The Mexican War on Drugs from a Human
Rights and Development Perspective
Fernando ELIZONDO GARCÍA1
Abstract
Mexico is currently undergoing one of the hardest moments in history. The war on
drugs waged by the mexican government has brought many negative consequences
such as high murder rates and an increase in crime throughout the country. After
almost six years of war, the results are not necessarily encouraging. This article seeks
to demonstrate how a change in perspective is necessary. The use of human rights
based approach in the war on drugs could bring important changes to the current
strategy used by the government and, hopefully, improve the results achieved up
until today.
1
Juris Doctor (Licenciado en Derecho), Facultad Libre de Derecho de Monterrey.
Master in Laws concentrating in human rights, Harvard Law School.
Contents:
I. Introduction II. The social relevance of mexican drug cartels
III. The mexican war on drugs in a nutshell
IV. A change in perspective: from citizen security to a human
rights based and development approach
V. Conclusions
I. Introduction
Since late 2006, the mexican government has been waging a very important war against the mexican drug cartels. Soon after his election, President Felipe Claderón decided on a major shift in policy from a former
“toleration” of the drug cartels to declaring a war against and combating
them actively. From that day on, the mexican federal government has
been spending a lot of resources in waging that fight. The military has
been deployed to the streets, security budgets have been increased, both
at the federal and local levels, initiatives are underway to strengthen and
professionalize police forces, etc.
After 5 years of war, many positive results have been accomplished.
Several leaders of the most important drug cartels in the country have either been detained or neutralized during military operations. Detentions
have also included other members of the cartels and even public officers
that have been found to be working for or supporting the drug trafficking organizations. Thousands of tons of drugs have been confiscated and
laboratories and drug crops destroyed.
Unfortunately, not all results have been positive. At this point, the
death toll in Mexico is “higher than combat-related deaths in places like
Iraq and Afghanistan”2. Data released in January of 2011 by the federal
government revealed that since the beginning of the so called “war on
2
José de Córdoba and David Luhnow, In Mexico, Death Toll in Drug War Hits Record, Wall
Street Journal, (Jan. 13. 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870388920457607
8363012731514.html
64 . Derecho en Libertad
drugs” 34,612 people have been killed, including members of the drug
cartels, members of the military and other enforcement bodies, as well as
civilians that were casualties of the war3.
In addition to the death toll, the war-like situation that the country
is currently experiencing has caused many other unfortunate effects.
People are being deprived of property or put out of business by the
drug cartels. Many families have relocated into different areas of the
country or have left the country all together. Tourism has been severely
affected after the increasing international media coverage of the violence
in Mexico. And, in general, people live in a constant state of fear. Forced
to change their daily habits, many people are even afraid to be on the
streets for fear of being caught in a crossfire.
Up to this point, the federal government has been focused on the
security aspect of the drug issues: deploying the military and increasing
security budgets. Unfortunately, many other aspects of the drug violence
have been neglected, resulting in a mono focal strategy that appears to be
having more failures than successes. It is necessary to stop for a second
and question the very nature of the strategy that is currently being used.
This paper seeks to analyze and shed light on other aspects of the
drug-related violence that have been largely neglected. Using a similar
method to that of the rights-based approach to development, I intend to
look past the initial security concerns of the current situation and take a
look at underlying causes of the drug violence.
The first section will focus on explaining some of the social-related
aspects of the drug cartels, particularly focusing on their relevance for society. The second section will then look into the general current strategy,
pointing out some of the successes and failures of said policy. Finally, the
third section proposes a change in focus. Premised on the findings of the
first sections, I argue that using a rights-based approach to the war on
drugs could lead to a more comprehensive policy.
It is important to point out that, due to the complexity of the issue,
any attempt at policy considerations would exceed the scope of this paper. Instead, what I seek to achieve is to frame the issue of drug violence
3
Presidencia de la República, Base de datos de fallecimientos ocurridos por presunta rivalidad
delincuencial, http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-fallecimientos/, (last visited,
May 5, 2011)
The Mexican war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective . 65
and the war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective
to highlight the necessity of including said aspects in designing a more
holistic strategy to combat the drug cartels.
