command Standing Instructions (SIs), supported by subordinate Group, Wing and Unit SIs, and
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Sect 1 Chap 3
Group, Wing and Unit Flying Orders (FOs). The Army takes cognisance of DI(AF)s, noting that these may not always
have been drafted with reference to an Army aviation context. Consequently, the Army uses SIs and Special Flying
Instructions to supplement DI(AF)s. In addition to DI(N), many of which parallel DI(AF), the RAN has a range of
Australian Books of Reference (ABRs), with ABR 5150—RAN Aviation Instructions as the primary reference for
Navy airworthiness instructions, supported by a range of subordinate documents.
The role of ACPA in operational airworthiness
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14.
ACPA is the staff of the OAR and therefore represent the OAR on matters concerning operational
airworthiness. DACPA may interpret OAREGs on behalf of the OAR, and provide authoritative advice. ACPA
sponsor regulatory development, under the direction of the OAR, following consultation with stakeholders through the
ASPRC. Petitioners seeking to propose, amend or repeal regulations may do so in accordance with the OAREGs.
DACPA sponsors AAP 8000.010.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR GUIDANCE
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AAP 8000.010 contains detailed information on the applicability and application of the OAREGs.
Additionally, AAP 8000.010 contains further guidance on the implementation of the operational regulations.
AAP 8000.010 will continue to be updated by amendment as the guidance evolves to suit user requirements. ACPA
should be consulted for further guidance or interpretation in the first instance.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 1 Chap 4
TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION
INTRODUCTION
1.
Technical airworthiness management is the process by which Defence assures that aircraft and aeronautical
product (AP) are airworthy and for Aviation Support Systems (AvSS) are suitable for operation in approved
configuration, roles and environment.
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2.
Chief of Service Committee (COSC) determination 2/98, agreed to the establishment of a joint Technical
Airworthiness Agency (DGTA–ADF) with DGTA as head to: develop, implement, manage and undertake compliance
with the technical aspects of a regulatory framework; determine airworthiness certification requirements; and manage
in-service technical standards for all Defence aircraft. This has been reiterated in DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation
Safety Program and MILAVREG 1—airworthiness management however the scope has been increased to include
AvSS.
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3.
DGTA’s title when regulating with respect to technical airworthiness is the TAR. Note, that DGTA is also
appointed as the TAA for determining the technical suitability and communicating risks to the OAA for all Defence
aircraft and AvSS.
4.
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PURPOSE
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APPLICABILITY
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This chapter describes the technical airworthiness framework.
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5.
This chapter is applicable to the conduct of all design, construction and maintenance of Defence aircraft, AP,
and AvSS.
TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION
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6.
The TAR is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the technical elements of the AMS.
This includes design, construction, maintenance and continuing airworthiness management of all aircraft, AP and
AvSS subject to the DASP. The TAR will consider regulation of:
materiel design standards
b.
design, construction and maintenance processes
c.
competencies for engineering and maintenance personnel.
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key organisational and individual delegations and approvals
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a.
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The TAR provides the regulatory framework for the promulgation of regulations; education of regulatory
requirements to affected personnel and organisations; certification and ongoing assessment of compliance of regulated
organisations; and the assessment of compliance to design standards for aircraft, AP and AvSS. Supporting the
framework are:
DGTA-ADF staff
c.
AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual
d.
processes for urgent and advisory material (Technical Airworthiness Directives and Technical
Airworthiness Advisory Circulars)
e.
processes for seeking feedback on proposed regulatory changes.
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8.
Organisational Authorisations and Approvals. The TAR approves maintenance organisations and
authorises engineering organisations supporting aircraft, AP, and AvSS.
9.
Centres of Expertise. The TAR has a support network consisting of centres of expertise (CoE) in key
airworthiness disciplines not supported by DGTA-ADF staff. These organisations provide support in revising,
prescribing and interpreting airworthiness standards relevant to specific disciplines including stores clearance, aerial
delivery, life support equipment, fuel and lubricants and explosive ordnance. The TAR personally delegates the senior
engineer within each CoE as an Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR).
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Sect 1 Chap 4
10.
Regulations. There are two complimentary aspects of the technical regulatory framework: engineering
management (focussed on the design, construction and maintenance processes) and design standard management
(focussed on the product). TAREG for engineering and maintenance management are promulgated in AAP 7001.053.
The TAR publishes minimum airworthiness design requirements in AAP 7001.054—Electronic Airworthiness Design
Requirements Manual.
11.
Standards. A design standard lays down the various requirements that an aircraft, AP or AvSS should meet
in order to assure airworthiness. There are standards for design, construction and maintenance. These are determined
by the TAR or delegate and include, but are not limited to:
materials (eg grades of aluminium or steel)
b.
parts (eg nuts and bolts)
c.
processes (eg welding, bonding, electroplating or wiring)
d.
facilities (eg clean rooms)
e.
major systems (eg an airworthiness code for an aircraft).
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Changes to airworthiness standards can affect the requirements for certification. In general, the following
conditions constitute a need to change an airworthiness standard:
the previous standard produces a level of airworthiness which is no longer acceptable
b.
the previous standard does not provide, either adequately or at all, for a particular aspect of
airworthiness
c.
new technology or methods of analysis and design require additional standards
d.
a standard previously expressed in general terms needs expression in more specific terms
e.
the use of an aircraft in different types of operations or in a different environment requires the
specification of new standards.
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The first step in airworthiness control is the establishment of design requirements (a TAR function) and the
second step involves the certification of compliance with these standards (a TAA function). These steps establish a
baseline to which airworthiness and any changes can be compared. In other words, the assurance of continued
airworthiness is based on a philosophy that the standard (of airworthiness) acquired is (at least) the standard
maintained.
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Sect 1 Chap 4
TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY
14.
The TAA is accountable to the Defence AA and responsive to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for:
a.
determinations regarding the technical suitability of aircraft and AP subject to the DASP
b.
determinations regarding technical suitability of AvSS
c.
communicating technical risks to the relevant OAAs.
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15.
Personal Delegations. The Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) is delegated authority by the TAA, to
perform Design Acceptance on behalf of the Commonwealth. The DAR’s role, for those Defence aircraft, AP or AvSS
they are delegated authority, is to assess their technical suitability and where necessary communicate risk to the OAA.
Airworthiness Code
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16.
Defence does not have the resources to develop and maintain a complete Airworthiness Code, ie a complete
set of airworthiness design standards. To administer its own Type Certification programs, Defence relies extensively
on design standards that are recognised by other civilian and military airworthiness authorities. Some of these design
standards are comprehensive and directly applicable to Defence. Others may meet many of our requirements, but
require supplementation or tailoring to account for:
Defence’s particular Configuration, Role and/or operating Environment (CRE)
b.
deficiencies in the level of safety provided by the design standard, detected by Defence through local
research or experience (eg investigations into aircraft incidents)
c.
intentional ambiguities in the design standard, where it is assumed the standard will be tailored to meet
the needs of the specific application
d.
Defence’s particular approach to through-life support.
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17.
AAP 7001.054 documents the TAR minimum design standards, and any tailoring they require to address
known shortfalls. The manual also presents the TAR’s underlying design philosophy for key aircraft technologies or
functions. Together, this information presents a benchmark level of safety for the design of Defence aircraft. Any
design shortfalls against this benchmark must be analysed and evaluated, so that informed risk treatment decisions can
be made.
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Application of Current Airworthiness Design Requirements to Older Systems. Where Defence is either:
acquiring an aircraft that has been manufactured and certified to an earlier airworthiness code or conducting a major
modification to such an aircraft; there is a requirement for the TAA to make a ruling on the applicable airworthiness
code for Defence certification (ie the Certification Basis). If a new standard has been added, or an existing standard
revised, it is necessary to determine if the standard should be applied retrospectively. Where an older standard is used
in place of an updated standard, the reasons for using the older standard must be formally documented and endorsed
by the TAA. TAA policy for application of airworthiness requirements is detailed in AAP 7001.053.
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Sect 1 Chap 4
TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS CONCEPTS AND TERMS
Formal recognition that an aircraft design, as documented, is safe to operate in its intended roles and
operating environments
b.
A list of operating and maintenance instructions and design standards underlying that recognition, and
to be observed in all on-going engineering undertaken with respect to that aircraft type.
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20.
Certification Basis. The Certification Basis forms part of the total set of requirements that must be satisfied
before a design can be accepted by Defence. It is the comprehensive set of airworthiness requirements, drawn for
example from DEF STAN 00–970, FARs and military or company standards, which must be met to assure the
Commonwealth that the Aircraft Type is airworthy. The TAA will compare any proposed certification basis with the
minimum set of airworthiness standards identified in AAP 7001.054(AM1). The TAA policy for development and
approval of a certification basis is provided in AAP 7001.053.
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21.
Recognition of Prior Certification (Acceptance). Type Certification of a new aircraft or major upgrade can
be based upon prior certification (acceptance) by another authority, provided that the TAA is satisfied that:
The authority responsible for the prior certification is recognised by Defence as a competent national
or international, civil or military airworthiness authority.
b.
The basis for the prior certification is adequately disclosed to the Commonwealth.
c.
The certification basis is relevant to the Defence configuration and the intended roles and operating
environment.
d.
Evidence exists that the civilian or military airworthiness authority applied a level of oversight to the
design commensurate with the consequences of system failure.
e.
Any risk treatments, including risk retentions, agreed to by the airworthiness authority are
comprehensively disclosed.
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Configuration, Role and Environment. While an airworthiness code is applied to an aircraft (specific
configuration) to assess its inherent airworthiness, Defence also pays particular attention to the aircraft role and
operating environment when applying that code. These terms encompass, but are not limited to:
Configuration. The functional and physical characteristics of existing or planned hardware, firmware,
software or a combination thereof as set forth in technical documentation.
b.
Role. Consideration of flight profiles, day/night operations, external stores carriage, cargo
configurations, operating weights and operating limits (eg, airspeeds, and altitudes) associated with
performing the role.
c.
Environment. Consideration of atmospheric parameters, structural loading conditions, corrosive
environment, ground movement and parking conditions, runway surface and arrest conditions, the
electromagnetic environment, the airspace environment, Defence policies and other factors associated
with the intended operating environment.
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Systems Safety. Systems safety engineering is a key element of the airworthiness assurance process
underpinning type certification. It is a method by which the level of safety provided by a system design is established,
and aims to identify and hence control the hazards and risks associated with the design, operation, maintenance and
disposal of an item. TAR regulation and guidance on systems safety engineering is provided respectively in AAP
7001.053 and AAP 7001.054.
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19.
Type Certification. Type Certification is the process through which compliance with the airworthiness
design requirements contained in the Certification Basis Description (CBD) is established through the development of
the Type Design to meet the operating roles and environment contained in the SOI. It has both operational and
technical airworthiness elements. The process leads to the award of an AMTC or an STC. The AMTC or STC, issued
by the Defence AA on the advice of the TAA and OAA, and following independent review by the AwB, provides :
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24.
Acceptable Risk. Defence aircraft should have an equivalent level of inherent safety to that of civilian
aircraft types; however, this objective is not always practicable for military aircraft where designers trade-off attributes
such as manoeuvrability, speed and payload for redundancy. Normally high performance aircraft do not involve the
same potential loss of life in a catastrophic accident as a large transport aircraft, and egress systems provide an
additional mechanism to preserve life. Similarly, the introduction of unmanned aircraft can increase the level of
acceptable risk in terms of catastrophic loss of the aircraft, although the level of acceptable risk to other equipment or
personnel is unaffected. Whereas civilian airworthiness specify particular probabilities for aircraft catastrophic failures
(for example, the FAA requires less than 1 x 10-9 occurrences per flight hour for large aircraft), the determination of
appropriate failure probability figures for Defence registered aircraft systems needs to be agreed with the TAA and
OAA prior to system development or certification.
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25.
Compliance Findings. Airworthiness compliance findings are engineering decisions that the aircraft or
equipment complies with the certification basis requirement. Compliance is typically assessed through inspection,
analysis, demonstration, test or similarity. While compliance findings are termed ‘engineering decisions’ they do
broach both technical and operational aspects of airworthiness. Compliance findings should be made by the agency
best positioned to assess compliance. This would normally be project engineering staff, but some complex compliance
findings may be made by specialist CoEs or DGTA-ADF technology specialists. DGTA-ADF staff are responsible for
auditing compliance and providing specialist guidance and advice. TAA policy and guidance for completing
certification basis compliance findings is provided in AAP 7001.053(AM1).
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Designs Not Affecting Technical Airworthiness
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26.
Type Record. The Type Record is an index to the Type Design of, or a major change to, an Aircraft Type.
The Type Record is a summary document that defines a type design, at the time of certification or acceptance by the
Commonwealth, by reference to the issue status of all type design data. It should incorporate all type design data
(eg data, drawings, specifications, operating procedures etc) submitted in support of the design. The TAR
requirements for a Type Record are detailed in AAP 7001.053.
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The primary aim of the technical airworthiness regulatory framework is to establish a minimum standard for
engineering and maintenance activities to ensure that they do not compromise airworthiness or safety of flight. These
regulations also form the basis of the TAR’s requirements for the management of engineering and maintenance of
AvSS.
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Sect 1 Chap 5
SECTION 1
CHAPTER 5
s
AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT
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- TO BE ISSUED -
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AAP 7001.048(AM1)
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Sect 1 Chap 5
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 1
DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
1
The operation of aviation systems by or on behalf of Defence is conducted within the purview of the Defence
Aviation Safety Program (DASP). This program is invoked by exception under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (the Act)
whereby State aircraft are not regulated under the Act. The only exception to this is for Australian civil registered
aircraft operating as State aircraft where other agreements between CASA and Defence may be in place.
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Individuals within the DASP are appointed with authority, through DI(G) OPS 02-2— Defence Aviation Safety
Program, to exercise airworthiness and aviation safety management judgements in order to operate aviation systems.
The authority is exercised within a framework of operational, technical and safety regulations, which assure
airworthiness and aviation safety. The operation and regulation of aviation systems is independently reviewed to
assess ongoing airworthiness and aviation safety management, and the applicability and function of the DASP. Safety
is assured through the interaction of these functions which results in sound judgements concerning an aircraft’s
suitability for flight.
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MILITARY AVIATION REGULATION 1
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The outcome required by this regulation is that appropriate decisions are made regarding the operation of Defence
Aviation systems in light of the risk posed to members of Defence and the public by the conduct of those operations.
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MILAVREG are applicable to all aircraft and AvSS:
owned, leased, hired or chartered by Defence
(2)
operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence
(3)
any aircraft for which CASA has placed statutory airworthiness responsibilities on Defence.
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MILAVREG 1.1 – APPLICABILITY
All Defence personnel and organisations must comply with these regulations whenever they are
engaged in, or seeking to engage in the design, construction, maintenance, operation or support of
Defence Aviation operations under MILAVREG 1.1a.
c.
All contractor or civilian personnel and organisations must comply with these regulations whenever
they are engaged in, or seeking to engage in the design, construction, maintenance, operation or
support of Defence Aviation operations under MILAVREG 1.1a.
d.
A Defence organisation must not engage a commercial or private entity in the design, construction,
maintenance, operation or support of Defence Aviation operations within the scope of these regulations
unless the terms of operation are subject to these regulations through a legally binding agreement
which is acceptable to the Defence AA.
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Includes Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).
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Sect 2 Chap 1
MILAVREG 1.2 – EXEMPTIONS
a.
Exempt Defence registered aircraft from airworthiness certification requirements.
(2)
Authorise operation of a Defence registered aircraft without a valid AMTC or SFP.
(3)
Authorise operation of a Defence registered aircraft in an unapproved role or after major
changes that in normal circumstances would require Supplemental Role Approval (SRA) or a
STC.
(4)
Authorise operation of an AvSS without an AvSSC.
(5)
Exempt any person or organisation from compliance with these regulations.
GUIDANCE
Any person or organisation seeking an exclusion from these regulations by the
Defence AA may be required to support the application with a risk based assessment
to demonstrate how the airworthiness integrity of the affected aviation system will
be maintained.
•
The relevant authority may satisfy themselves that such systems continue to be
operated in a safe manner and that competent and reasonable decisions are made
regarding the operation of those systems in light of the risk posed to members of
Defence and the public by the conduct of those operations. The relevant authority
may also take into consideration the existing command structure and monitoring of
these systems with regard to it meeting the intent of the regulations.
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(1)
The pilot-in-command of an aircraft, where presented with the most compelling emergency
circumstances, may only undertake a course of action which contravenes these regulations when
absolutely necessary in the interests of safety.
c.
An operational commander, where presented with the most compelling emergency or contingency
circumstances, may only adopt or authorise a course of action which contravenes these regulations
where the risk is assessed as acceptable in light of the operational necessity.
d.
Exemptions authorised under MILAVREG 1.2.b or 1.2.c must be advised to the Defence AA through
the relevant OAA and notified to the TAR in writing as soon as possible.
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Individuals within the DASP appointed in accordance with DI(G) OPS 02–2 must exercise their
authority in accordance with that Instruction and these regulations.
b.
An OAA and FTAA will be appointed by the Defence AA as nominated by Service Chiefs and Group
Heads.
c.
Except when exempted by the Defence AA, DASP appointees must meet the qualification and
competency criteria identified in annex A.
d.
Airworthiness Board members will be appointed by the Defence AA. Qualification and competency
criteria for Airworthiness Board members are in annex A.
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The Defence AA may:
The OAR must establish and maintain an operational airworthiness framework for the operation of
aircraft and a management framework for the operation of AvSS, within the scope of these regulations.
AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 1
MILAVREG 1.5 – OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES
Ensure the operational airworthiness management of aircraft types and the management of
AvSS within the scope of their appointment complies with the airworthiness and management
frameworks established by the OAR.
(2)
Make informed decisions on the treatment of risk.
(3)
Make recommendations to the Defence AA, through DACPA, regarding the issue of
airworthiness instruments for aircraft types within the scope of their appointment.
(4)
Not authorise or appoint any person to act on their behalf as an OAA.
(5)
On return from absence, review any airworthiness decisions made by a person appointed by the
Defence AA to act in their stead, as soon as practicable.
(6)
Ensure that relevant safety information is provided to DASP Agency staff on request without
unnecessary delay.
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An OAA may:
Make determinations regarding operational airworthiness within the scope of their appointment.
(2)
Delegate operational airworthiness management, as permitted by the OAR.
(3)
Make recommendations to the Defence AA, through their Service Chief or Group Head,
regarding the appointment of a temporary OAA in their absence.
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An OAA must:
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GUIDANCE
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DI(G) OPS 02–2 is the instrument through which the CDF and Secretary appoints
responsibility for the DASP management. For OAA and FTAA appointments, the
scope of this authority is limited to those aviation systems and activities delegated to
them by the Defence AA in accordance with their individual appointments.
(2)
Assure the technical airworthiness management of aircraft types, AP, and AvSS within the
DASP complies with the technical airworthiness regulatory framework.
(3)
On return from absence, review any airworthiness decisions made by a person appointed by the
Defence AA to act in their stead, as soon as practicable.
The TAR may:
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(1)
Interpret technical airworthiness regulations in the context of design, construction, and
maintenance processes.
(2)
Define and prescribe technical airworthiness design, construction and maintenance
requirements.
(3)
Further delegate technical airworthiness regulatory authority.
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construction and maintenance of all aircraft, and a technical management framework for
Aeronautical Product (AP), AvSS and related equipment subject to the DASP.
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The TAR must:
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MILAVREG 1.6 – TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATOR
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 1
MILAVREG 1.7 – TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY
a.
Make recommendations to the Defence AA, through DACPA or the relevant OAA, regarding
the issue of airworthiness instruments for aircraft types and AvSS within the scope of the
DASP.
(2)
Communicate technical risks to the relevant OAA.
(3)
On return from absence, review any airworthiness decisions made by a person appointed by the
Defence AA to act in their stead, as soon as practicable.
(4)
Ensure that relevant safety information is provided to DASP Agency staff on request without
unnecessary delay.
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The TAA may further delegate technical airworthiness authority in accordance with TAREG.
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MILAVREG 1.8 – FLIGHT TEST APPROVAL AUTHORITY
a.
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b.
(1)
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An FTAA must:
Ensure the operational airworthiness management of aircraft types allocated for the purposes of
flight test complies with the operational airworthiness management framework established by
the OAR.
(2)
Must ensure the technical airworthiness management of aircraft types allocated for the purposes
of flight test complies with the technical airworthiness management framework established by
the TAR.
(3)
Except as provided by MILAVREG 1.8.b.(1), issue a FTP in accordance with MILAVREG 3.5
to authorise flight test of a Defence registered aircraft, and UAS with a valid UAS Operating
Permit (UASOP), within the scope of their appointment.
(4)
Not authorise or appoint any person to act on their behalf as an FTAA.
(5)
On return from absence, review any airworthiness decisions made by a person appointed by the
Defence AA to act in their stead, as soon as practicable.
(6)
Ensure that relevant safety information is provided to DASP Agency staff on request without
unnecessary delay.
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(1)
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b.
An FTAA may:
Within the scope of their appointment, authorise flight test of a Defence registered aircraft, and
UAS with a valid UASOP, without an FTP as permitted by the OAR.
(2)
Within the scope of their appointment, further delegate flight test approval authority as
permitted by the OAR.
(3)
Make recommendations to the Defence AA, through their Service Chief or Group Head,
regarding the appointment of a temporary FTAA in their absence.
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MILAVREG 1.9 – AIRWORTHINESS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITY
The Airworthiness Board must independently review the operational and technical airworthiness
management and aviation safety of aviation systems within the DASP.
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a.
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The TAA must:
AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 1
MILAVREG 1.10 – DIRECTOR AIRWORTHINESS COORDINATION AND POLICY AGENCY (DACPA)
(2)
Formulate Defence airworthiness policy on behalf of the Defence AA.
(3)
Act as the principal adviser to the Defence AA on Defence airworthiness management.
(4)
Develop OAREG on behalf of the OAR in consultation with each OAA.
(5)
Act as the principal adviser to the OAR on operational airworthiness management.
(6)
Liaise with external airworthiness authorities on behalf of the Defence AA.
(7)
Monitor the effectiveness of the DASP on behalf of the Defence AA.
(8)
Maintain the Defence Register.
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Act as directed as the principle representative of the Defence AA on matters concerning
Defence airworthiness management.
ty
DACPA may:
Interpret MILAVREG.
(2)
Interpret OAREG.
(3)
Issue Defence Airworthiness Advisory Circulars (AAC).
(4)
Approve minor and editorial changes as described under the DASP Regulation Change
Process.2
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(1)
Av
As the custodian of the Defence Register, DACPA must:
Maintain a register of all Defence registered aircraft operating under an SFP or AMTC and SR.
(2)
Maintain a register of all airworthiness instruments issued by the Defence AA.
(3)
Coordinate input from applicable stakeholders for Airworthiness Boards.
(4)
Manage Airworthiness Corrective Action Requests (ACAR) resulting from a review required
by MILAVREG 1.9, including a record of closure action.
(5)
Advise the CASA of any addition or removal of aircraft to the Defence Register.
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(1)
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c.
(1)
–
b.
DACPA must:
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2
Defence AA Decision Brief of 19 Jan 15 (AB20565663)
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 1
MILAVREG 1.11 – DIRECTOR DEFENCE AVIATION AND AIRFORCE SAFETY (DDAAFS)
a.
(2)
Formulate Defence aviation safety policy on behalf of the Defence AA.
(3)
Act as the principal adviser to the Defence AA on Defence aviation safety management.
(4)
Monitor the effectiveness of the Defence Aviation Safety Management System (Defence
ASMS) on behalf of the Defence AA.
(5)
Provide advice, services and tools to commanders and their subordinates in the implementation
and management of their Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS).
(6)
Investigate all Defence aviation accidents on behalf of Service Chiefs and Group Heads.
(7)
Provide aviation safety education and training.
(8)
Develop strategies and programs to enhance Defence aviation safety.
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Act as directed as the principal representative of the Defence AA on matters concerning
Defence aviation safety management.
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b.
(1)
Sa
DDAAFS may:
Provide independent and direct advice to the Service Chiefs on the aviation safety health of
their respective Services.
(2)
Advise Service Chiefs and commanders at all levels on methods of developing their ASMS.
(3)
Investigate Defence aviation safety matters and aviation safety occurrences not classified as
accidents.
(4)
Liaise with external aviation safety authorities on behalf of the Defence AA.
(5)
Liaise with appropriate allied Services, government departments, education authorities and
other organisations on aviation safety matters.
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(1)
GUIDANCE
•
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DDAAFS also has responsibilities and accountabilities relating to Air Force Work
Health and Safety (WHS) management on behalf of the Chief of Air Force (CAF).
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Aviation Safety Program management qualification and competency criteria.
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DDAAFS must:
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 2 Chap 1
AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT QUALIFICATION AND
COMPETENCY CRITERIA
INTRODUCTION
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s
1.
DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation Safety Program formally appoints CAF as the Defence AA, DCAF as
the OAR, and DGTA as the TAR and TAA. The remaining aviation safety program appointments are nominated by
their respective Service Chiefs and Group Heads and formally appointed by the Defence AA. This annex indentifies
the desirable attributes that an individual appointed to the respective aviation safety program appointment should
possess.
eg
2.
An individual may be exempted from these requirements in accordance with MILAVREG 1.2—Exemptions
and exclusions. An exemption request should show that the nominated individual has the appropriate experience and
competence to assume the aviation safety program appointment.
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APPOINTMENTS
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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY
4.
An officer appointed by the Defence AA as an FTAA must:
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FLIGHT TEST APPROVAL AUTHORITY
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3.
Officers appointed by the Defence AA to a designated OAA position must be aligned with senior key
appointments in the Service or Group chain of command and be a member with broad and extensive level of command
and Service experience.
be an aircrew or engineer member who has been qualified as a long course trained test specialist by a
recognised flight test training institution;
b.
possess a broad and extensive level of experience with Defence flight test operations within the
relevant organisation, including:
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a.
operation and test of a range of aviation systems operated by Defence;
(2)
operation and test involving aircraft stores compatibility clearance; and
(3)
command of flight test operations;
–
D
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(1)
possess a high level of experience with, and knowledge of, the operational airworthiness regulatory
framework;
d.
possess a high level of experience with, and knowledge of, acquisition flight test operations; and
e.
possess a high level of knowledge of civilian or OEM flight test operations.
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5.
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AIRWORTHINESS BOARD PANEL MEMBERS
Officers appointed by the Defence AA to the Airworthiness Board panel must:
Be star rank officers of the permanent forces, or reserve forces on active duty.
by
a.
Possess either:
(1)
an operational background with extensive experience in the Defence operation of aircraft types
or aviation support systems (AvSS); or
(2)
a technical background with extensive experience in Defence technical management of aircraft
types or AvSS.
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b.
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DIRECTOR AIRWORTHINESS COORDINATION AND POLICY AGENCY
6.
An officer appointed by the Defence AA as DACPA must:
a.
be an aircrew member with a high level of experience in Defence Aviation operations;
b.
have previously fulfilled a command position within a Defence flying organisation;
c.
possess experience with, and knowledge of, aviation acquisition or modification processes; and
d.
possess experience with, and knowledge of, Defence airworthiness management and operational
airworthiness regulations.
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1A–1
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 2 Chap 1
DIRECTOR DEFENCE AVIATION AND AIR FORCE SAFETY
7.
be an Air Force aircrew member with a high level of experience in Defence Aviation operations;
b.
have previously fulfilled a command position within a Defence flying organisation;
c.
possess experience with, and knowledge of, Defence Aviation Safety Management System application;
and
d.
possess experience with, and knowledge of, Air Force Work Health and Safety Management System
application.
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a.
1A–2
s
An officer appointed by the Defence AA as DDAAFS must:
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 2
DEFENCE REGISTRATION AND OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT
INTRODUCTION
Under the DASP, aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence are defined as ‘Defence registered aircraft’ or ‘nonDefence registered aircraft’. MILAVREG 2—Defence registration and operation of aircraft contains:
the requirements for determining whether an aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence may be listed on the
Defence Register
b.
management of the Defence Register.
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a.
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Defence operations require that aviation systems are managed to allow safe, effective, ready and sustainable combat
power that is sufficient to meet operational requirements. Airworthiness in support of this goal is established through a
process of Type Certification and Service Release (SR). Aircraft which are Type Certified, or granted a limited scope
of flying under a SFP are recorded in the Defence Register. Type Certification and SR are therefore intrinsically linked
to the acquisition of new aircraft or significant new capabilities which require an aircraft type to undergo major
modification. Accordingly, Defence registration provides the authority and necessary conditions and limitations for the
operation of an aircraft type by Defence.
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DACPA is the custodian of the Defence Register and is responsible to ensure the validity of the Defence Register.
MILAVREG 2 requires that relevant agencies notify ACPA whenever additions or changes to the Defence Register
are required.
Av
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The outcome required by this regulation is that Defence registered aircraft are designed, constructed, operated and
maintained safely within approved roles, standards and limitations by competent and authorised personnel.
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MILITARY AVIATION REGULATION 2
MILAVREG 2.1 – DETERMINATION OF REGISTRATION
D
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An aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence must be Defence registered when:
(1)
the aircraft is predominantly operated in a military configuration, role or environment by
Defence or non-Defence personnel
(2)
the aircraft is owned by Defence
(3)
the aircraft is predominantly operated by members of Defence in the course of their duties.
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a.
•
GUIDANCE
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The registration and airworthiness management requirements for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) are contained in MILAVREG 7.
MILAVREG 2.2 – THE DEFENCE REGISTER
For all Defence registered aircraft types, the Defence Register must include:
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a.
b.
(1)
the Airworthiness Instrument number and issue date
(2)
an application identifier unique to each aircraft type and tail number
(3)
manufacturer name and current OEM authority
(4)
the aircraft models designated within each type
(5)
the engine and propeller model designations, as appropriate
(6)
reference to any STCs issued which supplement the aircraft Type Design
(7)
details of when the aircraft was added to the Defence Register and its current operational status
(8)
if an individual aircraft has been removed from the Defence Register, the date and reason for
removal.
An applicant seeking to add an aircraft type to the Defence Register must:
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AAP 7001.048
c.
Sect 2 Chap 2
(1)
upon government approval of acquisition, apply to DACPA for an application identifier unique
to the aircraft type
(2)
identify a tail number unique to each aircraft to be certified
(3)
complete all activities required by MILAVREG 2.3.
a.
An applicant seeking to introduce a Defence registered aircraft type to Defence service must:
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MILAVREG 2.3 – INTRODUCTION AND MODIFICATION OF A DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
1
TYPE
establish and maintain an SOI2. appropriate to the intended operating roles and environment of
the aircraft
(2)
maintain an AAMP in accordance with annex A
(3)
ensure that, prior to Defence registration, the aircraft is operated in accordance with
MILAVREG 5
(4)
comply with operational and technical airworthiness requirements regarding the acquisition of
the aircraft type
(5)
when documented in the AAMP, seek airworthiness instruments to support type certification
activity and introduction to service in accordance with MILAVREG 3
(6)
present appropriate proofs to the Defence AA Airworthiness Board in accordance with
MILAVREG 4.
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(1)
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An applicant seeking to make a change to a Defence registered aircraft classified as ‘Major’3 in
accordance with TAREG 2.5.3—Classification of changes in Type Design must:
maintain an AAMP in accordance with annex A
(2)
ensure that, for any period of non-Defence registration, the aircraft is operated in accordance
with MILAVREG 5
(3)
comply with operational and technical airworthiness requirements regarding the modification of
the aircraft type
(4)
when documented in the AAMP, seek airworthiness instruments to support supplemental type
certification activity and introduction to service in accordance with MILAVREG 3
(5)
present appropriate proofs to the Defence AA’s Airworthiness Board in accordance with
MILAVREG 4.
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b.
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AAMP issued under this regulation can only be approved by the Project Manager following
endorsement by the TAA, DACPA and the relevant OAA.
MILAVREG 2.4 – OPERATION OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
a.
ed
by
The OAA must operate a Defence registered aircraft under an authorised airworthiness instrument
IAW MILAVREG 3.
Except as provided under MILAVREG 2.4.c, the OAA must ensure that Defence registered aircraft are
operated and maintained:
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b.
(1)
within the limitations and conditions established under MILAVREG 2.4.a
(2)
in accordance with the operational and technical regulatory frameworks established by the OAR
(3)
in accordance with any directives issued by the Defence AA, OAR or TAR
(4)
such that the Certification Basis is not compromised.
Section 3, Chapter 4 contains guidance on the processes and requirements to achieve Defence registration of an aircraft type.
Section 3, Chapter 4 contains guidance on the processes and requirements to achieve Defence registration of an aircraft type
3
The determination of ‘Major’ and ‘Minor’ changes to the Type Design of an aircraft is described in AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical
Airworthiness Management Manual (eTAMM)
1
2
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DACPA must advise CASA when a new aircraft type has been added to the Defence Register.
AAP 7001.048
A Defence registered aircraft must only be operated outside the limitations and conditions established
under MILAVREG 2.4.b:
(1)
when specifically authorised to do so under an approved airworthiness instrument as provided
by MILAVREG 3.6;
(2)
when authorised to conduct flight test:
i.
by an FTAA; or
ii.
by an aircraft OEM recognised by the Defence AA as competent to conduct the
required operations;
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c.
Sect 2 Chap 2
when permitted by the OAA under relevant OAREG
(4)
following issue of a STC and SR for a Major change to the Type Design, as provided by
MILAVREG 3.2
(5)
following approval of a supplemental role by the relevant OAA for a new or Substantial change
to the operational role or environment as provided by OAREG 3.5; or
(6)
when exempted under MILAVREG 1.2.
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The airworthiness management of Defence registered aircraft must undergo review in accordance with
MILAVREG 4.
Sa
d.
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R
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(3)
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Av
the aircraft or aircraft type becomes temporally un-airworthy such that suspension of operations
is required under MILAVREG 2.6
(2)
the aircraft or aircraft type becomes permanently un-airworthy for the SOI roles and
environment.
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(1)
The logistics manager for an aircraft type must advise DACPA of a change to the operational status of
an aircraft following completion of an approved transfer off the Defence Register.
–
b.
The OAA for an aircraft type must advise the Defence AA through DACPA when the airworthiness
Certification Basis of an aircraft is compromised to the extent that either:
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MILAVREG 2.5 – CHANGE OF OPERATIONAL STATUS OF A DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
4
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MILAVREG 2.6 – SUSPENSION OF FLYING OPERATIONS
An OAA, OAAR, or operational commander must suspend personnel, aircraft or organisations from
flying operations under their command or management where necessary in the interests of safety.
b.
An OAA, OAAR or operational commander must suspend or restrict flying operations under their
command or management:
Following TAA advice:
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4
i.
indicating that the technical condition of an aircraft or aircraft type no longer
supports safe operation in the SOI roles or environment
ii.
indicating there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the technical condition of
an aircraft or aircraft type will no longer support safe operation in the SOI roles
or environment
iii.
indicating that the technical airworthiness arrangements supporting the operation
of the aircraft type have become insufficient to assure safety in the SOI roles or
environment.
(2)
When the operational airworthiness arrangements supporting the operation of the aircraft type
become insufficient to assure safety in the SOI roles or environment.
(3)
When the logistics arrangements supporting the operation of the aircraft type become
unavailable or insufficient to assure safety in the SOI roles and environment.
(4)
When any other factors exists which, could compromise the safe operation of the aircraft type in
the SOI roles or environment.
Section 4, Chapter 3 contains guidance on the processes and requirements for suspension and resumption of flying operations.
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Sect 2 Chap 2
The OAA must inform the Defence AA through DACPA and the TAA of any fleet wide suspension of
operations.
d.
Where suspension of flying operations are less than fleet wide, the OAA, OAAR or operational
commander must inform the Defence AA through DACPA and the TAA as there may be wider
Defence and/or civil implications which are not readily apparent to the respective commander.
e.
The Defence AA may limit or cancel the Service Release, SFP or AD of any aircraft type whose flying
operations have been suspended.
f.
A suspension of flying operations, which is not fleet wide, must only be lifted by the relevant
operational commander following advice from the appropriate technical authority.
g.
Where the Airworthiness Instrument has not been limited or cancelled, a fleet wide suspension of
flying operations must only be lifted by the OAA, following a recommendation for resumption of
flying operations by the TAA and implementation of appropriate measures to assure safety.
h.
Where the Airworthiness Instrument has been limited or cancelled, a fleet wide suspension of flying
operations must only be lifted by the Defence AA on application through DACPA, following
recommendation from the OAA and the TAA and implementation of appropriate measures to assure
safety. Where the AMTC and/or Service Release have been withdrawn, these can only be reissued by
the Defence AA on advice from the applicable OAA and TAA and will require a Defence AA
Airworthiness Board.
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MILAVREG 2.7 – REMOVAL FROM THE DEFENCE REGISTER
An applicant seeking to remove an aircraft from the Defence Register must seek approval from
DACPA.
b.
An application submitted for a temporary removal under MILAVREG 2.7.a must:
Av
ia
a.
identify the reason for removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register
(2)
describe the process to temporarily or permanently remove Defence registration markings and
Defence insignia, where appropriate
(3)
where applicable, reference the plans and agreements endorsed by the TAA which define the
technical airworthiness requirements for returning the aircraft to the Defence Register
(4)
where applicable, reference the plans and processes endorsed by the relevant OAA and the
TAA which describe the intended certification of any modification to the aircraft, prior to return
to the Defence Register.
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An application submitted for a permanent removal under MILAVREG 2.7.a must:
identify the reason for removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register;
(2)
describe the process to remove Defence registration markings and Defence insignia, where
appropriate;
(3)
where applicable, reference the plans and agreements endorsed by the capability manager of the
aircraft type which describe the process for aircraft disposal; and
by
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(1)
With OAA concurrence, DACPA must approve an aircraft’s removal from the Defence Register when
satisfied that:
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e.
4
where applicable, identify the subsequent owner and registrar of the aircraft.
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(4)
d.
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AAP 7001.048
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(1)
The aircraft will no longer be operated or maintained, or perceived to be operated or
maintained, by Defence.
(2)
For a temporary removal:
i.
the TAA is satisfied that the aircraft will be returned in an airworthy condition
ii.
the relevant OAA and the TAA are satisfied that any modification to the aircraft
prior to its return to the Defence Register will be adequately certified, where
applicable.
A change of operational status of aircraft removed from the Defence Register must be advised to the
Defence AA in accordance with MILAVREG 2.5.
AAP 7001.048
f.
Sect 2 Chap 2
When removing aircraft details from the Defence Register, DACPA must:
remove the aircraft details from the Defence Register
(2)
advise the applicant, Defence AA and CASA of the date and time of any temporary or
permanent removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register
(3)
where applicable, advise the subsequent owner and registrar of the removal of the aircraft from
the Defence Register.
The date and time recorded for a temporary or permanent removal from the Defence Register must be
a time or the time of an event nominated by DACPA.
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g.
(1)
MILAVREG 2.8 – REINSTATEMENT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER
eg
An applicant seeking to reinstate an aircraft to the Defence Register must:
(1)
where subject to a Major change to the Type Design, an aircraft must only be returned to the
Defence Register following issue of an SFP or STC and Service Release by the Defence AA;
otherwise
(2)
apply to DACPA (through the TAA and relevant OAA) to endorse an aircraft’s return to the
Defence Register, or
fe
Sa
Update the aircraft details in the Defence Register, and
(2)
Advise the applicant, Defence AA and CASA of the date and time of reinstatement of all
aircraft to the Defence Register.
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(1)
Av
c.
When requested to reinstate an aircraft to the Defence Register, ACPA staff must:
The specified date and time recorded for an aircraft acceptance on to the Defence Register must be a
time or the time of an event nominated by DACPA.
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a.
MILAVREG 2.9 – ADDITION OF FLEET AIRCRAFT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER
An applicant seeking to add additional aircraft to an existing fleet operating under an AMTC must
make an application to DACPA.
b.
An applicant seeking to add additional aircraft to an existing fleet operating under an AMTC must
maintain an AAMP in accordance with MILAVREG 2.3.
c.
Applications submitted under MILAVREG 2.9.a must:
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a.
Identify the AMTC under which the proposed aircraft will be certified
(2)
Reference the necessary documents pertinent to the fleet addition aircraft which describe:
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d.
i.
the acquisition airworthiness management strategy
ii.
the aircraft configuration or configurations
iii.
the history of previous operational use, including the roles and environment
iv.
the maintenance history
v.
the engineering history
vi.
evidence that the aircraft has been removed from any previous aircraft register.
(3)
Describe the validity of the existing AMTC as a basis for Type Certification.
(4)
Identify any exceptions or differences between the aircraft configuration and usage history to
that covered by the existing AMTC.
(5)
Be endorsed by the relevant OAA and the TAA.
Where the evidence submitted under MILAVREG 2.9.b indicates that the configuration and
operational history are largely consistent with the extant AMTC, DACPA must approve the addition of
the aircraft to the Defence Register subject to:
(1)
The satisfaction of the OAA and TAA that all necessary activities to support the technical and
operational airworthiness have been completed.
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AAP 7001.048
e.
Sect 2 Chap 2
(2)
The satisfaction of the logistics manager for the aircraft type that all necessary logistics
arrangements to support the continued airworthiness of the additional aircraft have been
accommodated.
(3)
Issue of Certificates of Airworthiness (CoA) for each additional aircraft in accordance with
TAREG.
The satisfaction of the OAA and TAA that all necessary activities to support the technical and
operational airworthiness have been completed.
(2)
The satisfaction of the logistics manager for the aircraft type that all necessary logistics
arrangements to support the continued airworthiness have been accommodated.
(3)
Recommendation by the Defence AA’s Airworthiness Board that the technical, operational and
logistics requirements have been satisfied and that there are sufficient arrangements in place to
support ongoing airworthiness.
(4)
Amendment to the extant AMTC and Service Release to reflect the additional model numbers
or type variations covered by the AMTC.
(5)
Issue of CoA for each additional aircraft in accordance with TAREG.
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(1)
f.
Add the aircraft details to the Defence Register.
(2)
Advise the applicant, Defence AA and CASA of the date and time of the addition of the aircraft
to the Defence Register.
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The specified date and time recorded for an aircraft accepted on to the Defence Register must be a time
or the time of an event nominated by DACPA.
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Requirements for an Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan.
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(1)
Annex:
A.
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When advised to add an aircraft to the Defence Register, DACPA must:
g.
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Where the evidence submitted under MILAVREG 2.9.b indicates that the configuration and
operational history constitute significant variation from the extant AMTC, the Defence AA may
approve the addition of the aircraft to the Defence Register subject to:
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 2 Chap 2
REQUIREMENTS FOR AN
ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT PLAN
1.
An AAMP maintained under MILAVREG 2 must:
Detail the scope of the acquisition activity to introduce a new aircraft type or UAS to service or make a
major change to an existing aircraft type or UAS, including:
a description of the aircraft, technical equipment or system to be introduced
(2)
a description of the intended roles and environment, or reference to the SOI
(3)
identification of the acquisition phases and a schedule of key milestones for the operation of the
new or modified system
(4)
identification of the intended arrangements and responsibilities for the design, construction,
operation, maintenance and logistics support of the system both prior to and following Service
Release or issue of a UASOP.
eg
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(1)
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Describe the strategy and identify the supporting plans to achieve and maintain airworthiness for the
specified scope of acquisition activity, including:
(1)
a description of the overarching strategy to support the airworthiness of the aircraft type or UAS
during and after introduction to service
(2)
a description of any current or planned type certification and operation of the aircraft type or
UAS under an NAA and/or MAA prior to Defence registration
(3)
a schedule of key airworthiness milestones, including issue of airworthiness instruments
(4)
reference to any necessary plans which identify:
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technical and operational airworthiness certification requirements; and
(b)
activities and tasks supporting the certification activity and compliance with operational
and technical regulatory requirements.
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(a)
–
reference any necessary plans which identify the logistics support arrangements to ensure the
continuing airworthiness of the aircraft or UAS when operating:
during any specified limited scope of operations prior to Service Release or issue of a
UASOP
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a.
in the intended roles and environment following Service Release or issue of a UASOP ,
at the rate of effort expected at the commencement of operations as a Defence registered
aircraft or UAS.
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(b)
a description of the process to manage and resolve airworthiness issues that arise during the
acquisition activity.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 3
AIRWORTHINESS INSTRUMENTS
INTRODUCTION
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Determinations of airworthiness involve consideration of a range of factors which contribute to the condition of an
aircraft and the judgement for its suitability for flight. Airworthiness Instruments provide clear and unambiguous
direction based on sound and considered criteria and advice from relevant specialists within the DASP. This direction
provides authority for the safe operating limits and conditions established in support of the airworthiness of an
Aviation System. Airworthiness Instruments are therefore the mechanism which signify the completion of necessary
airworthiness activity, direct a course of action or advise circumstances to maintain airworthiness. This regulation
defines the applicability and requirements for Airworthiness Instruments issued by the Defence AA, or OAA or FTAA
depending on the instrument.
R
eg
The outcome required by this regulation is that declarations regarding the airworthiness of Defence registered aircraft
are unambiguous and are based on the satisfactory completion of sound airworthiness processes to assure the safety of
an aircraft within specified conditions and limitations.
fe
n
The Defence AA may issue an AMTC for a new aircraft type following:
completion of all activities required by the OAR and TAR
(2)
compilation of a Type Certification Data Sheet for inclusion with the AMTC which includes a
list of applicable aircraft and approved instruments, and summarises the aircraft basis of
certification by identifying or recording:
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(1)
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a.
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MILAVREG 3.1 – AUSTRALIAN MILITARY TYPE CERTIFICATES (AMTC)
ty
MILITARY AVIATION REGULATION 3
the Certification Basis Description (CBD) and critical equivalent safety finding
ii.
the aircraft role and environment
iii.
aircraft configuration
iv.
operating and maintenance instructions
v.
limitations and special conditions.
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i.
•
GUIDANCE
recommendations by the applicable OAA and the TAA regarding the airworthiness of the
aircraft in the intended roles and environment, when operated by qualified and competent
personnel
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(3)
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While the TCDS supports issue of AMTC, the TCDS is a separate document to
AMTC.
by
(4)
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b.
•
a review by the Defence AA Airworthiness Board of the technical and operational airworthiness
activities supporting the application for an AMTC, as required by MILAVREG 4.
Following issue of an AMTC by the Defence AA, the TAA must ensure a Certificate of Airworthiness
(CoA) is issued in accordance with TAREG for each aircraft complying with the physical and
functional configuration identified in the AMTC. Until a CoA is issued, aircraft operating under an
alternate Airworthiness Instrument prior to award of AMTC may continue to operate as per that
instrument, unless direction specifically to the contrary accompanies award of AMTC.
GUIDANCE
CofA are issued against the Type Design. Where the Type Design subject to AMTC
is known, CofA may be issued prior to award of AMTC. Further guidance regarding
issue of CofA should be sought through the TAA.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 3
MILAVREG 3.2 – SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATES
a.
completion of all activities required by the OAR and TAR
(2)
amendment to the Type Certification Data Sheet which includes all changes to the aircraft CBD
resulting from the STC and documents the STC as an additional instrument
(3)
recommendations by the applicable OAA and TAA regarding the airworthiness of the modified
aircraft in the intend roles and environment, when operated by qualified and competent
personnel
(4)
a review by the Defence AA Airworthiness Board of the technical and operational airworthiness
activities supporting the application for the STC, as required by MILAVREG 4.
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b.
(1)
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Following issue of an STC by the Defence AA, the TAR must ensure certificates of airworthiness are
amended in accordance with TAREG for each modified aircraft complying with the physical and
functional configuration identified by the STC.
fe
MILAVREG 3.3 – SERVICE RELEASE
a.
Sa
The Defence AA may issue Service Release for a new aircraft type or major change to the type design
following:
issue of an AMTC or STC
(2)
completion of all activities supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft type required by
the OAR and TAR
(3)
recommendations by the applicable OAA and TAA regarding the acceptability of the
arrangements supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft in the intend roles and
environment
(4)
a recommendation by a logistics representative appointed within the command of the relevant
Service Chief regarding the acceptability of the logistics arrangements supporting the intended
roles, environment and planned usage
(5)
a review by the Defence AA Airworthiness Board of the technical, operational, and logistic
arrangements supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft, as required by
MILAVREG 4.
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The Defence AA may issue an STC for a major change to an aircraft type following:
AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 3
MILAVREG 3.4 – SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMITS
(2)
flight test in support of development, production, acceptance or operational evaluation
(3)
initial pilot training where required prior to the commencement of operations
(4)
other limited flying operations as allowed by the Defence AA.
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flight test in support of type certification activity
The Defence AA may issue an SFP to permit a limited scope of flying operations prior to Service
Release of a major change to the type design, for the purposes of:
flight test in support of type certification activity, unless authorised under an FTP issued by an
FTAA
(2)
flight test in support of development, production, acceptance or operational evaluation, unless
authorised under an FTP issued by an FTAA
(3)
initial pilot training where required prior to the commencement of operations
(4)
other limited flying operations as allowed by the Defence AA.
Sa
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(1)
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The Defence AA may issue an SFP for operations specified under MILAVREG 3.4 for a set duration
following:
completion of sufficient activities required by the OAR and TAR to support the limited scope of
operations sought under the SFP
(2)
completion of sufficient activities required by the OAR and TAR to support the ongoing
airworthiness of the aircraft type for the limited scope of operations sought under the SFP
(3)
recommendations by the applicable OAA and the TAA regarding the airworthiness of the new
or modified aircraft for the purpose and duration of the limited scope of operations sought under
the SFP
(4)
for a new aircraft, review by the Defence AA Airworthiness Board of the technical and
operational airworthiness of the aircraft for the purpose and duration of the limited scope of
operations sought under the SFP, as required by MILAVREG 4.
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c.
(1)
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b.
The Defence AA may issue an SFP to permit a limited scope of flying operations prior to Service
Release of a new aircraft for the purposes of:
D
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a.
The Defence AA may require Airworthiness Board review of a major change to the type design prior
to issue of an SFP, based on the recommendations of the applicable OAA and TAA.
e.
The Defence AA may issue an SFP to permit a limited scope of flying operations prior to
Supplemental Role Approval of a new role or substantial change to an existing role for the purposes of
flight test in support of the Supplemental Role Approval, unless authorised under an FTP issued by a
FTAA.
f.
The Defence AA may issue an SFP for operations specified under MILAVREG 3.4 for a set duration
following:
g.
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d.
(1)
completion of sufficient activities required by the applicable OAA to support the ongoing
airworthiness of the aircraft type for the limited scope of operations sought under the SFP; and
(2)
recommendation by the applicable OAA regarding the airworthiness of the aircraft for the
purpose and duration of the limited scope of operations sought under the SFP.
An applicant seeking to change or extend an existing SFP must submit an application to the Defence
AA (through DACPA) which:
(1)
describes the additional scope of activities or duration required; and
(2)
demonstrates that the activities required under MILAVREG 3.4 are sufficiently complete to
accommodate the change or extension.
h.
Changes or extensions to an SFP must only be approved by the Defence AA where the basis
established under MILAVREG 3.4 is sufficient to accommodate the proposed change.
i.
The continuing validity of an SFP must be reviewed at a date or event specified within the instrument
which is appropriate to the scope of operations to be conducted under the SFP.
AL 6
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 3
MILAVREG 3.5 – FLIGHT TEST PERMITS
a.
Except as provided under MILAVREG 3.5, an FTAA may issue an FTP to permit flight test of a
Defence registered aircraft or UAS with a valid UASOP:
in support of Supplemental Role Approval
(2)
beyond existing approved operating limitations
(3)
in a modified configuration prior to or without:
Defence AA issue of an SFP or Service Release
ii.
service release issued in accordance with TAREG 3.
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i.
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b.
(1)
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An FTAA must refer the authorisation of flight test operations to the Defence AA for conduct under an
SFP when:
the required testing is beyond the scope of the FTAA appointment
(2)
the required testing involves a new aircraft type which has not been Defence registered under an
SFP or AMTC issued by the Defence AA
(3)
the testing is significantly complex or specialised such that, in the opinion of the FTAA,
authorisation of the flight test operations is required by the Defence AA
(4)
the residual risk from an AVRM assessment of the required testing is beyond the approval level
of the FTAA.
c.
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(1)
for specific test operations with a limited duration; and
(2)
in accordance with OAREG 4.1.
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immediately prescribe operational or technical conditions or limitations regarding the operation
of an aircraft or aviation system to maintain airworthiness
(2)
immediately prescribe operational or technical conditions regarding the airworthiness
management arrangements supporting the operation of an aircraft or Aviation System
(3)
authorise or restrict a course of action to maintain or establish the airworthiness of an aircraft or
aviation system
(4)
provide interpretation or definition of an airworthiness regulation in the context of new or
unique operational circumstances
(5)
prescribe any other immediate and mandatory direction in the interests of airworthiness.
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The Defence AA may issue an AD to:
Av
(1)
MILAVREG 3.6 – AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
a.
ia
An FTP must only be issued by an FTAA:
An AD must only be cancelled, extended or changed:
at the discretion of the Defence AA
(2)
in accordance with any conditions contained in the AD which permit cancellation, extension or
amendment
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following submission to, and consideration by, the Defence AA (through DACPA) of an
application to cancel, extend or amend the AD.
An AD specifying a permanent limitation must be cancelled following incorporation as a Service
Release limitation or condition by the Defence AA following review at the next scheduled
Airworthiness Board.
AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 3
MILAVREG 3.7 – UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATING PERMIT
•
A Category 1 UAS requires AMTC and SR/SFP prior to operation. Category 4 UAS
requirements are detailed at OAREG 7.
•
Guidance on the requirements of a UASOP is contained in Section 3 Chapter 4 –
Type Certification and Service Release for Defence Registered Aircraft and Section
5 Chapter 3 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
ul
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documents supporting Categorisation determination
(2)
the UAS configuration, role and environment (CRE)
(3)
the approved SOI
(4)
approved technical configuration
(5)
the UAS Risk Analysis
(6)
the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation
(7)
operational restrictions imposed
(8)
any other limitations or special conditions
(9)
recommendation by the TAA regarding the Technical airworthiness of the UAS in the intended
CRE
(10)
inclusion of the UAS on the Defence Register
(11)
completion of other activities required by the OAR and/or TAR.
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Av
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(1)
D
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An OAA must issue a UASOP for operation of a Category 3 UAS following compilation of supporting
documentation for inclusion with the UASOP, that identifies or records:
documents supporting Categorisation determination
(2)
the UAS configuration, role and environment (CRE)
(3)
the approved SOI
(4)
approved technical configuration
(5)
the UAS Risk Analysis
(6)
the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation
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(1)
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b.
The Defence AA must issue a UASOP for operation of a Category 2 UAS following compilation of
supporting documentation for inclusion with the UASOP, that identifies or records:
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GUIDANCE
operational restrictions imposed
(8)
any other limitations or special conditions
by
(7)
completion of other activities required by the OAR and/or TAR.
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(9)
AL 6
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 4
DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
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Within the DASP, the Defence AA’s Airworthiness Board provides independent executive review and oversight
commensurate with the risk and complexity of acquisition activities and in-service operations of Defence Aviation.
This systematic consideration by experienced officers of the technical, operational, safety and logistical factors which
contribute to the safe operation of an aircraft assures that a satisfactory basis for airworthiness has been established
and is maintained. This regulation defines the requirements of members and applicants for initial and in-service
Airworthiness Boards for Defence Aviation. This executive review process may be utilised for Defence AA review of
non-Defence registered aircraft, Aviation Support Systems and UAS.
R
eg
The outcome required by this regulation is that the design, construction, operation and maintenance of any aviation
system within the scope of the DASP as defined by DI(G) OPS 02-2, is subject to appropriate oversight to assure that
an adequate basis exists to establish and sustain airworthiness.
ty
MILITARY AVIATION REGULATION 4
MILAVREG 4.2 – AIRWORTHINESS BOARD CONDUCT
ia
Av
(2)
an application for an SFP, AMTC, STC, Service Release or Category 2 UASOP, as required by
MILAVREG 3.
