The More Things Change... American Identity and Mass and Elite Responses to 9/11
Author(s): Deborah J. Schildkraut
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 23, No. 3, Special Issue: 9/11 and Its Aftermath: Perspectives
from Political Psychology (Sep., 2002), pp. 511-535
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Political Psychology, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2002
The More ThingsChange... AmericanIdentity
and Mass and Elite Responsesto 9/11
Deborah J. Schildkraut
Department of Politics, Oberlin College
Thisarticle examinesconceptionsof Americannational identityby contrastingAmericans'
responses to the Pearl Harborattackin 1941 with their responsesto the terroristattacksin
2001. Examinationsof official rhetoric,mass media statements,and public opinion after
Pearl Harbor and after 9/11 reveal changes as well as continuities in the relationship
betweenconceptionsof national identityand responsesto experiencingthreatin theface of
diversity.Lingeringascriptivistviews have been awakenedby 9/11, yet this narrow image
of American identity is being directly challenged by a more inclusive incorporationist
tradition. This clash of symbolic conceptions of national identity results in divergence
between elite rhetoric and mass opinion, with elites promoting incorporationismand
ordinarycitizens displayingthe reawakeningof ascriptivistnorms.
KEY WORDS: Americanidentity,elite and mass opinions, symbolic politics, 9/11
Within 10 weeks of the Japaneseattackon PearlHarboron 7 December 1941,
PresidentRoosevelt issued Executive Order9066, which authorizedthe exclusion
of any andall people from"militaryareas"alongthe West Coast.Despitethe ethnic
neutralityof the order,Japaneseresidentsand JapaneseAmericanswere the only
ones excluded from these military areas and subsequentlyinterned.The "mass
evacuation"was officially terminatedin December 1944, althoughcampsfor those
who refusedto takethe infamousloyalty oathsremainedoperativeuntilmid-1946.
Roughly two-thirdsof the 120,000 people internedduringthe war were American
citizens (Murray,2000).
Since the terroristattacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
11 September2001 (9/11), the attackon PearlHarborandits aftermathhave again
become prominentfeatures of American national consciousness.1At one level,
1 A Lexis-Nexis searchof "PearlHarbor"in majornewspapersfor the 4 weeks following 9/11 yields
666 hits. The same searchfor the month preceding9/11 yields 100 hits, most of which refer to the
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Publishedby Blackwell Publishing,Inc., 350 Main Street, Maiden,MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF,UK.
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people are recallingthe shock and fear thatcame with the suddenrealizationthat
theirworldshadbeen instantlychangedforever.Similarly,people arerecallingthe
patriotismthatthe attackevoked andthe subsequentdeterminationof the American
people to worktogetherto defendthe nationandits ideals, an effortthatforgedthe
"greatestgeneration."2At the same time, people are also recallingthe internment
camps and the mistreatmentof many innocentpeople, practicesthatgrew out of a
combinationof fear and prevailingunderstandingsof Americannationalidentity.
Takentogether,these nationalrecollectionsareuseful for helpingcitizens navigate
these newly uncertaintimes. They serve as both an inspirationand a warning,for
they portraya nation simultaneouslyat its best and worst. These recollectionsare
useful from a scholarly standpointas well. When comparedto responsesto 9/11,
they illustratethe extent to which ourefforts to deal with the combinationof threat
and diversityhave changedand the extent to which they have remainedthe same.
To understandthese changesandcontinuities,we need to examinehow people
conceive of Americannationalidentity,the extentto which these conceptionshave
evolved since the Second World War (WWII), and the relationship between
nationalidentityandpolicy preferences,particularlyunderconditionsof threat.My
goal here is to provide these examinations.In particular,I analyze changes and
continuities in the role that ethnoculturaland incorporationistconceptions of
American identity have played and continue to play in the reactionsof political
leaders,the media, andordinaryAmericansto these domesticattacks.The analysis
focuses on threecomparisons.First,elite responsesto 9/11 in the formof presidential rhetoric,policy proposals, and media coverage are comparedto similar responses to the attack on Pearl Harbor.Next, quantitativeand qualitativepublic
opinion data collected before 9/11 are comparedto trendsemerging since then,
including views on immigrationand ethnic profiling. Finally, the relationship
between currentmass and elite opinions is explored.
The analysis documents both changes and continuities in the relationship
between conceptions of nationalidentity and responses to experiencingthreatin
the face of diversity. On the one hand, lingering ethnoculturalconceptions of
American identity have been awakened by the attacks. On the other hand, this
narrowimage of "whatit means to be an American"is being directlychallenged
by the incorporationisttradition.Examplesof this counterbalancingforce include
George W. Bush's immediate plea for Americans to avoid ethnic profiling and
intense media commentary promoting a multiethnic conception of American
identity. The prominenceof this clash of traditionsillustratesan importantbreak
with the past.
motionpicturePearl Harbor,which was releasedin late spring,andto a cable television series about
an armydivision in WWIIcalled Band of Brothers,which began runningonly days before 9/11.
2 The "greatestgeneration"is the name
given to the WWIIgenerationin a best-sellingbook, called The
GreatestGeneration(1998), by news anchorTom Brokaw.
The More Things Change
513
Attemptsto understandthese developing patternsare informedby contributions from researchon symbolic politics and on the relationshipbetween elite and
mass preferences.Scholarshipon agenda-settingand opinion leadershipindicates
that opinion convergence should exist between elected officials and the majority
of ordinarycitizens once anissue achieves high salience,regardlessof which actors
are seen as the leaders and which are seen as the followers. Symbolic politics
studies, on the otherhand, suggest thaton issues dealing with race, ethnicity,and
identity,electoral incentives may inhibit convergence.These divergentpossibilities about how masses and elites respondto majorpolitical developmentsframe
the investigation that follows. In line with previous symbolic politics findings,
particularlyMendelberg'sanalysis of racial discourse (2001), I find that changes
in societal norms over the past several decades have led us to the currentcontext
where ascriptivistnorms appearto be shaping the views of ordinaryAmericans
more than they are shapingthe rhetoricof political leaders.This disjunctureleads
to the clash of traditionsdescribedabove andis a productof the dynamismthathas
characterizedconceptionsof Americanidentityover the past several decades.
Ethnicity, American Identity, and Policy Preferences
SymbolicPolitics
The presentstudy fits within a broaderline of inquiryin political psychology
researchthat focuses on the relationshipbetween symbolic predispositions,such
as nationalidentity, and policy preferences.This scholarshipposits that national
identityis an abstractsymbolicattachmentanddemonstratesthatabstractsymbolic
attachmentsare often strongpredictorsof policy preferences.These attachments
area mechanismthroughwhichpeople determinewhatthey want,whatis possible,
whatto fear,andwho they are(Edelman,1964/1985). Simplyput,politicalsymbols
wield power over policy preferencesbecause they are functional.By using them,
individualsbecome betterable to navigatethe political and social world. Political
symbols make the complex seem simple and provide prescriptionsfor bringing
orderto a disorderlyworld (Elder & Cobb, 1983). As such, abstractideas about
nationalidentity shapethe needs and desires of Americancitizens as far as public
policy is concerned (Citrin & Duff, 1998; Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990;
Frendreis& Tatalovich, 1997; Schildkraut,2001a). A thoroughinvestigationof
responsesto the terroristattacks,therefore,requiresus to look to the roles played
by differentideas aboutwhat it means to be an American.
We have recentlyseen a growinginterestin studyinganddissectingAmerican
identity.This interesthas been driven,in part,by (1) real and dramaticchanges in
the ethnic makeup of the U.S. population, (2) the mid-1990s surge in nativist
sentimentand legislation, and (3) the maturationand normalizationof the rights
revolutionsthat startedin the 1960s. This confluence of factorshas led people to
questionwhat being Americanmeans and to be concernedaboutthe implications
514
Schildkraut
of rapid ethnic change for a unified sense of nationhood.These questions and
concerns have been festering for some time, but 9/11 has finally broughtthem to
the fore. Many people believe that, as Stanley Renshon (2001) wrote, American
nationalculturehas over the yearsbeen "decoupledfromethnicity,separatedfrom
religion, and detachedeven from race"(p. 258). As othershave shown, however,
this decouplinghas often existed more in rhetoricthanin practice(see, e.g., Mills,
1997; Stevens, 1995). The place of race,ethnicity,andreligionin determiningwhat
people thinkit means to be an Americanis still very much an active debate.
