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with its failure, Yeltsin felt compelled
to act directly. On 29 November he
ordered the Chechens to disarm. When
they refused, he sent in his military.
Four Phases
1994-95 Battle of Grozny
By Christopher Miskimon
Note: The article is illustrated with
scenes from the Battle of Grozny.
Background
A
s the Soviet Union fell apart
in the early 1990s, various
national groups within its
borders declared independence.
The Chechens were one such group.
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A Chechen and former Soviet Air
Force general, Dzhokhar Dudayev,
became their independence
movement’s leader, and the region
declared “autonomy” in October
1991, even before the Soviet Union
formally dissolved that December.
A month later the Russians sent
troops to reestablish Moscow’s control,
without success. In the next several
MODERN WAR 14 | NOV–DEC 2014
years the Kremlin leaders were too
busy consolidating their position
domestically to take further action.
In late 1994, President Boris Yeltsin
decided the situation had to change.
The catalyst was a failed attempt by
ethnic Russians inside Chechnya
to seize power. While the Moscow
government denied involvement, their
support for the coup was obvious and,
Yeltsin placed Defense Minister
Pavel Grachev in charge of the
operation. Grachev in turn assigned
the North Caucasus Military
District (NCMD) as the responsible
headquarters element. Russian army
regulars, MVD (Interior Ministry)
troops, Border Guards and FSK
(Federal Counterintelligence
Agency) units were all assigned
to a hastily assembled force. That
was the Russians’ first misstep.
Those then running the NCMD
lacked combat command experience, and they weren’t prepared to
handle the influx of troops. Further,
they weren’t versed in conducting
joint operations involving different
service branches. Even so, planning
moved ahead despite the noticeable
shortfalls, as well as others in overall
troop training and equipment.
The Russians developed an invasion plan in which multiple columns
would first surround Chechnya and
then converge on its capital Grozny.
That plan was divided into four parts.
In its first phase, planned to last
three days, the Chechen border
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was to be sealed and Grozny surrounded on the north, east and
west. The route south was left open
to allow Chechen forces to flee.
The Second Phase was to be the
reduction of Grozny. The Russians
would send strong armored columns
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View from Grozny
The North Caucasus
Chechnya is a land-locked state
in the North Caucasus region. Russia
proper and other regions under Moscow’s
control border it to the north, west and
east, while Georgia is on the south. The
northern portion of Chechnya is steppe
country, while the south is mixed woodlands turning into mountains. The capital
Grozny is located almost exactly in the
center of the country. Built on the ruins of
three villages destroyed by the Russians
during the 1800s, Grozny was considered
a modern city by local standards and was
heavily urbanized with high-rise buildings
and extensive industry. Part of the reason
for Russian interest was Chechnya’s
large oil reserves. Chechnya was also a
primary source of aviation fuel.
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to seize major objectives in the city,
such as utilities, radio and television
stations and government buildings.
It was anticipated that phase would
take four days, with the expectation
the Chechens wouldn’t resist, but
would instead retreat through the
open southern escape route.
Hounding those fleeing Chechens
into the mountains was to constitute
phase three, and it was anticipated as
lasting no more than 10 days. During
it a pro-Russian government
was to be set up in Grozny.
Afterward, the final phase was to
involve the elimination of all Chechen
groups who remained defiant in
the mountains. The timeline for the
fourth phase was open-ended, but
was expected to take no more than a
few weeks to several months at most.
Dangerous assumptions were
evident in the hastily conceived plan.
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Foremost, the Russians believed
the Chechens would never attempt
to stand against the firepower they
could bring to bear against them. That
conclusion was surprising in light of
the then still recent Soviet experience
in Afghanistan fighting irregulars –
where a similar firepower superiority
had generated no real benefits.
Additionally, the Russian planners
assumed their units were capable of
a quick campaign similar to the 1991
US-Coalition Desert Storm operation
in Kuwait and Iraq. In reality, though,
the Russian military of the mid-90s was
only a shadow of its Cold War self, lacking almost everything needed for a fast,
decisive attack. Due to a lack of funds
and an excess of corruption and apathy
in many quarters, training was poor,
equipment was badly maintained,
and the logistics required to support
a mechanized force weren’t in place.