D
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a case supporting an in-service aircraft, as required by MILAVREG 2
At the discretion of the Defence AA, the Airworthiness Board must convene to review the operational
and technical airworthiness aspects of:
a non-Defence registered aircraft
(2)
an Aviation Support System
(3)
a Category 3 UAS.2
–
(1)
The Airworthiness Board must only convene to consider an application submitted under MILAVREG
4.2 following submission of supporting evidence by the applicant which demonstrates that:
(1)
the Certification Basis identified in the relevant AMTC TCDS remains valid for the
configuration, ongoing roles and operating environment of the aircraft; and
(2)
the supporting operational, technical and logistical arrangements are sufficiently maintaining
the airworthiness of the aircraft for operations in accordance with the current SOI and Service
Release.
by
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(1)
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The Airworthiness Board must convene to review the operational and technical airworthiness aspects
of:
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The Airworthiness Board must be comprised of at least one operational and one technical member who
meet the eligibility criteria contained in MILAVREG 1.
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a.
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MILAVREG 4.1 – AIRWORTHINESS BOARD MEMBERSHIP
Su
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d.
e.
The evidence submitted under MILAVREG 4 must include the information and documents specified in
annex A and any additional supporting information at the discretion of the Airworthiness Board.
The Airworthiness Board must only convene to consider an application submitted under MILAVREG
4 following submission of supporting evidence by the applicant which demonstrates that:
(1)
for an SFP, AMTC, STC or Category 2 UASOP, the operational and technical certification
activity required by the OAR and TAR is sufficient to ensure the airworthiness of the aircraft
within the specified roles and environment when operated by appropriately qualified and
competent personnel; and
1
Guidance material is provided in Section 3 Chapter 7 regarding the agenda and conduct for an acquisition-related
AwB and in Section 4 Chapter 4 regarding the agenda and conduct for an in-service AwB.
2
For Category 2 or 3 UAS the initial requirement for Airworthiness Board should be determined during categorisation
(see MILAVREG 7).
AL 6
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 4
(2)
f.
for a SFP or Service Release, the operational, technical and logistical supporting arrangements
are sufficient to maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft for operations in accordance with
MILAVREG 4.
The evidence submitted under MILAVREG 4.2 must include the information and documents specified
in annex B and any additional supporting information at the discretion of the Airworthiness Board.
The Airworthiness Board must raise any concerns as deemed necessary in the interests of
airworthiness.
b.
The Airworthiness Board must recommend corrective actions be issued by the Defence AA where
deemed necessary in the interests of airworthiness.
c.
The Airworthiness Board must only recommend issue of an Airworthiness Instrument or Service
Release to the Defence AA:
eg
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a.
where the OAA and the TAA have recommended issue of the Airworthiness Instrument; and
(2)
in the case of Service Release, where the OAA and the TAR have recommended Service
Release; and
(3)
where they are satisfied that the aircraft type may be safely operated and maintained in the
intended roles and environment, subject to any conditions and limitations as deemed necessary
in the interests of airworthiness.
n
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(1)
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d.
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The Airworthiness Board must only recommend continuation of Service Release to the Defence AA:
where the OAA and TAR have recommended continuation of the Service Release; and
(2)
where they are satisfied that the aircraft type will continue to be safely operated and maintained
in the intended roles and environment, subject to any conditions and limitations as deemed
necessary in the interests of airworthiness.
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GUIDANCE
•
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Such conditions and limitations may include serious deficiencies resulting from a
shortfall in the design against the certification design requirements or a shortfall in
support arrangements that warrants documentation in the AMTC or Service Release
so that the Defence AA is required to remove them. Section 3 Chapter 4 contains
further guidance on limitations to Service Release.
e.
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ACPA must record all concerns, corrective actions or recommendations raised by the Airworthiness
Board.
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Annexes:
A.
Airworthiness Board requirements for review of in-service airworthiness management of Defence Registered
Aircraft.
Airworthiness Board requirements for review of SFP, AMTC, STC and Service Release of Defence
Registered Aircraft.
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MILAVREG 4.3 – AIRWORTHINESS BOARD OUTCOMES
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AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 2 Chap 4
DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REQUIREMENTS FOR
REVIEW OF IN SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF
DEFENCE STATE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
1.
Guidance on the preparation of a summary in support of continuing Service Release of an in-service aircraft is
contained in Section 4, Chapter 4.
ul
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2.
The evidence submitted to the Airworthiness Board in support of the continuing Service Release of an
aviation system must include:
a summary of outstanding actions from the previous Airworthiness Board, including closure action;
b.
a summary of the operations conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board, including the nature
and extent of any deployed operations within the reporting period;
c.
the current TCDS and a description of any changes since the previous Airworthiness Board;
d.
a description of any changes to the SOI including any new or modified roles approved by the OAA
since the previous Airworthiness Board;
e.
a summary of the state of the relevant FMS and the adequacy of operational management activity
conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board;
f.
a summary of the state of the relevant synthetic training devices and adequacy of evaluation activity
conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board;
g.
a summary of the state of the relevant maintenance organisation and adequacy of maintenance activity
conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board;
h.
a summary of the flying safety incidents, trends and corrective or preventative actions since the
previous Airworthiness Board;
i.
a summary of the state of the relevant engineering organisation and adequacy of engineering activity
conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board;
j.
a summary of any activity conducted on the aircraft type by a specialist organisation including the
impact and outcome of such activity; and
k.
if necessary, a list of recommended limitations to the existing Service Release resulting from any
operational, technical or logistical activity since the previous Airworthiness Board.
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AAP 7001.048
4A–2
Annex A to
Sect 2 Chap 4
Blank Page
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AAP 7001.048(AM1)
Annex B to
Sect 2 Chap 4
DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REQUIREMENTS FOR
REVIEW OF SFP, AMTC, STC OR SERVICE RELEASE OF DEFENCE
STATE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
•
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Guidance on the preparation of a summary in support of an SFP, AMTC, STC or
Service Release is contained Section 3, Chapter 7.
s
NOTE
1.
The evidence submitted to the Airworthiness Board in support of a SFP, AMTC, STC or Service Release
must include:
a current version of the AAMP, documented in accordance with MILAVREG 2;
b.
the SOI as approved by the OAA;
c.
the certification basis description as endorsed by the TAA;
d.
a summary of the project activity to date;
e.
a summary of the certification history of the aircraft;
f.
a summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate compliance with:
R
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(2)
applicable operational airworthiness regulations;
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operational certification requirements; and
ia
(1)
Av
a summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate compliance with
(1)
technical certification requirements; and
(2)
applicable technical airworthiness regulations;
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g.
eg
a.
for an AMTC or STC, a Type Certification Data Sheet or update compiled in accordance with Section
3 Chapter 4;
i.
for an SFP or Service Release, a summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate that the
supporting logistical arrangements are satisfactory for the commencement of the intended scope of
operations; and
j.
a description of any outstanding issues affecting the certification or supporting arrangements of the
aircraft which impact airworthiness.
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AAP 7001.048(AM1)
4B–2
Annex B to
Sect 2 Chap 4
Blank Page
AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 5
NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT AND FOREIGN MILITARY
AIRCRAFT
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REFER OAREG 5
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 6
AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
The Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) applies to all Defence Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).
The criteria used to determine if a system or service may be an AvSS is that it:
is Defence-owned or operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence
b.
has a functional or physical interface with aircraft
c.
has the potential to compromise suitability for flight.
ul
at
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s
a.
The outcome of MILAVREG 6 is to regulate the AvSS so that suitability for flight is not compromised.
eg
AvSS DETERMINATION
ground-based, ship-based, aircraft-based or space-based; and
b.
fixed or deployable.
Sa
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a.
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R
AvSS may be:
tio
n
AvSS is viewed from a functional nature, both technically and operationally, vice being directly linked to the
organisational structure to which the service or system belongs.
Defence aerodromes
b.
Aerodrome rescue and fire fighting (ARFF)
c.
Aeronautical information
d.
Air battle management (ABM)
e.
Air cargo delivery (ACD)
f.
Air traffic management (ATM)
g.
Air weapons ranges (AWR)
h.
Meteorology (MET)
i.
Ship aviation facilities (SAF)
j.
Terminal attack control (TAC)
k.
Joint personnel recovery (JPR)
l.
Medical.
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The following systems, including their relevant sub-systems and services, are AvSS:
GUIDANCE
Before applying the requirements of MILAVREG 6 to a system not identified under
AvSS determinations, the responsible OAA should seek a determination from the
OAR or TAR (as appropriate) on whether the system should be determined as an
AvSS.
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•
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MILAVREG 6 guidance provides AvSS determination reasoning, AvSS descriptions and the manner in which an
AvSS can compromise suitability for flight.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 6
MILITARY AVIATION REGULATION 6
1
TRANSITION RESPONSIBILITIES
MILAVREG 6.1 – AvSS CONFORMANCE TO OTHER REGULATIONS
The OAR and TAR must consider AvSS compliance with International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 1988 and
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) to assure interoperability with non-Defence aviation
activities.
b.
The OAR and TAR must consider if existing Commonwealth regulations and/or controls are adequate
for achieving AvSS compliance vice being regulated under MILAVREG 6.
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MILAVREG 1.4 and MILAVREG 1.6 provide the OAR and TAR requirements
regarding the AvSS management framework.
MILAVREG 6.2 – AvSS ACQUISITION AND IN-SERVICE MANAGEMENT
The OAA must approve an AvSS Certificate (AvSSC), or equivalent document, prior to introduction
into service and ensure the AvSSC remains current for as long as the AvSS remains in–service in order
to ensure that the AvSS will not compromise suitability for flight.
b.
The OAA must approve a Statement of Operating Intent (SOI), or equivalent document, which details
the intended AvSS configuration, roles and operating environments (CRE) and provides the context of
how the AvSS will be utilised in those CRE.
c.
The OAA must approve an AvSS Management Plan (AvSSMP), or equivalent document, which details
the implementation and the ongoing in-service management.
d.
The OAA must obtain an Accomplishment Summary, or equivalent document, from the organisation
executive sponsoring the AvSS prior to AvSSC approval, which assures the SOI and AvSSMP
requirements regarding design, construction, maintenance and operation have been achieved.
e.
The TAA must ensure a Certificate of Conformance, or equivalent document, is obtained that confirms
compliance with the approved AvSS design for multiple instances of a system intended to operate
under a single AvSSC as identified in the AvSSMP.
f.
The OAA and/or TAA must ensure that a system is established that provides appropriate review of in–
service AvSS modifications that can determine if a modification is a Substantial Change, and if found
to be a Substantial Change, the AvSSC is reviewed as required.
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MILAVREG 6.3 – AvSS AUTHORITY TO OPERATE
The OAA must approve an AvSS Authority to Operate (AUTHOP) that confirms the ongoing logistic,
technical, and operational arrangements supporting the AvSS are satisfactory.
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Compliance assurance events against MILAVREG 6 align to the first planned formal compliance assurance events
against the regulations. Should an AvSS not be scheduled for an AwB in 2015, the first formal compliance events
against the regulations must align with the scheduled OAA compliance activities in 2015.
MILAVREG 6 guidance is contained in Section 5 Chapter 2.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 7
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
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An Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is that system whose components include the necessary equipment, network
and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft (UA). Depending on the system in question, such as civilian
equivalents, a UAS may also be referred to as a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS). UA are air vehicles that fly
under remote control or autonomous programming without a human operator on board. The air vehicle component of a
UAS is designed to be recovered and reused and may be classified as a UA, Remotely-Piloted Aircraft (RPA) or
Unmanned Aerial Target (UAT). Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles and other guided weapons are not
considered UA under this regulation.
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All UAS owned, leased or chartered, and operated by or on behalf of Defence, must be managed within the Defence
Aviation Safety Program (DASP). For the purposes of airworthiness management, UAS risk management is achieved
though the use of four broad UAS categories. The intended outcome of MILAVREG 7 is to assure that Defence
related UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of safety to other aircraft, people and property.
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Further guidance on the Airworthiness Management of UAS is contained in section 5, chapter 3.
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TRANSITION RESPONSIBILITIES
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Compliance assurance events against MILAVREG 7 will align with the scheduled AwB from 2015 onwards. Should
an UAS not be scheduled for an AwB in 2015, the first formal compliance assurance events against the amended
regulations will align with the scheduled OAA/OAAR compliance assurance activities.1
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The OAA must complete categorisation/re-categorisation determination process of existing UAS, delegated/or under
their oversight, by 30 Jun 15.
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The OAA may continue to operate an existing UAS IAW approved UASOP until 30 Jun 15, should transition to the
revised regulations be impractical or unachievable beforehand.
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MILITARY AVIATION REGULATION 7
MILAVREG 7.1 – UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
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The OAA must, with recommendation from the TAA and in accordance with the UAS categories in
Annex A:
(1)
make recommendation to the Defence AA to categorise a UAS as Category 1 or 2; or
(2)
categorise a UAS as Category 3.
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a.
The OAA must, in accordance with the UAS categories in Annex A, categorise a UAS as Category 4.
c.
The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows:
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(1)
Category 2 UAS: in accordance with MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration and Operation of
Aircraft under issue of a UAS Operating Permit (UASOP), unless managed as a Non-Defence
registered aircraft under MILAVREG 5.
(3)
Category 3 UAS: under issue of a UASOP, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered
aircraft under MILAVREG 5.
(4)
Category 4 UAS: in accordance with the requirements of the OAR.
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Category 1 UAS: in accordance with MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration and Operation of
Aircraft under issue of a SFP or AMTC / SR, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered
aircraft under MILAVREG 5.
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Defence AA Decision Brief: Publish DASP UAS Regulation Amendments as an Airworthiness Directive of 7 Jul 14
(AB18514571)
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d.
Sect 2 Chap 7
(1)
carry humans, or
(2)
carry or employ weapons.
A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 1 or 2 UAS to Defence service must
seek categorisation of the UAS through the relevant OAA IAW MILAVREG 7.1.a.(1).
f.
A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 3 UAS to Defence service must seek
categorisation of the UAS IAW MILAVREG 7.1.a.(2).
g.
A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 4 UAS to Defence service must seek
categorisation of the UAS IAW MILAVREG 7.1.b.
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Defence Unmanned Aircraft System Categories
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An OAA must obtain Defence AA approval for any Category UA to:
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AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 2 Chap 7
DEFENCE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM CATEGORIES
1.
The Defence UAS Categories are:
Category 1 UAS
A Category 1 UAS, when operating in the intended Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE), is a
system for which the outcome of a catastrophic failure can reasonably be expected to result in death or
serious injury, or significant damage to property.
b.
Category 1 UAS are characterised by a requirement to operate in any class of Airspace, over populated
areas.
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a.
Category 2 UAS
A Category 2 UAS, when operating in the intended CRE, is a system for which the outcome of a
catastrophic failure may result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.
b.
Category 2 UAS are characterised by a requirement to operate in any class of Airspace with
appropriate operational restriction; including limited flight over populated areas.
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Populated and sparsely populated areas are used to guide OAA risk determinations
against people and property on the ground. Category 2 UAS flight over populated
areas should not be authorised as a matter of flight planning convenience.
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A Category 3 UAS, when operating in the intended CRE, is a system for which the consequence of a
catastrophic failure is unlikely to result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.
b.
Category 3 UAS are characterised by operations in Segregated Airspace only, where the UA of the
system has a requirement to operate over sparsely populated areas, mission essential personnel and
associated property, with appropriate operational restriction.
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Exemption. MILAVREG 7 is intended to ensure UAS operations do not compromise suitability for flight
within legally enforceable airspace boundaries; however, Segregated Airspace requirements outside of
national airspace boundaries will be problematic. Where UAS operations will occur outside a country’s
national airspace, the ATMP/UASOP should list available means to ensure the UAS operation will not
compromise suitability for flight.
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Category 3 UAS
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GUIDANCE

utilising ship radar surveillance, when UA operations are within range of
the sensor;

broadcasting UAS advisory messages over marine band radio where
suitable; and

notification of UAS operations to other naval operators via mission
planning tools, such as air tasking orders.
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To satisfy the intent of MILAVREG 7, a ship operating in international waters
desiring to employ a Category 3 UAS may utilise several mitigations to ensure the
operation will not compromise suitability for flight. These might include:
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AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 2 Chap 7
a.
A Category 4 UAS, when operating in the intended CRE, is a system for which the consequence of a
catastrophic failure can reasonably be expected not to result in death or serious injury, or significant
damage to property.
b.
Category 4 UAS are characterised by the UA of the system having a collision energy contribution of
less than 42 Joules, and operations confined to airspace less than 400’AGL and greater than 3 nm from
an aerodrome.
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Operation within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome. Should operation of a CAT 4 UAS be required
within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome:
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Exemption.1 MILAVREG 7 is intended to ensure UAS operations do not compromise suitability for flight within
legally enforceable airspace boundaries; however, operational requirements may exist for Category 4 UAS to
operate within 3 nm of an aerodrome or above 400 ft AGL. Category 4 UAS are granted the following
exemptions:
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* Written agreement is required from the Senior ADF Officer (or delegate) for the relevant
Defence aerodrome that details how CAT 4 UAS operations will interact safely with other
aviation activity.
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* If an Air Traffic Service (ATS) is provided at the Defence aerodrome, written agreement is
required from the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) that details how CAT 4 UAS
operations will interact safely with other aviation activity, including a provision for the ATS
provider to suspend CAT 4 UAS operations for safety reasons.
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* Where CAT 4 operations will occur outside of ATS hours and the airspace will revert to
Class G (uncontrolled) airspace, compliance with CASR 1998 Part 101 – Unmanned Aircraft
and rockets is required.
Operation within 3 nm of a civil aerodrome. Should operation of a CAT 4 UAS be required within
3 nm of a civil aerodrome, compliance with CASR 1998 Part 101 – Unmanned Aircraft and rockets is
required.
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Operation above 400 ft AGL. Operation of CAT 4 UAS above 400 ft AGL is only permitted where:
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* Written agreement is obtained from the relevant airspace authority that details how CAT 4
UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity.
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Defence AA Decision Brief – CAT 4 UAS operations within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome or above 400 ft AGL of
12 Jun 15 (AB22283236).
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Category 4 UAS
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 2 Chap 8
FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE
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REFER OAREG 8
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AAP 7001.048(AM1)
Sect 2 Chap 9
SECTION 2
CHAPTER 9
AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT
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MILITARY AVIATION REGULATION 9
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TO BE ISSUED
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AAP 7001.048(AM1)
2
Sect 2 Chap 9
Blank Page
AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 1
AIRWORTHINESS AND AVIATION SAFETY DURING THE ACQUISITION
PROCESS OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
INTRODUCTION
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1.
Acquisition is a management process through which Defence purchases and brings into service new items of
capital equipment and appropriate supporting systems. The term is typically applied to completely new systems, such
as a new class of ship or aircraft type; however, may equally be applied to capability modifications of significant
scope and complexity. The acquisition process for a new aircraft type or capability upgrade begins during capability
development, where evolving operational requirements are defined and potential solutions investigated. The
airworthiness and aviation safety management process for that aircraft type or upgrade begins at the commencement of
these acquisition activities. Acquisition airworthiness and aviation safety management remains inextricably linked
with the acquisition process before, during and following the introduction to service of the new or modified aircraft.
Whilst the broader tasks involved with acquisition in general, such as determination of operational requirements and
assessing the effectiveness of the acquired capability, is not within the scope of airworthiness management, the
airworthiness and aviation safety of the system must support operations in all roles that are intended for the capability.
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2.
This chapter provides an overview of the acquisition airworthiness management process and to describe the
relationship between MILAVREG, OAREG and TAREG that underpin the process.
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3.
This chapter is applicable to a new acquisition or ‘Major change’ to the Type Design of a Defence registered
aircraft type. New Defence registered aircraft require Type Certification by the Defence AA. A Major change to an
existing Type Design of an aircraft is one deemed by the TAA to be of sufficient technical scope and complexity such
that Supplemental Type Certification by the Defence AA is required.
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FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
AIM OF AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
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4.
The aim of airworthiness management is to assure adequate levels of safety whilst simultaneously allowing
operational commanders to exploit capability to the maximum possible extent. Importantly, airworthiness and aviation
safety management allows commanders to make operational judgements based on a known and sustainable of their
aviation assets. Airworthiness and aviation safety regulations should not be an obstacle to capability; rather,
regulations should provide the maximum possible flexibility in their implementation in an outcome based manner. In
considering the application of the regulations, two key factors should always be considered:
Intent. What is the intent of the regulation? In other words, what hazard is being treated by complying
with the regulation? Satisfying the intent, in most cases, will satisfy the regulation.
b.
Compliance. Through what process or mechanism is compliance established? Is this method
appropriate to meet the substance or intent of the regulation?
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5.
Ultimately, the Defence AA, the OAR (both represented by DACPA) and the TAR provide authoritative
advice on the interpretation and application of the regulations. Early involvement of ACPA and DGTA–ADF staff,
along with the relevant OAA staff, in the acquisition process is essential to assist the acquisition agency to apply and
manage the airworthiness and aviation safety requirements that will underpin the capability.
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DEFENCE REGISTRATION
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6.
An important decision that occurs early in the acquisition process of a new aircraft type is whether or not the
aircraft will be ‘Defence registered’. A Defence registered aircraft type is one which has been Type Certified by the
Defence AA through issue of a Special Flight Permit (SFP) or Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC).
MILAVREG 2.1—Determination of registration, requires that virtually all Defence owned aircraft with a military
configuration and role are Defence registered.
7.
Defence registration through SFP. At the expiration of a SFP the applicable aircraft effectively ceases
to be a Defence registered aircraft unless a subsequent SFP is issued or an AMTC is issued for the type and subsequent
certificates of airworthiness are issued for each Commonwealth accepted aircraft.
8.
The decision to type certify an aircraft other than through Defence registration is to be made in accordance
with MILAVREG 2.1. Where any doubt exists, DACPA should be consulted. An existing Defence registered aircraft
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 1
undergoing a Major change to Type Design will continue to be Defence registered, except where one or more
individual aircraft are removed from the Defence Register for extensive development and test activity by an
appropriately authorised Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The determination and management of aircraft
type registration is addressed in detail in Section 3, Chapter 2.
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9.
At the inception of an acquisition project, key appointments involved with the project are identified to manage
airworthiness throughout the acquisition phase. Initially this should include an operational representative, engineering
manager and logistics manager knowledgeable with both the acquisition process, and the configuration, role and
environment of the likely aircraft type required to meet the designated capability. During the early stages of the
project, these appointments will be responsible for defining the acquisition airworthiness and aviation safety strategy
in consultation with ACPA, DGTA-ADF and the relevant OAA staff. As the project activity increases, airworthiness
authority may be delegated by the OAA to an Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR)
Acquisition (Acq) and by the TAA to a Design Acceptance representative (DAR). The requirements for delegation of
operational and technical airworthiness authority are specified at OAREG and TAREG. Appointment and
management of an acquisition team to achieve airworthiness outcomes is covered in detail in Section 3, Chapter 3.
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APPOINTMENT OF KEY PERSONNEL
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The acquisition airworthiness strategy includes the plans and processes that will be implemented to support:
a.
Type Certification and Service Release (SR) of the aircraft for Defence use in the intended roles and
environment;
b.
safe operations involving Defence personnel prior to Defence AA issue of an SFP or SR;
c.
the issue of airworthiness instruments by the Defence AA during the acquisition process; and
d.
the appropriate management of airworthiness issues that arise during the acquisition process.
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MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type, requires the
acquisition agency to maintain an AAMP for any new aircraft acquisition or Major change to the Type Design. The
AAMP must document the strategy identified above in conjunction with an Operational Airworthiness Management
Plan (OAMP), and a Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS), which are operational and technical airworthiness
documents required by OAREG 3.2.1—Operational airworthiness management strategy, and TAREG 2.2.3—Issue of
a Design Acceptance Certificate for new aircraft or Major changes. The AAMP should also identify the logistics
strategy or plan to support the airworthiness of the aircraft type at the expected rate of effort at the commencement of
operations as a Defence registered aircraft.
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12.
The AAMP should not duplicate the information contained within the OAMP, PDAS or logistics support
plans. Rather, the AAMP should focus on bringing together the outcomes of operational, technical and logistics
activities to provide a cohesive basis for airworthiness and safety before and after SR. Additional detail on the
acquisition airworthiness strategy is contained in Section 3, Chapter 3.
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Needs and Requirements phases. Formal airworthiness documentation is not normally required during
the capability development phase. However, ACPA, DGTA-ADF and OAA staff should be engaged to ensure proper
consideration of airworthiness regulations. More definition may be required if a project decides to pursue an offer
definition phase between first and second pass. In any case, regulatory agency input is recommended as the feasibility
or time to staff airworthiness instruments for a particular certification and/or test strategy can adversely affect a
program’s schedule or outcome.
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THE TYPE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
•
GUIDANCE
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Section 3, Chapter 4 contains detailed guidance on Type Certification.
14.
MILAVREG 2.4—Operation of Defence registered aircraft requires any new Defence registered aircraft or
major change to the Type Design to be Type Certified. Following selection of an aircraft type or modification to meet
capability requirements, two co-dependant factors form the basis of the Type Certification process.
a.
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The Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The SOI describes all intended aircraft roles and the
operating environment which have been derived from the capability requirements in light of the
particular aircraft type or modification chosen for acquisition. The SOI provides the operating
parameters within which the aircraft type must safely operate. The SOI is an operational airworthiness
document required by OAREG 3.2—New Aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.
AAP 7001.048
b.
Sect 3 Chap 1
The Type Design. The Type Design is comprised of the aircraft design specification to meet the
capability requirements and the SOI, a description of the aircraft type configuration, operating and
maintenance instructions, and all necessary test data, analysis and evidence which demonstrates that
the aircraft type configuration meets the specification when operated and maintained in accordance
with the approved instructions. TAREG 2.2—Type Certification, governs the technical aspects of the
Type Certification process in order to achieve an acceptable Type Design.
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15.
Certification Basis Description (CBD). The CBD provides the link between the SOI and the Type
Design. The CBD is essentially a list of airworthiness requirements against which compliance must be achieved, in
conjunction with a system safety assessment, to assure the safety of the aircraft type, when operated in accordance
with approved instructions and limitations, throughout the roles and environment in the SOI. Verification evidence in
the form of design data, analysis and test reports in conjunction with operating and maintaining instructions are used to
show compliance with each individual element of the CBD. The content and compilation of the CBD is covered in
AAP 7001.054—Airworthiness design requirements manual. Whilst the custodian of the CBD is the DAR appointed
by the TAA, the CBD itself should account for both technical and operational aspects of the design. Many CBD
elements will require assessment by operational representatives appointed by the OAAR (Acq) or FTAA.
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16.
Type Certification. Type Certification is the process through which compliance with the airworthiness
design requirements contained in the CBD is established through the development of the Type Design to meet the
operating roles and environment contained in the SOI. Once sufficient compliance findings have been established and
the operating instructions are adequately described to form a safe operating basis for the aircraft, an AMTC or STC
may be issued by the Defence AA following OAA, TAA and Airworthiness Board recommendation. MILAVREG
3.1—Australian Military Type Certificates and MILAVREG 3.2—Supplemental Type Certificates contain the Defence
AA requirements for issue of an AMTC or STC.
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17.
Statement Of Requirement (SOR). The SOR is the formal mechanism through which the
Commonwealth identifies all requirements of the commercial contracting organisation in developing and delivering
the capability, including Type Certification. The SOR will contain the specification for the aircraft type or
modification including the airworthiness design requirements that form the CBD. Additionally, the SOR articulates the
mechanisms through which compliance with the specification are demonstrated, requirements for organisations
participating in the development activity, and requirements for the delivery of data and evidence which comprises the
Type Design. In acquisition terminology, the SOR comprises the Functional Performance Specification (FPS), and the
acquisition Statement of Work. OAREG 3.2.2—OAA endorsement of the Statement of Requirement and TAREG
2.2.4—ADF Statement of Requirement for new aircraft and Major changes contain the OAR and TAR requirements
for the content and endorsement of the operational and technical airworthiness aspects of the SOR respectively.
•
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Section 3, Chapter 4 contains detailed guidance on SR.
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18.
In parallel with Type Certification activity, the acquisition agency must procure or sponsor sufficient
infrastructure and logistics support to allow the sustained safe operation of the aircraft type at the expected rate of
effort within the approved SOI roles and environment. This will include measures to ensure appropriate operational,
maintenance and engineering management arrangements are in place, there are sufficient trained and qualified
personnel to operate and maintain the aircraft type, and there are adequate logistics arrangements in place to sustain
operations at the expected rate of effort. This activity should be structured to accommodate the intended operating
purpose and roles documented in the SOI.
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19.
The SR is a declaration that these support and management arrangements are in place and are sufficient to
sustain the airworthiness of the aircraft type when operated as described in the SOI. The Defence AA may issue a SR
for a new aircraft type only after an AMTC or STC has been achieved, and following the recommendations of the
relevant OAA, TAA and the Defence AA Airworthiness Board. Deficiencies in meeting airworthiness requirements
contained in the CBD, or in the supporting arrangements may be accounted for by limiting SR. MILAVREG 3.3—
Service Release contains the Defence AA requirements for issue of a SR.
Acquisition flight test and operations prior to Service Release
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20.
Acquisition development activity normally requires the aircraft type to be flown under test conditions to
gather data and evaluate the compliance of the system with the specification. Closer to delivery to Defence, the aircraft
type may be required to undergo a period of flight testing to demonstrate that the specification requirements have been
met, and the aircraft type is acceptable for use by suitably trained and qualified Defence personnel. Additionally, each
1
Section 3, Chapters 5 and 6 contain detailed guidance on acquisition flight test and operations prior to SR.
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21.
The location of such testing will largely determine how the airworthiness for these events is managed. For a
new aircraft type, much of the early developmental flight test activity will occur at an overseas OEM facility. Such
activity will be certified under an experimental type certificate or exemption issued by the National Airworthiness
Authority (NAA), or Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) of that country. Notwithstanding, the Defence AA has
a duty of care to ensure Defence personnel participating in such testing are afforded at least an equivalent level of
safety to that provided by the DASP. MILAVREG 5 and OAREG 4 contain Defence AA and the OAR requirements
regarding the involvement of Defence personnel in such flying activity.
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production aircraft must be shown to conform physically and functionally to the Type Design via issue of a Certificate
of Airworthiness (CoA) after AMTC is awarded. Prior to AMTC, the SFP or other airworthiness instrument includes
airworthiness requirements and fulfils the role of a CoA.
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22.
For a new or non-Defence registered aircraft type, where flying operations are to be conducted within
Australia and the acquisition development activity does not yet warrant issue of an AMTC or STC and SR, the aircraft
may only be operated by Defence personnel following issue of a Defence AA temporary airworthiness instrument.
This may also include operation of individual aircraft prior to its’ transfer to the Defence Register. Depending on the
circumstances, the Defence AA temporary airworthiness instruments issued may be:
Special Flight Permit (SFP). Prior to flight testing for development, acceptance or operational
evaluation by Defence, an SFP must be issued by the Defence AA. An SFP specifies the scope of
limited operations authorised, the applicable aircraft tail numbers and the operational, maintenance and
engineering arrangements supporting the limited flying activity. This includes airworthiness
requirements for individual aircraft being accepted under the SFP. A SFP may also be used for other
limited flying activities prior to SR such as ferry flights or limited initial transition training. A SFP
Defence registers the participating aircraft. MILAVREG 3.4—Special Flight Permits stipulates the
Defence AA requirements for issue of a SFP.
b.
Airworthiness Directive (AD). Where an aircraft is to be operated temporarily by an aircraft OEM
within Australian airspace prior to transfer to the Defence Register, the OEM may be required to apply
to the CASA for an exemption from civil Type Certification requirements and from holding an Air
Operator Certificate (AOC) applicable to the intended scope of flying. An AD may be used to permit
the participation by Defence aircrew in flying activity with such an aircraft and define the terms and
controlling arrangements for such operations. MILAVREG 3.6—Airworthiness Directives stipulates
Defence AA requirements for issue of an AD.
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For a Defence registered aircraft type which has undergone a major modification, or for subsequent operations
following issue of a SFP, MILAVREG 3.5—Flight Test Permits (FTP) allows flight test of such an aircraft under a
FTP issued by an FTAA. The airworthiness management arrangements for all operations prior to SR are to be
documented in the AAMP.
ROLE OF THE DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD
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The Airworthiness Board provides an independent executive review of the acquisition activities supporting
the Type Certification and SR of a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design. Whilst all reasonable efforts
will have been made by the acquisition agency, the OAA and the TAA to ensure the system meets all necessary
airworthiness requirements, the Airworthiness Board provides an additional level of oversight to the process and a
recommendation to the Defence AA regarding the award of AMTC and SR. In some cases at the Defence AA’s
discretion, the Airworthiness Board may also be required to review a case supporting issue of a SFP. Importantly, the
Airworthiness Board will not convene to review any case for the issue of an Airworthiness Instrument without
supporting recommendations to the Defence AA through DACPA from the OAA and the TAA. To enable the
Airworthiness Board to consider an application for the issue of an airworthiness instrument, MILAVREG 4.2—
Airworthiness Board conduct requires the acquisition agency submit evidence supporting the airworthiness of the
aircraft type or major modification.
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INTRODUCTION TO SERVICE
25.
Following issue of SR by the Defence AA the aircraft may be used operationally. Often, the SR will limit
operations with a stepped approach to role expansion toward full SOI operations, and/or pending the resolution of
airworthiness issues or implementation of additional supporting arrangements. Furthermore, individual aircraft
delivered to Defence may only be used once their physical and functional configuration has been certified as meeting
the Type Design, and any deviations have been appropriately accounted for. To achieve this, the TAR requires that
CoA are issued for each individual qualifying aircraft after AMTC award. Where the SR is in respect of a major
2
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Section 3, Chapter 7 contains detailed guidance on the conduct and requirements for an acquisition Airworthiness Board.
Section 3, Chapter 8 contains detailed guidance on the considerations for the introduction to service.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 1
modification, the existing aircraft CoA must be cancelled as each aircraft enters the modification program and a new
CoA issued for each modified aircraft once an STC has been awarded and the aircraft confirmed as meeting the new
Type Design. MILAVREG 3.1—Australian Military Type Certificates, MILAVREG 3.2—Supplemental Type
Certificates, and TAREG 2.6.3—Issue of Certificates of Airworthiness, contain the requirements for CoA.
FLEET ADDITION AND NEW MODELS OF AN EXISTING AIRCRAFT TYPE
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26.
Where the acquisition agency seeks to augment a fleet or Type Certify a new model of an existing aircraft
type, the process of Type Certification and SR can be tailored according to the degree of similarity of the new aircraft
to those operating under the extant AMTC. MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register
contains the requirements for addition of such aircraft to the Defence Register.
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Section 3, Chapter 9 contains detailed guidance on addition of fleet aircraft and new models of an existing aircraft type (ie. adding aircraft under
and existing AMTC).
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 2
DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF AIRCRAFT TYPE
REGISTRATION
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 2.1—Determination of registration
MILAVREG 2.7—Removal from the Defence Register
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MILAVREG 2.8—Reinstatement to the Defence Register
INTRODUCTION
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1.
Where Defence seeks to acquire a new aircraft type, the strategy for registration of the aircraft will largely
determine the overarching airworthiness and aviation safety requirements that are applied to most aspects of the
design, construction, maintenance and ongoing support of the aircraft. Whilst most Defence aircraft will require
Defence registration, there are some circumstances where the application of a non-Defence registered aircraft will be
appropriate. MILAVREG 2.1—Determination of registration contains the requirements regarding the determination of
registration.
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2.
Where an existing Defence registered aircraft is undergoing a Major change to the Type Design, the
acquisition strategy may include removal of one or more individual aircraft from the Defence Register. Where an
acquisition strategy is implemented that includes removal and reinstatement of Defence registered aircraft, specific
requirements must be observed to ensure the airworthiness continuum of the aircraft is not compromised.
MILAVREG 2.7—Removal from the Defence Register and MILAVREG 2.8—Reinstatement to the Defence Register
contain the requirements regarding removal and reinstatement of aircraft to the Defence Register.
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3.
The purpose of MILAVREG 2 is to describe the considerations for determining the registration requirements
for new aircraft acquired by Defence, and to describe the process through which Defence registered aircraft may be
removed and reinstated to the Defence Register.
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DETERMINATION OF REGISTRATION
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4.
Most aircraft types acquired for Defence use are Defence registered. However, MILAVREG 2.1 accounts for
situations where Type Certification other than through Defence registration may be acceptable. The decision regarding
the registration of an aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence will be determined through consideration of three
main factors:
configuration and role
b.
aircraft ownership
c.
duration and type of operation by Defence.
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CONFIGURATION AND ROLE
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5.
Where an aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence is operating in a military configuration and role, the
aircraft must be Defence registered. Civil type certification requirements do not take into account the complexities of
military operation and are inadequate to form the full basis of certification of a military specific aircraft type.
Examples of military roles include, tactical air combat, strike and reconnaissance, tactical airlift, maritime patrol, close
air support, etc. Aircraft operated in these roles by Defence will be listed on the Defence Register. Where an aircraft
type is not specifically performing these roles, but is of such a configuration that the design basis of the aircraft clearly
intends a military role, then the aircraft may also be Defence registered. Examples where this might not occur include
aircraft belonging to the military, customs or police forces of a foreign country that are operating within Australian
airspace. Such foreign aircraft operations are permitted by recognised countries on the basis that the aircraft type is
foreign registered within the country of origin.
6.
Defence aircraft operating in a configuration and role substantially similar to an equivalent civil aircraft type
may, at the discretion of the Defence AA and with the agreement of CASA, undergo type certification as a nonDefence registered aircraft only where the certification basis is essentially equivalent to a civil aircraft operating under
an existing type certificate issued by a recognised NAA. In this instance, the aircraft type certificate would be issued
by CASA, however under the definition of ‘State Aircraft’ in the Act, the Defence AA is obliged to ensure the civil
type certification remains applicable and airworthiness management of the aircraft continues to be acceptable. The
operational airworthiness management of any civil registered aircraft utilised by Defence aircrew and flying
organisations, remains the responsibility of the OAA in command of the operating organisations.
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The Defence AA prefers that all aircraft owned and operated by Defence are Defence registered, however as
previously described, the Defence AA will accept that a civil type certification provides an acceptable level of safety
under some circumstances. Where a civil aircraft type is leased for long term use by Defence, non-Defence registration
may also be acceptable due the conditions of the lease or any existing civil type certificate and civil accreditation of
engineering and maintaining organisations already in place. Where the aircraft is not owned by Defence and the
duration of a lease or agreement for operation by Defence personnel or on behalf of Defence is relatively short,
Defence registration will most likely be impractical. The Defence AA will consider the appropriateness of the
registration and airworthiness management arrangements for non-Defence-registered aircraft to be acquired by
Defence on a case by case basis through examination of the AAMP developed by the acquisition agency.
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AIRCRAFT OWNERSHIP AND DURATION OF OPERATION
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8.
Guidance on operations involving commercial owned aircraft operated by Defence personnel for the purposed
of acquisition flight test and development prior to Defence registration is contained in Section 3, Chapters 5 and 6.
MILAVREG 5—Airworthiness management of non-Defence-registered aircraft and foreign military aircraft contains
the Defence AA’s requirements for the operation and management of non-Defence-registered aircraft. Section 5,
Chapter 1 contains guidance on the airworthiness management of non-Defence-registered aircraft and foreign military
aircraft. Technical airworthiness requirements regarding the acquisition of leased civil aircraft are contained in
TAREG 2.7.
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APPLICATION FOR DEFENCE REGISTRATION
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9.
Upon government approval of an acquisition, the agency responsible for bringing a Defence registered aircraft
type into Defence service is required to apply to DACPA for the issue of a unique AI. The AI is a key reference, used
to both identify the aircraft type, and also within the logistics management system as a key element of technical
management codes. The acquisition agency must then maintain an Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan
(AAMP), which identifies the overarching airworthiness strategy that will be utilised to achieve Type Certification and
Service Release of the aircraft type in the intended operational roles and environment. Similarly, an agency seeking to
make a major modification to an aircraft type, which requires Defence AA issue of a STC and Service Release, must
maintain an AAMP which satisfies the Defence AA’s requirements.
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10.
For new aircraft types, the agency responsible for bringing specific aircraft into service must nominate the tail
numbers for each individual aircraft. The tail numbers will be listed on the Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) and
each tail number is appended to the AI to form each aircraft’s specific registration number. Tail numbers are typically
derived from the last three digits of a manufacturer’s build (or serial) number (eg a manufacturer serial number of
XX5440 may become aircraft serial number 440 for a given type). In cases where additional aircraft have been
purchased and a large production number of the type has meant a possible duplication of tail numbers, a unique
numbering system must be applied. In most cases this will be a sequential numbering that does not conflict with that of
the previous numbering, eg from 001 onwards.
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A Defence registered aircraft registration number is formatted as the AI followed by a hyphen and then the
tail number. For example, AP–3C Orion aircraft are registered A9–751 to A9–760 and A9–656 to A9–665, where
‘A9’ denotes the aircraft type as an AP–3C Orion and the hyphenated three digit number identifies each individual
aircraft of that type.
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Regulations regarding the acquisition and Defence registration process are contained in MILAVREG 2.
Requirements for AMTC, STC, SFP and Service Release (SR) are contained in MILAVREG 3—Airworthiness
Instruments. Guidance on the process of acquisition airworthiness management and Defence registration of aircraft is
contained in Section 3.
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ADDITION, REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER
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REQUIREMENT FOR AN AIRCRAFT TO BE REGISTERED
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13.
MILAVREG 2.1 provides Regulations governing when a Defence registered or non-Defence aircraft may be
operated by or on behalf of Defence. The term ‘operated’ is defined as any activity involving an aircraft which may
lead to the aircraft becoming airborne. For a fixed wing aircraft, this is usually when the aircraft speed in a high speed
taxi approaches a speed which may result in flight. For rotor-wing aircraft, this is where the aircraft engine is turning
and is engaged to the main rotor.
ADDITION OF NEW AIRCRAFT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER
14.
An aircraft may be added to the Defence Register through a number of processes:
a.
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through inclusion of the tail number in a SFP
AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 2
b.
through issue of AMTC
c.
through addition of aircraft to the Defence Register post issue of AMTC where the additional aircraft
were considered as part of the initial Service Release
d.
through the fleet addition process of MILAVREG 2.9
e.
through another process approved, such as issue of an AD.
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15.
Addition of aircraft through issue of AMTC. The Accomplishment Summary prepared to support issue
of an AMTC and Service Release should identify all aircraft approved for acquisition, which are to be operated under
the AMTC and Service Release. An application for AMTC must include a draft TCDS. The draft TCDS should list all
aircraft to be operated under the AMTC at the time the AMTC is issued. Where the draft TCDS also includes aircraft
which have not been confirmed as conforming to the Type Design, the TCDS should indicate this. By including all
aircraft to be operated under the Service Release within the Accomplishment Summary, the TAA, OAA and AwB can
consider the Service Release provisions in place for all aircraft including those yet to be added to the Defence
Register. Where all aircraft to be operated under the Service Release are listed in the Accomplishment Summary at the
time AMTC is issued, there is no requirement to complete the MILAVREG 2.9 process to add tail numbers to the
Defence Register.
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Once the Defence AA has issued AMTC and Service Release for an aircraft type, all aircraft already listed on
the Defence Register will be considered to be operating under the AMTC. The Defence Register is to be updated to
indicate that the Defence registered aircraft are operating under the AMTC. The DAR is to issue Certificates of
Airworthiness as required by TAREG 2.6.3 and advise ACPA and the TAA within 28 days of the issue of AMTC.
Aircraft already on the Defence Register may continue to operated under the AMTC and Service Release during this
period.
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Addition of aircraft post issue of AMTC. Where an AMTC has been issued and the Service Release
aspects have already been approved by the Defence AA to cover additional aircraft, an applicant wishing to add new
aircraft to the Defence Register must request that DACPA approve the addition of the new aircraft to the Defence
Register. The application should provide ACPA with the following information:
the manufacturers serial number and corresponding proposed aircraft tail number
b.
confirmation that the Commonwealth has Accepted the aircraft
c.
confirmation that the aircraft is not on any other aircraft register, which may be either:
confirmation that the aircraft has never been registered on an aircraft register, or
(2)
evidence that the aircraft has been removed from the previous aircraft register (eg. a copy of the
‘Loss Message’ or temporary airworthiness instrument which clearly stated an expiration date
or event for aircraft registration)
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confirmation that the aircraft conforms to the Type Design of the aircraft, or that all deviations have
been Accepted, which may be provided:
(1)
prior to issue of AMTC, normally under an SFP, through evidence that the DAR has competed
a verification process verifying that the aircraft confirms to the documented Type Design; or
(2)
post issue of AMTC, through evidence that the DAR has issued a Certificates of Airworthiness
for each aircraft.
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18.
Where an AMTC has been issued and the Service Release aspects have already been approved by the
Defence AA to cover additional aircraft, a TAA and OAA position is not required. Where the Defence AA has not
previously considered the Service Release implications of adding new aircraft to the Register, MILAVREG 2.9
applies.
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REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT OF AIRCRAFT ON THE DEFENCE REGISTER
19.
Aircraft may be removed from the Defence Register under several conditions including the following:
a.
Disposal (sale, termination or expiry of lease).
b.
Determined to have Category 5 damage (crashed, written off or destroyed).
c.
Reduction to spares or reclassification to training aids.
d.
When subject to extended modifications and test activities by an aircraft OEM.
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21.
Aircraft that are leased by Defence must be removed from the Defence Register upon termination of a
contracted lease or on the expiry of a lease, at which time registration of the aircraft will be transferred (in most cases)
back to the Australian Civil Register.
REMOVAL FROM THE DEFENCE REGISTER
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The requirement to remove an aircraft from the Defence Register usually originates from the logistics
management or acquisition organisation responsible for the management or modification of an aircraft type, in
conjunction with the Capability Manager.
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A Defence registered aircraft type undergoing an extensive capability upgrade that introduces a Major change
to the Type Design may be required to operate for a period of time as a non-Defence-registered aircraft. Usually, all
required acquisition and modification activity can be achieved without the need to remove an aircraft from the
Defence Register. An acquisition agency should only consider temporary removal from the Defence Register as part of
their airworthiness strategy as a last resort. Reasons to adopt this approach may include:
the unavailability or incapacity of existing Defence agencies to authorise or conduct the required
developmental flying activity; or
b.
the requirement to register a Defence aircraft under a national or military airworthiness authority of a
foreign country for development and modification by an OEM.
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When necessary under these conditions, MILAVREG 2.7 requires the acquisition agency to apply to DACPA
for temporary removal of an aircraft from the Defence Register. The application is to justify the necessity for removal
of the aircraft from the Defence Register and describe or reference the strategy to ensure that the aircraft will be
returned in a known state of airworthiness which is satisfactory to the OAA and TAA. This strategy may be captured
in the Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan required by MILAVREG 2.3. The strategy adopted will largely
depend on whether or not the aircraft is to be operated within Australian airspace or by Defence aircrew following
removal from the Defence Register.
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Participation of Defence personnel in production acceptance testing, ferry flights, flight testing or other
limited flying operations before an aircraft is Defence registered, or while temporarily non-Defence registered, is
governed by MILAVREG 5 The airworthiness arrangements required by these regulations are to be documented in
the AAMP, including identification of the flying management systems and procedures implemented to ensure
airworthiness is maintained for operations involving Defence personnel.
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Aircraft temporarily removed from the Defence Register for the purposes of modification, test or upgrade by
an aircraft OEM must be sufficiently managed to ensure the airworthiness condition is known and is acceptable prior
to reinstatement.
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Removal from the Defence Register for operations within Australian airspace. DACPA will
only approve an application to remove an aircraft from the Defence Register for acquisition development and test
activity within Australia when there are no other means available to authorise the necessary operation of the aircraft
within the DASP. For an aircraft type with a military configuration or role, the subsequent non-Defence operating
organisation may be required to apply to CASA for an exemption from civil type certification requirements and from
holding an Air Operators Certificate applicable to the intended scope of flying. Where such an exemption is granted,
or where CASA is otherwise satisfied that the organisation may safely operate the aircraft within Australia, DACPA
will direct the transfer of the relevant aircraft from the Defence Register. Any involvement of Defence personnel in the
flying activity or where airworthiness management responsibilities are assigned to Defence by CASA, the
Defence AA will issue a temporary airworthiness instrument (AD) that stipulates any requirements for the
participation of Defence Personnel. CASA may require concurrence from Defence that the aircrew required to operate
the aircraft under the temporary civil registration are appropriately trained, qualified and current. Such determinations
may be made by the relevant OAA of the aircraft type or the relevant FTAA, with conditions applicable to the
operational airworthiness management of the aircraft specified in the AD.
28.
Removal from the Defence Register for operations outside Australian airspace. DACPA will
approve an application to remove an aircraft type from the Defence Register for acquisition development and test
activity outside Australian airspace when the test aircraft are required to be registered under an experimental type
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The disposal process usually occurs through a ministerial approval that is sought by the Capability Manager.
The agency responsible for Defence disposals will effect the disposal of an aircraft and the appropriate logistics
management agency is responsible for stripping the aircraft of classified components and removing military markings,
as required. ACPA is usually notified by the disposal agency of the completion of disposal action, including the
ministerial documentation. Upon receipt of disposal correspondence, ACPA staff will remove the aircraft from the
Defence Register, annotating the type of disposal action and, where appropriate, inform new owners of the respective
aircraft’s removal.
AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 2
certificate or exemption from a recognised NAA or MAA of a foreign country. A recognised NAA or MAA is one
whose airworthiness system has been determined and documented by the TAA and the Defence AA as providing at
least an equivalent level of safety to that provided by Defence. Following agreement by the relevant NAA or MAA,
DACPA may transfer the aircraft off the Defence Register. Operations with such an aircraft by Defence personnel are
subject to the provision of MILAVREG 5 and OAREG 4. The acquisition related involvement of Defence personnel in
such flying activities is covered in more detail in Section 3, Chapters 5 and 6.
CHANGES TO CONFIGURATION AND ROLE DURING NON–DEFENCE REGISTRATION
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29.
Prior to transfer off the Defence Register, DACPA must be satisfied that the aircraft will be returned in an
airworthy condition. Such a condition may include:
where a minor change to the aircraft Type Design has been made during any period of non–Defence
registration; or
b.
where a Major change to the Type Design has been made.
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The TAR must be satisfied that the organisations conducting any design, modification and maintenance
activity on the aircraft are subject to an acceptable regulatory system, and will therefore adequately carry out and
record any design, modification and maintenance activity on the aircraft. The design and maintenance organisations
may have already achieved an authorisation from the TAR for an inclusive scope of acquisition activity, or may be
subject to the requirements of an NAA or MAA recognised by the TAR.
REINSTATEMENT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER
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Lastly, the terms of the loan of the aircraft to the non–Defence organisation must be specified in a formal
agreement which is acceptable to the relevant OAA and TAA. The agreement should specify the requirements for the
return of the aircraft to the Defence Register, and the process to certify any modification to the aircraft configuration
or role.
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Minor or no change to the Type Design. Where an aircraft has undergone a minor or no change to the
Type Design, DACPA may approve the aircraft’s return to the Defence Register. This requires the DAR to reissue the
aircraft’s certificate of airworthiness, and requires the endorsement of both the TAA and relevant OAA. The TAA and
the relevant OAA must be satisfied that the existing Service Release for the aircraft type remains valid and that:
any minor design change to the aircraft is treated in accordance with technical airworthiness
regulations
b.
any new or modified role or capability resulting from a minor design change is treated in accordance
with operational airworthiness regulations
c.
substantial changes to the aircraft role or capability undergo Supplemental Role Approval in
accordance with OAREG 3.5 prior to re-commencement of in-service operations with the modified
aircraft.
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Major change to the Type Design. Where an aircraft has been subject to a Major change to the Type
Design during the period of non-Defence registration, the aircraft may only be returned to the Defence Register
following issue of an SFP or STC by the Defence AA. Further guidance on Type Certification, Service Release and
operations under an SFP are contained in Section 3, Chapters 4 and 6. Where the acquisition airworthiness strategy
includes incorporation and de-modification of a Major change to the Type Design during the period of non-Defence
registration, the acquisition agency and the aircraft DAR should seek advice from the TAA regarding the requirements
for reinstatement to the Defence Register.
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ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE
REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 1.5—Operational Airworthiness Authorities
MILAVREG 1.7—Technical Airworthiness Authority
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MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type
INTRODUCTION
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1.
Early in the acquisition process, a strategy for the airworthiness management of the acquisition activities must
be implemented. The strategy normally includes delegation of authority to key personnel, and appropriate technical
and operational airworthiness management plans to ensure that the acquisition activities will assure the airworthiness
of the aircraft, both prior to Service Release during development, and in the SOI roles and environment following
Service Release.
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MILAVREG 1.5—Operational Airworthiness Authorities and MILAVREG 1.7—Technical Airworthiness
Authority allow OAAs and the TAA to delegate their authority in accordance with Operational Airworthiness
Regulations (OAREG) and Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREG), including authority for acquisition
activities. MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type requires the
acquisition agency to maintain an Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP) for new aircraft acquisitions,
or Major changes to the Type Design.
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This chapter describes the overarching principles for the airworthiness management of acquisition activities
within the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP).
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APPLICABILITY
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This chapter is applicable to all acquisition activities to introduce a new Defence registered aircraft type, or
make a Major change to the Type Design of an existing Defence registered aircraft type.
OVERVIEW
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Acquisition airworthiness management encompasses a number of elements of the acquisition process. The
main considerations include:
delegation of authority to personnel and organisations to conduct and manage aviation safety during
acquisition
b.
formulation and implementation of a strategy to manage the airworthiness and safety of flying
activities involving Defence personnel prior to Service Release
c.
formulation and implementation of a strategy to achieve Type Certification and Service Release.
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ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT PLANNING
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6.
The AAMP required by MILAVREG 2.3 is the top level mechanism through which each of these elements
are managed. The AAMP is supported by subordinate technical, operational and logistics strategies to assure
airworthiness throughout the acquisition process.
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DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
7.
A fundamental premise of the DASP is that competent individuals are appointed or delegated airworthiness
authority within their area of training, qualification and experience. MILAVREG 1.5—Operational Airworthiness
Authorities, MILAVREG 1.6 – Technical Airworthiness Regulator, and MILAVREG 1.7—Technical Airworthiness
Authority allow the OAA, TAR and TAA to make such delegations in accordance with OAREG and TAREG. In the
acquisition context, operational and technical airworthiness authority is delegated to appropriately competent
personnel to ensure that sound decisions and judgements are made regarding the operational and technical design
characteristics of the new aircraft type or major change. Fundamentally, the operational and technical delegates are
responsible for ensuring that the new aircraft or Major change is operationally and technically acceptable, and that
appropriate supporting arrangements are in place to sustain the airworthiness of the aircraft following Service Release.
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9.
Technical Airworthiness Authority delegation. TAREG 1.2 contains the TAR’s requirements for
delegation of technical airworthiness authority. The TAR may delegate an appropriately qualified and competent
person as a Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) to determine the technical acceptability of an aircraft for service
use on the TAR’s behalf. The authority required to act as a DAR for a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type
Design is usually specified in the scope of a written delegation provided by the TAR. TAREG 2 contains the majority
of the TAR requirements for the conduct of acquisition activities by the DAR.
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8.
Operational Airworthiness Authority delegation. OAREG 1.2.2 allows an OAA to appoint through a
written delegation an Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative Acquisition (OAAR(Acq)), who may
exercise airworthiness authority on behalf of the OAA for a specified scope of acquisition activities. For a new aircraft
type or Major change to the Type Design of an existing aircraft, OAREG 3 describes the responsibilities typically
delegated to an OAAR(Acq).
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10.
Unlike OAREG, TAREG do not discriminate between a DAR delegation for in-service and acquisition
activities. The reason two separate delegations are specified in the OAREG is because the activities performed by an
OAAR are distinct from those performed by an OAAR(Acq). An OAAR is primarily concerned with operational
airworthiness relating to the operation and management of in-service aircraft types. An OAAR(Acq) is primarily
concerned with the operational airworthiness impact of the design characteristics of the new or modified aircraft.