II. The social relevance of mexican drug cartels
Drug production and trafficking in Mexico is, and has been for a long
time, a very important source of revenue for the country. “In short, the
Mexican drug business can be characterized by a billion-dollar illegal industry that produces and transports marijuana, cocaine and heroin into
the US.”4 Regardless of the illegality of the industry5, many recognize the
economic importance of this business and even rank it high among the
most profitable industries in the country. The revenue generated just by
the sale of marihuana alone in 2008 exceeded that of the number one
agricultural export product of Mexico (tomato) by approximately 930%6.
Similarly, comparing the price that is paid to the peasant, marihuana is
16 times a better business than vanilla (the most expensive product) or
50 times better than almond (the second best paid product). In relation
to corn, weed is paid close to 300 times better7.
It is clear, just by looking at the size of the industry, that the drug
trade and production business in Mexico is not an easy one to tackle.
Given its position in the economic ranks of the country, not only is it
inherently hard to eradicate but can also bring about significant consequences if managed to be destroyed. According to Rios, there exists
already an example of this in history when the Mexican Government
4
Viridiana Rios, Evaluating the economic impact of drug traffic in Mexico, (Working Paper),
available at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/people/viridiana-rios-contreras (last visited, Apr.
27, 2011)
5
Viridiana Rios, Evaluating the economic impact of drug traffic in Mexico, (Working
Paper), available at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/people/viridiana-rios-contreras (last visited,
Apr. 27, 2011)
6
Ana Arana, Narco SA, una empresa global, (July 20, 2009) http://www.cnnexpansion.
com/expansion/2009/07/17/narco-sa
7
Reforma as cited by Carlos Resa Nestares, La Organización de la Producción de Drogas en
México, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, (last updated Feb. 27, 2001), http://www.uam.es/
personal_pdi/economicas/cresa/text10.html
66 . Derecho en Libertad
called off “Operación Condor”8 for economic-related reasons: “the abrupt
stop of drug income created severe economic destabilization into the
region9.”
But why has the illicit drug industry become such an important
force in Mexico? Several reasons can be advanced to exemplify the importance of this business for the mexican economy. First of all, mexican
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are important sources of employment for many people. DTOs currently employ close to half a million
individuals in Mexico for various purposes such as crop growing, drug
transportation and private security; a number which is 25% higher than
the number of people employed worldwide by McDonald’s10.Out of this
figure, “there are roughly 200,000 people earning a living growing drug
crops (the Mexican attorney general's office calculates that the figure may
be as high as 300,000)11.”
The ranks of people that are employed by DTOs come from very
different backgrounds: peasants, street gang member, unemployed urban
youth, former members of the military and even lawyers and doctors.
In a country where “20% of Mexicans live below the extreme poverty
line and at least 40% of the Mexican economy is informal”12, it should
come as no surprise that people seek their livelihoods within the illegal
drug industry. In the cases of peasants for example, given the low prices
of agricultural products in the international market and the inability to
8
Operation Condor was a joint effort by the Mexican and American authorities
to combat drug trafficking and drug production in Mexico. “In the mid-seventies, the
Mexican federal government launched the most impressive military operation against
drug plantations and traffickers called "Operation Condor". Ten thousand soldiers under
the command of General José Hernández Toledo […] were sent to the sierra of Sinaloa,
Durango and Chihuahua to destroy the illegal plantations.” Luis Astorga, Drug Trafficking
in Mexico: A First General Assessment, http://www.unesco.org/most/astorga.htm#_Toc460234111
(last visited, Apr. 28, 2011)
9
Viridiana Rios, Evaluating the economic impact of drug traffic in Mexico, (Working Paper),
available at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/people/viridiana-rios-contreras (last visited, Apr.
27, 2011)
10
Ana Arana, Narco SA, una empresa global, (July 20, 2009) http://www.cnnexpansion.
com/expansion/2009/07/17/narco-sa
11
Peter Andreas, The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico, http://www.brown.
edu/Departments/Political_Science/people/documents/ThePoliticalEconomyof NarcoCorruptioninMexico.pdf (last visited, Apr. 27, 2011)
12
Vanda Felbab-Brown, A Shared Responsibility: Counternarcotics and Citizen’s Security in the
Americas, (Mar. 31, 2011) http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2011/0331_counternarcotics_
felbabbrown.aspx
The Mexican war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective . 67
compete in them, growing illegal crops such as marihuana becomes a
very attractive alternative for a peasant seeking the means to support and
provide for his family.
