From Competition to Partnership: The Lessons of
Anglo-American Cooperation in Central America
during the 19th Century
Michael Sampson
Michael Sampson is a final year PhD candidate in International Relations
at Balliol College, University of Oxford, and former Procter Fellow and
Fulbright Scholar in the Department of Politics at Princeton University.
His research focuses on the strategic and distributional implications of
international contracts. As a result he writes on Chinese trade contracts
and the international political economy of East Asia more broadly. He has
also written on 19th century Anglo-American diplomacy and published on
cooperation theory with Oxford University Press. He holds a first class
honors degree in politics from the University of Bristol and an MPhil in
International Relations from the University of Oxford.
Abstract
No reasonable person would argue that in 50 years the relative
position of the United States in East Asia will remain the same as it
is today. In large part this is due to one factor: the growth in the
power of the People’s Republic of China. The policy debate has
consequently moved on from whether the United States needs to
adapt to this emerging reality but rather how it does so. In the
following article I point to lessons that may be learned from an
historical example of two states competing for regional hegemony:
Great Britain and the United States in Central America in the mid19th century. I argue that Britain, by abandoning its pretensions to
a regional monopoly was able to peacefully secure a degree of
restraint on the part of the rising power, the United States, and in
so doing transformed a potentially volatile situation into one of
constructive partnership which ultimately improved outcomes for
both parties. I conclude by drawing out the policy implications for
the United States from this historical precedent.
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Hegemony in East Asia
The United States, as a result of its geography, history, and national
interest, is a Pacific power, and as a great power it will continue to have
legitimate interests in East Asia for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless its
relative position in East Asia is changing due to the relative rise and
growing assertiveness of China. As this transpires, there are many aspects
of policy on which U.S. and Chinese interests will converge. However,
there are, of course, important instances when the interests of the two
powers will not.1
ANGLO-AMERICAN
RELATIONS ARE
How can the United States
manage this without creating
PARTICULARLY FRUITFUL TO
regional or global instability, a
CONSIDER DUE TO THEIR
damaging decline in bilateral
NUMEROUS PARALLELS TO
relations,
or
a
significant
THE CONTEMPORARY
deterioration of its position in the
region? I draw on the history of
POSITION OF THE UNITED
Anglo-American relations to
STATES VIS-À-VIS CHINA IN
suggest how the United States and
EAST ASIA.
China may coordinate on the
many issues upon which their interests can be furthered more effectively
through regional partnership than by pursuing their interests alone. These
issues are sufficiently significant that both powers should abandon
simplistic ambitions to exclusive regional hegemony and work toward a
regional partnership. On issues where the difference between the two
states’ interests is apparently irreconcilable, a useful ambiguity can and
should be maintained, whilst areas of shared interest are emphasized. An
examination of the evolution of relations between Great Britain and the
United States in 19th century Central America can provide some useful
lessons on both of these counts.
Anglo-American relations are particularly fruitful to consider due to their
numerous parallels to the contemporary position of the United States visà-vis China in East Asia.2 In the mid-19th century, Britain’s hegemonic
position in Central America was expected to deteriorate relatively, to the
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benefit of the United States. However, like the United States today, Britain
had an important economic relationship with its challenger that it did not
wish to jeopardize through confrontation.3 At the same time, as a result of
its growing power, the United States was increasingly wary of outside
interference in what it considered to be its sphere of influence. Also, its
foreign policy was in part driven by assertive nationalist opinion,
particularly following the U.S. victory in the war with Mexico.4 Equally,
like the United States today, Britain had to balance its obligations to local
allies against broader geopolitical considerations, and though Britain
retained its global military edge, its calculations were significantly
affected by the growth of U.S. regional power. Despite this, also like the
United States today, Britain remained an important regional power and
wished to remain so for the foreseeable future. Finally, there existed
mutual suspicion, a history of antagonism, and significant potential for
conflict between the two powers but also many areas ripe for cooperation.