Conversely, an aircraft DAR is concerned with the technical acceptability of a design regardless of whether the aircraft
is a new type, undergoing a major modification, or undergoing a minor in-service modification.
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ACQUISITION ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
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11.
Flight Test Approval Authority delegation. MILAVREG 1.8 allows a FTAA to delegate a defined
scope of Flight Test activity to a suitably qualified representative. Acquisition activity to introduce a new aircraft type
will normally include an extensive program of ground and flight testing to verify that the development activity
demonstrates specification requirements have been met. In such cases, a more appropriate OAAR(Acq) appointment
during the development phase may be a Qualified Test Pilot (QTP) nominated by an FTAA. Appointment of a QTP as
the OAAR(Acq) for an acquisition involving a Major change to the Type Design may be appropriate in some
circumstances, however the relevant OAA and FTAA should agree on the required delegation of authority on a case
by case basis. Some circumstances may require a QTP or other flight test systems specialist as a part of the acquisition
team, with operational airworthiness responsibility retained by the OAAR(Acq).
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12.
At the inception of an acquisition project for a new aircraft or major change to the Type Design, the
acquisition agency will be required to appoint personnel responsible for various aspects of the required capability.
Notwithstanding project management and financial functions, a component of the project team will comprise
personnel responsible for performing activities related to the technical and operational airworthiness, and the logistics
support of the new capability. The project management strategy adopted may vary significantly from project to
project, however the acquisition agency must ensure that the organisational arrangements satisfy the Defence AA’s
requirements for airworthiness management.
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Prior to making determinations relevant to the development of the Functional Performance Specification
(FPS) or the acquisition Statement of Work (SOW) which comprise the SOR, the relevant OAA and the TAA should
appoint an OAAR(Acq) and a DAR with a scope of airworthiness management responsibility relevant to the
acquisition activities to be performed. Such appointments may be within or outside the project management structure,
depending on the stage of the project or the scope of the acquisition. A typical initial project organisational structure
showing lines of airworthiness authority is shown in Figure 3–1. Solid lines represent a direct management or
command relationship and dashed lines represent the airworthiness management relationships. In this scenario, the
OAAR(Acq) and DAR remain external to the project structure, however are responsible for ensuring the project staff
are sufficiently supported to conduct acquisition activities in cognisance of airworthiness requirements.
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Sect 3 Chap 3
OPERATING
COMMAND
DGTA-ADF
TAR
OAA
OAAR(ACQ)
PROJECT
OTHER
PROJECT
FUNCTION
AUTHORISED
ENGINEERING
ORGANISATION
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LOG
MANAGER
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DAR
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ACQUISITION ORGANISATION
FIGURE 3–1 INITIAL PROJECT AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
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14.
A more mature project structure indicative of a new aircraft acquisition after a formal contract with an OEM
has been established is shown in Figure 3–2. In this scenario the aircraft OAAR(Acq) and DAR are within the project
organisation. For the acquisition of a new aircraft type, this structure may be suitable until Service Release where
elements of airworthiness authority will transition to an operating command and in-service engineering and
maintenance organisations. This management structure provides the acquisition project with a large degree of
autonomy and flexibility in conducting acquisition activities; however the OAREG and TAREG require that the
operational and engineering activities are conducted within an appropriate flying management system and an
authorised engineering organisation.
OPERATING COMMAND
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FTAA
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FLIGHT TEST ORG
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AUTHORISED
ENGINEERING
ORGANISATION
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ENGINEERING
MANAGER
(DAR)
LOGISTICS
MANAGER
FLYING
MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM
FLIGHT TEST
MANAGER (QTP
AND OAAR(ACQ))
PROJECT
ENGINEERING
STAFF
PROJECT
LOGISTICS
STAFF
PROJECT
TEST/
OPERATIONAL
STAFF
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OTHER
PROJECT
FUNCTIONS
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
FIGURE 3–2 –MATURE PROJECT AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR A NEW
AIRCRAFT TYPE
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Sect 3 Chap 3
15.
Ultimately, the organisational structure of the acquisition project should suit the scope and complexity of the
capability under development without compromise or ambiguity of airworthiness control. The acquisition
organisational structure should also be supported by a network of operational, design and test specialists and agencies.
OAA, ACPA, DGTA–ADF and a relevant FTAA staff should be consulted early in the project to provide advice
regarding the development of the acquisition organisational and supporting structures.
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16.
OAREG 3.2.1 and TAREG 2.2.3 require that the OAAR(Acq) and the DAR document the airworthiness
strategy through which the airworthiness of the new capability will be demonstrated. MILAVREG 2.3 requires that the
acquisition agency identify the overarching strategy to combine the operational and technical activities to enable the
introduction to service of the new capability. These plans should be developed at the commencement of acquisition
activities. MILAVREG 2.3 requires the acquisition agency to develop and maintain an AAMP from the
commencement of acquisition activities. This effectively means prior to the development of the SOR, or activities
which significantly contribute to the SOR, such as a Request for Tender or similar document.
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ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT PLANS AND STRATEGIES
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17.
If a particular airworthiness management strategy is central to a project’s timeframes and will be included in
RFT or contract documentation, the desired strategy should be documented by the project and endorsed by the TAA,
the relevant OAA and DACPA prior to RFT release or the commencement of contract negotiations.
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18.
Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP). The OAMP describes the strategy and scope
of operational airworthiness activities and responsibilities identified to achieve and maintain operational airworthiness
prior to and following Service Release. The OAMP identifies the organisational arrangements, personnel, processes
and supporting networks that have been or will be implemented to achieve the required operational airworthiness
outcomes. Additionally, the OAMP is required to identify the approved SOI, operational input to the development of
the SOR, and a strategy to assess critical operational aspects of the design in support of compliance finding and
Design Acceptance by the aircraft DAR. Applicable aspects of the acquisition derived OAMP should be included in
the in-service OAMP (normally at the OAA/OAAR level) at the appropriate point of transition into service.
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Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS). The PDAS is a technical airworthiness document
required to similarly identify the organisational arrangements, personnel, processes and supporting networks that have
been implemented to achieve the required technical airworthiness outcomes. The PDAS also documents the
development of the SOR to confirm that the Certification Basis Description is adequate, and that sufficient evidence
exists or will be provided to justify recognition of prior certification by recognised airworthiness authorities. Due to
the similar aim of both the OAMP and the PDAS, these documents could be combined where convenient, however
OAAR(Acq) and TAA endorsement of the relevant parts of the document is required.
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Logistics Support Plans. MILAVREG 2.3 identifies the requirement to demonstrate that the logistics
arrangements implemented to support operational and technical airworthiness are adequate to sustain operations in
accordance with the approved SOI. OAAR(Acq) and DAR input and review of logistics support plans and activities is
important to ensure that appropriate measures will be available to support the introduction to service. The OAAR(Acq)
must be satisfied that the planned operational infrastructure, such as training devices and syllabi, aircrew publications
and procedures, and other flying management system arrangements are adequate. The DAR must be satisfied that
appropriate technical infrastructure is provided, such as authorised engineering and approved maintenance
organisations, ground crew training and technical publications to support operations at the required rate of effort.
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21.
Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP). The AAMP is required to identify the overall
strategy to introduce the new aircraft type or major change to service. Importantly, the AAMP should not duplicate the
content of the PDAS or the OAMP. Rather, the AAMP should provide the context for development of these
subordinate documents, identifying the overarching acquisition airworthiness strategy and bringing together the
planned outcomes of the operational, technical and logistical activity to provide a cohesive basis for the airworthiness
of the aircraft before and after Service Release. The audience of the AAMP is the acquisition project staff and
supporting agencies, the OAA, TAA, FTAA and the Defence AA. The Defence AA requirements for the content of an
AAMP include the following:
Endorsement. MILAVREG 2.3 requires that the AAMP is endorsed by the TAA, DACPA and the
relevant OAA, and approved by the Project Manager to confirm that the identified strategy is realistic
and achievable. Airworthiness strategies relying substantially on flight test by Defence agencies should
include endorsement by the relevant FTAA.
b.
Scope. The AAMP should describe the scope of acquisition activity to meet the capability
requirements. The scope should include a brief description of the aircraft or technical equipment under
acquisition and a summary of the required aircraft roles and environment. Reference to the approved
SOI may be included to cover much of this detail. The aim of this section is to provide the audience
with an understanding of the operating requirements which will drive the design activity.
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Sect 3 Chap 3
Acquisition schedule. The AAMP should identify the planned acquisition phases and a schedule of
key milestones for the operation of the aircraft. The schedule should include the duration of the major
activities supporting the introduction to service and identify when supporting Airworthiness
Instruments are required to be issued by the Defence AA. The aim of this section is to identify
achievable objectives for the introduction of the capability which can be supported by the DASP.
d.
Responsible organisations and personnel. The AAMP should identify the delegation and
organisational mechanisms through which airworthiness authority for the acquisition activities will be
assigned. This should include the level of oversight or support to be provided by the TAA, OAA and
an FTAA, and a list of supporting organisations and their function. Much of the detail of this section
may subsequently reside in the OAMP and PDAS in which case the AAMP need only include a brief
summary and reference to the supporting documentation. The aim of this section is to identify the key
personnel and organisations directly involved with or supporting the acquisition activities.
e.
Certification Basis Description (CBD). The AAMP should contain or provide reference to the
CBD against which compliance of the Type Design must be demonstrated to meet the approved SOI.
f.
Strategy. The AAMP should identify the strategy to achieve Type Certification and Service Release
of the new aircraft or major change. This should typically describe the methodology adopted to
compile the CBD and include the mechanisms through which the acquisition agency plans to meet the
technical and operational certification requirements. The strategy should draw on or reference
information contained in the OAMP, PDAS, logistics plans and other documents as required to
describe compliance with operational and technical regulatory requirements and how Type
Certification and Service Release will be achieved. Section 3, chapter 4 provides detailed guidance on
Type Certification and Service Release.
g.
Operations prior to Service Release. The AAMP should identify any planned operations
involving Defence personnel during the acquisition development activity. The description should
include any operations to be conducted under a type certificate or exemption issued by a foreign
National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) or Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA). The AAMP
should identify what airworthiness arrangements have been or will be implemented to ensure an
appropriate level of safety is provided for operations involving Defence personnel, including Defence
AA recognition of foreign airworthiness authority were necessary. Where operation within Australia
will be required under a temporary airworthiness instrument, the AAMP should identify, in
conjunction with the schedule and strategy, the likely scope of operations, timeframe and duration of
operations to be authorised. Further guidance on the management of acquisition related operations
prior to Service Release is contained in section 3, chapters 5 and 6.
h.
Introduction to service. The AAMP should describe how the acquisition agency intends to
transition the new aircraft or major change into Defence service. This should include allocation and
addition of aircraft tail numbers to the Defence Register, transfer of individual and organisational
airworthiness authority, and the implementation of adequate and timely arrangements to support the
planned build up of operations following Service Release. Further guidance on the introduction to
service is contained in section 3, chapter 8.
i.
Resolution of airworthiness issues. Finally, the AAMP should identify a mechanism to manage
and resolve airworthiness issues that arise during the acquisition activity. Airworthiness issues may
include any design or operating feature which precludes a finding of compliance with an airworthiness
standard in the CBD, resulting in an operating limitation or other mitigating strategies to assure the
safety of operations until the issue can be resolved. Further guidance on managing airworthiness issues
is contained in section 3, chapter 4.
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INVOLVEMENT OF DGTA-ADF, ACPA AND OAA STAFF
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22.
DGTA–ADF, ACPA and the relevant OAA staff will be involved with the acquisition activity throughout the
life of the project. This should begin at project inception to ensure the ongoing level of interaction and oversight
required is agreed. Initial project activities will include development of the AAMP, OAMP and PDAS in consultation
with the airworthiness authorities and relevant specialist agencies. Initially, these documents need only outline the
anticipated arrangements and strategy to identify applicable airworthiness management requirements. The AAMP,
OAMP and PDAS will need to be mature prior to receiving OAA and TAA endorsement of the SOR for the required
capability.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
TYPE CERTIFICATION AND SERVICE RELEASE FOR DEFENCE
REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 2.1—Determination of registration
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MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type
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MILAVREG 2.4—Operation of Defence registered aircraft
MILAVREG 3.1—Australian Military Type Certificates
MILAVREG 3.2—Supplemental Type Certificates
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MILAVREG 3.3—Service Release
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INTRODUCTION
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PURPOSE
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1.
Type Certification and Service Release are the means through which an airworthy basis to operate a Defence
registered aircraft is established. The Defence AA issues AMTC to signify the completion of sufficient design, test and
certification activities to meet established airworthiness standards to operate safely within specific roles and
environment. The Service Release is a declaration by the Defence AA that the infrastructure, personnel training and
availability, organisations, and supporting arrangements are sufficient to support operations within the designated roles
at a sustained rate of effort. The Type Certification process begins at the commencement of acquisition activities for
new aircraft or Major changes to the Type Design.
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2.
This chapter describes the process to achieve Type Certification, Service Release, or the issue of a Category 2
UASOP by the Defence AA.
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APPLICABILITY
KEY CONCEPTS
OVERVIEW
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Type Certification and Service Release is applicable to all new Defence registered aircraft types, or Defence
registered aircraft types undergoing a Major change to the Type Design in accordance with TAREG 2.5.3—
Classification of changes in Type Design. Similarly, the issue of a UASOP is applicable to Defence registered
Category 2 UAS.
a particular aircraft type is chosen for acquisition on the basis that it will satisfy the operational
capability requirement when performing designated roles in a defined operating environment;
by
a.
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4.
The Principles Behind Type Certification and Service Release. Type Certification and Service
Release are based on the following fundamental principles:
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b.
the design and method of operation of the aircraft type is such that the aircraft may safely perform the
designated roles with an acceptable risk of; loss of life or injury to aircrew and passengers, loss or
damage to the aircraft, and equivalent loss to other personnel or property as a direct consequence of
operating the aircraft;
c.
established airworthiness standards are used as the basis to assess the capacity of the design to safely
perform the designated roles;
d.
the design is found to comply with the established airworthiness standards when operated in the
designated roles by appropriately qualified and competent aircrew; and
e.
ongoing operations can be sustained by adequate infrastructure and supporting arrangements.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The SOI describes all intended aircraft roles and the
operating environments and the operating parameters within which the aircraft type must safely
operate.
b.
Type Design. The Type Design describes the complete aircraft configuration and design, including
all supporting data.
c.
Certification Basis Description (CBD). The CBD provides the link between the SOI and the
Type Design and is a list of airworthiness requirements against which compliance must be achieved, in
conjunction with a system safety assessment, to assure the safety of the aircraft type.
d.
Compliance Finding. Compliance Finding is the process of formally documenting that applicable
verification data or evidence has been examined in relation to an airworthiness requirement contained
in the CBD and that the data has shown that the requirement has been satisfied.
e.
Type Certification. Type Certification is the process through which compliance with the
airworthiness design requirements contained in the CBD is established through the development of the
Type Design to meet the operating roles and environment contained in the SOI.
f.
Service Release. The Service Release is a declaration that sufficient supporting arrangements are in
place to sustain the airworthiness of the aircraft type when operated as described in the SOI.
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE CERTIFICATION AND SERVICE RELEASE
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6.
For most acquisition projects seeking to introduce a new aircraft type or Major change, much of the project
activity which underpins Type Certification and Service Release must occur concurrently to achieve timely
introduction to service. Consequently, the distinction between those activities contributing to Type Certification and
those related to Service Release can be confusing at times. In reality, the functions performed by the Type
Certification and the Service Release are distinctly different. Type Certification relates to the technical and operational
aspects of the aircraft system design and the accompanying instructions which define how the system is operated and
maintained. Service Release relates to the ‘readiness’ of the supporting elements to commence and sustain operations
with the aircraft at a designated rate of effort.
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Importantly, in relation to the operation of a Defence registered aircraft, Type Certification and Service
Release are co-dependent. An AMTC or STC must be issued prior to Service Release, however without Service
Release an AMTC or STC is ineffective. An aircraft conforming to the Type Design cannot be operated as a Defence
registered aircraft prior to Service Release, unless authorised for temporary operations under a SFP or FTP as
appropriate. Consequently, airworthiness planning normally requires that Type Certification and Service Release are
achieved simultaneously to enable the capability of the system to be realised at the earliest possible opportunity.
MILAVREG 2.4 contains the Defence AA’s requirements for the operation of Defence registered aircraft.
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE CERTIFICATION AND DESIGN ACCEPTANCE
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8.
The distinction between Type Certification and Design Acceptance can be confusing due to their close
relationship. The Design Acceptance process seeks to assure the technical acceptability of a particular design against
all Defence requirements documented in the functional performance specification, including airworthiness,
performance, mission, appearance etc. Type Certification is concerned with only those requirements in the
specification which comprise the airworthiness standards listed in the CBD to assure the design safety of the aircraft.
The Type Certification process also provides an additional level of oversight by the TAA, OAA and the Defence AA
for issue of an AMTC or STC to be issued. Importantly, activities conducted as part of the design acceptance process
to verify that the aircraft system meets particular airworthiness requirements listed in the specification should normally
be sufficient for Type Certification purposes, provided that a formal record of each compliance finding is made. There
should be no reason for an acquisition agency to duplicate or require specific additional verification activity to meet
Type Certification requirements.
9.
Additional guidance on the Design Acceptance Process is contained in AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical
airworthiness management manual (eTAMM).
2
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5.
Key Certification Terms. Key certification concepts are defined in Section 3, Chapter 1. A summary of
these definitions is included as follows:
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Sect 3 Chap 4
DETERMINING TYPE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
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10.
MILAVREG 2.1 specifies the Defence AA’s requirements for determining the registration of a new
Defence aircraft. Following a decision to Defence register a new aircraft type, the Defence acquisition agency, in
conjunction with the OAA, TAA, FTAA and DACPA, must determine the detailed Type Certification requirements as
part of a comprehensive airworthiness management strategy. MILAVREG 2. requires the acquisition agency to
maintain an AAMP to describe the airworthiness arrangements supporting the acquisition activities, Type Certification
and Service Release. The composition of an acquisition team and guidance on documenting an airworthiness strategy
are contained in Section 3, Chapter 3.
STATEMENT OF OPERATING INTENT
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11.
The SOI forms a cornerstone of the Type Certification process and is required by OAREG 3.2. The SOI
contains all the roles and environments in which the aircraft type is intended to operate. For a new aircraft type,
development of the SOI should begin during capability development where the aircraft roles and environment are
derived from the Defence capability requirements. Following selection of an aircraft type to meet the capability
requirement, the SOI should be fully developed by the OAAR(Acq) in consultation with OAA staff, ACPA and
DGTA–ADF. The SOI will inform a significant component of the Statement of Requirement (SOR) so must therefore
be sufficiently mature to enable OAA and TAA endorsement of the SOR prior to contract signature. As an operational
airworthiness document, development of the SOI is described in detail in AAP 8000.010—ADF Defence Operational
Airworthiness Manual. The SOI is necessary as a starting point for determining type certification requirements
because it defines:
the aircraft roles which, in conjunction with aircraft and mission subsystem equipment, are used to
determine the applicable airworthiness requirements to include in the CBD
b.
the role and environmental parameters against which compliance with the airworthiness requirements
documented in the CBD must be achieved
c.
the expected usage spectrum to determine the aircraft and engine structural certification requirements
d.
the likely stores, life support and role equipment necessary to meet the designated roles.
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OAAR(Acq)s are responsible for ensuring the SOI is developed as part of the acquisition activities, as
required by OAREG 3.2. SOIs require approval of the relevant OAA prior to inclusion as part of an SOR. For a new
aircraft type, OAREG 3.2 requires the OAA under whose command the aircraft will operate following Service Release
to approve the SOI.
Changes to the SOI
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For a Major change to the Type Design, the SOI must be amended to incorporate any new roles,
environmental parameters or usage introduced by the new capability or modification. In such cases the existing
certification basis must be examined in conjunction with the SOI amendment and the new aircraft and mission
subsystem equipment to determine:
any new airworthiness certification basis requirements which need to be added to the CBD
b.
those existing certification basis requirements affected by the change to which compliance must be reestablished.
by
a.
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14.
OAREG 2.1.2 requires changes to the SOI to be advised to the aircraft DAR and a determination made
regarding the impact of the change. For changes to the Type Design classified as ‘Major’ under TAREG 2.5.3, any
corresponding change the SOI is managed in accordance with OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type
Design.
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15.
In accordance with OAREG 2.1.2 , all changes to the SOI are to be endorsed by the TAA, or the DAR when
so delegated by the TAA, prior to being approved by the OAA.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
RECOGNITION OF PRIOR CERTIFICATION
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17.
Recognition of prior certification need not be restricted to the entire aircraft Type Design. A new aircraft type
developed to meet the SOR may comprise an existing Type Certified aircraft plus a role or capability modification to
meet any new or Defence unique requirements. For example, the RAAF Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft
is based on an existing Boeing 737–700 Increased Gross Weight (IGW) type design certified by the United States
(US) Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), plus equipment and mission system modifications to provide an airborne air
defence capability. Where the existing Boeing 737–700IGW certification basis requirements are unaffected by the
modification, the FAA Type Certificate may be used as part of the basis to achieve an AMTC. Since the FAA is a
recognised airworthiness authority, the Defence certification activity may therefore be limited to those new
certification basis requirements, or those affected by the modification to which compliance must be re-established.
Such a strategy is contingent upon the provision by the aircraft manufacturer of the existing applicable Type
Certificate and sufficient information, including a continuing level of disclosure, to indicate the design configuration,
role and environment are sufficiently similar to the Defence aircraft type variant.
s
16.
Prior certification by recognised airworthiness authorities can greatly simplify the Defence Type Certification
process. Where a new aircraft type has partially or completely undergone type certification by such a recognised
agency, Defence may accept that an adequate level of safety of the design has already been established, providing that
the configuration, role and operating environment are substantially similar to that required by Defence . The
acquisition agency should always consider prior certification as part of their acquisition strategy because this can
significantly reduce the effort required by Defence agencies to establish the airworthiness of the aircraft type.
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Technical Versus Operational Recognition. TAREG 2.2.7 contains the TAR requirements for
recognition of prior certification for a new or modified aircraft type design. Importantly, the recognition of
certification by other airworthiness authorities is based on assessment by the TAR that an equivalent level of safety is
provided by that authority. Whilst recognition may be provided by the TAR through examination of the processes and
methodology utilised by the external airworthiness authority, such a mechanism is not necessarily appropriate to
satisfy Defence operational airworthiness requirements. Technical airworthiness can generally be established through
the application of universal engineering principles resulting in quantitative outcomes which can be measured against
defined standards. Conversely, operational airworthiness can depend largely on qualitative factors such as operational
culture, flying philosophy, training methods and human machine interface. Where recognition of prior certification is
included as part of an acquisition strategy of a new aircraft or Major change to a Type Design, the aircraft DAR and
OAAR(Acq), in consultation with an FTAA, should carefully consider what aspects of the existing type certified
aircraft may still require assessment from an operational airworthiness perspective to ensure the aircraft type is
suitable for use by Defence .
CONCURRENT CERTIFICATION BY RECOGNISED AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES
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Defence may consider the acquisition of a new aircraft type concurrent with a foreign military force of a
recognised country. The acquisition strategy may include a collaborative approach to Type Certification for those
aspects of the design that share the same configuration, and where the role and environment are substantially similar to
that intended by Defence . For example a variant of the Eurocopter Tiger aircraft acquired to meet Army’s Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) capability was being acquired by the French Armed Forces in a similar
configuration and role. The Defence acquisition airworthiness strategy included participation by the French military
airworthiness authority Directorate General de l’Armament (DGA). DGA compliance findings for the French Tiger
variant were applicable to the ARH Tiger and were therefore recognised by the TAA for the common aspects of the
certification program.
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20.
Such a concurrent Type Certification program requires the agreement of both airworthiness authorities. Where
an acquisition agency seeks to utilise this approach as part of their acquisition airworthiness strategy, advice from
DGTA–ADF and ACPA should be sought prior to negotiating any such agreement.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
COMPILING THE CERTIFICATION BASIS DESCRIPTION
21.
Once the Type Certification strategy has been formulated, the acquisition agency must ensure the CBD is
properly compiled, including a system safety program. The Defence approach to establishing the CBD for new aircraft
types, or for a Major change to an existing aircraft Type Design, is described in detail in Section 3, Chapter 12 of
AAP 7001.053. TAREG 2.2.5 contains the TAR requirements for the airworthiness standards which comprise the
CBD.
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Composition of CBD Elements. Whilst AAP 7001.053 provides detailed guidance on compiling the
CBD, the following two aspects are fundamental to the process:
each CBD element contains an airworthiness standard, or part of a standard, to which compliance must
be found
b.
each element contains an acceptable verification method to demonstrate compliance.
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NOTE
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The OAAR(Acq) and the aircraft DAR should identify the verification method in
consultation with an FTAA and the TAA when compiling the CBD. However,
where recognition of prior certification is used as part of the acquisition strategy,
those elements subject to the prior certification need not be re-verified other than
through provision of adequate documentation to support the prior certification as a
whole.
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Use of Foreign Airworthiness Standards. As the custodian of the CBD, the aircraft DAR is responsible
for developing the CBD content in accordance with the ADRM requirements, however significant emphasis should be
placed on the original or proposed set of airworthiness standards applied by the aircraft Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM). Where the OEM of the aircraft type is operating subject to a recognised airworthiness authority,
the design methodology utilised will most likely include the airworthiness standards of the country of origin. Defence
utilises the UK Defence Standard (DEF STAN) 00–970/971 as the airworthiness code normally prescribed by the
Defence, plus some additional Defence -specific requirements. However, the application of DEF STAN 00–970/971
by default may not be appropriate to a US designed aircraft for example, where the design is subject to FAA and US
military standards. In all cases the acquisition agency should request the OEM propose the applicable airworthiness
standards and verification method as a part of tendering activities. Clearly, mandating a set of airworthiness standards
unfamiliar to the OEM would result in a significant increase in effort and cost, with no real additional benefit to
Defence. Importantly, only the TAA and designated ASR have the authority to prescribe airworthiness standards for
Defence aircraft. Therefore, any such proposed use of airworthiness standards other than those contained in the
ADRM must be endorsed by the TAA prior to issue of SOR.
ENDORSEMENT OF THE STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENT
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The SOR is the basis upon which Defence establishes a formal contract with the OEM to develop and deliver
an aircraft type or modification to meet the Defence capability requirements. In acquisition terminology, the SOR
comprises the Functional Performance Specification (FPS) and the acquisition Statement of Work (SOW). The FPS
contains the detailed functional and physical requirements of the aircraft system, whereas the SOW describes the
Defence requirements of the OEM in developing and delivering the aircraft system, and all necessary data, instructions
and support required to operate and maintain the system.
rs
ed
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25.
Functional Performance Specification. The FPS details the intended roles and capability requirements.
Supporting these functional aspects are the detailed design requirements including all the airworthiness standards
which form the CBD. Accordingly, the FPS must be consistent with both the SOI and the CBD, and should contain an
acceptable verification method for each CBD requirement.
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26.
Acquisition Statement of Work. The SOW normally contains detailed requirements for OEM delivered
plans, procedures and reports which will be used to demonstrate compliance with the FPS. TAREG 2.2.4 requires the
acquisition agency to include contractual measures which enable sufficient Defence visibility of the design and test
activity, and delivery of the resulting data. Where recognition of prior certification forms part of the acquisition
airworthiness strategy, delivery of extant type certificates and configuration data must be included in the SOW.
Importantly, performance of the verification activities listed against the CBD requirements must be identified in the
SOW, including Defence involvement, to provide an opportunity for compliance finding.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
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Linkage of Contractual and Airworthiness Milestones. Whilst Type Certification and Service
Release form fundamental airworthiness milestones during the acquisition of a new aircraft type or Major change to a
Type Design, direct linkage of these activities to financial milestones must be avoided. Achievement of Type
Certification and Service Release for a subset of the contracted roles and environments may be possible at several
points during the certification program. Linking these airworthiness milestones to contractual milestones will place
undue emphasis on issue of an airworthiness instrument, rather than on delivered capability. Rather, the acquisition
agency must identify what capability is required at various milestones, and then implement an airworthiness strategy
to support achievement of the capability. Airworthiness authorities will be unwilling to endorse a strategy where
airworthiness and contractual milestones are combined.
s
27.
Involvement of Flight Test. The OAAR(Acq) and the aircraft DAR should develop the SOW in close
consultation with an FTAA to ensure that the scope of testing identified is sufficient to meet the verification
requirements listed in the FPS. Defence involvement in the ground and flight testing identified in the SOW will
underpin a significant proportion of the Type Certification activity. Acquisition flight test activity is covered in more
detail in Section 3, Chapter 5 of this manual.
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29.
OAA and TAA endorsement. OAREG 3.2.2 and TAREG 2.2.4 require OAA and TAA endorsement of
the SOR prior to inclusion with the acquisition contract. The OAA and TAA endorsement of the SOR signifies their
satisfaction that the FPS and the SOW contain sufficient provision to demonstrate the operational and technical
airworthiness of the aircraft type to achieve Type Certification and Service Release in the SOI roles and environment.
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30.
Changes to the SOR. The SOR may require amendment or update during the life of the acquisition for a
variety of reasons. Following endorsement, the aircraft DAR may approve a change to the SOR, or the CBD,
providing that there is no reduction in the level of safety. Where changes to the CBD or the SOR do result in a
reduction in the level of safety provided, or the resulting level of safety is unclear, the TAA (or relevant ASR) and
OAA (or FTAA) must endorse the change.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
FINDING COMPLIANCE WITH CERTIFICATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS
ESTABLISHING A SUPPORT NETWORK
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31.
TAREG 2.2.11 and OAREG 3.2.3 require that competent and authorised persons make Type Certification
compliance findings. During acquisition airworthiness planning, the OAAR(Acq) and the aircraft DAR should identify
positions within the project team with the necessary prerequisite operational or engineering experience and
qualifications to make and review compliance findings for components of the acquisition activity. However, formation
of an acquisition project team with all the necessary skills and experience to make compliance findings against all
CBD elements may be impractical. In such cases, the acquisition agency should identify additional personnel and
agencies external to the project to support compliance finding activity. TAREG 2.2.11 and OAREG 3.2.3 require that
persons and agencies authorised to make compliance findings are documented in the Project Design Acceptance
Strategy (PDAS) and Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP). Further guidance on the formation of an
acquisition project team and acquisition airworthiness strategies is contained in Section 3, Chapter 3 of this manual.
R
MAKING COMPLIANCE FINDINGS
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32.
Compliance findings are made on the basis of data obtained through inspection or test of the aircraft, data
obtained through Defence involvement in inspection or test activity, and type design data provided by the OEM or
relevant design agency. Evidence used as a basis for compliance findings are usually contained in formal document
deliveries required under the SOW, or through access provisions. Similarly, Defence involvement in OEM ground and
flight test activities, and the requirement for the OEM to make sufficient demonstrations to Defence to enable
compliance finding activity, can also be included in the SOW. However, informal involvement or witnessing by the
acquisition project team of test or developmental activities may also provide a basis to make a compliance finding,
combined with reference to formal data or documentation.
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33.
Normally, a compliance finding is made for each certification basis element of the CBD, although depending
on the applicability of verification evidence, a number of CBD elements may be covered by a single compliance
finding. TAREG 2.2.11 and OAREG 3.2.3 require that compliance finding are only made when the authorised person
is satisfied that:
the evidence provided by the design agency shows that the certification basis requirement has been
met, and
b.
the method used to demonstrate compliance is appropriate.
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TECHNICAL VERSUS OPERATIONAL COMPLIANCE FINDINGS
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The aircraft DAR, as custodian of the CBD, is responsible for managing compliance finding activity.
However, many certification basis elements will require a both a technical and operational person to agree the finding.
OAREG 3.2.3 requires any certification basis requirements which impacts operational airworthiness be assessed by a
person authorised by the OAAR(Acq). These may include, for example, any aspect of the design which impacts
cockpit layout, avionics symbology, warnings and cautions, engine performance, stores jettison envelopes, etc. Where
the compliance finding relates to aircraft handling qualities or crew workload, a qualified test pilot or relevant flight
test systems specialist is to agree the finding in accordance with OAREG 3.2.6.
ed
by
35.
During acquisition airworthiness planning, the aircraft DAR and OAAR(Acq) should determine those
certification basis requirements which require both technical and operational compliance finding. However,
compliance finding activity should be centrally managed, and each applicable compliance finding should record both
technical and operational agreement.
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36.
Flight test staff assigned to the acquisition project team usually carry out operational airworthiness
compliance findings. However where resources are limited, or a finding requires specialist input from outside the
acquisition agency, other competent operational staff from Defence flight test or operating units may make compliance
findings provided they have the required competencies and are authorised through the OAMP.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
FINALISING COMPLIANCE FINDINGS
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38.
Compliance findings remain valid for the aircraft configuration unless a modification is embodied which
specifically affects the finding, in which case compliance must be re-established. Similarly, a change to the role or
environment may require a compliance finding be re-established where the verification evidence previously provided
is insufficient to satisfy the certification basis requirement under the modified operating conditions.
s
37.
The progress of compliance finding activity should be tracked via a certification database or similar tool.
Accumulation of sufficient compliance findings for a designated configuration operating in defined roles and
environments will enable an application to be made to the Defence AA for Type Certification. In managing
compliance finding activity, the DAR should ensure that sufficient compliance findings have been made to support
Type Certification in the intended roles and environment.
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39.
The database of compliance findings applicable to the aircraft type for the purposes of Type Certification
effectively becomes part of the Type Record when Design Acceptance Certification is performed by the aircraft DAR.
Design Acceptance is a prerequisite to obtaining a TAA recommendation for Type Certification. The TAR
requirements for compilation of the Type Record are contained in TAREG 2.2.9 and Section 3, Chapter 12, annex G
of AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical airworthiness management manual (eTAMM).
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MANAGING AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES
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40.
An airworthiness issue occurs where compliance with a certification basis requirement cannot be established
for the required role and environment. Such non-compliance may be acceptable if the OEM can demonstrate an
equivalent level of safety through other means. Otherwise, where the issue cannot be immediately resolved,
TAREG 2.2.2 and OAREG 3.2.8 require that airworthiness issues are managed through Airworthiness Issue Papers.
Av
AIRWORTHINESS ISSUE PAPERS
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41.
An Airworthiness Issue Paper describes the specific non-compliance with the airworthiness standard
comprising the certification basis requirement. The acquisition agency must document the raising and management of
issue papers in the AAMP as required by MILAVREG 2.3. The issue paper should:
reference the certification basis requirement
b.
describe the specific non-compliance
c.
describe the mitigating factors implemented to temporarily limit or restrict operations with the aircraft
d.
document a process to resolve the airworthiness issue.
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Any mitigating factors implemented to permit further operations with the aircraft must take cognisance of the
roles or environment for which the compliance data is valid. For example, an aircraft role may include flight to
600 KCAS with a specific stores configuration. Flutter testing and analysis to meet a certification basis requirement
may only have satisfactorily demonstrated a flutter free envelope up to 500 KCAS in the same configuration. An issue
paper is raised to document and manage the non-compliance for operations up to at 600 KCAS, however test
operations may resume with an airspeed limitation of 500 KCAS imposed.
by
43.
Issue papers require both the OAA and the TAA approval. Further guidance and an example of an
Airworthiness Issue Paper can be found in AAP 7001.053—eTAMM.
Airworthiness issues may be resolved through several means. These predominantly include the following:
ed
44.
ed
RESOLVING AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES
Su
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rs
a.
additional testing or analysis is undertaken to subsequently demonstrate compliance with the
certification basis requirement
b.
whilst not specifically compliant with the certification basis requirement an equivalent level of safety
is established through other means which is acceptable to the relevant OAA and the TAA
c.
a reduction in the level of safety is accepted by the relevant OAA and the TAA
d.
a permanent role or environment restriction is imposed.
45.
Approved Airworthiness Issue Papers that remain open awaiting resolution must only be closed following
endorsement by the OAA and the TAA.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
PREPARING FOR SERVICE RELEASE
REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE RELEASE
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46.
Operational Airworthiness Requirements. The operational airworthiness component of Service
Release relates mainly to the operational infrastructure implemented to support flying operations at the expected rate
of effort within the designated roles and environment. The OAR provides for this infrastructure through
implementation of a FMS within the Defence organisation. OAREG 2 contains the OAR requirements of flying
organisations with respect to implementing a FMS. In order to obtain an OAA recommendation for Service Release,
the acquisition agency must ensure:
a FMS has been established which meets the requirements of OAREG 2.1 to the extent necessary to
safely manage flight operations within the SOI roles and environment;
b.
a system of operational rules, limitations and instructions have been documented in relevant OIPs, as
required by OAREG 2.2, which are approved by the relevant OAA or OAAR to safely conduct flight
operations;
c.
the training, qualification, and competency criteria have been established in accordance with
OAREG 2.3 and have been approved by the relevant OAA or OAAR to safely operate the aircraft; and
d.
there are sufficient trained aircrew to manage and operate the aviation system at the expected rate of
effort, within the SOI roles and environment.
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47.
Technical Airworthiness Requirements. The technical airworthiness component of Service Release
relates mainly to the capacity for the engineering and maintenance organisations to adequately support the operation of
the aircraft in the intended roles and environment. These requirements are regulated by the TAR through accreditation
of AEO and AMO. TAREG 3 contains the TAR requirements for AEOs and TAREG 4 and TAREG 5 are the TAR
requirements for AMO and the conduct of aviation maintenance activity. In order to obtain a TAA recommendation
for Service Release, the acquisition agency must ensure:
a STC or AMTC has been or will be issued;
b.
a strategy for the issue of Certificates of Airworthiness in accordance with TAREG 2.6.3 is in place;
c.
a DAR has been delegated responsibility for the Design Acceptance of the aircraft following Service
Release;
d.
an AEO is in place, including a design support network, to provide configuration item management of
the aircraft in accordance with TAREG 3.5 following Service Release;
e.
appropriate aircraft and engine structural integrity management systems are in place for the aircraft in
accordance with TAREG 3.5.4—Aircraft structural integrity management and TAREG 3.5.5; and
f.
a maintenance support network including AMOs has been established.
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Implicit in the establishment of the maintenance support network is that qualified
and competent ground crew and technicians with adequate training on the new
aircraft system are available to conduct maintenance activity.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
supply support to replenish items of aircraft equipment is adequate to support the planned Rate of
Effort;
b.
adequate training has been provided for all aspects of the aircrew and ground crew operations and
maintenance with the aircraft type and supporting equipment;
c.
adequate personnel are in place to manage and provision the support for operations and maintenance;
d.
sufficient approved technical data and publications are available at the operating, engineering and
maintaining organisations; and
e.
adequate facilities and supporting equipment are in place to support operations and maintenance.
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Implementation Mechanisms
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49.
Acquisition activities in support of Service Release are normally managed concurrent to Type Certification.
The OAAR(Acq) and aircraft DAR must ensure that these activities will be adequate to support operation of the
aircraft type in the SOI roles and environment, however in reality, most of the activities supporting Service Release
are managed by the logistics element of the acquisition team. The AAMP should briefly describe the strategy to
implement arrangements in support of Service Release and should identify those plans which document the activities
in detail.
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Operational Implementation. Provision of appropriate operational infrastructure should be managed in
conjunction with the operating command of the aircraft type. For a new aircraft type, the acquisition team may include
one or more Qualified Flying Instructors (QFI) who have converted to type prior to Service Release. These QFIs in
conjunction with OAA staff should ensure appropriate operational arrangements are identified to manage operations to
the required rate of effort following Service Release. This may include mechanisms to provide training to additional
QFIs on a variant aircraft type in service with the military forces of the country of origin, or through a program of
flying training offered by the OEM. Provision of sufficient publications, training devices and materials, and training
packages is normally included as part of the acquisition SOW. For a Major change to the Type Design, the
OAAR(Acq) in conjunction with the existing Defence operating units should determine the best approach to
implementing the new capability within the extant flying management system. Initial operations involving the new
aircraft or Major change following Service Release will also need to be identified. These may include initially involve
training and OT&E to demonstrate the effectiveness of the system and develop operational tactics.
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Technical and Logistic Implementation. Provision of adequate arrangements to support the technical
and logistic aspects of Service Release is normally included within the scope of the acquisition SOW. Where a new
aircraft type is being introduced to Service, an additional contract for the Through Life Support (TLS) of the capability
may be tendered by Defence. Technical airworthiness regulations require that any commercial organisation engaged in
design or configuration management activities in support of Defence aircraft are held accountable to the TAREG
through a legal instrument. Therefore, provision for compliance with TAREG, and timely implementation of technical
and logistics supporting arrangements needs to be included in the TLS SOW. Notwithstanding; the acquisition
organisation will need to ensure the relevant Defence agencies are appropriately resourced to manage operations at the
expected rate of effort. This may include increase in the scope and level of engineering authority for an existing
aircraft DAR, and provision of initial funding and personnel offsets to enable an Defence logistics organisation to
manage the aircraft Type Design for a designated period. The aircraft DAR and project logistics manager, in
conjunction with the operating headquarters’ logistics staff, must ensure these arrangements are in place prior to, or at
the time of Service Release. This may include any contracts for the ongoing supply of equipment or engineering and
logistics support as necessary to sustain operations.
•
NOTE
Ultimately, a logistics representative of the operating command should be satisfied
that the logistics arrangements are adequate to support the planned operations.
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48.
Logistics Requirements. The logistics component of Service Release relates to the provision of adequate
logistics supporting infrastructure and arrangements to enable the ongoing operation of the aircraft at a designated rate
of effort. In providing logistics support for the operation of the aircraft type, the acquisition agency must ensure:
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 4
ISSUE OF AN AMTC/STC AND SERVICE RELEASE
DEFENCE AA REQUIREMENTS FOR AN AMTC OR STC
52.
MILAVREG 3.1 and MILAVREG 3.2 contain the for issue of an AMTC or STC. Prior to issue of and AMTC
or STC, the Defence AA requires:
completion of all activities required by the OAR under OAREG 3.2 and TAR under TAREG 2.2
b.
compilation or amendment of a Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) which summarises the aircraft
certification basis as part of the AMTC or STC
c.
recommendations from the OAA and TAA regarding the airworthiness of the aircraft in the intended
roles and environment, when operated by qualified and competent personnel
d.
a recommendation for issue of the AMTC or STC by the Airworthiness Board.
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53.
Type Certification Data Sheet. The TCDS for a specific type will underwrite the AMTC by documenting
the approved instruments and summarising the basis of certification for all models of the aircraft certified by Defence.
For example, the TCDS for the C130 must have data on the H and J models. The TCDS will provide a summary of the
basis of certification which identifies information contained in Defence approved records, or in records approved by
other recognised airworthiness authorities.
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DEFENCE AA REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE RELEASE
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54.
The TAR is to ensure that the TCDS is compiled for the aircraft type in accordance with MILAVREG 3.1. An
example TCDS is available from the ACPA website. The DAR is responsible for ensuring the on-going validity of the
TCDS and is to ensure that the current TCDS is presented at each AwB for review and endorsement.
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55.
MILAVREG 3.3 contains the Defence AA requirements for the issue of Service Release. Prior to issuing
Service Release, the Defence AA requires:
issue of an AMTC or STC
b.
completion of all activities supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft type required by the
OAR under OAREG 3.4, and by the TAR under TAREG 2.4
c.
recommendations by the relevant OAA and TAA regarding the acceptability of the arrangements
supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft in the intend roles and environment
d.
a recommendation by a logistics representative appointed within the command of the relevant Service
Chief regarding the acceptability of the logistics arrangements supporting the intended roles,
environment and planned usage
e.
a recommendation for Service Release by the Airworthiness Board.
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Limitations to Service Release. Incomplete certification activity, open airworthiness issues, or immature
supporting arrangements may result in limitations to the Service Release. Limitations may include, restricted flying
hours prior to completion of certain certification activities, flight envelope limitations, stores configuration limitations,
or any other limitation deemed necessary in the interests of safety. Where the acquisition agency wishes to proceed
with Type Certification and Service Release, the OAAR(Acq) and the DAR must disclose all current airworthiness
issues and recommend a strategy to limit the Service Release or otherwise restrict operations to maintain the
airworthiness of the aircraft type. These limitations will be considered by the relevant OAA, TAA and the
Airworthiness Board prior to recommending Type Certification and Service Release to the Defence AA.
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OBTAINING OAA AND TAA RECOMMENDATIONS
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58.
In seeking these recommendations, both the OAA and the TAA require the acquisition agency to compile a
summary of accomplishments made against the operational and technical airworthiness strategies. This
accomplishment summary is used as a basis for the OAA and the TAA to provide their recommendations to the
Defence AA. Prior to seeking an OAA recommendation, the acquisition agency must first ensure a recommendation
from TAA has been provided. In seeking these recommendations, the OAAR(Acq) and DAR normally provide the
accomplishment summary to the TAA, who then on forwards the documentation to the OAA if a favourable
recommendation is provided, subject to any conditions and limitations. If the OAA concurs with the TAA, he will
make his recommendation available to the Airworthiness Board, including any recommended limitations to the
Service Release.
s
57.
OAA and TAA recommendations to the Defence AA for Type Certification and Service Release are obtained
following completion of all activities required by the OAR and TAR. The OAA and TAA recommendations signify
their satisfaction that the airworthiness activities performed to assure the safety of the type are adequate for the
intended roles and environment.
Sa
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59.
OAREG 3.2.9 and TAREG 2.2.2 contain the requirements to achieve OAA and TAA recommendations for
Type Certification. Similarly, OAREG 3.4.1 and TAREG 2.4 contain the requirements to achieve OAA and TAA
recommendation for Service Release. Section 3, Chapter 7 contains further guidance on compilation of an
accomplishment summary.
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DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD EXECUTIVE REVIEW
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60.
The accomplishment summary is also the mechanism used by the Airworthiness Board to review the case
supporting the issue of a Type Certificate and Service Release. The information provided to the OAA and TAA in the
accomplishment summary satisfies most of the requirements for review by the Airworthiness Board. Unlike the OAA
and TAA, the accomplishment summary is likely to be the first occasion the Airworthiness Board members are
exposed to detailed information on the acquisition activities and strategies implemented to achieve Type Certification
and Service Release. For this reason, the Airworthiness Board members require some additional information to enable
a comprehensive, yet independent, review of the progress made to achieve Type Certification and Service Release.
The process and conduct of an acquisition Airworthiness Board is described in detail in Section 3, Chapter 7 of this
manual.
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61.
Following review the Airworthiness Board will provide a recommendation to the Defence AA for the issue of
the AMTC or STC, and Service Release, including any limitations of conditions.
ISSUE OF AIRWORTHINESS INSTRUMENTS BY THE DEFENCE AA
An example of an AMTC, STC, TCDS and Service Release are available from the ACPA website.
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DACPA collates the recommendations of the TAA, OAA and coordinates a review by the Airworthiness
Board. Following a successful Airworthiness Board for the issue of an airworthiness instrument and Service Release,
DACPA makes the OAA, TAA and Airworthiness Board members’ recommendations available to the Defence AA.
ACPA staff also draft the airworthiness instruments for signature by the Defence AA. The time required to issue the
actual airworthiness instruments depends on the availability of the Defence AA to consider the recommendations. Any
further questions or concerns the Defence AA may have must also be satisfied prior to issue. Service Release
limitations imposed by the Defence AA may only be amended or lifted following implementation of an agreed course
of action to the satisfaction of a nominated representative. Unless the Defence AA states otherwise in a limitation, the
nominated representative has the authority to amend or lift a limitation. DACPA will advise the acquisition agency,
operating units and other capability stakeholders once the airworthiness instruments have been issued to enable
operations.
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Sect 3 Chap 4
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATING PERMIT
65.
s
64.
A UASOP enables a Category 2 or 3 UAS to operate in its designated Configuration, Role and Environment
(CRE). This includes both certification of the system to operate in accordance with the CRE and assurance of the
management arrangements supporting the continuing airworthiness of the system. A UASOP is issued to support a
defined level of capability of the system required for operations. This may include operation for the purposes of
system qualification, acceptance, or in limited roles prior to the acceptance into service of the system. Issue of a
UASOP, as with other airworthiness instruments, does not automatically imply that the system has met defined
capability objectives.
identify the UAS
b.
reference the approved SOI or OIP defining CRE
c.
reference appropriate design documentation which identifies the approved technical configuration(s)
d.
identify operational restriction applied to mitigate the risk the UAS presents to personnel, property and
other aircraft
e.
identify, or reference, any unique airworthiness management arrangements required for ongoing
operations with the UAS type
f.
identify operational, maintenance and engineering authority for the UAS
g.
identify the approved UAS operational units
h.
identify the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation
i.
identify any applicable operating limitations resulting from:
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a.
the immaturity of the supporting management arrangements
(2)
technical issues affecting the system’s suitability for the SOI purpose and scope
(3)
T&E activities performed prior to issue of the UASOP.
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A UASOP should:
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Sect 3 Chap 5
ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 1.8—Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA)
MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type
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INTRODUCTION
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1.
Most acquisition projects involving some degree of developmental activity rely on some level of flight testing
in the execution of their airworthiness strategy. In terms of airworthiness, flight testing provides a large proportion of
essential data in the compilation of Type Certification compliance findings. Additionally, flight testing provides the
opportunity to demonstrate that an aircraft type is suitable for flight in the intended roles and environment, by
appropriately qualified and competent Defence aircrew.
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PURPOSE
2.
fe
This chapter describes the role of flight test during acquisition activities leading to Type Certification.
Sa
APPLICABILITY
tio
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3.
This chapter is applicable to acquisition activities involving the flight test of a new aircraft type, or a change
to the Type Design classified as Major in accordance with Technical Airworthiness Regulation (TAREG).
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ia
THE ROLE OF FLIGHT TEST
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4.
For the purposes of Type Certification, flight testing includes any activity conducted for investigative,
developmental or demonstration purposes on new aircraft or modifications prior to Service Release or beyond existing
approved operating limitations. In an acquisition context, flight testing is utilised for several purposes. These include:
gathering of data to support design development;
b.
gathering of data to assess design performance;
c.
verification that particular aspect of the design specification has been met; and
d.
demonstration that the aircraft or modification satisfies those parts of the Functional Performance
Specification (FPS) which require verification by flight test.
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Flight testing is important to establishing the airworthiness of a new aircraft or Major change to the Type
Design because:
test data forms a significant part of the Type Design developed in the context of the SOI;
b.
test data is used as verification evidence in support of Type Certification compliance finding and
design acceptance;
c.
flight testing provides an opportunity for involvement of Defence personnel in support of Type
Certification compliance finding; and
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a.
flight testing is used as the mechanism to assess the acceptability for Defence use of those aspects of
the design which impact operational airworthiness, eg. human-machine-interface (HMI), handling
qualities, cockpit workload, etc.
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d.
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rs
6.
Flight testing is also integral to demonstration of many of the capability requirements which are not part of the
Certification Basis Description (CBD), such as performance verification. Typically, flight testing for both
airworthiness and capability related purposes is managed centrally so some aspects of this chapter will be applicable to
both.
ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST PLANNING
THE ROLE OF THE FTAA
7.
FTAAs are the appointed authority for the management of aircraft allocated for the purposes of flight test. For
acquisition flight test activity, the scope of this authority includes:
a.
appointing qualified and competent test personnel to participate in, and manage acquisition flight test
activity;
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Sect 3 Chap 5
endorsing that the scope of test activity documented in the Statement of Requirement (SOR) is
adequate to support the Type Certification process;
c.
determining the adequacy of operational airworthiness management arrangements for acquisition flight
test;
d.
determining the adequacy of specific flight test activity to demonstrate verification of airworthiness
requirements contained in the CBD; and
e.
determining the acceptability of operational elements of compliance findings which impact the
aircraft’s suitability for flight in the intended roles and environment by Defence aircrew.
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b.
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AAP 7001.048
eg
8.
FTAA Representative. MILAVREG 1.8 allows an FTAA to delegate flight test approval authority to
suitably qualified and competent individuals to exercise authority on their behalf. In the case of an acquisition project
for a new aircraft, this could be a Qualified Test Pilot (QTP) posted as part of the acquisition team. Detailed guidance
on the formation of an acquisition team and acquisition airworthiness authority is contained in Section 3, Chapter 3.
R
IDENTIFYING THE REQUIRED SCOPE OF TESTING
Sa
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ty
9.
MILAVREG 2.3requires the acquisition agency to maintain an AAMP which identifies the strategy to achieve
Type Certification and Service Release. The requirements of the AAMP include reference to any necessary plans
which identify:
activities and tasks supporting the certification activity such as verification and test and evaluation
b.
compliance with operational and technical regulatory requirements both for the conduct of acquisition
activity and management arrangements following Service Release.
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a.
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Av
10.
Detailed guidance on determining Type Certification requirements is contained in Section 3, Chapter 4.
FTAA involvement in both the development and planned verification methodology of certification basis requirements
is essential to the process. The CBD including acceptable verification methods is normally issued as part of the
Functional Performance Specification (FPS). The mechanisms to achieve compliance and provide data in support of
Type Certification are documented in the acquisition Statement of Work (SOW). The SOR comprises both of these
documents.
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11.
Test and Evaluation Master Plan. The document which normally describes the Defence approach to
satisfying all test related requirements is the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The TEMP should identify the
program of testing required to meet the test obligations contained in the SOW. The TEMP is normally developed from
a Test Concept Document offered as part of, or developed in conjunction with, tender documentation by the Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) which identifies the broad strategy proposed to meet both airworthiness and
capability requirements. The TEMP should identify the mechanisms to carry out the required testing and identify a
schedule to satisfy all required flight test for the purposes of providing data in support of Type Certification. In terms
of airworthiness, the TEMP is important as it provides a means for the FTAA or representative to assess the adequacy
of the proposed scope of testing to meet all certification basis requirements contained in the CBD. Operational
Airworthiness Regulation (OAREG) 3.2.4 identifies the OAR requirements with respect to identifying an adequate
scope of flight testing supporting Type Certification activity.
by
12.
Operational and technical airworthiness compliance. OAREG 3.2.4 also requires the OAAR(Acq)
to ensure all testing is carried out in accordance with OAREG 4. The implications of the OAREG for the conduct of
acquisition flight test activity are described in detail in Section 3, Chapter 6.
ed
IMPLEMENTING THE TEST STRATEGY
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13.
The strategy documented in the TEMP defines the overarching test requirements to achieve verification of
airworthiness and capability requirements. The TEMP is normally supported by OEM developed plans and procedures
which document the verification or acceptance test methods or processes to satisfy one or more FPS requirements. The
FTAA representative, and the relevant Defence test and engineering staff, typically reviews each test procedure and
provides endorsement that the documented test process is adequate to demonstrate the particular requirement under
test, and that the testing may be conducted safely. Subsequent test reports produced by the OEM are provided to
enable the acquisition agency to make compliance findings and determine contractual acceptability against FPS
requirements.
14.
Further guidance on the methodology and conduct of flight testing to satisfy certification basis, or other
requirements should be obtained from the relevant FTAA.
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Sect 3 Chap 5
AIRCRAFT–STORES COMPATIBILITY CERTIFICATION
s
15.
Aircraft which carry and employ stores require aircraft–stores compatibility (ASC) certification requirements
included as part of the CBD. The Defence approach to ASC certification relies substantially on a program of ground
and flight testing to demonstrate technical and operational airworthiness when using the aircraft stores configurations
in designated roles. An ASC certification plan developed by the OEM may be implemented in conjunction with the
TEMP to document the strategy to demonstrate both ASC airworthiness certification basis and ASC related capability
requirements. ASC certification plans typically identify additional requirements to enable Service Release with
designated aircraft stores capability.
eg
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16.
The likely ASC requirements should be determined as part of development of the SOR. The Aircraft Stores
Clearance Engineering (ASCENG) agency is the Defence centre of expertise for ASC-related certification
requirements and test procedures. ASCENG staff should be consulted during development of the SOR and ASC
Certification Plan and in the compilation of ASC related compliance findings. TAREG 3.5.9 requires that compliance
findings relating to aircraft stores compatibility are made or reviewed by ASCENG.
