ts
LTC No.
August 1969
fkI
66
The Land Tenure Center
310 King Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706
THE DECISIONAL ROLE OF THE SENATE
IN THE CHILEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
by
WESTON H. AGOR
The author wishes to acknowledge fellowship support from the Fulbright
Committee and the Midwest Universities Consortium for field research in
1962-63 and 1967-68, respectively. The Land Tenure Center, while it
provided no support for field research, did provide the author with partial
support at different points in his graduate study in Madison. LTC is
issuing this report because of its interest to those concerned with economic
development. Weston Agor is assistant professor at Wisconsin State Univers i ty-Oshkosh.
All views, interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions expressed in
this paper are the author's and not necessarily those of the Land Tenure Center.
ERRATUM
On page 6, this paragraph should follow the first paragraph on
that page, immediately preceding Section II, "Decisional Function."
The principal data sources on which this paper is based
are:
in-the-field interviews (forty-three of the forty-five
Senate universe),] ex-senator (who was also a former Minister
of Finance), twenty Senate staff members, I ex-Senate staff
member, 2 Chamber staff members, officials In the Executive
and the political parties: a detailed analysis of documents,
committee reports, floor debates, and the work of other scholars;
and extensive empirical observation of the operation of the
Chilean Congress. In this study, political parties will be
abbreviated thusly: National (PN), Radical (PR), ChristianDemocrat (PDC), Vanguard of the People (VNP), National Democrat
(PADENA), Socialist (PS), Communist (PC), and Independents (I).
Ank-
THE DECISIONAL ROLE OF THE SENATE IN
THE CHILEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
by Weston H. Agor
I.
Introduction
Chile is a highly centralized unitary, quasi-presidential political
system.
The President has a fixed six-year term, and members of the
Cabinet are chosen by and responsible to him, although Congress has the
constitutional
right to impeach ministers.
If the President selects a
congressman for a Cabinet post (usually a deputy and rarely a senator),
the congressman must give up his congressional seat.
The Congress is
bicameral--the Senate currently numbering forty-five members and the
Silvert prefers to describe the Chilean political system as
"semi" (K. H. Silvert, Chile: Yesterday and Today (New York:
Holt,
Rinehdrt and Winston, 1965), p. 93) or "neo-parliamentary" (Silvert,
The Conflict Society--Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (rev.
ed.) (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1966), p. 27).
Federico G. Gil uses the term "restricted parliamentary"--see his Political System of Chile (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1966). p. 89. They
contend that in a fully presidential system, cabinet ministers are the
servants only of the President.
In Chile, Congress may impeach ministers
and are "answerable" before Congress for their actions.
It seems more
accurate to describe the system as "quasi-presidential" in view of
the way the system actually works.
First, the President has a fixed
six-year term) which cannot be cut short by a vote of confidence.
Co-igtes5 has the constitutional perogative to impeach the President under
t ttblnlImited circumstances, but it has not been exercised in modern
tties.
Secondly, although Congress also has the constitutional right to
cIpeach
inftsters, the Chilean scholar, Carlos Andrade Geywitz, notes
that such proceedings have seldom passed both houses.
Finally
it is
customary for ministers to explain their actions to Congress, and
even participate in debates on key legislation.
But, this is not
unlike the American system, where cabinet members appear before hearings
of well-publicized congressional standing committees.
Chamber of Deputies one hundred and forty-seven.
2
The military has
traditionally abstained from active participation in politics, "acting
3
as a veto group only in so far as their own interests are concerned."
A proportional representation system is used for congressional elections
in an effort to assure faithful representation of all shades of political
opinion.
Although it
is debatable how "faithful" representation is, the
electoral process has enabled Congress (especially the Senate) to serve
as an effective opposition site.
Robert Dix has characterized Chile
(as well as Costa Rica and Uruguay) as follows, "The opposition role
is substantially (though not definitively) legitimized.
The presidency
has been won two or more times by the opposition during the 25-year
period; the opposition wins over a third of the votes of the legislative
seats in most elections; there have been no or only very brief (e.g.,
Costa Rica,
1948-49)
periods of non-constitutional rule."
5
2 The respective membership increased to 50 and 150 as of the 1960
congressional elections.
3 Silvert (1966),
op. cit., p. 23.
The degree to which the system "faithfully" represents all shades
of opinion has most recently been examined in German Urzua Valenzuela,
Los partidos politicos chilenos: las fuerzas pol(ticas (Santiago:
Editorial Jurtdica de Chile, 1968), pp. 128-29, 148, 165, & 175; and in
Carlos Ahdrade Geywitz, Elementos de derecho constitucional chileno
(Sdfitiago:
Editorial Juridica de Chile, 1963), pp. 313-324.
~Robett H. Dix, "ppositions
and Development in Latin America,"
dL&0Uered at the 196.7 Annual Meeting of the American Political
t~ti~e Association, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, September 5-9, 1967
- 1967, -A-PSA),
(Cpright
p. 21+..
.
...II
P&
"The result has been one of the most stable multi-party systems
16
in Latin America,
one that "hassuccessfully evolved from an aristo-
cratic oligarchic democracy into one in which the masses play the
leading role."'7
Indeed, Flanigan and Fogelman's index of democratization
for the period 1900-1950 places Chile fifth behind Canada, England, the
United States and Switzerland:
Chile is not only placed ahead of the
important European nations of France, Italy and Germany, but also ahead
8
of the Philippines and Brazil, states with Latin cultural origins.
"Chile is the only Latin American country where political forces
are clearly and distinctly aligned, as in many European countries, into
three great blocs:
the Right, the Center, and the Left.' '9
In the period
of approximately one hundred years during which the multi-party system
6 Silvert (1966), op. cit., p. 27.
Charles 0. Porter and Robert J. Alexander, The
Struggle for
Democracy in Latin America (New York: Macmillan, 1961). p. 6. For a
Chilean interpretation of this evolution, see: Julio Heise Gonzales,
150 a'nos de evolucikn institucional (Santiago: Editorial Andres Bello,
8 William
rianigan and Edwin Fogleman, "Patterns of
Political
Develolffnetit arid Democratization: A Quantitative Analysis," Paper
delivered it the 1..967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Associationf PIck-Congress Hotelz Chica o, September 5-9- 1967 (Copyright 1967, APSA), Figurer
This index updated to 1968 would not
alter this placement.
An index of democratization is of course normative. The author
does-rwl wish to imply in its use that political democracy--especially
"t' Okdeied aftet the United States--necessarily equates with political
de~~~iii#t (1 ,'W11
and capacity to cope with and to generate
foiitH atf
g1 a
fFaio
t
+on
toward whichever values seem appropriate in
Ule pt~uiLItf eotlte~t"), However, it is one means (among others) by
hiih vQI1id g l inay be achieved, and it is the system which has been
adopted with appropriate Chileanization in this country. Therefore,
when speaking of Chile, it is correct to make this equation.
has functioned in Chile, the number of parties in existence has varied
widely, reaching a maximum of thirty-six in 1953.
Recently, five
major parties have dominated the political field, ranging from Right to
Left as follows:
and Communist.
National, Radical, Christian-Democrat, Socialist,
Ideologically, the Chilean political scale leans to
the Left, with important factions in the two largest parties (ChristianDemocrat and Radical) tending toward detentes with the Socialist and
Communist parties.
Chile also appears to be characterized by a Congress which exercises
real influence in the political system.
