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I OSEPFI ÌvÍbunda adiusred the
ü angleof his40mmcannónandpressedthe button.The first roundof shells
feii on Sitatonga2, the main basein
ÌvÍaica province of guerrillasof the
rebel MozambiqueNational Resistance Movement (MNR). The heavy
attack that followed and the subsequent occupationof the baseby Governmenttrooos.the Peoole'sLiberation Forces(FPLÌvÍ)recehtlyrwasparr
of on-goingmanoeuvres
aimedat giving the soldiers experiencein combined operationsby ground and air
forces,b^utalsoeliminãtinsthe MNR.
Piercingthe skiesabovãMossurize
District, some50 kilometersfrom the
Zimbabweanborder,SitatongaìvÍountain,harbours a smallnumberof villaees
cut off from the rest of the countrv-bv
densebush and an absenceof imiroitant land communications.
Itwas there
that the ÌvÍNR beganbuilding its base
Li JanuarythisvearasRhodesiãentered
its transiíiontó independence.
Locatedat the top of the mountain,
the baseand observationpostsstretched
over20 squarekilometeis of treesand
high grass with 4 96by 4ó-metre helicoóte-rlandinÈ$tripat'thecentreof the
cainú. A whitõT-shapedpieceof parac.huç signalled the ianding placè for
the helrcopters, the most recent of
which werè seenbv FPLM soldierson
June.l8-this year asúey beganencirclmg me base.
_ According to MNR members, the
heücopters came from South Africa
bringrng in new weaponsand ammunition aswell asfoodsúppües.'Two days
later',.said Agostinlió Tiaeo. an e'xrecruit of the IÃ[R,'nvo SoüttrAfrican
No-.d Atlas planes dropped weapons
m the central cÍìmpof the base'.
Inside the camp, South African and
Portuguese miliiary instructors, as
weapons and ammunition, many of
theú still closed, carried' label's in
English and Afrikaans. In the camp
were alsofive cars,a numberof sewing
machinesand other goodsbelievedtõ
have beentaken by nrèMNR from merchantsof Mossuúe District.
As prisonerswere interrogated,previous assertionsabout the MNR'S composition were confilrred. Most of their
fighting units were composedof exmembers of the Portuguesecolonial
lnny's special gÍoups, which n 1972
becamenotoriouslyfamousfor a number of massacresinMoza mgiqueat the
time of FRELIMO's southérn push
toward the heartlands of Manica and
Sofala.
They ran to Rhodesia before
Mozambique's independencein June
o*g't
tember's anniversary of the start of the liberation war...a Íorce to deal with rebels
well asmercenaries'of variousnationalities', made last-minute preparations
to leavethe baseasnewsof thè mming
attack reached"the
mountaintop.'They
left by helicoprerwhenthe FpLM besan
encircling the mountain', saidTiae-o.
__Infantry and artillery units of-the
FPLM, aswell asa few oïthe air force's
recently acquired MIG jet fighters,
tool( part rn -tle attack and follow up
operationswhich left the MNR in totál
appears,definitive disarray: 270
en_d,_it
MNR güèrrilÉs \ryerekilled and'more
than 300 were taken prisoner, 68 of
them with their guns. Bv 5 p.m. on
June 30 after soõe houró ofìhe[ing
and occasionalmachine gun fire, thõ
first FPLM infantrv unitíentered the
camp. Three days later the whole surrounding area 'ivasundei'control as
the slynv.rnggroupsscatteredin different duectlons.
Amidst the captured'warmaterial
were machine güns, bazookas,mortars, h-andgrenãdesand a huge quantity of antì-tank, antlcar aád'antipersonnelmines.The boxescontaining
,df
t975 .There they were armedandwere
subsequentlymonitored by the Rhodesians to óperate accorditts to the
RhodesianA'rmy's overall strãteevfor
Mozambique's Gaza, Manica,Ïete
and Sofala'provinces.One of their piactices was tb kidnap men and wdmen
from local villages and either train
them for military purposesor simply
use them as servants.
According to someof thesevillasers
fregd by the Fpt-U during the on-gõing
military operations, the MNR, promised different úings in differentplaces,
namely, future ministerial posts for
people of each operational area-and
salariesof up to 30 30,000Escudosfòr
the soldiersof 'the future Mozambican
army'. Lately they were announcing
that soon thev would'declare Mozambique's independence'.
The MNR, usedMozambique'scurrent shortagesto its advantage.Groups
would stop a food lorry on a bushroad,
kill the driver or leavehim on the road,
steal the lorrv and distribute the food
among the vílhgers. In this way they
hoped to get local support and minimize
the negativeeffectsof theirmost brutal
practices,which includedrapeand the
kidnapping of young girls. After
ZANUPF's electoral victorv in Zimbabwe, the Ìv{NR lost its lihodesian
backing and most of its armed groups
could not afford to distribute the food
anymore. They hadto eat it themselves
in order to survive.f