The complex, contested,andpassionatedebateaboutthe relationshipbetween
ethnicity and national identity draws on multiple ideological traditionsin the
United States.A wide-ranginganalysisof this relationshipwould includea discussion of liberalism and civic republicanismin addition to ethnoculturalismand
incorporationism.Such a wide-rangingtreatmentwill not be providedhere, however. Instead,I focus on the lattertwo traditions,primarilybecauseof thedynamism
each one possesses and the tension between them-a tension that has been under
way for the past several years but has recentlyreachednew prominence.3
Ethnoculturalism.Although ethnoculturalism-the idea that Americanidentity is defined by white Protestantismrooted in NorthernEuropeanheritageand
ancestry(Smith, 1993, 1997)-has been widely criticizedand challengedover the
years, it continues to play a powerful role in shaping what people think of as
"American."Much like the automaticitythat characterizesthe staying power of
racialstereotypesdespite"knowingbetter"(Devine, 1989), the stereotypicalimage
of an Americanas a white Christianhas been overlearnedand shapesthe thinking
of many people towardnon-whitesin the United States, even as they condemnits
rigid exclusivity (Schildkraut,2001a).
Clearly, ethnoculturalbeliefs and practices are not as prevalenttoday in the
United States as they once were. Slavery has long been abolished,Jim Crow laws
are a thing of the past, women and minorities now have the right to vote, and
national origin quotas have been removed from immigrationlaws. Additional
evidence of ethnoculturalism'sdecline is the decrease over time in the public's
willingness to express or endorse openly racist beliefs, as documentedby public
opinionpolls (Schumanet al., 1997). However, opiniondata still reveal thatmany
people are willing to delineateAmericanidentityalong ascriptivelines. People no
longer say thatblacks should be denied the full range of rights and opportunities
availableto others,but they do say that some people arejust not able to be called
"American"becauseof ascriptivecharacteristics.Forexample,in the 1996 General
Social Survey (GSS), 55% of the respondentssaid thatbeing a Christianis either
somewhat or very importantin making someone a true American,and 70% said
the same about being born in America. Statements from white focus group
participantsalso point to a fair amountof supportfor this limited idea of who is
andis not American.Althoughpeople did not openly statethatmembersof certain
3 For more on the multipleconceptionsof Americanidentity,see Smith (1993, 1997).
The More Things Change
515
ethnic groupscould never become Americans,theirwords revealeda tendencyto
assumethatpeople who do not fit into ethnoculturalism'sideal type areforeigners.
The focus groups show that observing the traditions of one's ancestors and
maintainingculturaldistinctivenessoftentrumpcitizenshipwhen white Americans
delineatethe boundariesof Americannationalidentity(Schildkraut,2001a).4
So why the continuedprevalenceof ascriptivisttendencies?Recent work by
Conover and colleagues (1999) provides some guidancehere. They arguedthatit
is difficult to conceive of the concept of "citizen" without the influence of
ethnoculturalism.Citizenship,like any othergroupidentity,entails distinguishing
groupmembersfromnon-members.As social identitytheoristshave shown,people
have a tendencyto form ingroupsand outgroupsand to discriminateaccordingly,
whateverthe groupidentitymay be (Tajfel& Turner,1986). People make distinctions based on physical appearancebecause they find it cognitively easy to do so.
The salience and meaning of group membershipdiminish when people are surroundedonly by othermembersof theirgroup.In orderfor the conceptof "citizen"
to make sense, people use theirracialand ethnic communitiesas a proxy for their
political community in determining boundaries. Combine this argument with
Devine's (1989) demonstrationof the automaticityof overlearnedstereotypes,and
it becomes easy to see why the tendencyto use race andethnicityto define national
identityis so resistantto change.The addedcomponentof a horrificdomesticattack
carriedout by people of Middle Easterndescent introducesa pervasive sense of
threat that buttresses this ethnoculturaltendency even more (see also Volkan,
1994).
Incorporationism.Cracksin the ethnoculturaltraditiondo exist, though, and
the past several decades have seen the rise and growing acceptance of a rival
conceptionof Americanidentity,one thatis rootedin the nation'simmigrantlegacy
and cherishes culturaldiversity. The term I use to describe this immigrant-based
conception of American identity is "incorporationism."This understandingof
Americanidentityis not focused on the similaritiesbetween minoritiesand whites
in termsof theirrightsto citizenship;rather,it is aboutcelebratingethnicitiesand
providinga forumin which such celebrationscan take place. Incorporationismis
not a cover for ethnoculturalism.It does not celebratethe idea of the melting pot
while espousing a homogeneous society in which all memberslook, sound, and
worshipalike. Nor does incorporationismfavor the extreme scenarioof complete
culturaldivisions. As Zolberg and Woon (1999) wrote, "extremedifferentialism
and extreme assimilationismare equally ruled out" (p. 30) as political doctrines.
The challenge of finding a balance between those two extremes is a matterof
tangiblepolitical struggles;the ideal, however, allows for both.5
4 More informationon the focus groups, which I conductedin New Jersey in 1998, is availableupon
request.
5 Some readersmay questionwhy I do not use the term "multiculturalism"
to describethis conception
of nationalidentity."Incorporationism"
is an underusedtermwith no specific prescriptionregarding
the appropriatelevel of assimilation.Debates aboutthe properrole andextent of assimilationneeded
516
Schildkraut
Although the mythology of the United States as a "nationof immigrants"is
notnew, the extentto whichit now shapesideas aboutAmericanidentityandguides
policy is. Higham (1993), for example, documentedthe rise of "the politics of
difference"in the United States and describedit as a distinctlymodem struggle,
one thatis still makingonly "halting"progressagainstthe notionthatwhite males
form the core of American society (p. 199). And Hollinger (1995) wrote of the
"sheertriumph,in late-twentiethcenturyAmerica,of the doctrinethat the United
States ought to sustainratherthan diminish a great variety of distinctivecultures
carriedby ethno-racialgroups"(p. 101). HoraceKallenwas an early proponentof
this understandingof "whatit means to be an American,"althoughhe called it
"culturalpluralism."He was writingin responseto the Americanizationmovement,
which he criticizedfor tryingto eliminateculturaldifferencesinsteadof tryingto
instill respect for democraticprinciplesamong the new arrivals.And he likened
Americansociety to an orchestra,arguingthatharmonyratherthanunison should
be the ultimateaim (Kallen, 1924). Kallen'sideas did not get muchformalpolitical
recognitionin his time. He was writingduringthe age of literacytests for admission
to the country,strictimmigrationquotas,the banningof foreignlanguagesin public
schools, and of course the Jim Crow South. The essence of his argumentsdid not
matureandbecome a truerivalconceptionof Americanidentityuntildecadeslater.
