The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy across Organizational Forms
Author(s): Darcy K. Leach
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Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 312-337
Published by: American Sociological Association
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The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy Across
Organizational Forms*
DARCY K. LEACH
University of Michigan
The debate around Michels's "iron law of oligarchy" over the question of whether
organizations inevitably become oligarchic reaches back almost a century, but the
concept of oligarchy has frequently been left underspecified,and the measures that
have been employed are especially inadequate for analyzing nonbureaucratically
structured organizations. A conceptual model is needed that delineates what does
and does not constitute oligarchy and can be applied in both bureaucratic and
nonbureaucraticsettings. Definitions found in the research are inadequatefor two
reasons. First, treating oligarchy solely as a feature of organizational structure
neglects the possibility that a powerful elite may operate outside of the formal
structure. A democratic structure is a necessary precondition, but it does not guarantee the absence of oligarchy. Second, studies that equate oligarchy with goal
displacement and bureaucratic conservatism cannot account for organizations with
radical goals that are nonetheless dominated by a ruling elite. This article presents a
model that distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate forms of formal and
informal power to define oligarchy as a concentration of illegitimate power in the
hands of an entrenchedminority. The model is intendedfor use in organizations that
are nominally democratic to determine whethera formal or informal leadershiphas in
fact acquired oligarchic control. By providing a common framework for tracking
fluctuations in the distribution and legitimacy of both formal and informal power, it
is hoped that this model will facilitate a more productive bout of research on the
conditions under which variousforms of democratically structured organizations may
be able to resist oligarchization.
In 1911, Robert Michels summarizedhis analysis of the German Social Democratic Party
with the now-famous statement: "Whoever says organization, says oligarchy" (Michels
1962:365).Though a dedicated socialist at the time, Michels neverthelessconcluded that
in modern society, socialism and democracy were both structurallyimpossible--that the
very principle of organization made oligarchy the inevitable result of any organized
collective endeavor. Despite almost a century of scholarly debate on this question,
however, there is still no consensus about whether and under what conditions Michels's
claim holds true. This is due, I argue, to a lack of conceptual clarity that has its roots in
Michels's original formulation of the thesis. My goal in this article is, first, to demonstrate
the ways in whichexistingconceptualizationsare inadequatefor determiningwhethervarious
types of organizations can be considered oligarchic, and second, to propose a conceptual
*This research was carried out with support from the Horace Rackham School of Graduate Studies and
the Department of Sociology, University of Michigan. Many thanks as well to Renee Anspach, Judy Brown,
June Gin, Howard Kimeldorf, Richard Lempert, Mark Mizruchi, Devra Coren Moehler, Irfan Nooruddin,
Millie Piazza, Francesca Polletta, Joyce Rothschild, Emilie Schmeidler, Alexander Stein, Michelle Tepper,
Cihan Tugal, James L. Quinn, Jr., Mayer Zald, and anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on
previous drafts of this article.
Sociological Theory 23:3 September 2005
? American Sociological Association. 1307 New YorkAvenueNW, Washington,DC 20005-4701
THE IRON LAW OF WHATAGAIN?
313
model that clarifies the theoretical threshold between democratic and oligarchic distributions of power and can be applied across organizational forms.
Starting from Michels's original argument, the "iron law" thesis can be distilled into
three basic claims:
1. Bureaucracy happens: Large-scale organizations in modern society will always
have a rational-bureaucratic structure (i.e., a system of procedural formality,
jurisdictional specialization, and hierarchical authority). This claim is based
on the premise that there is an ever-increasing need for administrative efficiency, which necessitates a complex and hierarchical division of labor;1
2. If bureaucracy happens, power rises: Due to structural imperatives and aided
by the supposed "incompetence" of the masses, rational-bureaucratic structure
automatically concentrates power in the hands of a professional leadership,
conferring upon them a monopoly of skills, knowledge, and resources; and
3. If power rises, power corrupts:Once power is concentrated, the leadership will
always act to preserve its power-even when that means going against the
interests of the membership-and will use undemocratic means to stifle any
internal opposition that it interprets as a threat to its authority.
Critics have challenged Michels on each of these three claims. The earliest and least
frequent line of attack came from an orthodox Marxist position and challenged the
second step of Michels's argument, the claim that power rises in a bureaucracy.2
Scholars taking this line (Hook 1933; Bukharin 1925) have argued that bureaucracy
does not necessarily concentrate power, because power is not based in the technical
form of organization but rather in the ownership of property.3 Thus, unless administrative bureaucrats also own the means of production, they have no real power to
either defend or abuse and therefore cannot be oligarchic.
By the 1950s and 1960s, another group of arguments began to appear to the effect
that oligarchy may not be as inevitable as Michels claimed. Focusing on the third step
in Michels's argument and arguing from a pluralist perspective, these critics accepted
that bureaucracy happens and that in a bureaucracy power rises, but they questioned
whether power must necessarily corrupt and posited various structural ways in which
a leadership might be held accountable to the majority it is meant to represent
(Edelstein 1967; Lipset et al. 1956; Gouldner 1954; Schumpeter 1950). Others
concerned with accountability focused on the process of goal displacement, the
tendency of entrenched leaderships to abandon the membership's original goals in
favor of those that ensure organizational maintenance (Barnes 1987; Merton 1957;
Sills 1957; Gusfield 1955; Selznick 1949). Several of these studies suggested that the
iron law was perhaps better understood as an "aluminum tendency." In the 1980s, a
few scholars began to criticize the exclusive focus in the iron law literature on formal
bureaucratic .organizations (Rothschild and Whitt 1986; Breines 1980). They
challenged Michels on the basis of his foundational assumption that all organizations
would take on a bureaucratic structure. Even though his primary refreent, the
in FromMax Weber(1958).
1Definitionof bureaucracycondensedfrom Weber's"Bureaucracy"
2Lipsetmakesthis point in his introductionto Michels,but it is also apparentin Marx'sdebateswith
Bakuninduringthe last few yearsof the FirstInternational.SeeKenafick(1948)andMorris(1993)for good
accountsof the Marx/Bakunindebate,especiallywith respectto theirviews on politicalversuseconomic
power,the internalorganizationof the First International,and the amountof authorityto be vestedin its
GeneralCouncil.
3Foran argumentthat powercan also be basedin administrativeauthority,see Dahrendorf(1959).
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
German Social Democratic Party, was in fact a large-scale bureaucratic organization,
Michels explicitly stated that he was talking about all types of nominally democratic
organizations: "The formation of oligarchies within variousforms of democracy is the
outcome of organic necessity, and consequently affects every organization" (Michels
1962:366, emphasis added). And while Michels assumed that bureaucracy was the
only sustainable form of organization, he nevertheless acknowledged that if bureaucracy could be avoided, then theoretically, so could oligarchy.4 Prior to the 1970s,
however, empirical research had been restricted to large-scale, bureaucratically
structured membership organizations. Critics felt that the wave of workers' collectives,
communes, cooperatives, and political groups born of the New Left's commitment to
participatory democracy could pose a serious challenge to the iron law, yet because
nonbureaucratic organizations were being perceived as disorganized rather than
differently organized, these potentially exceptional cases were falling through a
theoretical loophole.
Whether or not Michels meant to include them, the question of the inevitability of
oligarchy in the context of smaller and/or nonbureaucratically structured groups is
important in its own right. It is important, first of all, because there is no reason to assume
that simply by virtue of a lack of formal authority, such groups are immune to being
pushed around by a domineering minority. On the contrary, they probably suffer at least
as much from the malady of oligarchization as do bureaucratic organizations.
Staggenborg (1988) even goes so far as to argue that oligarchy is more difficult to prevent
in informal organizations due to the lack of bureaucraticconstraints on informal authority. It is an empirical question whether or not the iron law holds in nonbureaucratic
settings-one that merits systematic investigation rather than dismissal on the basis of a
definitional technicality. Second, examining the applicability of the iron law in nonbureaucraticsettings is important because nonbureaucraticorganizationsare nowhere near as
anomalous as either Weber or Michels predicted they would become. Rather, they have
become a seemingly permanent fixture in the organizational landscape. Popular interest
and participation in such groups was not just a passing blip on the radar screen of the
1960s and 1970s. It neither started nor ended there. Although the Society of Friends,
which was founded in the 1650s and currently has approximately 300,000 members, is
probably both the largest and oldest collectivist organization in existence (Robinson 2004;
Brinton 1955), the 270 kibbutzim in Israel (with 130,000 members) and the Mondragon
complex of over 160 workers' collectives (with 23,000 members) in Spain are 95 and
50 years old, respectively (American-IsraeliCooperative Enterprise 2005; International
Institute for Sustainable Development 2005). Today, in addition to consumer cooperatives, living communes, and workers' collectives, the use of consensus-based structuresin
protest organizations refuses to die and is in fact presentlyexperiencinga resurgencein the
new global justice movement (Polletta 2002, 2001). Even in the business world there is a
drive toward less hierarchical,team-based structures(Rothschild 2000), although most of
them lack the structuralprerequisitesto be considered truly democratic.
