262
PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW
preventthe amountof destructionthatoccurred. This book is simply
anotherdisaster,but nottraceableto theJapanese.
GERALDE. WHEELER
SanJosiStateUniversity
TheUnitedStatesand theBerlinBlockade,1948-1949: A StudyinCrisisDeciof CaliforniaPress,
By AviSHLAIM.
sion-Making.
(Berkeley,University
1983. xiii + 463 pp. $38)
This is notjust anotherbook on the Berlinblockade and airlift.It is a
case studyin crisisdecision-making,
based on Americandata produced
by the Berlin crisisof 1948-1949, whichis analyzed in accord witha
theoretical,dynamic,three-stagemodel of a crisis developed by Michael Brecher,thedirectorofan InternationalCrisisBehaviorProjectat
McGill University.
The authorbeginswitha summaryofBrecher'smodel,notesthatthe
structureof his own book "is dictatedbythe analyticaldivisionofcrisis
intothreeperiods" (p. 9), and proceeds - afteran introductory
historical chapteron the "Origins of the Berlin Crisis"- throughthreecrisis
periods. The firsthe labels the precrisiswhichran fromthe day the
RussianswalkedoutoftheAllied ControlCouncilon March20, 1948, to
the Russian impositionof a fullblockade on Berlin on June 24, 1948.
The second crisisextendsfromJune24 toJuly22 whenthe U.S. rejected
General Lucius Clay's proposal to forcean armed convoyinto Berlin
and decided insteadto expand the airlift.The postcrisisran fromJuly
22, 1948 to May 5, 1949, whenthe Russiansagreed to liftthe blockade
and the Americansconsented to a meetingof the Council of Foreign
Ministersto discussBerlinand the futureof Germany.
Discussionof each of the crisesis marked by a listof Americandecisions during the period; a descriptionof the "psychologicalenvironment,"the "attitudinalprismsand images" (p. 45 and passim),of the
chief decision-makers(Harry Truman, George C. Marshall, Lucius
detailed,and sometimestediClay,and laterDean Acheson); a lengthy,
ous descriptionof various phases in the "decision flow,"followedby a
sectiondividedintofindings,
crisiscomponents(environmental
change,
threatto basic values, probabilityof war,time pressure),and coping
mechanisms(informationprocessing,consultation,decisional forums,
and alternatives:searchand evaluation).There is a concludingchapter
whichonce again discussesthe psychologicalenvironmentforcrisisbehaviorand coping: processes and mechanisms(information,consultation,decisionalforums,alternatives:searchand evaluation).
This is all verysymmetrical,
orderly,and scientific.The materialoftenappears to be forced,thereisconsiderablerepetition,thereis a great
ReviewsofBooks
263
deal of detail to master,and -other than the case studyof Brecher's
model- thereis nothinghere thatis not already familiarto those who
have keptcurrenton the literatureon postwarGermanyand Berlin.
The book has a useful bibliographyof pertinentarchivalmaterials,
publisheddocuments,oral histories,and books and articles.It does not
include (perhaps because it appeared too late) Harry R. Borowski'sA
AirPowerand Containment
Korea(Westport,
HollowThreat:Strategic
before
Conn., 1982), whichcontains a discussionof the Berlin crisisand the
decisionofthe U.S. to move B-29s to Europe.
JOHN GIMBEL
Humboldt
StateUniversity
ForeignRelationsof theUnitedStates,1952-1954. Vol. XIII: Indochina,
and NEAL H. PETERSEN.
Parts 1 & 2. Edited byJOHNP. GLENNON
(U. S.
Publications
of
State
9210, 9211. Washington,D.C., U.S.
Department
GovernmentPrintingOffice,1982.,xix + 2497 pp. $35.)
Reading these documentswill both enlightenand depress scholars.
Togetherwithcompanion materialson the Geneva Conferencein volume sixteenofthisseries,theyprovidethe mostcomprehensiveaccount
of the American commitmentin Vietnam as that conflictdeepened.
What theyrevealis depressing,not simplybecause it prefiguresthe debates and disastersof the Vietnam war years,but ratherbecause it
pointsup enduringweaknessesin the Americansystemof foreignpolicydecision-making.
This volume putsbeforethe readerwhatperhaps remainsas thecentral puzzle about Vietnam: How could Washingtonrepeatedlydeepen
were
itscommitmenttherewhenmilitarydefeatand politicalinstability
in
It
to
seen?
traces
massive
detail
the
evolution
of
Amerbe
everywhere
ican policyfromthefinalyearofthe HarryS. Truman administrationto
the firstofthe Ngo Dinh Diem regime.During that1952-1954 period,
WashingtonmovedfromlimitedsupportforFrenchmilitaryoperations
through rejection of massive militaryinterventionto assumptionof
quasicolonial overlordshipof South Vietnam. The editors have organized the documentsaround those threedevelopments.Materialsconcerningthe first,dealing with 1952 and 1953, occupy approximatelya
quarterof the volume.They make drearyreadingbecause no one at or
near the top heeded warningscoming fromIndochina. One particularly insightful1953 analysis by the last American consul at Hanoi
pointedout thatitwaswrongto paythe Frenchto stayon whentheyhad
already lost the war and the confidenceof the Vietnamesepeople. Instead, both the Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations
placed greaterimportanceon continuing,ratherthan fundamentally