For example, Robert Scott notes
that although the legislatures in most of the countries of Latin America
only go through the formal steps of lawmaking while their acts are
frequently dictated by presidents, in Chile, "The center of power has
virtually been transferred from the president to the legislature
.
.
,,lO
Numerous other American, Chilean. and Cuban scholars have presented
specific examples of Congress' decisional voice, and selected statements
from President Frei's 1968 Message to Congress provide still further
11
evidence.
Although these scholars would agree that Congress and particularly
the Senate exercise important influence in the decision-making process,
they probably also would contend that vis a vis one another, the
txha6-x
U
in
hitis
e important role insofar as policy initiation is
.Sot
,~~
"Legislatures and Legislation,"iHrl E.
tDavfs (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York:
Ronald
Press, 1958), p. 331.
11 Cuarto mensadie del presidente de la Republica de Chile don Eduardo
Frei Montalva al inau urar el er~odo de sesiones ordinarias del Con rs
Nacional, 21 de mayo de 1968 (Santiago:
Departamento de Publicaciones
de Ia Presidencia de la Republica de Chile), pp. 52, 74, 76-78.
5
concerned.
They would base this contention on the President's considerable
"formal" powers as outlined in the Constitution.
For example, the
President may classify certain legislation urgent, thereby setting a time
limit in which Congress "must" pass the bill.
12
He also has "exclusive"
areas of initiative, for example, in proposing the annual budget, and
Congress is supposedly "limited" to reducing the requested expenditures
13
of funds.
Congress may also grant extraordinary powers to the Executive
14
in emergency situations, and he has wide veto powers (e.g., item. additive).
However, there has been little systematic emprirical analysis to probe the
degree to which Congress' influence is in fact restricted by these formal
Executive prerogatives.
Objectives
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the Chilean
Senate does exercise real
influence.
Specifically, it will show that
despite the President's extraordinary urgency powers, the Senate exercises
considerable lawmaking initiative, and can delay, modify, and defeat
legislation generated by the Executive.
It also will consider the
Senate's role in overseeing the bureaucracy, granting patronage, articulating interests, and resolving conflicts.
Finally,
it will try to
explain the bases of the Senate's rather extraordinary powers.
For
FdJo
am~
see Manuel Matus Benavente, Desniveles entre
uUstkJesyrepuestos realizados (Santiago:
Editorial
1"Constitucic~n poll'tica de la republica de Chile" in Manual del
Senado (Santiago:
Editorial Universitaria, S. A., 1966).
comparative purposes,
the discussion adopts the decisional function
outline used by Robert Packenham in a recent survey of world legislatures
as follows:
(3)
(1)
lawmaking (initiation);
(2) lawmaking (modify and delay);
administrative oversight andpatronage; and
and conflict resolution.
(4)
interest articulation
15
II. Decisional Function
I.Lawmaking (initiation)
A close examination of the Executive's urgency powers and the
budgetary process indicates that Congress exercises far more initiative
than scholars have previously suggested.
President's urgency powers.
First let us consider the
Since bills classified "urgent" by the
President have priority on Congressional calendars, and "must" be
discussed and dispatched within a specified time limit, analysts often
conclude that Congress has little opportunity to present its own legislation.
But it has not been sufficiently stressed that Congress is free
to accept or reject the President's legislation.
Since the Executive
normally lacks a sufficient majority in one of the two chambers to pass
the bill (usually the Senate), congressmen use this lever to initiate
numerous unrelated bills (in the form of amendments) on its coattails.
The President frequently agrees to "tolerate" many of them rather than
16
have his proposed bill rejected within the required time limit.
15 Robert A. Packenham,
"Legislatures and Political Development,"
in Lloyd Musoif and Allan Kornberg (eds.), Legislatures and Development
Perspectives (Durham:
Duke University Press, forthcoming).
16
Jorge A. Tapia Valdes, La tecnica legislativa (Santiago:
Editorial Jur~dica de Chile, 1960), pp. 41 and 43-45.
A recent example was the 1968 Salary Readjustment Bill which
President Frei tagged "as important as the annual budget. ''17
Before
final clearance by the Senate, it was the subject of more than 2,000
8
attempted amendments--often new bills not related to the law in question.
Two senators and an important staff member observe:
These miscellaneous laws have the advantage of accelerating
passage--it is the only way some bills would get passed. There
are many bills, perhaps that shouldn't get passed, but they got
tacked on important legislation. The presidents of standing
committees have the power to rule unconstitutional or extraneous
to the material of the bill such amendments, but they often
don't or can't use this power depending on the situation.
The congressman must add on items of importance to him-it is the only way to get them passed, and the Executive has
to accept some of this. Presidents of standing committees do
also--there is a certain amount of tolerance.
This process of amendments is worse than ever before, but
it is a way of putting pressure on the President as well as
getting your own bills through.
As far as the annual budget is concerned, although Congress is
"restricted" by the Constitution from directly increasing the annual
budget, indirtl
it is able to circumvent this restriction by passing
laws during the year that entail permanent expenses which must be
included in the annual budget according to Article 44J Section 4 of the
17 Cuatro mensaje
.
.
.
OP_.cit
p. 76.
18 Indicaciones formuladas a] proyecto de ley que.reajuste las
reutna.iones.de los empleados y obreros de los sectores p'Ibli co y
.ydo ...
ara el ano 1968 boletfn no. 23.519-senado ND; based on
stahdfng c mmlttee reports, debates, interviews, and observations during
this pe~lod.
For an excellent service, see the photo-copies of all
teW [paper accounts:
"Cambios ministeriales," Boleti'n de informacic~n
_general no. 37 (OlS), May 9, 1968.
19
Constitution.
Although Congress is not supposed to pass laws during
the year which signify new expenses without simultaneously indicating the
it escapes this shackle by simply indicating that
20
the source of funds is a future annual budget.
Congress may also
source of financing,
decrease variable budget expenses during the fiscal year.
This power,
when it chooses to exercise it, permits Congress to bargain with the
Executive.21
There is also abundant evidence that Congress influences the
formulation of Executive legislation prior to actual presentation.
Cabinet ministers may "try out" several alternative proposals on party
congressmen, not only for their personal
reaction. but to solicit their
response as to what they sense Congress (especially the Senate opposition)
will accept.
Or, the President and his Cabinet may directly approach
Congressional
leaders for their views on a particular bill.
One Government
(PDC) senator discusses these exchanges, "Sure, a minister may call the
presidents of the respective parties /who are often senators_/, and have
them over for an informal dinner one night
....
"
The President
himself indicates his frequent communication with Congress when urging
constitutional reforms,
"I can say that Senators and Deputies of the most
distinct political viewpoints,
in private conversations, have told me of
19 El proceso presupuestario fiscal chileno (Santiago:
de Economra, Universidad de Chile, 1958)
Instituto
p. 41.
2Arnaldo Gorziglia Balbi, Facultades presupuestarias legislativas (Santiago:
Imprenta Lazcano, 1960), p. 124+.
21El proceso presupestario
.
.
.,
op..cit., p. 1+0.
9
their conviction that this situation /salary
adjustment and unfinanced
122
social security system-/
cannot continue and should be solved soon
"
...
A tangible example of such activity involved the 1968 Salary
After Sergio Molina, Minister of Finance,
Readjustment Bill.
resigned
over the Senate's opposition to his proposal in January, 1968, Raul Saez
23
replaced him.