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ACCEPTANCE TESTING
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ty
17.
Relationship between airworthiness and acceptance testing. In acquisition terminology,
acceptance testing is any test event used to demonstrate compliance with contractual FPS requirements. This includes
both airworthiness requirements documented in the CBD, and other FPS requirements related to performance and
capability. Acceptance testing is used as the mechanism through which the aircraft OEM offers the Type Design for
formal assessment by Defence in the configuration intended for operational use. Acceptance testing therefore provides
the opportunity for the acquisition agency to make operational airworthiness compliance findings associated with the
use of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment. OAREG 3.2.6 requires the compliance findings associated
with Human Factors resulting from HMI, crew workload, handling qualities etc. to be assessed by a QTP or other
suitably qualified and competent representative appointed by an FTAA. With respect to airworthiness, the outcome
required of acceptance testing is a determination that the aircraft is safe and suitable for use in the intended roles and
environment by the intended Defence aircrew.
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18.
Acceptance testing not impacting operational airworthiness. Where the suitability for flight of a
new aircraft or Major change to the Type Design has been established in a specified configuration, non-QTP aircrew
may participate in or conduct acceptance test sorties for performance or capability related assessments. The use of
operational aircrew may be appropriate where those aircrew are intimately experienced with the context of operational
use of the aircraft type, eg QFIs assessing the contractual acceptability of a training aircraft performing designated
training roles.
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19.
Changes to configuration, role and environment. Acceptance of subsequent changes to the
configuration, role and environment beyond that already assessed by the QTP or FTAA representative should be
evaluated in accordance with OAREG 3.1. Changes equivalent to a Major change to the Type Design must undergo
reassessment by the QTP or FTAA representative to ensure that operational airworthiness compliance findings remain
valid in the new configuration and role. Role or environment changes equivalent to a Substantial operational change
may undergo acceptance testing by operational aircrew only where the FTAA or representative is satisfied that the
operational airworthiness characteristics of the change have been adequately considered and the participating aircrew
are suitably qualified and competent.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE
rs
ed
ed
20.
Further guidance on the airworthiness management of flight test activities is contained Section 3, Chapter 6.
Further information and guidance on flight test techniques and procedures relevant to airworthiness management of
acquisition testing should be sought from the relevant FTAA staff within Aerospace Operational Support Group
(AOSG) or Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit (AMAFTU). Detailed guidance on aircraft stores
compatibility related testing and compliance finding should be sought from ASCENG.
Su
pe
21.
Further guidance on the application of airworthiness policy to flight test activities should be sought from
ACPA.
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Sect 3 Chap 6
OPERATION PRIOR TO SERVICE RELEASE
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 2.4—Operation of Defence registered aircraft
MILAVREG 3.4—Special Flight Permits
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MILAVREG 3.5—Flight Test Permits
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MILAVREG 3.6—Airworthiness Directives
MILAVREG 5.1—Registration requirements for non-Defence registered aircraft
MILAVREG 5.2—Airworthiness management of aircraft prior to Defence registration
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eg
MILAVREG 5.7—Operation of non-Defence registered aircraft
ty
INTRODUCTION
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1.
Acquisition activities to introduce a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design normally require
that the aircraft is operated prior to Service Release. This may include operations both before and after the aircraft has
been Defence registered by the Defence AA. Operations involving Defence personnel are provided a level of
regulation and oversight sufficient to discharge the Defence AA’s duty-of-care to provide and preserve a safe working
environment. For non-Defence registered aircraft operations involving Defence personnel, the Defence AA requires
that the airworthiness of those operations provides at least an equivalent level of safety to that provided by Defence.
The operation of a Defence registered aircraft prior to Service Release is only permitted under a temporary
Airworthiness Instrument issued for a specified scope and duration of flying. The mechanism utilised by Defence to
enable such flight operations will depend on the nature of the flying activities to be undertaken.
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PURPOSE
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2.
This chapter describes the airworthiness management requirements for authorisation and conduct of
operations prior to Service Release.
–
APPLICABILITY
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3.
This chapter is applicable to operations prior to Service Release of a new aircraft type, or an aircraft
undergoing a modification classified as Major in accordance with TAREG 2.5.3—Classification of changes in Type
Design which fall within the scope of Defence AMS. These include:
flight test operations by the aircraft Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) involving Defence
personnel outside Australian airspace;
b.
flying training or other flying operations by any foreign flying organisation involving Defence
personnel outside Australian airspace;
c.
flying operations by the aircraft OEM involving Defence personnel within Australian airspace; and
d.
any flying operations by the Defence prior to Service Release.
FLYING OPERATIONS PRIOR TO DEFENCE REGISTRATION
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DEFENCE INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN OEM FIGHT TEST
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4.
The development of a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design invariably requires an extensive
program of ground and flight testing by the OEM. The involvement of Defence personnel in this testing is important to
assist with the compilation of compliance findings against the Certification Basis Description (CBD) and for design
and contractual acceptance of the aircraft. The process of making compliance findings and managing the CBD is
addressed in detail in Section 3, Chapter 4 of this manual. Acquisition flight test activity in support of Type
Certification and acceptance is the subject of Section 3, Chapter 5.
5.
Depending on the extent or complexity of the test program, the involvement of Defence personnel could
include any activity from observation to captaincy of the aircraft throughout multiple test sorties. During early
development phases of the acquisition project, this flying activity will most likely occur at an overseas OEM facility.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 6
6.
Aircraft registration requirements. Whilst the aircraft remains the property of the OEM and is not
Defence registered, MILAVREG 5.1—Registration requirements for non-Defence registered aircraft requires that the
involvement of Defence personnel in operating such an aircraft is subject to:
a.
Type Certification of the aircraft by a recognised NAA or MAA; or
b.
issuance of an experimental Type Certificate or exemption by a recognised NAA or MAA applicable
to the scope of developmental flying to be conducted.
•
For recognition of an extant foreign Type Certificate, the airworthiness authorities
listed under TAREG 2.2.7—Informed Recognition of prior acceptance are
applicable.
eg
For the purposes of MILAVREG 5.1, a recognised NAA or MAA is one whose
airworthiness system has been assessed as providing an equivalent level of safety to
that provided by the Defence. MILAVREG 5.9— Defence AA recognised
airworthiness authorities lists the NAAs and MAAs that have a standing Defence
AA recognition.
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•
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NOTE
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Sa
7.
Airworthiness management requirements. MILAVREG 5.2 requires that appropriate airworthiness
management arrangements are in place to support operations involving Defence personnel. For OEM flight test
activities, Defence involvement is subject to:
satisfaction of the relevant FTAA that operational airworthiness management arrangements are
adequate to safely support the intended operations;
b.
satisfaction of the TAR that the scope and conduct of maintenance activity is sufficient to support the
intended operations safely; and
c.
accreditation of the OEM engineering organisation supporting the flying operations to an appropriate
scope and level by:
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Av
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a.
the TAR through issue of an Engineering Authority Certificate; or
(2)
an NAA or MAA recognised by the TAR under TAREG 2.2.7.
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8.
Operating requirements. MILAVREG 5.7t requires that the flight test operations are conducted within
the limitations and conditions of the aircraft certifying authority and subject to any requirements of the relevant OAA
or FTAA. Limitations and conditions for flight test operations are normally contained within a flight test plan
addressing each test event. The management of test activities to support Type Certification is described in Section 3,
Chapter 5.
Operational airworthiness management of OEM flight test
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9.
The requirements to satisfy the FTAA that the operational airworthiness management arrangements
supporting the OEM flight testing are adequate are contained in OAREG 4.3. This regulation allows the participation
of Defence aircrew in OEM flight testing through recognition that:
a.
by
ed
the flight test organisation (including the participating Defence aircrew) has been assessed by the
FTAA or representative as adequate to safely conduct the test operations.
ed
b.
the flight test organisation is certified to conduct an applicable scope of flight test operations under a
recognised NAA or MAA; or
Su
pe
rs
10.
Flight test Flying Management System. To meet the requirements of these regulations, Defence
participation is subject to the existence of adequate flight test flying management processes and procedures. Section 3,
Chapter 3 describes the requirement for Defence aircrew to operate within defined flying management system
arrangements. These may include those processes and procedures implemented by the OEM to control flight test
operations locally, but may also include procedures and processes implemented by the acquisition agency governing
the participation of the Defence aircrew. Ultimately, the acquisition agency is responsible for ensuring the
involvement of Defence aircrew in flight test operations meet the requirements of the Defence airworthiness
regulations, however the relevant FTAA or appointed representative should be consulted to confirm that the flying
management arrangements are adequate. Aspects of the flight test flying management system implemented to satisfy
the FTAA may include:
a.
2
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Interim Design Certificate. Interim Design Certificates, or a similar vehicle to document design
configuration and aircraft conformance to design, should be presented by the OEM prior to the
AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 6
commencement of that phase of testing relevant to a particular element of design. The design
certificate should identify that the specific design is considered airworthy for the planned test flights.
b.
Aircraft configuration conformance. The OEM should identify the physical and functional
configuration of the aircraft and confirm that the aircraft conforms to the configuration identified in the
design certificate.
c.
Test documentation. The test documentation should include:
the flight test plan or procedures endorsed by the acquisition agency, including specific test
points to be completed;
(2)
identification of instrumentation or data recording requirements;
(3)
identification of the required aircraft configurations to support each test flight; and
(4)
identification of all applicable operating conditions and limitations relevant to the scope of the
testing, or reference to appropriate operating manuals.
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(1)
Safety review. The OEM should ensure that hazards associated with a specific flight test activity
have been identified, documented and appropriately mitigated. Such activity is typically addressed
through the conduct of a flight test hazard (or risk) assessment that is subsequently formally reviewed
by acquisition agency as part of the test plan or procedure endorsement. Importantly, the acquisition
agency should ensure that appropriate approval authorities are identified for low, medium and high risk
test activities.
e.
Maintenance and operating manuals. The maintenance and operating manuals, including any
temporary procedures and limitations, should be current for each flight test activity. Amendments to
the maintenance and operating manuals should be prepared by the OEM and circulated for review. A
provisional or draft flight manual and other operating instructions necessary to support aircraft
operations should be available.
f.
Test Readiness Review. The Test Readiness Review (TRR) may be tailored for the conduct of
each flight test, however in general should be equivalent to standard flight test practices normally
expected by the FTAA. The FTAA or representative should be consulted during the development of
procedures defining the conduct of the TRR.
g.
Pre–flight briefing. A pre-flight briefing should be convened immediately before each flight in the
test program to verify that the participating aircrew, engineers and test specialists are prepared and
understand the sequence of testing to be conducted.
h.
Flight authorisation. Flight authorisation for the participating Defence aircrew should be granted
by an appropriate authorising officer.
i.
Maintenance release. The test aircraft should be subject to a maintenance release only where the
aircraft is serviceable for the intended flight and is configured as required in flight test plan or
procedure.
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d.
DEFENCE INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN FLYING TRAINING
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by
11.
The airworthiness requirements for Defence aircrew participating in overseas flying training are similar to
those required prior to Defence aircrew participation in flight test. The aircraft registration requirements and
airworthiness management requirements remain subject to MILAVREG 5. However, in the case of aircrew training,
the OAA must be similarly satisfied that the flying management system arrangements supporting the flying training
are adequate to provide an equivalent level of safety for the participating aircrew as that provided by Defence. This
may require assessment of the proposed training operations by the OAAR(Acq) or other representative appointed by
the OAA. The assessment should include examination of not only the extant operational procedures used by the
foreign flying organisation, but also the impact on operational airworthiness of Defence aircrew participation within
that flying organisation. Factors such as, language, flying philosophy, safety culture and instructional techniques
should be carefully considered to ensure the interaction of Defence aircrew with the established processes does not
compromise safe operations. The command to which the participating aircrew belong is responsible for ensuring the
airworthiness factors for overseas flying training are appropriately considered, in consultation with the relevant OAA.
DEFENCE INVOLVEMENT IN OEM FLYING ACTIVITIES WITHIN AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE
12.
Operation of a new aircraft type may be required prior to Defence registration within Australian airspace for
the purpose of production acceptance testing, ferry flights, limited flight testing or other limited flying operations. In
such cases the OEM may require an exemption from the CASA from holding an Australian Type Certificate for the
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s
aircraft and from holding an Air Operators Certificate for the proposed scope of flying operations. Participation in
such testing by Defence aircrew remains subject to the requirements of MILAVREG 5. Within Australian airspace and
following exemption by CASA, the involvement of Defence personnel is only permitted following issue of an AD by
the Defence AA which stipulates any requirements or considerations relevant to the Defence participation. These may
include direction to an OAA or FTAA to provide operational airworthiness oversight for the participating aircrew in
accordance with the requirements of an appropriate Defence flying organisation. MILAVREG 3 contains the Defence
AA requirements for issue of this instrument. An example AD used for the purpose of Defence involvement in OEM
flying activities within Australian airspace is available from the ACPA website.
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ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT PLAN (AAMP)
eg
13.
In all cases listed above, the airworthiness management arrangements are to be documented in the AAMP
required by MILAVREG 2.3. The AAMP should identify the flying management systems and procedures
implemented to assure airworthiness is maintained for operations involving Defence personnel.
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FLYING OPERATIONS PRIOR TO SERVICE RELEASE
ia
NEW AIRCRAFT UNDERGOING ACQUISITION DEVELOPMENT
tio
n
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fe
ty
14.
Most aircraft owned and operated by Defence are Defence registered. The determination of registration for
Defence aircraft types is described in detail in Section 3, Chapter 2. A new aircraft type undergoing Australian
Military Type Certification will require Defence registration prior to the conduct of operations with that aircraft by
Defence. MILAVREG 2.4 requires that aircraft must only be operated as Defence registered aircraft following issue of
an AMTC and Service Release, or under a SFP. An existing Defence registered aircraft may be operated prior to
Service Release in accordance with an SFP, or under a FTP issued by an FTAA.
Av
15.
Defence normally requires the operation of a new aircraft type prior to Service Release for several reasons.
These may include:
the conduct of developmental testing supporting type certification and performance evaluation,
b.
the conduct of acceptance testing,
c.
ferry flights,
d.
initial operational test and evaluation to exercise the operational arrangements supporting the
capability, or
e.
the conduct of initial QFI training in readiness for the introduction to service.
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16.
Conduct of operations by Defence may only occur following Defence registration. The Defence registration
process assigns ‘ownership’ of the certification basis to Defence and signifies that sufficient activities have been
completed, and adequate arrangements implemented such that the airworthiness of the aircraft has been established
and can be sustained. Initially, this basis may only provide for limited operations that do not warrant Type
Certification and Service Release to the full roles and environment documented in the SOI. In such cases, the
mechanism through which the aircraft is Defence registered is through issue of an SFP.
MAJOR CHANGES TO TYPE DESIGN
pe
rs
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ed
by
17.
Operation prior to Service Release of a Defence registered aircraft which has been subject to a Major change
to the Type Design may be required for similar reasons as a new aircraft. Since the aircraft type is already Defence
registered, Defence is the custodian of the certification basis. Therefore, operation prior to Service Release involving
flight test may be authorised under a FTP issued by an FTAA or, where the intended flying operations do not involve
flight test or the testing involves complex, unique or high risk considerations beyond the scope of the FTAA’s
authority, the scope of flying may be authorised under an SFP issued by the Defence AA.
Su
SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMITS (SFP)
18.
Application for an SFP. The requirement for an SFP should be identified in the AAMP when the
airworthiness strategy to introduce the aircraft to service is defined. MILAVREG 3.4 contains the Defence AA’s
requirements for issue of an SFP. Similar to the AMTC and Service Release, applications for an SFP require OAA and
TAA recommendation. In respect to applying for an SFP, operational airworthiness requirements are contained in
OAREG 3.3.2 and technical airworthiness requirements are contained in TAREG 2.3. An application for an SFP is
based on the following:
a.
4
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Scope, purpose and duration of operations. The SFP application must identify the required
scope, purpose and duration of operations. The scope of operations provides the basis against which
AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 6
the adequacy of certification activity and supporting arrangements are assessed in support of
airworthiness. For flight test activities to be authorised under an SFP, the flight test plan or TEMP
normally documents the specific flying to be conducted.
Design Acceptance. The SFP application must be supported by an aircraft type configuration
which is technically acceptable for the proposed scope and duration of operations. Sufficient
compliance findings must have been established to assure the safety of the aircraft Type Design at the
given state of development when operating within the designated scope of operations by designated
aircrew.
c.
Risk assessment. The scope of flying must be subject to an Aviation Risk Management (AVRM)
assessment applicable for all flying to be conducted under the SFP. For flight test operations, the risk
assessment must be documented as part of the flight test plan in accordance with OAREGs.
d.
Operating instructions and manuals. Sufficient operational instructions and manuals must be
available for use and must have been assessed as adequate by the test aircrew to support the proposed
flying operations. Any applicable orders, instructions or procedures supplementing the operating or
maintenance manuals must be available.
e.
Supporting technical arrangements. Appropriate technical infrastructure must be in place to
support the proposed scope of operations including engineering and maintenance organisations with an
adequate level of authority to perform engineering and maintenance throughout the proposed operating
duration.
f.
Supporting operational arrangements. Appropriate operational arrangements must be in place
to sustain airworthy operations. These include, designated qualification and competency requirements
for aircrew, a documented flight authorisation process relevant to the scope of flying and nominated
authorisation officers for the duration of the limited operation.
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b.
the SFP application;
b.
the draft SFP, which:
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–
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19.
OAA and TAA recommendation for an SFP. To obtain OAA and TAA recommendations for issue of
an SFP, OAA recommendation requirements are contained in OAREG 3.3.3 and TAA recommendation requirements
are contained in TAREG 2.3. OAA and TAA recommendations are based on the Authority being satisfied that
sufficient operational and technical certification activity has been completed to support airworthy operation of the
aircraft within the proposed scope of flying, and that the operational and technical supporting arrangements are
sufficient for the proposed duration of flying. In order to obtain OAA and TAA recommendations, sufficient evidence
must be provided by the acquisition agency to support the application. This evidence should include:
identifies the specific aircraft configuration/s to which the SFP applies;
(2)
summarises the scope, purpose and duration of flying to be authorised;
(3)
lists any applicable geographic or airspace restrictions applicable to the intended operations;
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(1)
identifies or references the operating limitations, manuals, procedures and AVRM plan
implemented to ensure flying is only conducted within the established certification basis;
(5)
identifies any prerequisite conditions prior to operation, or to progressing operations under the
SFP;
(6)
identifies the specific aircraft tail numbers which conform to the authorised configuration and
are intended to be used for the scope of flying; and
(7)
identifies a date or event to trigger a review of the continuing applicability of the SFP.
Su
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ed
by
(4)
c.
a design acceptance certificate including a document that identifies the applicable aircraft
configuration;
d.
current versions of the AAMP, Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS) and Operational
Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP);
e.
a document which summarises the current status of certification activity supporting the intended scope
of operations, including:
(1)
identification of those certification basis requirements against which compliance has not been
fully established,
(2)
identification of any issues through previous test and evaluation, and
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(3)
f.
mitigation of the uncertified or unacceptable elements of the design through implementation of
conditions and limitations.
eg
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20.
Defence AA Airworthiness Board executive review. For new aircraft types undergoing Defence
registration, MILAVREG 3.4 requires the Airworthiness Board review of the case supporting the issue of an SFP. This
is because the issue of the SFP signifies Defence registration of the aircraft type and transfers ‘ownership’ of the
certification basis to the Defence. For a Major change to the Type Design, Airworthiness Board review is not
automatically required prior to issuing an SFP. However, the Defence AA may require Airworthiness Board review of
an SFP application for a Major change if the acquisition activity involves complex, unique or high risk operations
warranting an additional level of oversight. The requirement for Airworthiness Board review of an SFP application for
a Major change to the Type Design should be clarified with ACPA during compilation of the AAMP. Detailed
guidance on preparations for Airworthiness Board review, including compilation of an Accomplishment Summary, is
contained in Section 3, Chapter 7.
s
attestations from appropriate operational, technical and logistics representatives that the supporting
arrangements are sufficient for the intended scope and duration of operations.
Sa
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ty
R
21.
Issue of an SFP. ACPA coordinates the issue of the SFP on behalf of the Defence AA. ACPA will
process the application for the SFP and collate the OAA, TAA and, if necessary, Airworthiness Board
recommendations for consideration by the Defence AA. Once the SFP is signed, ACPA will provide a copy of the SPF
to all stakeholders and identify any additional conditions and limitations required by the Defence AA. An example
SFP for a new aircraft type is available from the ACPA website.
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Use of an SFP for Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). An SFP may be utilised to authorise
flying operations with a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design by an operational organisation for the
purposes of OT&E prior to Service Release. This may be required to exercise the operational airworthiness system
under controlled test conditions to confirm the suitability of the operational arrangements for more general operations
following Service Release. Such testing may be conducted by the operating organisation under an SFP where the
Defence AA is satisfied that the scope of testing, participating personnel and technical and operational supporting
arrangements are adequate to assure airworthiness for the duration of the testing. The operating organisation remains
the custodian of the operational test objectives; however, these objectives may be set in consultation with the FTAA
and the acquisition organisation where the operational experience with the new capability is not extensive.
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Relationship between an SFP and a TEMP. Where an SFP cites a TEMP or other test plan as the
permitted scope of operations authorised under the SFP, those documents effectively become part of the SFP. As such,
a change the scope of the test documents is effectively a change to the SFP and may only be permitted with the
agreement of the Defence AA.
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Changes to SFPs. Changes to SFPs should only be considered under exceptional circumstances. In such
cases, MILAVREG 3.4 requires the acquisition agency to apply to the Defence AA (through DACPA) to make the
change. Changes to the SFP scope or duration will only be granted where the established certification basis supports
such a change. This must be justified by the acquisition agency and may require OAA and TAA endorsement.
Incremental amendment to an SFP will not normally be accepted by the Defence AA as part of an airworthiness
strategy to introduce a new or modified aircraft type.
FLIGHT TEST PERMITS (FTP)
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25.
Applicability of an FTP. An FTP is an airworthiness instrument, which can be issued by an FTAA, to
authorise the operation of a Defence registered aircraft for the purposes of flight test. The FTP performs a similar
function as an SFP, however may only be used for flight test operations within the scope of the issuing FTAA. The
primary prerequisite for issue of an FTP is a current AMTC or SFP for the aircraft type. In the acquisition context, the
circumstances where an FTP may be used to authorise the operation of an aircraft include:
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a.
flight test of a new aircraft type which has been Defence registered through issue of an SFP and prior
to issue of an AMTC and Service Release,
b.
flight test of a Defence registered aircraft undergoing a Major change to the Type Design prior to issue
of a STC and Service Release. and
c.
flight test prior to Service Release of a new aircraft type which has achieved an AMTC.
26.
The flight test activity may be any acquisition related testing within the scope of the FTAA’s authority
including developmental, acceptance, and operational test and evaluation. MILAVREG 3.5 contains the Defence AA’s
requirements for the applicability and issue of an FTP. OAREG 4.1.3 contains the detailed requirements for FTAA
issue of an FTP for specific test activities.
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27.
Purpose of an FTP. The purpose of an FTP is to authorise flight test operations beyond the established
certification basis. However, OAREG 4.1.3 requires that the FTAA is satisfied that the operational and technical
airworthiness aspects are adequate to commence the testing safely. The established certification basis is that identified
by the extant SFP or AMTC. Flight testing under an FTP may therefore build on the existing certification basis to
support subsequent issue of an AMTC or STC and Service Release.
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SFP versus FTP. For a new aircraft type, an SFP and an FTP need not be issued for the same scope of
flying activity. The SFP must first be initially issued to Defence register the aircraft and may include a limited scope
of operations based on the certification status of the aircraft. The scope and duration of the SFP may include allowance
for subsequent flight testing conducted under an FTP issued by an FTAA. FTPs may then be issued to authorise flight
testing beyond the certification basis established for issue of the SFP. For a Major change to the Type Design, an FTP
may be used to operate the aircraft beyond the extant certification basis identified in an AMTC and any STCs without
the need for an SFP. In each case, however, the FTAA may only authorise testing within their authority. Testing
involving unique or complex circumstances may require elevation for conduct under an SFP. Such a case would
include the involvement of overseas test agencies outside Australian airspace. The interaction with other NAAs or
MAAs and any implications of such involvement may be addressed more appropriately through issue of an SFP by the
Defence AA. Subsequent flight testing under an FTP may then be appropriate. The AAMP should describe the
strategy for flight test of the new or modified aircraft and should identify the airworthiness mechanism to support the
flying operations. The use of SFPs and FTPs for specific flying activities in the acquisition program can then be
confirmed in consultation the FTAA and ACPA.
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Issue of an FTP. The requirements for activities leading to issue of an FTP are contained in OAREG 4.
Guidance on flight testing in support of acquisition activities is contained in Section 3, Chapter 5.
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OEM FLIGHT TEST ON DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
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30.
OEM test and evaluation on Defence registered aircraft associated with the development and certification of a
Major change to the Type Design may be achieved through one of two mechanisms. The process applied depends on
whether the aircraft is maintained as Defence registered aircraft, or whether it is removed from the Defence Register
for the period of the development and modification activity.
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Retention of Defence Registration. Where one or more aircraft are provided for OEM flight test and
their Defence registration is maintained, the acquisition agency should seek issue of an SFP or AD to ensure the
Defence AA's requirements for the operation of the aircraft are appropriately captured. The considerations for such
operations are similar to those described throughout this chapter; however, ACPA should be consulted when OEM
flight test on a Defence registered aircraft is being considered as part of the acquisition airworthiness strategy.
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Removal from the Defence Register.
For an extensive program of modification and test, the
Defence AA will consider removing the specific aircraft from the Defence Register for the duration of the
development activity. The requirements for removal and reinstatement to the Defence Register are contained in
MILAVREG 2. Guidance on removal and reinstatement to the Defence Register is contained in Section 3, Chapter 2.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE
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Further guidance on the management of flight test supporting Type Certification is contained Section 3,
Chapter 5.
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DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW
Applicable Regulations
MILAVREG 3.1—Australian Military Type Certificates
MILAVREG 3.2—Supplemental Type Certificates
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MILAVREG 3.3—Service Release
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MILAVREG 3.4—Special Flight Permits
MILAVREG 4.2—Airworthiness Board conduct
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MILAVREG 4.3—Airworthiness Board outcomes
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INTRODUCTION
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1.
Acquisition activities leading to the Type Certification and Service Release require an additional level of
oversight to assure that the airworthiness of the new aircraft type or Major change to Type Design has been established
and can be sustained. The Airworthiness Board provides an independent review of the acquisition activities to provide
assurance to the Defence AA that the DASP requirements have been satisfied, and that a satisfactory basis exists to
commence operations within designated roles and environments at a defined and manageable rate of effort.
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PURPOSE
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2.
This chapter describes the role of the Airworthiness Board in relation to acquisition activities leading to Type
Certification and Service Release, and to provide guidance on meeting the requirements of an acquisition
Airworthiness Board review.
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APPLICABILITY
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This chapter is applicable to acquisition activities involving new aircraft and Major changes to the Type
Design leading to Defence AA issue of an AMTC, STC and Service Release. For new aircraft types, this chapter is
also applicable to acquisition activities leading to Defence AA issue of a SFP.
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ROLE OF THE DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD
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The Airworthiness Board is comprised of two star-rank officers, one with extensive technical experience and
the other with extensive operational experience. The role of the Airworthiness Board in relation to acquisition
airworthiness is to independently review the activities leading to the Type Certification and Service Release of a new
aircraft or Major change to the Type Design. MILAVREG 3 requires that the Airworthiness board review the case
supporting the issue of an AMTC, STC or Service Release by the Defence AA. Following the executive review, the
Airworthiness Board provides a recommendation to the Defence AA for issue of the relevant airworthiness instrument
with any condition and limitation caveats in the interests of airworthiness. MILAVREG 3 also requires the
Airworthiness Board to similarly review the case supporting issue of a SFP for a new Defence aircraft type undergoing
Defence registration.
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5.
The Airworthiness Board also regularly reviews the airworthiness management of in-service Defence aircraft
types and Aviation Support Systems. The role and conduct of the Airworthiness Board for this purpose is described in
Section 4, Chapter 4. The Airworthiness Board may be required to review the acquisition airworthiness activities of
non-aircraft Aviation Systems as required by the Defence AA. The application of the Airworthiness Board process for
these systems is described in Section 5 relative to the particular system under development.
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PREPARING FOR DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW
7.
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6.
MILAVREG 4.2 contains the requirements for an acquisition airworthiness board. For a review of the case
supporting the issue of an AMTC, STC or SFP, the acquisition agency is required to submit evidence which
demonstrates the airworthiness of the aircraft within the specified roles and environment when operated by
appropriately qualified and competent Defence personnel in accordance with approved instructions. For a review of
the case supporting issue of Service Release or an SFP, the acquisition agency must also demonstrate that the
operational, technical and logistical supporting arrangements are sufficient to maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft
within the intended roles and environment at the expected rate of effort.
b.
presentation of the key aspects of the submission to the Airworthiness Board.
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preparation of a documentary submission
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Demonstration of these requirements by the acquisition agency is achieved through two means:
a.
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8.
The documentary submission satisfies the dual purpose of providing a basis to achieve TAA and OAA
recommendations and allows the Airworthiness Board to familiarise themselves with the scope of the acquisition
project and the operational and technical evidence underpinning airworthiness. The documentation required to achieve
TAA and OAA endorsement is a subset of that required by the Airworthiness Board. This is because the OAA and the
TAA (and members of their staff) will have been involved with the acquisition activity throughout the project through
endorsement of the AAMP, involvement in the compilation of the Certification Basis Description (CBD) and
Statement of Requirement (SOR), assessing the competency of organisations involved in the development activity,
and making of compliance findings. Conversely the Airworthiness Board is not directly exposed to any project activity
until they are provided with the opportunity to review the documentary submission. Consequently, some additional
information should be provided to describe the scope and achievements of the acquisition activity which may not be
required to achieve OAA and TAA recommendations. Notwithstanding, the compilation of the Airworthiness Board
submission should not be an onerous task, as much of the required information will already be contained in existing
project, operational and engineering documentation.
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The presentation to the Airworthiness Board provides the acquisition agency with the opportunity to describe
the airworthiness activities and events supporting the airworthiness of the aircraft type. Additionally, the presentation
provides a forum for the Airworthiness Board members to question the acquisition agency over any airworthiness
matter identified from the submission or presentation. Presentations should be attended by all primary operational,
technical and logistics stakeholders of the acquisition activity to ensure as many questions or concerns raised are
addressed during the conduct of the Airworthiness Board.
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REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EXECUTIVE REVIEW
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Sect 3 Chap 7
PREPARING THE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD SUBMISSION
10.
The requirements for the submission to the Airworthiness Board are outlined in annex B to Section 2,
Chapter 4 (MILAVREG 4). Generally, the documentation required for inclusion in the submission for an AMTC,
STC, SFP and Service Release includes the following:
Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan. The current AAMP for the acquisition activity
which has been endorsed by the OAA, TAA and Defence AA is required to identify the airworthiness
strategy utilised by the acquisition agency. Subordinate documents, such as the Operational
Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP) and Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS) are
required to obtain an OAA and TAA recommendation.
b.
Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). An approved version of the SOI is required to identify the
roles and environment in which the aircraft type is required to operate. For an SFP submission, a
detailed scope of the intended flying in the form of a flight test plan or similar may be provided instead
of the SOI.
c.
Certification Basis Description (CBD). The CBD which has been endorsed by the OAA and
TAA is required to identify the scope of certification compliance activity undertake. The compliance
status of each CBD requirement should be identified relevant to the roles and environment to be
authorised under the AMTC, STC or SFP.
d.
Accomplishment Summary. The accomplishment summary provides an overview of the activities
underpinning the airworthiness of the aircraft and includes:
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a.
A brief description of the project scope and activity to date.
(2)
A summary of the certification history of the aircraft.
(3)
A summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate compliance with operational
certification requirements and applicable operational airworthiness regulations as provided to
obtain the OAA recommendation.
(4)
A summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate compliance with technical certification
requirements and applicable technical airworthiness regulations as provided to obtain the TAA
recommendation.
(5)
For an SFP or Service Release, a summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate that the
supporting logistical arrangements are satisfactory for the commencement of the intended scope
of operations.
(6)
Description of any outstanding issues affecting the certification or supporting arrangements of
the aircraft which impact airworthiness.
(7)
Attestations regarding the status of operational, technical and logistics activity supporting the
airworthiness of the aircraft type through endorsement of the accomplishment summary by the
relevant appointments.
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Further guidance on the content and format of the accomplishment summary
is included in annex A.
TAA and OAA Recommendations. TAA and OAA recommendations are essential to the enable
conduct of the Airworthiness Board. The Board will not be held unless both the TAA and the OAA
recommend issue of the airworthiness instruments sought. Further detail on obtaining the TAA and
OAA recommendations is contained in the following paragraphs.
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NOTE
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OBTAINING A TAA RECOMMENDATION
a.
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A relevant Design Acceptance Certificate, which attests that the Type Design (TAREG 2.2.8) and the
product or system meets the SOR (all airworthiness and functional requirements), or provide an
equivalent level of safety appropriate to the configuration, role and operating environment as
documented in the SOI.
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The Design Acceptance Certificate is issued by the DAR and should reference or
include a summary of Compliance Findings from operational and technical staff.
A current version of the PDAS.
c.
A summary of technical accomplishments to meet the requirements of the PDAS and AAMP.
d.
Copies of all Issue Papers and attestations by the DAR that the Issue Papers adequately cover all
airworthiness matters and are being managed to resolution (TAREG 2.2.11).
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The technical accomplishments and attestations for Type Certification should be
provided as part of the Accomplishment Summary. Detailed guidance on preparing
the technical component of the Accomplishment Summary for Type Certification is
included in annex A.
An AMTC or STC has been or will be issued
b.
A DAR has been delegated responsibility for the aircraft following Service Release
c.
An Authorised Engineering Organisation is in place, including an appropriate design support network
(TAREG 3)
d.
An Authorised Maintenance Organisation is in place, including an appropriate maintenance support
network (TAREG 4 and TAREG 5)
e.
Appropriate aircraft and engine structural integrity management systems are in place (TAREG 2.2.3s,
TAREG 3.5.4, and TAREG 3.5.5)
f.
There is a process that provides assurance that all applicable aircraft or modification activities conform
to the Type Design through issue of Certificates of Airworthiness (TAREG 2.6.3).
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The evidence supporting the TAA recommendation for Service Release should be
provided as part of the Accomplishment Summary. Detailed guidance on preparing
the technical component of an Accomplishment Summary for Service Release is
included in annex A.
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TAA Recommendation for Service Release. The requirements to obtain a TAA recommendation for
Service Release are listed in TAREG 2.4.1. In order to obtain the TAA’s recommendation in support of Service
Release by the Defence AA, the acquisition agency must provide the TAA with evidence that:
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TAA Recommendation for Type Certification. The requirements to obtain a TAA recommendation for
issue of an AMTC or STC are listed in TAREG 2.2.2. In order to obtain a recommendation from the TAA in support
of Type Certification, the acquisition agency must provide the TAA with:
AAP 7001.048
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OBTAINING THE OAA’S RECOMMENDATION
13.
OAA Recommendation for Type Certification. The requirements to obtain an OAA recommendation
for issue of an AMTC or STC are listed in OAREG 3.2.9. In order to obtain a recommendation from the OAA in
support of Type Certification, the acquisition agency must provide the OAA with:
A supporting recommendation by the TAA in respect of the technical aspects of the type certification
of the new aircraft or Major change
b.
A current copy of the endorsed OAMP
c.
The current approved SOI
d.
A summary of operational accomplishments to meet the Type Certification requirements of the AAMP
and OAMP
e.
Where an Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR(Acq)) is appointed, a
recommendation from the OAAR(Acq) regarding the extent to which the aviation system is suitable
for flight in the SOI roles and environment.
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The operational accomplishments and OAA recommendation should be provided as
part of the Accomplishment Summary. Detailed guidance on preparing the
operational component of the accomplishment summary for Type Certification is
included in annex A.
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OAA Recommendation for Service Release. The requirements to obtain an OAA recommendation for
Service Release are listed in OAREG 3.4.1. In order to obtain an OAA’s recommendation in support of Service
Release by the Defence AA, the acquisition agency must provide the OAA with:
A supporting recommendation by the TAA in respect of the technical aspects of Service Release of the
new aircraft or Major change.
b.
A current copy of the endorsed OAMP.
c.
A summary of operational accomplishments to meet the Service Release requirements of the AAMP
and OAMP.
d.
If necessary, a list of recommended Service Release limitations resulting from:
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technical issues affecting the aircraft’s suitability for the SOI roles or environment, as advised
by the TAA
(3)
operational limits resulting from T&E activities performed prior to Type Certification.
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While not required by OAREG 3.4.1, the acquisition agency should liaise with the OAA's staff to
confirm whether the OAA requires an OAAR recommendation.
NOTE
The operational accomplishments and list of recommended limitations should be
provided as part of the Accomplishment Summary. Detailed guidance on preparing
the operational component of the accomplishment summary for Service Release is
included in annex A.
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The requirements for an Airworthiness Board submission for issue of an SFP for a new aircraft type are
essentially the same as that required for issue of an AMTC and Service Release. The exception is that the summary of
technical and operational accomplishments need only justify the operation of the aircraft for the intended scope of
operations for the specified limited duration. This may include certification activity and supporting arrangements
which are immature and would otherwise be unsuitable as justification for an AMTC and Service Release. However,
the acquisition agency must also demonstrate that any inherent risks associated with the immature state of the
acquisition development activity have been appropriately mitigated. Such mitigation would normally be documented
in the accomplishment summary or supporting documentation. Additionally, the application for the SFP described in
Section 3, Chapter 6 must be provided with the Airworthiness Board submission.
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AIRWORTHINESS BOARD SUBMISSION FOR AN SFP
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16.
The operational and technical airworthiness requirements to achieve an OAA and TAA recommendation for
an SFP are contained in OAREG 3.3.3 and TAREG 2.3.1.
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AIRWORTHINESS BOARD CONDUCT
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17.
DACPA coordinates the activities of the Airworthiness Board on behalf of the Defence AA. The likely
timeframe for the conduct of an Airworthiness Board should be forecast by the acquisition agency in the AAMP.
Nonetheless, acquisition agencies should liaise with DACPA several months in advance of completing activities
leading to issue of an airworthiness instrument to ensure that an Airworthiness Board can be accommodated from a
schedule perspective. This will enable ACPA staff to make the necessary arrangements and confirm the Airworthiness
Board members’ availability.
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The submission is required to be finalised at least six weeks prior to the scheduled date of the Airworthiness
Board. This timeframe is required to enable sufficient time for TAA and OAA review and recommendation, and a
subsequent review of the submission by the Airworthiness Board members prior to the scheduled date. The acquisition
agency should address the submission to DGTA and the relevant OAAR, and provide an information copy to DACPA.
The covering minute should request DGTA to provide a TAA recommendation regarding issue of the relevant
Airworthiness Instrument to the Defence AA (through DACPA) and to forward a copy of the recommendation to the
OAA with information copy to DACPA. The OAA will review the TAA recommendation, the submission and any
recommendations from the OAAR and provide a recommendation regarding the issue of the relevant Airworthiness
Instrument to the Defence AA (through DACPA). ACPA will then provide the submission and recommendations to
the Airworthiness Board members at least two weeks prior to the scheduled Board.
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DACPA will coordinate the agenda for the Airworthiness Board and provide this to all stakeholders. A draft
agenda will be provided by DACPA with the formal notification minute for the Airworthiness Board approximately 12
weeks before the Board convenes. The presentation to the Airworthiness Board usually requires participation from the
DAR or Engineering Manager and the operational representative (eg OAAR(Acq) or other suitable delegate). For
Service Release, representation from the relevant logistics management organisation and operating organisation is also
required. ACPA staff will act as the secretariat for the Airworthiness Board and will record any notes, concerns and
recommendations of the members.
AIRWORTHINESS BOARD OUTCOMES
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20.
Notes or concerns raised by the Airworthiness Board may be addressed satisfactorily during the presentation;
however, those concerns which remain unresolved may be recommended for management through an Airworthiness
Corrective Action Request (ACAR). An ACAR carries the authority of the Defence AA and orders mandatory action
or resolution in the interests of airworthiness. One or more ACARs may preclude the Airworthiness Board
recommending to the Defence AA for issue of the relevant Airworthiness Instrument or may result in a temporary
limitation to Service Release. Other limitations recommended by the TAA or OAA will be considered by the
Airworthiness Board for the impact on the issue of the relevant Airworthiness Instrument.
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At the conclusion of the Airworthiness Board the members will summarise the findings and provide feedback
to the acquisition agency and stakeholders present. Following the Airworthiness Board review, DACPA will provide
the Airworthiness Board Report to all relevant agencies along with any ACARs and a summary of any conditions and
limitations resulting from the Airworthiness Board. ACARs are managed to closure by ACPA staff. Where issue of the
relevant Airworthiness Instruments is recommended, DACPA will provide the recommendations to the Defence AA
along with the relevant Airworthiness Instruments for signature. Following signature, DACPA will advise all
stakeholders and provide copies of the instruments to all stakeholders.
Annex:
A.
Preparation of an Accomplishment Summary
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PREPARATION OF AN ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
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1.
The Accomplishment Summary is the means through which an acquisition agency collates and summarises
the acquisition activity supporting the airworthiness of a new aircraft or major change to the Type Design. The
accomplishment summary serves the purpose of providing sufficient information for Technical Airworthiness
Authority (TAA), Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) and Airworthiness Board review and recommendation
to the Defence AA for issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)
and Service Release. The accomplishment summary is similarly used to support the Defence AA issue of a Special
Flight Permit (SFP), in conjunction with an application for an SFP.
2.
eg
PURPOSE
This annex describes the structure and format of an accomplishment summary.
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APPLICABILITY
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3.
This annex is applicable to acquisition activities to introduce a new aircraft or a Major change to the Type
Design where an AMTC, STC, Service Release or SFP is sought from the Defence AA. Major changes to the Type
Design of an existing Defence aircraft are normally those which, in accordance with Technical Airworthiness
Regulation (TAREG) 2.5.3:
introduce a new capability, or significantly varying an existing capability; or
b.
have an appreciable effect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational
characteristics or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the system.
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4.
The Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (ACPA) should always be consulted to determine what
review requirements the Defence AA has for such changes to the aircraft’s design or role. The acquisition agency
should appoint a coordinator to liaise with, and obtain the necessary inputs from, the TAA, OAA, Systems Program
Office (SPO) (and other DMO agencies) and Force Element Group (FEG) staff. The acquisition agency should
regularly liaise with the TAA, OAA and ACPA staff for guidance and clarification on meeting their requirements,
including the evidence required for submission.
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ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – COVERING PAGES
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The signatories to the accomplishment summary are those personnel required to attest that the acquisition
activity has been completed as described. Use of the accomplishment summary for this purpose obviates the need for
each stakeholder to provide separate attestations to the acquisition agency and simplifies the preparation of the
summary.
Project Engineering Manager (PEM).
The PEM is normally responsible for preparing the
accomplishment summary and compiling the required documentation from technical, operational and
logistics agencies involved in the acquisition activity. Signature by the PEM attests that the
accomplishment summary and supporting documentation meets the necessary requirements for review
and recommendation by the TAA, OAA and the Airworthiness Board.
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AMTC/STC or SFP signatories. The signatories to the accomplishment summary for an AMTC/STC or
SFP should include:
Aircraft Design Acceptance Representative (DAR). Signature by the DAR attests that all
technical airworthiness activity supporting the issue of the relevant airworthiness instruments by the
Defence AA has been completed. For a new aircraft acquisition where the DAR is also the PEM, this
attestation will cover both aspects.
c.
Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (Acquisition) (OAAR(Acq)).
Signature by the OAAR(Acq) attests that all operational activity supporting the issue of the relevant
airworthiness instrument by the Defence AA has been completed. For a major change to the Type
Design where an OAAR(Acq) has not been appointed, endorsement of the accomplishment summary
by the OAAR for the aircraft type or other appointed representative is appropriate.
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7.
SFP or Service Release signatories. For an accomplishment summary for issue of an SFP or Service
Release the signatories listed above should also cover the respective Service Release aspects of the submission.
Additional signatories to the accomplishment summary containing evidence in support of an SFP or Service Release
should include:
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Sect 3 Chap 7
Project Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Manager. Signature by the ILS manager attests
that the logistics arrangements supporting the operation of the aircraft are sufficient for the planned
scope of operations following Service Release or issue of the SFP.
b.
Officer Commanding (OC) the SPO. Signature by the OC of the relevant SPO attests that the
engineering and logistics organisations are suitably prepared and resourced to manage operations with
the aircraft at the expected rate of effort following issue of the SFP or Service Release.
c.
Officer Commanding the operating organisation. Signature by the OC of the Wing (or
equivalent) organisation operating the aircraft attests that sufficient operational airworthiness,
maintenance and logistics arrangements and resources have been implemented to manage operations
with the aircraft type following issue of the SFP or Service Release.
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ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – INTRODUCTORY SECTION
INTRODUCTION
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8.
Provide a brief background to the submission and identify the aim of the Airworthiness Board review. The
aim will typically be to support Airworthiness Board recommendation and issue by the Defence AA of an SFP or
AMTC/STC and Service Release.
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PROJECT SCOPE AND ACTIVITY TO DATE
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9.
Briefly identify the scope of the acquisition project including the major equipment and capability under
acquisition. Include a brief history of the major project activities or phases completed leading to Type Certification
and Service Release.
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CERTIFICATION STATUS OF THE AIRCRAFT TYPE
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10.
Identify the existing certification status of the aircraft type. If the aircraft is already Defence registered, cite
the extant SFP or AMTC and STCs. For non-Defence registered aircraft, identify any prior certification upon which
the Defence aircraft type is based and cite any expired SFPs which have been issued to allow previous operations with
the aircraft.
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11.
Where the Type Certification strategy has relied substantially on prior certification by a recognised
airworthiness authority, identify the configuration, role and environment relevant to the prior certification and cite any
differences to that required by Defence. Identify the scope of any Defence unique certification activity to account for
these differences.
ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – AMTC/STC COMPONENT
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OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
12.
The operational aspects of the submission for an AMTC or STC are those required to achieve an OAA
recommendation, including:
Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). Reference the approved SOI and summarise developments
or changes made to account for the role, environment and planned usage. Identify how these have been
accounted for in the OAA endorsed Statement of Requirement (SOR). Where a major change to the
Type Design does not introduce or change any roles or the environment, identify how this was
assessed and approved (OAREG 3.2.2).
b.
Compliance finding. Provide a summary of the operational compliance finding activity which
demonstrates that the elements of the certification basis are acceptable and the system is operationally
suitable for the approved roles and environment. Include a summary of who has been involved in
operational compliance finding activity or provide reference the OAA endorsed Operational
Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP) (OAREG 3.2.3).
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c.
Test and evaluation. Provide a summary of the test and evaluation activity which demonstrates
that the activity has been sufficient to show compliance with the certification basis and has identified
all necessary operating limitations and procedures. Identify which agencies have been involved or
reference to the OAA endorsed OAMP (OAREG 3.2.4).
d.
Human factors. Provide a summary of human factors assessments which demonstrate that the
system can be safely operated in the intended roles and environment by Defence aircrew. Identify the
agencies and activities which have determined this outcome (OAREG 3.2.5).
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AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 3 Chap 7
Aviation safety.
Provide a summary of any aviation safety hazards and occurrences and a
description of mitigation activity which demonstrates that each hazard or occurrence has been
adequately addressed (OAREG 3.2.6).
f.
Orders, Instructions and Publication (OIP). Provide a summary of assessment of aircrew
publications which demonstrates that all limitations and procedures necessary to safely operate the
system have been captured. State the outcome of the assessment and who has been involved
(OAREG 3.2.7).
g.
Issue papers. Provide a list of current issue papers which are being managed to resolve outstanding
airworthiness issues identified for any of the certification activities listed above (OAREG 3.2.8).
h.
Exemptions. Provide a list of exemptions to Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREGs)
granted by the Operational Airworthiness Regulator ( OAR) including the scope and duration
(OAREG 1.1.1).
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13.
Throughout this section, where any aspect of the certification activity remains incomplete or unresolved, the
accomplishment summary must describe the mitigating activities and identify any resulting conditions and limitations,
or reference the relevant issue paper. The recommended conditions and limitations are to be summarised in the
conclusion.
TECHNICAL ASPECTS
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14.
The technical aspects of the submission for an AMTC or STC are those required to achieve a TAA
recommendation, including:
Statement of Requirement. Provide reference to TAA endorsement of the SOR, and notification
of amendments to the SOR (which might be detailed within the certification basis description) that
reduced the level of safety established by the airworthiness standards. Requirements traceability from
the specification to the product should be evident (TAREG 2.2.4).
b.
Type Record. Provide an assessment of the acceptability of the Type Record (or definition of Type
Design if interim product or system is to enter service) (TAREG 2.2.9).
c.
Design Agency competency. Identify the establishment and maintenance of design agency
Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) certification, including a summary of compliance
assurance outcomes.
d.
Design development.
Briefly describe the outcomes of major steps in the design process,
including design reviews, Functional Configuration Audits and Physical Configuration Audits.
e.
Design Approval. Identify or reference the Design Approval certificate (TAREG 3.4.3).
f.
Certification Basis Description (CBD). Identify or reference the airworthiness CBD which
shows or references compliance findings made against the SOR (TAREG 2.2.11). An assessment of
the suitability of the CBD to the Defence configuration, role and environment by the DAR is also
required. A list of airworthiness requirements, where the acquisition agency is not confident the
evidence shows the requirement has been met, and is likely to result in limitations or mitigations being
required of operators or maintainers, should be separately included in the Design Acceptance
certificate provided with the submission. The CBD may be included as a separate document or as an
annex to the accomplishment summary.
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Instructions for continuing airworthiness. Provide an assessment of the acceptability of the
instructions for continuing airworthiness (eg instructions to enable the product or system to be
maintained in accordance with its CBD).
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g.
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15.
Throughout this section, where any aspect of the certification activity remains incomplete or unresolved, the
accomplishment summary must describe or provide reference to another document in the submission which describes
mitigating activities and identifies any resulting conditions and limitations, or reference the relevant issue paper. The
recommended conditions and limitations are to be summarised in the conclusion.
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Annex A to
Sect 3 Chap 7
ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – SERVICE RELEASE COMPONENT
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
Scope of flying. Describe of the scope of flying to be undertaken following service release.
b.
Flying Management System. Provide a summary of the status of each element of the flying
management system require by OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System. For a Major change to the
Type Design, include a brief summary of the changes made to the Flying Management System to
account for the new capability, roles or environment.
c.
Orders, Instructions and Publication (OIP). Identify the approval status and availability at the
operating organisation of OIP necessary to safely conduct flight operations, including those procedures
and instructions implemented or modified as part of the Flying Management System (OAREG 2.1).
d.
Training and qualification requirements.
Identify the approval status of training and
qualification requirements necessary to operate the new aircraft or capability in the required roles and
operating environment.
e.
Aviation risk management (AVRM). Provide a summary of the AVRM conducted to address
initial operations including appropriate risk mitigation.
f.
Aircrew availability. Identify the availability of trained and competent aircrew to operate at the
expected rate of effort following Service Release.
g.
Limitations. If necessary, identify any Service Release limitations resulting from:
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the immaturity of the flying management system;
(2)
technical issues affecting the aircraft’s suitability for the SOI roles or environment; and
(3)
operational limits resulting from T&E activities performed prior to type certification.
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(1)
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The Service Release limitations are to be summarised within the conclusion.
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TECHNICAL ASPECTS
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18.
The technical aspects of the submission for Service Release are those required to achieve a TAA
recommendation, including:
AMTC/STC. Where an AMTC or STC has already been issued, provide reference to the instrument.
Where the submission includes evidence in support of an AMTC or STC, that component of the
accomplishment summary is sufficient.
b.
DAR delegation. Confirm that a DAR has been delegated responsibility for the aircraft following
Service Release with an appropriate scope of engineering authority.
c.
Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO).
Confirm that an AEO is in place with an
appropriate scope of engineering authority, including an appropriate design support network
(TAREG 3).
d.
Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO).
Confirm that an AMO is in place with an
appropriate scope of maintenance authority, including an appropriate maintenance support network
(TAREG 4 and TAREG 5).
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16.
The operational aspects of the submission for Service Release are those required to achieve an OAA
recommendation, including:
Engineering Management Plans. Confirm that appropriate Maintenance Engineering Analysis
(MEA), Aircraft Structural Integrity (ASI) and Engine Structural Integrity (ESI) management systems
are in place (TAREG 2.2.3, TAREG 3.5.3, TAREG 3.5.4, and TAREG 3.5.5).
Certificates of Airworthiness. Confirm that there is a process that provides assurance that all
same or similar products or systems meet the Type Design (TAREG 2.6.3—Issue of Certificates of
Airworthiness).
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Annex A to
Sect 3 Chap 7
LOGISTICS ASPECTS
19.
The logistics aspects of the submission support the technical and operational evidence for recommendation
and issue of Service Release. The logistics aspects of the submission should include:
Engineering activities. Confirm that there is the capability to manage engineering activities;
including sufficient competent staff and training systems, publication management systems etc.
b.
Maintenance activities. Confirm that maintenance activity can be adequately performed (ie there
are sufficient competent staff and an ongoing training system for maintenance personnel). Confirm
there is an appropriate maintenance management system (eg CAMM2, LSAR, TMP, Type Record,
MEAP, etc.)
c.
Availability of publications.
Confirm that appropriate and useable instructions, including
sufficient technical publications, TMPs and servicing schedules, weight and balance procedures,
configuration control procedures etc.
d.
Tools and facilities. Confirm that there are sufficient support equipment, tools, test equipment and
maintenance handling equipment and facilities to enable necessary engineering, maintenance and other
logistics support functions to be carried out.
e.
Logistics support elements. Confirm there are sufficient integrated logistics support elements in
place, ie spares and consumables combined with arrangements for their continuing availability,
sufficient competent logistics staff and a training system (eg established repair pipelines, contracts, and
contractor software support).
f.
Aircraft stores capabilities. Confirm that any necessary stores clearances have been completed,
and are appropriately reflected in operating instructions and limitations.
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20.
Any unique or special arrangements to account for the above elements should be included in the submission.
Any deficiencies in the logistics management arrangements which impact airworthiness, including mitigation
strategies, should be identified. Any salient limitations should be summarised in the conclusion.
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ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
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21.
Summarise the case supporting the issue of the AMTC/STC and Service Release (as applicable) including
statements that operational, technical and logistics aspects are sufficient for the intended scope of operations, subject
to the limitations identified in the submission and by the TAA and OAA. A cross-reference matrix to the requirements
for issue of an AMTC/STC and Service Release may be included to aid the review by the TAA, OAA, ACPA staff and
the Airworthiness Board.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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22.
The submission should recommend issue of the AMTC/STC and Service Release (as applicable) subject to
the identified limitations. A summary list of recommended Type Certification and Service Release limitations should
be included.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 8
CAPABILITY ACCEPTANCE INTO OPERATIONAL SERVICE OF
DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
Applicable Regulations
MILAVREG 3.1—Australian Military Type Certificates
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MILAVREG 3.2—Supplemental Type Certificates
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MILAVREG 3.3—Service Release
INTRODUCTION
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1.
The process of introducing a new aircraft or Major change to the Type Design into Defence service involves
both the assurance of airworthiness through the issue of a Type Certificate and Service Release, and the acceptance of
operational capability. Additionally, following Service Release, each aircraft operating under the Type Certification
must be assured as conforming to the Type Design reflected in the AMTC or STC.
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PURPOSE
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2.
Whilst the Type Certification and Service Release enable the commencement of operations within the SOI
roles and environment, Type Certification and Service Release do not in isolation signify achievement of an effective
and suitable capability. The achievement of capability objectives supporting the acceptance into operational service is
the responsibility of the acquisition agency. Processes to accept aviation system capabilities into Defence service is the
responsibility of the relevant Service Chief under whose command the aviation system will operate.
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3.
