Delex Maritime
Analysis Center
(DMAC)
Suez Canal Security Tracker
August 2013
Table of Contents
Introduction
P. 3
Risk Assessment: Threats to Transiting Vessels, the Suez Canal
Authority, Canal Infrastructure, and the SUMED Pipeline
P. 4
Maps & Images of Potential Targets for Attack
P. 14
Briefing 1: Sinai Instability and Suez Canal Security
P. 21
Briefing 2: Political Upheaval and the Suez Canal
P. 23
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Delex Maritime Analysis Center (DMAC)
Suez Security Tracker
As months of massive opposition protests culminated on July 3, 2013 in a military coup against Egyptian
President Mohamed Morsi, the eyes of the commercial maritime industry were fixated on the Suez
Canal. Though the general report from the vital waterway is ‘business as usual,’ the political and security
situation in Egypt remains incredibly fluid. In the restless Sinai Peninsula, militant groups have seized a
perceived moment of weakness to launch a fresh round of attacks against Egyptian authorities. In the
major cities, including those along the Canal, pro- and anti-Morsi demonstrations have turned violent,
resulting in dozens of deaths. Military deployments have been increased in the Canal Zone, but the
balance between security and efficiency is a delicate one.
The Delex Maritime Analysis Center (DMAC) Suez Security Tracker assists Canal users mitigate
operational risk by providing timely and continuous analysis of Egypt’s political and security
environment and assessing the implications for the Suez Canal. Issue Briefings assist in contextualizing
unfolding events and promoting threat understanding, while a series of Risk Assessments cover
vulnerable targets for attack, mitigating security measures, and the potential impact of worst-case
scenarios. The aim is to reduce the uncertainty surrounding operational risk and thereby enable Canal
users to make better-informed decisions and contingency plans.
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Delex Maritime Analysis Center (DMAC)
Suez Security Tracker
Risk Assessment 1:
Threats to Transiting Vessels, the Suez Canal Authority, Canal Infrastructure, and
the SUMED Pipeline
While there has been no explicit declaration, a potential threat to Suez Canal operations exists because
militant groups have demonstrated their capability and intention to launch attacks against the authority
and vital interests of the Egyptian state. The following is the first Risk Assessment in the DMAC Suez
Security Tracker series, which analyzes vulnerable targets for attack, mitigating security measures, and
the potential impact of worst-case scenarios. The aim is to reduce the uncertainty surrounding
operational risk and thereby enable Canal users to make better-informed decisions and contingency
plans.
Vulnerability I: Vessel Attack
Hijack/Scuttle with Intent to Block Canal – p. 6
o Probability of Occurrence: Very Low – p. 6
o Potential Impact: High – p. 6
o Risk Level: Low – p. 6
RPG/Missile Attack against Vessel – p. 7
o Probability of Occurrence: Low – p. 7
o Potential Impact: Medium-High – p. 7
o Risk Level: Medium – p. 7
Vulnerability II: Attack on Suez Canal Authority
Attack on SCA Administrative or Control Center – p. 8
o Probability of Occurrence: Medium-Low – p. 8
o Potential Impact: High – p. 8
o Risk Level: Medium-Low – p. 8
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Attack on SCA Personnel – p. 8
o Probability of Occurrence: Medium – p. 8
o Potential Impact: Low – p. 9
o Risk Level: Low – p. 9
Attack on SCA Pilots – p. 9
o Probability of Occurrence: Medium – p. 9
o Potential Impact: High – p. 9
o Risk Level: Medium-High – p. 9
Vulnerability III: Attack on Suez Canal Infrastructure
Collapse Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel – p. 10
o Probability of Occurrence: Medium – p. 10
o Potential Impact: Low – p. 10
o Risk Level: Medium-Low – p. 10
Mine Approaches – p. 10
o Probability of Occurrence: Low – p. 10
o Potential Impact: High – p. 11
o Risk Level: Low-Medium – p. 11
Drop Highway/Railway Bridge – p. 11
o Probability of Occurrence: Low – p. 11
o Potential Impact: High – p. 11
o Risk Level: Low – p.11
Port/Cargo Facilities Attack – p. 12
o Probability of Occurrence: Medium – p. 12
o Potential Impact: Low – p. 12
o Risk Level: Medium-Low – p. 12
Vulnerability IV: Attack on SUMED Pipeline and Facilities
Attack on SUMED Pipeline – p. 12
o Probability of Occurrence: Medium-High – p. 13
o Potential Impact: High – p. 13
o Risk Level: High – p. 13
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Vulnerability I: Vessel Attack
There is currently a low probability of an attack against a vessel transiting the Canal, but such an attack
could potentially have significant adverse effects on Suez operations. The worst-case scenario would be
a single large ship that, if scuttled at an ideal location, could obstruct the Canal and stop traffic until
salvage is completed. Such an attack could occur via hijacking or infiltration, or by detonating explosives
next to the vessel. A less significant, but more probable, scenario would be an isolated small arms attack
against a transiting vessel.