Hegemonic Power Dynamics
Before examining Anglo-American relations more closely, however, it is
useful to consider the nature of hegemonic power shifts more generally. In
any negotiations between two states, power dynamics play an important
role in their strategies. A rising state is, ceteris paribus, incentivized to
prolong negotiations and delay any agreement as its relative power
position becomes more favorable. On the other hand a strong, relatively
declining state is incentivized to conclude a deal as soon as possible before
its position deteriorates further. How then can these competing incentives
be overcome?
One way this may be resolved is for the declining power to utilize the
power advantage that it still retains to incentivize the rising power to
engage in cooperation immediately, by offering concessions that the rising
power cannot yet secure alone. Under such conditions the stronger
declining state gets a worse deal than its power can command at the time,
but locks in a stable and predictable equilibrium that is more favorable
than it will be able to secure down the line. Conversely, the weaker state
gets a better deal in the short term but must accept the restraint that the
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new partnership places on its future freedom. In terms of policy, this
implies that the United States should consider the benefits that China will
inevitably gain in the future as a result of its growing power and determine
which of these it is willing to compromise on now in exchange for
fostering partnership.
Of course, even where a strong declining state concludes such a bargain
with a weaker but rising state, the latter has an incentive to renege on the
agreement as its power increases. This basic commitment problem is also
at the heart of Thucydides’ trap: The declining power cannot be certain of
the rising power’s future behavior and is thus wary of engaging in
cooperation lest it be exploited when its position is relatively weaker.5
However, if cooperation can provide the rising power with material
benefits, legitimacy, and certainty, this can halt, or at least significantly
delay, reneging by the rising power. That is, it will be reluctant to depart
from mutually agreed-upon principles for fear of losing the benefits
provided by partnership with the existing hegemon. The benefits of the
partnership can thus serve as a signal of commitment, as reneging will be
costly. Crucially, though, the declining power must take the initiative to
instigate such a bargain since it is already in a position to credibly commit
as a result of its power trajectory.
Such a strategy can be seen on the part of Britain in the 19th century and in
particular in its negotiations of 1850 with the United States over the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. This treaty addressed the issue of construction of
a waterway across the Isthmus of Central America in a region that Britain
dominated but which had far more strategic significance for the United
States. Although ostensibly designed to address a narrow technical issue,
the treaty played a central role in shaping relations between the two
powers in the region for many decades and was indicative of Britain’s
general approach in this period.6
The case demonstrates that the British, upon perceiving their relative
regional decline, were able to “buy off” the United States using precisely
the mechanism outlined above; they supplied upfront benefits in Central
America that the latter could not yet secure alone. These concessions:
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[M]ade the United States an American power, equal in every
respect to the only other first-class American power, Great Britain.
To it, rather than to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States owes
this position. 7
Britain made these concessions in part, to secure a regional bargain that
implied partnership between the two states and ensure subsequent
American restraint. The eventual regional arrangement secured benefits
for both parties. It also ensured a degree of regional stability in a period
when both states, particularly Britain, had more pressing concerns;
promoted economic development; and prevented the situation from
deteriorating into a zero-sum dynamic. This outcome, however, was by no
means as inevitable or as easy to achieve as we may now think, and an
examination of the region’s history demonstrates this.
