Turkey's security in the 20th and 21st century
dr Karol Bieniek
The Modem Turkish state has been created since 1923. After the First
World War, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and has been actually divided
between foreign powers. According to Sevres Treaty, its territories were
to remain under control of powers that won the previous conflict, and the
Turkish state was to be reduced to Istanbul and its surroundings.
However, due to the Turkish Independence War, led mainly by Mustafa
Kemal, and later Ataturk, Turks managed to successfully defeat opponents
and create, according to Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish Republic. This new
state has several internal and external problems, and a so-called security
issue was one of them. The debate about internal and external security has
become a vital part of the country's political life. This paper aims to
explain the main features of this debate and to describe how security has
been perceived in Turkey during the Cold War and afterwards.
The First Word War was to be a disaster for the Ottoman Empire.
According to the Treaty of Sevres, the envisaged Turkish State would be
reduced only to Istanbul and central and northen Anatolia. According to it,
Ottoman rule in Istanbul would be maintained, but control over the Straits
was placed under international commision in which the Ottoman
government would have only minor representation. What is more, the city
of Izmir and surrounding territory would be administered by Greece for
five years, after which, it could be attached to Greece. In eastern Anatolia,
Armenia was to be estabilished as an independent state, and a scheme of
local autonomy for the Kurds was also to be worked out by a commission
composed of Brithish, Franch and Italian delegates. Severence of Arab
provinces of Empire and recognision of so-called “special interests” of
Italy in southern Anatolia and France in Cilicia (Adana and the area to its
north-west) simply meant an end of Empire1.
The landing of Greek troops in Izmir on 15 May 1919, as well as
Italians in Antalya, while the French occupied Cilicia, along with the
simultanious occupation of the Straits by three Great Powers, resulted in
huge protests in Istnabul and local resistance movements organised in
Anatolia and coordinated by Mustafa Kemal - a most distinguished
Turkish general in the First Word War. Sent by Istanbul government to
Samsun, Mustafa Kemal was elected a chairman of the Representation
1W. Hale, Turkish foreign policy 1774- 2000, Franc Cass Publishers, London 2000, p. 45.
Comittee of an organization called “Eastern Provinces Society for the
Defence of National Rights” whose proclamation made during the
Congress in Erzurum declared that “the entire country within its
[undefined] national frontiers is an undivided whole”2. During the second
congress, the “Society for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia”
was estabilished and Mustafa Kemal who moved his headquaters to
Ankara, become a head of the goverment over the most of Anatolia, which
was effectively outside of the sultan's control.
The nationalist movement created a so-called National Pact (Misak-i
Milli) (January 28 1920) which consisted of their main aims and formed
the Ankara government which later was to be the only one recogized by
western powers. They accepted the loss of the “portions of the Ottoman
State which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority” and in
general, decided not to re-build a Turkish power in the Midde East3. On
the other hand, the Pact concluded that it would never submit to the
partition and foreign occupation of Anatolia and eastern Thrace4.
Thus, the Turkish Independence War was started. Between 1920 and
1923, a nationalist movment gathered next to Mustafa Kemal, was able to
create a new, independent Turkish State by military actions as well as by
exploiting divisions and weaknesses of the First Word War's allies. After
defeting the Greeks, whose forces were operating in Anatolia more or less
since 1920, a new peace treaty was signed on July 24, 1923 in Lausanne.
During the negotiations, firstly there were two delegations from
Turkey (one from the Istanbul government and one from the Ankara
government). Mustafa Kemal asked the Ankara government to abolish the
Sultanate in November 1922 and of the Ankara government, there was
only one representative in the Lausanne conference where a Turkish
delegation under I. Inonu - a close friend of Mustafa Kemal and forman
commander during Independence War - who was able to achive most of
the goals which were included into the National Pact.
According to the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey recovered Thrace, several
Aegean islands, a strip along the Syrian border, the Smyrna district, and
the demilitarized Zone of the Straits, which, however, was to remain
demilitarized and remained under an international commision. Turkey
2 Ibidem, p. 46.
3Ibidem, p. 47.