Hijack/Scuttle with Intent to Block Canal
Probability of Occurrence: Very Low
Incidents of maritime terrorism are rare (accounting for less than 2% of the global terrorist attacks)
because of the intensive preparation and specialist maritime and technical skill required to mount an
attack on water. Scuttling a vessel with the intent to block the Canal would require the attackers to have
access to a large quantity of explosives and the ability to deliver them via hijacking or infiltration, or by
detonating explosives (for instance, a small explosive laden boat) next to the ship.
As they are currently locked in a struggle with the Egyptian military, there is currently little indication
that Sinai militants would divert resource to launch a complex strike at a transiting vessel. Although
there have been reports of Iranian agents plotting terror attacks on Israeli ships in the Canal, it is
unlikely that Iran or any other Canal-using state would launch an attack that damages its own economic
interests. An al-Qaeda affiliate would be the most likely group to attempt to block the Canal. Jihadist
chatter from Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) prompted a heightened security
alert for shipping companies operating off the Yemeni coast in early August. Reports of a foiled AQAP
plot to seize ports and oil facilities in southern Yemen indicate that maritime terrorism remains an
integral component of the militants’ strategy. That said, the robust security architecture of the Suez
Canal makes it a less attractive target for attack, given the high cost and low probability for success.
Potential Impact: High
The scuttling of one or more large vessels in the Canal or at its bottleneck approaches is one of the few
ways an outside actor could force the waterway’s closure. As a point of reference, the Canal remained
blocked from 1967 to 1975 because of mines and war debris. The sudden closure of the Suez Canal
would force transiting vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, incurring increased fuel costs
and supply chain delays. While the impact would be severe, such an attack is not be expected to close
the Canal for longer than a week, given the speed in which previous blockages have been cleared.
Risk Level: Low
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RPG/Missile Attack against Vessel
More plausible, would be an isolated attack (such as firing a Rocket Propelled Grenade [RPG], anti-tank,
or anti-aircraft missile) on a vessel in transit or at anchor, as regional actors are known to be in
possession of such weapons. RPGs fired by Somali pirates have penetrated bridges and staff
accommodations of target vessels, resulting in fires and evacuations. Advanced anti-tank weapons pose
a greater threat, as they are able to penetrate the hulls of most ships and could disable a vessel if they
hit the rudder, bridge, engine room or fuel tanks.
Probability of Occurrence: Low
The probability of such an attack is currently low because the Egyptian military has heightened security
along the entire length of the Canal and its approaches, while military aircraft and armored and
mounted infantry units patrol the banks.
A disabled or evacuated vessel could be cleared relatively quickly from the Canal, while a blockage
resulting from a ship running aground would take a day or two to clear. Heightened Egyptian security
following an attack may also result in reduced convoy schedules and delays.
Potential Impact: Medium-High
The impact of such an attack would depend on the type of vessel. Attacks on cargo ships in other regions
(such as Nigerian and Somali waters) have resulted in delays to repair damage and detainment by
authorities for investigation. It is not likely that serious mechanical damage could be repaired
satisfactorily in an Egyptian shipyard, meaning that the vessel would have to be towed elsewhere, likely
to Greece or Italy. Such an attack may also cause a spike in insurance premiums and demands for
hazardous pay, resulting in a cost calculation to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope.