Some recent survey and focus group data indicate that many Americans
endorsean immigrant-basedconceptionof Americanidentity.In a nationalsurvey
called "Lookingfor America,"conductedby Wisconsin PublicTelevision (1997),
respondentswere asked whetherthey agreedthatcertaincharacteristicsmake the
United Statesdifferentfrom all othercountries.Eighty-twopercentof the respondentsagreedthat"theblendingof many differentculturesinto one culture"makes
the United Statesdifferentfrom all othercountries.6In the 1994 GSS, respondents
were asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale, where 1 meantthatit would be
better for America if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct
culturesand where 7 meant that it would be betterif the differentgroups would
change so that they would blend into the largersociety. Thirty-onepercentof the
sample scored between 1 and 3, favoring the maintenanceof distinct cultural
traditions;37% scoredbetween 5 and 7, favoringa more uniformpopulation;and
the remainderscored a 4, perhapsfavoringa certaindegree of varietyalong with
a certaindegreeof homogeneity.As Citrinandcolleagues (1994) wrote,thispattern
in an immigrantnation shape how people interpretthis conceptionof nationalidentity;they do not
define it. A vocal left promotesmulticulturalismin the form of rejectingassimilation,and an equally
vocal right decries this movement, maintainingthat an immigrantnation can only survive with an
assimilationistagenda. A more mainstreamconception of a multiethnicsociety, one that celebrates
America's immigranttraditionand seeks to work out a balance between manynessand oneness, is
more widely endorsed (Alexander & Smelser, 1999; Tyack, 1999). The term "incorporationism"
covers these differentperspectivesthatare all rootedin a reverencefor the immigranttraditionin the
United States.
6 The data set and codebook for this survey, USPSRA1997-COLUMBUS,were obtainedfrom the
RoperCenterfor Public OpinionResearchat the Universityof Connecticut.
The More Things Change
517
reveals that"manyAmericansmay not considermaintainingone's ethnicheritage
and blendinginto the largersociety as mutuallyexclusive" (p. 16).
When asked what makes us American,participantsin focus groupsroutinely
replied by mentioning the extent to which one will be surroundedby different
culturesin America,a simplefact of everydaylife thatis seen as bothpraiseworthy
and uniqueto this country.Regardlessof theirown ethnicity,participantsstrongly
identified with the nation's immigranttradition,describingthe joys and wonders
of living in a diverse society and lamentingthat they have largely become out of
touch with the cultureof their ancestors.They see culturaldiversity as distinctly
Americanand are wary of too much assimilation,although,in supportof Citrin's
claim, they believe that a certaindegree of assimilationis necessary(Schildkraut,
2001a).
Summary.Symbolic notions of Americanidentity are consistent and strong
predictorsof policy preferences.Two rival conceptionsof thatidentity,ethnoculturalismand incorporationism,are particularlyrelevantto domestic debatesabout
how to deal with terrorism.Incorporationismcenters on the immigrantlegacy of
the nation,emphasizesthe immigrantexperienceas a sharedone, and sees American society as a multiethnicone that occupies a space somewherein between the
two extremes of cultural erasure and separatism.After 9/11, this tradition is
challengedby new concernsaboutimmigrationand a possible "enemywithin."At
the same time, 9/11 has also demonstratedthe powerthatthis traditionhas amassed
in the yearsbetween 1941 and 2001. The inherenttensionsbetweenincorporationism andethnoculturalismarenow surfacingin a clash of traditionsthatwas largely
absent in responses to the attack on Pearl Harbor.In the sections that follow, I
documentthis contrastand show how bothof these traditionsare shapingmass and
elite responsesto 9/11.
OpinionLeadership
Before getting to empiricaldetails, we must considerthe roles played by the
two sets of actors under investigationhere-elites and masses-in this clash of
traditions.We have learned over the years that the media, elected officials, and
citizens influence each other's beliefs and behaviors in very complicated ways.
Scholars studying elite/mass linkages have been driven by the empiricalpuzzle
such relationshipspresent, but they are also driven by normativequestions that
such pathsof influence can raise. These normativeconcernsinvolve the natureof
representation,accountability,manipulation,and mobilization.In other words, it
is importantto untangle the specific roles that different political actors play in
shapingresponsesto crises like 9/11 because doing so will furtherilluminatehow
political developmentsunfold underconditionsof diversityand threat.
Research on agenda-setting,opinion leadership,nationalism,and symbolic
politics is useful in this regard. Several agenda-settingand opinion leadership
studies arguethatpublic opinion and elite action on salient issues converge, even
518
Schildkraut
though they may differ in theirexplanationsof which actors serve as leadersand
which actorsserve as followers. Some studies suggest thatelite policymakingand
rhetoricshapes mass opinion (Baumgartner& Jones, 1993; Zaller, 1992); other
studiesmaintainthatelite movementon salientissues follows ratherthanprecedes
changes in public opinion (Monroe, 1979; Page & Shapiro, 1983) or that convergence exists because of electoralaccountability(Uslaner& Weber, 1983). Finally,
other works argue that the relationshipamong elite opinion, mass opinion, and
policy outputsis reciprocalratherthan unidirectional(Hill & Hinton-Andersson,
1995; Jacobs & Shapiro,2000).
Realistically, there are cases where policymakerstake the lead, cases where
ordinarycitizens take the lead, and cases where opinion-sharingdominates.The
questionthen becomes whetherthereare systematicpatternsthatdeterminewhich
issues follow which trajectory.Research on symbolic politics and nationalism
suggests thaton issues dealing with ethnicityandidentity,issues thathave loomed
largely post-9/11, majorityopinion lags behind movement in elite discourse and
actions.
Much scholarshipon nationalismargues that elites indeed take the opinionleading role in shaping understandingsof the nationalidentity. In these studies,
nationalidentityis often describedas dynamicand arbitrary,with differentunderstandingsbeing mobilized by elites, who act in response to political events and
technological advancements(Anderson, 1991; Brubaker, 1996; Gellner, 1983;
Hobsbawm, 1990; Hutchinson& Smith, 1994; Snyder & Ballentine, 1996). The
current American context differs from many contemporaryexamples of fluid
nationalidentitiesin thatthe elite effortsappearto be mobilizingthe masses away
from ethnoculturaldefinitionsof the nationalidentityratherthantowardthem,but
it is similarin thatpublicofficials seem to be aheadof the masses in theirpromotion
of the transformation.The initial steps in this transformationindeed were rooted
in empowered minority voices, which influenced official rhetoric.In line with
theoriesof nationalism,the rest of society at largehas since begunto adoptthe new
inclusive norms, but it has been slow to do so because of the enduringpower of
racial and ethnic stereotypes,which become even more powerful in the face of
threatsto the nation(Volkan, 1994).
Convergencecan emergeon issues thataddressracialandethnicconcerns,but
dominantsocietal normsaffect the speed andlikelihood.In TheRace Card(2001),
Mendelbergshowed that when inegalitariannorms prevail in society, elites and
masses are both unconstrainedin basing their attitudesand behaviors on their
inegalitarianbeliefs, resultingin convergence.Whenegalitarianorinclusive norms
takehold, however,elected officials becomeconstrainedin theirwordsandactions;
violating powerful norms of acceptable discourse would spell electoral doom.
Ordinarycitizens do come to accept the new norm, but such acceptancecan be
slow to evolve and does not necessarilydisplace the lingeringadherenceto racial
stereotypes. As such, public opinion surveys are able to document strains of
inegalitarianismthatare less evident in analyses of elite rhetoric.
The More Things Change
519
Whetherthe story describedby Mendelbergapplies to attitudesand policies
that affect non-black minorities in the United States has yet to be determined.
Characteristicsof the currentenvironmentsuggestit is likely. As mentionedabove,
the late 20th century has seen the advancementof an incorporationistnorm in
Americansociety. ManyAmericansendorsethis normeven thoughit conflictswith
theirlingeringethnoculturalconceptionsof Americanidentity.Mendelberg's work
leads us to expect that this simultaneousadherenceto contradictorynotions of
nationalidentity can lead to elite and mass responses to 9/11 taking on different
trajectories.It would be unwise for an elected official to violate the new norm in
an explicit fashion. Doing so would certainlyalienateminorityvoters and would
offend many white voters as well. Ordinarycitizens, on the otherhand,do not face
the same constraints.7Combining these argumentsleads to the expectationthat
analyses of elite and mass responsesto 9/11 will reveal a clash of traditions,with
elites promotingincorporationismmore than ethnoculturalismand with ordinary
citizensdisplayingthe reawakeningof ascriptivistnorms.Similarly,we shouldfind
more convergence between elites and masses during the WWII era than we do
today.