This chapter describes the airworthiness processes associated with introducing a new aircraft type or Major
change to a Type Design into service following Service Release. This chapter will also highlight the considerations
associated with acceptance into operational service and to distinguish those issues from the requirements for assurance
of airworthiness.
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APPLICABILITY
5.
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4.
This chapter is applicable to any new Defence registered aircraft type, or one undergoing a Major change to
the Type Design.
KEY CONCEPTS
The introduction to service process involves:
Type Certification and Service Release of the aircraft type through which the Defence AA advises the
relevant Service Chief that:
the aircraft is designed and constructed to acceptable standards and meets applicable
airworthiness requirements;
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by
(2)
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(3)
an adequate technical airworthiness and operational airworthiness infrastructure is in place to
facilitate the maintenance of continuing airworthiness of the aircraft;
b.
following Type Certification, issue of Certificates of Airworthiness (CofAs) to bring individual aircraft
tail numbers onto the Defence Register in a certified airworthy condition; and
c.
acceptance into operational service (AIOS) by the relevant Service Chief on the basis that the Aviation
System meets capability requirements.
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the aircraft will remain airworthy in approved roles when operated and maintained in
accordance with approved procedures and instructions; and
6.
Type Certification and Service Release. The process of Type Certification and Service Release is
covered in detail in Section 3 Chapter 4. Airworthiness processes supporting Type Certification and Service Release
are described throughout Section 3.
7.
Certificates of Airworthiness. MILAVREG 3 requires that a CofA is issued for each new or modified
aircraft that conforms to the Type Design, following AMTC or STC. TAREG 2.6.3 contains the TAR requirements for
the content and issue of a CofA. Issue of a CofA is the mechanism through which individual aircraft are brought onto
the Defence Register following issue of an AMTC.
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Sect 3 Chap 8
8.
Aircraft being flown on a SFP prior to AMTC or STC may not be issued a CofA as the Type Design is not yet
approved and may not be finalised. The airworthiness requirements for these aircraft are to be embodied within the
SFP instrument.
9.
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10.
Acceptance into Operational Service (AIOS).
Defence policy governing AIOS is provided in
DI(G) OPS 45–2—Capability Acceptance into Operational Service. AIOS signifies acceptance by the Capability
Manager (the individual in the command chain of the respective Service Chief who is responsible for managing a
particular aviation system) that the aviation system meets the intended operational requirements and is ready to be
used on operations. AIOS may be defined progressively depending on capability requirements for provision of an
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Final Operational Capability (FOC). The assignment of capability levels is
determined in consultation between the Capability Manager and the acquisition agency, and is beyond the scope of
this manual. AIOS is typically achieved through a process of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) to measure the
operational effectiveness and operational suitability of the aviation system in providing the required capability, defined
as follows:
s
The requirement to issue a CofA does not apply for aircraft in Defence service prior to 13 Mar 98.
Operational effectiveness. Operational effectiveness is: The ability of a system to perform its
intended function over its intended operational spectrum, in the expected environment, and in the face
of the expected threats when operated by typical operational personnel (DI(G) OPS 43–1—Defence
test and evaluation policy).
b.
Operational suitability. Operational suitability is: The capacity of the system, when operated and
maintained by typical operational personnel in expected numbers, at the expected level of competency,
to be reliable, maintainable, available, logistically supportable, compatible, interoperable, safe and is
ergonomically satisfactory (DI(G) OPS 43–1).
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NOTE
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Initial phases of AIOS may also be supported by acquisition acceptance test
outcomes and limited OT&E prior to Service Release.
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AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF INTRODUCTION TO SERVICE
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ISSUE OF CERTIFICATE OF AIRWORTHINESS
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11.
TAREG 2.6.3—Issue of Certificate of Airworthiness (CofAs) requires that the aircraft DAR issue a CofA for
new aircraft to certify that individual aircraft conform to the Type Design cited in the AMTC, after AMTC issue. For a
Major change to the Type Design, the DAR is required to amend or reissue an existing CofA after STC issue. The
issuance or amendment of a CofA by the DAR may be supported by:
a physical configuration audit of each individual production aircraft by the OEM or production
contractor with a certified record provided to the acquisition agency which shows that the aircraft
conforms to the Type Design, subject to any deviations;
b.
a record of all production or other deviations from the Type Design which have been design approved
by an appropriate Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) and design accepted by the aircraft
DAR;
c.
functional configuration audit through conduct of maintenance testing to confirm the serviceability of
the complete aircraft and subsystems in accordance with approved maintenance instructions;
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production acceptance flights which confirm the airborne functionality of the aircraft in accordance
with an approved production or maintenance flight test procedure; and
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issue of a Commonwealth supplies acceptance certificate which transfers ownership of the aircraft to
Defence.
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AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCTION ACCEPTANCE FLIGHT TESTS
12.
New aircraft. Prior to issue of a CofA, individual aircraft of a new type are not deemed to be Defence
registered under the AMTC, with the exception of specific aircraft tail numbers authorised for production acceptance
flying under a current SFP. The involvement of Defence personnel in the operation of a non-Defence registered
aircraft undergoing Type Certification is subject to specific airworthiness conditions. The involvement of Defence
personnel in operations prior to Defence registration is addressed in detail in Section 3 Chapter 6. As covered by
MILAVREG 5.2(a) and (b), the involvement of Defence personnel in production acceptance test flying while the
aircraft is still owned by the OEM will typically be approved:
2
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 3 Chap 8
a.
through the issue of an AD by the Defence AA where the aircraft is to be operated in Australian
airspace, or
b.
through the approval of a FTP by the FTAA or OAMP by the OAA where the aircraft is to be operated
outside Australian airspace.
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13.
Major change to Type Design. Except where the aircraft has been removed from the Defence Register
for the period of modification, individual Defence aircraft that have undergone incorporation of a Major change to the
Type Design may be operated by Defence personnel following Service Release in accordance with an approved
maintenance or production test schedule for the purposes of production acceptance.
ANNOTATION OF THE DEFENCE REGISTER
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14.
Issue of individual CofA must be formally advised to DACPA who will then initiate entry of the aircraft tail
number onto the Defence Register under the relevant AMTC. Typically, each tail number will be entered into the
Defence Register prior to Service Release however, the operational status will be listed as ‘Not active’. Following
issue of the CofA, the Defence registration entry for the relevant tail number will be amended to ‘Active’. The
requesting body/organisation must receive confirmation of Defence registration prior to commencement of flying
operations.
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15.
DACPA must be advised prior to aircraft commencing flying operations under an SFP. Each aircraft operating
under an SFP is to have an appropriate note entered on the Defence Register. The requesting body/organisation must
receive confirmation of Defence registration prior to commencement of flying operations.
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ACCEPTANCE INTO OPERATIONAL SERVICE
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DEMONSTRATING CAPABILITY
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16.
Policy for the transition of an aircraft into Service is determined by the Service Chief responsible for the
particular aircraft. A collaborative approach between the Capability Manager (in the command chain of the Service
Chief) and the acquisition agency may be adopted to ensure that activities associated with AIOS can be conducted, to
varying degrees, throughout the acquisition and introduction to service phase. The introduction to service phase may
be separated into three elements, depending on the scope of the acquisition or modification:
Pre–acceptance. Whilst the aircraft is under development and is owned by the contractor Defence
may undertake certain elements of AIOS through the conduct of acceptance testing that demonstrates
particular operational capabilities. Such testing is normally associated with Functional Performance
Specification (FPS) items which reflect discrete system performance requirements, for example,
weapon accuracy, max climb rate, manoeuvre envelope, etc. However, the acquisition agency should
be cautious to ensure that acceptance test results produced under test conditions by Qualified Test
Pilots are applicable to operational Defence aircrew for the purposes of AIOS. In such cases,
involvement of operational aircrew may be appropriate where the OAAR(Acq) is satisfied the state of
the aircraft and operating arrangements provide an airworthy basis for such operations.
b.
Pre–AMTC/Service Release.
Following Acceptance, the aircraft is operated under the
authority of the Defence AA, typically on the basis of an SFP or FTP (see Section 3 Chapter 6). The
Commonwealth may undertake OT&E, supportability assessments, and conduct transition training in
support of AIOS prior to AMTC and Service Release.
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a.
Post–AMTC/Service Release. The aircraft is operated under the authority of the Type Certificate
and Service Release but has not yet reached the capability readiness requirements. Any remaining
OT&E and supporting activities necessary to achieve AIOS would be completed in this final phase of
transition into service.
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AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF AIOS-RELATED TEST AND EVALUATION
17.
Acceptance testing. Airworthiness management provisions for the conduct of acceptance testing are
addressed in detail in Section 3 Chapters 5 and 6.
18.
Operations prior to Service Release. Airworthiness management provisions for Defence conduct of
operations prior to Service Release under and SFP or FTP are addressed in detail in Section 3 Chapter 6.
19.
OT&E following Service Release. Operational capability development or assessment through OT&E
requires involvement of an FTAA where the testing involves the exercise of new aircraft roles equivalent to
‘Substantial’ operational changes. A Substantial change is defined at OAREG 3.1.2—Changes to an aircraft
operational role, environment or capability as one which has an appreciable affect on aircrew training curriculums,
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Sect 3 Chap 8
competency management, cockpit workload, human-machine-interface or flight authorisation considerations.
Although flying in the designated SOI roles is authorised under the AMTC or STC and Service Release, the OT&E
may involve the exercise of the new roles or capability with limited operational experience with the system.
Accordingly, although a FTP is not required, FTAA endorsement of the flight test plan is appropriate to ensure:
a.
the planned testing may be safely conducted, and
b.
the identified flying operations are sufficient to assess the test objectives.
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CONDUCT OF OT&E
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The operating organisation remains responsible for defining the test objectives and
determinations regarding AIOS. The sponsoring organisation in conjunction with the
operating organisation conducting the OT&E is responsible for ensuring
airworthiness requirements are met.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE
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20.
Policy for the conduct of OT&E is beyond the scope of this manual. However, OT&E is a key element of the
assessment of operational suitability and operational effectiveness of the aircraft/aviation system in support of AIOS.
Each Service has unique processes which address AIOS. Further information regarding OT&E, or flight testing in
support of AIOS, should be sought from an appropriate FTAA and Group (or equivalent) Headquarters staff.
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21.
Further information and guidance on CofAs should be sought from DGTA–ADF. Further information and
guidance on airworthiness policy for flight testing, operations prior to Service Release, or Defence registration should
be sought from ACPA. Further information on flight test conduct should be sought from an appropriate FTAA.
Direction regarding AIOS should be sought from within the operating command chain of the respective Service Chief.
4
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Sect 3 Chap 9
FLEET ADDITION AND NEW AIRCRAFT MODELS
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register
INTRODUCTION
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1.
Defence may seek to add additional aircraft of the same type to the Defence Register under an existing
AMTC. This may be in response to expanded capability requirements, increased requirements for availability, or to
satisfy additional training roles without compromising an established operational rate of effort. Whilst in-service
airworthiness management arrangements are likely to be in place for existing Defence aircraft, their immediate
application to the newly acquired fleet addition aircraft may not be totally appropriate. A tailored approach to the
Defence Type Certification process is therefore used to register new aircraft modes of the same type, or add additional
fleet aircraft to the Defence Register.
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PURPOSE
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2.
This chapter describes the airworthiness considerations for adding fleet addition or new aircraft models to the
Defence Register under an existing AMTC.
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APPLICABILITY
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3.
This chapter is applicable to the addition of aircraft to the Defence Register where an existing AMTC is extant
for a similar aircraft type.
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DETERMINATION OF AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS
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AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF FLEET ADDITION
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4.
The addition of production aircraft to the Defence Register is described in Section 3 Chapter 8. MILAVREG
2.9 contains the requirements for the acquisition of additional fleet aircraft, or aircraft models which are substantially
similar to the existing type already certified under and AMTC. The airworthiness strategy to manage the acquisition of
fleet aircraft depends on the degree of similarity between the existing and new aircraft. An assessment of the similarity
must consider the following:
the aircraft configuration or configurations;
b.
the history of previous operational use, including the roles and environment;
c.
the maintenance history; and
d.
the engineering history.
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5.
MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register requires the acquisition agency to apply
to DACPA for approval to add the additional aircraft to the Defence Register under the existing AMTC. The
assessment of similarity considering the factors listed above will largely determine DACPA’s requirements for
addition of the aircraft to the Defence Register.
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APPLICATION FOR FLEET ADDITION
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6.
Applications for fleet addition must first identify the extant AMTC under which the aircraft is proposed to be
Type Certified. The acquisition agency must then establish the validity of the extant AMTC as a basis to Type Certify
the additional aircraft. The validity is established through assessment of the configuration and usage history of the
aircraft.
7.
Configuration. Configuration similarity is a major consideration for any fleet addition aircraft acquisition.
Differences in configuration between the fleet aircraft and the existing Defence Type Design must be identified. The
assessment of configuration provides the basis for the OAA and the TAA to determine whether an existing AMTC is
applicable, or whether issue of a new AMTC or STC is warranted. The configuration assessment also contributes to
the basis for implementation any operational or technical airworthiness arrangements, beyond that currently
established, to manage the aircraft in service.
8.
Used aircraft. Where the fleet addition aircraft have been previously used, the assessment provided by the
acquisition agency must justify that the integrity of the existing certification basis has not been undermined, and that
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sufficient arrangements can be implemented to manage any issues resulting from the usage history. This is achieved
through assessing the following:
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Examination of the factors associated with the usage history of the aircraft and
differences identified from the existing Defence aircraft provide a means for the
TAA and OAA to assess the suitability of the aircraft to operate in the Defence roles
and environment. The assessment may also contribute to the basis for any operating
limitations or implementation of any additional operational or technical
airworthiness arrangements beyond those currently established.
Operating history. The role and environment under which the aircraft was previously operated and
associated management practices should be identified. The acquisition agency needs to compare the
operation of the aircraft by the previous operators against the existing SOI roles and environment.
Differences in structural and engine operating history need to be clearly identified.
b.
Maintenance history. The assessment of the past maintenance history of the aircraft should
identify any differences between the previous operators maintenance philosophy and that existing
within Defence. Differences or discrepancies in maintenance history resulting in an unknown or
reduced level of safety will require specific additional maintenance requirements for the new aircraft.
c.
Engineering history. The engineering history of the aircraft must be assessed to identify how the
aircraft has been previously managed, and what data exists to support both the identified
configurations and the ongoing airworthiness management of the aircraft. Primary considerations
include aircraft structural and engine life accrual, and the previous technical airworthiness
management arrangements which assure that the documented history of the technical management
confirms the identified configuration.
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DEFENCE REGISTRATION OF FLEET ADDITION AIRCRAFT
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ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS STRATEGY
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9.
MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register requires the application for fleet addition
to be endorsed by the TAA and the OAA. In examining the assessment of the additional aircraft, the TAA will
consider whether the differences between the Defence aircraft and the new aircraft warrant issue of a new AMTC in
accordance with Technical Airworthiness Regulation (TAREG) 2.5.4—Changes requiring a new AMTC or an STC in
accordance with TAREG 2.5.5—Supplemental Type Certification. The application will then be forwarded to the OAA
who will consider whether the additional aircraft may be suitable for operation in the intended roles and environment,
subject to implementation of any required supporting operational airworthiness arrangements.
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Based on the OAA and TAA recommendations, the Defence AA will determine whether a new AMTC or
STC is required, or whether the acquisition of the additional aircraft may be managed within the provision of
MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register. Aircraft requiring a new AMTC or an STC are to
be managed in accordance with MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type.
Where no new AMTC or STC is required, the acquisition airworthiness strategy required will depend on the extent of
the assessed differences between the existing Defence aircraft and the proposed fleet addition aircraft.
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CONSISTENT CONFIGURATION AND OPERATIONAL HISTORY
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11.
Where the application provided to DACPA demonstrates that the fleet addition aircraft are largely similar to
that Type Certified under the extant AMTC, the additional aircraft may be Defence registered through issue of a
Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA) by the aircraft DAR. Issue of CofAs is subject to:
the satisfaction of the TAA and OAA that all technical and operational airworthiness activities have
been completed with respect to the design, configuration and operating and maintaining instructions;
b.
the satisfaction of the TAA and the OAA that the technical and operational airworthiness infrastructure
will adequately support operation of the additional aircraft in the intended roles and environment at the
expected rate of effort; and
c.
the satisfaction of the relevant logistics manager that operations may be sustained by existing or
augmented logistics support arrangements.
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12.
Following issue of a CofA DACPA will amend the register to include the additional aircraft. For a new
aircraft model, the acquisition agency must submit an amended Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) which includes
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the new aircraft model details for inclusion with the extant AMTC. Guidance on compiling the TCDS is contained in
Section 3 Chapter 4.
13.
Additional production aircraft. Production aircraft acquired following Service Release of a new aircraft
type in addition to those included under the initial acquisition contract may be added to the Defence Register under
existing arrangements for issue of a CofA following approval of an application by DACPA which has been endorsed
by the TAA and the OAA which confirms:
the additional tail numbers to be added to the Defence Register; and
b.
the adequacy of existing operational, technical, and logistics arrangements to account for the additional
aircraft.
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INCONSISTENT CONFIGURATION AND OPERATIONAL HISTORY
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Where the application submitted to DACPA identifies that the configuration and operational history of the
fleet addition aircraft constitute significant variation from the extant AMTC, the aircraft may only be Defence
registered following:
the satisfaction of the TAA and OAA that all technical and operational airworthiness activities have
been completed with respect to the design, configuration and operating and maintaining instructions;
b.
the satisfaction of the TAA and the OAA that the technical and operational airworthiness infrastructure
will adequately support operation of the additional aircraft in the intended roles and environment at the
expected rate of effort;
c.
the satisfaction of the relevant logistics manager that operations may be sustained by existing or
augmented logistics support arrangements;
d.
recommendation by the Airworthiness Board that the technical, operational and logistics requirements
have been satisfied and that there are sufficient arrangements in place to support ongoing
airworthiness;
e.
amendment to the extant AMTC and Service Release to reflect the additional model numbers or type
variations covered by the AMTC; and
f.
issue of a CofA for each additional aircraft in accordance with the TAREG.
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Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP). The acquisition agency should compile an
AAMP to describe the acquisition airworthiness strategy to introduce the additional aircraft to Defence service.
Guidance on the preparation of an AAMP is contained in Section 3 Chapter 3. In each case, the acquisition agency
should liaise with DGTA–ADF, the OAA staff and ACPA during compilation of the AAMP to determine the
requirements to bring the additional aircraft onto the Defence Register. The strategy will largely depend on the
differences identified in the application for fleet addition, and the ramifications of those differences on airworthiness.
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Airworthiness Board requirements. The requirements for Airworthiness Board executive review for
fleet addition aircraft whose configuration and operational history are extensively different to that identified in the
extant AMTC are largely similar to that required for an STC. Tailoring of the Airworthiness Board review
requirements will depend on the extent of the differences. During compilation of the AAMP, the acquisition agency
should liaise with ACPA to identify the likely scope of the Airworthiness Board review. Airworthiness Board review
requirements for AMTC, STC and Service Release are contained in Section 3 Chapter 7.
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17.
Introduction to service. The introduction to service and Defence registration process for fleet addition
aircraft whose configuration and operational history are extensively different to that identified in the extant AMTC is
the same as that required for new aircraft. Section 3 Chapter 8 contains further guidance on the introduction of aircraft
to Defence service.
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Sect 4 Chap 1
IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE
REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 1.4—Operational Airworthiness Regulator
MILAVREG 1.5—Operational Airworthiness Authorities
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MILAVREG 1.6—Technical Airworthiness Regulator
MILAVREG 1.7—Technical Airworthiness Authority
MILAVREG 1.8—Flight Test Approval Authority
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MILAVREG 2.4—Operation of Defence registered aircraft
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INTRODUCTION
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1.
In-service airworthiness management of Defence operated aviation systems is achieved through the
operational and technical airworthiness management frameworks regulated by the OAR and the TAR respectively.
TAREG for the management of engineering and maintenance organisations, including personnel, processes and data,
are published in AAP 7001.053—Technical Airworthiness Management Manual. OAREGs for the management of
flight operations with in-service aircraft types are published in AAP 8000.010—Defence Operational Airworthiness
Manual. Effective interaction between the operational and technical regulatory frameworks is required to achieve
sound airworthiness management.
PURPOSE
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This chapter describes the operational and technical airworthiness management principles that are necessary
for the management of the continuing airworthiness of Defence registered aircraft. An overview of the operational and
technical airworthiness frameworks is provided in Section 1, Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.
APPLICABILITY
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3.
This Chapter is applicable to the in-service airworthiness management of Defence registered aircraft. That is,
aircraft which have been Type Certified by the Defence AA through issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate
(AMTC) or Special Type Certificate (STC) and Service Release (SR).
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IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
THE PURPOSE OF IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
4.
an aircraft continues to meet the airworthiness requirements and standards defined in the certification
basis which was established through Type Certification (see Section 3, Chapter 4); and
the technical and operational airworthiness infrastructure that was established at Service Release
remains effective in assuring the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft.
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The purpose of in-service airworthiness management is to ensure that:
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AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT APPOINTMENTS AND AUTHORITY
5.
The DASP is implemented and controlled by appointed individuals with authority for various aspects of
airworthiness management. DI(G) OPS 02–2— Defence Aviation Safety Program is the appointing instruction and
defines high level requirements for Defence airworthiness management. The role of the airworthiness appointments is
described in detail in Section 1, Chapters 1, 3 and 4. For in-service airworthiness management, the roles of the
airworthiness appointments are as follows:
a.
Operational Airworthiness Regulator. DI(G) OPS 02–2 appoints DCAF as the OAR. The OAR
manages the operational airworthiness framework and the process for prescribing the OAREG. The
OAR conducts compliance assurance of the OAA to OAREG. MILAVREG 1.4 lists Defence AA
requirements of the OAR. It is desirable that the officer appointed to this position should:
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(a)
Defence registered aircraft types;
(b)
non-Defence registered aircraft types; and
(c)
aviation support systems;
possess a substantial level of experience and knowledge of the operational airworthiness
regulatory framework;
(3)
possess a substantial level of knowledge of civil operational airworthiness regulatory
frameworks; and
(4)
possess a substantial level of experience with flight test and training operations.
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Operational Airworthiness Authority. An OAA has a command responsibility for the effective
and safe operation of delegated Defence Aviation systems. The OAA is responsible for implementing
an in-service management system to assure the operational airworthiness of delegated Defence aircraft
and aviation systems. The OAA normally delegates operational airworthiness management
responsibility for specific types to an OAA Representative (OAAR). MILAVREG 1.5 lists the OAA
requirements. It is highly desirable that the OAA should:
be an aircrew member with a broad and extensive level of experience in Defence Aviation
operations within the relevant command (or equivalent), including:
command and operations with the aircraft types within the relevant command (or
equivalent); and
(b)
operations with aviation support systems (AvSS) within the relevant command (or
equivalent);
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b.
be an aircrew member with a broad and extensive level of experience in Defence aviation
operations including:
possess a substantial level of experience with, and knowledge of, the operational airworthiness
regulatory framework.
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If an OAA does not meet the highly desirable attributes then it is essential that an OAA
immediate/direct subordinate in the chain of command does.
Technical Airworthiness Regulator. DI(G) OPS 02–2 appoints the DGTA as the TAR. The TAR
manages the technical airworthiness framework and the process for prescribing that are prescribed by
the TAR through a proposal, review and amendment process. The TAR provides authoritative
airworthiness advice to in-service engineering and maintenance organisations regarding the
interpretation of TAREG. The TAR also accredits competent organisations to conduct engineering and
maintenance activity on Defence registered aircraft and conducts compliance assurance to the TAREG.
MILAVREG 1.6 lists the Defence AA requirements of the TAR. An officer appointed to the
designated TAR position must:
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be an aerospace engineer with postgraduate qualifications in an aeronautical engineering
discipline;
(2)
possess a broad and extensive level of experience in Defence aviation engineering including:
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(1)
(a)
extensive experience in Defence in-service design and maintenance practices;
(b)
previous appointment as a Senior Design Engineer with responsibility for one or more
aviation system, or flight test engineering and
(c)
substantial experience in flight test and acquisition engineering activities;
(3)
possess a substantial level of experience with, and knowledge of, the Defence technical
airworthiness regulatory framework; and
(4)
possess a substantial level of knowledge of civil technical airworthiness regulatory frameworks.
Technical Airworthiness Authority. DI(G) OPS 02–2 appoints the DGTA as the TAA. The TAA
prescribes airworthiness standards for in-service engineering activity where they are not already
defined or following cancellation of existing standards. The TAA may delegate technical airworthiness
authority for the in-service management of specific Defence aircraft types to Design Acceptance
Representatives (DARs). MILAVREG 1.7 lists the Defence AA requirements of the TAA. The
competency criteria for the TAA are equivalent to those for the TAR.
AAP 7001.048
e.
Sect 4 Chap 1
Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA). A FTAA manages the airworthiness of in-service
Defence aircraft allocated for the purposes of flight test. This will normally be in support of flight test
prior to service release of a Minor design change or prior to Supplemental Role Approval by an OAA.
Flight test operations with new aircraft types or aircraft undergoing a Major change to the Type Design
are described in Section 3, Chapter 6. MILAVREG 1.8y lists the Defence AA requirements for a
FTAA.
Specialist organisations
eg
Aerospace Operational Support Group (AOSG). An FTAA appointed in AOSG may authorise
flight test of a Defence registered aircraft in accordance with Defence airworthiness regulations.
AOSG encompasses several specialist organisations including:
(1)
Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU). ARDU plan, conduct and report
flight test activities under the authority of an FTAA. ARDU also provide authoritative advice
regarding flight test airworthiness and conduct in accordance with FTAA direction.
(2)
Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering (ASCENG). ASCENG are a centre of
expertise for aircraft stores compatibility engineering and related flight test practices.
(3)
Joint Electronic Warfare Support Unit (JEWOSU). JEWOSU provide engineering and
capability support for Defence electronic warfare systems.
(4)
Institute of Aviation Medicine (AVMED). AVMED provide specialist advice regarding the
physiological effects of aviation activities on Defence personnel. AVMED also sponsor
Defence aviation medicine training.
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6.
In-service airworthiness management is supported by specialist organisations that perform roles unique to the
skills, experience and capability of their organisation. Specialist Defence organisations include:
Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit (AMAFTU). Commanding Officer (CO) of
AMAFTU, if appointed by the Defence AA as an FTAA, and in conjunction with an aircraft DAR and
Commander Fleet Air Arm, may authorise the conduct of flight test of naval specific systems including
the interaction of Defence rotary wing aircraft with ship-based aviation facilities.
c.
Air Movements Training and Development Unit (AMTDU). AMTDU are recognised as
competent to conduct flight testing within approved operating limitations related to aerial delivery and
external carriage of cargo from Defence aircraft prior to service release of an Aerial Delivery
Clearance.
d.
Guided Weapons and Munitions Branch (GWB and MunB). These provide engineering and
logistics support services for Defence weapons and items of Explosive Ordnance (EO). Some non EO
stores may managed by GWB and MunB, however most stores suspension equipment and aircraft
unique stores (such as external fuel tanks) are managed by the parent SPO.
e.
Maritime Patrol Systems Program Office – Aeronautical Life Support Logistic
Management Unit (MPSPO-ALSLMU). MPSPO-ALSLMU provides engineering and logistics
support services for Defence aeronautical life support equipment.
f.
Joint Fuels and Lubricants Agency (JFLA). JFLA are a centre of expertise and provide
engineering and logistics support services for Defence aviation fuels and lubricants.
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Additional guidance on operational airworthiness specialist organisations should be sought through the
relevant command chain.
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BASIS OF OPERATIONS
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8.
MILAVREG 2.4 stipulates the Defence AA requirements for establishing a basis of operation of a Defence
registered aircraft. This basis includes:
a.
Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The SOI describes the approved roles and operating
environment in which the aviation system is to be operated. The structure of an SOI is described in
AAP 8000.010.
b.
Type Design. The Type Design contains the specification, description of configuration and all the
test data, analysis, drawings, evidence and operating and maintaining instructions necessary to
underwrite the operation of the aircraft. TAREG 2.2.8—Type Design contains the TAR requirements
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Sect 4 Chap 1
(1)
the design has been formally approved by a competent agency; and
(2)
the design has been formally accepted by Defence as meeting specified Defence requirements.
AMTC. The AMTC documents, and their accompanying Type Certification Data Sheets (TCDS) that
underwrite them, document the SOI, certification basis and Type Design underpinning operations. The
process to achieve an AMTC is contained in Section 3 of this manual.
d.
Service Release. The Service Release provides the determination by the Defence AA that an
aviation system is airworthy if operated in a certified configuration throughout the roles and
environment listed in the SOI. Any limitations affecting operation to the extent of the SOI are listed on
the Service Release. The process to achieve Service Release of an aircraft type is contained in Section
3 of this manual.
e.
Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP). The operating procedures, limitations and
performance data provided in the Flight Manual and associated operating publications are collectively
called OIP, the equivalent of technical Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA). The OAAR is
responsible for the management of OIP specific to a delegated aircraft type, the authoritative data that
is established at AMTC and Service Release.
f.
Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA). The technical instructions for continuing
airworthiness are authoritative data established at AMTC and Service Release. The delegated technical
airworthiness authority for the management of instructions for continuing airworthiness is the DAR of
the applicable aircraft, which is normally the Chief Engineer of the System Program Office managing
the engineering and logistics activities for the aircraft type.
g.
Flying Management System. Flying management systems are implemented by an OAA and
delegated OAAR at the command level appropriate to the effective operation of an aircraft type. A
flying management system is a framework of processes, rules and training to effectively manage inservice flying operations of a particular aircraft type. The OAR requirements for flying management
systems are described in detail in OAREG.
h.
Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs) and Approved Maintenance
Organisations (AMOs). AEOs and AMOs are accredited by the TAR as competent to provide a
specified scope and level of engineering and maintenance services for the in-service management of
Defence registered aircraft. Detailed requirements for AEOs and AMOs are contained in AAP
7001.053—Technical airworthiness management manual.
i.
Logistics organisation. The logistics organisation for an aircraft type or types performs the vital
function of sustaining operations through the provision of spares, test and support equipment, facilities,
and resources for the engineering, maintenance, and operation of Defence aircraft. In Defence,
Systems Program Offices (SPO) normally encompass both the logistics organisation and the AEO for
relevant aircraft types. Logistics organisations are responsive to operational, engineering and
maintenance organisations in sustaining the both the airworthiness and capability of Defence aircraft
types.
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Changing the basis of operations
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9.
Changes to the SOI. Changes to the SOI are managed in accordance with OAREG. SOI changes include
any change to the aircraft roles, operating environment or capability determined as ‘substantial’ in accordance with
OAREG 3.1.2. A substantial change is one which has an appreciable affect on aircrew training syllabi, competency
management, cockpit workload, human machine interface or flight authorisation considerations. Substantial changes to
the SOI must undergo Supplemental Role Approval in accordance with OAREG 3.5. The determination and
management of operational changes is described in more detail in Section 4, Chapter 2.
10.
Changes to the Type Design. Changes to the Type Design are managed in accordance with TAREG.
Changes to the Type Design are classified as either ‘Major’ or ‘Minor’ depending on the scope, complexity and impact
of the change on technical airworthiness. Major changes also require Supplemental Type Certification and SR by the
Defence AA. Minor changes are managed within the extant Type Certification and SR through the relevant SPO inservice engineering and design change management processes. The classification and management of changes to the
Type Design is described in more detail in Section 4, Chapter 2.
4
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for the Type Design. The Type Design provides the basis to operate the aircraft within the approved
SOI where the aircraft has been found to meet certification basis requirements only where:
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Change of Operational Status
11.
Whilst aircraft are listed on the Defence Register their operational status may be subject to change
(eg individual aircraft may be placed in storage). The logistics agency responsible for an aircraft type is required to
notify DACPA of any change in the operational status of an aircraft, by type and/or tail number, as appropriate, in
accordance with MILAVREG 2.5—Change of operational status of a Defence registered aircraft. The change of
status will then be annotated in the appropriate section of the Defence Register.
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12.
Similarly, where an aircraft’s airworthiness certification is compromised as a result of action or inaction
during operation or maintenance activity which renders the aircraft incapable of performing in the intended roles and
environment, the Defence AA is to be advised through the TAA and the relevant OAA.
IN-SERVICE FLIGHT TEST
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13.
Flight test is used by the OAA to underwrite Supplemental Role Approval for Substantial changes to the SOI
and to assess operational effectiveness and operational suitability through the conduct of Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E). Similarly, the AEO uses Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) to support verification of
both capability and technical airworthiness requirements in support of the design change process. MILAVREG
3.5describes the scope of activities which constitute flight test. In-service flight test activities are normally limited to:
operations in support of Supplemental Role Approval;
b.
operations outside established operating limitations for investigative purposes; and
c.
operations prior to service release of a Minor change to the Type Design in accordance with TAREG
3.5.13.
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Flight test by an FTAA. FTAA organisations are specialist flight test organisations (FTO) whose technical
and operational capabilities allow conduct of flying outside an established certification basis. FTO maintain an
Airworthiness Management Plan which describes the application of OAREG and TAREG to the conduct of test
activities. A FTAA may issue a Flight Test Permit (FTP) in accordance with OAREG 4.1.3—Flight Test Permit to
permit such operations.
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15.
Test and evaluation by organisations without an FTAA. In-service test and evaluation (T&E)
activities by a non-FTAA flying organisation are permitted within the scope of the OAREG for:
operations prior to service release of a Minor design change;
b.
operations in support of Supplemental Role Approval; and
c.
Operational Test and Evaluation.
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under an FTP issued by an FTAA; or
b.
under a letter of authorisation from the FTAA specifying a scope of test activity; or
c.
through FTAA endorsement of a flight test plan detailing the conduct of the test operations.
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GUIDANCE
Approval to conduct T&E by non-FTAA organisations is subject to the FTAA
satisfaction that the testing may be safely conducted and the scope of intended
operations is sufficient to satisfy the test objectives.
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Conduct of test and evaluation by organisations without an FTAA. The conduct of T&E activities
by non-FTAA flying organisations may be achieved in accordance with OAREG 4.2 through one of three means:
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OTHER OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE ESTABLISHED BASIS
17.
In exceptional circumstances, the DASP allows the operation of an aircraft without normal levels of technical
or operational assurance of airworthiness. Such action is only justifiable under certain conditions and where either, the
operational benefits outweigh the level of risk posed by the activity, or the activity warrants acceptance of risk at
higher levels of airworthiness authority. Other than flight test, MILAVREG 2.4 allows several options for in-service
operations outside the established basis of operations.
18.
Operational Clearance. Operational Clearance is a regulated under OAREG 2.
19.
Exemptions. Exemptions to Defence airworthiness regulations are regulated under MILAVREG 1.
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20.
Airworthiness Directives (AD). An AD may be used by the Defence AA to prescribe or direct a course of
action in the interests of airworthiness, such as being used to permit flying operations outside the established basis of
operations in justifiable circumstances. Such occasions may be beyond the scope of the aircraft DAR and OAAR to
resolve and are therefore addressed through issue of an AD. Further guidance on the issue of an AD is contained in
Annex A.
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The suspension of flight operations is regulated under MILAVREG 2. . The Defence process for identification
and resolution of airworthiness issues with potential for a temporary or permanent suspension of flying operations is
described further in Section 4, Chapter 3.
DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD EXECUTIVE REVIEW
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The Defence AA conducts a periodic review of the airworthiness processes associated with specific aircraft
types and associated organisation as required by MILAVREG 1.9 and IAW MILAVREG 4.
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An AAC is normally issued by the Defence AA, but may be issued by DACPA when appropriate. An AAC
does not introduce new regulation; rather, it enhances compliance understanding for existing regulation or provides
policy guidance for aviation issues not yet regulated that require further understanding.
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AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 4 Chap 1
DEFENCE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
APPLICABLE REGULATION
MILAVREG 3.6—Airworthiness Directives
BACKGROUND
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Where an airworthiness deficiency has been identified in either an aircraft or the airworthiness management
system, the Defence AA may issue an AD to describe the unacceptable condition and to prescribe procedures,
conditions and limitations, if any, under which operations may continue. ADs are usually of a temporary nature and
are cancelled when the deficiency has been rectified or permanent management procedures have been implemented to
manage the risk of continued operation. ADs, once issued, form part of the certification basis for an aircraft.
STI where technical airworthiness is in question; or
b.
Defence AD where operational airworthiness is involved.
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2.
Civil airworthiness authorities such as the FAA and CASA issue ADs to address deficiencies in civil aircraft
airworthiness. Where Defence operates similar aircraft those ADs may apply. However, before the implementation
they must be reviewed by the appropriate OAA or delegate and the applicable DAR. Where such ADs are applicable,
they may be issued as an:
n
The difference between Defence and civilian ADs, is that Defence typically uses:
the STI as an equivalent for a civil AD; and
b.
the Defence AD to address deficiencies with either an aircraft or the airworthiness management
system.
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PURPOSE
4.
The Defence AA’s requirements for issue of an AD are contained at MILAVREG 3.6—Airworthiness
Directives. This chapter describes:
b.
the process for developing an AD,
c.
the endorsement and approval requirements for an AD, and
d.
the in-service administration of an AD.
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the situations requiring the promulgation of an AD,
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a.
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An example AD is available from the ACPA website.
SITUATIONS REQUIRING AN AD
the requirement for a clearly defined operational airworthiness management framework for a specific
scenario; or
by
a.
Operational airworthiness requirements necessitating an AD are normally
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6.
Operational airworthiness.
associated with either:
the requirement to conduct temporary flight operations in a condition which is not addressed within the
extant certification basis (ie increased limits, alternate role, alternate environment or modified
configuration).
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b.
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7.
Technical airworthiness.
include, but are not limited to:
Technical airworthiness processes that address airworthiness deficiencies
a.
defect reports,
b.
technical investigations,
c.
STIs, and
d.
Carried Forward Unserviceabilities (CFUs).
NOTE
•
Technical airworthiness processes are managed by the applicable in-service AEO.
Where an aircraft is required for flight operations, and the DAR believes that there
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1A–1
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 4 Chap 1
exists an airworthiness deficiency that cannot be managed within existing
Engineering Authority, then an AD may be used for authorisation.
The types of airworthiness deficiency that are typically addressed by ADs
The requirement to operate an aircraft with an uncertified modification installed (ie the certification
basis (configuration) has been compromised).
b.
The requirement to operate an aircraft at a gross weight exceeding that which was addressed in the
certification basis.
c.
Requirement for the establishment of an interim operational airworthiness management framework for
the conduct of specific aviation operations.
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a.
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Examples
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AD 003/99—Kiowa Maximum All Up Weight (MAUW) increase for contingency operations. This AD
authorised the use of this aircraft fitted with Kiowa Interim Aerial Reconnaissance Capability
(KIARC) equipment and crew protection armour at an MAUW greater than the aircraft’s flight manual
MAUW limit for internal load, enabling sufficient fuel to be carried for missions of 180 minutes
endurance. This was required to meet operational requirements in East Timor.
tio
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AD 004/99—Carriage of passengers in RAAF transport aircraft. This AD authorised the carriage of
passengers in RAAF C–130 and Caribou aircraft, with some restrictions. These aircraft were never
certified to carry passengers.
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Av
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AD 002/2000—Hawk Lead-in Fighter operational airworthiness oversight prior to aircraft
acceptance. This AD directed that CDR ACG provide operational airworthiness oversight of BAe
Systems flight operations from RAAF Base Williamtown, and supported a CASA Civil Aviation Order
that covered the conduct of production flight test of the Hawk aircraft prior to Defence registration of
individual aircraft.
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9.
Caveat. Any flying activities that require operation of the aircraft incorporating a major change to the type
design prior to the issue of a STC and Service Release will require the issue of a SFP or FTP (see Section 3,
Chapter 6). This could include developmental, production or type acceptance test and evaluation flights, proof of
concept or demonstration flights, ferry flights or operational test and evaluation flights prior to the issue of an STC and
Service Release. However, SFPs and FTPs do not provide an adequate basis of certification to underwrite use of an
aircraft for operational tasks. Consequently, operational tasking is prohibited while operating under an SFP.
•
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ADs differ from SFPs in that they provide a mechanism for underwriting the use of
a Defence aircraft for operational tasks or general training. However, ADs are not
intended to circumvent the DASP.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUE OF AN AD
by
10.
The applicant is required to assemble an application for an AD, which should include supporting
documentation and endorsements from the TAA and the relevant OAA.
ed
11.
Supporting documentation. Supporting documentation is required by both the relevant OAA and the
TAA to support endorsement of the AD. Such documentation includes, but is not limited to:
for modifications, engineering documentation as detailed in the electronic Technical Airworthiness
Management Manual (eTAMM) AAP 7001.053 and TAREG 2.3—Special Flight Permits;
rs
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a.
b.
a list of known technical limitations, deficiencies and anomalies, with suggested work-arounds noted;
c.
operating manuals and procedures for new equipment;
d.
assessment and verification of aircraft performance and flying qualities (where applicable);
e.
flight test reports if AOSG or AMAFTU have been involved;
f.
flight manual amendments;
g.
Flying Orders (FOs) or Special Flying Instructions (SFIs) detailing new operating procedures and any
new operating limits that must be complied with;
h.
flight authorisation procedures, if special authorisation is required;
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1A–2
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8.
Airworthiness deficiency.
include:
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 4 Chap 1
i.
AVRM assessment of the proposed AD; and
j.
documentation of training and proficiency required for aircrew.
12.
TAA endorsement.
The operation of Defence aircraft under an AD may have implications for the
ongoing technical airworthiness management. Operations may affect aircraft usage (and hence fatigue accrual), or may
require changes to inspection or servicing intervals. Consequently, the TAA endorsement may be qualified by
additional limits or conditions.
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13.
OAA endorsement. The OAA’s endorsement will take into consideration the fact that an AD may
authorise the full range of operational tasking that Defence is likely to encounter. The OAA may choose to include
additional restrictions or conditions to ensure the ongoing operational airworthiness of a particular aviation system.
ACPA STAFF ACTION
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14.
AD drafting. The applicant must forward copies of the TAR and OAA endorsements and any relevant
supporting documentation to ACPA. ACPA staff will draft the AD, in conjunction with the requesting organisation.
The following details, if applicable, should be addressed in a draft AD covering Defence aircraft operations:
the existing operational limitation or restriction,
b.
the specific aircraft configuration for which the AD applies,
c.
the outcome of any documented reports or flight trials carried out,
d.
the flight manual amendment detailing changed operating limits or restrictions,
e.
flying orders detailing new operating procedures, and
f.
any additional limits, restrictions or conditions identified by the TAA or OAA.
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a.
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15.
AD approval. ACPA will staff the draft AD through the office of the Defence AA. Once authorised, the
AD will be forwarded to the applicant, operators and relevant organisations. The original copy will be held on file at
ACPA.
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Changes to existing ADs
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16.
Any changes requested to existing ADs will result in the issue of a new AD. Changes to operating limits or
operating procedures not specifically documented in an AD do not constitute a change to an AD. Such limits or
procedures may have been documented in other publications (eg flight manuals, FOs or SFIs) which are referenced in
the AD. As long as the original references remain valid, an amendment to a referenced document does not require
reissuing an AD.
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1A–3
AAP 7001.048
Sect 4 Chap 2
DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL AND
TECHNICAL CHANGES OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 2.4—Operation of Defence registered aircraft
s
INTRODUCTION
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at
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1.
Throughout the in-service life of an aircraft type the configuration, role and environment will evolve to suit
operational circumstances and to ensure the type design continues to provide capability in the roles and environment
documented in the SOI. Accordingly, the aircraft type will undergo both operational and technical changes. The
Defence operational and technical regulatory systems are structured to adequately manage in-service changes and to
take full cognisance of the impact of changes in either domain on the alternate aspect of airworthiness. Accordingly a
collaborative approach is adopted to manage changes to the configuration, role or environment to ensure a cohesive
introduction to service of such changes.
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PURPOSE
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APPLICABILITY
tio
n
Sa
2.
This chapter describes considerations for the airworthiness management of operational and technical changes
to ensure appropriate consideration is afforded to the alternate aspect of airworthiness. Detailed requirements on the
management and conduct of operational and technical changes are contained in AAP 8000.010—Defence Operational
Airworthiness Manual and AAP 7001.053—Technical Airworthiness Management Manual.
3.
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This chapter is applicable to any operational or technical change to an in-service Defence registered aircraft.
INITIATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF CHANGES
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INITIATION OF CHANGES
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4.
Changes to the configuration, role and environment of an in-service aircraft type may be initiated for
operational or technical reasons. A change may be required to meet a new operational capability requirement, to
enhance an existing capability, or to enable performance of an existing role with alternate mission equipment or stores.
Changes may also result from a technical requirement to correct a defect to maintain the established airworthiness
certification basis or as a result of changes to sub-system components supplied from a third party.
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CLASSIFICATION OF TECHNICAL CHANGES
introduces a new capability or significantly varies an existing capability; or
by
a.
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5.
Technical changes are managed by the designated AEO and the DAR delegated engineering authority for the
aircraft type. Changes to the configuration, capability, role or environment of an aircraft type may incur a technical
change requiring the application of a formal design change process managed by the aircraft AEO. TAREG 2.5.3allows
the aircraft DAR to assume all such changes are Minor except where the change:
ed
b.
has an appreciable effect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational
characteristics or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the system.
Su
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ed
6.
Where the design change meets these criteria the DAR must consult the TAA in classifying the change as
‘Minor’ or ‘Major’. Importantly, a change which meets these criteria is not automatically classified as Major. In
consulting the TAA, the DAR may present a case supporting classification of the design as Minor. Major changes
warrant additional airworthiness oversight and require Supplemental Type Certification (STC) by the Defence AA.
Where the TAA is satisfied that the change does not require the additional level of oversight, the change may be
classified as Minor.
7.
Management of Major changes to Type Design. Major changes to type design are managed through
the Type Certification and Service Release process documented in Section 3. The technical and operational
airworthiness frameworks contain respective airworthiness management requirements for such changes.
8.
Management of Minor changes to Type Design. Minor changes to type design are managed within the
operational and technical airworthiness frameworks. Detailed guidance on technical change management processes are
contained within AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 4 Chap 2
CLASSIFICATION OF OPERATIONAL CHANGES
the change introduces a new configuration, role or environment to the aircraft type; or
b.
the change modifies an existing configuration, role or environment such that there is an appreciable
affect on aircrew training syllabi, competency management, cockpit workload, human machine
interface or flight authorisation considerations.
ul
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a.
s
9.
Operational changes are managed by the OAAR or an appointed member of operational airworthiness staff
within the Force Element Group (FEG) or equivalent operational headquarters. Operational changes must be judged as
either ‘Substantial’ or ‘Non-Substantial’ in accordance with OAREG. The OAAR may assume all operational changes
to aircraft capability, role or environment are Non-Substantial, except where:
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10.
Where the operational change meets these criteria, the OAAR must seek classification of the change from a
Flight Test Approval Authority with flight test expertise with the aircraft type. The FTAA provided experience in the
conduct of test and evaluation activities is applicable to assessing the nature of the operational change, and the likely
test requirements to fully determine the scope of supporting changes required of the relevant flying management
system, or any new operational limitations. The FTAA should make the determination in consultation with the OAAR
to ensure the appropriate scope of operations resulting in the role change is being considered. Where the FTAA
considers that FTAA oversight of flight testing is required to fully evaluate the impact of the change on operational
airworthiness, the change is to be classified as ‘Substantial’.
tio
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Sa
11.
Management of Substantial operational changes. Substantial operational changes must undergo
‘Supplemental Role Approval’ by the relevant OAA in accordance with OAREG. Substantial changes usually result in
amendment to the SOI for the aircraft type.
Av
ia
12.
Management of Non–Substantial operational changes. Non-Substantial operational changes are
managed within the FMS of the relevant aircraft type through review and amendment to procedures, orders, and
instructions, and adjustments to training curriculum.
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MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGES
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MAJOR VERSUS SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES
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13.
By virtue of the scope and complexity involved, a Major change to the Type Design usually involves a
substantial operational change to the aircraft capability, roles or environment. In such cases, the operational aspects of
the Type Certification and Service Release (SR) processes adequately address the operational requirement for
Supplemental Role Approval. Therefore, issue of an STC and SR, including development and approval of the SOI,
negate the requirement for a separate process addressing only the operational airworthiness requirements.
Accordingly, Supplemental Role Approval need only be conducted for Substantial operational changes where no
corresponding technical change, or where a Minor technical change to the aircraft is required.
IMPACT OF TECHNICAL CHANGES ON OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS
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14.
Whilst the DAR and AEO for an aircraft type operate predominantly within the technical airworthiness
framework, technical staffs are obliged to take cognisance of the impact of minor technical changes to the Type
Design on operational airworthiness. This should be evident throughout the Design Acceptance process, beginning
with specification development where consultation with operational staff is appropriate to ensure the specification for
the change, including any airworthiness requirements, adequately covers the operational requirement. Verification
activity may include participation by flight test agencies to evaluate the impact of the change on operational
airworthiness. Such participation is mandatory where Minor change to the Type Design involves a Substantial
operational change (and thus requires Supplemental Role Approval). Prior to Design Acceptance, the aircraft DAR
must be satisfied that all operational airworthiness considerations have been appropriately accounted for. Prior to
incorporation of the change onto the aircraft, TAREG 3.5.12 requires that the operating instructions have received
operational endorsement for any change which affects functional performance or other operational characteristics of
the aircraft.
15.
Configuration Control Boards (CCB). The CCB is a mechanism through which the operational aspects
of a Minor technical change may be considered. Each stakeholder in the change management process is usually
represented at the CCB including technical, operational, logistics and financial management staff. Proposed design
changes will be raised at the CCB where the operational representative should consider what further operational
airworthiness action may be required to support the change. Where a technical change impacts operational
airworthiness, the change should be referred to the OAAR or appointed representative for operational airworthiness
classification. CCBs held to approve incorporation and Service Release of Minor design changes are normally subject
to the satisfaction of the operational representative that operational airworthiness considerations have been
appropriately accounted for.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 4 Chap 2
IMPACT OF OPERATIONAL CHANGES ON TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS
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16.
Changes initiated by Capability Managers, or operational units concerned with operating the aircraft type,
must similarly undergo an assessment by technical personnel to determine whether a resulting design change will be
required. Operational changes are normally managed through amendment of the SOI. Where a proposed operational
change is sought, the operational headquarters must confirm that the change can be technically supported. OAREG
2.1.2—Management of the SOI requires that the aircraft DAR is notified of any change to the SOI. The DAR will
assess the impact of the change on the existing certification basis of the aircraft and will determine whether a resulting
technical change is required. Where no design change is necessary, technical airworthiness consideration of the change
is required to ensure the impact of the change on ongoing airworthiness management is appropriately accounted for.
This may include aircraft or engine structural integrity management, maintenance management, logistics planning, etc.
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17.
Supplemental Role Approval. Where Supplemental Role Approval is required for a Substantial change to
the operational capability, role or environment, the OAAR must ensure corresponding technical and logistics
implications have been assessed and accounted for. Prior to approving the supplemental role, the OAA must confirm
the adequacy of technical and logistics arrangements supporting the new or modified role or environment.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 4 Chap 3
SUSPENSION OF FLYING OPERATIONS
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 2.6—Suspension of flying operations
INTRODUCTION
eg
ul
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s
1.
At times the condition of an aircraft or an organisation supporting the operation of an aircraft may no longer
support airworthy operations. At such times, or when reasonable doubt exists regarding the condition of an aircraft
such that it may not support safe operations, operational commanders must suspend flying operations appropriate to
the circumstances. The nature of the causal factors will largely dictate the extent of the suspension and will similarly
impact the course of action to re-commence operations. MILAVREG 2.6—Suspension of flying operations contains
the Defence Aviation Authority’s (Defence AA) requirements for the suspension of operations of Defence aircraft.
R
PURPOSE
APPLICABILITY
3.
tio
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This chapter is applicable to operations involving any Defence aircraft.
Sa
fe
ty
2.
This chapter describes the circumstances resulting in a suspension of operations and the mechanisms to
recommence flying activity.
ia
SUSPENDING FLYING OPERATIONS
4.
Av
SUSPENSION MECHANISMS
en
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Several mechanisms are available to suspend the flying operations of an aircraft:
Command or Aircraft Captain Temporary Cessation of Flying Operations. This describes
any situation where an officer in the operational chain of command (Detachment Commander,
Commanding Officer, Officer Commanding or Force Element Group Commander, or equivalent)
decides to temporarily cease operation of one or more aircraft within the officer’s command.
Command may also suspend operation of aviation system equipment impacting flying operations. A
decision to apply a command suspension of flying is to be immediately referred to the Operational
Airworthiness Authority (OAA) or Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR) with
appropriate recommendations.
b.
OAA or OAAR Suspension of Flying Operations. The OAA, or the OAAR if so delegated,
decides to temporarily cease operation of one or more aircraft for which the officer is responsible.
c.
Cancellation of Service Release, Special Flight Permit (SFP) or Airworthiness Directive
(AD). The Defence AA, on the basis of recommendations from either the OAA, TAA or the
Airworthiness Board, may remove the Service Release, SFP or AD for any of the following reasons:
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Certification of an aircraft against the certification basis has been compromised to the extent
that the Australian AMTC has been withdrawn.
(2)
Certification of an aircraft against the certification basis has been compromised to the extent
that the Interim Type Certificate is no longer valid.
(3)
Maintenance, engineering or operational organisations are unable to comply with the
airworthiness regulations and, hence, aircraft airworthiness cannot be assured.
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(1)
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 4 Chap 3
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5.
Unserviceability. The aircraft captain or maintenance crew report an unserviceability that warrants further
action. An unserviceability affecting the airworthiness of the aircraft that cannot be simply handled within normal
maintenance procedures must immediately be advised to the aircraft DAR and OAAR. Where the unserviceability
affects the ability of the aircraft to operate safely, suspension of operations with that aircraft is required until the
unserviceability can be rectified. Where the unserviceability affects, or is suspected to affect, part or all of the aircraft
fleet, a fleet wide suspension of operations may be warranted. The DAR is required to advise the TAA in accordance
with TAREG 2.6.5—Notification of unairworthy conditions, and the appropriate operational commander. Based on
the recommendation of the DAR, the commander may elect to impose a command suspension of operations and advise
the OAA and OAAR.
s
CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS
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6.
Unsafe Operational Condition. Operation of Defence aircraft within normal operating limits may result
in the occurrence of an unsafe operational condition. Normally, such occurrences are managed through the Aviation
Safety Occurrence Reporting (ASOR) and Operational Hazard (OPHAZ) reporting process. However, where the
occurrence of the unsafe condition affects routine operations, or cannot be predictably identified, a suspension of
operations may be appropriate until further investigation under flight test conditions has occurred. The OAAR may
elect to suspend flying operations in consultation with the aircraft DAR and Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA).
The suspension of operations must be advised to the OAAR and OAA. Where the certification basis is compromised
to the extent that the AMTC is no longer valid, the Defence AA, based on the advice of the TAA and OAA, may
consider withdrawing the Type Certificate and Service Release for the aircraft. For aircraft operating under a
temporary Airworthiness Instrument, where the certification of an aircraft against the certification basis has been
compromised to the extent that the interim type certification is no longer valid, the Defence AA, based on the advice
of the TAA and OAA, may consider withdrawing the temporary Airworthiness Instrument for the aircraft.
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7.
Engineering Deficiency or Service Bulletin. The Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) for an
aircraft type may determine that an engineering deficiency exists through routine activities or following issue of an
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Service Bulletin. Where such a deficiency affects, or is suspected to affect,
the immediate airworthiness of the relevant Defence aircraft type, the DAR must advise the TAA in accordance with
TAREG 2.6.5—Notification of unairworthy conditions, and the relevant operational commander. Based on the advice
of the DAR, the operational commander may elect to enforce a command suspension of operations and advise the
OAA and OAAR. Where the certification basis is compromised to the extent that the AMTC is no longer valid, the
Defence AA, following the advice of the TAA and OAA, may consider withdrawing the Type Certificate and Service
Release for the aircraft. For aircraft operating under a temporary Airworthiness Instrument, where the certification of
an aircraft against the certification basis has been compromised to the extent that the interim type certification is no
longer valid, the Defence AA, following the advice of the TAA and OAA, may consider withdrawing the temporary
Airworthiness Instrument for the aircraft.