Tankers face these same impacts from an attack, with the heightened environmental risk and cleanup
costs that may arise from an oil spill. Cruise ships are the most vulnerable to heightened Canal risk, as
any attack in Egyptian waters would see the industry divert away from the country’s ports and Canal.
Risk Level: Medium
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Vulnerability II: Attack on Suez Canal Authority
An attack on the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) could encompass the raiding or bombing of an
administrative building, such as the SCA control center in Ismailia, the signal station in Port Tewfik, or
the pilot houses along the Canal. SCA personnel and pilots are other potential targets, with the pilots
being the most vulnerable due to their high involvement with Canal traffic.
Attack on SCA Administrative or Control Center
Probability of Occurrence: Medium-Low
An attack on a SCA building (such as a car bomb or other explosive) would require getting past SCA
checkpoints and close to the intended target. Sinai militants have frequently targeted symbols of
Egyptian authority and may extend their fight to the SCA if their conflict with the military intensifies.
There is also the risk that extremist elements of the anti-military opposition could target the SCA as a
way of undermining military rule. Port Said has already witnessed two attacks on government
installations since Morsi’s ousting. Mob violence due to political unrest is the most likely scenario for an
attack on SCA property. Last year’s Port Said soccer riots are an example of how destructive mob
violence can be, with government buildings usually being the preferred target.
Potential Impact: High
A significant attack on the Ismailia control center, could delay shipping by disrupting vessel monitoring
and convoy traffic. If damage to an SCA building were minor, normal operations would ensue. An attack
would also most likely result in increased patrols by authorities. In sum, an attack on SCA facilities would
be more damaging to the SCA itself than to Canal traffic.
Risk Level: Medium-Low
Attack on SCA Personnel
Probability of Occurrence: Medium
An attack or ambush on SCA personnel, including administrators, traffic operators and tug operators, is
more probable, and could be launched by Sinai militants or violent opposition factions from the
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mainland. Both groups have clashed with the Egyptian military and police and could strike at SCA
personnel as another way to undermine government authority. Potential perpetrators may dress in
disguise as SCA employees, as has been the modus operandi of extremists in Sinai. There is also the risk
that SCA personnel may be harmed or incapacitated by spontaneous mob violence that frequently
appears in the Canal cities.
Potential Impact: Low
An attack on SCA employees could cause temporary delays on the waterway. However, it would most
likely not shutdown the Canal or disrupt shipping unless the casualties resulted in a significant
knowledge or technical gap for the SCA.
Risk Level: Low
Attack on SCA Pilots
Probability of Occurrence: Medium
The most vulnerable SCA personnel with the greatest impact on Canal operations are the pilots who
guide ships through the Canal, as pilotage is compulsory for all vessels when entering, leaving, and
transiting the Canal and the Port Said and Suez harbors. If an attack were specifically aimed at disrupting
pilotage service, it would need to be a coordinated strike against one or more pilot houses.
Potential Impact: High
A coordinated strike against the pilot exchange at Ismailia resulting in numerous casualties could slow
traffic if inexperienced are then forced to navigate or delay transits if there are not enough pilots
available.
Risk Level: Medium-High
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Vulnerability III: Attack on Suez Canal Infrastructure
Our analysis of the Suez Canal infrastructure has identified four potential high-profile targets for
terrorist attack: the Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel, the anchorage areas, the two bridges (highway and railway)
and port/cargo facilities (see Appendix). In anticipation of large political protests, the SCA shuts down all
bridges and roads near the Canal to secure the waterway from potential threats, such as car bombs.
However, these stringent security measures are not an everyday occurrence.
Collapse Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel
Probability of Occurrence: Medium
The Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel is moderately vulnerable to an attack due to poor security. Several trucks
have been stopped inside the tunnel and found with explosives onboard. Most of the seized vehicles
were smuggling explosives to the Sinai Peninsula. There has been no deliberate attack against the tunnel
to date, but with the demonstrated use of the tunnel to transport illegal explosives, a car/truck
exploding while being inspected is a concern.