In short, nonbureaucratic organizations would seem to be here to stay, yet there
has been surprisingly little systematic analysis of the ability of such organizations to
resist oligarchy. For example, the use of informal, decentralized network structures
has been frequently cited as a central characteristic of the so-called new social
4This is implied throughout the book, but in his critique of anarcho-syndicalist attempts at preventing
oligarchy, Michels notes that any organization that delegates authority to representatives cannot escape
oligarchy:"Butwe have to ask whetherthe antidote to the oligarchicaltendenciesof organizationcan
possibly be found in a method which is itself also rooted in the principleof representation"
(Michels
1962:318).
THE IRON LAW OF WHATAGAIN?
315
movements in western Europe (cf. Katsiaficas 1997; Rucht 1990; Gundelach 1989;
Klandermans 1986; Offe 1985), and several scholars have traced the rocky history of
the participatory impulse in American social movements in the last century (Polletta
2002; Epstein 1991; Breines 1982; Gerlach and Hine 1970), but the question of
whether and under what conditions maintaining this structure helps individual movement organizations resist oligarchy has only barely been raised.5 The international
explosion of workers' collectives in the 1970s sparked more explicit scholarly interest
in this alternative organizational form (e.g., Leviatan et al. 1998; Rothschild and
Whitt 1986; Jackall and Levin 1984; Gamson 1980; Johnson and Whyte 1977). But
even here the focus has been more on issues of productivity and worker satisfaction
than the process or inevitability of oligarchization. One important exception is
Rothschild and Whitt's (1986) study of five workers' collectives that had "collectivistdemocratic" organizational structures. The central characteristic of a collectivistdemocratic structure is its lack of formal hierarchy; decision-making authority rests
with the group as a whole rather than being delegated. Rothschild and Whitt outlined
a number of dilemmas that inhibited the ability of these organizations to sustain the
collectivist form, but they did not actually evaluate whether or not the groups had
become oligarchic.
Although Rothschild and Whitt explicitly opened the door to this important line of
inquiry, research on the question of oligarchy in collectivist organizations has made
little progress since then. The reason for this is that once we begin looking at a
broader range of organizational types, we encounter increasingly difficult problems
with the concept of oligarchy itself.6 It is difficult enough to determine whether or not
an oligarchy exists in a standard bureaucratic setting; it is even more complicated in
collectivist organizations where there is no one officially in power. For example, how
does one ascertain the presence of an oligarchy in an organization where every
individual has the right of veto? How do we determine whether or not an informal
elite is nevertheless exercising oligarchic control? Should not the same conceptual
standard be used for all the "various forms of democracy" Michels claimed were
subject to his iron law? Research settings for investigating oligarchy thus far have
ranged from triads of friends to workers' collectives, from informal social movement
groups to formal NGOs, and from trade unions to nation-states. As it stands,
however, different measures have been used from one context to the next-often
without the choice being explicitly stated or defended.
In truth, there has never been agreement on what constitutes either the fulfillment
or the negation of Michels's thesis-in any setting. As Schmidt (1973:10) noted:
"Since Plato and Aristotle, most writers who discuss oligarchy fail to define the
concept, apparently because they assume the word is understood in the light of its
Greek etymology (the rule of a few). Michels also fails to offer a formal definition..."
5Whilethese Americanscholarshave all noted the use of decentralizedparticipatorystructuresin social
movementsand discussedthe difficultiessuch groups frequentlyencounter,none have systematically
evaluatedthe circumstancesunderwhichthe use of this structurediscouragesan oligarchicconcentration
of power.Similarlyin Europe,Rucht(1999, 1996,1990),Roth (1997),Haunss(2000),and Gundelach(1989)
have acknowledgedthe nonbureaucratic
structuresof NSMs and discussedtheir ideologicaljustifications.
Of these, Haunss (2000) went so far as to delineate internallines of conflict in "basisdemokratische"
organizations, but only Rucht (1999) has empirically examined whether they resist oligarchy.
Unfortunately,he did not operationalizeit as a distributionof power.
withinand amonggrassroots
6Forexample,Fisher's(1994)veryinterestingdiscussionof power-relations
NGOs and theirsupportof organizationsin the thirdworlddefinesoligarchyas "oneor morememberswho
assumecontrolat the expenseof othermembers,"but does not specifywhat constitutescontrol, nor is it
clearwhatkind of organizationalstructurehergroupshave otherthanthat somearemembershiporganizations and some are not and that they are locallybased.
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
Early students of oligarchy made progress on the basis of common-sense measures that
were derived from Michels's argument and seemed to fit the assumed bureaucratic
context. Since scholars have begun examining a broader range of organizational forms,
however, existing conceptual tools have proved inadequate. Measures that have been
employed in bureaucraticsettings are not directly transferableto nonbureaucraticsettings,
and measures employed (implicitly or explicitly) in nonbureaucraticsettings have offered
no way to distinguish between a minority that is merely persuasive and one that is
oligarchic. In the end, we are left with a collection of findings that cannot be integrated
into a more general theory because they are too often looking for different things and
using different yardsticks. In short, the organizational landscape has diversifiedover the
last severaldecades, and this diversitycalls for a conceptualizationof oligarchythat can be
operationalized in a comparable way across organizational settings.
In what follows I will begin by discussing the two ways scholars have generally
conceptualized organizational oligarchy-treating it either as a feature of organizational structure or as a policy orientation, conflated with the process of goal displacement-and show that both of these approaches are inadequate for analyzing the
informal authority structures found in nonbureaucratic organizations. I will then
argue that oligarchy is best understood as a particular distribution of illegitimate
power that has become entrenched over time. To illustrate and justify this definition,
I will present a model that allows for the possibility that both formal and informal
authority can become oligarchic, while distinguishing between an oligarchic elite and
a legitimately authoritative or influential minority. On the basis of this model, I
briefly discuss three situations in organizational life that are often taken as indicators
of oligarchy: lack of leadership turnover, minority control of resources, and low levels
of participation in governance. These conditions frequently either facilitate or are
symptoms of minority dominance, and as such, they should be examined in any
empirical study of the iron law, but I will argue that they are not, on their own,
necessarily indicative of oligarchic control.
It is important to note that the model presented here is intended to help determine
whether various forms of nominally democratic organizations in fact have a democratic distribution of power. While I will argue in the next section that a democratic
structure is not sufficient to show a lack of oligarchy, it is certainly a necessary
component. Thus, organizations that do not have some kind of democratic structure
can be eliminated as possible counterexamples to the iron law from the start. By a
democratic structure I mean, minimally speaking, one that includes structural
mechanisms that place ultimate governing authority in the hands of the organization's
membership-either through direct participation in all important decisions or indirectly through the election of representatives-as well as structural protections for the
minority and checks on the power of elected representatives, where they exist. There
are, of course, a range of democratic forms that fit these criteria. For the purposes of
this article, I will divide them somewhat crudely into two categories: those with a
formally hierarchical authority structure (i.e., representative democracies) and those
without any formal hierarchy, in which everyone in principle has an equal right to
participate directly in decision making (i.e., collectivist democracies). Generally speaking, there are two steps that must be taken to show that oligarchy has been avoided:
first, one must show that the majority is not structurally prevented from ruling-that
is, that the group has a democratic structure of one kind or another. Second, one must
show that within this structure, power is in fact distributed broadly enough that no
minority (formal or informal) can effectively maintain ruling control. The model
presented here is meant as an aid in this second step.
THE IRON LAW OF WHATAGAIN?
317
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE LITERATURE ON OLIGARCHY
Etymologically, oligarchy means simply "the rule of the few." That may be a fine
place to start, but it leaves a host of complex questions unanswered. For example,
what exactly do we mean by "rule"? What must "the few" do to be considered
oligarchic? Must they hold formal office or can they work behind the scenes? Do
they have to be coercive and actively suppress dissent or can they simply be persuasive
and get people to go along with them out of respect for their competence or charismatic appeal? Is there a difference between "ruling" and "leading"? If so, is it the
exercise of "power" as opposed to "influence" that differentiates the two? Or are
power and influence both commodities that may be employed by democrats and
oligarchs alike? Is it simply having a certain amount of power and influence that
makes a minority oligarchic (in which case, how much is necessary and how can they
be measured?), or is it a matter of how they are exercised, or both?