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8.
Organisational Issues. There are instances where commanders, the DAR, the OAA, the TAA, or
Airworthiness Board may consider that the organisation or organisations that underpin safe flying operations (i.e. the
operating organisation, the maintenance organisation or the engineering organisation) are incapable of doing so. In
such cases, the OAA or TAA may recommend to the Defence AA that the Service Release (SR), SFP or AD be limited
or cancelled until the deficiencies can be rectified. The Defence AA may limit or remove the SR, SFP or AD for the
affected aircraft type thus suspending or restricting operations.
2
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 4 Chap 3
COMMUNICATION OF AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES
9.
Underpinning the mechanisms for suspension of operations is the expectation that:
at the operating and AEO level, there is timely and effective communication between technical
airworthiness and operational airworthiness staff
b.
there is timely and effective communication of:
capability issues through the chain of command to the applicable Service Chief
(2)
airworthiness issues through the TAA and OAA to the Defence AA (through DACPA).
ul
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(1)
s
a.
10.
Where flying is suspended through Defence AA removal of SR, SFP or AD, the OAA, TAA, OC or
equivalent of the relevant System Program Office, OAAR and/or OAAR(Acq) are to be advised.
•
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NOTE
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The use of differing terms such as Operational Pause or Pause in Flying Operations
in place of Suspension of Flying Operations is to be avoided. The use of alternative
terms does not negate the intent of MILAVREG 2.6 and all actions required by the
regulation.
COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING SUSPENSION
n
11.
tio
Mechanisms to enable the recommencement of flying operations include:
Restriction of Flying Operations. A restriction of flying operations places limitations on the
operation of an aircraft type or system pending resolution of airworthiness concerns and is usually
promulgated through Flying Orders (FOs) or Special Flying Instructions (SFIs). Commanders may at
any time limit the operations of aircraft or systems under command while seeking OAAR or OAA
action.
b.
Special Technical Instruction (STI). An STI is a mechanism for issuing urgent design change and
continuing airworthiness instructions, prescribed inspections, and conditions and limitations under
which the aircraft or system may continue to be operated. The DAR of the AEO responsible for the
aircraft type may issue a STI in accordance with TAREG 3.5.11—Special Technical Instructions.
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Isolated Airworthiness Problem. Suspension of operations of a limited number of aircraft may be lifted
following implementation of measures to assure the safety of operations with those aircraft. Typically, these will be
determined between the DAR and operational commanders through implementation of a FO, SFI or STI with advice
of the action taken provided to the TAA and OAA.
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Fleet-wide Airworthiness Problem. Following a fleet wide suspension where a SR has not been
cancelled or limited, regardless of who imposed the suspension, operations may resume following a TAA
recommendation and subsequent approval by the OAA that the mechanisms implemented to assure airworthiness are
adequate. On initial determination that there may be a fleet-wide airworthiness deficiency and, that continued flying
might present an unacceptable risk, the responsible commander will consider a command suspension of flying
operations to assure safety and initiate an investigation. Following notification to the OAA and TAA, outcomes from
the investigation may include:
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a.
b.
The aircraft type DAR and operational commander agree a way forward to manage aircraft operations
as required to assure airworthiness. Mechanisms to achieve this will include the use of a STI, FO or
SFI and such flying suspension or operating restrictions necessary to accommodate implementation.
An operational commander decision to recommend to the OAA that either:
(1)
operations can resume with caveats described in a FO or SFI
(2)
suspension of flight operations be formalised through an AD or a limitation to Service Release
or SFP.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 4 Chap 3
COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING CANCELLATION OR LIMITATION TO
AIRWORTHINESS INSTRUMENTS
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15.
Withdrawal of AMTC. If, after completing all necessary investigation to quantify and resolve the
airworthiness deficiency, the OAA and TAA believe that the aircraft type can no longer be safely operated in the
Defence roles, then the OAA may recommend to the Defence AA to remove the AMTC (and consequently, the
Service Release). The resumption of flying operations for the affected type will then only occur following a formal
Type Certification or Supplemental Type Certification process and recommendation from the OAA, TAA and the
Airworthiness Board.
s
14.
Cancellation of Service Release, SFP or AD. Only the Defence AA can reissue the Service Release,
SFP or AD and may do so following advice from the OAA and TAA and Airworthiness Board that appropriate
measures have been implemented to assure safety, and that operations may commence subject to any conditions and
limitations. Limitations to Service Release, SFP or AD may be amended or lifted by the nominated representative
following completion of any necessary activities specified by the Defence AA. DACPA normally manages limitations
to SR, SFP and AD on behalf of the Defence AA.
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NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
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16.
Where a suspension of flying operations involves a non-Defence registered aircraft, the OAA and
commanders might have less control over rectification of the issue; however, they retain a duty of care for Defence
personnel using the aircraft. The processes outlined in MILAVREG 2.6 provides a suitable basis for an OAA and
commanders to ensure appropriate Defence agencies are involved in the suspension and resumption of flying of these
platforms.
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17.
Further information on airworthiness policy relating to the suspension of operations should be sought from
ACPA.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 4 Chap 4
IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW OF
DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 1.9—Airworthiness review responsibility
MILAVREG 2.4—Operation of Defence registered aircraft
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MILAVREG 4.2—Airworthiness Board conduct
MILAVREG 4.3—Airworthiness Board outcomes
INTRODUCTION
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PURPOSE
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1.
MILAVREG 1.9 and MILAVREG 2.4 require each Defence registered aircraft type to undergo a periodic
review of the basis of certification and Service Release by the Defence AA executive review board, the Airworthiness
Board. Requirements for the conduct and outcomes of the Airworthiness Board are contained in MILAVREG 4. The
airworthiness/aviation safety management of each aircraft type is reviewed at an Airworthiness Board to ensure that
they are being maintained and operated within the roles defined in the SOI, the basis of certification remains valid, the
integrated logistics support arrangements are still relevant to the defined aircraft roles and that the safety management
system remains appropriate and effective. The objective of the review is to validate the currency of the existing
Service Release (SR).
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2.
This chapter describes the process by which the basis of Type Certification and SR of a Defence registered
aircraft is reviewed.
APPLICABILITY
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This chapter is applicable to the Airworthiness Board review of Defence registered aircraft and organisations
who manage the airworthiness of Defence registered aircraft.
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KEY CONCEPTS
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IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
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4.
In-service airworthiness is managed within the context of the operational and technical airworthiness
frameworks established by the OAR and the TAR. An overview of the in-service airworthiness management is
described in Section 4 Chapter 1. An overview of the operational and technical regulatory frameworks is described in
Section 1 Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
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THE ROLE OF THE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD
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5.
The DASP includes a review function for the in-service operation of Defence registered aircraft. The
airworthiness of Defence registered aircraft is established through a process of Type Certification and SR (see Section
3) and is maintained through management by competent organisations in accordance with the OAREG and TAREG.
The aim of an Airworthiness Board is:
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b.
to review the basis of certification as identified in the relevant Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS)
to ensure the continued validity of the relevant AMTC; and
to review the conduct of operational, maintenance, engineering, logistical and safety management
activities supporting the ongoing operation under the extant Service Release.
6.
Airworthiness Board reviews are not limited to aircraft types. Organisations and aviation support systems may
also be subject to independent review.
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Sect 4 Chap 4
SCOPE OF THE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW
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8.
Developments. The Airworthiness Board must be made aware of any significant changes affecting the way
aviation activities are conducted. The following list describes significant key activities that the Airworthiness Board
must be briefed on:
Special conditions or limitations for in-service needs that are put into effect by either a SFP or an AD;
b.
Activities conducted under an Operational Clearance.
c.
New roles approved by the OAA through Supplemental Role Approval, including action taken to
implement the role into the flying management organisation;
d.
Special developments such as the advancement of Aircrew Training Accreditation on certified
simulators; and
e.
Any operational or engineering changes that are deemed to improve or affect the way roles are
fulfilled.
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AIRWORTHINESS BOARD CONDUCT
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Notification. Formal notification for each Airworthiness Board will be forwarded by DACPA to
airworthiness managers approximately 10 weeks before the Airworthiness Board convenes.
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10.
Submissions. Written submissions are to be raised by the airworthiness managers as nominated in the
notification and forwarded to ACPA four weeks before the Airworthiness Board. This timeframe is required to enable
sufficient time for ACPA staff to review and collate the submissions and forward them to the Board members. Each
submission should expand on the MILAVREG 4 requirements and cover all of the airworthiness management and
Service Release aspects that are detailed in the submission template provided by ACPA with the notification. Each
submission template also provides detailed guidance on the information required. The draft agenda, outlining the order
of conduct of an Airworthiness Board, is also provided by ACPA with the notification.
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Collation. ACPA is to collate all written submissions received from the nominated airworthiness managers.
The assembled submissions are to be presented to the Airworthiness Board members for their review, approximately
two weeks before the Board. Copies of the information forwarded to the Airworthiness Board members, along with the
final agenda are made available to other stakeholders by electronic means.
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12.
Attendance. Sufficient personnel should attend the Airworthiness Board to address any questions the Board
members may raise in the course of proceedings. This may include personnel from operational, engineering,
maintenance, test, aviation safety or regulatory domains. As well as responsible officers, a senior technician from the
operating unit(s) under review should attend to provide specialist maintenance comment if required.
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13.
Outcomes. The proceedings and outcomes of the Airworthiness Board are documented in an Airworthiness
Board Report (ABR). The ABR formally records all Observations, Notes and Concerns raised by the AwB members
and incorporates any ACARs requiring closure to maintain the Service Release. The ABR is forwarded to the Defence
AA through the DACPA with a recommendation concerning the continuation of Service Release.
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ACPA monitors ACAR status and resolution progress.
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7.
The cornerstone of the Airworthiness Board review is the verification that the operational, maintenance,
engineering, logistics and safety management aspects covered in annex A to MILAVREG 4.2—Airworthiness Board
conduct (Section 2, Chapter 4, annex A) are sufficient to support operation in the roles approved in the SOI. In
general, the presentation should concentrate on significant operational, maintenance, engineering, logistics support and
safety management criteria and provide a detailed breakdown of any important changes or reason for non-compliance.
AAP 7001.048
Sect 4 Chap 4
REQUIREMENTS FOR ORGANISATIONS AND SYSTEMS UNDER REVIEW
15.
Defence registered aircraft types. The five functional areas responsible for submissions to the
Airworthiness Board are as follows:
(2)
reporting on any changes to the SOI including approval of supplemental roles by the OAA; and
(3)
reporting on maintenance activity supporting operation with the aircraft type.
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reporting on each element of the FMS required by OAREG 2.1 for the aircraft type;
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Long term detachment (more than 30 days), isolated Units and Ships Flights. Ships
Flight Commanders, Detachment Commanders or Commanding Officers are responsible for providing:
a summary of how operational airworthiness oversight was achieved
(2)
a summary of how technical airworthiness oversight was achieved
(3)
reporting on the continuing adequacy of maintenance arrangements and the extent of
maintenance conducted.
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(1)
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Systems Program Office (SPO) and DAR. The SPO is responsible for:
(1)
reporting to the Airworthiness Board on the conduct of in-service engineering activities for the
aircraft type
(2)
reporting to the Airworthiness Board on the adequacy of the in-service logistics support
infrastructure.
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b.
Force Element Group (FEG), OAAR or OAAR (Acq). The operating OAAR/OAAR (Acq) is
responsible for reporting to the Airworthiness Board on the operations and operational maintenance
elements of the submission including:
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a.
Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS). DDAAFS is responsible
for reporting to the Airworthiness Board on any aviation safety matters affecting the aircraft type.
e.
Directorate General Technical Airworthiness–ADF (DGTA–ADF) and TAA. DGTA–ADF
staff are responsible for:
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reporting to the Airworthiness Board on the aircraft structural integrity management program
(2)
reporting on any systems integrity issues that are applicable to the aircraft type
(3)
reporting on any significant outcomes of compliance assurance activity.
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(1)
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Flight test organisation (FTO). Airworthiness Board FTO review requirements are similar to Defence
registered aircraft with the following differences and exceptions:
a brief summary of major flight test activities conducted by the FTAA should be provided including
those conducted by external organisations for which FTAA oversight has been maintained
b.
operational airworthiness and maintenance activities with aircraft which have been allocated for flight
test should be briefed by the FTAA in relation to the flight test Airworthiness Management Plan rather
than the aircraft SOI
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c.
d.
engineering activities should be limited to those conducted by the engineering element of the flight test
organisation
e.
logistics support aspects specific to flight test systems which support the airworthiness of operations,
such as logistics support for non-standard modifications, management of instrumentation and telemetry
equipment.
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airworthiness management of aircraft permanently allocated to the flight test organisation should be
included
17.
Other organisations. The application of the Airworthiness Board process to non-Defence registered aircraft,
AvSS and UAS is described in Section 5. Policy regarding the application of the Airworthiness Board process to such
systems is under development and may be promulgated via amendment.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 5 Chap 1
RESERVED
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Sect 5 Chap 2
MILAVREG 6 – AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
GUIDANCE MATERIAL AND ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE
MILAVREG 6.1.a
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The OAR and TAR must consider AvSS compliance with International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 1988 and
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) to assure interoperability with non-Defence aviation
activities.
1.
Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Aviation Support Systems (AvSS) are sufficiently
regulated so that suitability for flight is not compromised.
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2.
As advised in Section 1, Chap 1–Introduction para 2, the Chicago Convention, including associated amending
protocols, is set out in the Schedules to the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Clth), and further implemented through the Civil
Aviation Act (CAA) 1988 (Clth) (the Act). Consistent with Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, Section 4 of Part I of
the Act states that ‘except where the expression state aircraft is used, references in Part III or IIIB or section 98 to
aircraft or air navigation do not include references to state aircraft or air navigation by state aircraft. A significant
consideration is that the use of the term state aircraft may not exempt all Defence AvSS from the Act because
Defence provides AvSS to civil aircraft, which are required to comply with the Act, therefore the Defence services
provided to civil aircraft must also comply in order to be interoperable. Civil aircraft operate in Defence controlled
airspace, and Defence aircraft operate in civil controlled airspace; as such, Defence is well motivated to align with the
Act to ensure interoperability between Defence and civil aviation.
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3.
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is the agency responsible for implementing Civil Aviation
Regulations 1988 (CAR) and Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) 1998, which are derived from the CAA 1988
and other Acts.
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4.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) implements the requirements set by the Chicago
Convention through the distribution of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS). ICAO publishes
Annexes to the Convention that contain SARPS and Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) documents that
provide guidance and information facilitating the uniform application of the SARPS.1 ICAO Annexes2 have a higher
status than PANS documents, therefore MILAVREG 6 will normally only make mention of ICAO Annexes when
used for acceptable mean of compliance. As States may also exempt themselves from ICAO SARPS, any significant
differences to ICAO SARPS should be documented as an exemption as identified in ICAO Annex 15, Appendix 1
section GEN 1.7.
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MILAVREG 6.1.b
The OAR and TAR must consider if existing Commonwealth regulations and/or controls are
adequate for achieving AvSS compliance vice being regulated under MILAVREG 6.
5.
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Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensue that AvSS is regulated for safety only and no more.
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6.
Commonwealth regulations can include building codes, civil engineering standards, and other civilian rules and
practices. Defence regulations used to manage Defence resources and logistics in support of an AvSS output may also
be applicable.
1
2
ICAO Doc 7231/11.
MILAVREG 6 refers to Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation simply as ICAO Annexes.
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Sect 5 Chap 2
MILAVREG 6.2.a
The OAA must approve an AvSS Certificate (AvSSC), or equivalent document, prior to introduction
into service and ensure the AvSSC remains current for as long as the AvSS remains in–service in
order to ensure that the AvSS will not compromise suitability for flight.
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An AvSSC fulfils a similar purpose for AvSS that an AMTC does for aircraft. Certification is the end result of
a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a product against predefined standards, to the
satisfaction of the certificating authority.3
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Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that an AvSS has been designed, constructed, and can be
maintained and operated for its intended purpose.
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9.
The OAA chooses how AvSSCs are managed. AvSS may be interchangeable among various platforms, each
providing the same output but may not be entirely approved under the same regulations as far as equipment is
concerned. For example, should an AvSS service be provided from an aircraft or ship (vice a land based system) the
aircraft or ship systems utilised to provide the service are certified as part of the aircraft’s AMTC or the ship’s
equivalent document vice MILAVREG 6 requirements. Therefore, only the service provider’s operational staff would
be captured under AVSS regulations. Such flexibility allows for effective regulatory integration in order to assure
suitability for flight is not compromised regardless of the platform used.
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10. The management process should account for multiple types and occurrences of AvSS. However, while
multiples of the same type of AvSS can be included on a single AvSSC, different types of AvSS can not be combined
(eg aerodrome and ATM).
An AvSSC is supported by the following documents:
A Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) or equivalent document.4
b.
An AvSS Management Plan (AvSSMP), or equivalent document.
c.
An Accomplishment Summary, or equivalent document.
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11. An AvSSC can be approved for a limited scope of activity such as T&E or operational activities. For example
testing of NAVAIDs and duration of deployment are scope limitations.
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13. Supporting documents. The AvSSC supporting documents ensure that AvSS management begins at the
commencement of the acquisition process (SOI), continues throughout the life cycle of the system (AvSSMP) and
provides the appropriate summary used to make AvSSC determinations (Accomplishment Summary). MILAVREG
1.7 requires the TAA to ensure that the AvSS complies with the AvSS management frameworks established by the
TAR, and to make recommendation to the OAA regarding the issue of the AvSS instruments, which include the
AvSSC supporting documents. To afford ease of verifying the TAA has provided appropriate recommendations, the
OAA approval and the TAA recommendation signatures for all AvSSC supporting documents should be co-located on
each document.
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14. Equivalent document. An equivalent AvSSC document may be any document that achieves the same purpose
as the required outcome under MILAVREG 6, including those superseded Installation Operating Permits (IOP) and
Limited Operating Permits (LOP) and their supporting documents. As these documents are reviewed and updated, the
AvSS is expected to use the document identified in the relevant regulation. Over time, this implementation process
will standardise Defence AvSS management without imposing unnecessary resource expenditure.
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15. Legacy systems. Legacy systems are those AvSS that have been in service before MILAVREG 6 was
established. The resources required to produce all AvSSC supporting documents for legacy AvSS may exceed the
benefit. Should existing documents achieve the intent of MILAVREG 6, then the OAA may consider those documents
to be a suitable equivalent. Should a legacy system be subject to a Substantial Change then it is expected that
MILAVREG 6 be complied with using the supporting documents identified in the regulation. Existing Defence
aerodromes are examples of legacy systems.
3
DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para g.
In the case of an aerodrome an equivalent document is an aerodrome manual (refer to OAREG 6). Aerodromes are distinctly different than other
AvSS, if for no other reason than their ‘static nature’ and the large amount of civil engineering requirements that control the aerodrome build
process. The replacement of the SOI with an aerodrome manual ensures a standard for aerodromes that captures required operational information,
affords a reduction in resource requirements.
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Sect 5 Chap 2
16. Waivers. While some AvSS service providers will utilise more than one AvSSC in support of the overall
service output, other AvSS service providers may not need an AvSSC at all should the equipment utilised already be
regulated elsewhere, or the AvSS is an intellectual output vice equipment based. Where practicable and justifiable the
OAA may provide a waiver to any or all AvSSC supporting documents. For example, it may be a legacy system that
has a different process but still can demonstrate suitability for flight will not be compromised, or it may be that the
AvSS has little relevant equipment to certify and the process exceeds the benefits, hence not IAW the ALARP
process.
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17. Unless the OAA determines otherwise, and noting that other OAREG or TAREG may still apply as determined
by the OAR/TAR, the following AvSS do not require an AvSSC:5
ARFF
b.
Aeronautical information (if the TAR considers another system provides sufficient oversight)
c.
ACD
d.
AWR6
e.
Medical
f.
JPR
g.
MET
h.
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18. The OAA will seek and obtain TAA technical advice regarding AvSSC and supporting documents as required.
MILAVREG 1.7 requires the TAA to make recommendations and communicate technical risks to the relevant OAA.
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19. Should the OAA authorise a waiver, in order to ensure the waiver is retained within the AvSS management
system, the waiver process used should:
Follow the AvSSC approval process.
b.
In place of expected AvSSC supporting document requirements, the AvSSC should record the reasons
for the waiver, including any supporting criteria.
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An AvSSC template is available from the ACPA website.
21.
The AvSSC information should include:
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20.
The identity of the AvSS.
b.
A reference to the approved SOI, or in the case of an aerodrome the approved aerodrome manual.
c.
A reference to the approved AvSS Management Plan (AvSSMP).
d.
For aerodromes, state the:
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classification (if approved as a heliport)
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(1)
Any AvSS restrictions, limitations or waivers. An AvSS restriction is an imposed condition that is
intended to restrain the use of an AvSS even though it may be able to achieve the desired output. For
example, an ABM system intended for ATC use might be restricted to military aircraft only depending
on the certification outcomes.
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The review period, if any.
g.
The AvSSC expiry date, if any.
h.
Other OAA stipulations.
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5
If an AvSSC is not required, then by extension any AvSSC supporting documents are also not required.
As advised under the AvSS determination section, AWR (infrastructure only), medical and JPR are exempt from MILAVREG 6 and are included
here to ensure awareness of their status.
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Sect 5 Chap 2
MILAVREG 6.2.b
The OAA must approve a SOI, or equivalent document, which details the intended AvSS CRE and
provides the context of how the AvSS will be utilised by those CRE.
22. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the AvSS will be operated outside of approved
configuration, roles and environments (CRE).
b.
A description of the AvSS operational roles.
c.
A description of the environment in which the AvSS is expected to operate.
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For aerodromes, an aerodrome manual is an equivalent SOI document.
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The identification and configuration of those AvSS elements that have a functional or physical interface
with aircraft, and have the potential to compromise suitability for flight so that only those elements of
the AvSS that need to be regulated are regulated.
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24.
A SOI should address the following details:
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 5 Chap 2
MILAVREG 6.2.c
The OAA must approve an AvSSMP, or equivalent document, which details the implementation and
the ongoing in-service management.
25. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensue that the scope and requirements of an AvSS are managed
over the full lifecycle.
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26. The AvSSMP should be updated at the beginning of each phase of the capability lifecycle. The capability
lifecycle phases for new AvSS are described in the Defence Capability Development Handbook.
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27. An AvSSMP will vary depending on the type of AvSS supported. An AvSSMP is not intended to be an overly
detailed document; rather it is the regulator desired outcome that will ensure appropriate AvSS requirements have
been considered and addressed. While noting each AvSSMP will be different, the AvSSMP should include references
or information which may include:
A description of the AvSS, including any CoC requirements that will attest that a product conforms to
its intended design.
b.
A reference to the approved SOI. If the SOI has not yet been approved at the initial planning stages of a
project, provide detail on the expected operating CRE. Once the AvSS has achieved 1st Pass Approval
in the Defence Major Capability process, or equivalent if the new AvSS is being obtained by Defence
using another process, the SOI should be available and the AvSSMP should then reference the
applicable SOI vice listing CRE separately within the AvSSMP.
c.
An outline of the scope of the acquisition activity to introduce an AvSS, or to make a Substantial
Change to an existing AvSS. The outline is intended to provide basic awareness of the overall process
to be followed. It should only make reference to any complex documents or processes, vice including
any substantial detail in the AvSSMP.
d.
The technical and/or operational regulations that apply to the AvSS. The degree of regulatory oversight
of the design, construction, maintenance and operation of an AvSS requires tailoring to specific systems
to suit the AvSS CRE capabilities. The OAA, in conjunction with the TAA, should determine the
system rigour required to ensure an AvSS can achieve the intended output.
e.
The system safety requirements that apply to the AvSS. System safety requirements should consider
what the AvSS will be used for and from this activity invoke appropriate limitations on resources in
order to assure that the AvSS is neither over nor under designed. For example, a system used to ensure
collision avoidance or separation assurance would require a higher degree of availability and reliability
than a system used to provide advisory information.
f.
Operational and technical training requirements. The detail need only provide basic concepts of the
requirements that directly relate to the AvSS, such as training course duration and training provider
details.
g.
A reference to any design acceptance and operational certification requirements. Test and evaluation
(T&E) planning details should be broadly provided or a reference provided for the location of the T&E
plan to be utilised. The T&E information should also advise the funding provided as part of the contract
to develop the system.
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i.
Logistics, technical and operational activities undertaken in support of the AvSSC.
j.
A schedule of the milestones for providing the key documentation and plans.
k.
The AvSS organisational responsibilities and any delegations.
l.
The responsible organisations for compliance with technical regulatory oversight of the AvSS.
m.
The responsible organisations for compliance with operational regulatory oversight of the AvSS.
n.
Other required activities.
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A reference to any activities and tasks supporting the certification activity and compliance with
operational and technical regulatory requirements.
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MILAVREG 6.2.d
The OAA must obtain an Accomplishment Summary, or equivalent document, from the organisation
executive sponsoring the AvSS prior to AvSSC approval, which assures the SOI and AvSSMP
requirements regarding design, construction, maintenance and operation have been achieved.
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28. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the results of any activity necessary to achieve an
AvSSC are provided to the relevant authority to substantiate the assurances required in order to approve an AvSSC.
Such assurances may include:
Reference to the approved SOI and/or the AvSSMP.
b.
Design acceptance outcomes, including limitations or adverse findings.
c.
Status of technical, logistics and infrastructure support availability.
d.
Status of relevant Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) management framework. The titles and
amendment status of relevant OIP should be included, and any outstanding issues identified.
e.
Status and availability of qualified, trained and competent maintenance and operational personnel.
Personnel reports should indicate whether sufficient capability does in fact exist.
f.
Compliance with the integrated Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS), including a safety case
that nominates hazards present within the system and retained risks. The basic requirement is to identify
that an ASMS exists and point to its location.
g.
Results of any other required activities.
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MILAVREG 6.2.e
The TAA must ensure a Certificate of Conformance (CoC), or equivalent document, is obtained that
confirms compliance with the approved AvSS design for multiple instances of a system intended to
operate under a single AvSSC as identified in the AvSSMP.
29. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to afford a means to reduce compliance costs when other activites
can provide required assurances to achieve the intended outcome
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30. A CoC is a certificate attesting that an individual instance of an AvSS that will have multiple installations has
been examined and conforms to the intended AvSS design. A single instance of an AvSS, or the first of multiple AvSS
installations does not require a CoC.
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31. Utilisation of a CoC for identical AvSS instances (except the initial instance) minimises resource expenditure,
as the AvSSC and supporting AvSSC documents have already been approved in the first instance.
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32. An example of multiple instances of an AvSS is an ATM system that will install an identical design at more
than one location. The initial ATM installation would obtain an AvSSC based upon the SOI, AvSSMP and
accomplishment summary, but would not require a CoC. Any follow on installations would only require a CoC in
order to be utilised, as the first installation already has all required system documentation.
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33. A CoC is normally obtained from the contractor and may use any format accepted by the TAA. A CoC may be
recorded separately or appended to the AvSSC. Once obtained, the CoC validity should be confirmed concurrently
with any relevant AvSSC review.
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MILAVREG 6.2.f
The OAA and/or TAA must ensure that a system is established that provides appropriate review of
in–service AvSS modifications that can determine if a modification is a Substantial Change, and if
found to be a Substantial Change, the AvSSC is reviewed as required.
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35. A Substantial Change is one that may introduce a potential for an in-service AvSS to compromise suitability
for flight. Changes to AvSS that could be deemed Substantial include:
CRE
b.
HMI
c.
operator training syllabi
d.
competency management
e.
operations authorisation processes
f.
design basis of the system
g.
any other AvSSC approval considerations.
Sa
fe
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a.
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36. Not all changes to in-service AvSS will require an OAA and/or TAA assessment. The system established to
determine which changes require OAA and/or TAA determinations may be as simple as the normal filter process that
is associated with routine staffing and management of AvSS requirements.
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37. For a Substantial Change to an existing in–service AvSS, the AvSSMP should be updated before the change is
developed and implemented.
8
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s
34. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that appropriate oversight is proved to in–service AvSS
that maintains the AvSS integrity.
AAP 7001.048
Sect 5 Chap 2
MILAVREG 6.3.a
The OAA must approve an AvSS Authority to Operate (AUTHOP) that confirms the ongoing logistic,
technical, and operational arrangements supporting the AvSS are satisfactory.
s
38. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the overall service output of an AvSS, which may
include use of more than one AvSSC, is only provided once the relevant authority is satisfied that the ongoing
operational suitability7 and operational effectiveness8 of an AvSS service output will not compromise suitability for
flight.
eg
ul
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39. The AUTHOP is a declaration by the OAA, after conducting an appropriate review, that confirms the ongoing
operational suitability9 and operational effectiveness10 of an AvSS service output, including its applicable subsystems.
An AUTHOP is issued to an AvSS service provider in recognition of the OAA confidence in the service provider’s
ability to deliver the intended output. An AUTHOP fulfils a similar purpose for AvSS that Service Release does for
aircraft.
fe
ty
R
40. Not all AvSS will require the same rigour when determining AUTHOP requirements. AUTHOP requirements
should be determined by the complexity of the organisational influences that are required in order to produce service
output requirements.
Sa
41. To ensure an AUTHOP remains valid the OAA should develop an AUTHOP review process. An AvSS that is
operating as intended should be considered for an AUTHOP review every three years.
tio
n
42. Unless the OAA determines otherwise, and noting that other OAREG or TAREG may still apply as determined
by the OAR/TAR, the following AvSS do not require an AUTHOP:
Aeronautical information (if the TAR considers another system provides sufficient oversight)
b.
AWR (if the airspace safety system element is included as part of another suitable review)
c.
Medical11
d.
JPR
e.
MET (unless product is provided by a Service)
f.
TAC.
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a.
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43. MILAVREG 6 does not control how the OAA manages an AUTHOP. The AUTHOP is intended to be flexible,
allowing the AvSS to be managed efficiently and cost consciously. For example, while aerodromes may be certified or
registered, the OAA may use one AUTHOP for all aerodromes, or could approve an AUTHOP for certified
aerodromes and another for registered aerodromes.
45.
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44. The OAA may approve an AUTHOP to allow operation of an AvSS, yet restrict the AvSS capability in certain
ways in order to maintain capability output yet safeguard areas of concern. This is particularly advantageous for an
AvSS that provides multiple services, such as an individual air capable ship or deployable systems versus fixed
systems.
Use of MILAVREG 4 as the means to conduct an AvSS AUTHOP review may occur when:
ed
b.
the OAA makes a request to the Defence AA (through DACPA) for the review and the Defence AA
approves, or
by
a.
the Defence AA deems a MILAVREG 4 review would be beneficial.
Su
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46.
Defence may require AvSS to be provided from non-Defence entities within Australia. In such cases, the
service provider may be CASA endorsed, which can then be recognised by Defence. If no CASA endorsement exists,
an AUTHOP may consider the provider’s technical and operational management processes and if deemed acceptable
in comparison to Defence requirements, an AUTHOP may be approved.
47.
Figure 2-1 details the AUTHOP management process.
7
DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para t.
DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para s.
9
DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para t.
10
DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para s.
11
AWR (infrastructure only), medical and JPR are exempt from MILAVREG 6 and are included here to ensure awareness of their status.
8
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 5 Chap 2
Yes
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No
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Does the AvSS have an
approved AvSS
Certificate?
Statement of
Operating Intent
Is the AvSS
identical?
n
Sa
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No
Yes
Accomplishment
Summary
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AvSS
Certificate
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AvSS Management
Plan
AvSS Certificate
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AvSS Certificate
approved
Su
AUTHOP
Figure 2–1 AvSS Management Process
10
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Certificate of
Conformace
AAP 7001.048
Sect 5 Chap 3
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
MILAVREG 7—Unmanned Aircraft Systems
MILAVREG 3.7 — Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit
s
INTRODUCTION
ul
at
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1.
The outcome of MILAVREG 7 is to assure UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of safety to
other aircraft, people and property.
PURPOSE
R
eg
2.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance supporting the airworthiness management of UAS operated
by, or on behalf of, Defence.
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ty
APPLICABILITY
3.
Sa
MILAVREG 7 and guidance is applicable to all UAS operated by, or on behalf of, Defence.
n
MILAVREG 7 GUIDANCE
4.
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Categorisation guidance for all UAS categories is provided at Annex A.
Av
MILAVREG 7.1.a(1)
en
ce
The OAA must, with recommendation from the TAA and in accordance with the UAS categories at
Annex A; make recommendation to the Defence AA to categorise a UAS as Category 1 or 2.
D
ef
5.
The authority required to determine the category of UAS is representative of the risk to safety presented by
the operation of the UAS.
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6.
A recommendation to the Defence AA (through DACPA) to categorise a UAS as either Category 1 or 2
requires robust analysis of the planned operating environment, known/planned technical capabilities, any planned
operational restriction and the resultant potential for a catastrophic failure of the UAS to result in death, serious injury,
or significant damage to property. Documents that may assist a categorisation or a re-categorisation recommendation
include:
An SOI.
b.
UAS Risk Analysis or equivalent document.
c.
An AAMP or equivalent document.
d.
An ATMP.
e.
A UASOP.
f.
Other OAA approved OIP.
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MILAVREG 7.1.a(2)
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The OAA must, with recommendation from the TAA and in accordance with the UAS categories at
Annex A; make recommendation to the Defence AA to categorise a UAS as Category 1 or 2; or
categorise a UAS as Category 3.
7.
Category 3 UAS present a reduced level of risk to property and people though the application of controls such
as segregation of airspace and operating over sparsely populated areas. Through the application of this regulatory
requirement the OAA acceptance of risk to safety for the operation of Category 3 has been determined to be
appropriate.
MILAVREG 7.1.b
The OAA must, in accordance with the UAS categories at Annex A, categorise a UAS as Category 4
8.
Category 4 UAS are managed under OAREG 7.
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 5 Chap 3
MILAVREG 7.1.c(1)
ul
at
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9.
Category 1 UAS airworthiness management is equivalent to manned aircraft due to the level of risk posed by
the operation of a Category 1 UAS throughout all categories of airspace, over populated areas. The application of
MILAVREG 2 and 5 to Category 1 UAS operations is as appropriate for the UAS as it is for manned aircraft;
therefore, operator qualification and a recognised certification basis are essential.
s
The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows: Category 1 UAS:
in accordance with MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration And Operation Of Aircraft under issue of a
SFP or AMTC / SR, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft under MILAVREG 5.
eg
10.
The technical assurance process should assure that the overall safety risk to personnel, other airspace users
and property is appropriately identified, analysed and evaluated and if necessary communicated to the appropriate
authority for treatment. Any restrictions on the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) operating over populated areas are to be
documented within the Service Release Limitations (SRLM).
Av
ia
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ty
R
11.
A foreign military Category 1 UAS operating in Defence exercises or under sustained operations within
Australian Airspace will comply with all applicable DASP regulations. The acceptability to Defence of operations
involving non-Defence registered Category 1 UAS is predicated on the demonstration that an appropriate level of
airworthiness oversight and management has been achieved in each case. Non-Defence registered Category 1 UAS
will normally hold an extant type certification or permit issued by a foreign national or military airworthiness
authority. However, UAS airworthiness management is still maturing, so Defence does not automatically recognise
extant UAS certifications, under MILAVREG 5. Rather, operations of non-Defence registered Category 1 UAS will
be approved by the Defence AA on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the recommendations of the OAA and
TAA. Any extant UAS type certification or permit issued by a foreign national or military airworthiness authority
could be a contributing factor in the approval process.
en
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MILAVREG 7.1.c(2)
D
ef
The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows: Category 2 UAS:
in accordance with MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration And Operation Of Aircraft under issue of a
UAS Operating Permit (UASOP), unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft under
MILAVREG 5.
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12.
The level of technical assurance required by Category 1 UAS may not be achievable for some UAS, or
required when the UAS may be operated at an acceptable level of safety without AMTC. Therefore, the airworthiness
management for Category 2 UAS is conducted under a UASOP as alternative instrument to AMTC/SR.
80
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13.
The UASOP is an airworthiness instrument issued by the Defence AA (Category 2 UAS only) which
summarises the UAS basis of certification, key airworthiness restrictions and special conditions to balance the
operational requirements with the risk of the UAS operation.
AA
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14.
The application of MILAVREG 2 for a Defence Registered Category 2 UAS should be no different to the
process followed for an aircraft/Category 1 UAS receiving AMTC/SR, with the notable exception being the issue of
the UASOP as the applicable airworthiness instrument (MILAVREG 3.7). Accordingly, MILAVREG 4 equally
applies.
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by
15.
A Category 2 UAS managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft in accordance with the requirements of
MILAVREG 5 may not require a UASOP, however, using the UASOP as a template document may provide the OAA
an acceptable means of complying with the requirements of MILAVREG 5. A Cat 2 UAS requires an AAMP that
should be tailored as applicable whilst ensuring that any identified risks are adequately addressed.
Su
pe
rs
16.
A foreign military Category 2 UAS operating in Defence exercises or under sustained operations within
Australian Airspace is required to comply with all applicable DASP regulations (MILAVREG 5 and 7). The
acceptability to Defence of the risk from operations involving non-Defence registered Category 2 UAS is predicated
on the demonstration that an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight and management has been achieved.
Operations of non-Defence registered Category 2 UAS will be approved by the Defence AA on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account the recommendations of the OAA and TAA. Any extant UAS type certification or permit issued by
a foreign national or military airworthiness authority could be a contributing factor in the approval process.
2
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 5 Chap 3
MILAVREG 7.1c(3)
The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows: Category 3 UAS:
under issue of a UASOP, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft under MILAVREG 5.
s
17.
Correctly categorised, Category 3 UAS operations present a lower level of risk to safety than Category 1 and
2 UAS operations due to their restricted operating areas. However they present a greater risk than Category 4 UAS and
therefore like Category 2 UAS, the airworthiness management of a Category 3 UAS is conducted under a UASOP
(issued by the OAA).
ul
at
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n
18.
A Category 3 UAS operating under a valid UASOP is appropriately managed in accordance with the
requirements set by the OAR and TAR. Accordingly, understanding and applying the requirements of the OAR and
TAR is essential for Category 3 operations.
R
eg
19.
An AAMP (MILAVREG 2 Annex A) may be used to document the acquisition airworthiness process. Using
the AAMP as a template document can provide the OAA an acceptable means of complying with the requirements of
MILAVREG 7.
fe
ty
MILAVREG 7.1c(4)
Sa
The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows: Category 4 UAS:
in accordance with the requirements of the OAR.
ia
tio
n
20.
Due to the negligible risk presented by a correctly categorised Category 4 UAS, the Defence AA has
delegated the responsibility for determining the airworthiness management regulatory requirements to the OAR.
Av
MILAVREG 7.1.d
en
ce
An OAA must obtain Defence AA approval for any Category UA to carry humans, or carry or employ
weapons.
D
ef
21.
The weaponisation or carriage of humans by UAS carries increased risk. Therefore, the Defence AA has
decided to retain authority to approve any Category UAS to be inhabited by humans, or to carry or employ weapons,
noting that the physical size constraints of Category 4 UAS make it unlikely that a UA of this size would be able to
carry humans.
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22.
Laser pointers, range finders, laser spot trackers and designators are not considered weapons under this
regulation; however, all risk to safety from lasers will require assessment and appropriate approval for use.
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MILAVREG 7.1.e
A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 1 or 2 UAS to Defence service must
seek categorisation of the UAS through the relevant OAA IAW MILAVREG 7.1.a(1).
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23.
Defence UAS airworthiness management is predicated on UAS being correctly categorised in accordance
with the UAS Categorisation system described at MILAVREG 7 Annex A. MILAVREG 7.1—Unmanned Aircraft
Systems requires that UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of risk to personnel, other aircraft and
property. The level of rigour applied to the certification process is intrinsic to achieving the intended UAS category
and CRE. Timely and appropriate engagement with the applicable OAA is an important consideration of this process,
and is essential to achieving the intended capability.
Su
pe
rs
ed
24.
The AMTC / SR process for new aircraft type can be useful to an organisation acquiring UAS; however, the
degree to which they are applied will vary depending on the UAS Category. Applicants intending to introduce a
Defence UAS into service need to understand the level of risk posed by the operation of the system and correctly
categorise the UAS to ensure an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight is applied.
25.
The introduction into service process for Category 1 and 2 UAS is shown in figure 3-1.
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Sect 5 Chap 3
ul
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AAP 7001.048
FIGURE 3–1 INTRODUCTION INTO SERVICE PROCESS FOR CATEGORY 1 AND 2 UAS.
R
eg
26.
A Defence organisation submitting a categorisation application should provide a compilation of supporting
documentation as proofs for the categorisation determination as per MILAVREG 7 Annex A including:
An SOI which describes the intended CRE applicable to the UAS operation;
b.
An AAMP , including any risk mitigation strategy proposed for the UAS;
c.
Reference to, or documentation of, an ATMP which details the airspace management procedures for
where the UA is to be operated and how the UA is to be operated in conjunction with other military
and/or civilian aircraft; and
d.
A covering document which identifies the proposed airworthiness categorisation and references any
relevant supporting justification.
Processing of a categorisation application for a new UAS follows:
An applicant seeking to introduce a UAS to Defence service prepares an application to be submitted to
the TAA, with an information copy provided to the relevant OAA and DACPA.
b.
With the advice of the TAA, the applicant submits the application to the relevant OAA. The OAA, once
satisfied, will make the recommendation to the Defence AA (through DACPA) to categorise the UAS
(Category 1 or 2). Applications for the operation of Category 1 or 2 UAS will be endorsed by the OAA
and the TAA prior to submission to the Defence AA.
c.
If satisfied, the Defence AA will endorse the AAMP as acceptable for the airworthiness management of
the system. Note – For category 2 UAS, the OAA, with recommendation from the TAA, may then
recommend the Defence AA issue a UASOP.
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27.
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a.
MILAVREG 7.1.f
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A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 3 UAS to Defence service must seek
categorisation of the UAS IAW MILAVREG 7.1.a(2).
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28.
Defence UAS airworthiness management is predicated on UAS being correctly categorised in accordance
with the UAS Categorisation system (MILAVREG 7 Annex A). MILAVREG 7.1 requires that UAS operations are
conducted at an acceptable level of risk to personnel, other aircraft and property. The level of rigour applied to the
technical certification process is intrinsic to achieving the intended UAS category and CRE. Timely and appropriate
engagement with the applicable OAA is an important consideration of this process, and is essential to achieving the
intended capability.
Su
pe
rs
29.
The Type Certification and Service Release process for new aircraft type can be useful to an organisation
acquiring an UAS; however, the degree to which they are applied will vary depending on the Category of the UAS.
Applicants intending to introduce a Defence UAS into service need to understand the level of risk posed by the
operation of the system and correctly categorise the UAS to ensure an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight is
applied. The introduction into service process for Category 3 and 4 UAS is shown in figures 3-2 and 3-3.
4
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Sect 5 Chap 3
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AAP 7001.048
FIGURE 3–2 INTRODUCTION INTO SERVICE PROCESS FOR CATEGORY 3 UAS
eg
MILAVREG 7.1.g
R
A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 4 UAS to Defence service must seek
categorisation of the UAS IAW MILAVREG 7.1.b.
30.
tio
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Sa
fe
ty
Defence organisations should seek guidance from the relevant OAA prior to Category 4 UAS acquisitions.
Av
ia
FIGURE 3–3 INTRODUCTION INTO SERVICE PROCESS FOR CATEGORY 4 UAS
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE
31.
en
ce
Further advice regarding airworthiness management of UAS is available from ACPA or DGTA-ADF staff.
Annexes:
A.
B.
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UAS Categorisation and Risk Management
History and Philosophy of UAS Airworthiness
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5
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
UAS CATEGORISATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Applicable Regulations
MILAVREG 7 —Unmanned Aircraft Systems
MILAVREG 3.7 — Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit
ul
at
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n
s
INTRODUCTION
eg
1.
UAS risk analysis should be conducted against the risk to other aircraft, people and property. With respect to
people, use of first, second and third party can help assure identification of risk. As Unmanned Aircraft (UA) do not
carry people unless Defence AA approval is granted under MILAVREG 7, first party will not normally apply. Second
party is considered to be Mission Essential Personnel. Third party is considered to be the general public.
R
UAS Risk Analysis
Sa
fe
ty
2.
The UAS Risk Analysis (RA) is a mechanism that may be used to achieve the robust identification, analysis,
evaluation and proposed treatment (eg mitigation, retention, etc) of UAS risk to other aircraft, people and property. It
encompasses:
risks posed by the system in the context of the intended roles and environment documented in the SOI;
b.
risk to other aircraft, people and property anticipated to be in the area of operations; and
c.
risks due to systems carried by the UA that may endanger other aircraft, people and property during all
phases of operation (both normal or abnormal operations), for example, laser designation systems.
Importantly, when assessing the failure modes of the system and the associated risks, the most
hazardous activity forms the basis for consideration in determining the categorisation of the system.
en
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Av
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a.
D
ef
3.
The inputs to the RA should be derived by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of the UAS, in
conjunction with operational requirements and an initial SOI provided by Defence. The RA should include both
technical and operational risks; some of the common sources of risk are suggested below.
5.
–
4.
Technical Analysis. Technical analysis should consider those critical factors that may impact the technical
integrity of the system. These may include:
Flight control system failure.
b.
Engine Failure.
c.
Autonomous Recovery Systems/Flight Termination Systems failure.
d.
Positional information system failure.
e.
Failure of any component of the ground based infrastructure critical to the operation of the system.
f.
Data link failure.
g.
Launch and recovery systems failure.
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Technical risks should be identified through the application of a system safety process acceptable to the TAA.
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6.
Operational Risk Analysis. Operational analysis should identify those critical factors which may impact
the airworthiness of the system. These may include:
7.
a.
Mid air collision resulting from inadequate mission planning or operator induced error.
b.
Controlled flight into terrain.
c.
Uncontrolled flight into people on the ground and/or property.
d.
Loss of control through operation outside approved limits.
e.
Incorrect use of on-board mission systems e.g. laser designation systems.
The RA may provide support for:
a.
UAS categorisation or re-categorisation determination process.
b.
Determine appropriate operational restriction.
c.
Development of an ATMP.
AL 4
3A–1
AAP 7001.048
d.
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
The issue of an appropriate airworthiness instrument.
8.
The process used to identify operational risks should be consistent with Defence approved risk management
processes.
Mid–air collision risk analysis. Depending on the complexity of the UAS and the intended area
of operations, the ATMP may consider mid-air collision risks; however, the difficulty of modelling the
likelihood may require the risk to be considered in absolute, worst case terms, i.e. the likelihood that a
collision will occur is assumed to be certain if the aircraft is operating within a certain density level or
volume of airspace. Similar to ground impact, it may also be possible to model the likelihood of a midair collision event. However, this type of modelling is considerably more complicated than that
available for ground impact risk because it is necessary to:
R
eg
ul
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a.
s
9.
ATMP. An ATMP should be developed as part of the operational RA process to address the specific risks of
collision with other airspace users. Operational or airspace limitations may be considered in the analysis; however,
where it is impractical to consider these factors in absolute terms, the ATMP development may need to consider:
model space in three dimensions;
(2)
consider the speed of both the aircraft and RPA;
(3)
consider the respective trajectories of each in terms of head-on, following or some crossing
angle; and
(4)
consider the reliability and effectiveness of any collision avoidance systems fitted to the aircraft
and/or RPA.
tio
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Sa
fe
ty
(1)
Mathematical modelling. It might be possible to mathematically model risk posed by the system.
The extent of mathematical modelling would depend on the category of the UAS and its intended
operating environment
en
ce
Av
ia
b.
10.
Risk Mitigation. There are several means available to reduce the risk posed by a UAS to other aircraft,
people and property:
Design mitigation. Design mitigation concerns the application of appropriate rigour to the design
and construction process such that system’s likelihood of catastrophic failure is known and controlled.
Through the application of more rigorous design standards, or integration of systems designed to
support safe operation, the likelihood of failure can be reduced to acceptable levels appropriate to the
operational role and environment.
b.
Operational mitigation. Operational mitigation concerns the application of restrictions and
limitations to the operating environment of the system. This may include such measures as limiting
operation to exclusive airspace, over designated ground safety template or restricting flight over
populated areas.
c.
Systemic mitigation. Systemic mitigation concerns the application of regulatory standards to
organisations involved in the design, construction, maintenance and operation of the system. Systemic
mitigation is designed to reduce the occurrence of organisational and human errors which can contribute
to failure of a system. Systemic mitigation supports both the design and operational mitigation, and
assures an appropriate level of safety of activities supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the system.
by
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11.
UAS Acquisition. Where a new UAS is to be developed to meet emerging operational requirements the
risk mitigation measures should be specifically designed to maximise the operational capability of the system in the
required roles and environment. For example, where the operating environment includes operations over populated
areas and/or within airspace occupied by other users, the design (including airworthiness standards) should be
appropriately specified to include all required on board safety systems and an appropriate level of design rigour.
Alternatively, systems may be developed that inherently (due to very small size and overall design) pose an
insignificant risk to other airspace users and personnel and property on the ground and therefore do not need onboard
safety systems or the same level of design rigour.
12.
The acquisition of an existing UAS limits the level of mitigation that can be applied because the design of the
system, and therefore its likelihood of failure, will be more or less fixed. Where Defence requires a system to operate
in a role and environment against which the system has already been certified, then appropriate design mitigation may
have already been applied. However, where Defence seeks to expand the operational role of an existing UAS,
modification of the system or operational restrictions may be the only avenues open to the OAA enable operations at
an acceptable level of risk.
3A–2
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AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
Categorisation of UAS
13.
The category of a particular UAS is defined by the operational capability requirement (SOI CRE), and the
mitigated consequence of catastrophic failure of the system in relation to the capacity of any part of the failed system
to cause death or serious injury to personnel, or significant damage to property and other aircraft when operating in the
intended CRE.
ul
at
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n
s
14.
The TAR may publish minimum technical design requirements, safety targets, population density and any
additional guidance to enable quantitative or qualitative assessment of the technical airworthiness of a given UAS.
15.
In considering the risk that UAS operations present to people and property on the ground, the terms Populated
and Sparsely populated areas are used throughout the Categorisation system, and are defined in the glossary.
eg
Category 1 UAS
R
16.
Category 1 UAS are intended to operate in all classes of airspace, both Civil and Military administered, with
flight over populated areas and therefore require the ability to act and respond as manned aircraft do
Sa
fe
ty
17.
A Risk/consequence summary derived from an analysis of the risk of a ‘potential’ Category 1 UAS (when
operated in its planned SOI CRE), should arrive at the outcome that the consequence of a catastrophic failure of a
Category 1 UAS will be death, serious injury or significant damage to property. The purpose of such an assessment is
to assure that Category 1 UAS risk is treated with clarity.
ia
tio
n
18.
Notwithstanding, all risks should be treated and mitigation strategies documented (AMTC/SR, AAMP,
ATMP) to provide an acceptable level of safety, such that the likelihood of a catastrophic event would be considered
rare and the subsequent risk is low for safety.
Av
Technical Design. To undertake its role a potential Category 1 UAS may have:
a.
The ability of the UA to be controlled by a ‘remote pilot’;
(2)
Ability to act as a communications relay between remote pilot and ATC;
(3)
Transaction time and continuity of communications link;
(4)
Required navigation performance; and
(5)
Timeliness of UA response to ATC instructions.
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Approved navigation and communication capability; (ability to navigate and communicate IAW ICAO
rules with an appropriate level of redundancy). Key factors include:
Approved means of self separation and/or collision avoidance or Certified detect and avoid capability.
Detect and avoid is the ability of a UAS to remain well clear and avoid collisions with other airborne
traffic, terrain and potentially weather. A Detect and avoid1 system should have the ability to:
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Detect traffic and avoid collisions;
(2)
Identify and avoid terrain; and
(3)
Identify and avoid severe weather.
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d.
Approved Recovery/ Launch system may have the:
(1)
ability to launch and recover from joint user aerodromes (military/civilian) complying with
traffic flow and regulation;
(2)
ability to recognise and understand aerodrome signs, markings and lighting; whilst providing
visual separation from other aircraft and vehicles; and
(3)
ability to recover UA safely under abnormal/emergency conditions (loss-link, power plant
failure etc).
Approved operators and maintenance personnel.
1
Detect and avoid provides the intended functions of self-separation and collision avoidance as a means of compliance
with regulatory requirements to “see and avoid” compatible with expected behaviour of aircraft operating in the
airspace system. UA operations beyond line of sight may require an automated detect and avoid system due to
potential communication latencies or failures. This ability need not be organic to the UAS. Potential detect and avoid
options include terrestrial (ie ATC/Surveillance) or airborne (ie AEW&C or chase/escort aircraft) systems.
AL 4
3A–3
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
Category 2 UAS
20.
Category 2 UAS are intended to operate in any class of Airspace, civil or military administered, with
appropriate operational restriction, including limited flight over populated areas.
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22.
The risk treatments should include a combination of minimum systems safety requirements and application of
operational airworthiness mitigations (via UASOP, AAMP, ATMP) to provide the acceptable level of safety, such that
the likelihood of a catastrophic event occurring is rare for peacetime operations2 and the subsequent risk is low for
safety.
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21.
The risk/consequence summary derived from an initial analysis of the risk of a ‘potential’ Category 2 UAS
(when operated in its planned SOI CRE), should arrive at the outcome that a catastrophic failure of the Category 2
UAS may result in death, serious injury or significant damage to property. The purpose of such an assessment is
intended to assure that Category 2 UAS risk is treated with clarity.
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23.
Appendix 1 provides an example of an initial operational risk analysis to support risk assessment and
categorisation determination of a potential Category 2 UAS. This example is not meant to provide a comprehensive
template; rather, it identifies many issues that require critical evaluation if a UAS is to be used in an airspace and
ground environment that would normally be the province of a Category 1 UAS.
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24.
Technical design. Some UAS designs may not meet all the certification requirements of a Category 1
UAS. However, the reasons for desiring a Category 2 UAS over a Category 1 may range from value for money to an
absence of other UAS being able to achieve Defence capability requirements. Therefore in addition to Defence UAS
data, it may be necessary to consider other existing UAS certifications and/or data from other NAA/MAAs when
undertaking a technical analysis.
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25.
For Category 2 UAS where the design integrity cannot be assured against an approved technical standard, or
the design integrity of the system cannot be assured through certification in the manner of a Category 1 UAS, the
OAA will determine appropriate operational restrictions to manage the risks that the UA will pose to other aircraft,
people and property and then apply risk mitigations via the UASOP and/or other OIP. A Category 2 UAS may have:
Approved navigation and communication capability suitable for any airspace (as per Category 1 UAS),
or operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable operation in the required airspace;
b.
Approved means of self separation and/or collision avoidance or Certified detect and avoid capability
(as per Category 1 UAS), or operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable separation in the
required airspace, such as Air Traffic services (ATS) in controlled airspace;
c.
Approved recovery/launch system (as per Category 1 UAS) or appropriate operational restriction; and
d.
Approved operators (as per Category 1 UAS) or suitably trained operators restricted to operate in
specific airspace only, and approved maintenance personnel (as per Category 1 UAS).
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Populated Areas. Where limited flight over a populated area is required for completion of essential
mission objectives by a Category 2 UAS, specific operational restrictions and limitations will be applied to ensure the
risk of a catastrophic failure that may result in death, serious injury or significant damage to property, particularly
third party (general public), will be low by treating the likelihood of such an event being able to occur.
Sensor limitations of the UAS require extended loiter over a populated area to achieve an essential
National security objective;
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27.
The intent of the regulation is that a Category 2 UAS should maintain its operations over sparsely populated
areas, and only fly over populated areas by exception. Examples where limited flight over populated areas may be
permitted are:
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b.
c.
A limited series of UA launches/recoveries, in support of a Defence joint exercise will require short
duration transit overhead populated areas on arrival/ departure, because there are no alternative
reasonably practicable launch/recovery sites that do not require overflight of populated areas; or
A limited series of short duration transits over populated areas are required to access an operating area
for essential training and there are no reasonably practicable alternative routes that avoid overflight of
populated areas.