Potential Impact: Low
Unless a tunnel collapse affected the floor of the canal (unlikely due to the high amount of explosives
needed and the reinforced concrete design of the tunnel), an explosion inside the tunnel would most
likely not have a direct impact on Canal traffic. Delays due to any repair work from the surface of the
Canal or resulting from investigations would likely be minor.
Risk Level: Medium-Low
Mine Approaches
Probability of Occurrence: Low
A mine attack against Canal infrastructure would likely be directed at the northern and southern
anchorage zones of Port Said and Port Suez. The probability of this type of an attack is low, but if
achieved, it would have significant impact on Canal shipping. Given heightened security inside the Canal,
the ideal location for a mine approach would be in the anchorage zones outside of Port Said and Port
Suez. Naval mines are attractive to extremists because they are cheap to manufacture. However, they
are difficult to deploy since the perpetrators would need to navigate a vessel in a high traffic and heavily
watched area.
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Potential Impact: High
Detection of mines in the anchorage areas would effectively stop traffic though the Canal until secure
channels could be swept and new traffic patterns/procedures put in place. Depending on availability of
minesweeping craft/equipment, this could take up to several weeks. In addition to any ships damaged
by mine contact, other ships in the anchorage would be delayed until minefield extent is determined.
Diverting ships en route to the Canal would be also required. An attempt to mine the approaches would
likely result in higher risk premiums being applied vessel and cargo insurance until the Canal area is
confirmed clear.
Risk Level: Low-Medium
Drop Highway/Railway Bridge
Probability of Occurrence: Low
Both of the bridges (Suez Canal Bridge and El Ferdan Railway Bridge) crossing the Canal are potential
targets. An attack against a Canal bridge would be difficult to accomplish, as it (a) would require a large
amount of explosives, (b) specialized structural engineering knowledge and (c) time to set charges in a
high security environment. The Egyptian military has bridge watch-keepers, duty officers and detailed
lookouts always on alert for anything suspicious on or around these important structures.
Potential Impact: High
A successful attack would have high impact on shipping in the Canal. If either the highway or railway
bridge was attacked it could cause delays, depending on how much of the bridge was disabled and the
level of debris in the Canal. Even minimal damage could lead to convoy delays while the bridge’s
structural integrity is assessed. If all or part of the bridge structure was dropped into the water, it could
close the Canal for days or weeks until the obstructions are removed. Any successful terrorist attack on
Canal infrastructure will likely put pressure on crew wages and insurance rates.
Risk Level: Low
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Port/Cargo Facilities Attack
Probability of Occurrence: Medium
Sites such as the Suez Canal Container Terminal (SCCT) are possible targets for individuals or
organizations wishing to make a political statement. An attack against the port/cargo facilities has a
medium probability of occurring, but its impact would be minimal to vessels using the waterway. The
most vulnerable targets would be quay and rubber tired gantry cranes (RTGs), containers and trucks
inside of Port Said and Port Suez terminals. An attack with typical standoff-weapons would most likely
not be powerful enough to shut down the Canal due to the location of the facilities being off of the main
convoy traffic lane.
Potential Impact: Low
The result of an attack would be damaged goods, delays and the deployment of more security to
reinforce the Canal. Destruction to sites such as the SCCT could subject transport vehicles, such as
container hustlers and trailers, to extensive delays. The perpetrator’s weapons of choice would probably
be stand-off arms such as RPGs, mortars and machine guns. If the attackers hit the offshore petroleum
terminal near the Port of Suez, the damage and delays could be worse due to the chance of fire or a
large explosion.
Risk Level: Medium-Low
Vulnerability IV: Attack on SUMED Pipeline and Facilities
The Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline runs from Ain Sukhna on the Gulf of Suez to Sidi Kerir on the
Mediterranean (see Appendix). The pipeline accommodates the passage of very large crude carriers
(VLCCs), which sit too low for transit when fully loaded, by allowing them to partially unload their
product at the southern entrance to the Canal and reload at the other end. With a carrying capacity of
2.5 million barrels a day, the pipeline moves more oil than the Canal, meaning that a disruption to
SUMED would have a bigger impact on the tanker market than a closure of the Suez Canal. Its great
strategic and economic value makes the pipeline a prime target for militant groups. Though security has
been heighted in the wake of recent instability and terrorist threats, the 200-mile length of the
aboveground pipe is inherently vulnerable.