In contrast to the Russians, the Chechens
were under no illusions about their situation,
and they therefore prepared more realistically for
the coming conflict. First, the menace on their
border served to unify them against the Russian
threat. Dudayev didn’t have control of all the
Chechen factions and several actually opposed
him; however, the looming invasion motivated all
of them to come together to fight the invaders.
They also had a realistic understanding of their
own capabilities. The Chechens had seized large
quantities of weapons during the Soviet breakup.
More had been purchased or traded from corrupt
Russian officials, including a deal with Grachev during the withdrawal of Russian troops a few years earlier. Even so, most of the Chechens’ armaments were
merely small arms, including RPG, assault rifles,
automatic weapons and grenades. There was a small
number of tanks and AFV (armored fighting vehicles), but they weren’t enough to face the Russians in
open battle. Similarly, the Chechens lacked adequate
maintenance capability for the mechanized gear
they did possess. Overall, they knew engaging the
enemy in the open was tantamount to suicide.
Instead the Chechens planned to fight inside
Grozny using tactics of their own choosing. Their
forces outside the city would engage in delaying
actions to slow the Russian advance. Civilians would
be used in passive resistance mode, not fighting
the Russians but obstructing their movement whenever possible.
When the invaders reached Grozny, its defenders would isolate
and destroy columns in ambushes using hit-and-run attacks.
Many Chechens had experience in the Soviet Army and they
could therefore anticipate Russians tactics. Volunteer Muslim
fighters from abroad also arrived to assist in what they viewed as a
jihad, and they brought their own experience to the fight. Aware of
the Russian propensity to use heavy artillery strikes, the Chechens
planned to stay close to their enemy. By so doing, Russian firepower
MODERN WAR 14 | NOV–DEC 2014
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Tactics
Russian
Russian tactical shortfalls were a direct result of the planning,
training and logistical difficulties under which their troops labored.
Those tactics improved as the problems were slowly addressed.
Russian troops suffered setbacks and needless casualties during the
initial stages of the attack, with changes made only after it became
obvious a new approach was needed to prevent complete defeat.
Most of the Russian troops were conscripts who’d received only
the most rudimentary training. Many hadn’t fired their weapons in
months, and field exercises were infrequent, conducted once a year at
best. Most such exercises were of small units, battalion and below,
and there was a lack of coordination among larger formations.
Most Russian units were understrength, so ad hoc formations
were created just before the invasion, giving those troops no
time to train together or work out command relationships. Some
battalions had troops from up to seven different units within their
ranks, making cohesion impossible. Most units were still trying
to teach basic soldiering skills, such as marksmanship, while
waiting on the Chechen border to start the invasion. There was
no preparation for urban combat or other complex operations.
Equipment problems likewise plagued the Russians. Maps were
one shortfall: there were no detailed maps of the region or capital
available. The maps that were on hand were large scale, 1:100,000
or 1:50,000, totally unsuited for effective tactical use. That caused
Russian columns to become lost when Chechens took down or changed
street signs. The lack of maps also made it simpler for Chechens
posing as sympathetic civilians to lead the Russians into ambushes.
Communications were a second major failing. The Russians
were short of encryptable radios for secure transmissions, and there
wasn’t time to train conscripts on what equipment was available.
The decision was made to use plain language on unsecured
channels, something the Chechens exploited. The Russians also
lacked the repeaters and antennae to ensure communication
in built-up areas where power lines, multi-story buildings and
other structures interfere with radio traffic. That made coordination
among different units and calls for fire support more difficult.
All those issues contributed to Russian failings on the
battlefield. When blocked by Chechen civilians, Russian columns
often simply stopped, unsure of how to react. Infantrymen, with
no training in urban fighting, simply stayed in their AFV, even
after they’d become immobilized. Those who did get out of their
vehicles didn’t know how to move or react in the environment, and
they were subject to punishing sniper and machinegun fire. When
they tried to assault Chechen positions, they found the ground
floor entrances blocked and didn’t know how to breach them.
would be minimized in order to avoid
friendly fire incidents. The ultimate
Chechen objective was to inflict
large numbers of casualties while
dragging out the fighting long enough
for the Russians to lose their will to
continue the war, or for international
pressure to force them to withdraw.