Though definitions of oligarchy are often left implicit or underspecified, one can
discern two general approaches to the concept in the iron law literature. The most
common approach has been to treat oligarchy in purely structural terms-that is, as a
feature of the formal authority structure (Schmidt 1973; Stone 1972; Zald and Ash
1966; Michels 1962; Lipset et al. 1956; Lipset 1952). Lipset, Trow, and Coleman
(1956), for example, characterize oligarchy as a one-party political system where
"one group, which controls the administration, usually retains power indefinitely,
rarely faces organized opposition, and when faced with such opposition often resorts
to undemocratic procedures to eliminate it." Arguing from a pluralist perspective,
they imply that the establishment of a two-party system is a sufficient safeguard
against oligarchic tendencies, and their evaluation of the International
Typographical Union focused on explaining how this union managed to sustain
such a system of organized opposition. "Democracy," they argue, "in large measure
rests on the fact that no one group is able to secure such a basis of power and
command over the total allegiance of a majority of the population that it can
effectively suppress or deny the claims of groups it opposes." At the abstract level,
this definition does treat democracy (and by implication, oligarchy as well) as a
distribution of power-an oligarchy being essentially any minority with enough
power to suppress dissent. The problem is that power is only operationalized in
structural terms. As is clear from the following statement, holding elected office is
the only "basis of power" with which Lipset and his colleagues are concerned:
At the head of most private organizations stands a small group of men most of
whom have held high office in the organization's government for a long time, and
whose tenure and control is rarely threatened by a serious organized internal
opposition. In such organizations, regardless of whether the membership has the
nominal right to control through regular elections or conventions, the real and
often permanent power rests with the men who hold the highest positions.
While lack of turnover in elected office is certainly one indicator that an oligarchy
likely exists, there are two problems with defining oligarchy solely in these terms. First
of all, it ignores the possibility that an oligarchy might have an informal basis of
power, deriving from something other than the delegation of legitimate authority.
Whether or not one agrees with the elitist model of American society, it is certainly
plausible that a powerful elite could constitute an oligarchy, without necessarily
serving as elected officials in the political apparatus (Domhoff 1998, 1983; Mills
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1956). In fact, in historical case studies of oligarchies, especially at the national level, the
term is routinely understood precisely in nonpolitical terms-as an economic or cultural
elite governing without formal political power (Whitney 2001; Dosal 1995;Ramseyer and
Rosenbluth 1995; Hammer 1986; Clark 1977; Alba 1968; Wertenbaker 1947). It is an
empirical question whether or not power based on economic wealth, kinship ties, military
strength, or access to information-to name just a few possibilities-might become concentrated enough to make oligarchs of those wielding it, but the question can only be
investigatedif our conceptual definition allows for the possibility of an informal oligarchy.
Second, because it only considers formal power, a purely structural definition of
oligarchy cannot be applied to directly democratic organizations that have no formal
delegation of decision-making authority. Lipset, Trow, and Coleman's study, for
example, makes the existence of a two-party electoral system a prerequisite of democracy. If we start from that premise, how do we evaluate collectivist-democratic
organizations, which have no elected leaders but instead have a structure that gives
each individual the right to both participate in and veto any decision that affects
them? If a minority has to have formal authority to be oligarchic, then we would have
to conclude that collectivist organizations are never oligarchic, because no one has
formal authority over anyone else. Such a position privileges the role of structure in
determining the ultimate distribution of power in an organization, to the exclusion of
any other social or cultural bases of power. That kind of determinism is simply not
tenable, especially in light of the range of outcomes documented in the literature. At
the opposite extreme, some have implied that collectivist organizations are always
oligarchic (Staggenborg 1988; Freeman 1975), arguing that without the constraints
that bureaucracy places on informal power, a "tyranny of structurelessness" results in
which a minority with greater status will always come to dominate the group. In their
more systematic investigation of this question, however, Rothschild and Whitt (1986)
make the more reasonable claim that, in fact, collectivist organizations are neither
always successful nor are they never successful in maintaining a directly participatory
form of democracy. Although Rothschild and Whitt did not apply any formal test to
determine whether or not their groups were oligarchic, their analysis clearly showed
variation in the groups' ability to maintain this form of democracy. In short, just as
we cannot assume that groups without a formal authority structure automatically
avoid oligarchy, we also cannot assume that oligarchs always hold positions of official
power. Any definition, therefore, that predicates oligarchic power on formal office
holding is useless for the analysis of collectivist-democratic groups and will lead us to
miss informal oligarchies even in bureaucratic settings.
A second approach to the concept of oligarchy has been to focus on Michels's
supposed claim that organization also inevitably leads to conservatism through a
process of goal displacement (Voss and Sherman 2000; Rucht 1999; Barnes 1987;
Fox and Arquitt 1981; Swerdlow 1973; Merton 1957; Sills 1957; Gusfield 1955;
Selznick 1949, 1943; Kopald 1924). While it is of course interesting to ask under
what conditions organizations that start out with radical goals become more conservative over time-and clearly this process is often related to oligarchizationasking why an organization changes its goals is not the same thing as asking how
many are ruling it. Unfortunately, scholars have too often conflated the two, even to
the extent of treating goal displacement as if it were an indicator of oligarchy, such
that if goals change, we can assume oligarchy and if goals do not change, we can
assume democracy. Not only is this a misreading of Michels's original argument, but
it implies that organizations with radical goals are somehow immune to oligarchic
rule, a position that is both theoretically and historically unsupportable.
THE IRON LAW OF WHATAGAIN?
319
In his chapter on "The Conservative Basis of Organization,"Michels argues that what
keeps oligarchic political parties from maintaining revolutionary aims is the fact that the
"natureof party" is "the endeavor to organize the masses upon the vastest scale imaginable." This endeavor constitutes a vital interest as soon as a party begins to engage in
parliamentary politics, because "every decline in membership and every loss in voting
strength diminishes its political prestige." Thus, "[t]o avoid alarming [potential new
members], who are still outside the ideal worlds of socialism or democracy, the pursuit
of a policy based on strict principleis shunned"(Michels 1962:334-35). His argumentwas
not that oligarchy is the same thing as conservatism, nor even that it always necessarily
leads to conservatism. His argumentwas that in certain bureaucraticorganizations where
the survival of the organization depends on it maximizing its membership, the leadership,
having once become oligarchic, would use its power opportunistically to move the
organization in whatever direction is likely to attract the most members.
This means that even in membership-maximizing organizations, while goal displacement may often be a result of oligarchization, it is not an automatic result, nor is it
clear that the change in goals would necessarily be in a conservative direction. As Zald
and Ash (1966) pointed out, we cannot assume that the rank and file is always more
radical than an organization's leaders. Where the reverse is true-where the leadership
is more radical than its current membership-member apathy and oligarchic tendencies should result in the leadership pushing the organization in a more radical
direction. Michels also acknowledged this possibility. Speaking of political parties
he said: "The interests of the body of employees are always conservative, and in a
given political situation these interests may dictate a defensive and even a reactionary
policy when the interests of the working class demand a bold and aggressive policy; in
other cases, although these are very rare, the roles may be reversed"(Michels 1962:353,
emphasis added). Note the distinction between "conservative" in the original sense of
wanting to conserve what one has and its current political connotation, for which he
uses the terms "defensive" and "reactionary." Those with power are always conservative in the sense that they have an interest in conserving their power, but where
conservation of power depends on maintaining a mass membership, the avowed goals
of the organization will take on whatever political content is most likely to attract more
members.