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Probability of Occurrence: Medium-High
An attack on SUMED is judged to have a high probability as it fits the current modus operandi of the
Sinai militants. The Sinai pipelines supplying Egyptian natural gas to Israel and Jordan have been
attacked at least 16 times since the February 2011 revolution, resulting in frequent disruptions to the
cross border trade. Other Egyptian or foreign groups may also seek to attack SUMED as a way to
undermine Egypt’s military and interim government and raise their public profile. Militants are unable to
move as freely through mainland Egypt as they are through Sinai making an attack on SUMED more
difficult than previous gas pipeline bombings. In the wake of the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian army
doubled the number of sentry posts along SUMED and have implemented further security measures in
recent weeks.
Potential Impact: High
There will be significant consequences for the global tanker industry if a militant attack was able to
disrupt SUMED. RPG or missile fire would result in minor damage, likely shutting down the pipeline for a
number of days, while a car bomb or IED could disrupt the flow for a week or more. During this period,
fully-laden VLCCs would be unable to transit the Canal and forced to reroute or carry reduced cargo. This
would have the greatest impact on VLCCs carrying Gulf crude oil to Western markets, as they would
have to sail round the Cape of Good Hope to reach Europe and North America, adding an extra 3,500
miles and five to six days to the transit from Saudi Arabia to the U.S. The tanker industry would likely
adopt strategies to mitigate this disruption, such as forgoing VLCCs and using extra SUEZMAX tankers to
supply Western markets.
Risk Level: High
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Maps and Images of Potential Targets for Attack
A = El Ferdan Railway Bridge
B = Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel
C = Ain Sukhna Terminal (SUMED Pipeline)
D = Suez Canal Bridge
E = Sidi Kerir Terminal (SUMED Pipeline)
F = Suez Canal Container Terminal (SCCT)
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El Ferdan Railway Bridge
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Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel
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Ain Sukhna Terminal (SUMED)
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Suez Canal Bridge
18
Sidi Kerir Terminal
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Suez Canal Container Terminal (SCCT)
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Briefing 1: Sinai Instability and Suez Canal Security
Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula became increasingly lawless and violent following the January 2011 Egyptian
Revolution, a situation which has only worsened since the July 3 ousting of President Mohammed Morsi.
This security vacuum has emboldened a number of insurgent groups, who now launch attacks against
government forces on a near daily basis. Though insurrection is largely contained to northeast Sinai, the
Suez Canal is only 150km away and its infrastructure may become a target of the well-armed insurgents
as they find themselves locked in a protracted struggle with Egypt’s military government. It is thus in the
interests of Canal users to understand the drivers of this instability and its potential impacts on
commercial operations.
Militant Actors and Organization
The Sinai’s Bedouin tribesmen, facing social and economic marginalization from Cairo, have engaged in
low-level conflict against the states for decades. The fate of the Sinai became intertwined with that of
the Gaza Strip once Hamas Islamists took control of the territory in 2007, as Bedouin-controlled
smuggling tunnels allowed Palestinian militants to spread a Salafist Jihadi ideology throughout the
Peninsula. Attacks against Egyptian soldiers persisted after the June 2012 election of Mohamed Morsi
and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), with the military criticizing the government for giving a free hand to
the militants and halting planned offenses against them. There are claims that the military’s ousting of
President Morsi drove factions of the MB to ferment armed revolt in the Sinai, but a more tempered
explanation for the recent uptick in violence is that existing militant groups are attempting to press an
advantage against the preoccupied and overextended Egyptian military.