-
Saez began to explore possible alternative approaches
with the leadership of opposition parties.
Victor Garcia, president of
the National Party, declared after talking with Saez, "The Minister
.
.
has pointed out the need to discuss the general aspects of the project
before it
is
sent to Congress
.
.
.
and not to impose his point of view
as saying, "I
think that if
have proposals to make.
2.
Saez called us to know our opinion,
...
.24
Saez himself was quoted
they have rejected the previous bill, they
I hope to hear them and see what can be done
...
Lawmaking (modification or delay)
The Senate also appears able to modify or delay the President's
legislation.
First of all, Article 138 of the Senate Reglamento (internal
rules and procedures) prohibits the Senate or a standing committee from
considering at the same time two or more urgency bills.
22 Catrmensae
231"Jue
.
,
op. cit.
26
This provision
p. 77.
" El Mercurio, February 16, 1968,
ui
p. 1.
"IPosjtlvo primer contacto de Saez con dirigentes pol'ticos,"
i~~utli~l de Ia empresa privada destacan dos nuevos ministros,"
t1Me*~eu~lo,
February 24,
2"Reglamento del
1968,
p.
1.
senado," in Manual del senado,
op.
cit., p.
158.
10
obviously enables them to draw out the time period in which they consider
Executive-inspired urgency legislation.
Secondly, the President's
"urgency" prerogative is considerably weakend if
in either chamber.
They will simply reject the proposed bill in the
required time limit.
either:
(a)
he lacks a majority
Faced with this alternative, the President will
withdraw and re-submit the bill several times (starting the
urgency period over again from the beginning each time);
to reach a compromise solution with the opposition; or
Congress more time to consider
it.
(b) attempt
(c) simply give
27
He may even discard the bill altogether.
Two examples which illustrate this process are the Bill on Public
Housing Developments and the 1968 University Reform Law.
The Public
Housing Development Bill was sent to the Senate standing committees of
Public Works and Finance on September 7, 1965 (See Table 1).
than three months
After more
in committee, the President decided to ask for urgency
classification of the Bill,
thereby requiring passage within thirty days.
It became clear to the President two weeks later that the committees would
report out the Bill within the required time limit. but not in the form
desired.
Therefore, on January 12,
1966, the Executive retired and
immediately presented the same Bill again, thereby starting the time limit
all over from the beginning.
repeated four times,
By mid-July,
this procedure had been
and over ten months had elapsed since original
submission to the Senate.
In the case of the University Reform Law,
the President arrived
at a compromise solution with the Senate opposition which allowed for
27 Andrade Geywitz, o
i.
p. 439.
II
Table 1. Senate Action Delay of the Public Housing Development Bill
Declared Urgent by the President
Date
Session
9/7/65
43a
Bill sent to Senate Committee of
Public Works and Finance.
11/3/65
27a
Included in list of bills to be
considered.
12/22/65
46 a
Presents Executive urgency request.
Classified simple urgency.
1/4/66
52a
Agree to give committees extra week
to review bill.
1/12/66
57a
Executive retires urgency and presents
Bill again. Classified simple urgency
again.
1/25/66
6 7a
Executive retires urgency again.
5/31/66
la
Executive presents urgency again
for third time. Classified simple
urgency.
7/7/66
3a
Time limit of until 7/15 is given to
committee of Public Works to report
out the Bill.
7/15/66
7a
Executive for the fourth time retires
urgency.
Source:
Senate Office of Information 1967 File.
12
but also provided more time
rapid dispatch of the Bill (sixty days),
for committee study than a simple urgency classification would have.
Hence, in May 1968, the representatives of the PC, PDCI PR, and PS
(comites)
issued this public statement:
The respresentatives declare that the project contains
matters of great importance which require study and careful
legislation . ...
The periods for a petition of urgency are
insufficient to make such a study ....
In view of this,
we have asked the Minister of Education . . . to ask the President to retire the urgency . . . and we indicated that a
period of sixty days was a prudent and legitimate period to
study the initiative, obtain all the relevant data, 2d hear
the opinions of the authorities of the universities.
Except by special Senate agreement or Executive urgency (and
we have seen how effective this is in fact), a standing committee does
29
not normally have a fixed period in which it must report out a bill.
Matters pending in Senate standing committees as of May, 1968, filled
a sixty-page booklet.
30
Should the originating chamber reject a law,
it may not be introduced again for another year.
31
President's veto powers appear substantial (e.g.,
On paper, the
item, additive).
But since the Executive normally lacks a majority to pass his legislation
in both houses, he is often forced to make informal bargains with the
opposition on how he will exercise his veto power once the bill leaves
Congress.
Furthermore, Congress may also overrule a Presidential veto
by two-thirds vote of both houses, and the President may not use his
28Declaracin de los comit s Comunista,
Demcrata Cristiano
Radical y Social ista del senado en relacion con el estudio del proyecto
gue legisla sobre las universidades (ND).
29.Tapia Valdes, op
i.
p. 28.
30 Senado-asuntos pendientes en comisiones al 21 de mayo de 1968
(Santiago:
instituto Geografico Militar, 1968).
3Adela Ramos Pazos,
sidad de Concepcion,
La funcion legislativa (Concepcion:
memoria de prueba,
1965),
p.
32.
Univer-
13
additive veto (add totally new pieces of legislation) on matters of
constitutional
32
reform, as he can with a normal bill.
Table 2 illustrates the Senate's capacity to delay the dispatch
of five additional key pieces of legislation during President Frei's
Administration.
Note that standing committees of the Chilean Senate
often are the central arena in the process.
For example, of the total
eighty-seven days required to pass the Bill entitled "The Creation of
a Committee to Adjust National Defense Pensions," eighty-five days
(98 percent) were spent in committee.
Frequently, it is there that bills
are carefully studied, and most compromises pounded out.
'"ithout public
tribunes, official versions and so on, there is more calm; it is much
easier to produce a climate which leads to agreement on different points
of view.
There is less passion, and more give and take when an idea has
merit.
Delay should not necessarily be considered negative in effect.
There is considerable evidence that the Senate improves the laws it
modifies or delays, a process which reflects a serious and professional
34
standing committee analysis comparable to the United States Senate.
Those who regard Senate delays or modifications as undue harassment of
a Government which currently leans to the Left should not forget that
the Senate has acted no differently when the President has represented
the Right0
Examine these excerpts from Senate debates for example:
Andrade G~eywitz, ogp. c it., P. 650.
See also, Alejandro Silva
Bascu?an, Tratado de derecho constitutional, tomo Ill (Santiago:
Editorial
Jurfdica, 1963), p. 4+9 3.
Andrade Geywitz, op. cit., p. 446.
3Tapia Valdes, op
i.
p. 31; Guillermo Bruna Contreras,
Esauod
rfso parlamentaria (Santiago:
Universidad Catolica de
Chile, memoria de pru ..., 1963), p. 8 ...
Senate-Time Taken to Pass Five Key Administration Bills
Table 2.
Total Time in Senate (Days)
Time in Committee
Title of Bill
1. Creation of a Committee
to Adjust National
Defense Pensions
2.
Creation of New Min
is t
of Housing and
Urbanization
3.
4.
5.