Across the Frontier
The invasion began on 20
November with a Russian aerial
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Vehicle crews hadn’t trained together and were often short
handed, forcing single crewman to fill more than one role, such as
a vehicle commander also having to act as a gunner. That slowed
their ability to react in the fast-moving urban battlefield.
After their initial defeats, however, the Russians were quick to
adapt and addressed their errors and shortcomings. During the lull
after their first setbacks, they brought in more troops of better quality,
including airborne, naval infantry and special forces. They took care to
equip them and provided urban warfare training before sending them
to Grozny. On arriving in the city, new units were given brief duty in
quiet sectors to acclimatize them before commitment to the fighting.
Perhaps the most important change was the formation of combined
arms “storm” (assault) groups that brought with them everything needed
for city fighting. Those groups were each formed around an infantry
company, usually a motorized rifle unit. Augmentation forces included a
tank platoon, an artillery battery, a grenade launcher platoon, mortars,
engineers and chemical troops (smoke and tear gas). Those groups
would break down into obstacle clearing parties supported by a covering
force who would then reconsolidate on the objective once it had been
seized. That was an improvement, though it still suffered from a lack
of cohesion, as units were often broken up to form the storm groups.
Another method was to take an infantry platoon and simply
reinforce it with what was needed for its particular mission. A
final technique was the Russian propensity for using mass artillery to pulverize enemy defenses. That was effective, though it
often caused extensive collateral damage and civilian casualties
that were exploited by the Chechens for propaganda value.
In those ways, the Russians learned to suppress the defenders
of a building, assault it with grenades and small arms, and conduct
room-clearing to secure it before consolidating in it to make a
defensible position from which to advance for further action.
Chechen
Chechen tactics were a realistic reflection of their own situation,
strengths and weaknesses. They couldn’t hope to defeat the Russians
in conventional battle, so they planned a close fight that highlighted
the advantages of their own irregular light infantry force.
The small number of tanks and AFV they possessed were insufficient
for mass action, so the Chechens dispersed them. Outside Grozny they
were employed to delay Russian columns and harass their rear echelons.
Inside the city, their tanks were usually dug in as pillboxes covering
vital intersections and streets with their fields of fire. Most of their
tanks were obsolete T-54 and T-62 models along with a few T-72s.
The majority of Chechen forces operated as light infantry. The tribal
structure of their Teip, two or three villages joined together, could each
produce around 600 fighters. Those fighters broke into groups as small
as 25. They would in turn divide into three squad-sized elements, armed
offensive that destroyed the Chechen
Air Force on the ground. Road
junctions, bridges and key towns
were also bombed. The Russians
had air supremacy as the Chechens
lacked anti-aircraft capability. As
long as Russian planes stayed above
the limited ceiling of their light AA
guns and shoulder-fired missiles the
Chechens possessed, they were safe.
The air campaign made little use of
precision weapons in the Russian arsenal owing to a reluctance to use them
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due to their expense. That had the
effect of increasing collateral damage
and civilian casualties, which was then
something on which Chechen psychological operations (PSYOP) capitalized.
Yeltsin ordered the ground attack
to begin at 7:00 a.m. on 11 December
1994. Three columns advanced: Army
Group North, from Mozdok in North
Ossetia; Army Group West, from
Vladikavkaz; and Army Group East,
from Dagestan. Each force led with its
paratrooper formations, followed by
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with two RPG, one or two machineguns and a sniper rifle. The remaining
squad members carried rifles, a radio if available, and extra ammunition.
Those squads were the basis of Chechen tactics in Grozny.
They could act independently if needed, but generally operated in
concert with other squads depending on the mission, and larger
groups could coordinate to engage larger Russian forces.