Though the number and organization of insurgent groups is unclear, there are now thought to be some
1,000 militants operating in the Sinai. Membership is fluid between Salafi Bedouin factions, including
Ansar Jerusalem, Ansar al-Shariah, Tawhid al-Jihad and Tafkir Wal Hijra, and offshoots of Palestinian
groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who are united in their goal of ridding the Sinai of Egyptian
authority. Certain groups have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda doctrine and maintain communication
with jihadists in the Arabian Peninsula, but formal links between the global terrorist organization and
Sinai militants remain scant. Shortly after Morsi’s ousting, a Sinai “War Council” was announced as an
attempt to organize the militant groups’ fight against the Egyptian army.
Patterns of Attack: Targets, Capability & Tactics
The targets of militant attacks are usually symbols of Egypt’s political and military authority in the
Peninsula, including security checkpoints, police stations, administrative buildings and army camps.
Militants have also struck at critical infrastructure such as oil pipelines to Israel and Jordan, power
stations, and the airport at El-Arish.
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An influx of weapons looted from Libya and the function of Gaza as a smuggling hub has meant that
Sinai militants are increasingly well armed, brandishing unguided missiles, rocket propelled grenades
(RPGs), mortars, anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine guns. The insurgents commonly employ guerrilla
tactics, showering their targets with sniper, rocket and mortar fire before fleeing on 4x4s back into the
desert and mountains.
Recent attacks have been largely concentrated in northeast Sinai around the provincial capital of ElArish and the city of Rafah on the Gaza border, but the militants have previously demonstrated their
ability to strike further afield. For example, Bedouin and Palestinian terrorist groups, including Tawhid al
Jihad, were behind a series of bombings at resort towns along the southeast Sinai coast between 2004
and 2006. In August 2011, Sinai militants crossed into Israel just north of Eilat and killed eight Israelis in a
series of ambushes.
The Threat to Suez
Throughout recent unrest, the Suez Canal has operated with minimal disruption and has not been the
target of a significant attack. That said, there is the risk that a Sinai-based militant group may attempt to
strike at the Canal or its infrastructure with the goal of undermining and embarrassing the Egyptian
army. The legitimacy and support the military government receives is largely based on the relative
stability it provides, to the Canal Zone in particular. As the military attempts to suppress insurrection in
Sinai, an attack on a transiting vessel or the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) oil pipeline would
demonstrate to Egypt and the world that the military is unable to protect the country’s vital interests.
Sinai militant groups have established their will, capacity, and interest to strike at the vital interests of
the Egyptian state, and there are several indicators that the Canal Zone is a target. On July 8, armed
gunmen attacked the Port Said traffic police directorate and the city’s western seaport in a series of
drive-by shootings that mirrored those seen in northeast Sinai. There are also indications that militants
may attempt to use Grad missiles or other rockets to strike Canal targets. On June 25, a rocket fired
from central Sinai landed in an empty area east of the Canal in what Egyptian officials speculate may
have been a military drill by an insurgent group. It was also reported that another inaccurate rocket
launch in early July was an attempt to hit oil installations in the city of Suez. In addition, according to
Egyptian military sources, an attempt to attack SCA facilities by Sinai insurgents was foiled on August 9.
Forcing a closure of the Canal would be incredibly difficult, but options for disruption are many. Regional
security expert Ehud Yaari notes that even a lone jihadist in the Sinai could fire an anti-tank missile or
RPG at a ship moving slowly through the Suez. This would be unlikely to block the Canal, but may result
in delays, increased insurance premiums, and demands for hazard pay for shipping.
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Briefing 2: Political Upheaval and the Suez Canal
The demonstrations surrounding the ouster of Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi have resulted in
protests and violent clashes between supporters and opponents of the fallen Islamist president in many
cities across Egypt, including the Suez Canal region. Since the initial protests on June 30, at least 265
people have been killed. Throughout the violence and chaos, however, both sides have stated that they
will not disrupt shipping in the Canal because it is a vital part of Egypt’s economy. Despite the informal
declaration, political unrest in Egypt may cause unintended delays to the Canal
Military Movements
On May 18, Egyptian security forces closed the airport and seaport in Sinai’s el-Arish, in protest of the
kidnapping of their colleague. This type of incident could occur in the Canal port cities if the unrest
continues to escalate. The movement of troops and vehicles across the Canal on their way to the
restless Sinai Peninsula could also cause unintended delays. This scenario occurred on May 20 and
briefly halted Canal traffic. On June 18, in preparation for the massive anti-government protests on the
30th, the Interior Minister closed down the tunnels and ferries over the Suez Canal in order to prevent
the crossing of extremists. More recently on August 12, the Egyptian military and SCA have tightened
security along the Canal and neighboring roads, including close inspections of vehicles heading to and
from Sinai. Furthermore, aircraft have been deployed to protect vessels transiting the Canal. Troop
movements and unintended Canal disruptions could escalate as the Egyptian army prepares for a large
military offensive in the Sinai.