Change and Continuity Among Political Leaders and the Media
Political Leaders
It has been establishedthat ascriptiveunderstandingsof Americannational
identitycontinueto retainpower thatlurksbeyond the awarenessof many Americans even thoughthey are formallycondemned.The most obvious example is the
tendency of white Americans to assume that a member of a minority group,
particularlyif he or she has an accent, is not an American (Schildkraut,2001a;
Takaki, 1999). Key questions to investigate are whether 9/11 will awaken this
lingering ethnoculturalismand bring a returnof nativist sentimentsand policies,
and whethersuch awakeningwill occur amongboth elites and masses. I begin the
empirical investigation with an examination of elite rhetoric and behavior. As
Delgado (1999) wrote, nativist discourse and actions tend to emerge among
political leaderswhen the nationexperiencessocial and economic upheaval,often
taking two forms: (1) restrictingimmigrationto keep foreigners,"usuallyones of
darkercoloration,"out, and(2) "enactingmeasuresaimedat makingthingsdifficult
for those [foreigners]who are alreadyhere" (p. 247). An initial reading of elite
responses to 9/11 suggests we may be headed down these two familiarpaths, for
they reveal a desire to both restrictimmigration(possibly along ethnic lines) and
"makethings difficult"for those alreadyhere.
7 Also see Schildkraut(2001b) for a
comparison of elite and mass discourse on official-English
legislation that shows that membersof Congresswho supportmakingEnglish the official language
are less likely thanordinaryAmericansto invoke ascriptiveinterpretationsof Americanidentity.
520
Schildkraut
An exampleof such desiresincludesa proposalin Congressthatwould restrict
eligibility for studentvisas. This proposalis watereddown from its initialversion,
but will still give critics of ethnoculturalismpause. Senator Dianne Feinstein
(D-Calif.) originallyproposeda moratoriumon all studentvisas. By the time her
bill was introduced,however,this measurewas substantiallychanged.As currently
written,the bill prohibitsgrantingstudentvisas to people from countriesthat the
federalgovernmentconsidersto be sponsorsof terrorism[Iran,Iraq,Sudan,Libya,
Syria, Cuba,and NorthKorea(Schemo, 2001)], except when a backgroundcheck
demonstratesthat the applicantdoes not pose a securityrisk to the United States.
The visa applicationprocess for students from all other countries is essentially
unaltered,save for some new requirementson the partof educationalinstitutions
and the INS.8 As with Executive Order9066, this bill does not call attentionto a
particularethnic group,but createsthe potentialfor ethnicity-basedpolicy implementationand institutesnew restrictionsbased on one's countryof origin.
Anothergovernmenteffort that signals an ethnoculturalapproachto policymakingis the attemptby the FBI to interviewmore than5,000 men who recently
came to the United States from countriesin the Middle East. Althoughostensibly
carriedout in the name of nationalsecurity, such efforts have yet to yield useful
information(at least none that has been reported).Moreover,they recall the FBI
arrestsof morethan2,000 Japaneseimmigrantswho hadbeen identifiedas leaders
in theircommunitiesafterthe attackon PearlHarbor.These local leaderswere the
firstinternees(Murray,2000, p. 3). Althoughtoday'sintervieweesarenotofficially
suspects, they surely fear that their performanceduringthe interviewcan change
that quickly. As any law-abidingdriverwho has ever noticed a patrolcar in the
rear-viewmirrorandinstantlythought"Ihope they don't catch me doing anything
wrong" can attest, simply interactingwith law enforcementauthoritiescan feel
adversarial.The personalandpsychologicalstakesin the case of recentimmigrants
being interviewedby the FBI are certainlyhigherthanthose of a driverwho fears
a speeding ticket. These practices are also sure to affect how Middle Eastern
immigrantsand citizens who do not fall underthe dragnetfeel toward U.S. law
enforcementauthoritiesand Americansociety in general.
Despite these instances of political elites using ethnicity as a proxy for
threat-practices that risk the continuedalienationof minoritieswho are already
particularlyawareof ethnoculturalism'senduringpower-there are signs thatthe
responses of political leaders are tempered with an incorporationistnotion of
nationalidentity that elite responses to Pearl Harborlacked. For example, when
PresidentBush delivereda speech to a joint session of Congressand the nationon
20 September 2001, he repeatedly stated that the U.S. response would not be
directed toward Muslims or toward the Afghan people and sought to clearly
8 The bill was introducedin
early Novemberand was referredto the SenateJudiciaryCommittee.The
text of the bill, S.1627, is availableat http://thomas.loc.gov.
The More Things Change
521
distinguishbetween terroristsand Arabs. Moreover,he imploredU.S. citizens to
make the same distinctions:
I ask you to uphold the values of America,and rememberwhy so many
have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first
responsibilityis to live by them. No one shouldbe singled out for unfair
treatmentor unkindwordsbecauseof theirethnicbackgroundor religious
faith.9
These repeatedand specific mentionsof Muslims and Arabsstandout, especially
when comparedto FDR's State of the Union address on 6 January1942, just 1
month after Pearl Harbor. In this speech, FDR made only one plea to avoid
discrimination,andhe framedhis vaguerequestin strategicandinstrumentalterms:
We mustbe particularlyvigilantagainstracialdiscriminationin any of its
ugly forms. Hitlerwill try again to breedmistrustand suspicionbetween
one individualand another,one groupand another,one race and another,
one governmentand another.'0
Elsewherein the speech, FDR referredto the Europeanenemy as "theNazis" and
"theFascists,"whereashe referredto the Pacific enemy as "theJapanese."Failure
to distinguishbetween Japaneseleadersand civilians characterizedthe discourse
of otherelected officials as well. For example, days before FDR issued Executive
Order9066, FletcherBowron, mayorof Los Angeles, warnedof a " 'prearranged
plan whereineach of our little Japanesefriendswill know his partin the event of
any possible attemptedinvasionor airraid'" (Daniels,2000, p. 49). And pejorative
terms such as "Jap"and "Nip"were ubiquitousat many levels of elite discourse
(Chappell,1997, p. 26). This rhetoricfits with the policy reactionsto PearlHarbor,
whereinternmentsignaledthatevery personof Japanesedescenton theWest Coast,
citizen or not, shouldbe considereda threatto nationalsecurity.1
Contrastthis to today's reactionwhen Rep. JohnCooksey (R-La.)arguedin a
radio interviewthat"a person 'wearinga diaperon his head' shouldbe subjectto
more scrutinywhen travelingon airlines"(Alpert& Walsh, 2001). His remarkwas
condemnedby the editorialpage of the WashingtonPost and by columnistsin his
9 In all, Bush devoted274 wordsof this 3,023-wordspeechto invokingincorporationismor distinguishing between Muslims and terrorists.Text of the speech can be found at www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
0This one plea accountsfor only 40 of the speech's 3,401 words. Text of the speech can be found at
www.theamericanpresidency.net/1942.htm.
Il Earlierin his career,and in line with prevailingnormsof the day, FDR wrote an articlecalled "Shall
We TrustJapan?"(publishedin the 1923 issue of Asia) in which he describedJapanesepeople as
"non-assimilable"(Robinson,2001, p 38). At the time it was published,FDR was a privatecitizen,
not an elected official. He briefly left politics afterthe Democratslost the 1920 election with him as
the party's nominee for Vice President.Then in 1921, he contractedpolio. During his recovery,
accordingto Robinson(2001), he "undertooknumerouswritingprojects"in orderto "keephis name
before the public in anticipationof an eventualreturnto politics" (p. 33), a returnthatcame in 1928
when he became the governorof New York.