Time on Floor
Days
%
Days
98
(85)
2
97
(131)
Total Time in
Committee and
on the Floor
%
Days
(2)
100
(87)
3
(4)
100
(135)
(101)
4
(17)
100
(118)
y
Exemption of Property
from Tax if Valued Less
Than E-5,,0086
Rules to Stimulate
Exports
84
(84)
16
(16)
100
(100)
Creation of a Director
of National Boundaries
and Frontiers
49
(97)
51
(98)
100
(195)
Source:
Senate Office of Information 1967 File.
15
Altamirano (PS): No other President had his initiatives
approved in block . ...
The Government says that all of its
predecessors were given extraordinary faculties.
This is a half
truth ...
During the last administration of Mr. Ibanez he was
not given faculties to restructure either the Central Bank or the
Controllor General's Office. And, if I remember correctly, Senator
Enriquez, who is also President of the PR, demanded substantial
modifications of the faculties asked by former President Jorge
Alessandri .
Aguirre Doolan (PR): For example, faculties to legislate 35
over social security and the petroleum industry were not given.
3. Administrative Oversight and Patronage
Effective legislative scrutiny of administrative performance must
be based in part on the capacity to obtain necessary information
(particu-
larly executive agency documents), and an adequate staff to seek out and
analyze these data.
Passage of Article Five of Law 13.609 in 1959 gave the Senate
both the authority and staff to more energetically perform this function.36
First of all,
the Office of Information of the Senate (OIS) was created.
Composed of economists, political scientists/public administrators,
lawyers, translators, and a newspaperman, OIS conducts for senators
valuable studies on the performance of administrative agencies.
Secondly, Law 13.609--tested and upheld in several legal cases over a
period of eight years--requires all administrative agencies to forward
whatever information or data OIS deems necessary to complete these studies.
In a 1968 test case, OIS sought to evaluate the progress of
Chiie It agrariarn reform from 1964 to 1968.
OIS asked the Agrarian
35
Sesion
8
Diario de sesiones del senado, ...
legislatura extraordinaria,
7a OP. cit., p. 430 6
36 "Disposiciones legales y labor que desarrolla la oficina de
informaciones del senado," Boletin de informacion general No. 18,
Santiago, OIS, May 31, 1967.
16
Reform Corporation (CORA) to submit the balances of agriculture settlements (asentamientos) for this purpose.
After some resistance by CORA,
the Controller General ruled on July 6, 1968, that the information must
be provided as in the past,
and it
subsequently was.
37
In some nations, legislative control of administrative performance
is frequently weakened because opposition senators cannot get access
to executive documents they need.
does not occur for the Senate.
In Chile, this problem apparently
OIS conducts studies for all senators
in a non-partisan manner, an operation which, in effect, is an institutionalized guarantee of information for the opposition.
An analysis
of OIS consultas (studies or consultations) for the period 1967-March,
1968 (see Table 3) reveals that 91 percent (three hundred and twentynine) of the total three hundred and sixty-three consultations were
in answer to requests made by opposition senators.
Subject matter standing committee hearings and floor debates
are also used by the Senate to review administrative activity.
For
example, interviews and extensive personal observation show that ministries
regularly appear before Senate committees to explain both policy stands
and bureaucratic performance.
On the floor, senators often call attention
to administrative bottlenecks by taking advantage of the hora de incidentes
(hour of incidental matters).
During this period, senators can bring
up or debate whatever matters they deem to be in the public interest.
37 or a more detailed account, see the author's "Senate vs.
CORA--An Attempt to Evaluate Chile's Agrarian Reform to Date,"
InterAmerican Economic Affairs (Autumn 1968), and a shorter version in Land
Tenure Center Newsletter Number 27 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin,
March-August, 1968), pp. 1-7.
Table 3. Senate Office of Information Consultations 1967-68 Ordinary Sessions
PC
%
(N)
PS
%
(N)
PADENA
%
(N)
PDC
%
I
(N)
%
(N)
PR
%
(N)
PN
%
Total
(N)
%
(N)
1967
(109)
(89)
(1)
(28)
(14)
(30)
(14)
(285)
1968
(32)
(19)
(1)
(6)
(2)
(17)
(1)
(78)
Total
39
(141)
30
(108)
1
(2)
9
(34)
4
(16)
1.3
(47)
4
(15)
i00 (363)
Note: Coverage does not include consultations to committee secretaries or other personnel.
1968 data only until March 31, 1968.
Source:
Senate Office of Information Consultations.
18
In particular instances, committee hearings and floor debates
may lead Congress to request that the Controller General conduct an
audit of an administrative program to determine whether funds have been
spent as Congress intended.
Or, a committee might travel to an agrarian
reform settlement, for example, to verify the information the Agrarian
Reform Corporation provided.
The Chamber may also set up special
investigating committees to explore a particular matter.
Furthermore,
if the evidence warrants such action, the Chamber can and sometimes does
start impeachment proceedings of a minister.
If the measure passes the
Chamber, the Senate must make the final decision.
As Table 4 indicates,
the Senate usually votes not to impeach, but if sufficiently provoked
or justified, it will vote otherwise, as happened on several occasions
during the Iba'nez administration (1952-58).
officials (mayors, for example).
The same is true of local
Finally, the Senate may also seek to
alter Administration policies (or their implementation) by refusing to
approve military advancements, diplomatic appointments, and presidential
travels abroad as occurred on two occasions in 1967 and 1968.38
As noted earlier, the Senate exercises some control over financial
resources, and therefore has an instrument--patronage--to exert influence.
Friends and constituents regularly approach senators for political
appointments or other special favors.
Reviewing his mail, one senator
cited a typical group of solicitations. "Here is a woman who wants me
to get her a naval pension because her husband died recently.
Another
3The Senate refused to allow Frei to travel to the United
States in 1967, and also rejected a diplomatic appointment to Peru in 1968.
19
Table 4.
Accusations Against Ministers of State Congress-1926 to 1966
Year
Total
No.
1
9
2
2
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
41
2
2
1926-27
1931
1935
1936
1938
1939
1940
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1951
1952
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1962
1963
1966
Total
49
Chamber
Approved
6
2
Senate
Approveda
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
2
13 (27%)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
l
0
0
0
0
0
0
4 (8%)
aZero is used for the Senate to indicate that it does not need
to totlsder the case if the Chamber itself rejects the charges.
Source:
Senate Office of Information 1967 File.
20
is a man who wants me to get him a job as an elevator operator."
Tapia
Valdes points out that 55.2 percent of the laws passed by Congress between 1938 and 1958 were over particular matters such as pensions, jobs,
or retirement benefits (asuntos de gracia) in response to these requests.39
4.
Interest Articulation and Conflict Resolution
Congress not only articulates interests, but resolves conflicts,
in part by initiating or modifying legislation in response to demands
made upon it. This takes place on three levels--particular groups,
vincial (agrupacion),
pro-
and national.
Pressure groups have a long history in Chile (e.g., the National
Society of Agriculture was formed in 1838) and unlike Brazil, there is
close contact between them and Congress.
Menges writes:
Chile's business associations have the usual types of formal access to the legislature. They may testify on bills before
appropriate committees, and they submit documentation stating
their views on legislation under discussion. Each of the major
peak organizations keeps a close watch over the legislative
calendar and informs potentially interested members of developments. The peak organizations also very often serve as middlemen in transmitting the views of member associations and individual
companies to the Congress.
...
Following the pattern of American business group activity,
however, it seems that the really important contact with the legislature involves informal relations with individual congressmen
....
In the case of controversial
legislation, business
association leaders present their views and perhaps ven coordinate strategy with sympathetic congressmen
39
4
lapia Valdes,
op. cit.,
..