Even in urban environments, DTOs also provide important economic opportunities for people. For example, drug cartels hire people,
specially youth, to work in different stages of the drug business. “These
groups receive formal training in the use of violence, a monthly salary
of around 10 or 12 thousand pesos, and bonus payments coming from
human trafficking, extortions, kidnapping and other crimes13.”
According to a study conducted by the Attorney General’s Office
in 300 cases of conviction for drug growing, over 60% of those convicted
had done it for economic reasons, 20% did it for drug addiction and the
rest for various reasons ranging from ignorance of the law to coercion.
Those convicted had a mean income below 20 pesos per day, clearly insufficient to cover the cost of basic needs14. When economic opportunities
are scarce and most of the existing ones are inadequate, it should come
as no surprise that informal and illegal industries grow exponentially.
Another alarming sector that makes up the population of people
working for DTOs is that of children and minors. In recent months,
several sources have reported on the involvement of children, teens and
other young individuals with drug cartels. From december 2006 to date,
at least 1,107 teenagers have been detained by federal, state and local
authorities, out of which only 339 have been formally accused of participating with DTOs. Perhaps the most shocking arrest was that of
Édgar, a.k.a. “El Ponchis”, a 14 year old who allegedly participated with
the Cartel del Pacífico Sur and who confessed before the media to the
beheading of 4 people15.
This increased participation of minors and youth in DTOs can be
considered a reflection of a widespread national phenomenon that has
13
Alfredo Corchado as cited by Viridiana Rios, Evaluating the economic impact of drug traffic
in Mexico, (Working Paper), available at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/people/viridiana-rioscontreras (last visited, Apr. 27, 2011)
14
Carlos Resa Nestares, La Organización de la Producción de Drogas en México, Universidad
Autónoma de Madrid, (last updated Feb. 27, 2001), http://www.uam.es/personal_pdi/
economicas/cresa/text10.html
15
El Norte, Crece detención de narcomenores, (Apr. 24, 2011) http://www.elnorte.com/
nacional/articulo/622/1242530/
68 . Derecho en Libertad
come to be known as ninis16. In a recent interview with the dean of
Mexico’s biggest and most important university, the National Autonomous University, he estimated that there are currently 7 million ninis in
the country.17 Having kids, teenagers and young adults out of school and
with no adequate sources of income will logically lead to them finding
activities to occupy their time, and seeing how profitable drug activities
are, these become a very attractive option.
One of the main areas where youth participates with DTOs is in
providing “intelligence” to the organizations. Many youngsters have been
found to be involved in what the media has dubbed as hawks. Hawks,
or hawking, refers to an intelligence service that individuals render to
DTOs to inform them of the movement of rival organizations, the military or other authorities or relevant actors.
In a recent interview with a former member of one of the most
ruthless mexican DTOs, Los Zetas, the interviewee explained about La
Guardia, a branch of the organization whose sole purpose is to provide
information about the movements of other actors to the rest of the cartel.
Their main objective is to guard exits and entrances of the towns and
other areas where they operate and report by radio to the bosses about
said movements18.
Opportunities such as this, in which the risk is rather minimal and
the profit can be rather high, are a clear example of why more and more
people, specially young ones, get involved with DTOs as employees.
In addition to providing jobs, mexican DTOs have become even
more important for a wider array of services they render to society in
general. As Felbab-Brown very eloquently puts it, DTOs position themselves well among the population by: “protecting the local population’s
reliable (and frequently sole source of) livelihood from government efforts to repress the illicit economy […] by using revenues from the illicit
economies to provide otherwise absent social services such as clinics and
infrastructure, as well as other public goods”19.
16
Nini is a term based on the spanish preposition ni which can be translated to
neither/nor. It refers to young people who neither study nor work, i.e., ni estudian ni trabajan.
17
Jose Gil Olmos, Los ninis mexicanos, (Feb. 3, 2011) http://www.proceso.com.mx/rv/
modHome/detalleExclusiva/76179
18
Ricardo Ravelo, Soy un treinta y cinco…, in Proceso, no. 1619, Nov. 11 2007, 10-15, p. 13.