522
Schildkraut
home state's Times-Picayuneof New Orleans. Fellow Louisiana Republicans
criticized the remarkbut stopped short of asking Cooksey to apologize. He did
apologize laterfor the diaperremarkbutmaintainedhis supportfor ethnicprofiling
("AnUgly Appeal,"2001; Ritea,2001). To date,Cooksey's commentsarethe only
ones by an elected official thatso blatantlyrecallthe prevailingnormsof an earlier
era. Instead, membersof Congress waited only 4 days after 9/11 to introducea
resolutionthatcondemned"bigotryand violence againstArab-Americans,American Muslims, and Americans from South Asia in the wake of terroristattacks"
(H.Con.Res.227),a resolutionthat breezed throughboth houses. And by the end
of October, both houses passed a bill that authorizes the president to provide
educational and health care assistance to women and children in Afghanistan
(S.1573). These responsesare surelydrivenby the need to securethe aid of states
in the Middle East in the fight againstterrorism,but they are also drivenby newly
prominentdomestic norms that reject the use of ascriptivecharacteristicswhen
deciding to confer rightson individuals.
During WWII, official rhetoricand public consciousness made a distinction
between "good Germans"and Nazi soldiers, whereas all Japanesewere characterized as treacherousand barbaric (Dower, 1986). Today, the government's
rhetoricalresponse mirrorsthe former, with the Afghan people constantlyportrayed as victims of the Talibanregime. In additionto the congressionalactions
mentionedabove, this image has been communicatedthroughLauraBush's radio
addresson the plightof Afghanwomen (andthe subsequentmediacoverageof that
address)andthroughCNN's near-continuousplay of Beneaththe Veil,a documentaryaboutlife in Afghanistanunderthe Talibanthatwas originallyairedin August
2001 but was then shown repeatedlyafter9/11.
Media
The CNN documentaryis only one of severalexamplesof how incorporationism has alteredmedia reactionsto diversityunderconditionsof threat.One of the
more notoriousmagazinearticlesto appearin the aftermathof PearlHarborranin
Timemagazineandwas titled"Howto Tell YourFriendsfromtheJaps."Thearticle
describedhow one could distinguishChinese and Japanesepeople:
Thereis no infallible way of telling [ChineseandJapanesepeople] apart.
Even an anthropologist,with calipersandplentyof time to measureheads,
noses, shoulders,hips, is sometimesstumped.A few rulesof thumb-not
always reliable ... Japanese-except for wrestlers-are seldom fat;they
often dry up and grow lean as they age. The Chinese often put on weight.
The Chinese expression is likely to be more placid, kindly, open; the
Japanesemore positive, dogmatic, arrogant.Japanesewalk stiffly erect,
hard-heeled.Chinese,morerelaxed,have an easy gait, sometimesshuffle.
[Time,22 December 1941, quotedin Takaki(2000, p. 111)]
The More Things Change
523
Presumablythe purposeof an article like this one would be to arm citizens with
knowledge needed for vigilance. An equivalent article today might be one that
describedhow to tell a Muslim from a Sikh in orderto avoid being suspicious of
the wrongpeople. As of this writing,however,no mainstreammediaoutlethas run
such an article,even aftera Sikh gas stationownerwas killed by a white American,
who apparentlythoughtthe man was Arab (Anton, 2001). A Lexis-Nexis search
did turn up an article called "Telling Friend from Foe" in the PittsburghPostGazette, the goal of which was to identify a handful of terroristorganizations,
including al-Qaeda,Hamas, and Hezbollah, as "foes," and to identify Muslims,
Arabs,and Sikhs as "friends"(Kelly, 2001).
During WWII, media commentatorssaid we need not worry that bombing
cities in Japanmight kill innocentcivilians because therewas no such thing as an
innocentJapanesecivilian (Chappell,1997, p. 107). The Los Angeles Timesranan
editorialarguingthateven U.S. citizens of Japaneseancestrycould not be trusted
(Daniels, 2000, p. 51). In contrast,the Los Angeles Times editorial page in late
September2001 called on moderateMuslims to condemnterrorismand publicly
acknowledge that the United States has allowed moderateIslam to have a voice
that it does not have elsewhere ("Islam and Democracy," 2001). Regarding
discriminationand civil liberties, another Septembereditorial warned, "At this
moment, when Americans are especially vulnerable to fear, it is importantto
recognize the importanceof liberty and resist any efforts to use calamity as the
rationaleto furthererode rights"("FreedomTrumpsFear,"2001). An editorial
from Octobereven highlighteda new kind of patriotism,one that seeks to learn
aboutIslam:"Theevolved patriotsarenotjust buyingAmericanflags; they'realso
overwhelming Amazon.com with orders for books on Islam, Afghanistan,and
foreignpolicy" ("A New, NuancedPatriotism,"2001). In otherwords,the patriotic
desire to protect the flag and "what it stands for" is now characterizedby new
understandingsof "whatit standsfor."It standsfor a people thatare carefulnot to
label membersof a particularethnicity as terrorists,and for a land that welcomes
membersof those ethnicities and allows their cultureto thrive in a way that their
own homelandsmay not.
To look for more systematic patterns, I conducted a content analysis on
editorials from the Los Angeles Times that ran in the 13 weeks following Pearl
Harborand in the 11 weeks following 9/11. All editorialsaddressingracial and
ethnic components of the conflicts were selected for the analysis, as were any
editorialsthataddressedcivil liberties,includingfreedomof the press,rightsof the
accused,due process,andgovernmentsecrecy.Table 1 presentsthe coding options
and the patternsof media discourseduringthese two periods.
The datashow thatin the aftermathof PearlHarbor,nearly32%of the editorial
paragraphsadvocated ethnic-profilingor promoted an ascriptive conception of
American identity, compared to zero after 9/11. The WWII-era editors were
unwilling to refer to JapaneseAmericans as Americans,preferringto call them
"descendantsof enemy aliens." These editorials were often accompanied by
Schildkraut
524
Table 1. Ethnoculturalism,Civil Liberties,and Incorporationismin Los Angeles TimesEditorials
Identity
Ethnoculturalism,neutral
Ethnoculturalism,promote
Ethnoculturalism,reject
Incorporationism,neutral
Incorporationism,multicultural
Incorporationism,melting pot
Civil liberties,neutral
Civil liberties,protectin wartime
Civil liberties,restrictin wartime
All otherparagraphs
Total
After
PearlHarbor
After
9/11
Numberof
paragraphs
1.38
31.72
0
1.38
0
0.69
11.03
5.52
13.79
34.48
100
(N= 145)
0.69
0
2.08
9.72
8.33
2.08
16.67
27.08
0.69
32.64
100
(N= 144)
3
46
3
16
12
4
40
47
21
97
289
PearsonX2(9)= 110.6613
Note. Cell entries representpercentof paragraphs;editorialsreferringto domestic policies that touch
on issues of race, ethnicity,and civil libertiesin wartimewere selected for analysis.
cartoonsdepictingJapanesepeople with buck teeth,thick glasses, and spying eyes
and ears. In contrast,20% of the post-9/11 paragraphshighlightincorporationism
in some form, versus only 2% of the WWII-eradiscourse.Today's editorialsrefer
to the United Statesas a nationof immigrants(neutralincorporationism),celebrate
diversity(multiculturalincorporationism),andhighlightthe evolving ethnicnature
of Americanidentity (melting-potincorporationism).
Not surprisingly,civil liberties were a significantconcern in both eras, with
editorsin the earlierera more willing to accept restrictionson free speech and due
process. In both eras, due-processconcerns that did not refer to ethnicity-based
policymakingand implementationwere coded as referringto civil liberties. The
concerns addressedin this category also cover the rights of the accused, freedom
of the press,andgovernmentsecrecy. Then,restrictingthe libertiesof some for the
good of the whole was accepted,althoughregretfully.Today,editorshighlightthe
liberty-for-safetytradeas dubious.12
12A similaranalysis was conductedon editorialsfrom the New YorkTimes(resultsnot shown). In that
paper, argumentsin favor of protectingfreedom of the press dominatedin both eras. That paper's
chief concern, then and now, was its own ability to criticize the governmentand the need for the
governmentto shareits informationwith the public. In the WWIIera, roughlyequal proportionsof
paragraphspromotedand rejectedethnoculturalism.The paperdid not advocateinternment,nor did
it condemn it. Indeed,only one editorialmentionedinternmentat all, and it appeared2 weeks after
ExecutiveOrder9066 was issued. This lack of attentioncould be due to the paper'shome on the East
Coastor to a lack of concernaboutthe treatmentof JapaneseAmericans.The one editorialaddressing
evacuation said that pledges of loyalty from GermanAmericangroupscould be taken to represent
the views of all GermanAmericans, whereas the federal governmentneeded to be vigilant over
innocentJapaneseAmericansin orderto catch spies.