0.
p. 47.
Constantine C. Menges, "Public Policy and Organized Business
in Chile:
A Preliminary Analysis," Journal of International Affairs,
Vol. 20, No. 2 (1966),
p. 354.
21
Menges also notes that parliamentary groups of some of the
major political parties may effectively make policy on some or all
issues in Chile, just as MacKenzie found in England.
If this is the
case, "Contact of business association leaders and prominent individual congressmen would be tantamount to contact with a party organization rather than a free agent.
' 4 1
But if the business community has its linkage to Congress, so
does the Left.
There are at present six PS and five PC senators among
the total of forty-five senators (not counting independents or small
parties tied to the Left).
One PC senator was a former director of the
party paper, El Siglo; two others were former union directors, and all
view their role as representing the worker and marginal groups.
Just
as the Right attempts to chair the standing committees of Finance or
Economy and Commerce,
the Left shows
lation, or Public Health.
interest in Labor and Social Legis-
Colonization of the presidencies of different
committees and linkages to individual congressmen insure access to competing interests, "permitting a balance of forces, more facts, and resolution with greater clarity.I
4 2
Before 1925, senators were elected by provinces.
Alessandri
President
Palma attempted to make the Senate less provincial and more
41
T2apia V~ld~s,
b1f
op.
cit.,
p.
41.
this struicture in conflict management,
tt~ItSoti
Random House1-
For a description of the place
see Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel
he Legislative Process in the United States (New York:
966), p. II.
22
national in outlook, but was forced
to accept a compromise solution
whereby senators are now elected by a group of provinces (arupacion)
directly by the people.
As in the United States, senators maintain
frequent contact with their agrupaci-n
and have on occasion voted
against their party in preference to regional
interests.
"Pork" com-
mittees like Public Works and Government are popular among senators,
because they control funds for roads and water which directly involve
the electoral interests of each congressman.
Many senators find regional election and representation a useful mechanism for reconciling conflict between societal and regional
interests.
One senator argues"
in my view, /it/ is the escape
valve (valvula de escape) which preserves our system.
With our uni-
tary system which tends toward control from Santiago, and at the same
time, regions with such diverse characteristics and needs, direct representation by agrupacion is necessary."
Yet many senators do not share
this view; they find "errand boy" tasks distasteful, concern for reelection degrading, and prefer to see the Senate as representing the
"national
interest," at times as a brake (freno) on the Chamber.
They
contend that the objective of partial election of senators is to encourage a national versus regional view on issues, and certain senators
would favor disallowing re-election for this purpose.
Some of this
latter group of senators find re-election difficult, and others gravitate to "safe" districts.
But some are re-elected consistently because
they so admirably perform this reconciliatory role.
Therein lies the
importance of the form which the Senate interest articulation and
23
conflict resolution functions take.
It is the meshing of each level--
group, region, and nation--which aids national integration and political
system persistence.
One senator sums it up nicely:
On the one hand is the problem of national disintegration
.
*
.
Each region tries to obtain privileges, principally on
taxes........This tendency is seen primarily in the frontier
zones, and at times, one hears talk of total separation. Some
see a national senator a response to this problem. On the
other hand, there is the question of centralism /in capital
and geographically/--a trend considered adverse to our development.
If you create a national senator, this process would be
accentuated. The conclusion has always been that the existing
system is the best overall solution to both problems.
II1. Basis for Decisional
Influence
Several factors help explain the Senate's considerable influence
in the political system.
The first is the long historical development
of the institution. 4+3 At first (1812), the Senate was little more than
a legitimating body, with its members selected by the Executive.
But
by 1818, disagreements began to arise between the two powers when President O'Higgins violated the formal constitution, and the President decided
to dissolve the body in 1822.
After several subsequent changes, a Senate was set up under the
Constitution of 1833 which was to last until 1874.
The first seeds of
increasing decisional power were planted here, when member selection was
"formaiiy"' shifted from the President to provincial assemblies, and later,
i 1874, to the public.
3
(Santiago:
Although the objective of the 1833 Constitution
Luis E. Williamson Jordan, La evolucion del senado en Chile
Imprenta General Diaz, 1937), p. 21.
24
was "to establish a strong Executive independent of the pressure and
,4k
tyranny of Parliament,"
Manuel Antonio Tocornal returned from Euro-
pean travels in 1848 with a new concept of Congress' role.
His ideas
subsequently led to even greater influence for Congress with a corresponding decrease in the relative importance of its legitimizing role.
This movement culminated in the "revolution of 1891" with the establishment of a parliamentary regime which was to last until 1925.
On balance, despite all of the bad effects generally attributed to this parliamentary period,
it
should also be recognized that,
"It facilitated the development of new social groups:
class and the proletariat.
the middle
Also, it made possible the organization
of popular political parties: Workers Socialist and Communist
..
In this manner, the Parliamentary period was a magnificent civic
school
for the Chilean people
Functionally and institu-
....
tionally, presidential veto power was modified, the need for Senate approval of diplomatic appointments established, and ethical guidelines
for member activities outside Congress defined.
The evolutionary trend toward greater congressional
influence
proved difficult to reverse or overcome in 1924, when attempts were
44"Version oficial de la conferencia dictada por S. E. el Iresidente de Ia Republica, Arturo Alessandri Palma, en el Salon de Honor, de
]a Universidad de Chile, el dia viernes, 3 de Julio, 1925," which appears
th Actas~enca'rgadasdel
oficiales de estudio
las sesiones
Ia constituiJ
comision "y subcomi_slones
del .. celebradas
rojecto de por
nueva
l tica
....
----.--.
Republica
... ,..;,-........
(Santiago:
.... ,-_
_.d
Imprenta Univers'itaria, 1925), p.
98!.
5
Heise Gonzalez,
o p. cit.,
pp.
3l-82.
25
made to re-establish presidential pre-eminence.
Many of President
Alessandri Palma's proposals for stronger Executive power (for example,
the right to dissolve Congress) were rejected by the Constitu-
tional Committee which helped write the Constitution of 1925 (many
members of which were congressmen).46
Some congressional members
of the Committee (Radical, Conservative, Communist parties) actually
presented simultaneously to the public an alternative plan, which
called for substantially less change than the reform actually adopted.4 7
Even after its passage, effective reduction of Congress' decisional
role was limited by the number of congressmen who continued to serve
in 1926 versus 1924, carrying with them parliamentary traditions
and habits which reinforced decisional role persistence.
Twenty-seven
(60 percent) of the forty-five senators elected in 1926 were members of
Congress in 1924, and this carry over represents a clear linkage to
48
the Senate's influence today.
We have already touched on a second variable which gives Congress
such a strong voice in lawmaking--the presence of an opposition majority
46
"Sesiones de la subcomisio*n de reformas constitucionales,"
. A .
, op.
cit., pp. 382-88; see p. 5 of this document for list of members of the first session of La Comision Consultiva., which added members later also.
147"Fruadiidneormula disidente," Actas oficiales
.
op. cit
pp.
644-46.
Actas oficiales
4jose Guillermo Guerra,
La Constitucin de 1925 (Santiago:
ktabi.cimientos Graficos Balcells7f199,especially pages 192-94.
26
in one of the two chambers.