19
Vanda Felbab-Brown, A Shared Responsibility: Counternarcotics and Citizen’s Security in the
Americas, (Mar. 31, 2011) http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2011/0331_counternarcotics_
felbabbrown.aspx
The Mexican war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective . 69
The important revenues generated by the drug industry are commonly invested in the provision of several goods valuable to society. For
example, “Mexican traffickers enjoy building churches”20. In an effort to
launder money, DTOs will invest not only in building churches, but also
health clinics and even schools. This appeals widely to the impoverished
communities that are benefitted by those investments and in turn offer
loyalty and assistance to the cartels.
III. The mexican war on drugs in a nutshell
Notwithstanding these and other economic considerations21, soon after
being sworn in as new president of Mexico in 2006, Felipe Calderón
Hinojosa decided to launch a full frontal attack against the mexican
drug trafficking organizations. It is true that the issue of DTOs in
Mexico is not a recent one. For years, Mexico has been an important
part in the production and transportation of drugs for the American
market, and that is no secret. So, what happened? Why did President
Calderón decided all of a sudden that it was necessary to confront the
DTOs and launched an attack against them? Several reasons have been
advanced to explain this decision. Jorge Castañeda, for example, claims
that Calderón “had to declare a war on drugs because the drug cartels
had reached a level of power, wealth, violence, and penetration of the
state that made the situation untenable22.”
Some people believe that the country that President Calderón received was infested with criminals and was a recipe for disaster. Many
blame the successful US operation in closing the Caribbean route for
drug transportation as the main reason why the violence and presence
20
Viridiana Rios, Evaluating the economic impact of drug traffic in Mexico, (Working Paper),
available at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/people/viridiana-rios-contreras (last visited, Apr.
27, 2011)
21
The purpose and scope of this paper is not to the delve into an economic analysis
of costs and benefits of drug trafficking in Mexico. For a very interesting analysis of this
nature see Viridiana Rios, Evaluating the economic impact of drug traffic in Mexico, (Working
Paper), available at http://www.gov.harvard.edu/people/viridiana-rios-contreras
22
Jorge Castañeda, Mexico´s Failed Drug War, in Economic Development Bulletin, Cato
Institute, no. 13, May 6, 2010, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11746
70 . Derecho en Libertad
of DTOs in Mexico increased23. Regardless of the reasons, the fact is that
a war is being waged now.
It is not my purpose to evaluate, based on economic or any other
analyses, the decision to start the war initially. The war on drugs started
almost five years ago already and therefore, I do not aim at criticizing
this decision. However, I do consider very important to take a quick
look at the strategies that have been used and how the so called “war” is
currently being waged.
Since the beginning of the so called “war on drugs”, several strategies have been taken on by the federal mexican government. The main
focus of the actions has mostly been security, considerint the problem as
one of national security over any other possible perspective. For example,
President Calderón has deployed over 45,000 soldiers into eight different
states (other sources say that is over 50,000 including elements from the
federal police) and has increased the security budget from $2 billion in
2006 to $9.3 billion in 200924.
As for the results, many claim that the war has been rather successful, specially when compared to other countries with similar problems
that undertook similar strategies. In Mexico, 227 laboratories have been
destroyed, 389 million dollars have been confiscated, along with 30,500
war weapons, 24,900 small weapons, 409 aircrafts, 310 ships and 22,900
vehicles and 5,000 tons of drugs25. As for detentions, the Secretary of
National Defense reports that, from December 1, 2006 to March 2011,
31,251 people involved in any way with the DTOs have been detained
by the military26.
However, not all has been good in the war against drugs. Negative
consequences have come out of this, and some of them can even be said
to obscure the positive effects of the war. For starters, the death toll of
the war for the last four years is now at alarming proportions. “The rate
23
Peter Andreas, The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico, http://www.brown.
edu/Departments/Political_Science/people/documents/ThePoliticalEconomyof NarcoCorruptioninMexico.pdf (last visited, Apr. 27, 2011)
24
Guillermo J. Garcia, Radiography of the War Against Drug Cartels in Mexico: Truths and
Myths, Presentation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, October 2011. (Copy in
possession of the author)
25
Joaquín Villalobos, Doce mitos de la guerra contra el narco, Nexos, (Jan. 1, 2010) http://
www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulov2print&Article=72941
26
Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, Detenidos, (last updated, Apr. 16, 2011), http://www.
sedena.gob.mx/index.php/actividades/combate-al-narcotrafico/3276-detenidos
27
José de Córdoba and David Luhnow, In Mexico, Death Toll in Drug War Hits Record,
Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 13. 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703889204
576078363012731514.html
The Mexican war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective . 71
of killing in Mexico's drug war has escalated steadily since Mr. Calderón was inaugurated in December 2006, rising from an estimated 2,800
deaths in 2007 to roughly 9,500 in 2009 to nearly 15,300 last year27.”