Outside the city, Chechen fighters harassed Russian columns
and fought delaying actions to provide those in Grozny with more
time to prepare defenses. Particular focus was placed on attacking
Russian support troops in the rear echelons. They were often
MVD units that weren’t as well armed as the regular army.
Inside Grozny, Chechen units focused on trapping Russian
columns in ambushes and enveloping them if they took up defensive
positions. Moving around in civilian trucks, they would remove or
switch street signs to misdirect the invaders. Individuals posing as
sympathetic civilians would offer to lead Russian units through safe
areas, only to draw them into prepared kill zones. Those kill zones
were set up so as to trap columns so they could be fully destroyed.
An ambush would begin with selected RPG gunners, the
most skilled, simultaneously immobilizing the lead and trail
vehicles in the column, thereby trapping the rest. Those expert
RPG gunners would then withdraw to be used elsewhere; they
were preserved as much as possible as a precious elite. Positioned
in buildings lining the street, other RPG men, supported by
machinegunners and snipers, would then reduce the trapped column
until it was totally destroyed or found a way to break out.
Buildings became tiny fortresses all their own. The Chechens
would connect them with trenches or tunnels (including sewers
and storm drains) and block off the ground floor entries so Russian
troops couldn’t easily get in. Since many of the fighters had been
conscripts in the Soviet Army, they knew the capabilities of Russian
other army units with the MVD troops
in the rear. The weather deteriorated,
limiting air support and slowing
the advance on unpaved roads. All
three forces soon met resistance.
Chechen forces initiated delaying
and harassing attacks in close terrain
such as forests and hills. After bloodying the Russians, the raiders would
fade away to await another opportunity. Support troops and the less heavily
armed MVD units were preferred targets. At the same time, civilians began
weapons. They would take position in basements too low for
Russian tank guns to depress, or in upper floors too high for them
to elevate. The upper floors and rooftops also allowed them to gain
shots at the more vulnerable roof armor of the tanks and AFV.
Lacking radios, the Chechens used cell phones to coordinate
their movements. They further used the Russians’ lack of communication security to monitor enemy movements, easily done
since many Chechens spoke Russian. The fighters would also add
false messages into Russian radio traffic, further confusing them.
The Chechens also had weaknesses, though they were difficult for
the Russians to exploit. Since they were a tribal group, Chechens valued
displays of bravery in combat. Chechen groups assigned to secondary or
quiet areas would often abandon them to join in the fighting. Often they
would do so without informing even their own leadership. That created
gaps in the line the Russians could exploit if they realized their presence.
Further, not all the fighters were Chechen: some were
Jihadi from abroad who saw the conflict as part of a
greater holy war in support of Islam. Those forces and the
various Teip leaders often chose if, when, and where they
would fight, causing problems in coordination and planning.
Another tactic the Chechens used was to exploit the information
and propaganda wars. The Russians had little experience in dealing
with news media, and they had little idea of what to do with reporters.
In contrast the Chechens fully exploited the media, taking journalists to
the sites of collateral damage and showing them civilian casualties.
The Russian propensity for using massive firepower created many
such situations of which the Chechens speedily took advantage. Some
sources claim the Chechens purposely placed civilians, hospitals and
other off-limits structures in the Russian line of fire, knowing they could
use the resulting carnage and destruction to their advantage.
their own resistance campaign, blocking roads and intersections to further
delay the advance. Russian troops,
unprepared for nonviolent actions by
the populace, didn’t know what to do
and often simply stopped and waited.
Some conscripts found themselves
besieged by Chechen grandmothers.
It was imperative for the Russians
to reach Grozny quickly, but their
entire advance bogged down. Phase
one lasted over two weeks, allowing
the Chechens time to bring additional
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forces into the city. Army Group West
faced civilian protesters before it
even crossed the Chechen border,
and during an altercation killed
several by running over them with
an armored vehicle. Before long a
firefight broke out, with some three
dozen killed and wounded between
the two sides and numerous Russian
vehicles destroyed. Army Group East
faced the same challenge: protesters
blocking the column even before it
crossed the border. Those Russian
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