Britain in Central America
The English presence in Central America began in the early 17th century
and was limited to trade in contraband and piracy along the Bay of
Honduras and what was then known as the Mosquito Shore.8 Significant,
formal involvement in the area began in 1742 when, whilst at war with
Spain, the British seized the Bay Islands off the coast of Honduras.9
British possession of the Islands was contested until 1796, when the
Spanish regained control; the Spanish thereafter retained this position until
the independence of the Central American territories in 1821 when the
islands passed into the possession of Honduras.10
On the mainland, British involvement in Belize (then British Honduras)
grew from the mid-18th century as a result of its support of the activities of
woodcutters in the area, even as the region remained under Spanish
sovereignty.11 This situation continued until the conclusion of the Seven
Years War in 1763, when Britain formally recognized Spanish sovereignty
in return for concessions relating to woodcutting rights in the region. 12 In
1798 the Spanish attempted to expel the remaining British settlers from
Belize by force, but were repelled with British military assistance. Later
the British would point to this as the moment at which the territory of
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Belize passed to them by means of conquest. 13 However, following the
independence of the Central American territories from Spanish rule in
1821, the successor states also claimed sovereignty over Belize. The new
Federal Republic of Central America accordingly appealed to the United
States in 1830 for assistance, but the United States refused the appeal;
consequently, the British Foreign Office claimed the region for the
crown.14
Figure 1: Central American Historical Borders.15
Finally, the Mosquito Shore became increasingly important in the mid-19th
century as Britain and the United States began to consider construction of
a waterway. British influence in this region stemmed from Spain’s failure
during its rule to assert effective sovereignty over the coast; and in 1687
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the head of the Mosquito people “requested” English protection, to which
the latter acceded. The English subsequently dubbed him king of the
Mosquito lands in a ceremony in Jamaica, and through this the English
attained indirect influence in a region that would come to hold the key to
construction of the canal.16
Following Central America’s independence from Spain in the 1820s,
Britain also expanded its role in the region, beyond its small territorial
possessions and protectorates, through its informal economic supremacy.17
The states in the region at this time imported mostly British goods, their
exports were largely sold in Britain, and the production and transportation
of these goods depended upon British shipping and credit. Like the U.S. in
East Asia today, Britain’s relationship with Central America in the early
19th century was thus both commercial and strategic.18 The largely
informal and sporadic nature of Britain’s presence in the region, however,
does not suggest that its activities failed to rouse the attention of the
United States, particularly given the latter’s growing regional interests. As
the two powers’ interests began to clash, a return to confrontation became
a distinct possibility.
The United States’ Growing Sphere of Interest
Like China today, the United States’ growing interest in its immediate
neighborhood in the mid-19th century was directly related, not to the
activities of other major states, but rather to the growth of its own power.
Of particular significance were its acquisition of the territories of Oregon
and California on the west coast in 1846 and 1847, respectively. The need
for a transportation link to the west coast consequently became more
pressing, particularly following the discovery of large amounts of gold and
silver in the region.19 The connection was thus viewed as essential by the
U.S. government, not only to exploit these resources but also as a means to
control the region more generally. Many in the United States thought a
canal linking the Atlantic to the Pacific was the best means of achieving
this as it was thought that transcontinental railroads could not be operated
profitably.20 Following victory over Mexico, the idea of the “manifest
destiny” of the United States to eventually occupy all American territory
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also became popular. At the same time, some in Congress began to
reinterpret the Monroe Doctrine to imply the exclusion of any outside
presence in the region.21 These combined factors explain the U.S. clamor
for an isthmian crossing.
It can be seen then that, as with the United States and China today, there
were significant conflicts of interest between the two potential hegemons.
The United States became increasingly suspicious of the British position
on the isthmus, which they saw as an attempt to block a link between the
east and the west.22 This suspicion was not entirely unfounded, as the
British, for their part, saw the development of the western territories as a
threat to their dominant trading position in East Asia.23 The British also
suspected the Americans of using construction of the canal as a pretext for
further expansion, while the Americans saw the British presence as an
attempt to interfere in the U.S. sphere of influence.
As a result of these concerns, U.S. agents made contact with
representatives of Nicaragua in the late 1840s to begin negotiations over
the construction of a crossing. This agreement would have given the
United States exclusive rights to build and use any canal constructed
within Nicaragua’s territory, which was thought to the most favorable
location for the waterway. In return, Nicaragua asked the United States to
guarantee its sovereignty, which it feared was threatened by the British.
The United States ultimately spurned this arrangement, however, because
it wished to avoid the entangling commitments that it would entail and the
consequent risk of war with Britain.24 The U.S. government perhaps
calculated that any arrangement that did not include Britain would
ultimately be unsustainable given Britain’s favorable position on the east
coast of the Isthmus.