To take a recent empirical example, this is exactly what appears to have happened
in the "revitalized" union locals studied by Voss and Sherman (2000). Although the
article is entitled "Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy," the dependent variable on
which the authors focus has little to do with the amount of democratic control
exercised by rank-and-file union members. Rather, "breaking the iron law" is operationalized in terms of how radical or conservative the unions' policies were: specifically, the degree to which the unions had reversed the trend of "bureaucratic
conservatism" by making a policy shift from a "service model" to a more radical
"organizing model" of trade unionism. A local was considered to have broken the iron
law if it adopted the "use of confrontational tactics in the pursuit of radical goals"
(2000:304). If this policy shift had been something the membership had wanted, one
could well argue that taking on an organizing model indicated a reversal of oligarchization, especially because the change was often accompanied by a turnover in leadership. But in fact, as the authors note, what differentiated "fully" from "partially
revitalized" locals was that (a) the leaders in the fully revitalized locals interpreted
actual or potential membership decline as a vital threat that required a stronger
commitment to organizing-that is, it was a lack of membership, not a lack of
membership control, that led to the change, and (b) the leaders in the fully revitalized
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locals were successful in "overcoming member and staff resistance" to the change
(2000:320). In other words, what Voss and Sherman interpret as a reversal of
oligarchization is a situation where the leadership (a minority) successfully pushes
through a top-down initiative against the active resistance of the membership because
it sees the survival of the organization threatened by shrinking membership rolls. Far
from constituting a refutation of the iron law, this case would seem to represent a
quintessential example of oligarchy in action-a perfect illustration of how even
supposedly radical organizations can become oligarchic, given that they are bureaucratically structured, dependent on membership growth for their survival, and face a
pool of potential members who might be attracted by a more radical stance. In short,
conflating oligarchy and goal displacement can blind us to the ways in which
oligarchic radicalism can sometimes masquerade as democracy. Radicalism is not
the opposite of oligarchy, democracy is. And our operationalization of the concept
must reflect that fact.7
A further problem is that if we fall into the trap of conflating bureaucraticconservatism with oligarchy and thereby radicalism with democracy, it leads us to gloss over the
deeper question underlying Michels's analysis: the question of the appropriate relationship between means and ends, and the effectiveness of parliamentary strategies for
realizing revolutionary goals. Michels's study of the German Social Democratic Party
was largely a critique of the parliamentary politics and vanguardist political strategy
practiced by the socialists of his day, who, in claiming to represent the emancipatory
interests of "the masses," inevitably felt justified in repressing dissent within their own
ranks. Debate over this question has been an especially prominent feature of leftist
politics over the last half-century. Concerns over vanguardism and oligarchy were at
the heart of the New Left's embrace of participatory democracy and their ambivalence
over the organizational style of the "Old Left," they have been a central justification for
the extra-parliamentarystance of many of the so-called New Social Movements in the
postwar era (cf. Katsiaficas 1997; Epstein 1991; Breines 1982, 1980), and they played a
central role in the factionalization of the German Green Party (cf. Markovits and Gorski
1993; Spretnak and Capra 1986). Social scientists have paid relatively little attention to
the vexing empirical question of how effective parliamentaryversus extra-parliamentary
strategies can be in accomplishing the kind of revolutionary change that does more than
replace one oligarchy with another. If we imagine that all it takes to avoid oligarchy is to
remain committed to a radical agenda, no matter how undemocratic the "revolutionary"
leadership might be, we bypass the question at the very heart of Michels's work and,
indeed, at the very heart of much of activist history since then.
7Onecould argue that as the union leaders'goal was to organizelow-paidserviceworkers,consisting
by unionsand particularly
mostlyof womenand peopleof color, who are traditionallyun(der)represented
oppressedin the societygenerally,that the leadershipwas not reallybeingoligarchic,butsimplyresponding
to the interestsof a broaderconstituency.Shouldwe not take the structuresof powerin the largersociety
that necessarilyaffectthe choicesand goals of the organization'sleadershipinto accountwhenaddressing
the question of oligarchy?It is certainlytrue that externalforces and structuralinequalitiesaffect the
processof oligarchization,and they are consequentlyrelevantto any investigationof the conditionsunder
which oligarchy arises, but our task here is first to define and operationalize oligarchy so that we can
determine whether one has emerged. It is politically tempting to think of the "membership"of an organization as including all those who are affected by its decisions. But if we want to use that move to acquit the
leadershipof oligarchicpracticeswhen it overridesits actualmembership'swishes,then we wouldhave to
show that everyonein the largergroupis entitledto participatein the decisionmakingof the organization,
or we cannotverywellclaimthatit is democratic.To claimthatan organizationhas avoidedoligarchy,one
mustat the veryminimumbe able to show thatthosewithinit areentitledto participatein the governingof
the organizationin some way. Whilelooking to the largercontextis importantfor understanding
whyan
organizationhas or has not avoidedoligarchy,in assessingwhetherit has done so, it is in fact necessaryto
isolatethe internalpowerdynamicsof the organizationfrom those of the largersociety.
THE IRON LAW OF WHATAGAIN?
321
To avoid these sources of confusion and to find a standard that can be applied
across different organizational structures, I propose that instead of seeing oligarchy as
a feature of structure or equating it with bureaucratic conservatism, we conceive of
both oligarchy and democracy as particular distributions of power. Such a definition,
however, requires careful attention to several issues regarding the concept of power,
which is the topic to which we turn in the next section.
OLIGARCHY AS ENTRENCHED, ILLEGITIMATE POWER
On the basis of the discussion above, let us take as a relevant starting point the fact that
power in bureaucratic organizations is for the most part formally held, whereas in
nonbureaucratic organizations, power still exists, of course, but it is exclusively informally held because there are no formally appointed or elected officials. Furthermore, let
us begin with the assumption that while inequality of one kind or another is ubiquitous,
not every form or degree of inequality is oligarchic. With that in mind, I submit that an
adequate model of oligarchy must help us to make three separate determinations: it
must help us to determine (1) what kind of power a minority must have, (2) how much
power it must have, and (3) in what manner that power must be wielded, for one to
conclude that the organization is oligarchic. With respect to the first of these determinations, I would argue that a distinction between formal and informal power is
necessary, as both kinds of power can become oligarchic, and without this distinction,
as should have become clear from the discussion above, nonbureaucratically structured
organizations tend to fall through the cracks of our analysis.
At the same time, we need a distinction between oligarchic and nonoligarchic uses of
both formal and informal power. In some ways, this is more difficult to do with respect
to informal power. Consider the situation in a nonbureaucratic, collectivist organization
where someone comes up with an idea that is then supported with persuasive arguments
by a few others. The rest of the group then decides that it agrees with these arguments,
and the idea is adopted. Would we call that oligarchic simply because a minority
convinced the others to go along? Probably not. It is no doubt safe to say that there
are inequalities of status and influence in every group or organization. Yet, one would
not call an organization oligarchic just because some people have a bit more credibility
than others. If we did, we would have to conclude that oligarchy is inherent in any
gathering of two or more people, however brief their association, at which point both
democracy and oligarchy would cease to be meaningful concepts.8 Exerting influence is
not the same thing as ruling. Nor is exercising authority-not all formal power is
oligarchic. For example, when elected officials in bureaucratic organizations make
decisions that lie within the scope of their job description, we certainly would not
consider them to be acting in an oligarchic fashion.
But if inequality does not automatically indicate an oligarchic distribution of
power, we must find an upper limit to how disproportionate the distribution of either
formal or informal power can be before they become oligarchic. At some point,
formal authority exceeds the bounds of what we would consider proper in a democratic society or organization, either because one has too much of it or because of the
way one uses it. Similarly, we can certainly imagine a situation in which informal
influence has become so concentrated that we would no longer think of it as democratic. But where is the boundary between the two? How do we differentiate
5In their experimental study of access to information in triads, however, Katovich et al. (1981) did
actually treat any inequality of influence as oligarchic.
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
empirically between a persuasive minority and a manipulative one or between an
authoritative minority and a coercive one? In sum, if we want to be able to identify an
oligarchic minority in nonbureaucratic organizations, we need to distinguish between
formal and informal power, and if we want to be able to identify an oligarchic
minority in any supposedly democratic organization, we need to distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate power, be it formal or informal in nature.
In sociological and political theories of power, there is a tendency to speak of power
as synonymous with causality itself-as the ability to bring about any kind of change
in someone else's behavior-and to subsume all forms of interactional outcomes
under this rubric.9 As Isaac (1987) notes, voluntarist models of power, including all
participants in the "three faces of power" debate, share this view of power as a
property of interaction between strategic individuals, such that whenever person A
causes person B to do, see, or feel anything, A has exercised power over B.10 Similarly,
Foucault's (1976) postmodernist conception, while rejecting the totalizing approach
of the voluntarists in favor of the analysis of "micropower," nevertheless finds the
operation of power in virtually every social encounter. Both of these perspectives tend
to lump together such varied phenomena as influence, authority, manipulation, coercion, force, extortion, persuasion, and the simple provision of information, as undifferentiated subcategories of power. Such a move ignores the important fact that some
of these kinds of power are easier to resist than others, some are more normatively
acceptable than others, and some are nearly egalitarian forms of social interaction that
are part and parcel of our everyday negotiation and construction of reality. In short,
some kinds of power are likely to be indicative of oligarchic rule, while others are
perfectly compatible with democracy. The idea that "power is everywhere" gets the
important point across that a number of behaviors short of outright force can be
difficult to resist. It also mitigates against the tendency to "blame the victim" in
situations where domination takes less overt forms. But without clarifying the qualitative and quantitative differences between these various phenomena, a totalizing
notion of power cannot help us determine when power becomes oligarchic.