The More Things Change
525
This analysisprovidesfurtherconfirmationof the sea change in elite rhetoric
aboutthe role that race, ethnicity,and religion play in delineatingthe boundaries
of national identity. These examples reflect incorporationism'scontestation of
ethnoculturalismin the statementsof elected officials andeditorialwriters.But do
such statementscorrespondto the reactionsof most Americancitizens?
Change and Continuity Among Citizens
Public opinion data sets from 1941 are hardto find, which makes it difficult
to say much aboutpublic opinion in the aftermathof PearlHarbor.Evidence does
suggestthatthe pejorativestereotypesandcharacterizationsof all Japanesepeople,
even U.S. citizens, as the enemy were endorsed by a majority of Americans
(Chappell, 1997). Survey data collected throughoutthe past few decades (mentioned above) reveal the continued presence of the ethnoculturalconception of
Americanidentity that promotedsuch blanketsuspicion, despite its official condemnation.Accordingto symbolic politics researchon racial discourse(Mendelberg, 2001), this latent ethnoculturalism, combined with the powerful
incorporationistmessages coming from elite sources, shouldlead to contradictory
impulses and to more supportfor ethnoculturalpractices than elites have been
advocating.
Perhapsit shouldcome as no surprisethatsupportfor restrictingoveralllevels
of immigrationrose sharplyafter 9/11. In an October2001 Gallup poll, 58% of
respondentssaid that immigrationshould be decreased;this result agrees with
Delgado's (1999) observationthat the desire to close the bordersis a common
reactionto social and political stress.Just 1 year before, only 38% of respondents
felt that immigrationshould be decreased,the second lowest level of supportfor
decreasing immigrationon record since Gallup started asking the question in
1965.13
But debatesaboutthe properlevel of immigrationare perennial,and support
for restrictionsfluctuateseven undermore normalconditions;otherpolicy issues
are uniqueto the nation's new wartimeconsciousness. In a Time/CNNpoll taken
shortlyafter 9/11, 31% of respondentssaid they would favor allowing the federal
government"to hold Arabs who are U.S. citizens in camps until it can be determined whether they have links to terroristorganizations."'4Similarly, 32% of
respondentsin a Newsweekpoll said thatthe United States "shouldput Arabsand
Arab-Americansin this countryunder special surveillance."This latterquestion
even compared such surveillance to internmentduring WWII.15In an ABC
areavailablefromGallup(www.gallup.com/pol/topics/immigration.asp).
13 Questionwordingandpercentages
14Questionwordingis availablefrom Polling the Nations (http://poll.orspub.com).
15"Inresponseto the (WorldTradeCenterandPentagon)terroristattacks,do you thinkthe UnitedStates
shouldput Arabsand Arab-Americansin this countryunderspecial surveillance,or thatit would be
a mistake to targeta nationalitygroup, as was done with Japanese-Americansafter Pearl Harbor?"
Wordingfrom Polling the Nations.
Schildkraut
526
News/WashingtonPost poll taken 1 monthafter9/11,44% of respondentssaidthey
supportgiving police the powerto stopanyone"whoappearsto be AraborMuslim"
at random,28% said thatbeing Arabor Muslim shouldbe an importantpartof the
profile of a suspectedterrorist,and 39% said thatthey have personallybeen more
suspicious of people they "thinkare of Arabdescent."16Given the obvious social
undesirabilityof these responses,it is likely thatthe numberof people supporting
them is actually higher. These figures recall the findings of a governmentsponsoredsurvey released weeks afterPearl Harborthat found that up to 43% of
the respondentsfelt thatpre-intemmenteffortsto monitorsubversiveactivitywere
insufficient(Robinson,2001, p. 101).
In a survey conductedin October2001 by the KaiserFamily Foundation,the
KennedySchool of Governmentat HarvardUniversity,andNationalPublicRadio,
a split sample yielded a finding concerningprofilingthathighlightscontemporary
clashes betweenlingering(andreawakening)ethnoculturalismon the one handand
newer incorporationistnormson the other.One-halfof the sample was asked:
It has been reportedthat some police officers stop motoristsof certain
racial or ethnic groupsbecause the officers believe thatthese groupsare
more likely than othersto commit certaintypes of crime. This practiceis
known as racial profiling. Do you approve or disapproveof the use of
racialprofilingby police?17
The otherhalf of the sample was asked:
Since September11th,some law enforcementagencies have stoppedand
searchedpeople who are Arabor of Middle Easterndescent to see if they
may be involved in potential terroristactivities. Do you approve or
disapproveof this kind of profiling?
In the first version, 21% approvedof ethnic profiling.In the second version, 66%
approved.This stark difference suggests that diversity in the face of threatis a
powerful combinationof factors that makes ethnoculturalismacceptable.Trends
in public opinion have pointed to a lurking, latent ethnoculturalismthat faces
explicit condemnationalong with a growing acceptance of an incorporationist
conceptionof nationalidentity.Incorporationismpromotesoppositionto the type
of profiling described in the first question. Yet responses to the other survey
questionsdescribedabove revealpreferencesthataremoreexplicitly ethnocultural
thanpre-9/11 normswould have allowed and hearkenback to the mass suspicion
of JapaneseAmericansafterPearlHarbor.
It will still be some time before analystsare able to use opinion datato make
strongcausal claims about reactionsto the 9/11 attacks.One obstacle is that the
questions described above, particularlythe items about supportfor internment,
16Data and codebook are availablefrom ICPSR.
17Questionwordingis availablefrom the Kaiser
Family Foundation(www.kff.org).
The More Things Change
527
were not asked until after 9/11, leaving no real baseline for comparison.And it
might be too soon after the attacks to have a clear picture of emerging trends.
Anotherobstacle is thatfew post-9/11 surveys are publicly availablefor analysis,
and of those that are, items regardingrelevant independentvariables are often
lacking.Thatsaid, individual-levelanalysiscould still help us to identifyemerging
trendsand relatethem to existing understandingsaboutopinionformation.One of
the few publicly available post-9/11 public opinion surveys is the ABC
News/WashingtonPost poll mentionedabove. It does not include general items
regardingconceptions of nationalidentity, which limits its utility for the present
study, but it has enough informationto provideinsightfulanalyses nonetheless.
Respondentswere askedwhetherthey supportor oppose giving police powers
to stop and search (1) anyone, at random;(2) anyone who fits the profile of a
suspectedterrorist;and (3) anyone who appearsto be Arabor Muslim, at random
(question orderwas randomized).Supportfor these options was 50%, 85%, and
44%,respectively.The thirdoptionis the most problematicfroman incorporationist perspective, and its high level of support demands investigation. A probit
analysis of opinions on all three options was conductedwith the following independentvariables:age, education,partyidentification,liberal/conservativeideology, race (white, black, Hispanic,or other),being a Muslim (n = 4), knowing any
Muslims, approvalfor Bush's job performance,approvalfor bombingin Afghanistan,fearinganotherattackon the UnitedStates,fearingbeing a victim of a terrorist
attack, claiming to have a good understandingof Islam, and claiming to have a
favorableopinion of Islam.