Anglo-American Negotiations
Despite the outcome of negotiations with Nicaragua, U.S. negotiations
were not entirely futile; the concern that the United States would make a
private deal and use the construction of a canal as a pretext for further
expansion of its influence into the region drove the British to the
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negotiating table. That Britain now had to engage in these calculations was
a sign of its weakening regional position. As in East Asia today, this
instability required British policymakers to skillfully adapt to these
challenges, and the path they chose is instructive. Van Alstyne neatly
summarizes British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston’s calculations
during this period:
The foreign secretary was in reality interested in forming a pact of
another kind with the United States. He had scant respect for the
Monroe Doctrine and Hispanic American diplomacy, but he was
keenly alive to the importance of good relations with [the U.S]. Its
position as a granary, vastly enhanced by the repeal of the corn
laws, and as a commercial nation with a very large merchant
marine, able to help or to inflict serious damage on England in
time of war did not escape him…and with the clouds on the
European horizon growing threatening in 1848, Palmerston was
solicitous that no quarrel should arise with this country.25
A delicate balance was thus required by which Britain could preserve its
regional influence as far as possible while avoiding antagonism with the
United States and maintaining diplomatic face.26
Britain held a very favorable bargaining position with respect to control of
a potential crossing. The Mosquito Coast was a key component of what
was at the time considered the most viable route for constructing a canal.
As a result of Britain’s support for the King of the Mosquito Coast in the
expansion of his territory in the 19th century, the mouth of the San Juan
river passed into his possession and consequently under the British sphere
of influence. Friendly relations also existed between Britain and Costa
Rica to the south.
Suspicious of British motives, representatives of the U.S. government
began inquiries in London into Britain’s intentions and declared that the
U.S. did not desire exclusive control of the isthmian passage but could not
tolerate the exclusive control by another power. The British agreed with
this view that the canal should serve as “a common highway to all
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nations.”27 Moving beyond these basic principles to more specific details,
however, proved problematic, and negotiations made little progress. The
British would not concede the territorial rights of the inhabitants of the
Mosquito Coast even in the interests of securing an agreement according
to which the canal would be open to all nations. Sir Henry Bulwer, whom
the British government had dispatched to Washington in early 1850,
responded by attempting to shift focus from the incompatible rights of
Nicaragua (supported by the United States) and the Mosquito peoples
(supported by Britain) to the issue of the construction of the canal itself;
this strategy was more likely to succeed given the demand in the United
States for a canal.28
The proposed treaty, which culminated from negotiations between Bulwer
and U.S. Secretary of State John Clayton, stated that the future canal was
to be neutralized and protected by both governments and that the ports at
each end of the waterway were to remain free. It also precluded either
country from using an existing or future protectorate or alliance to
establish control over the canal and established a general principle
whereby both parties extended the application of the treaty to any other
potential means of transit across the isthmus.29 Crucially, the treaty further
precluded either country from further colonizing or extending dominion
over Central American territory in general.
Both governments found these principles to be broadly acceptable, and
each thought they had secured the better deal. Clayton saw the agreement
as a precursor to Britain’s abandonment of its minor possessions and
protectorates in Central America, whilst Bulwer believed he had erected a
barrier to American expansionism in Central America.30
Despite U.S. acceptance of the agreement, American concerns remained
that Britain would use the Mosquito territories to maintain control of the
region. To allay these fears, Bulwer issued a memorandum stating that
Britain had no intention of using the Mosquito protectorate to establish
exclusive control over the canal.31 However, this alone did not resolve the
differences of interpretation exemplified by Bulwer’s statement in the
memorandum that “Her Majesty’s Government do not understand the
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engagements of that convention as applying to Her Majesty’s Settlement
at Honduras or its dependencies.”32
The definition of dependencies here was particularly important – did this
refer also to the Bay Islands and Mosquito Coast? As a result of this
Clayton was now placed in the position of either accepting the declaration
or allowing the treaty to fail, which likely would have allowed Britain to
establish a stronger foothold in the area. Consequently, Clayton offered a
counter declaration stating that the treaty did not:
Include the British settlement in Honduras commonly called
British-Honduras, as distinct from the state of Honduras, nor the
small islands in the neighborhood of that settlement, which may be
known as its dependencies…It was intended to apply to and does
include all the Central American states of Guatemala, Honduras,
San Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica with their just limits and
proper dependencies.33
The final sentence reflected the disagreement over the legitimacy of the
Mosquito protectorate. The definition of neighborhood Clayton used here
was unclear given the uncertain status of the Bay Islands. This ambiguity
was not accidental; the signing of the treaty made clear that Britain did not
interpret the agreement as implying the repudiation of its claims in the
area. The United States, on the other hand, saw the treaty as restricting
British influence in strategically important regions.