More useful, especially for analyzing power in nonbureaucraticorganizations, is the
literature in social psychology, where power and influence have long been treated as
conceptually distinct, and the relationship between coercion and compliance on the one
hand and persuasion and conversion on the other has been a long-standing subject of
inquiry.Interestingly,however, this literatureis generallyconcernedwith majority"power"
(securingminority compliance) and minority "influence"(leading to majorityconversion).
There is almost no mention of minority power." Thus, while many of their conceptual
distinctions will be of use here, social psychologists have also not developed a model for
understandinga minority powerful enough to exert oligarchiccontrol.
Table I is an attempt to integrate relevant aspects of these bodies of work by teasing
out the distinctions between formal and informal power (authority and influence) and
applying the concept of legitimacy to both in a way that allows us to map the various
is perhapsan exception.Althoughhe treatsinfluenceas a discursiveformof power,he also
9Wartenberg
claimsthat someformsof influenceinvolvethe use of powerwhereothersdo not. His definitionof
influence:"An agent A influencesanotheragent B if and only if A communicativelyinteractswith B in
in a fundamentalmanner"
such a way that, as a result,B altershis assessmentof his action-environment
(1990:105).
'See Dahl (1957), Bachrachand Baratz(1970), and Lukes (1974) for the debate over the various
"faces"of power,and Isaac (1987)for a critiqueand the proposalof a structuralalternative.
"For a good reviewof this literature,see Turner(1991).For an earlyapproachto powerand influence,
see Raven(1965),and see Moscovici(1976)for an influentialcritiquethat is still widelyaccepted.See also
Ng (1980) for an attemptto integratethe social psychologyliteratureon power with scholarshipon the
subject in political science and philosophy.
Table 1. Legitimate and Illegitimate Forms of Formal and Informal Power
Formal Power
Legitimate Authority.
exercised by: officeholders w/delegated decision-making
authority.
Infor
Influence.
exercised by: non-officehold
norms to exert disproportio
delegated decision-making a
how exercised. making and enforcing decisions in keeping how exercised: use of logica
non-material rewards.
with formal mandate.
majority goes along. willingly, because they recognize the majority goes along. willing
(private acceptance/convers
authority as legitimate and have consented to its
approval or acceptance (soc
delegation.
Illegitimate Coercion:
exercised by: improperly-appointed officeholders or nonofficeholders who do not have delegated authority to
make and enforce decisions.
Manipulation:
exercised by. non-officehold
disproportionate influence w
entrusted with that right by
includes: use of material sanctions/rewards (money, jobs,
physical harm...) without or beyond the scope of
formal mandate.
includes: emotional or cover
agenda setting, withholding
non-material sanctions (ridi
majority goes along: either u
majority goes along: grudgingly, not because they agree
or feel authority is legitimate, but simply to win material are unaware of deceit) or u
rewards or avoid material sanctions (public compliance). want to avoid non-material
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
conceptions of power found in the literature onto the grid and draw a meaningful
boundary between democracy and oligarchy. While I will offer a brief rationale for
my choices, a thorough theoretical defense of this model within the context of each of
the debates from which it draws is beyond the scope of this article. My goal here is
primarily to explain the conceptual framework and then demonstrate its utility in
determining whether a democratically structured organization actually has a democratic distribution of power, or whether, despite its structure, it is in fact dominated by
an oligarchic elite.
The model starts with the Weberian concept of legitimacy and his definition of
formal authority as legitimate power (Weber 1958). Building on that, I sought to create
a 2 x 2 conceptual matrix that distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate forms of
both formal and informal power, based on the idea that neither formal nor informal
powers are necessarily or intrinsically oligarchic but that both can become so.
Authority Versus Influence
The matrix begins with the distinction between formal and informal power, where
formal power is the ability to make and enforce decisions-with "enforcing decisions"
conceived broadly to include the ability to change a person's action environment
through the distribution of material rewards and sanctions-and informal power is
the ability to affect decisions by changing others' assessment of their action environment, including the use of nonmaterial rewards and sanctions. Following Weber,
I have categorized formal legitimate power as authority. Legitimate informal power
I define as influence. A person with legitimate authority is anyone to whom the group
has formally delegated the right to make and enforce decisions, and a person with
legitimate influence is anyone to whom the group has informally granted the right to
disproportionately affect decisions by virtue of their higher status in the group, but
does not include the right to make and enforce decisions. In their legitimate forms,
both formal and informal power are bestowed on the leadership and consented to by
the group, but whereas a formal leadership will always hold office and may often
legitimately exercise influence as well as authority (influence decisions as well make
and enforce them), an informal leadership may or may not occupy a particular office
or position but in either case may only influence decisions and may not itself make or
enforce them. Among officeholders, then, the distinction between authority and
influence in this model rests upon whether their office affords them the right to
legitimately make and enforce decisions or merely to have disproportionate influence
over decisions.'2 As we will see, illegitimate power, whether formal or informal, may
be exercised by officeholders and non-officeholders alike.
Legitimacy Versus Illegitimacy
Whereas legitimate formal power is called authority and legitimate informal power is
called influence, the corresponding illegitimate forms of power in this model are
coercion and manipulation. Before going any further, however, a point of contention
between political philosophers and social scientists with respect to the concept of
legitimacy should be briefly addressed. The debate has to do with whether legitimacy
influenceI mean more influencethan any othergiven person.A proportionate
12By "disproportionate"
amountof influencewould be an equal share,i.e., proportionateto the fractionof the group whichthat
would be anythingmore than that.
personmakesup, and disproportionate
THE IRON LAW OF WHAT AGAIN?
325
can be discerned with reference to certain universal and objective criteria or whether
the legitimacy of a system is always and necessarily context dependent, such that, as
Weber maintained, power is legitimate if and only if the people subjected to that
power believe it to be (Weber 1956:23, 157, 659).13 Beetham (1991) tries to split the
difference by defining legitimacy as follows: "Where power is acquired and exercised
according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or
legitimate" (Beetham 1991:3). Despite his attempt to distance himself, Beetham's
definition is actually very similar to Weber's by virtue of his own insistence on
subjective criteria. There must be justifiable rules, but it is important to ask:
Justifiable according to whom? I would maintain that while one can certainly discern
continuities and broad consensus as to the standards of legitimacy in certain kinds of
governed bodies, the specific kinds of behavior that constitute legitimate and illegitimate means of exercising authority are nevertheless not universal and have varied in
different historical settings. Those of us looking into another system from the outside
or looking back from the present will not see the system of power from the same
perspective or through the lens of the same cultural values of those who live(d) within
it, so what seems illegitimate to us may well have been considered legitimate in that
system. Ultimately, it is those who are subject to any particular system of power who
must be the final arbiters of its legitimacy, whatever criteria they may use to make that
determination. At the same time, there is no reason not to incorporate, as hypothetical starting points, standards of legitimacy that seem to be broadly accepted in the
particular type of organized body under investigation.14
With that in mind, the discussion of legitimacy in this model is based on three
claims that are relevant in the context of democratically structured organizations.
First, legitimacy follows from the consent of either the governed (in the case of formal
authority) or the led (as we might call it in the case of informal influence). As will be
13Partof the difficultyis that the two disciplineshave differentobjectivesin theirstudyof legitimacyand
are not alwaysclear about that fact. Wherepoliticalphilosophersare concernedwith the normativeand
ethicalquestionsof whatshouldbe consideredlegitimatein a just society,social scientistsare engagedin an
explanatoryprojectto discernwhat is consideredlegitimatein differentcontexts,whatcauseslegitimacyto
wax and wane, and its consequencesfor political stability(See Zelditch[2001]for a concise conceptual
review).Weber'sdefinitionof legitimacyas "thebelief in legitimacy"is the most frequentlyused among
socialscientists,and sincethe task at handis explanatoryratherthannormativein nature,I startfromthere
as well. Weberheld that as collectivitiesgrow in size and complexity,neitherpure power nor "bought"
power (maintainedthroughmaterialincentives)are sustainablewithout some voluntarybasis of loyalty.