The traditional existence of such a major-
ity is in turn a product of several factors:
in a different year than the President;
(2)
(1) Congress is elected
the Senate is only partially
renovated and in such a way that it is difficult to win a majority;
(3) the President himself rarely wins more than a plurality (Frei
exception)
and may not run for another term;
is an
(4) even when a President
obtains a majority, many voters give their support only to prevent a
less desirable candidate from being elected.
Under these circumstances,
the next congressional election is viewed as a more accurate reflection
of the President's "real"
support. 4 9
Public opinion also appears to provide a third base in support
of Congress' demands for a powerful voice in the policy process.
In
January 1965, Eduardo Hamuy asked a random sample of Santiago residents
(just after Frei's presidential
election and before the March 1965 con-
gressional election, a time when the President's support was probably
at its apex),
"Returning
to the subject of the actual
Government,
let us
suppose that Frei cannot govern because Congress obstructs his work.
Would you be in favor of dissolving Congress so that the Government could
complete its program, or would you be in favor of waiting until the parliamentary elections of 1969 in order to obtain a favorable Congress?"
Table 5 indicates that although 67.1 percent of the sample recognized that a conflict existed between the President and Congress, and 73
4
9For example,
President Frei obtained a majority of the popular
votes in the 1961+ presidential election, but many voters supported him
only in preference to Socialist candidate Salvador Allende.
-lw
27
Table 5.
Santiago Survey Sample
President Frei vs. Congress
January 1965
I.
Dissolve Congress
2. Wait until 1969 elections
3. President renounce
4.
Number
Percent
205
36.8o
250
44.9
18
3.2
1.3
Plebiscite
5. Unite, combine w/o parties
.7
6, Pressure Congress
7. Other or in error
16
8. Not known,
57
Total
not answer
557
2.9
I0.2
100.0%
Source: These data were generously provided by Eduardo Hamuy
from his January 1965 print-out sheets, question 6Y, Universidad de
Chile, Facultad de ciencias Economicas-Centro de Estudias Socio-Economico's
study.
28
Table 6.
Profession/Activity
Lawyer
Doctor
Bus inessman
Civil engineer
Newspaperman
Senate Members Background
1965-69 Vs. 1933-37
1933-37
N
21
2
4
Senate
%
46.8
4.6
9.0
1965-69
N
Senate
21
2
3
46.3
4.4
6.8
4.5
2.2
-
-
2
-
-
Worker
3
6.6
Chemical engineer
Accountant
Engineer
Agronomy engineer
Professor
-
-
1
2
1
-
-
2
2.2
4.5
2
4.4
-
-
-
-
1
2.2
-
-
2
2
4.5
4.5
-
-
Agriculturist
Ex-mil itary
(6
13.2)
4.4)
(2
1
2.2
1
3
6.8
(T2
4.4)
-
-
Writer
-
Industrialist
Wi nemaker
Architect
Ex-pol iceman
No data
Total
-
2.2
2.2
-
-
1
1
2.2
-
-
2.2
1
2.2
45
100.0
(slight rounding to equal 100.0%)
Source:
4.5
Senate Office of Information 1966 File.
45
100.0
29
percent felt the President was correct versus 12 percent for Congress
(based on other questions in the survey), only 36.8 percent favored
dissolving Congress as the solution; 4+4.9 percent preferred to wait
until the 1969 Congressional elections, and only ],3 .percent favored
a plebiscite.
Even when social class is controlled, the variation in
attitudes is relatively similar.
One may conclude that although the
vast majority in this sample supported the President over this conflict,
and at this point in time, the majority was not prepared to undercut
Congress' constitutionally guaranteed decision-making role by opting
for dissolution or a plebiscite.
The public's reluctance to support dissolution may be due, in
part, to Congress' demonstrated capacity to change.
One measure is the
career background of the Senate membership in 1965 versus 1933 (see
Table 6).
In 1933, ten (22 percent) of the senators were ex-military
men or rural representatives.
But in 1965,
this representation had
dropped to two (4.5 percent,) in response to greater urbanization,
re-
duction of corrupt electoral practices, and civilian predominance in
political
life.
Correspondingly, career backgrounds of senators to-
taled fifteen different types in 1965 versus eleven in 1933, representing a wider spectrum and reflecting Chile's economic and political
development during this period.
Polsby has argued that a political system is better able to
utherltatively make decisions if
50
it
is institutionalized.
50
Hence,
an
Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House
of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. l,
p. 14k.
30
organizational package of member stability, and informal norms of Chamber-Senate apprenticeship provide the Chilean Senate with a fourth base
of influence.
Table 7 shows that of forty-five present members, thirty-
one have served previously in the Chamber (eighteen of twenty-five in
1961, thirteen of twenty in 1965 or after).
Of those originally elected
in 1961 and 1965, thirty-five (78 percent) were Deputies before, and
only three senators have renounced to accept other positions (President,
Ambassadors to the United States and Argentina).
This pattern has
existed for more than thirty-five years (see Table 8).
Not only do a high percentage of the 1968 Senators have previous
Chamber experience, but they also frequently represent the same district
repeatedly while in the Chamber.
Their Chamber district often forms a
part of their agrupacion (group of provinces) once in the Senate, and
they generally continue to represent it there.
to the United States system.
This pattern is similar
Thirty-four of the thirty-five senators
who previously served in the Chamber represented the same district all
during their period there.
For twenty-six (74 percent),
their Chamber
district formed a part of the same agrupacion they represented once in
the Senate.
The most typical Chamber-Senate career (see Table 9)
totals
nineteen years (nine in the Chamber and ten in the Senate), and a mean
for the total
1968 Senate sample is seventeen years (see Table 10).
This Chamber apprenticeship and district stability enables the senator
to acquire knowledge,
ski lls,
and local contacts necessary for an influ-
ential legislative career.
The Senate's capacity for a lawmaking role is further enhanced
by the support of a highly competent staff (see Table l l),
which compares
31
Table 7. 1968 Senators with Prior Service
in the Chamber of Deputies
Term
PC
PS
1961-69
3
2
-
1
1965-73
2
1
-
7
Total
5
3
-
8
Source:
ject Fi les.
PADENA
PDC
VNP
I
PR
PN
TotalI
1
6
4
18
-
-
3
-
13
1
1
9
4
31
Compiled from Library of Congress Biographical Date Pro-
Table 8.
Institutionalization of Congress
Senate
Chamber
Year
1930-32
1933-37
1937-41
1941-45
1945-49
1949-53
1953-57
1957-61
1961-65
Total No.
NFC =
AOPD
Year
% (N)
%
(N)
%
(N)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
141
145
156
150
150
152
33
4
3
5
2
1
51
47
36
71
69
90
77
147
39
58
1
3
1
Ic
1
147
54
79
-
-
1957-65
148
59
88
-
-
1961-69
25
46
46
6o
5
4c
8
1
1933-37
1933-41
1937-45
1941-49
1945-53
1949-57
1953-61
Total No.
AOPb
NFCa
%
(N)
%
(N)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
27
27
28
22
29
23
41
71
71
68
83
74
11
19
20
15
24
17
4
7
7
3
4
1
2
2
1d
1d
25
60
15
-
-
25
84
21
-
-
21
72
15
% (N)
5
1d
aNFC stands for number former congressmen.
bAOP stands for accept other post.
c Became senator in mid-term.
d Became President of Chile,
Noteand to deaths,
Different numbers correspond to change in numbers of members over time,
etc., which cause other by-elections.