This ambiguity was vital to the success of the agreement but would remain
a point of disagreement that threatened the treaty’s very existence on a
number of occasions.34 Despite these threats, however, the treaty
ultimately endured for decades and fulfilled Britain’s objective of
constructing a barrier to the southern expansion of the United States.
Objectives and Strategy of the Declining Power
The primary British concern that the United States would extend its
influence into Central America meant that the British attempted to make
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the canal a barrier to U.S. growth. What upfront payments, though, did the
British need to supply in order to secure such restraint on the part of the
United States?
At this time the British were still expanding their influence in the region,
and the status quo certainly favored them; nevertheless, the British offered
short-term concessions in order to achieve a more favorable long-term
position.35 The agreement implied that Britain could no longer use its
relations with the Mosquito peoples to establish dominant control over or
block construction of the canal – something which it retained the power to
achieve in 1850. The most significant strategic concession that the British
provided during negotiations was the abandonment of its long-held plan to
develop Central America exclusively in line with British interests and to
“[harness] Latin America under British leadership.”36 The British
abandoned their claims to sole regional hegemony in favor of an explicit
Anglo-American partnership, whereby both states would patrol the
waterway and neither would attempt to dominate a future crossing. 37 As a
result of this concession, the United States secured de jure equal status
with Britain in the region, which bestowed a degree of legitimacy on the
United States’ future role.38
From the outset of negotiations the British also pursued multiple other
objectives. One of these was to improve relations with the U.S. given “the
angry feeling which…existed in the United States against Great Britain.”39
The British also saw the treaty as means by which they could arrest the
relative deterioration of their position, especially given the prospect of the
United States gaining Nicaragua and Honduras as protectorates at those
states’ own invitation. This would have had a negative impact on the
British position in the region and greatly increased the chances of war
between the two powers. By means of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, then,
Britain aimed to “bind the United States against further annexations to
their empire from Central America-Honduras and Nicaragua being at that
time desirous to annex themselves.”40 Because of this, the treaty was
wide-ranging in its implications, was not temporally limited, and obliged
the United States to share access with Britain wherever and whenever the
final waterway was constructed.
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Given the importance of the treaty to the British position, attention
gradually turned to how it might be retained in spite of the objections of
the United States, which came to see it as unnecessarily restrictive.41
Francis Napier, British minister to Washington from 1857 to 1859 was
prominent in these discussions; he summarized the reasons for the British
attachment to the treaty as follows:
The English Race whether by direct movement from the Mother
Country or by transmission through the United States will
undoubtedly spread to the Central American Region, but under the
provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which can now be
preserved by concessions insignificant if we turn from the past,
and look to the future, that Region can never be annexed or
associated to the North American Confederation, but will maintain
a separate and neutral position so desirable if we regard the
avenues which traverse it and untie the Oceans [emphasis added].42
Maintenance of the treaty would have the added benefit of protecting
British possessions in the Caribbean from encirclement by the United
States. By supplying concessions to the United States, Britain hoped that
the United States “might be thoroughly conciliated and fixed in a position
of cordial and benevolent neutrality.”43 Crucially, Britain achieved this by
conceding something – in this case, rights to use the canal, recognition of
U.S. legal rights in the area, and the abandonment of some British
territorial claims – that the U.S. would have secured in time in any event.
These sacrifices were demanded by the Democratic administration:
…as a sort of a gratuity for remaining faithful to this partnership
and for therefore submerging the budding American ideology of
supremacy in the western hemisphere [and this sacrifice] was a
secondary price which did not greatly disturb [Palmerston].44
Nor was this the final concession offered by the British in order to
maintain the treaty. Britain gradually surrendered its claims to the Bay
Islands and Honduras and eventually abandoned the Mosquito protectorate
in 1860. These concessions served to allay the Buchanan administration’s
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misgivings, and the United States remained party to the agreement for
decades to come.45
All of this is not to suggest, however, that the British policy of conciliation
was always applied uniformly or that the policy was without its critics.