Effects of Heightened Insecurity
The instability in Egypt has caused cruise lines to cancel their ports of call. In addition, some Turkish
heavy-freight trucks were blocked at Port Said and Port Tewfik in July due to the political unrest.
According to Turkish sources, the Egyptian authorities were not providing the needed security escort,
forcing the drivers to wait at the port. A heightened level of insecurity has also contributed to a rise in
maritime robberies at the anchorages of Suez, Port Said and Alexandria. The number of reported
incidents has increased steadily throughout 2012-2013, with robbers commonly able to escape with
stolen stores before called port authorities arrive.
An influx in smuggled weapons has led Suez Canal Authority (SCA) officials to inspect transiting ships
more thoroughly. The Egyptian Navy in Port Said is carrying out inspections of vessels on behalf of the
SCA Inspection Committee. The Navy is selecting vessels at random to assure that there are no weapons
or illegal cargo onboard. If a vessel does not cooperate with the inspection, it could lead to the ship
being delayed for up to seven days, while a more thorough investigation takes place.
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Persistent Protests
Most of the current protests are by Morsi supporters (Islamists) and are concentrated in Cairo. The
message that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) demonstrators are sending is that Egypt will become
ungovernable unless Morsi is reinstated as president, something the military and interim government
will not do. The tightknit MB remains powerful in the streets, as they claim to represent 20 to 30
percent of the Egyptian electorate. The military has called their supporters to also take to the street and
give the interim government a mandate to confront “violence and terrorism.”
There have been several violent clashes between security forces and Morsi supporters, the deadliest
incident occurred on July 26 - 27, when over 80 people (mainly Islamists) were killed and more than 750
wounded. This event has caused renewed fervor for the MB’s political fight. The two sides are now
locked in zero sum game, with little indication that a compromise will be reached in the coming weeks.
There is a very low probability that the MB will abandon its current strategy of sit-ins and protests in
favor of armed revolt against the military. However, if the military continues to violently disperse the
protests, the risk increases that certain individuals or factions of the MB will breakaway and adopt more
extreme tactics. There are reports that some Islamists have fled mainland Egypt to join the insurrection
currently waged in the Sinai. Other protest groups have threated to block roads and railways, and attack
security directorates and public facilities if the military attempts to break up sit-ins or gatherings.
The longer the protests continue, the harder it will be for the MB to prevent its members from engaging
in violent clashes. The worst case scenario for the Canal would be if individual Islamists become so
frustrated with the Egyptian government that they resort to economic destabilization by disrupting the
Canal. It is also possible that continued military violence against Islamist protestors could lead other
political groups, such as the Salafists (ultra-conservative Islamists), to abandon mainstream politics in
favor of armed conflict. If such groups flee the political system, it could equate to targeted attacks
against the backbone of the Egyptian economy: the Suez Canal, the SUMED pipeline and tourist centers.
There is currently little indication that either the MB or the Salafists will adopt these tactics, but it is a
threat that will remain until normalcy returns to Egypt.
Securing the Canal
Though there has not yet been a concerted attempt to disrupt the Canal as a symbol of protest, the
cities along the waterway have witnessed a series of politically fueled clashes in recent weeks. On July
21, over 100 people were wounded in an hours-long street fight between pro- and anti-Morsi groups in
Suez. Similar clashes have also occurred in Ismailia and Port Said. As of this publication, however, the
Egyptian Armed Forces have been able to quell the violence, resulting in no reported delays or
disruptions to the Suez Canal.
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