The databased unveiled in January classifies the killings into three
categories: executions, confrontations and aggressions. The first one refers
to killings perpetrated with extreme violence which usually indicates
that the victim was involved in some way with the DTOs. The second
and third one are results of confrontations. The difference comes from
the fact that “confrontations” entail that one of the parties is a DTO and
the other is some sort of public authority such as the military or police
officers. In the category of aggressions, the element of public power
is lacking. According to the federal government, from december 2006
through december 2010, they have registered 30,913 executions, 3,153 confrontations and 546 aggressions28.
Although there are no official figures, displacement has also been an
important consequence of the war on drugs. Many people have indeed
left the country for fear of being affected by the drug violence. Specially
in the northern states, were the violence is particularly grave, families
are sending their children to study abroad or just leaving all together in
an attempt to escape the killings.
IV. A change in perspective: from citizen security to a human rights
based and development approach
From the figures presented, it is easy to appreciate that the current
strategy is having very high costs, specifically when it comes to human
lives and citizen security. Although it is hard to affirm that the strategy
has completely failed, I believe there is something more that can be done
to address the issue and possibly increase the rate of success of the war
waged by the federal government.
27
José de Córdoba and David Luhnow, In Mexico, Death Toll in Drug War Hits Record,
Wall Street Journal, (Jan. 13. 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703889204
576078363012731514.html
28
Presidencia de la República, Base de datos de fallecimientos ocurridos por presunta rivalidad
delincuencial, http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-fallecimientos/, (last visited,
May 5, 2011)
72 . Derecho en Libertad
It is clear that, by this point, the mexican DTOs are enmeshed in
the social fabric. As providers of jobs and other public services, it should
come as no surprise that there is, and has been, possible backlash from
society regarding this war. Is it not logical that people fight back when
they are deprived of their livelihood? Furthermore, with more people
getting involved with the DTOs, more families are dependent of this
business and thus it becomes harder to fight the cartels without increasing the risk of casualties. Then, what to do?
I believe that the human rights-based approach to development
movement (RBA) can serve as a model to improve the current strategy
of the war on drugs. RBA can be helpful in two different ways. First,
the way RBA was conceived and is currently framed can provide an
important analogy to develop a more comprehensive strategy to fight the
DTOs in Mexico. Second, seeing how economically important DTOs are
and observing their impact and their interactions with society in general,
development should be a part of that comprehensive strategy; not the
traditional view of development but a rights-based one.
The rights-based approach to development was born as the next
step in a process of reconfiguration of the concept of development. Moving from a simplistic vision of development as mere economic improvement towards a more holistic concept of human development that encompasses other aspects different from money, RBA was a step beyond
mere association between human rights and development. With political
conditionality, for example, human rights played a limited and secondary role in development. They were but standards by which countries
needed to abide if they expected to receive any kind of foreign development aid. They were not a fundamental part of development and neither
was development understood in terms of human rights.
Through RBA this gap was effectively closed. “At this level, development and rights become different but inseparable aspects of the same
process, as if different strands of the same fabric […] development comes
to be redefined in terms that include human rights as a constitutive part29.”
In other words,
A rights-based approach deliberately and explicitly focuses on people
achieving the minimum conditions for living with dignity (i.e. achiev23
Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development, Kumarian Press, 2004, p. 122.
The Mexican war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective . 73
ing their human rights). It does so by exposing the roots of vulnerability and marginalization and expanding the range of responses. It
empowers people to claim and exercise their rights and fulfill their
responsibilities. A rights-based approach recognizes poor, displaced,
and war-affected people as having inherent rights essential to livelihood security – rights that are validated by international law30.