Indeed, in later years the debate in Britain continued to focus on whether
Britain should confront or continue to conciliate the United States in
Central America and elsewhere.46 Nevertheless, the conclusion was
always the same: the costs of confrontation would be too great. The same
may also be said of the United States and China today.
Lessons for Sino-U.S. relations
Thucydides’ trap describes a dynamic created when the growth in the
power of one actor creates fear among other powers. In their attempts to
guard against this threat, the existing
powers inadvertently increase the threat
THE TIME TO
to the rising power, and, unless arrested, CONSTRUCT THIS GRAND
this dynamic can quickly escalate into
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
antagonism or even war. This article has
THE UNITED STATES
argued that Thucydides’ trap is a basic
commitment problem that states can
AND CHINA IS
resolve through creation of a valuable
THEREFORE LIMITED…
partnership that makes subsequent
defection from cooperation costly for both parties.47 The Clayton-Bulwer
treaty is an example of one such partnership, which ensured that both
Britain and the United States had less to gain and more to lose from
engaging in subsequent confrontation.
Today the United States remains the predominant power in East Asia;
consequently a similar strategy could be relatively easy to achieve in the
short term, should the United States wish to pursue it. However, as the
United States’ relative power in the region diminishes, and the power and
interests of an increasing number of actors start to come to the fore, this
task will become increasingly difficult. The time to construct this grand
partnership between the United States and China is therefore limited, and
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both states should begin the process of creating a meaningful regional
bargain, such that its resultant gains outweigh the costs incurred by mutual
restraint. Fortunately, the United States may also find willing partners in
China, some of whom share a preference for this exact kind of strategic
partnership or condominium with the United States.48 On the other hand,
in the absence of such partnership, China may continue its attempts to
neutralize U.S. influence not through explicit hard balancing but through
cooperative arrangements with its neighbors, like ASEAN plus three1 that
exclude the United States.49
The issues upon which this partnership may be built are numerous and
present significant opportunities for mutual benefit. First, as the two
largest trading states in the world, the U.S. and China share an interest in
maintaining the stability of the global economy – of which East Asia is a
fundamental part. The two powers can achieve more financial
coordination, and the strategic and economic dialogue between the two
countries provides a strong foundation upon which to build. A second area
in which cooperation may be increased is maritime security. 50 In recent
years both states have already cooperated in patrolling the Gulf of Aden to
restrict piracy; this kind of cooperation can and should be expanded
elsewhere, for example in tackling the problem of drug trafficking in East
Asia.51 Third, cybersecurity will become increasingly important for both
states; despite important differences, both countries share a basic
fundamental interest in this area, which is a significant source of both
countries’ economic growth.52 Fourth, in terms of non-proliferation, both
states have a clear interest in maintaining their cooperation over North
Korea and the eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.53 China,
for its part, like the U.S. in Central America in 1850, will gain significant
legitimacy from its cooperation with the existing hegemon in these fields,
which will buttress its image as a responsible regional stakeholder.
On the other hand, just like Britain, where fundamental interests collide
such as on Taiwan or the South China Sea, the United States should
pursue a policy of useful ambiguity in the same way that Bulwer
1
The forum that facilitates cooperation between ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea.
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stimulated cooperation between the United States and Britain by focusing
on common interests and avoiding focus on irreconcilable disagreements.
Relations between the mainland and Taiwan have improved significantly
in recent years, largely as a result of economic interdependence; the
United States must therefore take a pragmatic approach on this issue in
order not to be left behind as and when relations improve.54 If the United
States and China cannot agree on
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
concrete measures to reduce the
threat across the Taiwan Strait
NEGOTIATIONS OF THE 19TH
through, for example, mutual arms
CENTURY ILLUSTRATE THAT
reductions, they should place their
SUCH SUBSTANTIAL
efforts elsewhere until conditions
DISAGREEMENTS DO NOT
become more favorable. Likewise,
in the South China Sea the United
HAVE TO PRECLUDE
States should continue to support
COOPERATION IN OTHER
regional stability whilst not making
IMPORTANT ISSUE AREAS.
the issue central to their bilateral
relations with China. The Anglo-American negotiations of the 19th century
illustrate that such substantial disagreements do not have to preclude
cooperation in other important issue areas.