Thus, he claimedthat poweris legitimateonly whereit is seen to be legitimate(als legitimangesehen)by
those subjectedto it and arguedthat societies have historicallyfound power legitimatebased first on
traditional,then charismatic,and finally,legal-rationalgrounds(Weber[1918]1978).Variouscriticshave
taken issue with Weber'sdefinition,claiming that by reducinglegitimacyto a belief, he negates the
possibilityof judginglegitimacyaccordingto rational,objectivecriteria(Schaar1970;Pitkin 1972),that
the definitionleavesno roomfor moraljudgmentGrafstein1981,that it providesno meansof determining
why people find power legitimatein one context and not another(Beetham1991), and that legitimacy
dependsmore on the authorizationof otherpowerholdersthan the consentof the governed(Stinchcombe
1968).I addressthe first two of these in the body of the article.Stinchcombe'sposition, that power is
legitimatewhen it can "callupon centersof power,especiallythe armedforces"to back up its claim, "in
sucha fashionthat the powercan alwaysovercomeopposition"(1968:160)seemsto resemblethe simpleuse
of coercive power more than the securing of a voluntary basis of loyalty. Nor does Beetham's critique seem
justified,becausedefininglegitimacyas a belief in legitimacyin no way precludesinvestigatingpeople's
reasonsfor theirbelief.In fact, Beetham'sdefinitiondoes not differsubstantiallyfromWeber'sas muchas it
offersa usefulway of operationalizing
it.
14To be morespecific,becauseI am claimingthat legitimacyis a collectivedesignation,the way in whichI
have chosen to map the differentforms of power and influencefrom the literatureonto this model is a
of standardsof legitimacythat are broadlyacceptedin Western-styleliberal
reflectionof my understanding
democraticpoliticalculturewith respectto democraticallystructuredorganizations.They should not be
takenas a statementof any universalstandardof legitimacy.In any studyusingthis model,these standards
should be empiricallyderivedaccordingto the values and beliefs of the membersof the organization(s)
beingstudied.
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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
discussed in more detail below, defining legitimacy in subjective terms means that
there must be evidence of consent if one is to maintain that a particular leadership
is wielding legitimate authority or influence as, conversely, there must be evidence
of resistance to claim that power is being wielded illegitimately. Second, legitimacy
is a threefold designation, establishing (a) who may exercise power (be it formal or
informal), (b) the scope of that power, in terms of the people and areas of social
life that will fall within its jurisdiction, and (c) the means that are acceptable for
them to use in exercising it. Third, in organizations that are nominally democratic
and have a formally democratic structure, legitimacy is closely related to democracy: practices that are seen as undemocratic are generally seen as illegitimate and
those that are seen as legitimate are frequently justified by reference to their being
democratic.15
Proceeding from these claims, the important criterion for legitimate formal authority is that the leaders are formally granted by the group the right to make and enforce
decisions. In democratically structured organizations with a bureaucratic structure,
this generally means that the leaders are formally elected. In Weber's terms, this is
primarily a legal-rational form of legitimate authority, although a particular leadership may also enjoy a degree of traditional or charismatic authority as well. In
collectivist organizations, on the other hand, where there is no formal authority
because no one has the right to make decisions for the group, legitimacy is often
conferred on the basis of what Weber refers to as value rationality. As Rothschild and
Whitt (1986) note, what commands respect in collectivist groups is more an ethic than
a set of formal rules; it is adherence to a set of substantive principles that reflect the
value system of the group. Those who best exemplify and act according to those
values earn the respect of the group and are thereby granted the right, as expressed in
group norms, to exert disproportionate influence. This is what I have categorized as
legitimate informal power.
Both authority and influence can become illegitimate forms of power. Again, the
exact location of the threshold is culturally contingent but, generally speaking, it is
crossed whenever formal or informal power is wielded by someone who has not been
given that right by the group (illegitimate person), or when a person with legitimate
power either exceeds the scope of that power (illegitimate jurisdiction) or exercises it
in a manner that has not been sanctioned by the group (illegitimate means). Thus, a
situation of illegitimate authority is either when decisions are made or enforced by
people who have not been granted that formal power, or when those who do have
legitimate authority either overstep their jurisdiction or use means that are not
officially sanctioned to squelch dissent or maintain their positions. Similarly, a sense
of illegitimate influence would arise when (a) decisions are disproportionately influenced by people who are not considered to have that right by the group, or (b) when
those who do have that right exceed the scope of their mandate, either by usurping
decision-making power or by using means that are not considered appropriate to
15Thisof courseis not the case in all organizations.For example,in businessfirms,wherethe CEO is
generallynot elected by the workersand oligarchyis built into the structureof the organization,the
structure itself and those in leadership positions within it are nevertheless generally considered legitimate
by those subjected to their authority. And as Enron and other recent corporate scandals illustrate, the
leadersof such organizationscan also act in ways that are consideredillegitimateby stakeholderssuchas
workers,unions,stockholders,the SEC, and the broadercommunity.Althoughit is beyondthe scope of
this article,it wouldbe interestingto explore whetherthe move fromlegitimateto illegitimateusesof power
in structuraloligarchiesmirrorsthe processof oligarchizationin nominallydemocraticorganizations.At
present,however,our concernwith legitimacyhas more to do with its role as a step towardoligarchyin
structurally democratic organizations, rather than the role it plays in organizations that are already
structurally oligarchic.
THE IRON LAW OF WHAT AGAIN?
327
affect decisions.16 Another way of saying this is that authority becomes illegitimate
when it becomes coercive, and influence becomes illegitimate when it becomes
manipulative. 17
The Three Faces of Power
So far, I have explained the distinctions drawn in this model in very abstract terms. But
what kinds of behavior are involved in the exercise of legitimate and illegitimateauthority
and influence?If we want to determinewhether or not an oligarchy exists in a particular
setting, we need some kind of behavioral way to measure the distribution of both formal
and informal power and to ascertainits legitimacy. To that end, it may be helpful to map
onto the presentmodel measuresfrom the political science debate on power-the so-called
three faces of power debate. The straightforwarddecision-making power emphasized by
Dahl (1968, 1957) is categorized here as formal power. This may be of the legitimate or
illegitimate kind, because we have defined formal power as the ability (and the right, in
the case of authority) to make and/or enforce decisions that affect other people. Both the
second and third faces of power would fall into the category of informal power. The
agenda-setting ability to make sure that certain threatening issues never come up for
discussion-Bachrach and Baratz's (1970, 1963, 1962) second face of power, which they
call the power of nondecision-as well as the intentional withholding of information
that, were it available to the rank and file, would likely lead to an undesirable outcome
for the elite, are both ways of manipulating people's assessment of their action
environment. Insofar as such means of affecting decisions are not generally sanctioned
by the majority, they would be considered manipulation, or an illegitimate use of
informal power, even if it were done by someone who also had formal power.
With respect to the third face of power, Lukes (1974:23) claims that it is "the
supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want
them to have-that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and
desires." I would argue, however, that the ability to change peoples' preferences, to
shape the values that guide the decisions of a community, is not power in the
authoritative or coercive sense, but influence, which, depending on the means
employed and the normative context, may be considered legitimate. Lukes holds
that whenever A affects B in a way that is contrary to B's "real interests"--even if
neither A nor B believe there to be a conflict of interest-then A has power over B.
The problem with this perspective is, first of all, that if none of the actors believe their
interests to be conflicting, then there is no way of knowing whether or not they are in fact
16Groups may have differentnormsregardinghow to indicatewhen they feel this line has been crossed.
Ridgewayand Berger'stheoryof statusorders,whichdealswith the legitimacyof socialinfluencein small
informalgroups,found that explicitconsent("strongvalidation")is usuallynot necessaryto indicatethat
the exerciseof influenceis consideredlegitimate.Rather,"if an act presupposedconsensus,the fact that
othersdo nothingto contradictit confirmsthe consensusit presupposes."(1986:46).This suggeststhat the
existenceof unexpressedresentmentsshouldnot be takenas sufficientevidenceof illegitimacyunlessmeans
that would be consideredillegitimateare being used without the knowledgeof the other members.This
is consistentwith the norms of the consensusprocess employedby Quakers(Leach 1998) and by the
activistgroupsI am studyingin Germany(Leach2005).In both cases,if one objects
collectivist-democratic
to a proposalor some aspectof the process,one is expectedto speak up, and the absenceof resistanceis
consideredevidenceof consent.
aspectsof power.Power-over,a term
'7Notethat the modelalso incorporatesthe positive,transformative
often usedfor the moredirectlycausaland unilateralaspectsof power,can be foundin this modeleitheras
authority(bothlegitimateand illegitimate)or as illegitimateinfluence.Legitimateinfluenceis more akin to
power-to--asociallyfunctionalmeansof personaland collectiveaccomplishmentthat does not impingeon
the freedom or agency of others. See Wartenberg (1990) and French (1985) for extensive treatments of
power that make use of a distinction between power-over and power-to.