The results, shown in Table 2, indicate that education makes a person less
likely to supportgiving police powers to stop Arabs or Muslims at random.This
finding is expected. Previous analyses have shown educationto be a strong and
consistent influence on whether a person endorses ethnoculturalconceptions of
Americanidentity (Citrin& Duff, 1998; Citrinet al., 1990; Schildkraut,2001a).
More generally,people who are more politically awaretend to have views similar
to politicalelites, or as Zaller(1992) wrote, "exposureto elite discourseappearsto
promote supportfor the ideas carriedin it" (p. 11). If we accept that education
serves as a proxy for political awarenessand exposureto elite discourse,then we
should expect to see that people with more education are less likely to accept
policies that allow for ethnic profiling. Educationalso makes people concerned
about protecting the civil liberties of everyone; it is the strongest predictorof
opposition to allowing police to stop anyone at random.Again, given the elite
concern with protectingcivil liberties establishedearlier,this finding fits within
existing understandingsof the relationshipamong education, elite rhetoric,and
policy preferences.8
18It also fits within establishedfindings on the general relationshipbetween political knowledge and
supportfor civil libertiesand tolerance(see, e.g., Delli Carpini& Keeter, 1996; McClosky, 1964).
528
Schildkraut
Table 2. PredictingSupportfor Police Powers and Suspicionof Arabs
Independentvariable
Supportpolice powers to stop and search:
Fits terrorist
Anyone
Any Arab
or Muslim
profile
Age
Education
Republican
Conservative
Black
Hispanic
Otherrace
Muslim
Doesn't know anyone
Muslim
Bush approval
Bombing approval
Worriedaboutmore attacks
on U.S.
Worriedaboutbeing a
victim of attack
Does not understandIslam
Unfavorableopinion
of Islam
-0.24 (0.25)
-0.86*** (0.25)
0.24* (0.13)
0.07 (0.16)
-0.17 (0.26)
-0.001 (0.22)
-0.18 (0.24)
1.11(0.81)
0.06 (0.32)
-0.42 (0.28)
-0.09 (0.16)
0.09 (0.16)
-0.31 (0.24)
0.02 (0.32)
-0.01 (0.27)
-0.08 (0.73)
0.20* (0.12)
0.51 (0.34)
-0.06 (0.35)
0.10 (0.13)
1.18*** (0.35)
-0.26 (0.38)
Constant
N
g2
-0.17 (0.26)
-0.87*** (0.26)
0.06 (0.17)
0.12 (0.16)
0.04 (0.27)
0.27 (0.22)
0.06 (0.23)
0.75 (0.66)
Suspicious
of Arabs
-0.26 (0.27)
0.28 (0.27)
-0.03 (0.14)
0.30* (0.16)
0.63** (0.29)
0.44** (0.22)
0.33 (0.24)
0.19(0.81)
0.16 (0.11)
0.59* (0.32)
0.13 (0.32)
0.39*** (0.12)
0.68** (0.36)
0.05 (0.35)
0.19 (0.21)
0.28 (0.24)
0.03 (0.21)
0.21 (0.22)
0.24** (0.12)
0.02 (0.12)
0.38*** (0.14)
0.05 (0.13)
0.34** (0.12)
0.08 (0.12)
0.29** (0.13)
0.07 (0.13)
0.28*** (0.11)
0.35*** (0.13)
0.46*** (0.11)
0.72*** (0.12)
-0.32*** (0.12)
783
54.87
0.70*** (0.13)
782
47.92
-0.77*** (0.13)
781
78.11
-1.13*** (0.15)
786
102.80
Note. Standarderrorsare in parentheses.All independentvariablesare coded to have a rangeof 1.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
The results also show that having a favorable view of Islam makes a person
less likely to support profiling, while approving of the way Bush is handling his
job as president makes a person more likely to favor profiling. Given Bush's high
ratings in the wake of the attacks (in this survey, 77% of respondents strongly
approve of the way Bush is handling his job as president and 17% approve
somewhat, a total of 94%), widespread support for profiling should perhaps not be
surprising. Why approval ratings lead to support for profiling is the next obvious
question, one that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article.19
Contrary to many symbolic politics analyses, self-interest-measured by the
fear that one or one's family and friends will be the victim of a terrorist attack-is
also a strong predictor of support for profiling, more so than fearing another attack
against the United States (43% of respondents expressed fears about being a
19An ordinaryleast squaresregression(resultsnot shown)indicatesthatpartisanidentificationandrace
shape approvalfor Bush; Republicansand whites are more likely than Democrats and blacks to
approveof Bush's job performance.Neither of these factors are significant in the probit analysis,
indicatingthey have an indirectinfluence on supportfor profiling.
The More Things Change
529
victim). In most analysesof publicopinion,measuresof self-interestfail to perform
well in termsof predictingpolicypreferences,despitetheirintuitiveappeal.Searsand
Funk (1990) explained that short-termand personal interests are more likely to
shape opinions when the costs and benefits associatedwith a policy areboth clear
and substantialand when political leadersexpressly politicize self-interest.Costs
andbenefits,however,arerarelyclearor substantial,andAmericansin generalare
not inclined to blame the governmentfor their personal (mis)fortunes(Feldman,
1982; Sniderman& Brody, 1977). This combination of factors usually works
againstthe abilityof personalcost/benefitcalculationsto affect policy preferences.
In our currentcontext, the stakes are high (dying, or losing a loved one), and
many Americanstravelby plane, know people who do, or know people who live
nearManhattanor Washington.Moreover,people not only look to the government
to protectthem from terrorists,they need governmentto do thatjob; combating
terrorismlacks the "attributionproblem"(Mutz, 1998, p. 101) thatoften prevents
people fromconnectingtheirown intereststo governmentaction.Whereaspeople
can look to individual-levelactionsto improvetheirincome,to combatstereotypes,
or to fight drug addiction, counterterrorismefforts do not lend themselves to
individual initiative. No other viable options for catching terroristplots in the
making really exist. Additionally, Mutz (1998) found that when perceptionsof
personalsituationsand assessmentsof the well-being of the nationare similar,and
when the issue at handreceives heavy mediacoverage,self-interestshapespolitical
judgments more than collective interest does. With this research in mind, the
significantcoefficient on perceptionsof self-interestbegins to make more sense.
The stakesare clear and substantial,the situationis squarelywithin government's
purview, media coverage of the attacks could not have been more intense, and
perceptionsof personalthreatandcollective threatareunitedfor manyrespondents
(r = 0.41). Underthese conditions,self-interestis morelikely to have an impacton
policy preferences.People who fear being a victim are looking to governmentto
do something, anything, even if it means engaging in the liberty-for-safetyexchanges of earliereras.
The same model was used to analyze whetherpeople admit to being more
suspicious of people who look Arab (Table 2). As before, people are more likely
to admitto this suspicion if they express approvalfor Bush, fear thatthey may be
victims of a futureattack,and have an unfavorableview of Islam. Not knowing
any Muslimsand identifyingas conservativealso contributeto suspicion.Herewe
also see an effect for race,but in an unanticipateddirection-blacks andHispanics
are more likely than whites to be suspicious of people who look Arab. More
systematicanalysesabouthow the terroristattacksare shapingblack andHispanic
views of Arabsand Muslims are clearly needed.20
20Additional models were run in which support for giving police the power to stop anyone at
random-perhaps a measureof generalconcernfor civil liberties-was includedas an independent
variable.Supportfor this measurewas a strongpredictorof supportfor allowingpolice to stop anyone
530
Schildkraut
A tentativeconclusion from these initial models is thata personwho supports
the administration,is less educated,is unfamiliarwith Muslims and/orIslam, and
is afraidof becoming the victim of an attackwill be likely to supportpolicies that
make life difficult for a particularethnic group. Elsewhere,ethnoculturalunderstandingsof Americanidentity have been shown to increase supportfor policies
that make life difficult for members of particularethnic groups (Citrin& Duff,
1998; Citrin et al., 1990; Schildkraut,2001a). Lacking specific measures of
ethnoculturalism,the most thatcan be said at this point is thatit is likely that the
independentfactors listed above contributeto an awakeningof the ethnocultural
conception of American identity, which in turn gains increased influence over
policy preferences and results in greater supportfor ethnic profiling and even
internment.In time, we will be able to test this claim more thoroughly.