East Asia is a vital and increasingly important region for U.S. national
interests, as the recent pivot to Asia demonstrates. The prospect of China
challenging U.S. regional hegemony would, of course, present grave
dangers for the United States and in turn would jeopardize regional and
international stability.55 China’s rise is seemingly inevitable, but this does
not imply either that the U.S. role in East Asia must diminish or that U.S.Chinese confrontation is unavoidable.56 If the United States can maintain
the initiative and foster a hegemonic partnership with China on a range of
issues, it can cement and even expand its role in the region for decades to
come whilst also reaping important rewards from deeper cooperation. The
British approach to the United States’ rise in Central America provides a
useful blueprint for such a partnership.
Clearly any historical analogy is by its nature imperfect; the U.S. position
in East Asia today is in many ways very different from that of Britain in
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Central America in the 19th century. The United States has important and
powerful allies in East Asia that may be wary of a U.S. partnership with
China. East Asia is of far greater strategic importance to the U.S. than
Central America was to Britain. Perhaps most importantly, the gulf in
fundamental values between the United States and China is much larger
than the one between Britain and the United States.57 As in the United
States today, there were long-running debates in Britain regarding whether
to confront or conciliate the rising power.58 Many rightly worried that the
existing hegemon would make too many concessions and would project an
image of weakness, thus provoking further challenges.59
There is no reason, though, that the United States cannot combine
conciliation with a firm stand on issues of vital interests. Both China and
the United States will of course defend
BOTH CHINA AND THE
their core interests but this should not
UNITED STATES WILL OF
preclude expanding their focus on to
areas of shared interests. The example
COURSE DEFEND THEIR
of Britain in Central America
CORE INTERESTS BUT THIS
demonstrates concrete mechanisms by
SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE
which a clear delineation of legitimate
EXPANDING THEIR FOCUS
and shared interests can provide
certainty, increase trust, and reduce the
ON TO AREAS OF SHARED
risk of miscalculation. It is worth
INTERESTS.
remembering too that Britain and the
United States achieved cooperation despite historical animosity, strong
suspicions on both sides, and the supposedly destabilizing effects of major
power shifts.60 Whilst circumstances today are very different from those in
the 19th century, such cooperation is achievable, would be hugely
beneficial to the interests of both the U.S. and China, and would make an
important contribution to international stability more broadly.
Endnotes
1
Prominent examples include territorial claims in the South China Sea and the status of
Taiwan.
2
For a global rather than regional perspective on British management of decline, see:
John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-
44
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW
MICHAEL SAMPSON
1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Aaron L. Friedberg, The
Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988).
3
Richard W. Van Alstyne, “The Central American Policy of Lord Palmerston, 18461848,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 16, no. 3 (1936): 339-59 at 350.
4
Ira Dudley Travis, The History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (Michigan Political
Science Association, 1900), 79.
5
On the commitment problem, see: Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,”
International Organization 60 no. 1, (2006): 169-203, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0020818306060061. For a more detailed description of Thucydides’ Trap and its
consequences, see: Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613 at 596, http://www.jstor.org/stable/
204816
6
For more on this, see: Paul M. Kennedy, “The Tradition of Appeasement in British
Foreign Policy 1865-1939,” British Journal of International Studies 2, no. 3 (1976): 202,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20096775
7
Richard W. Van Alstyne, “British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 185060,” The Journal of Modern History 11, no. 2 (1939): 149-83 at 168, http://www.jstor.org
/stable/1872500
8
Robert A. Naylor, “The British Role in Central America Prior to the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty of 1850,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 40, no. 3 (1960): 361-82 at
365, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2509955
9
David A. G. Waddell, “Great Britain and the Bay Islands, 1821-61,” The Historical
Journal 2, no. 1 (March 1959): 59-77, at 59, http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_
S0018246X00021786
10
Travis, 3-4.
11
Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915,
(Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 1916), 2.