The relevance of RBA is that it strengthens development aid by
transforming it from a charity, i.e., a prerogative of the donor, into an obligation that is correlated to a right held by the receivers. It achieves such
goal by analyzing the underlying causes of poverty as a phenomenon and
stepping out of the traditional and narrow economic view of poverty in
order to include other non-economic causes.
1. RBA as a lens for analysis and diagnosis of the drug problem
Similarly to the realizations that brought about the birth of RBA,
an analysis of the underlying causes of the drug problem in Mexico
is important. As demonstrated in the first section, DTOs are not just
an organization that profits from the production and transportation of
drugs. DTOs are much more than that. DTOs are employers. DTOs are
providers of basic public services. DTOs are the livelihood of thousands
of people in Mexico.
Can a strategy that is solely focused on the security aspect of the
drug-related problem succeed in eradicating the problem? The answer
to this question is most likely negative. The most valuable resource of
DTOs are not the laboratories or crops that have been destroyed by the
military. They are certainly not the DTO leaders that are currently in
prison or that fell victims to a military operation. The most important
and valuable asset of DTOs are the people that work for them. As long
as people, ordinary citizens, keep depending on and supporting DTOs,
these organizations will be strong.
Many people have compared the mexican drug cartels to the mythical monster Hydra. It does not matter if you cut the monster´s head
because every time you do so more heads will appear. DTOs started as
30
CARE, Incorporation of a Rights-Based Approach into CARE’s Program Cycle, http://pqdl.
care.org/CuttingEdge/Incorporating%20RBA%20in%20CARE's%20Program%20Cycle.pdf,
(last visited, May 3, 2011)
74 . Derecho en Libertad
family run organizations. Even before an organization leader is detained
or killed, there already are a few other individuals that have been involved with the DTOs that know how to operate the business. It is true
that, as Villalobos points out, these people still need training and that
takes time. Probably even more time than it takes the military and federal police to neutralize members of the cartels. However, as long there
is support from the people and they side with the DTOs, the securityfocused strategy by itself will not be sufficient.
Take for example the case of the ninis. Youth with no education
and job opportunities yet with needs and desire for respect are a great
market for DTOs to harvest labor. What is specially worrisome is that,
at least in Mexico, that market is particularly large, and it is not getting
any smaller. Even if we take the numbers of the dean of the National
Autonomous University as an exaggeration, the number of people out of
school and without a job is still enormous.
It is also true that we cannot downplay drug violence as, solely, a
poverty issue. It is definitely a phenomenon much more complex than
that. This is exactly why an RBA approach analysis would prove to be
helpful. RBA recognizes poverty as a multi causal event. In this same
sense, a study of the drug problem in Mexico should equally recognize
its multi causality and address it from that perspective.
Put in other terms, which are probably closer to the way the issue
is currently framed, the concept of human security brings together the
security aspect and the human rights approach. Felbab-Brown elaborates
on this notion and concludes that:
Human security includes not only physical safety from violence and
crime, but also economic safety from critical poverty, social marginalization, and fundamental under-provision of elemental social and
public goods such as infrastructure, education, health care, and rule
of law. Chronically, Latin American governments have been struggling
to provide these public goods in large parts of their countries, in both
the rural and urban areas31.
31
Vanda Felbab-Brown, A Shared Responsibility: Counternarcotics and Citizen’s Security in the
Americas, (Mar. 31, 2011) http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2011/0331_counternarcotics_
felbabbrown.aspx
The Mexican war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective . 75
Human security is not, by any means, a different concept to that
which I have been advocating for. Human security is only a name given
to this same phenomenon which recognizes the underlying causes of
the violence and brings it to the forefront. It acknowledges that security,
as well as poverty, is a complex phenomenon with root causes that are
situated outside the “normal” realm of security issues. In other words,
human security is a term that follows the RBA analysis on poverty and
applies it to a security context.
2. RBA as a method for creating a more comprehensive anti-drug strategy
If we agree on my previous analysis of the importance of DTOs
for mexican society, we necessarily conclude that an important root
cause of the problem is poverty and overall marginalization in Mexico.
It should not be surprising, then, to turn to development literature and
strategies to broaden the scope of the current plan against DTOs. This
is the second aspect in which RBA becomes helpful, not only is it a tool
in diagnosing the real issue, but it is also a tool in proposing solutions.