4 M.B Altunisik, O. Tur, Turkey, Challenges of continuity and change, London and New York 2005,
p. 13.
recovered full sovereign rights over all its territory, and foreign zones of
influence, as well as capitulations were to be abolished. Outside the Zone
of the Straits, the borders between Turkey and Greece and Turkey and
Bulgaria were to be demilitarized 30 km on both sides. No reparations
were exacted. In return, Turkey renounced all claims on former Turkish
territories outside its new boundaries and undertook to guarantee the
rights of its minorities. A separate agreement between Greece and Turkey
provided for the compulsory exchange of minorities. Unsolved issues
were the so-called Mosul issue which was to be figured out later, and the
minorieties problem which fruited in exchange of the population between
Turkey and Greece.
In spite of that, it can be said without any doubts that the Laussane
Treaty was to be a turning point in Turkey's history. A new, nation state,
with the borders like today's had been created, and now the main concern
of its regime was the estabilishing of a new order.
According to M.Altun Isik and O. Tur, the new regime had three basic
institutional foundations. The first one was to be a National Assembly
equipped by both the legislative and executive powers, and became a
crutial part of the state formation process in the early years. In 1923, after
new elections created in the war time, the assembly was replaced by a new
one in which Kemalists won a slim majority but still were able to steer the
country onto a new course after the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty;
and what is more, despite growing authoritarian tendencies of the regime,
the Assembly remained a source of political activity.
Another instrument was to be a written Constitution - after discussions
in the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal and his supportes were able to adopt a
new constitution which established a basic institutional form of the state
as a Republic. The events which took place later, such as the proclamation
of Republic on 29 October 1923 with M. Kemal as first president and I.
Inonu as prime minister, and abolition of the Caliphate (which remained
after abolishment of the Sultanate) were designed with a view to
strengthen the kemalisf s regime.
The last issue was creating a new party regime. In 1923, Mustafa
Kemal formed the People's Party (renamed as Republican People's Party Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi in 1923). After a power struggle in the mid1920s, this party was to become the only legal party until 1946 and was to
be a basic instrument of implementing Kemalisf s policy and creation of
the new state5.
It was not only the new state to be created. Collapse of the Ottoman
Empire fruited in a total shift of the ideological views over both internal
and the external issues. This shift of the views cannot be considered as
weird or unreasonable when we take a look at the situation of a new
Turkish Republic.
The newly created state strongly needed to implement peaceful foreign
policy and give up any potential territorial claims against neighbours.
When we consider the size of the Ottoman Empire, we can clearly see that
an amount of lost territories gave a potential ground for such a claims.
Another factor was to be a need of internal progess. As William Hale
claims “the new Turkish state had at last achived a degree of security and
international recognition which its Ottoman predecessor had lacked ever
since the last quarter of the eighteenth century. As a result, foreign policy
could take second place to internal reconstruction”67.
From this perespective it seems quite obvious that the main goals of
Turkey's foreign policy in the early period of her existence was to gain an
international recognition and to protect its independence. The fact that the
new state did not rule any more over the territories which couldn't be
defended and had virtually no non-Muslim minorities which foreign
powers could exploit to undermine its territorial integrity, made it easier .
It seems to be quite reasonable to say that in the period between 19231938, Turkish foreign policy was shaped mainly by M. K Ataturk himself.
Using the advantage of a charismatic personality and creating a singleparty regime, he was able to construct the theory and practice of Turkish
foreign policy. He was able not only to control but also to create an
ideological framework of Turkish foreign policy.
Ataturk's views over foreign policy, like his political views, it seems,
represented a break with the past and were directly an extension of his
domestic policy. On the other hand, it was quite obvious for him that only
with a peaceful foreign policy would Turkey be able to achive domestic
progess and implement reforms. His famous motto, “peace in home, peace
in the word”, is a good, exemplification of his views and successfully set
basic goals of Turkish foreign policy in before the Second World War.