Source: Compiled from data in Guillermo Bruna Contreras, Estatuto de ]a profesion
Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1963, memoria de prueba), pp. 19-25.
parlamentaria (Santiago:
w
N3
33
Table 9.
Typical Congressional Career
1968 Senate
Chamber
Senate
Total
Prov.
Yrs.
Agrup.
IOa
17a
8
8
5a
7a
16
16
24
24
6a
4a
21a
la
17a
10
16
12
20
12
3a
2a
8a
6a
7a
16
8
16
8
8
26
24
28
28
20
23a
24a
12
8
9a
9a
8
8
20
16
9a
8
5a
8
16
Christian-Democrats
11.
Reyes
12. Palma
13. Musalem
14. Fuentealbaa
15. Gumucio
16. Pablo
7a
22a
7a
4a
7a
17a
16
8
12
8
8
4
4a
2a
4a
8a
4a
7a
8
8
8
8
8
8
24
16
20
16
16
12
Socialist Party
17. Rodrfguez
18. Altamirano
19. S. CorbaIanb
7a
22a
17a
4
4
8
9a
4a
5a
16
8
6
20
12
14
6a
4
4
4a
2a
8
8
12
12
10
19
Name
NationalParl
1. Bulnes
2. Curti
Radical Party
3. Bossay
4. Mirandaa
5. Duran
6. Juliet
7. Enriquez
Independent
8. Sepu Iveda
9. Von Mbhlenbrock
10
Natl. Vang. People
10. Castro
Communist Party
Teitelboim
20.
21. Campusano
Career Total
7a
9
Yrs.
Years
aAlso president or secretary-general of his party.
bDied in 1967 and replaced by wife in off-year election.
Table 10.
Year
Length of Congressional Career
Senate--1 953-65a
I
PN
PR
MNI
AGL
UNI
9
25
4
15
2
8
4
9
1
-
-
8
-
-
8
18
5
28
3
-
-
12
-
-
6
22
6
22
PDC
PADENA
VNP
PS
1
-
4
16
PC
Total
1953
No.
Yrs.
13
25
17
1957
No.
Yrs.
1
-
-
15
3
-
20
9
-
1961
No.
Yrs.
-
-
3
2
-
15
14
-
1
16
4
3
25
20
14
19
2
2
12
20
15
1965
No.
Yrs.
-
3
-
-
-
-
24
-
-
-
1
16
1
1
-
15
8
-
10
aBy year of election.
bMean career for 1961-65 is
Note:
17.
Abbreviations not noted elsewhere are:
MNI--National Movement for Ibanez
AGL--Agrarian Labor
UNI--Independent National Union
4:-
35
Senate Staff Not Including Personal
Secretaries of Senators
1967
Table 11.
Men
Position
of Senate
Personnel of Sec.
Office of Information
Editing Personnel
Women
Tota l
23
23
6
3
9
19
2
21
Treasurer
2
2
Edecan
I
I
Auxiliary Services
1
6
5
Service Aids
56
56
Dining Room
14
14
Other Positions
2
6
8
Contracted Personnel
3
2
5
28
4
32
Building
2
Chefs
2
Total
157
23
17.
CHAMBER
166
24
190
POSITIONS VACANT
26
1
27
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
28
28
56
9
6
15
HEALTH SERVICES
Source:
Senate Office of Information 1967 File.
36
favorably with the staff available to the American Congress.
tors Gonzalez Madariaga (PR)
and Castro (VNP)
51
Sena-
give testimony to their
reliance on the Senate staff:
The Senate knows how much we value the collaboration of
all the staff of the Senate, because they are our greatest
allies in the legislative action that Congress achieves.
Practically nothing can be done without the aid of all the
personnel of the Secretary .
.
. their collaboration through
their experience, which has been acquired over a long period
of work, at times, leads us to a common solution...*52
We have always maintained that it
is the staff of Con-
gress . . . to a great extent that carries on the democratic
tradition .
. they are the ones who show the way to those
.
Deputies and Senators who arrive for the first time to Congress .
.
. on their stability and good judgment depends to
a great extent the efficiency and capacity to work of Congress. 53
Except for personal secretaries, the Senate staff is filled through
competitive public examinations.
Advancement is based on demonstrated
ability and a long period of apprenticeship (escalafon).5 4
Two of the
5 1 Numerically,
the Senate staff is modest by American standards. But when appropriate adjustments are made for the fact that
Chile has only nine million people versus two hundred million, and
that legislation is not so complex as in the more highly industrialized U.S. system, the proportionate impact of each staff member may
be equal to or even greater than that of a staff member in the U.S.
Senate.
52Diario
November 2, 1960,
de sesiones del senado, leg. extro., Sesion 12a,
p. 643.
Diario de sesiones del senado. leg. extro.,
December 6, 1961, p. 1009.
5hTapia Valds, op.t
pp. 32-3.
Sesion 22a,
37
most important components of the Senate staff are the standing committee secretaries, and the Office of Information (OIS).
Standing
committee secretaries are an important driving force in a system
where the principal work is done in committees.
They are the ones
who really study the laws, and help inform the senators of their
contents.
They generally serve on the same committee for years, ac-
quiring a high level of expertise and specialization in their committee's subject matter.
One senator exclaims, "The secretaries
are extremely important.
They are highly efficient, and are the pro-
duct of many years of experience in the Senate .
tradition of the Senate.
. they are the
I ask my friends--that is how we regard
them--for their opinion on a project.
all.
.
That doesn't bother me at
After all, many were in the same law classes, and we have
been friends for years
...
i
A typical career is that of Jorge A. Tapia Valdes, secretary
of Constitution, LegislatJon, and Justice.
Graduating in law in 1960,
and author of the book, La tecnica legislativa, Tapia began in the
Senate in 1954.
After more than twelve years of apprenticeship, he
became the secretary of his committee.
55
Similarly,
Rafael Eyza-
guirre Echeverria received his law degree in 1947, became a secretary
of Constitution, Legislation, and Justice after eighteen years in
1962, and presently is working on the Special Committe on Constitution~al Reform.
55
Eyzaguirre is also a professor of constitutional
Diccionario biografico de Chile--decima tercera ed.
Empresa Per iodisticaChite, 1967), p. 1533.
(Santia:
38
6
law at the University of Chile.5
The secretaries and their aids are supplemented by the
OIS.
Also chosen by competitive examination, OIS carries out val-
uable in-depth studies for senators and secretaries of standing
committees in a totally non-partisan manner, as well as publishing
numerous bulletins of information for the public media 5 7 (see Table
12).
The Senate staff demonstrates a
high degree of adaptabil-
ity to the periodic increase and decrease of demands made on it.
As a rule, secretaries and their aids work only on one or two standing committees.
But, some committees work more than others, and
some hardly at all.
Therefore, in times of stress (e.g., 1968
Salary Readjustment Bill), or in the absence of a secretary, a temporary shift of secretaries or aids will take place to augment the
capacity of a committee (e.g.,
Finance).
Work hours follow a simi-
lar cycle, increasing in response to demands made on the system.
Standing committees can and do call on experts for testimony and
assessment.
Senators also have a personal staff, but it is modest
by United States standards (the size varies by senator).
This gap
is overcome in part by calling on party experts to help keep them
informed on important bills. 5 8
56 Ibid.1p. 484.
5 7 "Disposiciones
legales y labor
58
.
.
.,"
op. cit.t
See Chapter I I for a discussion of the relationship be-
tween senators and their respective national party leadership.
Table 12.