328
SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
conflicting, and second, it attributes a complete lack of agency to anyone who might
genuinely agree with the status quo. If a community expresses belief in a particularset of
values or set of decisions, who is to say that those values are irrational or that the
decisions are contrary to the community's "real interests"?Who is to decide what is in
their best interest, if not the members of that community themselves?According to the
subjective definition of legitimacy employed here, such a situation must be considered
one of legitimate influence, except where the means used to generate acceptance of these
values are seen as illegitimate by the group, and/or where those exerting the influence
have not been acknowledged as worthy of that role. Lukes's point, of course, is that
relations of dominance and the ideologies that rationalize them often become institutionalized, and that power can operate through these institutions without anyone intending
to dominate or consciously giving consent. I do not dispute that. But if relations have
become institutionalized to the point where no one believes any longer that they are being
oppressed, I believe we have to call that legitimacy, unless we want to deny agency
altogether. Until illegitimate power relations reach this point of hegemonic acceptance,
however, one would expect to find both some kind of resistance (even if it is latent and
more difficult to measure) and-because we are talking about deeply structuredpatterns
of domination that do not necessarily involve any intentional misuse of power-structural mechanisms that function to benefit the elites.'" In other words, to find institutionalized oppression, we must look for mechanisms in the workings of the institutions
without disregarding the perspectives of those subjected to them.
Material Versus Nonmaterial Rewards and Sanctions
The last distinction to be drawn in determining how to categorize various ways of
exercising power is that between material and nonmaterial incentives. As mentioned
above, formal power involves A actually changing B's action environment, and
informal power involves A changing B's assessment of his or her action environment.
While there is often a fine line between the two, material rewards and sanctions are
generally used to directly change the action environment (authority or coercion), and
rewards and sanctions of a more discursive, nonmaterial nature are primarily used to
change someone's assessment of their action environment (influence). Whether or not
the use of material or nonmaterial rewards and sanctions is legitimate again depends
on what is normatively considered to be acceptable in a given group. The literature
suggests that collectivist organizations generally see the use of nonmaterial rewards
such as approval, social affirmation, or a sense of belonging as acceptable and
appropriate, and even encourage it as a form of community building, whereas the
use of nonmaterial sanctions such as the threat of being socially rejected, ridiculed, or
shamed are considered manipulative and unfair.19
'8SeeJamesScott's Weaponsof the Weak(1985)for a good discussionof latentbut agenticresistance.
19The argumentcould be made that promisingsocial acceptance,for example, is at the same time
implicitlya threatto withholdsocial acceptanceand, therefore,it makesno senseto say one is legitimate
and the othernot. I agreethereis sometimesa fine line in practicebut, generally,the distinctionis between
positive and negativeforms of social reinforcement,whereneitherare explicitlypromisedor threatened.
Rather,they are patternsin the elite'smannerof interactionthat becomeapparentto potentialdissenters.
as a formof influenceis seenas acceptable,as long as it does not seemto
Generally,positivereinforcement
be done in an insincereor instrumentalizing
way.
THE IRON LAW OF WHATAGAIN?
329
Definition of Oligarchy
Having delineated what kind of behavior and circumstances constitute legitimate and
illegitimate forms of formal and informal power, we are now ready to derive a
definition of oligarchy from the model. On the premise that a minority exercising
authority or influence within bounds that are acceptable to the majority qualifies as
democratic, it seems reasonable to suggest that both authority and influence become
oligarchic at the point where they become illegitimate and resistant to majority
dissent. Oligarchy, then, is a concentration of entrenched illegitimate authority and/or
influence in the hands of a minority, such that de facto what that minority wants is
generally what comes to pass, even when it goes against the wishes (whether actively or
passively expressed) of the majority. To put this in terms of the categories in the
matrix:
* Authority becomes coercive when it becomes illegitimate, i.e., when leaders
exceed the scope of delegated authority and/or resort to illegitimate means of
exercising formal or informal power (coercion or manipulation) to squelch
dissent.
* Coercion becomes oligarchic when the illegitimate means of exerting formal
power become concentrated in the hands of a minority to the degree that that
minority can regularly achieve its intended ends against the will of the majority.
* Influence becomes manipulativewhen it becomes illegitimate, i.e., when leaders
exceed the scope of informal power implied by group norms. They can do
this by usurping decision-making authority and/or using illegitimate means
(coercion or manipulation) to affect decisions.
* Manipulation becomes oligarchic when the illegitimate means of exerting informal power become concentrated in the hands of a minority to the degree that
that minority can regularly achieve its intended ends even though a majority
would like to oppose them.
What this means is that in the case of democratically structured organizations of
either the representative or collectivist type, the emergence of oligarchy involves two
steps: (1) the move from the legitimate to the illegitimate exercise of formal or
informal power; and (2) the concentration of illegitimate power in the hands of a
minority such that it is able to retain its position over time against the wishes of the
majority, whether those wishes are expressed through disgruntled passive resistance or
conscious organized opposition (and it would often be a combination of the two). To
jump for a moment back to the level of organizations in general, from the point of
view of the researcher, there are two ways to demonstrate that an organization-any
organization-is oligarchic. One can either show that the organization does not have
a democratic structure, in which case a minority has formal authority to rule, or one
can show that an oligarchy exists despite a democratic structure. The model presented
here, which is intended to help distinguish an oligarchic minority in the latter case,
suggests that before we can say a nominally democratic organization is oligarchic, we
must show first that a minority is wielding illegitimate power, second, that the
majority is in some way resisting that power, and third, that there is a pattern of
the minority being able to overcome such resistance on issues it feels are important.
Conversely, to demonstrate that oligarchy has been avoided in any organization, one
must first of all establish that it has a democratic structure. Once it has been found
that the organization is not oligarchic by virtue of its formal structure, one must then
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additionally demonstrate either that no minority has been wielding illegitimate power
(i.e., it has not used means that are considered illegitimate in that group, and there is
no evidence of majority resistance) or, if there is some evidence of illegitimate power,
that it has not been used consistently or effectively enough to indicate a pattern of
minority control over time.
There are several implications of this definition that are worth noting. First, in a
collectivist organization where no one has formal power, a minority with informal
power could become oligarchic in one of two ways: by successfully exercising formal
power (i.e., making/enforcing decisions that they do not have the legitimate right to
do) or by successfully employing illegitimate means of exerting influence. In both
cases, "successfully" refers to the demonstrated ability to circumvent or overcome
majority opposition on issues of importance to the elite.
A second implication of the definition is that in both kinds of democratically
structured organizations depicted in this model, a minority can be oligarchic without
intending to be (i.e., without consciously setting out to "take over" the organization),
but it cannot be oligarchic without doing something to actively exceed the bounds of
its legitimate power. The definition presumes both active use of illegitimate power by
the rulers and some kind of resistance by the majority. Even in a situation where
hegemonic assumptions that benefit a minority to the detriment of the majority have
been internalized by all concerned, such assumptions will at some point be explicitly
or implicitly called into question by that majority, and when they are, if the elite that
has benefited from this arrangement successfully uses illegitimate means to protect the
status quo, that would suggest the emergence of oligarchic rule.
Lastly, a practical implication of this definition of oligarchy is that legitimacy may
usefully be operationalized in terms of the majority's motivation for going along with
the powerful minority. Were one to find evidence that the majority of members do
what the minority wants because (a) they have been bought off with the promise of
material rewards (e.g., jobs, money, and use of resources), (b) they want to avoid
material sanctions (e.g., loss of money or job, physical harm), (c) they want to avoid
emotional sanctions (e.g., being ridiculed or shamed for disagreeing), or (d) they do
not realize that information has been withheld or an issue has been kept off the
agenda, these would indicate illegitimate uses of power. On the other hand, if the
minority gets its way because most people agree with it, are convinced by its arguments, or because they identify with the people in the minority and want their
approval/acceptance, then the minority is legitimately influential and not oligarchic.
SUGGESTIVE BUT INSUFFICIENT INDICATORS OF OLIGARCHY
The discussion so far suggests that in nominally democratic organizations, be they
representative or collectivist in form, the ability to control the decision-making
process is both a necessary and sufficient indicator of oligarchic rule. Finding that a
minority regularly exceeds the bounds of its legitimate power to make, enforce, or
influence decisions in order to obtain a desired outcome on issues that could threaten
its interests, finding that information is manipulated or withheld when such issues
threaten to come to the fore, that opportunities to express dissent are denied, or that
the majority is unwilling to speak for fear of verbal or emotional attack-all these
would be evidence that a minority was both exercising power illegitimately and that it
had become resistant to challenge. The literatures on power and oligarchy suggest
three other conditions that might be present where an elite has become oligarchic and
are often taken as indicators of oligarchy: lack of leadership turnover, minority
THE IRON LAW OF WHATAGAIN?
331
control of resources, and low levels of participation in governance. I want to briefly
discuss these three conditions and argue that while they are certainly suggestive that a
minority has enough power to dominate the organization, they are generally either
cause or consequence of oligarchic control, and are not, on their own, sufficient proof
of it. I will then close with a brief discussion of the implications of this model for
future research.