12
Travis, 9.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., 14-15.
15
Ira D., Travis. The History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Michigan Political Science Association, 1900.
16
Travis, 21-22.
17
Naylor, 364.
18
Ibid.
19
Travis, 60.
20
Ibid., 83.
21
Ibid.
22
Williams, 53.
23
Travis, 74.
24
Ibid., 63.
45
VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015
FROM COMPETITION TO PARTNERSHIP
Richard Warner Van Alstyne, “The Central American Policy of Lord Palmerston,
1846-1848,” 350.
26
Further adding to this vulnerability was the repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849. See:
Arthur A. Stein, “The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the
International Economic Order,” International Organization 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 35586, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706445
27
Ibid., 97.
28
James J. Barnes, Private and Confidential: Letters from British Ministers in
Washington to the Foreign Secretaries in London, 1844-67, ed. Patience P. Barnes
(London: Associated University Presses, 1993), 44.
29
Travis, 119.
30
Barnes, 48.
31
Travis, 116.
32
Sir Henry Bulwer in ibid., 122.
33
Secretary of State Clayton in ibid., 123.
34
For more on this ambiguity, see: George F. Howe, “The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty: An
Unofficial Interpretation of Article VIII in 1869,” The American Historical Review 42,
no. 3 (1937): 484-90.
35
Fred R. Van Hartesveldt, “The Personal Factor in the Negotiation of the ClaytonBulwer Treaty,” The Proceedings of the Georgia Association of Historians 14 (1993):
158-68 at 159, http://archives.columbusstate.edu/gah/1993/158-168.pdf
36
Travis, 182.
37
Williams, 27.
38
Travis, 183.
39
Bulwer quoted in Van Alstyne, “British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,”
156.
40
Ibid.
41
G. F. Hickson, “Palmerston and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,” Cambridge Historical
Journal 3, no. 3 (1931): 295-303 at 302-03.
42
Lord Napier quoted in Van Alstyne, “British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, 1850-60,” The Journal of Modern History 11, no. 2 (June 1939): 149-183 at 180,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1872500
43
Van Alstyne, “British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850-60,” 181.
44
Ibid., 182.
45
Hickson, “Palmerston and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,” 302-03.
46
Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 181-83.
47
For an account of how commitment problems can lead to war see: James D. Fearon,
“Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995), 379414.
25
46
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW
MICHAEL SAMPSON
Muthiah Alagappa, “Constructing Security Order in East Asia,” in Asian Security
Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 2003), 70-106 at 96-97.
49
For more on ASEAN plus 3 and other regionalization projects in East Asia , see: Julie
Gilson, “Strategic Regionalism in East Asia,” Review of International Studies 33, no. 1
(2007): 145-63.
50
Thomas J. Christensen, “The Need to Pursue Mutual Interests in U.S.-PRC Relations,”
United States Institute of Peace, 2011, 8, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR269.pdf
51
On maritime cooperation, see ibid.
52
For more, please see Ian Adelson, Mellissa Z. Ahmed, Vivian Coyne, Han Lim, Zhifan
Jia, L.C. Paisley, and Kim Truong, “U.S.-China Cybersecurity Cooperation,” School of
International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, June 2014, https://sipa.columbia
.edu/sites/default/files/AY14_CyberCooperation_FinalReport.pdf
53
Christensen, 2.
54
Austin Ramzy, “China and Taiwan Hold First Direct Talks since ’49,” New York
Times, February 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/world/asia/china-andtaiwan-hold-first-official-talks-since-civil-war.html
55
For a more detailed exploration of the consequences of such competition, see: Aaron L.
Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in
Asia, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).
56
For an exposition of such predictions, see: John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 4.
57
Friedberg, 1-2.
58
George L. Bernstein, “Special Relationship and Appeasement: Liberal Policy Towards
America in the Age of Palmerston,” The Historical Journal 41, no. 3 (1998): 725-50 at
733, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639901
59
However, conciliation in one area may also make a firm stand in other areas more
credible. On this, see: Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement,” International
Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 345-73 at 368, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S002081830458205X
60
Mearsheimer, 4.
48
47
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