Senate-Office of Information Work for Period 1964-68
1967-68 1968
Ext.a Reg.a
1964
1965
1966
1967
1. Consultations
Sent out
Reports received
740
158
1,017
288
1,o049
356
967
316
621
204
318
126
Commun i cat ions
Sent out
Received
116
165
342
125
302
26-1
307
2+4
211
271
126
166
Type of Work
2.
3. Bulletins
Published
Press information
Parliamentary information
Translations
Economic reports
29
13
6
40
34
10
52
29
17
45
34
22
1
4
57
65
28
1
65
71
23
6
40
17
11
20
12
4
3
2
l
-
General information
2
-
Statistical information
3
4
375
525
461
355
252
232
1,885
2,311
1,834
1,572
1,273
974
1,983
217
1,165
433
26
81
61
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2,217
201
390
954
136
74
462
1,835
270
731
536
113
48
137
1,040
223
217
414
94
11
81
593
76
176
239
63
18
21
4.
Documents Loaded
5.
Communications Sent
6. Communications Received
Messages
From Chamber
From Ministries
From Controller et. al.
Requests of concern
Other contacts
For idea of trend, combine last two (some
aRegular and extraordinary sessions.
overlap with 1967).
Source: Senate Office of Information (Compiled from Annual Work Reports).
wJ
40
The existence of member stability, staff support, and norms
which encourage work and specialization contrasts sharply with most
other Latin American legislatures.
For example, Payne's data on the
Colombian Congress show that member stability is
members can be and are replaced by alternates,
low.
59
Regular
and only twenty-five
percent return for a consecutive term (versus seventy-eight percent
for the Chilean Senate).
Absenteeism is high.
Committees seldom
meet., and closed door sessions are rare (normal for Chilean Senate).
Columbian legislators are virtually without research or technical
assistance, and have no personal offices or secretaries (Chilean
senators do).
A senator's personal
ties (economic and kinship) and past
experience should not be underestimated as a fifth source of lawmaking influence.
Although the practice has been the subject of
frequent debate, it is still quite legal for a congressman to be a
director of a private company or bank as long as it does not have a
contract directly with the state.6
0
If a congressman is at the same
time a director in an important private company or bank, a potentially
59
See Chapter XI of James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in
Colombia (New Haven and London- Yale University Press, 1968).
6
oSee Guillermo Guerra,
cit., pp. 188-96, for his views
in 1924 and 1929; and Ada I. Manriquez G., El Senado en Chile (Santia:
Universitaria S.A., 1965), p. 176, for a 1965 position. Editorial
The PDC has,
as part of their constitutional reform project
(passed the Chamber and is still
in committee in the Senate), taken
a position against the continuation of this linkage--if it ever passes,
some of their own members will have to order their personal affairs.
P.
41
powerful linkage between public and private careers is created which
may be useful
in initiating or modifying proposed legislation.
Further-
more, if a congressman has acquired through service in the Executive
Branch, knowledge of the ins and outs of a ministry, personal loyalties,
or expertise,
a similar base is created.
A study of the directors and top ten stockholders of the top two
hundred sociedades anonimas, top twenty-five insurance companies, and
all domestic banks at the end of 1966,
exists. 6 1
First,
group studied.
shows clearly that career overlap
it is necessary to make clear the importance of the
For example, the top ten stockholders of the top one
hundred and ninety-three sociedades anonimas
(seven are foreign), or
3/10 of one percent of all sociedades anonimas stockholders, own 62.3
percent
of all sociedades anonimas value (valor patrimonial).
Of the
total number of directors of the top one hundred and ninety-three, 28
percent are also stockholders
in these companies, which represents a per-
sonal ownership of 6.4 percent of the value of all sociedades annimas.
If a person is a director or director-stockholder in one of these top
193 companies, he is a potentially influential
community.
individual
in the economic
If he is also horizontally linked to institutions such as the
top insurance companies and banks, this potential
is multiplied if
is still greater.
one is also such in more than one of the t
It
group.
Add
to this the position of congressman at the same time, and an immense
potential
61
for incluence is
Forthcoming.
created.
It
is
multiplied still
further if
Raw data were provided by the Superintendencia
de
Cmpanas de Seguros, Sociedades Anonlimas y Bolsas de Comercio, and
by the Superintendencia del Bancos for their most recent complete files.
1967 should be available shortly.
42
the congressman also happens to sit regularly on one of the two most
important standing committees
in either house (for example, Finance).
Examination of relevant data (see Table 13)
indicates that
twenty percent (nine) of all senators in 1966 were directors or director-stockholders in the top group mentioned above.
If we add to
this participation in any one of the sociedades anc#nimas, insurance
companies, or banks existing at the end of 1966, the number increases
to twenty-seven percent (twelve).
The respective percentages and
numbers for the Chamber are seven-tenths of one percent (one) and five
percent (seven).
At least two secretaries of Senate standing com-
mittees are also directors or director-stockholders in several companies--one in the same company as a senator.
In one case, two sen-
ators of opposing political parties (ideologically) are directors on
the same company.
62
IV.
It
Conclusion
is evident from this discussion that the Senate exercises
a significant level of influence in the Chilean political system.
have shown that the Senate:
We
(1) initiates its own bills, increases
and decreases the annual budget, helps to shape Executive public policy proposals, and delays, alters, or defeats Executive legislation-despite the President's extraordinary urgency power; (2) aggressively
scrutinizes Administration policy and bureaucratic performance through
2For possible implications of these ties, see Ricardo Lagos
E., La concentracion del poder economico--su teoria realidad chilena
ed. 5 (Santiago:
Editorial del Pacifico, S.A., 1965), pp. 168 ff.
Table 13.
1966 Senators and Deputies Who Are Also Directors or Director-Stockholders
in Top Group of 193/25/All or All Groupa by Party
Top Group
PC
PS
PDC
All Group
PR
PN
Total
(%)
PC
PS
PDC
PR
PN
Total
(/)
Senators
-
1
-
3
5
9
(20)
-
2
-
5
5
12
(27)
Deputies
.
.
.
.
1
1
(.7)
-
-
4
2
1
7
(5)
Total
-
1
-
3
6
(6)
-
2
4
7
6
19
(10)
10
aNot including congressmen who were only stockholders or formerly associated as
above during their terms.
Independent Senators are grouped with party that supports them in elections.
Seguros,
Source: Compiled from raw data provided by the Superintendencia de Compa'isd
Sociedades Anonimas y Bolsas de Comercio and by the Superintendencia de Bancos.
44
the application of 01S prerogatives (Article Five of Law 13.609)
and reliance on its staff studies,
use of standing committee sources
of information and control, floor debates and Chamber committee investigations; (3) performs a patronage function by passing asuntos
de gracia; and (4) articulates interests and resolves conflict
through member representation or participation on key standing committees, and by meshing of group, regional and national interests.
We have suggested that the Senate's decisional role is
based on:
(1) its long evolutionary historical development which
included a period of parliamentary government (1891-1925);
(2) the
presence of an opposition majority in one of the two congressional
chambers (usually the Senate), which in turn results from off-year
election of senators versus the President, and from partial renovation; (3) public support for a democratic system which includes a
Congress independent of the Executive; (4) an organizational package
of member stability, and informal norms of Chamber-Senate apprenticeship and "hardwork" in standing committees comparable to the United
States Senate; and (5) possibly personal links (economic and kinship)
of Congressmen.