Development should be an important part of the strategy of the
war on drugs and RBA can be a crucial tool in inventing new complementary approaches to combat the DTOs. Without a holistic strategy
that seeks to address not only security issues, but also the underlying
causes of the drug problem, the federal government will never be able
to break the vicious cycle that strengthens the DTOs and improves their
status in society.
This cyclical effect of drug violence and its relation to development
can be appreciated, for example, in the context of the right to education.
Considering the large number of ninis in Mexico, the right to education becomes particularly relevant. Schools are increasingly becoming
less and less safe. In Monterrey, Mexico, for example, in March 2010, a
confrontation broke out late at night between the military and a drug
cartel right outside the most important university in the city. After a
long persecution, the military caught up with the cartel just outside the
university campus. Two students who were working late on campus
were caught between de bullets and unfortunately died.
This event had a dire impact throughout the country. There was
a lot of speculation as to who had actually been responsible for the
deaths of both students, the military or the drug cartels. Regardless of
the culprits, the general perception was that not even schools were safe
76 . Derecho en Libertad
anymore. Boasting one of the biggest populations of exchange students
in the city, and perhaps the country, students at Instituto Tecnológico y
de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM) started to leave campus,
some not even finishing the then current semester and going back to
their homes, whether in different countries or just different states within
Mexico.
This is a very clear example at university level. However, scenes
like these are common throughout the most violent states in the country in almost all levels. In the case of ITESM, the students belonged to
privileged middle or upper classes and, hence, had the opportunity to
move or transfer to continue their studies. Yet, situations like this also
occur in public education involving people from lower socioeconomic
classes without the ability to move. Violent episodes in cities such as
Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, have prevented parents from sending their
children to school for a couple of days.
From a simplistic perspective, this is clearly an issue of security.
If the State could guarantee security to the citizens, they would not be
afraid to send their children to school. However, from an RBA perspective, we know that lacking or inadequate education has more profound
consequences for the country. As stated before, youth with no education
and no occupation are easy targets for DTO recruiters.
It is true that the State must guarantee the security of citizens so
that they are not faced with the decision of sending their children to
school due to the insecurity. Yet, the State should also pay closer attention to education policies and availability of schools, if only to cultivate
appropriate civic values that will assure that, if and when, kids are
forced out of school for security reasons they still understand the risks
of getting involved with DTOs and the transcendence of that decision.
An RBA development strategy that recognizes these rights violations as
a fundamental cause of poverty, and incorporates them into the developmental work of the State, coupled with security strategies, is more
likely to produce effective results in reducing violence than a security
strategy alone.
This example leads me to my next point: I do not advocate for a
radical shift in the focus with which the problem is being addressed. I
do not believe that elaborate development strategies focused solely on
poverty alleviation are a good solution either. What good will it be to
people that schools, even public ones, offer great-quality education if
The Mexican war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective . 77
they cannot even leave their houses for fear of being killed in a crossfire?
This is why RBA becomes an ideal tool to develop an anti-DTO strategy. Acknowledging the importance of the underlying causes of drug violence, such as poverty, as well as the underlying causes of poverty such
as education, leads to a more comprehensive and holistic plan to fight
the drug cartels: security strategies coupled with development policies.
This approach is already being used in the same context in other
countries, and not even by the State itself. The inhabitants of Heliopolis,
the biggest favela in Rio de Janeiro, have understood the importance of
poverty reduction and development strategies to help ameliorate the impact of drug trafficking in their own communities. Known as patches of
land where the power of the State is close to, if not already, inexistent,
favelas are places where not even the police dares enter and the State
fails to provide public services such as education and healthcare.
Aware of this context, the population of Heliopolis have taken it
upon themselves to provide these public services and prevent that the
drug cartels acquire more power by providing those services. Reginaldo,
one of the people in charge of security within Heliopolis, acknowledges
that the drug traffickers are in the business for lack of other opportunities and ways of earning a living. They entered the world of drugs
because of the hardships they encountered in other aspects of life. He
assures that the work the community does is mainly prevention. They
cannot rid the favela of the drug traffickers, they were born there and,
as such, are part of the community. At best, what the community can
do is keep the youth from joining the business in hopes that it will end
one day32.