As the immediatesense of threatwanes, it is likely that supportfor ethnoculturalpolicies will subsideas well andthatordinarycitizens will resumethe process
of adopting elite messages advocating inclusion, tolerance, and a multiethnic
conception of Americanidentity. According to Gallup, the percentageof people
saying they fear being the victim of a terroristattackwas, by mid-October,down
to 43% from a high of 58%immediatelyafterthe attacks.By January2002, a Pew
Research Centerpoll found 38% of respondentsvoicing this fear. And with the
2002 elections nearing, Bush's approvalrating is likely to continue to slide as
criticismof his domesticpolicies is sureto loom largein campaigndiscourse.21As
of this writing,his approvalratingis still remarkablyhigh-74% in Gallup(March
2002) and 69% in Pew (January2002)-although it is down more than 15 points
fromits peak.As the probitanalysisshows, when fearof personalthreatandBush's
approvalratingsare lower, so is supportfor ethnoculturalpractices.Therefore,as
the immediateshock of the 9/11 attacksfades, we might expect to see a returnto
pre-9/11 patternsregardingthe ethnoculturaland incorporationistconceptions of
Americanidentity,assuming,of course, the absence of anotherattack.
In the meantime,the currentstate of affairs is characterizedby less convergence than studies of mass/elite opinions would lead us to expect. Althoughthose
studies differ in theirdesignationof leaders and followers, they tend to agree that
high salience brings agreement between mass opinion and elite rhetoric and
behavior.Page and Shapiro(1983) noted that fluctuatingopinions are less likely
to be matchedby policy changes,andit is likely thatwe are in a periodof unstable
preferences.Also, it is undeniablethatincorporationism'sgains in recentyears are
who fits the profile of a terrorist(coeff. = 0.89, p < 0.01) and to stop anyone who appearsto be Arab
or Muslim (coeff. = 1.36, p < 0.01); it also led to a greaterlikelihood of being suspiciousof people
who look Arabor Muslim (coeff. = 0.38, p < 0.01). Takentogether,these resultssuggest thatpeople
who are willing to restrictthe rightsof everyoneare more likely thanothersto supportrestrictingthe
rightsof a few; it is not the case thatpeople arein favorof subjectingeveryoneto morescrutinywhile
rejectingethnic profiling.The only substantivechange in othervariablesin these new models is that
supportfor Bush became insignificantin predictingsupportfor police use of ethnic profiling.
21See Zaller (1992) for an
analysis of "two-sidedinformationflows" and attitudechange.
531
The More Things Change
due in largepartto the effortsof social movementsthatoriginatedfrompreviously
powerless groups. Models of opinion-sharing,or reciprocalrelationships,might
thereforealso apply here, but in a very specific manner,with opinions rooted in a
small sector of society affecting elite rhetoric,which then altersthe views of the
rest of society.
The story as it has developed thus far, however, also supportsthe argument
thatissues addressingethnicityandidentityareperhapsdifferentfromotherissues
studiedin researchon mass/elite convergence.As studies of nationalismsuggest,
elite actorsappearto be the mobilizing agents of the incorporationistresponse,at
least the most visible ones as far as the majorityof Americansare concerned.At
the same time, the enduringpower of ethnic stereotypes-particularly the overlearnedimage of Americansas white English-speakingChristians-is reawakened
in the face of threat and is clashing with new, inclusive societal norms. This
interpretationof events is an extension of Mendelberg's analysisof racialattitudes
anddiscourse.Even in the face of awakenedascriptivetendencies,we arein an age
when ascriptivesentimentsdo not go unchallenged.These challenges come from
political leaders, the media, ethnic leaders, and ordinarycitizens who have truly
adoptedmore inclusive ideas aboutAmericanidentity.
Anotherlesson fromMendelberg'sstudyis thathighlightingthe contradictions
in people's opinions-highlighting that their preferences go against norms of
acceptablediscourse and practices-should lead to a decline in their supportfor
ascriptivistpolicies and in the desire of elected officials to appeal to ascriptivist
beliefs throughimplicit means.As it turnsout, politiciansand the press have been
quick to point out that ethnic profiling, individual acts of retaliation,and mass
suspicion are not "the Americanway"; these responses have probablyprevented
mass reactionsfrom relying on ethnoculturalismeven more.
Conclusions
The automaticityof the ethnoculturalimpulse to assume that a memberof a
minoritygroup is not an Americanhas been a featureof the thoughtprocesses of
white Americansfor some time. The nationhas made great gains in recent years
in delegitimizingthe idea that only whites of NorthernEuropeanancestrycan be
consideredAmericanand in promotinga multiethnicunderstandingof American
identity,yet the old stereotypesremain.In peacetime,these stereotypesareharmful
to the nation because of the ethnic tensions and alienation they promote. Even
without terroristattacks, the persistence of the old stereotypes is worrisome,
particularlyas the demographicmakeupof the nationcontinuesto diversify. The
wholly new stateof affairsusheredin on 9/11 rendersthe questionsof how whites
view their fellow non-whitecitizens and how those non-whitecitizens view their
relationshipto the nationeven more pressing.
After 9/11, ethnoculturalism'simpacton how people feel aboutpublic policy
appearsto be strengthened;it has againbecome acceptableto manypeople to curtail
Schildkraut
532
the rightsand opportunitiesof those who do not fit into the dominantculturaltype.
It also appearsthat mass and elite responses to the attacks are taking different
trajectories.Elite rhetoricdemonstratesa muchmoredramaticbreakwith reactions
to the attackon PearlHarborthando the surveyresponsesof ordinaryAmericans.
Domestic developmentsnow are clearly not as ethnoculturalas they were during
WWII, and it does not seem like they will be. The United States is a much more
diverse place than it was then. A variety of sociopolitical developments in the
intervening years have normalized new understandingsabout what constitutes
Americanidentityandhave restrictedthe rangeof ethnicity-basedpolicies thatwill
be tolerated.Moreover,the media have been shown to have a powerful effect on
publicopinion [see, e.g., Iyengar& Kinder(1987)], andso far,the mediahave been
the most prominentand consistentmainstreamvoice of incorporationism.
Accordingto Takaki(2000), WWIIandinternmentled some JapaneseAmericans to renounce their citizenship-even some who had never been to Japanwhereasit led othersto "claimtheiridentitiesas Americans"(p. 143). Some 30,000
JapaneseAmericansserved in the militaryduringthe war, and some even fought
in areaswherethey hadfamily (p. 161). Today,the FBI findsitself in needof people
who can translatefrom Arabic, Pashto, Farsi, and Uzbek into English. Trustand
pride in Americansociety and its institutionsare essential for creatingthe desire
for thatkind of work. When ethnoculturalismprevails,it hindersthe development
of pride and trust among the nation's many non-white citizens whose help is
needed. If incorporationismtriumphs,it is likely we will see more of the "new,
nuanced patriots"extolled in the Los Angeles Times, and they will be of all
ethnicitiesandfaiths.It is too early to tell whethermass andelite responsesto 9/11
will enhance or diminish the place of incorporationismin our belief systems and
whetherethnoculturalismwill continue to recede as it had been doing for many
years.But incorporationism'sprogressto datehas undoubtedlypreventedattempts
to find domestic threatsnow from being modeled on our attemptsfrom 60 years
ago.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thankthe editors, StephenDeets, Jessica Grim,and Pablo Mitchell for their
comments, suggestions, and research advice. Correspondenceconcerning this
articleshouldbe sent to DeborahJ. Schildkraut,Departmentof Politics, Rice Hall,
OberlinCollege, Oberlin,OH 44074. E-mail:[email protected]
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