28.
Each of the above examples exhibits a common theme, namely that there is an overriding and substantial
capability imperative for flying over the general public. Further, all reasonably practicable steps would have been
2
Higher risk levels may be tolerable for some Category 2 UAS operations (warlike conditions, Counter Terrorism,
etc) and would be authorised by the appropriate authority.
3A–4
AL 4
AAP 7001.048
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
considered to reduce the general public’s risk exposure. Where such an argument cannot be mounted, either the flights
should not be authorised or a Category 1 UAS should be employed. Loitering over populated areas for training
purposes, for example, is reserved for Category 1 UAS.
29.
Ultimately, Category 2 operations over the general public involve a measure of risk retention, and this
retention should be an exception rather than a routine occurrence.
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Category 3 UAS
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30.
Category 3 UAS are only permitted to operate in Segregated Airspace, over Sparsely Populated areas and
over Mission Essential Personnel and associated Property3, with appropriate operational restriction.
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31.
The risk/consequence summary derived from an analysis of the risk of a potential Category 3 UAS, when
operated in its SOI CRE, should arrive at the outcome that a catastrophic failure of a Category 3 UAS is unlikely to
result in death, serious injury or significant damage to property. The combination of Segregated Airspace operations,
flight over sparsely populated areas and flight above mission essential personnel and property combined with technical
assurance and operational airworthiness mitigations (UASOP, ATMP) will provide an acceptable level of safety.
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Sparsely Populated Areas. Flight over Sparsely Populated Areas is essential for completion of mission
objectives by a Category 3 UAS; however, specific operational restrictions may be applied by the OAA to the
respective UASOP to ensure the UAS presents an acceptable level of risk to people and property on the ground.
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Segregated Airspace. In considering the risk that UAS operations present to other airspace users the term
segregated airspace is used. Segregated Airspace is airspace of specified dimensions allocated for use by a UA.
Mixing of other aircraft (manned or unmanned) and a UA within a Segregated Airspace intended for use by the UA
should be limited. Specific operational restrictions pertaining to UA flight within Segregated Airspace (sustained,
limited or otherwise), should be identified within the ATMP to ensure the UAS presents an acceptable level of risk to
other airspace users. Airspace Control Measures (ACM) may be used to facilitate the containment means of a
Category 3 UAS within Segregated Airspace. 4
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Additional considerations for segregated airspace include air traffic density, particularly if the UAS airspace
is other than controlled airspace, as other aircraft may be able to enter the airspace volume without a clearance.
Avoidance of Danger areas designed for General Aviation (GA) transit and similar flight paths should be avoided.
Importantly, the see and avoid principle is a main safety defence for any shared UAS airspace and the inclusion of
UAS active strobe lights to enhance visibility could enhance safety.
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35.
The OAA will need to be assured that Category 3 UAS operations will remain within the allocated Segregated
Airspace by assessing expected performance vs required performance and determine the level of confidence that an
airspace incursion will not occur. Factors that may affect the performance of the UAS include:
communications performance,
b.
controller experience, and
c.
maturity of procedures.
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36.
For example, a UAS is allocated Segregated Airspace volume of 10nm x 10nm. An assessment of the level of
performance and confidence of the UA’s ability to remain confined to that airspace volume is conducted. Due to a
reduced level of confidence (based on, for example, inexperienced controllers), in order to provide an adequate
airspace buffer in the event of degradation in expected navigation performance, the UA may be further constrained to
operate within a reduced airspace volume of 5nm x 5nm thereby reducing the risk of the UAS exiting the Segregated
Airspace volume via a 5nm airspace volume buffer.
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37.
Category 3 UAS whilst limited to operations over sparsely populated areas, may have a requirement to
operate over mission essential personnel and associated property. An OAA will need to ensure that the operational
restriction applied to a Category 3 UAS operation results in an acceptable level of risk in keeping with its
categorisation.
3
Personnel and associated property whose conduct or presence is essential to the successful execution of an
operational or military training UAS mission (e.g. supported troops, critical infrastructure, survivors from a SAR task,
UA launch/recovery equipment/ personnel etc).
4
The Joint Airspace Coordination Centre (JACC) at HQJOC may provide guidance for the implementation of airspace
ACM that can achieve segregated airspace requirements.
AL 4
3A–5
AAP 7001.048
38.
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
Category 3 UAS should have:
a.
flight control, navigation and communication capability with appropriate redundancy that enable safe
operation within the Segregated Airspace over sparsely populated areas or MEP,
b.
suitably trained and authorised operations personnel, and
c.
suitably trained and authorised maintenance personnel.
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Category 4 UAS
Refer to OAREG 7.
Appendix:
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Example – Initial Operational Risk Analysis for a potential Category 2 UAS
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3A–6
AL 4
AAP 7001.048
Appendix 1 to
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
EXAMPLE
INITIAL OPERATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS FOR A POTENTIAL
CATEGORY 2 UAS
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GUIDANCE
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This example is not intended to provide a comprehensive template; rather, it
identifies many of the issues that might require critical evaluation if a UAS is to be
used in an airspace and ground environment that would normally be the province of
a Category 1 UAS
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INTRODUCTION
2.
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1.
A requirement for operation of an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) UAS within Australia
may be required to satisfy Government objectives.
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Potential Category 2 UAS employment:
A requirement to provide continuous overwatch of a CBD in support of National Objectives. Solution
is to fly Category 2 UAS ISR missions from a nearby aerodrome.
b.
Category 2 UAS ISR training OPS (Day and Night) are required within training airspace (over sparsely
populated areas) to prepare for national tasking.
c.
Infrequent Category 2 UAS ISR missions (Day and Night) out of an aerodrome over a Defence
operating area (over mission essential personnel) to support multi-national large force exercises.
d.
Basic Category 2 UAS profile required to support employment: Depart launch and recovery site, when
safe to do so manoeuvrer to operate over sparsely populated area, climb to safe transit altitude,
establish in operating area for sensor pattern operations between 5000’- 20000’, return to base
maintaining area transit over sparsely populated where possible.
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3.
–
Assumptions from relevant airworthiness regulations:
Where a UAS will not be categorised as Category 1 (lack of type certification), yet the required
operation presents a credible risk to personnel or property, it will be categorised as Category 2 or 3.
(MILAVREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems)
b.
The TAA will make a technical recommendation/ or conduct a systems safety analysis to identify the
presence (or lack thereof) of TAREG defined critical elements of UAS design required to support
operation of UAS at acceptable levels of risk IAW SOI CRE (MILAVREG 1.7 – Technical
Airworthiness Authority).
c.
The OAA will gain a TAA recommendation before seeking a Category 2 UAS determination from the
Defence AA (MILAVREG 7.1 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems).
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d.
The OAA will apply appropriate operational restriction to the Category 2 UAS, in addition to OAREG
requirements, to mitigate the risk of operation of the UAS in its SOI CRE, prior to seeking a
Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP) from the Defence AA (MILAVREG 3.7 –
UASOP)
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4.
The following pages provide an example of initial risk analysis, in preparing a case to support the operation of
a Category 2 UAS for the scenarios described at paragraph 2.
AL 4
3A1–1
AAP 7001.048
Appendix 1 to
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
EXAMPLE BOW TIE ANALYSIS OF A CATEGORY 2 UAS
5.
Hazard. Phases of UAS Mission where Category 2 UA (the Hazard) poses a safety risk to
personnel/property:
b.
Departure / Transit (Launch to Operating Airspace).
c.
Operating Airspace.
d.
Transit / Arrival (Operating Airspace to Recover).
e.
Land (Recover) / Taxi / Shutdown.
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Start/Taxi/Take-Off (Launch).
Top Events:
b.
Breakdown in separation between UA and airborne traffic.
c.
Breakdown in separation between UA and ground traffic.
d.
Loss of Situational Awareness resulting in unacceptable proximity to terrain.
Technical Failure:
Design Flaw of critical component for safe flight.
(2)
Failure of critical component for safe flight.
c.
Operator error.
(2)
Operator violation.
–
External factor:
Other aircraft errors/violations.
(2)
Other aircraft technical failures.
(3)
Incapacitation of UAS operator.
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Threats:
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Loss of Control of UA.
Environmental Threats:
(1)
Weather.
(2)
Terrain.
(3)
Aviation Support Systems.
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a.
Consequences:
a.
Crash resulting in death or serious injury to Second Party (Mission Essential Personnel on ground).
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b.
Crash resulting in death or serious injury to Third Party (civilians on ground).
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8.
Crash resulting in significant damage to property (ground).
d.
Impact with other aircraft resulting in death or serious injury to Third Party (civilian aircraft).
e.
Impact with other aircraft resulting in death or serious injury to Second Party (military aircraft).
f.
Impact with other aircraft resulting in significant damage to property (airborne).
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c.
9.
Controls:
a.
3A1–2
Preventive Controls – Technical:
(1)
Other NAA/MAA Certification.
(2)
TAA Systems Safety Analysis.
AL 4
AAP 7001.048
Trained and competent maintenance personnel.
(5)
Secondary Data Link.
(6)
Secondary GCS.
(7)
Accuracy/redundancy of positional information (3D – Alt & GPS).
(8)
Reliable engine.
(9)
Reliable flight controls.
(10)
Reliable airframe.
(11)
Reliable/redundant communication of position with other airborne aircraft.
(12)
Reliable/Redundant Communication with ATC.
(13)
Reliable/redundant awareness of other aircraft.
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(4)
Autonomous Safe Recovery.
(2)
Autonomous Safe Flight Termination.
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Recovery Controls – Technical:
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Preventive Controls – Operational:
Tow UA on/off runway.
(2)
Qualified ground crew.
(3)
Qualified Remote Pilots.
(4)
Avoid flight in icing, thunderstorms, severe turbulence, etc.
(5)
Increased or restricted application of separation standards between UAS and other aircraft.
(6)
Flight is monitored by active surveillance measures.
(7)
Flight under the IFR (Rules of the Air).
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(1)
Recovery Controls – Operational:
(1)
Limit flight over populated areas to only that which is necessary to complete the mission.
(2)
Minimum Operating Height over populated areas (safe glide range).
(3)
Avoid direct over flight of MEP unless essential.
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Standard Maintenance Practices (regular servicing, etc).
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Sect 5 Chap 3
Trained and competent Pilots (Rules of the Air and In-flight Emergency (IFER) Management).
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AL 4
3A1–3
AAP 7001.048
Appendix 1 to
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
10.
Assumptions: HERON UAS is the potential Category 2 UAS.
11.
FACTS:
Heron, known in France as the SIDM HARFRANG has been issued with a French DGA Type
Certificate. If the basis for issue of this Type Certificate is disclosed, and the scope of operations
permitted under the Type Certificate is understood (for example, does the certificate specify limitations
that are consistent with MILAVREG 7), it might serve as a basis for UAS review, or support a
Category 2 recommendation regarding systems integrity for an equivalent Australian UAS platform.
b.
Heron UAS1 has demonstrated the platform is able to safely operate over extended periods (years) at
an Afghanistan airfield and surrounding airspace, an aerodrome supporting heavy jets (B747, C5, etc),
fighter aircraft and medium and light fixed and rotary wing aircraft that regularly conducted greater
than 500 daily arrivals and departures over sustained periods (years).
c.
Heron UAS has demonstrated the ability to safely operate in complex, high density airspace within
Afghanistan for prolonged periods supported by ATC service, ABM service, and sound airspace
control measures (ACM). The platforms physical size and external aircraft lighting also allows other
aircraft are able to sight and avoid the UA. Similarly, the USA MQ–1 and MQ–9 UAS have amassed
over 1 million flight hours and are surpassing manned aircraft for positive flight safety percentages in
relation to aircraft crashes2 and people harmed.
d.
Heron UAS operations employ qualified military pilots. This ensures Rules of the Air are complied
with in a professional manner under an approved FMS (as stipulated under OAREG) and that IFER
management is conducted at a high standard.
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OPERATIONAL MITIGATION
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12.
The following scenario provides examples of restrictions and limitations that can achieve a Category 2 safety
outcome for HERON. A Category 2 UAS will launch from a suitable Aerodrome (eg Amberley or Rockhampton) in
order for the UAS to complete an assigned mission. A suitable aerodrome would be an aerodrome that is reasonably
accessible for pre-positioning of the UA and has the required support services, such as runway capability, NAVAID
and ATC services. Specific operational restrictions and/or limitations that can ensure operational risk will be low
might include:
Limiting UA taxi on the aerodrome when preparing for departure or post arrival, such as towing of the
UA to and from positions that remove potential conflict with other ground traffic.
b.
As runways are aligned to environmental factors, flight over populated areas would only be conducted
during takeoff until the UA flight stability parameters allow turning the aircraft in the direction of
accessible airspace over a sparsely populated area.
c.
Similarly, on arrival at the aerodrome, flight is maintained in accessible airspace over a sparsely
populated area until flight parameters requires the UA to assume the approach design parameters
intended for the runway in questions, such as a GNSS approach.
d.
Use of UAS flight routes that minimise or avoid tracking over populated areas enroute to the intended
operating area. Limitations for such tracking will be dictated by environmental conditions on the day.
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ATC services, or Air Battle Management (ABM) services (such as Wedgetail, Vigilare or ship based
ABM) are employed to maintain observation of the UAS in relation to other aircraft.
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e.
The calculated use of minimum transit heights for Category 2 UAS transit will enable gliding range to
a sparsely populated or unpopulated area in the event of engine failure.
g.
Ensure the remote pilot has qualifications that ensure in flight emergency response (IFER) will be
managed in an equivalent manner to manned aircraft.
h.
Utilisation of sensor stand off capability to avoid flight over populated areas, noting the sensor suite
will have limitations and will be affected by environmental factors.
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1
AS of 2014, the RAAF Heron UAS has logged over 20,000 operational Flight Hours in a highly complex and harsh
operating environment with no incidents resulting in loss of life, serious injury or significant damage to property.
2
US DOD.
3A1–4
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APPLICATION
AL 4
AAP 7001.048
Appendix 1 to
Annex A to
Sect 5 Chap 3
Ensuring the UAS intended for Category 2 employment has a system reliability that can help assure
that suitability for flight will not be compromised due to failure of the UA flight control or power
systems. For example, Heron has operated in a high traffic density during OP SLIPPER employment
with one technical failure in over 20,000 hours3 resulting is a crash, noting the consequence of the
crash did not to result in harm to second or third party partially due to IFER management decisions that
ensured likelihood remained improbable and risk therefore low.
j.
Applying the Rules of the Air to the UA as per manned aircraft.
k.
Where possible, maintain UA operation within controlled airspace or other segregated airspace. When
operating in Class G airspace, NOTAM advice and use of available surveillance services are employed
to enhance traffic awareness.
l.
Within controlled airspace operate under the same ATC standards and procedures applied to manned
aircraft, including the following separation standard application techniques:
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i.
When applying visual separation standards, ensuring ATC are instructed to treat the UA as the
passive aircraft only. For example, the active aircraft will always be a manned aircraft, or for
two UA visual standards would not be employed at all.
(2)
When applying vertical separation standards, ensuring ATC are advised of aircraft
characteristics that may require increased vertical separation standards. For example, Heron
may change altitude in response to throttle manipulation, as such ATC may add an additional
10004 feet to the applied vertical separation standard.
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140508 – email –Director Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
Estimate only, not an authoritative number.
AL 4
3A1–5
AAP 7001.048
Annex B to
Sect 5 Chap 3
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF UAS AIRWORTHINESS
Applicable Regulations
MILAVREG 7 —Unmanned Aircraft Systems
INTRODUCTION
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1.
An Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is a system whose components include the necessary equipment,
network and personnel to control an Unmanned Aircraft (UA). UA are fixed wing, rotary wing, or lighter than air
vehicles that fly without a human operator on board under remote control or autonomous programming. The air
vehicle component of a UAS is generally designed to be recovered and reused and may be classified as a UA,
Remotely-Piloted Aircraft1 (RPA) or Unmanned Aerial Target (UAT) drone.2 Other components of the UAS include
payload, data communication links, control stations, ground support equipment, launch and recovery equipment, and
ground operators.
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2.
The safety risk posed by UAS operations, considering the spectrum of current and future systems, ranges from
negligible to exceeding that posed by manned aircraft. The objective of the UAS airworthiness regulations is to ensure
that UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of risk to other aircraft, people and property without undue
compromise to operational flexibility.
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3.
Airworthiness management of a UAS begins at the commencement of the acquisition process and continues
throughout the life of the system. Assessing UAS airworthiness according to the same criteria as manned aircraft,
whilst ideal, may be problematic for some UAS. In particular, the size and development path and intended operating
environment for many UAS means that designing and constructing them to manned aircraft standards may not be
possible or practicable. Consequently a paradigm shift is required in airworthiness management of UAS and
alternative means of assuring the risk to people, property and other airspace users is acceptable. These alternative
means of managing risk carry operational limitations; therefore the degree of regulatory oversight of the design,
construction, operation and maintenance of UAS requires tailoring to specific systems to suit the type, role and
capabilities of the system.
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Key concepts
4.
–
Airworthiness management of UAS is based on the following fundamental principles:
A particular UAS type will be chosen for acquisition on the basis that it will satisfy the operational
capability requirement when performing designated roles in a defined operating environment.
b.
A particular UAS when operating in its intended CRE will present a level of risk to other aircraft,
people and property, given its characteristics and intended operating environment.
c.
The level of airworthiness management3 applied to a UAS must be determined by the level of risk that
the system poses and it’s operational capability requirement.
d.
A UAS Categorisation system based on risk and desired operational capability forms the basis for
application of the DASP Regulatory framework to UAS, such that:
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Category 1 UAS. As far as reasonably practicable, established manned aircraft airworthiness
standards are to be used as the basis to assess the capacity of the design to safely perform the
designated roles.
(2)
Category 2 and 3 UAS. The technical airworthiness assessment and operational constraints
must ensure that the overall risk posed by the UAS, when operated in its intended configuration,
role and environment (CRE), is acceptable to the relevant OAA.
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1
ICAO define RPA as an aircraft piloted by a qualified “remote pilot” situated at a “remote pilot station” located
external to the aircraft (i.e. ground, ship, another aircraft, space) who monitors the aircraft at all times. The remote
pilot can respond to instructions issued by ATC, communicate via voice or data link as appropriate to the airspace or
operation, and has direct responsibility for the safe conduct of the aircraft throughout its flight. An RPA may possess
various types of auto-pilot technology but at any time the remote pilot can intervene in the management of the flight.
This concept equates to manned aircraft being flown either by an auto–pilot system or manually by the onboard pilot.
2
Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles and other guided weapons are not considered UA under this
regulation.
3
The airworthiness management must be applied to the whole UAS, not just the unmanned aircraft (UA) component.
AL 4
3B–1
AAP 7001.048
Annex B to
Sect 5 Chap 3
(3)
Category 4 UAS. The operating environment must ensure that the overall risk posed by the
UAS is unlikely to cause a ground fatality or pose an unacceptable risk to other aircraft or
property.
D
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Av
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Sa
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5.
The UAS comprises not just the air vehicle, it also consists of the Ground Control Station (GCS),
communications/data link system, the maintenance system and the operating personnel. The airworthiness regulations
are designed to cover the entire UAS to the extent necessary to mitigate the risks posed by the whole system when
operated in the intended roles and environment. (Figure 3-A-1) shows the key elements of a typical UAS.
s
Unmanned Aircraft System Airworthiness
Technical airworthiness management
–
Figure 3–B–1 KEY ELEMENTS OF A TYPICAL UAS
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6.
The technical airworthiness management of UAS concerns the design, construction and maintenance of those
components of the system that form the basis of the system’s suitability for flight in the intended role and
environment. This includes those ground based elements critical to the operation of the UAS that may include the
control interface, data link and other communication facilities and not just the physical design of the air vehicle
component.
AA
P
Operational airworthiness management
Su
pe
rs
ed
ed
by
7.
The operational airworthiness management of UAS concerns the ability for trained and qualified personnel to
safely operate the system within approved limitations and procedures in the intended roles and environment.
Operational airworthiness also impacts the design of the ground and air vehicle components in that the system must be
controllable, and provide sufficient warnings and indications to operators appropriate to safe operation in all intended
roles and environments.
3B–2
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–
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AAP 7001.048
Sect 5 Chap 4
RESERVED
AL 8
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AAP 7001.048
Glossary
GLOSSARY
1. This is the DASP Master Glossary, which provides authorised terms for use in Defence aviation. Collectively the
terms are maintained by ACPA, via an individual DASP Agency, on behalf of the Defence AA 1 . The DASP Glossary
is synchronised within:
AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program (the master copy of the DASP Master Glossary to
ensure DASP synchronisation)
b.
AAP 7001.053 – Technical Airworthiness Management Manual
c.
AAP 6734.001 – Defence Aviation Safety Manual
d.
Australian Defence Glossary (ADG).
ul
at
io
n
s
a.
^ – DDAAFS 2
c.
# – DGTA-ADF.
ty
b.
fe
* – ACPA
Sa
a.
R
eg
2. To identify terminology sponsorship, a superscript symbol placed after each term to denote which DASP agency
carries prime responsibility for maintaining the identified term as follows:
Ae
Ai
Al
Au
Av
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
N
O
P
Q
R
S
Se
Sp
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z
ia
tio
A
n
Navigation Bookmarks
Av
M
Su
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rs
ed
ed
by
AA
P
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–
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Su
1
2
Defence AA Decision Brief of 28 Feb 15 (AB13999105).
DDAAFS sponsored terms updated (AB24748974 and AB24719537)
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1
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
DEFINITIONS
A (back to top)
Above Obstacles (AO) *
The vertical distance between an aircraft and the highest obstacle on the terrain or water surface
ul
at
io
n
The level of safety accepted by the relevant authority in making risk based decisions after identified hazards and
associated risks are understood and retained using an approved contemporary risk management process.
Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) *
R
eg
A non-binding regulatory compliance method that can serve as a means by which the requirements contained in the
regulation can be met.
ty
Acceptance Test and Evaluation (AT&E) *
Sa
fe
An acceptance function used by Defence to verify that a system complies with the defined acceptance
requirements. AT&E is used to establish specification compliance and verify airworthiness.
n
Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP) *
Av
ia
tio
A document that describes the strategy and scope of airworthiness activities identified to achieve and maintain the
airworthiness of new or modified aviation system prior to and following Service Release.
Adequate Aerodrome *
en
ce
An aerodrome on which an aircraft can be operated, taking account of the applicable performance requirements,
runway characteristics3 and other relevant support facilities and services.
D
ef
ADF Cadets *
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11
–
A collective reference to the three cadet organisations, namely, the Australian Navy Cadets, Australian Army
Cadets and Australian Air Force Cadets.
Ae (back to top)
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Aerial Delivery *
The process of dispatching cargo or equipment from an operating aircraft.
AA
P
Aerial Delivery Equipment (ADE) #
ed
by
Equipment employed on transport or rotary wing aircraft in the aerial delivery of material; including slings,
platforms, containers, parachutes, rigging materials, cloths, cords, tapes, threads and webbing. ADE does not
include equipment employed in the aerial delivery of personnel.
Aerodrome *
rs
ed
A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, and equipment) intended to be used either
wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. 4
pe
Aerodrome apron areas *
Su
The surfaces intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or unloading air cargo, passengers, fuelling,
parking or maintenance 5 , excluding hangars.
Aerodrome manoeuvring areas *
The surfaces of the aerodrome used for the take-off, landing, and taxiing of aircraft 6 , excluding aprons.
3
4
5
EASA EU No. 965/2012 Annex 1 – Definitions
ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I – Aerodromes – Definitions page 1–2
ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I – Definitions, page 1–3.
2
AL 8
s
Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS) *
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Aerodrome movement areas *
A term describing the combined manoeuvring areas and apron areas, excluding hangars.
Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) *
A service whose principal objective is the preservation of life and materiel in the event of an aircraft accident or
incident occurring at, or in the immediate vicinity of, an aerodrome.
Aeronautical Product *
ul
at
io
n
s
Any aircraft system, sub-system, component, part or material, including computer systems software/firmware and
fuels, oils and lubricants whose intended end-use is to form a physical part of an aircraft.
Information and other required data necessary for the safety and efficiency of air navigation.
R
Aeronautical Information Service Provider (AISP) *
eg
Aeronautical Information *
Sa
fe
ty
An organisation responsible for the provision of aeronautical information and other required data that is necessary
for the safety and efficiency of air navigation.
Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE)
ia
tio
n
Essential safety or mission equipment to be carried or worn by crew or passengers when operating aircraft in a
military configuration, role or environment.
en
ce
Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC) *
Av
Ai (back to top)
D
ef
The ASIC is comprised of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Unites States Air Force and United
States Navy; who work together to resolve interoperability issues affecting combined air and space operations.
(see ASIC documents).
–
Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC) Documents *
Air Capable Ship *
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ASIC documents relate to technical, procedural and material aspects of air and space operations. When ratified as
Air Standards, ASIC documents are implemented through Defence procedural and material publications and
instructions, Defence standards or Defence technical publications or instructions. ASIC documents are not stand
alone documents and each ASIC document will list the national implementation documents (see ASIC).
AA
P
A sea based facility from which aircraft can take-off, be recovered, or routinely receive and transfer logistic
support.
by
Air Cargo Delivery (ACD) *
ed
A process that involves the loading of air cargo, whatever it may be including passengers, freight, paratroopers,
animals and EO materials, and the subsequent unloading of the air cargo, either on the ground or while in the air.
ed
Air Operator Certificate (AOC) *
Su
pe
rs
A certificate granted by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) permitting the conduct of commercial flying
activities.
Air Traffic Advisory (ATA) *
An ATS subcategory provided within advisory airspace to help ensure separation, in so far as practical, between
aircraft 7 through the provision of advisory information that may be used by pilots to avoid collision with other
aircraft.
4
ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I – Definitions, page 1–6.
12
ICAO Annex 11 – ATS – Definitions.
AL 8
3
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Air Traffic Control (ATC) *
An ATS subcategory that includes area control service, approach control service or aerodrome control service
provided for the purpose of:
a.
preventing collisions between aircraft
b.
on the manoeuvring area, preventing collisions between aircraft and obstructions
c.
expediting and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic. 8
ul
at
io
n
s
Air Traffic Management (ATM) *
A generic term encompassing the dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace in a safe, economical
and efficient manner through the provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration with all parties 9
involving airborne and ground-based functions. 10
eg
Air Traffic Management Plan (ATMP) *
ty
R
The approved systems and processes used to ensure the safe operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in
conjunction with other air traffic.
Sa
fe
Air Traffic Service (ATS) *
tio
n
A generic term meaning variously, flight information service, alerting service, air traffic advisory service, air
traffic control service, battlefield airspace control and maritime control service.
ia
Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) *
Av
A qualification awarded to a trained and competent individual who controls a Category 3 or Category 4 UAS
during flight time.
en
ce
Air Weapons Range *
A Defence Practice Area used for aviation activities involving:
air to surface, air to air, or air to sub-surface weapons release, be they live weapons, inert practices or
tests, or
b.
ground based firing activities involving the use of targets towed by manned or unmanned aircraft.
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11
–
D
ef
a.
Aircraft *
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Any machine or craft, including an unmanned machine or an unmanned craft, which can derive support in the
atmosphere from the reactions of the air.
AA
P
Aircraft altitude *
The aircraft altitude above mean sea level (AMSL). Example: 21 000 ft AMSL.
by
Aircraft Captain *
ed
ed
A Type Rated pilot designated as being in command and charged with the safe and effective conduct of the aircraft
during flight. Analogous with “pilot–in–command” 11.
rs
Aircraft Controller *
Su
pe
A generic term used by aviation medicine describing those specialist personnel who may issue control or advisory
information to aircraft that the pilot may base flight decisions upon.
8
ICAO Annex 11 – ATS – Definitions (expanded)
Doc 4444 PANS ATM Chapter 1 – Definitions
10
Ground based functions include maritime based functions
11
EASA Glossary.
9
4
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AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Aircraft Maintenance Documentation (AMD) #
An aircraft’s maintenance and operational certificate, maintenance forecast and technical particulars record. The
AMD may be paper based, electronic or a combination of both.
Aircraft oxygen system *
A means to store and supply aviators’ breathing oxygen.
ul
at
io
n
s
Aircraft Related Equipment #
Aircraft-related equipment can be aircraft airborne equipment or aircraft non-airborne equipment whose
performance could directly affect airworthiness.
eg
Aircraft Store #
Sa
fe
ty
R
Any device, excluding air cargo, intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft suspension and
release equipment, whether or not the item is intended to be separated in flight from the aircraft. Stores include
missiles, rockets, bombs, mines, torpedos, gun ammunition, grenades, pyrotechnic devices, sonobuoys, signal
underwater sound devices, fuel and spray tanks, dispensers, pods (refuelling, thrust augmentation, gun, electronic
countermeasures, etc), targets, chaff and flares from countermeasures dispensing systems, and suspension
equipment (racks and pylons).
tio
n
Aircraft–Stores Compatibility (ASC) *
Av
ia
The ability of each element of specified aircraft–stores configuration(s) to coexist without unacceptable effects on
the physical, aerodynamic, structural, electrical, electromagnetic or functional characteristics of each other under
specified ground and flight conditions.
en
ce
Aircraft Stores Configuration *
D
ef
Refers to an aerospace platform, incorporating a stores management system(s), combined with specific stores
suspension equipment and aircraft store(s) loaded on the aircraft in a specific pattern. An aircraft/stores
configuration also includes any downloads from that specific pattern resulting from the release of the store(s) in an
authorised employment or jettison sequence(s).
.0
11
–
Aircraft Type *
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A specific design (make and model) of aircraft. A type is the baseline from which models and variants are derived
and is the origin for subsequent lineage. Examples of aircraft types within the Defence inventory include the
C–130 Hercules and the F/A–18 Hornet.
Aircrew *
AA
P
A generic term describing personnel whose primary duties are conducted within the confines of an aircraft during
flight time. Not all aircrew are flight crew. Unless authorised as crew or as a mission essential passenger for the
specific aviation mission, aircrew are deemed passengers.
ed
by
AIRSAFE Program ^
ed
The RAN AIRSAFE Program, operated under the direction of CN, enables the management of flying safety policy
affecting the Fleet Air Arm.
Su
pe
rs
Airspace *
The zone next to the earth consisting of atmosphere capable of sustaining flight.
Airspace Management *
The design, allocation, integration, and regulation of airspace, including the application of airspace usage
procedures to ensure the airspace is appropriate for the mission or activity.
Airworthiness *
A concept, the application of which defines the condition of an aircraft and supplies the basis for judgement of the
suitability for flight of that aircraft in that it has been designed, constructed, maintained and operated to approved
AL 8
5
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
standards and limitations, by competent and authorised individuals, who are acting as members of an approved
organisation and whose work is both certified as correct and accepted on behalf of Defence. 12
Airworthiness Basis *
Justification or substantiation of a regulatory requirement in terms of the risk to safety posed or averted.
ul
at
io
n
An independent board of review appointed by the Defence AA to advise and make recommendations on
airworthiness certification and to review the in-service management of Aviation Systems such that continuing
airworthiness can be assured.
Airworthiness Directive (AD) *
eg
An Airworthiness Instrument issued by the Defence AA which promulgates immediate and binding requirements
to authorise or restrict a course of action in relation to an Aviation System.
ty
R
Airworthiness Instrument *
Sa
fe
A binding document issued to certify, authorise or restrict operation of a Defence aviation system under specified
conditions.
n
Airworthiness Regulator *
ia
tio
The individuals (TAR and OAR) responsible for establishing and maintaining the regulatory framework for the
airworthiness management of their respective area of responsibility.
Av
Airworthiness Standards #
D
ef
Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR) *
en
ce
The design requirements, including where appropriate the means of demonstrating compliance, prescribed for the
purposes of establishing adequate levels of safety.
–
A Commonwealth employee to whom the TAR may delegate authority to prescribe and revise airworthiness
standards for Defence.
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11
Al (back to top)
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Alerting service *
An ATS subcategory provided to notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in need of search and rescue
aid, and assist such organisations as required 13 .
AA
P
Allocated Baseline (ABL) #
ed
by
The initially approved documentation describing an item’s functional, interoperability and interface characteristics
that are allocated from those of a system or a higher level configuration item, interface requirements with
interfacing configuration items, additional design constraints, and the verification required to demonstrate the
achievement of those specified characteristics.
ed
Application Identifier (AI) *
pe
rs
The A or N prefix of the Defence registration number. For example A41 for C-17 Globemaster III, N48 for
MH-60R Seahawk.
Su
Appointing Authority ^
The command appointment that appoints an Investigating Officer, Aviation Accident Investigation Team, Aviation
Incident Investigation Team or Board of Inquiry to investigate an aviation safety occurrence.
12
11
6
DI(G)02-2 – Defintions.
ICAO Annex 11 – ATS – Definitions.
AL 8
s
Airworthiness Board (AwB) *
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Approval to Operate *
Authorisation to operate a non-Defence registered aircraft.
Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) *
An organisation that has been approved by the TAR to conduct maintenance of aircraft and/or aeronautical
product.
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) *
ul
at
io
n
s
ALARP is a principle. A risk is ALARP when it has been demonstrated that the cost of any further risk reduction,
where the cost includes the loss of defence capability as well as financial or other resource costs, is ‘grossly
disproportionate’ to the benefit obtained from that risk reduction.14
eg
ASOR Appointing Authority ^
Sa
fe
ty
R
Command appointment that appoints an Investigating Officer to investigate an aviation safety occurrence. In the
first instance, the ASOR Appointing Authority is the originating squadron/unit commanding officer/officer
commanding (CO/OC), ATS flight commander, senior maintenance manager (SMM) or squadron detachment
commander. Depending on the classification of the occurrence, the Appointing Authority may be from higher
within the command chain (e.g. in the event of an accident or serious incident).
n
ASSIST Program ^
Av
ia
tio
The Army Aviation Safety, Standardisation Inspection and Support Team (ASSIST) Program, operated under the
direction of the Chief of Army and the direction of the Commander Aviation Support Group, conducts compliance
audits and reviews of safety and operational airworthiness matters within Army Aviation.
en
ce
Au (back to top)
Australian Aircraft *
D
ef
An aircraft which is registered in accordance with section 9(1) (e) of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and is subject to
regulation by CASA.
–
Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC) *
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11
A document issued by the Defence AA, on advice from the TAA and OAA, following independent review by the
Airworthiness Board, signifying compliance with the Defence airworthiness requirements for Type Certification as
a Defence registered aircraft.
Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) *
AA
P
An organisation that has been certified (awarded an Engineering Authority Certificate) by the TAR to provide
design or engineering management services to Defence.
by
Authorised Maintenance Data #
ed
ed
Those instructions, approved for use by the responsible AEO, required to retain aircraft and aircraft-related
equipment in an airworthy condition. These instructions include, but are not limited to, maintenance manuals,
technical maintenance plans, servicing schedules, component lifing policies and inspection programs. Authorised
Person (AMO specific) #
Su
pe
rs
An individual who is authorised by the Senior Maintenance Manager, or delegate acceptable to the TAR, as being
competent to perform specific activities in the AMO.
Authorised Tradesperson #
An individual, operating as part of an Approved Maintenance Organisation, who is authorised by the Senior
Maintenance Manager or delegate as being competent to carry out a specific scope of maintenance activities.
14
DI(G) OPS 02–2 Glossary
AL 8
7
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Authority to Act
An authorisation for a designated organisation to act as a Flight Test Organisation (FTO).
Authority to Operate (AUTHOP) *
An AUTHOP confirms the ongoing operational suitability and operational effectiveness of an Aviation Support
System (AvSS) service output, including its applicable subsystems. An AUTHOP fulfils a similar purpose for an
AvSS that Service Release does for aircraft.
ul
at
io
n
s
Autonomous Aircraft *
An unmanned aircraft that does not allow pilot intervention in the management of flight.
Autonomous Operation *
R
eg
An operation during which an unmanned aircraft is operating without pilot intervention in the management of
flight
fe
ty
Av (back to top)
Sa
Aviation Accident ^
n
An occurrence that:
did affect the safety or airworthiness of the Aviation System, or safety of third parties
b.
where system defences were inadequate/absent to limit the severity of the occurrence resulting in a
critical/catastrophic consequence to safety or airworthiness.
Av
ia
tio
a.
en
ce
Aviation Accident Investigation Team ^
D
ef
A team of personnel, led by a qualified aviation safety investigator, appointed to investigate an aviation accident in
order to determine the factors that contributed to the occurrence and make recommendations to prevent a
recurrence.
–
Aviation Hazard Review Board ^
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11
A Board appointed by the FEG commander (and OAAR (Acqs) of ADF projects conducting flying operations) to
ensure all accepted recommendations of reported aviation hazards are actioned to completion within reasonable
timeframes.
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Aviation Incident Investigation Team ^
by
Aviation Materiel #
AA
P
A team of personnel, led by a qualified aviation safety investigator, appointed to investigate an aviation incident or
serious incident in order to determine the factors that contributed to the occurrence and make recommendations to
prevent a recurrence.
ed
Aircraft, aeronautical product and technical equipment which directly supports ADF aviation capability.
ed
Aviation medical certificate *.
rs
A document provided by an AVMO attesting to the medical fitness of a person to conduct flying related duties.
pe
Aviation Medical Officer (AVMO) *
Su
A medical practitioner who is recognised by the Surgeon General ADF as being appropriately trained and
authorised to provide aviation medicine support to Defence Aviation.
Aviation Medicine (AVMED) *
The component of military medicine that is concerned with the interaction between the aerospace environment and
human physiology, psychology and pathology.
8
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Aviation Physiology Training Officer (APTO) *
A person who is recognised by a SSAMA as being appropriately trained and authorised to provide supplemental
aviation medicine training support.
Aviation Risk Management (AVRM) *
s
A description of the application of Standards Australia Risk Management Standards in the context of Defence
aviation operations. AVRM offers a systematic, logical approach to identifying and treating risks to Defence
aviation resources and missions, while supporting initiative, flexibility and adaptability.
ul
at
io
n
Aviation Safety *
The state of freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons or damage to aircraft and property.
eg
Aviation Safety Audit ^
R
An audit aimed at ensuring compliance with the Defence ASMS, operational and technical orders, regulations,
instructions, doctrine, guidance and publications concerning aviation safety against a set standard.
fe
ty
Aviation Safety Committee (ASC) ^
Sa
A management tool that brings people together to assist commanders in the management of their Aviation Safety
Management System (ASMS).
tio
n
Aviation Safety Management *
en
ce
Av
ia
Aviation Safety Management is integral to the function of safe flying operations and requires processes and
procedures to ensure competence of commanders and all personnel associated with flying operations, adherence to
authorised orders and instructions, promotion of and maintenance of high levels of aviation safety awareness, and
systematic evaluation and management of risk in operations.
Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS) ^
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11
Aviation Safety Occurrence ^
–
D
ef
A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, policies, procedures
and plans. Aviation safety is progressed when the ASMS is coupled with the positive attitudes, beliefs, values and
practices of the personnel within an organisation.
80
00
Any occurrence which adversely affects, or could adversely affect, the safety or airworthiness of an Aviation
System, or safety of third parties.
Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (ASOR) ^
AA
P
A hazard report submitted via the Defence Aviation Hazard Reporting and Tracking System (DAHRTS) to notify
required agencies of all Defence Aviation safety occurrences, including operations, Air Traffic Control (ATC) / air
defence, technical and ground based activities.
by
Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) ^
ed
ed
A member appointed by the relevant aviation commander, to be responsible for supervising and managing all
aspects of the commander's Aviation Safety Management System.
Su
pe
rs
Aviation Safety Survey ^
A survey aimed at identifying hazards, and improving the safety culture and effectiveness of the organisation’s
ASMS. Ultimately the aim is to reduce the number of aviation safety occurrences.
Aviation Support System (AvSS) *
The systems or services that are Defence-owned or are operated exclusively by or on behalf of Defence, have a
functional or physical interface with aircraft, and have the potential to compromise suitability for flight.
Aviation Support System Certificate (AvSSC) *
An instrument that confirms an AvSS has been designed and constructed to approved standards and limitations,
and can be maintained and operated for its intended purpose.
AL 8
9
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Aviation Support System Management Plan (AvSSMP) *
A management system intended to capture the scope and requirements of an AvSS over its lifecycle.
Aviation System *
The integration of equipment, personnel, organisation, publications and procedures to achieve an aviation role.
Aviation systems include: Defence registered aircraft types, non-Defence registered aircraft types, Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).
ul
at
io
n
s
B (back to top)
Basic Flight Trainer (BFT) *
eg
A device, which does not meet the requirements for categorisation as a Flight Simulator or a Flight Training
Device, approved for the purpose of permitting experience acquired therein to be credited towards meeting a
sub-set of requirements for flight crew qualification, categorisation or currency.
ty
R
Battle Damage Repair (BDR) #
Sa
fe
A maintenance process used to restore sufficient strength and serviceability to permit damaged aircraft to fly
additional operational sorties. BDR comprises assessment, design, approval, acceptance and repair.
n
Battlefield airspace control (BAC) *
Av
ia
tio
An ATS subcategory provided in assigned airspace that supports the air, land or amphibious scheme of manoeuvre
by providing airspace management, coordination and de–confliction of joint fires and effects in that airspace in
order to facilitate safe and efficient access to airspace through a combination of coordination with adjoining
civil/military agencies and through the application of both procedural and positive control methods.
en
ce
C (back to top)
Cabin altitude *
–
Carried Forward Unserviceability (CFU) *
D
ef
The pressure altitude inside the hull of an aircraft. Example: 21 000 ft CA
.0
11
A deferred unserviceability that does not prejudice the airworthiness of an aircraft, or safety of personnel in flight.
80
00
Centre of Expertise (CoE) *
A Defence recognised and authorised organisation within which there exists qualified, competent and approved
specialists in particular disciplines, such as a flight test organisation (FTO).
AA
P
Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA) *
by
A document, issued by the DAR, certifying that a particular aircraft, at the date of issue, conformed to the Type
Design recorded in the Type Record.
ed
Certificate of Conformance (CoC) *
ed
A document attesting that an individual instance of an AvSS that will have multiple installations has been
examined and conforms to the intended AvSS design.
pe
rs
Certification *
Su
Certification is the end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a product,
against predefined standards, to the satisfaction of the certificating authority.
Certification Basis *
The complete set of airworthiness design requirements against which a design (or type) is certified as airworthy
and is described in AAP 7001.054 — Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual.
10
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Charter *
The commercial renting of a complete aircraft, crew and maintenance system for tasking undertaken within the
bounds of a legally binding contract.
Civil Register *
The CASA maintained civil aircraft register. Aircraft on this register are referred to as civil registered aircraft and
will be appropriately marked with a ‘VH’ registration.
ul
at
io
n
s
Civil Registered Aircraft *
An aircraft that is registered by a civilian airworthiness authority.
UAS Command and Control (C2) Link
eg
The data link between a remotely piloted aircraft and a remote pilot station for the purposes of managing flight.
R
Competency *
Sa
fe
ty
The capacity of an individual to effectively and safely complete a task to a required standard of performance
through the application of appropriate skills, knowledge and attitude.
Compliance Finding *
ia
tio
n
A record of verification evidence which establishes that an airworthiness Certification Basis requirement has been
met.
Av
Concern *
D
ef
Confidential Incident Report (CONFIR) *
en
ce
An AwB outcome which remarks on a critical airworthiness issue that if not addressed by a specified date and
managed in the interim could require amendment or withdrawal of the airworthiness instrument and/or Service
Release.
.0
11
–
A report that may be used when an individual wants others to learn from an aviation related experience, which they
thought alarming or even dangerous. It is used when an individual is reluctant, or unable, to report through the
normal safety reporting system.
Configuration #
80
00
The functional and physical characteristics of existing or planned hardware, firmware, software or a combination
thereof, as set forth in technical documentation (which includes specifications, standards and drawings) and
ultimately achieved in a product.
AA
P
Configuration Control Board (CCB) #
ed
by
A group comprising of technical and logistics members as required and which controls the process of creation,
change and deletion of CIs and their associated Configuration Records. The CCB's role is to maintain the required
level of system integrity, capability and supportability through the review, approval and monitoring of change
requests.
ed
Configuration Item (CI) #
Su
pe
rs
An item of aircraft or aircraft-related equipment designated for configuration management separately from the
aircraft.
Configuration Management Plan (CMP) #
A document that defines CI management responsibilities and overall configuration management processes for a
particular system or related groups of systems.
AL 8
11
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE) *
The specified configuration (functional and physical characteristics), role ( warfighting function15 )and
environment (eg physical and meteorological conditions) specified in an aviation system’s Statement of Intent.
Consequence *
The outcome of an event or situation expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, being a loss, injury, disadvantage or
gain.
ul
at
io
n
s
Contractor / Sub-contractor ^
A company, firm, organisation or any person, other than a Defence employee, contracted to provide goods and
services to the Defence Organisation.
eg
Construction *
ty
R
The production of materiel through manufacture, fabrication and assembly of approved parts and materials to meet
an approved design.
Sa
fe
Contingency Maintenance (CMAINT) #
tio
n
Those maintenance activities that are performed during a declared contingency operation. CMAINT involves
revised servicing schedules, component lifting strategies (plans) and repair philosophies, including Battle Damage
Repair, which will maximise operational availability while constraining and managing risk.
Av
ia
Corrective Maintenance #
en
ce
Those maintenance tasks necessary to restore items to a specified condition or to restore it to serviceability after
failure.
Crew *
.0
11
–
D
ef
Competent and authorised individuals, including personnel authorised to undertake aircraft type qualification
training, who may operate or interface with an aircraft's systems during flight specific aviation mission, including
temporary equipment installations. Crew is broken into subsets of flight crew and mission crew in order to
distinguish between airworthiness roles and capability roles.
Crew Resource Management (CRM) *
80
00
The process or act of effective and cohesive aircrew or operator teamwork which contributes to aviation safety.
Crew Station *
AA
P
A position, seated or otherwise, within an aircraft from which a crew member may perform an operational
function.
by
Critical / Catastrophic Consequence to Safety ^
ed
Fatal injury of any person (safety consequence), and/or Category 5 damage (i.e. unrepairable, missing, or
inaccessible for recovery) to an Aviation System (capability consequence).
ed
Crowd line *
pe
rs
The forward edge of the area(s) intended for spectators during a Flying Display from which aircraft safety
distances may be calculated.
Su
D (back to top)
Dangerous Goods *
Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which
are shown in the list of dangerous goods in authoritative technical instructions or which are classified according to
those instructions.16
15
AAP 1000-D – Air Power Manual.
12
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Dangerous goods include explosives, flammable liquids, gases, corrosives and chemically reactive or acutely
(highly) toxic substances. Authoritative technical instructions include ICAO – Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air and IATA –- Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) Manual.
Day #
Any calendar day.
Decompression illness (DCI) *
ul
at
io
n
s
A term referring to a group of clinical conditions that may result from exposure to a change in ambient pressure.
Defence Flight Test *
eg
Flight test conducted on Defence registered aircraft.
R
Deeper Maintenance (DM) #
Sa
fe
ty
Complex or extensive maintenance performed on an application or item. It includes overhaul and major repair of
items involving major disassembly and repair. DM normally requires specialised technical skills, support
equipment and workshop facilities.
Defence Controlled Workspace ^
ia
tio
n
Any location, whether Commonwealth premises or area of operations, in which an undertaking of the Defence
Organisation is carried out by Defence employees (as opposed to workplaces that are under the control of a
contractor).
en
ce
Av
Defence Organisation ^
The Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence.
D
ef
Defence Practice Area (DPA) *
Deferred Maintenance #
.0
11
–
An area intended to protect public safety by giving notice of a practice, prohibiting entry to, and allowing the
removal of unauthorised people, vehicles, vessels or aircraft from a DPA when an authorised Defence operation or
practice is in progress. DPA’s may also be referred to as Defence training areas and ranges.
80
00
Maintenance tasks, inclusive of both Corrective and Preventive Maintenance, for which the rectification or effect
of required actions has been deferred on a calendar, interval or event basis. The decision to defer is made by the
SMM or delegate and supported where required by the responsible AEO.
AA
P
Defect *
by
A fault, other than by fair wear and tear, which renders an item unsuitable for its intended use. The fault may be in
design or deviation of a dimension, finish or other functional characteristic from specified requirements or from
recognised standards of engineering practice.
ed
Defence *
ed
Civilian and Service elements of the Defence portfolio.
Su
pe
rs
Defence Aircraft *
Those aircraft listed on the Defence Register and non–Defence registered aircraft operated by or on behalf of
Defence.
Defence Aviation *
The design, construction, maintenance and operation of any aircraft owned, leased, hired or chartered by Defence;
any aircraft operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence; any aircraft for which CASA has placed statutory
airworthiness responsibilities on Defence; and any AvSS.
16
ICAO Annex 18 – Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods
AL 8
13
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) *
The Defence AA is accountable to the CDF and Secretary for establishing and managing the Defence Aviation
Safety Program.
Defence Employee *
A person employed in the Department of Defence under section 22 of the Public Service Act 1999.
ul
at
io
n
A person as defined in section 3 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, means (1) a member of the Permanent
Navy, the Regular Army or the Permanent Air Force; or (2) a member of the Reserves who is rendering continuous
full-time service or is on duty or in uniform.
eg
Defence Personnel *
R
Defence Personnel means all Defence Employees, Defence Members, ADF Cadets and ADF Cadet Staff and
equivalents from other defence organisations on exchange to Defence.
fe
ty
Defence Standard (DEF STAN) 00–970 *
tio
n
Sa
DEF STAN 00–970 is the UK Ministry of Defence standard containing design and airworthiness requirements for
Service aircraft and engines. This airworthiness code has been adopted by Defence as the baseline code for
validation of a Defence registered aircraft’s certification basis.
ia
Defence Register *
Av
The Defence aircraft register maintained by ACPA.
en
ce
Defence Registered Aircraft *
An aircraft type listed on the Defence Register.
D
ef
Dental Officer *
–
Any Defence member or Defence employee who is authorised to provide dental care to Defence personnel as a
registered Dentist.
.0
11
Design #
AA
P
80
00
The process or act of creating or changing a product and related technical process descriptions through the
application of scientific and engineering effort (verb), or the outcome of that process (noun). The design therefore
encompasses not only the configuration of the product, but also the test and evaluation needed to validate that the
design meets performance and safety requirements; the manufacturing processes (including production test
requirements) which require special control to ensure the product meets requirements; the in-service monitoring
requirements, the maintenance processes and authorised repairs; the maintenance lives and intervals and fatigue
life; and operating procedures and limits.
by
Design Acceptance #
pe
rs
ed
ed
The process whereby a design or design change (ie an output of the design process) involving aircraft or aircraftrelated equipment is determined to be technically acceptable for ADF use based on a determination that the
specified requirements and design standards are sufficient and applicable (to the ADF authorised configuration,
maintenance policy and procedures, and operations) and that the quality of the design has been proven to the
satisfaction of the responsible DAR. Generally, design quality is assured through approval of the design by an
AEO against the approved design requirements and standards plus an acceptable basis of design verification.
Su
Design Acceptance Certification #
The final act of the Design Acceptance process whereby a DAR provides a certified record of the technical
acceptability of a change to aircraft or aircraft-related equipment Type Design.
Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) #
A Commonwealth employee with delegated TAA authority to perform Design Acceptance certification of changes
to aircraft or aircraft related equipment.
14
AL 8
s
Defence Member *
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Design Approval Certification #
The act of approval of design output resulting from a process that formally examines and documents compliance of
a design (or design change) with specified requirements and design standards.
Design Change #
Design Control #
The control of a product design, a design change or design service performed for another AEO.
eg
Design Engineer #
ul
at
io
n
s
A change to the approved configuration documentation of an item or a proposed deviation from the approved
design configuration.
fe
ty
R
A Design Engineer (DE) is a professional engineer within an AEO with assigned authority from the Senior Design
Engineer to perform certain engineering activities, including judging the significance of design changes and
undertaking design review of significant design changes.
Sa
Design Output Data #
tio
n
All data produced in developing the design as provided by TAREG 3.4. Following Incorporation Approval of the
design, design output data is used to update the Type Design data.
Av
ia
Design Reference Data #
#
D
ef
Design Review
en
ce
Type Design data and any other data, including design manuals and handbooks, airworthiness design standards,
specifications, technical standards and technological practices, engineering reports and reference material, and
drawings, used as an input to a design activity.
.0
11
–
The act whereby a design (or design change) is independently checked by an authorised person (other than the
person who developed the design) to: verify the validity of the assumptions, conditions, data and methods used in
design development; and to verify that the design output meets the specific design input requirements.
Design Support Network (DSN) #
AA
P
Detect and Avoid *
80
00
A group of agencies that provide design support to an AEO.
The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards and take the appropriate avoiding action.
by
Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) #
ed
ed
An engineering function used by the manufacturer, or a nominated test agency, to establish that a system complies
with the design requirements. DT&E is typically an iterative process resulting in a final design that is considered,
by the contractor, to be specification compliant. An outcome of a successful DT&E process is assurance that the
aircraft is airworthy and specification compliant.
Su
pe
rs
Deviation #
A configuration change where: one or a limited number of Configuration Items (CI) within a population departs
from the current approved type design; or where the entire population of a CI departs from the current approved
type design for a limited time.
Disability ^
Any restriction or lack of ability (resulting from an impairment) to perform an activity in the manner or within the
range considered for a normal human being. 17
17
Defence Safety Manual (SAFETYMAN) Volume 1, General
AL 8
15
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Dry lease *
A Defence aircraft lease for an aircraft that does not include crew, maintenance or insurance requirements.
E (back to top)
Employee *
s
A member of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) or a civilian employee of the Department of Defence (DoD).
ul
at
io
n
Employer *
The Commonwealth, or acting for the Commonwealth – the Defence Organisation (i.e. the ADF and the
Department of Defence). Group executives, commanders/executives and supervisors represent the employer.
eg
Engineering Authority (EA) #
ty
R
The authority assigned expressly to an organisation (AEO) or to an individual within an organisation to undertake
specific engineering activities.
Sa
fe
Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC) #
Su
pe
rs
ed
ed
by
AA
P
80
00
.0
11
–
D
ef
en
ce
Av
ia
tio
n
The certificate awarded by the TAR to an organisation to operate as an AEO.
16
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Engineering Change #
A change to the current approved configuration documentation of a configuration item (CI) at any point in the life
cycle of the CI.
Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) #
ul
at
io
n
s
A proposed change to the current approved configuration of a CI and the supporting design documentation via
which the change is described, justified and submitted to the Configuration Control Board (CCB). Although
proposals in the initial stage may use different terminology such as System/Software Change Request or Software
Trouble Report, all formal proposals to change the current approved configuration documentation are categorised
as ECP.
Engineering Management Plan (EMP) #
R
eg
A controlled quality document containing the details of an organisation’s Engineering Management System (EMS)
including references to all engineering plans, processes and procedures to which the organisation must comply.
The EMP describes all of the requirements that are satisfied by an organisation to become, and to remain, an AEO.
fe
ty
Event ^
n
Sa
An occurrence that had the potential to affect the safety or airworthiness of the Aviation System, or safety of third
parties, but did not due to:
system defences that were adequate to prevent a compromise to safety or airworthiness, or
b.
system tolerance that was sufficient to prevent any degradation to safety or airworthiness.
Av
ia
tio
a.
en
ce
Exemption *
D
ef
Documented approval from the relevant regulator authorising non–compliance with a particular regulation for a
specified period.
External Service Providers *
.0
11
–
Contractors, consultants and professional service providers engaged by Defence.
F (back to top)
80
00
Fast jet *
A term referring to high performance, extremely manoeuvrable aircraft. For example a Super Hornet.
AA
P
Flight Authorisation *
The assessment process through which the Aircraft Captain is charged with the safe conduct of the flight.
by
Flight Authorisation Officer *
ed
A person authorised to make suitability for flight assessments and flight authorisation decisions.
ed
Flight Crew *
Su
pe
rs
Crew members, including personnel authorised to undertake aircraft type qualification training, who are charged
with duties essential to the safe operation of an aircraft during flight time, including remotely piloted aircraft.