Lack of Leadership Turnover
Even though this is the most common measure of oligarchy, a lack of leadership
turnover, in and of itself, is not necessarily an indication that a minority is exercising
illegitimate power. It is conceivable that a majority would want the same leaders for
long periods of time, in which case it could represent legitimate authority or influence.
Nonetheless, finding that the same people have been in leadership positions or on
particularly influential committees for an extended period of time would be suspicious
and a likely sign of oligarchy, because, as Michels so ably illustrated, the more
specialized people become in their functional responsibilities, the harder they are to
replace, the more dependent the membership becomes upon their expertise, and the
easier it is for leaders to get away with acting in illegitimate ways. Consequently, it is
important to evaluate whether long-term incumbents have resorted to illegitimate
means to maintain their positions of authority or influence and whether there has
been majority resistance to their rule.
Minority Control of Resources
To exercise illegitimate authority through the use of material rewards and/or sanctions, one must have access to resources and have control over their distribution.
Thus, finding evidence that the control of resources within an organization is concentrated in the hands of a small group would indicate that group's capacity to wield
illegitimate authority (Zald and Ash 1966). Because oligarchy has been defined here as
an actual outcome and not simply a capacity, however, having control over resources
in itself is also not sufficient proof of oligarchy. We would need to find evidence that a
minority had utilized that control successfully to make or enforce decisions that the
majority opposed or would oppose if it knew of the illegitimate means being used.
Low Participation Levels
Lack of participation can be a sign that people feel excluded or alienated from the
decision-making process-that their opinions are not being valued nor their interests
taken into account. It can be the majority's way of saying "Why should I show up?
The big shots will just do whatever they want to anyway." Thus, finding that a large
proportion of the membership does not participate in the governance of the organization often suggests that a minority is calling the shots. Again, however, lack of
participation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient indicator of oligarchy. It could
be that the majority was happy to leave the work of governance to a minority, as long
as that minority remained accountable and did not jeopardize the majority's interests.
But as often happens with long-term incumbency, this abdication of responsibility,
however consensual it might be, can easily lead to a situation of dependence where
people do not feel entitled or qualified to intervene--even when they suspect their
interests are being threatened--because they have not been involved in the process. At
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that point, the minority can often successfully push through an unpopular decision by
making the majority feel guilty (nonmaterial sanctions) for first letting the leaders do
all the work and then "holding everything up" when they disapprove of the way it has
been done. Again, this points to the importance of thoroughly evaluating the legitimacy of the means of exercising authority and influence in the organization to
determine whether or not there is a pattern of illegitimate minority control.
CONCLUSION
What does this conceptualization of oligarchy imply for future empirical research on
the distribution of power in organizations? The primary goal of this article was to use
insights on power and influence gleaned from political science, social psychology, and
political sociology to loosen what has become a log-jam in the debate over Michels's
"iron law of oligarchy." The frequent underspecification and/or misspecification of
the concept of oligarchy has led to a stalemate in the study of the conditions under
which various kinds of organizations might resist oligarchization. This has been
especially true in the case of collectivist-democratic organizations, where the lack of
formal hierarchy makes traditional measures awkward, if not meaningless. It is my
hope that the model presented here will provide a standardized conceptual framework
that can be applied to both bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic organizations in a
variety of settings. It should be especially productive for the analysis of collectivistdemocratic organizations, be they workers' collectives, communes, co-housing projects, finance collectives, consumer cooperatives, or activist groups. For example, a
resurgence is currently taking place in the United States, western Europe, and elsewhere of social movement groups using a collectivist affinity group structure to
coordinate mass direct action events in the peace, anti-nuclear, and global justice
movements (Polletta 2001; Leach 2005). As Polletta (2002) has so thoroughly documented, participatory democratic structures have been a fairly consistent feature of
social movements in the United States for a century or more. It is possible, and there
is some reason to suspect, that successive generations of activists are getting better at
breaking the iron law in ever larger groups and over longer periods of time. It is also
likely that collectivist movement groups have been more successful in some countries
than others at sustaining this structure without succumbing to oligarchy. Without a
common yardstick, however, comparative historical research can neither confirm
these hypotheses nor isolate the factors that explain them.
The concrete result of using the yardstick proposed here would likely be to raise the
bar for those who would show that bureaucratic, representative-democratic organizations have avoided oligarchy and to lower it for those trying to make the same case for
nonbureaucratic, collectivist-democratic organizations. On the bureaucratic side, the
task of finding exceptions to the iron law becomes more difficult for two reasons. First
of all, because the model incorporates the possibility that oligarchic power may be
informally held, proving that bureaucratic organizations have avoided oligarchy
requires that informal power dynamics be evaluated in addition to the more obvious
structural features of the organization. Where it previously sufficed to show that an
organization had a two-party electoral system and that there was periodic leadership
turnover, now one would have to additionally verify that there was no informal elite
exercising illegitimate power over either elected officials or the electorate itself, before
concluding that the organization was truly democratic. In terms of practical cases, for
example, it would be interesting to see whether the International Typographical
THE IRON LAW OF WHATAGAIN?
333
Union held up as an exception to the iron law by Lipset et al. (1956) would still have
measured up against this higher standard.
Second, by separating the question of oligarchy from that of goal displacement, this
model requires that the presence or absence of oligarchy be judged according to the
actual distribution of power in the organization and not according to its political
program. Were this standard applied to the union locals studied by Voss and Sherman
(2000), it seems quite possible, if not probable, that the locals they found to be
exceptions to the iron law would in fact be found to be oligarchic. If the resistance
exhibited by the membership and staff of those locals-resistance that the authors
admitted had to be overcome to implement the new organizing program-if that
resistance in fact represented majority opposition, and the leadership used means
that the membership would consider illegitimate to push it through, they would be
considered oligarchic according to this model.
In the case of nonbureaucratic, collectivist-democratic organizations, this model
will undoubtedly make it easier to prove that oligarchy has been avoided, simply by
virtue of the fact that it establishes a threshold between a minority that is oligarchic
and one that is legitimately influential, where previously there was none. Once we
parse out legitimate from illegitimate uses of informal power, i.e., influence from
manipulation, I think it is likely that at least some collectivist organizations will be
found to have resisted oligarchy, confirming the findings of Rothschild and Whitt
(1986), and contradicting the arguments presented by both Freeman (1984, 1975) and
Staggenborg (1988) that collectivist organizations are inevitably tyrannized by informal elites.
I have intentionally refrained in this analysis from addressing the question of how
and under what conditions democratic organizations might avoid oligarchy. A variety
of factors have been presented in the literature as mitigating oligarchic tendencies,
including the existence of a multiparty electoral system, the presence of subgroups,
and equality of income (Lipset et al. 1956); collective self-criticism, a social movement
orientation, and homogeneity of interests (Rothschild and Whitt 1986); having a
leadership with activist backgrounds and experience in the use of radical tactics
(Voss and Sherman 2000); and independence from external funding sources (Piven
and Cloward 1977). While these hypotheses certainly have surface plausibility,
because they were not tested against any rigorous definition of oligarchy, we cannot
know for sure to what extent they hold, or even if they held in the cases in which they
were developed. Before we can explain how oligarchy can be avoided, we must have an
adequate and consistent way of determining whether it has been avoided in different
kinds of organizational settings.
Being able to make this determination is also important for its potential to shed
light on the population ecology of democratic forms of organization. Recent work in
both organizational and social movement theory has begun addressing the question of
how and why particular organizational forms take root in some social contexts more
than others (Polletta 2002; Clemens 1998, 1993; Minkoff 1994). This research suggests
that how legitimate an organizational form is perceived to be is an important factor in
whether or not it endures and spreads. Legitimation is a process whereby concrete acts
are evaluated in light of the shared norms and values of the group. When this happens
in democratic organizations, democracy itself is legitimated in a way that makes it
attractive to others who share the same values. When it happens in the context of
collectivist-democratic groups, legitimation is equivalent to the reproduction of a
radical egalitarian consciousness and mode of interaction that is intended to have
an impact beyond the confines of the group itself. If an organizational form tends to
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flourish where it has legitimacy, and if democratic organizations gain legitimacy
where they successfully avoid oligarchy, then being able to determine whether they
have in fact avoided oligarchy is more than an exercise in theoretical hair-splitting. It
is the first step toward understanding not only the conditions that facilitate democracy in any given organization or political body, but also toward being able to explain
patterns in the diffusion of democratic forms from one organizational field or society
to another, and toward understanding the impact they may have on the societies
where they are most prevalent.
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