The community believes that by educating the youth they can keep
them out of that lifestyle. They try to create a sense of shame within the
community by fostering values that will make drug cartels unappealing
to the new generations. The educational projects of the community seek
to keep the children off the streets and away from crime by keeping
them busy with various activities and extracurriculars such as drama,
civic values, and environmental studies. But has this worked? Granted,
drug cartels are still a problem in Brazil, yet Heliopolis is an example
32
Sanjuana Martínez, Más que combatir al narco se lucha contra la pobreza, La Jornada,
(Nov. 27, 2010), http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/11/27/index.php?section=politica&artic
le=002n1pol
78 . Derecho en Libertad
of a favela where the community has not allowed DTOs to take over
and rule.
Mexico should follow the lead of efforts such as that of Heliopolis,
but also take it one step further through the RBA approach. Currently
education is a fundamental right under the mexican Constitution. Yet
many kids suffer violations to this right for lack of available schools
and poor funding from the government. An RBA approach would empower the citizens with legal claims to demand from the government
the fulfillment of their right to an education rather than just making it
a prerogative that the state can choose to exercise or not.
V. Conclusions
The drug violence that Mexico is experiencing right now is very grave.
However, the strategy currently employed by the the federal government is highly deficient and falls really short of adequately addressing
the problem. Drug cartels are not only about drug trafficking and drug
production. They are important economic actors in society that provide
jobs to, otherwise, poverty stricken families. They invest in communities
and provide valuable public services that the State is failing to provide.
RBA is a potentially powerful tool to analyze the current situation
in Mexico and identify alternate approaches that improve the chances of
the government in fighting the DTOs. First of all, RBA is an example of
a strategy that undertook deeper analysis of underlying root causes of
a phenomenon, in this case poverty, to later transform the analysis into
policy considerations of how development should work.
In the first place, RBA serves as a methodological example. Copying RBA’s way of framing poverty as a multi causal phenomenon would
benefit the analysis of the drug problem in Mexico. RBA was a breakthrough doctrine in that it pulled away from an overly economical
analysis of poverty. In this sense, an RBA-like approach would be extremely helpful in pulling away from an overly security-related analysis
of drug violence in Mexico.
Additionally, RBA can also be valuable in designing policies to
address the root causes of the DTO issue that are discovered through
a rights-based analysis. RBA provides an excellent opportunity to shift
the focus of the war on drugs by including development policies that are
The Mexican war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective . 79
grounded in human rights. Said policies should not be regarded as secondary but rather be front and center of a comprehensive governmental
strategy. That is why RBA would prove to be extremely valuable: it
would mean that all complementary development policies should come
from legal claims awarded to the citizens.
My proposal is, in no way, to replace the security strategy for
development policies. That would only result in even more mistakes.
Instead, stepping out of the current “comfort zone” and turning to RBA
for lessons can potentially result in a more robust and holistic strategy
to effectively address the drug issue and rid the DTOs of the importance
that currently makes them so strong and so difficult to eradicate.
In other words, “effective state response to intense organized crime
and illicit economies usually requires that the state address all the complex reasons why populations turn to illegality, including law enforcement deficiencies and physical insecurity, economic poverty, and social
marginalization33.”
32
Vanda Felbab-Brown, A Shared Responsibility: Counternarcotics and Citizen’s Security in the
Americas, (Mar. 31, 2011) http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2011/0331_counternarcotics_
felbabbrown.aspx
80 . Derecho en Libertad
VI. Bibliography
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Ana Arana, Narco SA, una empresa global, (July 20, 2009) http://www.
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(last
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The Mexican war on drugs from a human rights and development perspective . 81
Presidencia de la República, Base de datos de fallecimientos ocurridos
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Reforma as cited by Carlos Resa Nestares, La Organización de la Producción de Drogas en México, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid,
(last updated Feb. 27, 2001), http://www.uam.es/personal_pdi/economicas/cresa/text10.html
Ricardo Ravelo, Soy un treinta y cinco…, in Proceso, no. 1619, Nov. 11
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Sanjuana Martínez, Más que comabtir al narco se lucha contra la pobreza,
La Jornada, (Nov. 27, 2010), http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/11/27/
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Citizen’s Security in the Americas, (Mar. 31, 2011) http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2011/0331_counternarcotics_felbabbrown.aspx
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viridiana-rios-contreras (last visited, Apr. 27, 2011)