Flight crew is a subset of crew.
Flight Information Documents (FID) *
FID include Flight Information Publications (FLIP) aeronautical maps, aeronautical charts and similar documents
that support aviation activities.
Flight Information Publication (FLIP) *
An enduring term that describes various aeronautical information designed for use primarily in the cockpit
environment.
AL 8
17
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Flight information service (FIS) *
An ATS subcategory provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient
conduct of flight. 18
Flight Safety Critical Item #
s
Any part, assembly or installation containing a critical characteristic whose failure, malfunction or absence could
cause a catastrophic failure or an uncommanded engine shutdown, resulting in loss or serious damage to the
aircraft or an unsafe condition.
ul
at
io
n
Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD)*
R
eg
An FSTD is any device that simulates an aircraft or part of an aircraft used to train personnel who interact with
aircraft flight controls or power plant controls to manoeuvre the aircraft in flight and/or on the ground, and meets
approved standards for the purpose of permitting experience acquired therein to be credited towards meeting
requirements for operator qualification, categorisation or currency.
ty
Flight Simulator (FS) *
fe
See Flight Training Device (FTD).
Sa
Flight Test *
tio
n
The operation of an aircraft for the purposes of Test and Evaluation.
ia
Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA) *
en
ce
Av
An officer appointed by the Defence AA as responsible for the airworthiness management of Aviation Systems
required for, or undergoing Flight Test
Flight Test Organisation (FTO) *
D
ef
An organisation recognised as competent by an FTAA to conduct flight test activities within a specified scope.
Flight Test Permit (FTP) *
Flight Test Representative *
.0
11
–
An instrument that authorises the conduct of Flight Test.
80
00
A suitably qualified person (usually qualified test aircrew) appointed by an FTAA to make assessments and
determinations within specified guidelines regarding the airworthiness management of flight test activities and the
suitability of a system to be operated in designated operational roles by trained and qualified Defence aircrew.
AA
P
Flight Training Device (FTD) *
ed
ed
by
A Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) for a specific type (or a specific make, model and series) of aircraft.
An FTD is a device that simulates the aircraft in ground and flight operations to the extent of the systems installed
in the device and comprises a full size replica of the instruments, equipment, panels and controls in an open flight
deck area, or an enclosed flight deck of the aircraft, but does not, in every respect, simulate the aircraft in ground
and flight operations. An FTD includes the necessary software and equipment, and the way that the equipment is
interconnected.
rs
Flying Management System (FMS) *
Su
pe
A system of processes and procedures within a flying organisation centred on aircraft types or AvSS which
establishes the management practices, operational rules, and operator training and qualification requirements that
support operational airworthiness.
Flypasts *
A flight by one or more aircraft tasked to pass over a specific location on a constant track and at a constant altitude
at a specified time.
10
ICAO Annex 11 – ATS – Definitions.
18
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Flying display *
A planned display of sequence(s) by one or more aircraft for an assembled group of people that may include
demonstrations of handling and operational capabilities within the approved envelope for the type.
Foreign Military Aircraft *
A military aircraft of any foreign nation, expected to be certified for flight under the owning country’s Military
Aviation Authority.
ul
at
io
n
s
Foreign object debris (FOD) *
A substance, debris or article alien to a vehicle or system that has potential to cause damage to aircraft. Examples
of FOD are aircraft parts, rocks, broken pavement, ramp equipment, and vehicle parts.
eg
Foreign register *
R
A civil aircraft register or military aircraft register maintained by any country other than Australia.
ty
Forward Air Control–Airborne *
Sa
fe
See Terminal Attack Control
G (back to top)
tio
n
Generative Safety Culture ^
Av
ia
The ultimate state where safety performance is maximised and safety behaviour is fully integrated into the
management system as well as the conduct, values and attitudes of all members of the organisation.
en
ce
Ground Safety *
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) *
D
ef
The implementation of policies, practices and procedures which results in establishing a secure, safe work place
with the aim of preventing injury, illness and death.
Guidance material (GM) *
.0
11
–
The ancillary maintenance equipment necessary to maintain an aircraft during servicing.
H (back to top)
AA
P
Hazard #
80
00
Non-binding explanatory and interpretation material, including examples, intended to assist the user on complying
with the regulatory requirement.
by
A source of potential harm or a situation with a potential to cause loss.
ed
Hazard Log #
ed
A data base of identified hazards. It is a formal record of all data and tasks associated with identifying and
resolving hazards.
Su
pe
rs
Hazard Report ^
A DAHRTS report (OPHAZ, ASOR or SASOR) used to report any identified aviation hazard, which has the
potential to, or has caused an aviation safety occurrence.
Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA) ^
An appointment or appointments–made by aviation Force Element Group (FEG) commanders–responsible for
tracking actions and recommendations from FEG aviation safety reports to completion.
AL 8
19
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Height Above Obstacles Within (HAOW) *
The vertical distance between an aircraft and the highest obstacle on the terrain or water surface within a specified
lateral radius from the aircraft’s position. For example, ‘500ft HAOW 600m’ means 500 feet of vertical separation
between the aircraft and the highest obstacle within 600 metres of that aircraft.
Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) *
ul
at
io
n
s
A defined area that may be used by helicopters for the purposes of landing or taking off, including infrequent,
opportunity and short term basis for all types of operations. It may or may not be located on an Aerodrome. It may
also be referred to as a helipad.
Helipad *
See Helicopter Landing Site.
eg
Heliport *
ty
R
An Aerodrome or a defined area on a structure intended to be used wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and
surface movement of helicopters. 19
Sa
fe
Human Factors ^
ia
tio
n
The multi-disciplinary science that applies knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of human performance
to all aspects of the design, operation, and maintenance of products and systems. It considers the effects of
physical, psychological, and environmental factors on human performance in different task environments,
including the role of human operators in complex systems.
Av
Hypoxia *
en
ce
A lack of oxygen to the tissues sufficient to cause impairment of function.
I (back to top)
D
ef
Immediate Safety Report ^
.0
11
–
Reports to notify, as soon as possible, ADF aviation safety occurrences including accidents, serious incidents, and
those occurrences which have immediate implications for either safety of flight, public safety or possible media
exposure.
80
00
Incident ^
An occurrence that:
did affect, or could affect, the safety or airworthiness of the Aviation System, or safety of third parties,
and
b.
where system defences were:
adequate to limit the severity of the occurrence such that the consequences to safety or
airworthiness were less than major or
by
(1)
AA
P
a.
inadequate/absent to limit the severity of the occurrence, however system tolerance limited the
consequences to safety or airworthiness to less than major.
ed
ed
(2)
rs
Includes (rules of interpretation) *
pe
‘includes’ means ‘includes but is not limited to’.
Su
Incorporation Approval #
The formal process of permitting a design change to proceed from the design to the incorporation phase and has
the effect of committing whatever resources are required for implementation. Incorporation Approval is granted by
the Senior Executive or a nominated representative.
19
ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I – Definitions page 1–4.
20
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Independent *
In the context of, or similar to, ‘independent board’ or ‘independent inspection’ and within these Regulations
means independent of the chain of command which is being assessed or inspected.
Independent Maintenance Inspection (IMI) #
s
A discrete conformance activity utilised to verify the conformance of the maintenance task or component against a
prescribed standard carried out by an authorised person who was not involved in the performance of the
maintenance being inspected.
ul
at
io
n
Inspection #
The process of determining compliance with engineering standards and applicable maintenance documents.
eg
J (back to top)
R
K (back to top)
fe
ty
Key Staff *
Sa
Appointments within an engineering, maintenance or flying organisation which contribute to the safe operation of
an aviation system.
tio
n
L (back to top)
ia
Letter of Engineering Authority (LEA) #
en
ce
Av
An attachment to an Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC) which defines the scope of activity and any caveats
and limitations under which the EAC is issued.
Long Term Lease *
D
ef
The dry or wet leasing, renting or hiring of an aircraft by Defence, usually for more than a year, to support ongoing
Defence activity.
–
Lost Link *
.0
11
The loss of command and control link contact with a remotely-piloted aircraft during flight time.
80
00
Low Flying *
AA
P
By day, night or in IMC, flight below the OAA authorised minimum height above and within a defined lateral
distance of an obstacle. Low flying does not include flight associated with: a published instrument arrival,
approach and departure procedure; or takeoff and landing.
M (back to top)
by
Maintenance #
rs
ed
ed
All actions taken to retain material in or restore the materiel to a specified condition or to restore it to
serviceability. It includes inspections, condition monitoring, servicing, replenishment, repair, overhaul, testing,
calibration, rebuilding, reclamation, upgrades, modification, recovery, classification and the salvage of technical
equipment.
Su
pe
Maintenance Approval Certificate (MAC) #
The certificate awarded by the TAR to certify an organisation as an AMO. The certificate includes an
accompanying schedule that lists the certified level and scope of maintenance.
Maintenance Authority (MA) #
The authority to undertake specific maintenance activities.
Maintenance Certification #
The act of authorised persons signing (electronically or physically) that they have discharged their responsibilities
regarding the maintenance performed.
AL 8
21
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Maintenance Certifier #
The person responsible for either: performing the maintenance as a Self Certifying Tradesperson (SCT); or
supervising the maintenance as a Trade Supervisor.
Maintenance Management Plan (MMP) #
s
A document which details all activities in an AMO affecting the maintenance of aviation material. It specifies
processes to control maintenance and material management activities to assure the technical integrity of all
material, as required by the TAR to become, and to remain, an AMO.
ul
at
io
n
Maintenance Management System #
A documented system that describes every one of the procedures and processes for managing the conduct of all
maintenance in an AMO.
eg
Maintenance Manager (MM) #
ty
R
An authorised person who is responsible for the management of maintenance activities on nominated aircraft type
or aeronautical product within an Approved Maintenance Organisation.
Sa
fe
Maintenance Personnel #
tio
n
Maintenance personnel are those personnel authorised to plan, perform, supervise, inspect, and certify
maintenance.
ia
Maintenance Support Network (MSN) #
Av
A group of agencies that provide maintenance support to an AMO.
en
ce
Maintenance Task #
–
D
ef
An activity having a defined start and finish and where the responsibility for completion is assigned to a single
tradesperson. The task may include one or more actions which will be potentially effective in preventing or
detecting failures, will restore equipment to a serviceable condition or prepare an aircraft for a particular mission.
Such maintenance activities include replenishment, scheduled servicing and rectification. A particular maintenance
task may rely on other maintenance tasks for completion.
.0
11
Maintenance Test Flight #
80
00
A flight to ensure that an aircraft meets specification in regard to performance and handling characteristics and to
establish, on prescribed occasions, that no deterioration of that standard has occurred during maintenance.
Major Change *
by
AA
P
Any technical or configuration change to the Type Design that has an appreciable affect on weight, balance,
structural strength, performance, power plant operation, flight characteristics or other parameters that impact
airworthiness, and/or introduces a new capability or significantly varies an existing capability such that additional
airworthiness oversight is required.
ed
Maritime Control Service (MCS) *
rs
ed
A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment to support military aircraft operations
conducted to/from air capable ships and transiting the maritime operating area that may include positive, advisory
or broadcast control.
pe
May (rules of interpretation) *
Su
‘may’ is used in the permissive sense to state authority or permission to do the act prescribed, and the words ‘no
person may’ or ‘a person may not’ mean that no person is required, authorised or permitted to do the act described.
MCS Advisory safety control *
Analogous to an Air Traffic Advisory service. A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime
environment where the controlling unit will provide adequate warnings of hazards affecting aircraft safety. The
aircraft commander is responsible for the aircraft’s navigation and collision avoidance.
22
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
MCS Broadcast control *
Analogous to Flight Information Service (FIS). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime
environment where the controlling unit, when possible, provides adequate warnings of hazards but the aircraft
commander is responsible for aircraft navigation and collision avoidance.
MCS Positive safety control *
ul
at
io
n
s
Analogous to ATC. A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the
controlling unit is responsible for taking actions for collision avoidance such as ordering necessary alterations to
heading, speed, and altitude to maintain separation criteria.
Meteorology (MET) *
eg
A service that provides area and terminal weather information services that safely support aviation activities, such
as flight planning and enroute diversion decisions based upon changing weather conditions.
R
Minor Change *
fe
ty
Any technical or configuration change to the Type Design that is not deemed as Major by the aircraft DAR and the
TAA.
Sa
Major Consequence to Safety ^
tio
n
Serious injury or illness (safety consequence), and/or Category 4 damage (i.e. repairable in more than 14 days) to
the Aviation System (capability consequence).
Av
ia
Materiel *
en
ce
Product that is used in the manufacture of components and in the maintenance and operation of aircraft, including
fuels, oils and lubricants.
Meteorology (Met) *
–
Minimum Separation Distance (MSD) *
D
ef
A service that provides area or terminal weather information that safely supports aviation activities.
.0
11
A spherical distance around the aircraft that no obstacle or hazard is to penetrate.
Mission Crew *
80
00
Personnel who may or may not be qualified on aircraft type, but their qualifications are essential for the successful
outcome of a specific aviation mission. Mission crew is a subset of crew.
AA
P
Mission Critical Item #
by
An item whose failure will seriously degrade an aircraft’s ability to complete an assigned mission or lead to a
mission being aborted.
Mission Essential *
ed
ed
Personnel, equipment or cargo required to successfully conduct a specific aviation mission.
Su
pe
rs
Mission Essential Passenger *
A passenger whose carriage aboard an aircraft is directly associated with the specific mission being conducted. A
mission essential passenger may include a boarding party, medical patient, paratroops, troops, deploying personnel
or survivors from a SAR task.
Mission Essential Personnel (UAS operations context) *
Personnel whose conduct is essential to the successful execution of an operational or military training UAS
mission (e.g. supported troops, survivors from a SAR task, UA launch/recovery personnel etc).
Model *
An aircraft or system model is a derivative of an aircraft or system type that follows a unique lineage. For example
a C–130 is an aircraft type, while a C–130J is a model.
AL 8
23
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Modification *
A change to the physical or functional characteristics of an item of technical equipment.
Modification Installation #
For the purpose of TAREG 3.5.20, Modification Installation means the incorporation of changes to an existing
Type Design following Incorporation Approval, with the exception of trial modifications.
ul
at
io
n
‘must’ is used in the imperative sense. Use of other commonly used imperatives such as ‘shall, is to or will’ should
not occur.
N (back to top)
eg
Negative Training *
fe
ty
R
Negative training involves techniques learned or practiced in the FSTD which do not translate to correct actions
during a safety-critical activity in the airborne environment as a result of incorrect training, fidelity or fit out of the
FSTD.
Sa
Noise ^
ia
tio
n
Any unwanted sounds which have numerous separate frequencies and are not generated to convey meaning or
information.
Av
Non Compliance #
en
ce
The failure of a plan or procedure to comply with DASP requirements.
Non Conformance #
D
ef
The failure of a product, process or system to meet its regulatory, specification, drawing, or quality requirements.
Non-Defence Flight Test *
Non-Defence Registered Aircraft *
.0
11
–
Flight test conducted on non-Defence registered aircraft which includes participation by Defence members.
Non Substantial Change *
80
00
Any aircraft that is not recorded on the Defence Register, be it civil registered or foreign registered.
AA
P
Any operational change to the CRE SOI which is not determined as Substantial by the OAA in consultation with
the FTAA.
by
Note *
ed
An AwB outcome which identifies a significant airworthiness issue that is being addressed but requires further
attention.
ed
Noteworthy Risk #
pe
rs
A risk requiring DAR or higher level of authority retention in accordance with the TAR-approved System Safety
Program Plan (SSPP), typically with a risk level equivalent to Medium or above, as defined by MIL-STD-882C.
Su
O (back to top)
Observation *
An AwB outcome which highlights an airworthiness issue worthy of comment.
On-Board Recording (OBR) ^
A recording of sounds or images in the control area of an aircraft, including crew stations. Recordings made on
personal devices carried by personnel on board an aircraft can be deemed to be OBR.
24
AL 8
s
Must (rules of interpretation) *
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
On-Board Recording Information ^
Any part of an on-board recording (OBR), any transcript from an OBR, or any information obtained from any part
of an OBR.
Obstacle *
s
Is all fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that are located on an area
intended for the surface movement of aircraft; or extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in
flight; or stand outside those defined surfaces and that have been assessed as being a hazard to air navigation. 20
ul
at
io
n
Operation *
eg
The process and action of operating aircraft following the initial and continual acceptance of the design,
construction and maintenance processes, acts and actions by the operational chain of command at an acceptable
level of risk as to the suitability of flight of that aircraft in the operational environment.
R
Operational Airworthiness *
Sa
fe
ty
An element of Airworthiness concerned with ensuring aircraft are operated in approved roles, with correct mission
equipment, by competent and authorised individuals, according to approved procedures and instructions, under a
system of supervision and monitoring.
n
Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) *
Av
ia
tio
An officer, as nominated by the relevant Service Chief or Group Head, appointed by the Defence AA through
DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation Safety Program as responsible for the operational airworthiness management
of aircraft types and AvSS within the scope of their appointment.
Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR) *
en
ce
An officer delegated by the OAA to perform a specified scope of operational airworthiness management.
D
ef
Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative – Acquisition [OAAR (Acq)] *
–
An officer delegated by the OAA to perform operational airworthiness functions relating to the acquisition of a
new aviation system, or one undergoing a Major change to the Type Design or a Substantial operational change.
.0
11
Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP) *
80
00
A document that describes the strategy and scope of operational airworthiness activities and responsibilities
identified to achieve and maintain the operational airworthiness elements of a new or modified Aviation System
prior to and following Service Release.
Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR) *
AA
P
Deputy Chief of Air Force (DCAF) is appointed the OAR. The OAR is accountable to the Defence AA for
establishing and managing the operational airworthiness element of the AMS.
by
Operational Clearance *
ed
ed
An approval to deviate from an aviation system’s approved configuration, role, environment, limitation or
condition, when mission requirements cannot be achieved otherwise.
Su
pe
rs
Operational Contingency Loading *
Deleted from glossary. Included for reference only as this term existed in cancelled OAREG 2.2.14.
Operational Effectiveness *
The ability of a system to perform its intended function over its intended operational spectrum, in the expected
operational environment, and in the face of expected threats when operated by typical operational Defence
Personnel in accordance with DI(G) OPS 43–1—Defence Test and Evaluation Policy.
20
ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1 - definitions
AL 8
25
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Operational Evaluation *
The condition of systematic assessment of an Aviation System which requires operation of an aircraft within
existing approved operating limitations and within approved aircraft certification bases including: operation of
configurations prior to Service Release of a Minor Design Change, Non-Substantial operational role or
environment changes, and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).
ul
at
io
n
A DAHRTS format used for reporting aviation and aviation-related hazards, before such hazards result in an
occurrence.
Operational Maintenance (OM) #
R
eg
Maintenance activities directly related to the preparation of equipment for immediate use, recovery and minor
repair of the equipment after use. OM tasks require a limited range of support equipment and may involve the
limited use of workshop facilities.
ty
Operational Suitability *
tio
n
Sa
fe
The capacity of the system, when operated and maintained by typical operational Defence Personnel in expected
numbers, at the expected level of competency, to be reliable, maintainable, available, logistically supportable,
compatible, interoperable, safe and is ergonomically satisfactory (DI(G) OPS 43–1—Defence Test and Evaluation
Policy).
ia
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) *
en
ce
Av
OT&E is not an airworthiness function. The user Service conducts OT&E to assess operational effectiveness and
suitability. The OAA and the FTAA are obliged to conduct OT&E within the provisions of the operational
airworthiness regulatory framework.
Opposition Manoeuvre *
–
Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) *
D
ef
A manoeuvre where flight vectors of aircraft are opposing each other in close proximity.
80
00
.0
11
A suite of advisory, informative, procedural, directing and mandating documents that support the operations of an
aviation system. OIP may include: aircrew manuals specific to type; general aircrew publications; Defence
Instructions; Standing Instructions; command and unit issued Flying Orders, Special Flying Instructions and
standard operating procedures.
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) #
by
ed
Passenger *
AA
P
A manufacturer listed as the approved source of manufacture for components in the Type Certificate data sheet.
The OEM owns and controls the source drawings, ie the design of the component.
P (back to top)
rs
ed
Any person who is on board an aircraft other than a member of the authorised crew.
pe
Periodic Health Examination (PHE) *
Su
A more comprehensive assessment that periodically replaces the SESAHA IAW Defence policy. Also considered
an aviation medical certificate assessment when conducted by an AVMO.
Personnel ^
Employees and contractors in Defence-controlled workplaces. Visitors are not personnel and are referred to as
third parties. 21
21
Defence Safety Manual (SAFETYMAN) Volume 1, General, First Edition 2002
26
AL 8
s
Operational Hazard (OPHAZ) Report ^
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Populated Area *
For the purpose of assessing the risk to personnel on the ground from operating a UAS, a populated area is
considered analogous to the congested areas of cities, towns or settlements, or any area with an open-air assembly
of persons.
Preventative Maintenance #
s
Those actions that reduce the probability of a known failure mode in items with predictable wear-out
characteristics by retaining materiel and restoring it to a specified condition.
ul
at
io
n
Primary runway *
The runway used most frequently or that provides the best overall aerodrome capability.
eg
Procedure #
R
A documented course of action to be followed to ensure a consistent outcome.
fe
ty
Production #
Sa
The manufacture and assembly of new Configuration Items, related Aeronautical Product, or complete aircraft.
tio
n
Q (back to top)
ia
Qualification (FSTD Context) *
en
ce
Av
The verification and validation of the functionality and fidelity of a Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD)
against an accepted standard. The end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a
FSTD, against predefined standards, to the satisfaction of the relevant authority.
Qualified Flight Test Staff *
.0
11
Quality Management System (QMS) *
–
D
ef
Personnel who have attained Defence recognised qualifications and are competent to conduct some or all aspects
of flight testing. These include test pilots, flight test engineers, flight test system specialists and other personnel
trained and recognised as competent by an FTAA for specific flight test functions.
AA
P
R (back to top)
80
00
All activities of the overall management function that determine the quality policy, objectives and responsibilities
and implement them by means such as quality planning, quality controls, quality assurance and quality
improvement.
RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM)*
by
The ADF Centre of Excellence for aviation medicine related issues.
ed
Ramp Inspection *
rs
ed
Related to the operation of non-state registered aircraft chartered for temporary use by Defence. The Ramp
Inspection is an acknowledged means of providing confidence in a charter aircraft’s fitness for purpose and
assessing the suitability of a charter supplier.
Su
pe
Reliability *
The ability of an item to perform a required function under stated conditions for a specified period of time.
Remote Pilot (RP) *
A person charged by the operator with duties essential to the operation of a Category 1 or 2 remotely piloted
aircraft and who manipulates the flight control, as appropriate, during flight time.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) *
An unmanned aircraft that is controlled by a remote pilot or air vehicle operator.
AL 8
27
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
RPA Observer *
A trained and competent person designated by the operator who, by visual observation of the remotely piloted
aircraft, assists the remote pilot in the safe conduct of the flight.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) *
ul
at
io
n
s
A subset of an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), a RPAS is a system consisting of the remotely piloted aircraft
(RPA), together with any Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications/data links, maintenance, launch and
recovery systems. This includes the network and personnel required to fly the RPAS. A RPAS may also be
referred to as a UAS.
Remote Pilot Station *
A station at which the remote pilot manages the flight of an unmanned aircraft.
eg
Residual risk ^
ty
R
Risk remaining after risk treatment.
fe
Risk ^
Sa
The effect of uncertainty on objectives (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 – Risk Management—Principles).
n
Risk Hazard Analysis (RHA) *
ia
tio
A process of identifying, categorising and mitigating the hazards and risks associated with the use and operation of
any system.
Av
Risk Mitigation *
en
ce
The strategy and methods employed to reduce potential mishap risk presented by a hazard.
D
ef
S (back to top)
Safety *
Safety Assessment Report (SAR) #
.0
11
–
The control of recognised hazards to attain an acceptable level of risk.
AA
P
Safety Case Report (SCR) #
80
00
The comprehensive evaluation of the risk being assumed prior to test or operation of the system or at contract
completion. It identifies all safety features of the system, design and procedural hazards that may be present in the
system and specific procedural controls and precautions that should be followed.
by
A reasoned summary argument, supported by referenced evidence that justifies the system is acceptably safe from
a design, integration, operation, maintenance and disposal perspective.
ed
Safety Climate ^
rs
ed
A sub-set of safety culture and a measure of employee perceptions of the organisation's safety policies, practices
and procedures.
pe
Safety Critical Area *
Su
A working environment assessed as having a heightened risk to the physical safety of personnel, or where key
operational decisions are made. For example an aircraft flight deck or an ATC Control Tower.
Safety Critical Items and Systems (SCIS) #
Items or systems whose loss of function could, in a worst credible representative environment, directly affect the
aircraft’s ability for continued safe operation.
28
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Safety Culture ^
The product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation's safety management systems.
Safety Management System (SMS)*
A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities,
policies and procedures. 22
ul
at
io
n
s
Se (back to top)
Segregated Airspace (SA) *
eg
Airspace of specified dimensions allocated for use by specific user(s), such as UAS.
R
Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) *
Sa
fe
ty
An internationally recognised civil/military term describing the person commanding and/or managing the ATC
unit responsible for the ATS delivery at a specific aerodrome and the airspace relevant to the aerodrome. At
Defence aerodromes, the SATCO may also hold an administrative command title appropriate to the ATS unit
concerned.
n
Senior Aviation Medical Officer (SAVMO) *
ia
tio
An AVMO, who the Surgeon General ADF recognises as having advanced AVMO qualification and experience
and who may provide the OAA aviation medical advice.
Av
Senior Design Engineer (SDE) #
–
Senior Maintenance Manager (SMM) #
D
ef
en
ce
The senior professional engineer within an AEO, responsible to the senior executive for overall adequacy of the
engineering activities conducted by the AEO and for ensuring compliance with the regulations. The SDE is also
authorised to approve significant design changes and to assign engineering authority to other competent personnel
within the AEO. Overall responsibility for the Engineering Management System (EMS) is the responsibility of the
SDE.
80
00
.0
11
The senior appointment within an Approved Maintenance Organisation, with accountable responsibility for all
maintenance functions performed.
Separation Assurance *
AA
P
The assurance provided by the ATC service provider that if the pilot complies with ATC control instructions an
aircraft will maintain a prescribed minimum separation standard from another aircraft or object.
Serious Incident ^
ed
a.
by
An occurrence that:
Su
pe
rs
ed
b.
did affect, or could affect, the safety or airworthiness of the Aviation System, or safety of third parties
where system defences were:
(1)
only just adequate to prevent an accident – if there was a consequence to safety or
airworthiness the severity was less than critical/catastrophic or
(2)
inadequate/absent and an accident almost occurred – if there was a consequence to safety or
airworthiness it was only system tolerance that limited the severity to less than
critical/catastrophic.
Service Release (SR) *
A declaration by the Defence AA, on advice from the Airworthiness Board (AwB), that operational, engineering,
maintenance and logistics systems are adequate to ensure the continued airworthiness of a Defence registered
aircraft
22
ICAO, Annex 19
AL 8
29
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Short Term Lease *
The dry or wet leasing, renting or hiring of an aircraft by Defence, usually for less than one year, to support
specialised Defence activity.
. Should (rules of interpretation) *
‘should’ is used to imply an act or process identified for inclusion in a desired outcome is complied with unless
sound reasoning may determine otherwise. The word should is not to be used in regulation text.
ul
at
io
n
s
Side Number *
A unique RAN number that differs from the ‘tail number’ and is applicable to RAN aircraft only. The side number
is normally the identifier used in call signs and for flight planning purposes. The side number is not normally
included in the Defence Register.
eg
Significant Aircraft Maintenance Activity #
fe
ty
R
Modification installation activity, performed concurrently with aircraft deeper maintenance, and requiring
substantial dismantling of primary structure, or involving an extended period of maintenance by the organisation to
support an SFP or limited aircraft operations.
Sa
Significant Change *
ia
tio
n
A change to the type-certificate significant to the extent that it changes at the product level one or more of the
following: general configuration, principles of construction, or the assumptions used for certification, but not to the
extent that to be considered a Substantial change (under EASA Part 21).
Av
Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA) *
en
ce
An AVMO who represents a single Service, is recognised by the Surgeon General ADF as being qualified to
provide authoritative aviation medical advice and is responsible for the implementation of aviation medicine
policies.
D
ef
Sp (back to top)
–
Sparsely Populated Area *
80
00
.0
11
An area considered outside the areas of cities, towns or settlements characterised by rangeland grazing, desert,
uncultivated landscapes, wilderness, infrequent homesteads, large land holdings, extensive uncleared land, salt
lakes, adjacent coastal waters and open ocean or navigable tracts of water with infrequent water traffic.
Special Flight Permit (SFP) *
AA
P
An Airworthiness Instrument issued by the Defence AA authorising a Defence registered aircraft for flight for
specified purposes for a specified period. For example, conducting test flights or ferry flights.
Specialist Employment Stream Annual Health Assessment (SESAHA) *
ed
Specification #
by
A generic term that may be used to describe an aviation medical certificate assessment.
pe
rs
ed
A document defining the essential function and performance requirements of a product, which also identifies the
relevant standards for the acquisition process. Specifications, in contrast to standards, provide a more complete
description and include the basis for establishing conformance (particularly during test and evaluation), and hence
validation for the acceptance of material.
Su
Sponsor *
The authority responsible for defining the required aviation outcome, receives or uses the outcome and is
responsible for funding the related activities, processes, project or products required to safely achieve the outcome.
Standard #
A description of a material, product, doctrine or process meant for repeated applications by many users. A
Technical Standard is an established norm or requirement. It is usually a formal document that establishes uniform
engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices.
30
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
State Aircraft (Australian context) *
Aircraft of any part of the Defence Force (including any aircraft that is commanded by a member of that Force in
the course of duties as such a member); and aircraft used in the military, customs or police services of a foreign
country. 23
Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) *
ul
at
io
n
s
A document authorised by the OAA describing the approved roles, operating envelope, usage spectrum and
operating environment for a particular aircraft type. The SOI differentiates between tasks for which the type has
been certified and tasks that are planned but will require certification action before flight can be authorised.
Statement of Requirement (SOR) #
R
eg
A document or documents defining the complete set of DAR requirements on a design agency to allow DAR
acceptance of an aircraft or aircraft-related equipment design or design change. The SOR includes or references a
Specification, which is the document defining the specific essential function and performance requirements for the
product design or design change.
ty
Stores Suspension Equipment #
n
Sa
fe
All aircraft devices such as racks, adaptors, missile launchers, internal guns, countermeasure dispensers and
pylons, used for carriage, employment and jettison of aircraft stores. Aircraft guns and countermeasure dispensers
for flares and chaff must be considered to be stores suspension equipment.
ia
tio
Su (back to top)
Av
Sub-atmospheric DCI *
en
ce
The term used to describe cases of DCI induced by exposure to pressures less than sea level equivalent, such as
encountered during flight. DCI is a potentially lethal condition and should be treated as a medical emergency. The
term is referred to simply as DCI in this regulation.
D
ef
Substantial Change
.0
11
–
Any operational change to the SOI which has an appreciable affect on operational training curriculums,
competency management, cockpit workload, human-machine-interface, flight authorisation considerations or other
factors that impact operational airworthiness.
Substitution #
80
00
A configuration change where a new part is authorised for use in a Configuration Item (CI ) as an alternative to or
replacement for, a currently approved part. The configuration change must have no other effect on the
functionality, physical and performance properties, or interface characteristics of the affected CI(s).
AA
P
Suitability for Flight *
ed
a.
by
An assessment that flight of the aircraft within designated configuration, role and environment where risk is
eliminated or otherwise minimised, so far a reasonably practicable for:
ed
b.
loss to other personnel or property as a direct consequence of the flight
loss of, or damage to, the aircraft. 24
rs
c.
loss of life or injury to aircrew and passengers
Su
pe
Supervisor #
A person (civilian or military) who, at any level, has the day-to-day responsibility for employees’ workplace
activities.
23
Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Clth) Part 1 Sect 3. In the Australian context, State aircraft includes those aircraft listed on
the Defence Register, but may also include non-Defence registered aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence that
are held on the Australian civil aircraft register or a foreign aircraft register. When deemed a State aircraft, appropriate
DASP oversight is required.
24
DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Annex A Definitions
AL 8
31
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Supervision of Maintenance #
Personal observation to the extent necessary of the performance of maintenance and includes guiding, directing,
and correcting the person being supervised.
Supplemental Oxygen *
Refers to acceptable aviators’ breathing oxygen that is available for use whenever required.
ul
at
io
n
A process of examination and evaluation of a Substantial change to an aircraft CRE or capability culminating in
approval of the new CRE or capability by the relevant OAA and amendment of the SOI.
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) *
R
eg
A document issued by the Defence AA, on advice from the AwB, signifying compliance with the airworthiness
requirements for Type Certification of a Major change to the Type Design for a Defence registered aircraft.
*
ty
Supplementary Crew
Sa
fe
Discontinued term. See Mission Crew.
Supplementary Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (SASOR) ^
Av
ia
tio
n
A report that amplifies a previously submitted (partially complete) Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (ASOR) by
adding information gained from further investigation, which was not available at the time of dispatch of the
associated ASOR.
Switchover *
en
ce
The act of passing command and control of a RPA from one data link to another within the same RPS.
System Safety #
–
D
ef
The application of engineering management principles, criteria and techniques to optimise the safety of a ‘system’,
within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time and cost throughout all phases of the life cycle.
.0
11
System Safety Engineering #
80
00
An engineering discipline requiring specialised professional knowledge and skills in applying scientific and
engineering principles, criteria, and techniques to identify and eliminate hazards, in order to reduce the
associated risk.
System Safety Management #
by
AA
P
A management discipline that defines System Safety Program (SSP) requirements and ensures planning,
implementation and accomplishment of system safety tasks and activities consistent with the overall program
requirements.
System Safety Program #
ed
The combined tasks and activities of system safety management and system safety engineering.
rs
ed
System Safety Program Plan #
Su
pe
A description of the planned tasks and activities to be used to implement the required system safety program. This
description includes organisational responsibilities, resources, methods of accomplishment, milestones, depth of
effort, and integration with other program engineering and management activities and related systems.
System Tolerance ^
The inherent ability of the Aviation System to compensate for inadequate/absent defences.
32
AL 8
s
Supplemental Role Approval *
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
T (back to top)
Tail number *
The tail number is the unique numerical identifier, which is appended to the AI, and identifies each individual
aircraft.
Task Authorisation #
ul
at
io
n
s
The legal authority allowing a person to perform a specified maintenance task, recognising that the person has
completed the prerequisite training relevant to the task and has demonstrated competency in performance of the
task. Task authorisations are recorded in the persons ‘A’ card, AATTR or RAAFRTE or equivalent document.
Technical Airworthiness #
R
eg
An element of airworthiness concerned with ensuring aircraft are designed, constructed and maintained to
approved standards by competent and authorised individuals, using approved data and working within approved
organisations under a system of certification and acceptance.
fe
ty
Technical Airworthiness Advisory Circular (TAAC) #
Sa
The means used by the TAR to promulgate technical airworthiness related information but does not mandate any
actions by recipients.
tio
n
Technical Airworthiness Alert Information (TAAI) #
Av
ia
Technical information relating to unsafe conditions in an aircraft type, or changes to a Type Design which will
affect the safety of an aircraft type.
en
ce
Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA) #
D
ef
The TAA (DGTA) is accountable to the Defence AA and responsive to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for
determinations regarding the technical airworthiness of aircraft subject to the AMS, determinations regarding
technical aspects of AvSS and communicating technical risks to the relevant OAA. 25
Technical Airworthiness Directives (TAD) #
.0
11
–
The means by which the TAR issues direction on urgent technical airworthiness matters to address situations or
conditions that are considered either unsafe or unsatisfactory.
80
00
Technical Airworthiness Management #
The process of ensuring suitability for flight of Defence aircraft through regulation, authorisation and audit of all
aspects of the design, manufacture and maintenance of aircraft.
AA
P
Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) #
by
The TAR (DGTA) is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the technical airworthiness
element of the AMS.
ed
Technical Control #
Su
pe
rs
ed
The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of
forces. Of note - Technical control is exercised by capability managers, or by designated authorities through the
capability manager; for forces assigned to operations, technical control is exercised through Chief of Joint
Operations (CJOPS), where it directly affects operations only; and technical control advice may not be modified
but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors. (Australian Defence
Doctrine Publication 00.1 — Command and Control).
Technical Data #
Technical Data encompasses all recorded information of a scientific, technical and engineering nature relating to a
weapon system. Technical data includes all types of specifications, standards, engineering drawings, instructions,
reports, manuals, tabular data, test results and software documentation used in the development, production, in-
25
DI(G)OPS 02–2
AL 8
33
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
service operation and logistics support (such as maintenance, provisioning, codification, testing and modification),
and disposal of a weapon system.
Technical Equipment #
Technical equipment is specifically used in support of operations and includes weapon platforms and systems.
Technical equipment normally requires engineering processes to ensure that its design, configuration, performance
and availability satisfy operational and safety requirements.
Technical Integrity #
eg
An item’s fitness for service, safety, and compliance with regulations for environmental protection.
ul
at
io
n
Information relevant to the continuing airworthiness and technical integrity of a Configuration Item (CI).
s
Technical Information (TI) #
R
Temporary Airworthiness Instrument #
fe
ty
An Airworthiness Instrument issued by the Defence AA to permit a limited scope of flying operations for a limited
duration; typically an Airworthiness Directive or Special Flight Permit.
Sa
Temporary Maintenance Authority (TMA) #
tio
n
An authorisation issued by the Senior Design Engineer of an ADF AEO to an organisation to conduct limited
maintenance for a defined period of time not to exceed 12 months.
Av
ia
TEMPORARILY MEDICALLY UNFIT FOR FLYING (TMUFF) *
en
ce
A generic term that applies to aircrew, remote pilots and aircraft controllers where a member is medically unfit to
perform specialist flying related duties, but may perform non-flying related duties.
Terminal Attack Control (TAC) *
.0
11
–
D
ef
A tactical control or advisory information service, from a forward position, that supports the action of combat
aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air support activities. When conducted from an airborne
position, TAC may also be referred to as Forward Air Control–Airborne (FAC–A); however the functional
outcome is the same.
Test and Evaluation (T&E) *
by
Type Certification *
AA
P
80
00
T&E is a process to obtain information to support the objective assessment of a Capability System with known
confidence, and to confirm whether or not a risk is contained within acceptable boundaries across all facets of a
system’s life cycle. The individual terms are defined as: a test is an activity in which a scientific method is used to
obtain quantitative or qualitative data relating to the safety, performance, functionality, contractual compliance,
and supportability of a system; and evaluation is analysis of test results to determine (verify) or prove (validate)
something. 26
ed
ed
The process through which compliance with the airworthiness design requirements contained in the Certification
Basis Description is established through the development of the Type Design to meet the operating roles and
environment contained in the Statement of Operating Intent (SOI).
rs
Type Design #
pe
The physical design description of a specific aircraft Type as referenced in the Type Record.
Su
Type Design Data #
Data that has been defined at TAREG 2.2.8.
Type Rated *
A pilot or other flight crew member that is qualified to operate a particular aircraft type.
26
DI(G) OPS 43-1 Defence Test and Evaluation Policy, 2007.
34
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Type Record #
A summary document that defines the aircraft Type Design at the time of acceptance by the Commonwealth, by
providing an index to the issue status of all Type Design data. The Type Record is updated to reflect changes in
Type Design.
U (back to top)
UAS Command and Control (C2) Link
ul
at
io
n
s
The data link between a remotely piloted aircraft and a remote pilot station for the purposes of managing flight.
UAS Flight Termination System *
A control system that can immediately terminate flight of a UA safely.
eg
Unapproved Aeronautical Product #
ty
R
Any part, component or material that has not been manufactured and certified as conforming with the technical
data against which type certification is provided.
Sa
fe
Unmanned Aircraft (UA) *
tio
n
An aircraft that uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can
be expendable or recoverable. Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise or guided missiles and artillery projectiles
are not considered UA.
Av
ia
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) *
en
ce
The entire system consisting of the unmanned aircraft (UA), together with any Remote Pilot Station (RPS),
communications/data links, maintenance, launch and recovery systems. This includes the network and personnel
required to fly the UA.
D
ef
Unmanned Aircraft System Category *
–
A determination resulting from an assessment of risk to people or property that a particular UAS may pose when
operating in the intended CRE.
.0
11
Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP) *
Unpopulated Area *
80
00
A UASOP is an instrument which performs a similar purpose as the AMTC and SR does for manned aircraft.
AA
P
An area cleared of personnel (e.g. Military Firing Range).
V (back to top)
by
Variant *
ed
A variant of an aircraft or system is derived from a ‘model’. For example the C–130J is a model of the C–130 type,
and the C–130J–30 is a variant of the C–130J model.
rs
ed
W (back to top)
Su
pe
Waiver #
Documented approval from the relevant airworthiness authority authorising non–compliance with a particular
order, instruction or publication controlled under their authority for a specified period.
Warbird, Historic and Replica Aircraft (WHRA) *
A non–Defence registered aircraft that is an ex-armed forces (Warbird) aircraft, a historic aircraft or a replica
aircraft.
AL 8
35
AAP 7001.048
Glossary
Wet Lease *
A lease where an organisation provides Defence with an aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance for Defence
tasking.
Working Day #
A working day is the normal working routine for the unit, be it one or two shifts, with the usual complement of
personnel.
ul
at
io
n
s
Working Week #
The working week begins on Monday and ends on Friday. Saturday is considered the last day of the week, with
Sunday the first day of the new week.
eg
X (back to top)
R
Y (back to top)
Su
pe
rs
ed
ed
by
AA
P
80
00
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11
–
D
ef
en
ce
Av
ia
tio
n
Sa
fe
ty
Z (back to top)
36
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
List of Abbreviations
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Definition
AAC
Airworthiness Advisory Circular
AAP
Australian Air Publication
AAMP
Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan
ABL
Allocated Baseline
ABM
Air Battle Management
ABR
Australian Book of Reference (Navy)
ACAR
Airworthiness Corrective Action Request
ACAS
Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ACAUST
Air Commander Australia
ACB
Aviation Coordination Board
ACD
Air Cargo Delivery
ACG
Air Combat Group
ACM
Airspace Control Measures
ACO
Air Combat Officer
ACPA
Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency
Acq
Acquisition
AD
Airworthiness Directive
ADFP
Australian Defence Force Publication
ADMIN
Administration
ADRM
Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual
ul
at
io
n
eg
R
ty
fe
Sa
n
tio
ia
Av
Authorised Engineering Organisation
80
00
AEP
AERO
AA
P
AESSO
AF
by
AFC
Aerodrome Emergency Plan
Aeronautical Engineer
Aerospace Equipment Systems Support Office
Air Force
Aviation Facilities Certificate
Application Identifier
Acceptance into Naval Service
AIOS
Acceptance into Operational Service
AIRAC
Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control
AIS
Aeronautical Information Service
AISP
Aeronautical Information Service Provider
ALARP
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
ALoR
Acceptable Level of Risk
ALoS
Acceptable Level of Safety
ALSE
Aeronautical Life Support Equipment
AMAFTU
Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit
rs
ed
ed
AINS
pe
Su
en
ce
D
ef
–
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11
AEO
AI
s
Abbreviations
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1
AAP 7001.048
List of Abbreviations
Definition
AMC
Acceptable Means of Compliance
AMD
Aircraft Maintenance Documentation
AME
Aeromedical evacuation
AMG
Air Mobility Group
AMO
Approved Maintenance Organisation
AMS
Airworthiness Management System
AMTC
Australian Military Type Certificate
AMTDU
Air Movements Training and Development Unit
AO
Above Obstacles
AOC
Air Operator Certificate
AOSG
Aerospace Operational Support Group
AP
Aeronautical Product
APTO
Aviation Physiology Training Officer
ARDU
Aircraft Research and Development Unit
ARFF
Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting
ARH
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter
AS
Accomplishment Summary
D
ef
Aviation Safety Committee
Aircraft Stores Clearance Engineering
ASI
Aircraft structural integrity
ASIC
Air and Space Interoperability Council
.0
11
–
ASCENG
Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan
Aviation safety management
80
00
ASM
ASMS
Aviation Safety Management System
AA
P
ASOR
ASR
by
AvSS
AvSSMP
ed
AT&E
ed
AvSSC
pe
rs
ATA
Aviation Safety Occurrence Report
Airworthiness Standards Representative
Aviation Support System(s)
Aviation Support System Certificate
Aviation Support System Management Plan
Acceptance test and evaluation
Air Traffic Advisory
Air Traffic Control
Su
ATC
ATE
Aircraft Test Equipment
ATECH
Aviation Technician
ATM
Air Traffic Management
ATMP
Air Traffic Management Plan
ATS
Air Traffic Service
ATSB
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
AL 8
ul
at
io
n
eg
R
ty
fe
Sa
n
tio
ia
Aircraft–stores compatibility
^
ASIMP
2
Av
en
ce
ASC *
ASC
s
Abbreviations
AAP 7001.048
List of Abbreviations
Definition
AUSCANUKUS
Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States
AUTHOP
Authority to Operate
AVMED
Aviation medicine
AVMO
Aviation Medical Officer
AVO
Air Vehicle Operator
AVRM
Aviation risk management
AwB
Airworthiness Board
AWR
Air Weapons Range
BAC
Battlefield airspace control
BASO
Base Aviation Safety Officer
BFT
Basic Flight Trainer
BOM
Bureau of Meteorology
CAA
Civil Aviation Authority (of New Zealand)
CAAP
Civil Aviation Advisory Publication
CAF
Chief of Air Force
CAMM2
Computer Aided Maintenance Management version 2
CAR
Corrective Action Request
CAR
Civil Aviation Regulation
CASA
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
CASG
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group
CASR
Civil Aviation Safety Regulation
CBD
Certification Basis Description
ul
at
io
n
eg
R
ty
fe
Sa
n
tio
Configuration Control Board
80
00
CDF
CDR
AA
P
CFU
CI
ed
by
CJOPS
Chief of Defence Force
Commander
Carried Forward Unserviceability
Configuration Item
Chief of Joint Operations
Capability Manager
Contingency Maintenance
CMP
Configuration Management Plan
CoA
Certificate of Airworthiness
rs
ed
CMAINT
pe
Su
ia
Av
en
ce
D
ef
–
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11
CCB
CM
s
Abbreviations
CoC
Certificate of Conformance
CoE
Centre of Expertise
COMD
Commander
COMFAA
Commander Fleet Air Arm
CONFIR
Confidential Incident Report
COSC
Chiefs of Service Committee
CRE
Configuration, Role and Environment
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3
AAP 7001.048
List of Abbreviations
Definition
CRM
Crew resource management
CTAF
Common Traffic Advisory Frequency
CVR
Cockpit Voice Recorder
DACPA
Director Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency
DAPA
Defence Airspace Policy Authority
DAR
Design Acceptance Representative
DASM
Defence Aviation Safety Manual
DASP
Defence Aviation Safety Program
DASSPA
Director of Aerospace Simulator and Special Purpose Aircraft
DCAF
Deputy Chief of Air Force
DCI
Decompression illness
DDAAFS
Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety
DDA
Defence Disposal Agency
Defence AA
Defence Aviation Authority
DEF STAN
Defence Standard
DGTA
Director General Technical Airworthiness
DGTA-ADF
Directorate General Technical Airworthiness– Agency
DI
Defence Instruction
DM
Deeper Maintenance
DOTAM
Directorate of Operations and Training Area Management
DPA
Defence Practice Area
DSN
Design Support Network
ul
at
io
n
Developmental test and evaluation
Engineering Authority
80
00
EA
EAC
Engineering Authority Certificate
AA
P
EASA
E&IG
by
ECP
ed
EO
ELS
ed
EMP
pe
rs
ENGO
European Aviation Safety Agency
Estate & Infrastructure Group
Engineering Change Proposal
Explosive Ordnance
Effective Level of Safety
Engineering Management Plan
Engineering Officer
Engineer
Su
ENGR
ESI
Engine structural integrity
ESIMP
Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan
FAA
Federal Aviation Administration (US)
FAC-A
Forward Air Controller - Airborne
FAR
Federal Aviation Regulations
FCI
Fighter Combat Instructor
AL 8
eg
R
ty
fe
Sa
n
tio
ia
Av
en
ce
D
ef
–
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DT&E
4
s
Abbreviations
AAP 7001.048
List of Abbreviations
Definition
FDR
Flight Data Recorder
FEG
Force Element Group
FID
Flight Information Documents
FIR
Flight Information Region
FIS
Flight Information Service
FLIP
Flight Information Publication
FMS
Flying Management System
FO
Flying Order
FOC
Full/Final Operational Capability
FOCFT
First of Class Flight Trial
FOD
Foreign Object Debris
FPS
Functional Performance Specification
FS
Flight Simulator
FSTD
Flight Simulation Training Device
FTAA
Flight Test Approval Authority
FTD
Flight Training Device
FTP
Flight Test Permit
FTO
Flight Test Organisation
FUA
Flexible Use Airspace
G
General
GM
Guidance Material
GCS
Ground Control Station
AA
P
GWEO
HAOW
ed
by
HASD
ul
at
io
n
eg
R
ty
fe
Ground Telecommunications Equipment System Program Office
Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Branch
Height Above Obstacles Within
Head Aerospace Systems Division
Head Helicopter System Division
Helicopter Landing Site
HMI
Human machine interface
HQ
Headquarters
ed
Sa
Ground Support Equipment
HLS
rs
n
tio
80
00
GTESPO
pe
ia
Ground Proximity Warning System
GSE
Su
Av
en
ce
D
ef
–
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11
GPWS
HHSD
s
Abbreviations
HTA
Hazard Tracking Authority
IAM
RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine
IATA
International Air Transport Association
ICA
Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization
IGW
Increased gross weight
ILS
Integrated Logistics Support
AL 8
5
AAP 7001.048
List of Abbreviations
Definition
IMI
Independent Maintenance Inspection
IOC
Initial Operational Capability
IOP
Installation Operating Permit
IRE
Instrument Rating Examiner
ISO
International Standards Organisation
JAA
Joint Aviation Authorities
JAR
Joint Airworthiness Requirements
JEWOSU
Joint Electronic Warfare Support Unit
JFLA
Joint Fuels and Lubricants Agency
JPR
Joint Personnel Recovery
JUA
Joint User Airspace
KCAS
Knots Calibrated Air Speed
KIARC
Kiowa Interim Aerial Reconnaissance Capability
LEA
Letter of Engineering Authority
LOADM
Loadmaster
LOAS
List of Assessed Spares
LOG
Logistics
LSAR
Logistic Support Analysis Record
LSE
Life Support Equipment
LVP
Low Visibility Procedures
MA
Maintenance Authority
MAA
Military Airworthiness Authority
Maintenance Approval Certificate
Manual of Air Traffic Services
80
00
MATS
MAUW
Maximum All Up Weight
AA
P
MCS
MDR
by
MEA
MEL
ed
MET
ed
MEAP
pe
rs
MILAVREG
Maritime Control Service
Maintenance Deficiency Report
Maintenance Engineering Analysis
Maintenance Engineering Analysis Plan
Minimum Equipment List
Meteorology
Military Aviation Regulation
Maintenance Manager
Su
MM
MMP
Maintenance Management Plan
MoD
UK Ministry of Defence
MOS
Manual of Standards
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
MP
Management Plan
MSD
Minimum Separation Distance
AL 8
ul
at
io
n
eg
R
ty
fe
Sa
n
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ia
Av
en
ce
D
ef
–
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MAC
6
s
Abbreviations
AAP 7001.048
List of Abbreviations
Definition
MSN
Maintenance Support Network
MTOW
Maximum Take-Off Weight
NAA
National Airworthiness Authority
NAS
Naval Air Station
NPRM
Notice of Proposed Rule Making
NZ
New Zealand
OA
Operational Airworthiness
OAA
Operational Airworthiness Authority
OAAR
Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative
OAAR(Acq)
Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (Acquisition)
OAMP
Operational Airworthiness Management Plan
OAR
Operational Airworthiness Regulator
OAREG
Operational Airworthiness Regulation
OBR
On-Board Recording
OC
Officer Commanding
OEM
Original Equipment Manufacturer
OFI
Operational Flying Instructor
OIP
Orders, Instructions and Publications
OLS
Obstacle Limitation Surfaces
OM
Operational Maintenance
OPHAZ
Operational Hazard
OPS
Operations
AA
P
PDAS
PEM
ed
by
PERS
ul
at
io
n
Operational Test and Evaluation
Pavement Classification Number
Project Design Acceptance Strategy
Project Engineering Manager
Personnel
Periodic Health Examination
Pilot
PPR
Prior Permission Required
PRD
Prohibited, Restricted and Danger (areas)
ed
PLT
rs
eg
R
80
00
PCN
pe
ty
fe
Sa
n
tio
Operational Support Network
OT&E
Su
ia
Av
en
ce
D
ef
–
.0
11
OSN
PHE
s
Abbreviations
QAI
Qualified Aviation Instructor
QFI
Qualified Flying Instructor
QHI
Qualified Helicopter Instructor
QMS
Quality Management System
QTP
Qualified Test Pilot
RA
Restricted Area
RAAF
Royal Australian Air Force
AL 8
7
AAP 7001.048
List of Abbreviations
Definition
RAN
Royal Australian Navy
RDS
Runway Distance Supplement
RHA
Risk Hazard Analysis
RP
Remote Pilot
RPA
Remotely Piloted Aircraft
RPAS
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
RPT
Regular Public Transport
RTS
Raise, Train and Sustain
RVR
Runway Visual Range
SA
Segregated Airspace
SAF
Ship Aviation Facility
SAR
Search and rescue
SARPS
Standards and Recommended Practices (ICAO)
SASOR
Supplementary Aviation Safety Occurrence Report
SATCO
Senior Air Traffic Control Officer
SAVMO
Senior Aviation Medical Officer
SB
Service Bullet
SCIS
Safety Critical Items and Systems
SCR
Safety Case Report
SDE
Senior Design Engineer
SESAHA
Specialist Employment Stream Annual Health Assessment
SFI
Special Flying Instruction
ul
at
io
n
eg
R
ty
fe
Sa
n
tio
ia
So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable
Special Flight Permit
80
00
SFP
SHOL
Ship Helicopter Operating Limits
AA
P
SI
SI(AVN)
by
SMM
ed
SMS
ed
SOI
pe
rs
SOW
Standing Instruction
Standing Instructions (Army Aviation)
Senior Maintenance Manager
Safety Management System
Statement of Operating Intent
Statement of Requirement
Statement of Work
Systems Program Office
Su
SPO
8
Av
en
ce
D
ef
–
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SFARP
SOR
s
Abbreviations
SR
Service Release
SRA
Supplemental Role Approval
SSAMA
Senior Service Aviation Medical Advisor
STC
Supplemental Type Certificate
STD
Synthetic Training Device
STI
Special Technical Instruction
AL 8
AAP 7001.048
List of Abbreviations
Definition
T&E
Test and Evaluation
TAA
Technical Airworthiness Authority
TAAC
Technical Airworthiness Advisory Circular
TAAI
Technical Airworthiness Alert Information
TAC
Terminal Attack Control
TAD
Technical Airworthiness Directives
TAR
Technical Airworthiness Regulator
TAMM
Technical Airworthiness Management Manual
TAREG
Technical Airworthiness Regulation
TCDS
Type Certification Data Sheet
TEMP
Test and Evaluation Master Plan
TI
Technical Information
TLS
Through Life Support
TMA
Temporary Maintenance Authority
TMP
Technical Management Plan
TMUFF
Temporarily Medically Unfit For Flying related duties
TRR
Test Readiness Review
UA
Unmanned Aircraft
UAS
Unmanned Aircraft System
UASOP
Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit
UAT
Unmanned Aerial Target
UK
United Kingdom
.0
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D
ef
en
ce
Av
ia
tio
n
Sa
fe
ty
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
s
Abbreviations
UPT
User Preferred Trajectories
80
00
USA
WHMP
Wildlife Hazard Management Plan
Warbird, Historic and Replica Aircraft
Su
pe
rs
ed
ed
by
AA
P
WHRA
United States of America
AL 8
9