5Ibidem, p. 15-16.
6W. Hale, Turkish foreign policy 1774- 2000...op.cit., p. 56.
7Ibidem, p. 57.
With the end of the Second World War, the world has been divided
into two hostile political blocks; one under the leadership of the USA and
the second one under the USSR. This division highly limited Turkish
abilities to choose a potential ally. On the other hand, due to its
geopolitical location, Turkey became a subject of interest both for the US
and the Soviet Union. Soon after the War had ended, the Soviet Union
implemented a highly offensive policy towards Turkey. The Soviet Union
wanted to revise the Montreux Convention and also to gain free access to
Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelle).
These claims were accompanied by several territorial claims and
generally were unacceptable for Turkish political elites that had to search
for new security conceptions. In that situation, the US, whose relations
with the Soviet Union got worse rapidly after end of Second World War,
became a natural ally. Soon after the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan were proclaimed and in April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, NATO was created. President Truman's speech about the
necessity of help for Greece and Turkey in the anti-communist struggle,
actually is considered as a beginning of the Truman Doctrine. Since 1948,
Turkey has been given almost 400 million US dollars for the
restructurization of its army8. Thus, soon after the end of the Second
World War, cooperation with the USA and NATO became the vital base
for the creation of Turkish international security, and joining this
organization became a primary aim for the Turkish political elites.
This cooperation was soon strengthened by the start of the Korean War
in 1950. Eruption of this conflict has had two basic results for the Turkish
Republic. First of all, it tightened military cooperation between Turkey
and the US as the first one to send its troops to Korea, as a part of the
United Nations contingent. Secondly, the fact that USSR was ready for a
struggle with the Western Block in such a far area as the Korean
Peninsula, was a clear signal for the Western countries that it is ready to
attack actually everywhere. This fact was an impulse for Turkey's NATO
accession, as several countries which opposed that mainly due to Turkey's
neutrality during Second World War, now changed their attitude. Finally,
Turkey became NATO's member in 1952, together with Greece.
With no doubts, these two issues were the most important in Turkey's
accession process, in the security context. First, the geostrategical position
of Turkey which made settlement of the western military bases close to
W. Hale, Turkish foreign policy 1774- 2000...op.cit., p. 116.
the USSR borders possible, was extremely important for the US. Second,
being a NATO member was a security guarantee for Turkey, and placed
this country among western states for the whole Cold War period. It was a
direct security guarantee accompanied by army restructuring and an
impulse for the whole economical system9.
Turkey's NATO accession and American expectations towards this
country made her become a regional leader, also in the security context.
Creation of the Balkan Pact on the 9'th of August 1954 was a clear
example of such policy. This agreement made together with Greece and
Yugoslavia, and strongly desired by the USA, guaranteed mutual help for
the members in case of military aggression. The Balkan Pact became a
security guarantee for Turkey, and on the other help was used by all of
NATO as a tool envisaged to cooperation with Yugoslavia, without her
direct participation in that organization10.
The Baghdad Pact was another important security initiative in the
1950's. It was signed in 1955 between Turkey and Iraq; Pakistan, Iran and
Great Britain joined later. Although it was an American initiative, the US
remained beside and were only an observer. For the US, a strong position
of the close ally, mainly the UK, was a crucial issue. The UK's strong
position on the Middle East was to guarantee stability and safe petrol
transportation by the American companies. US perceived Turkey as an
internal guarantor of the Baghdad Pact. In that period, Turkey was rather
willing to play an important role in the European security structures.
However, her engagement in that Pact strengthened her positive image
among European countries and final acceptance of Turkey as a NATO's
member - a priority for the country's security policy of that period11.
Soon the meaning of these two initiatives was to become minor.
Turkey wasn't able to build good relations with the Arab states, mainly
because Turkey created quite good relations with Israel, a harsh enemy for
the Arab countries. In the same period, Yugoslavia decided not to tighten
relations with the NATO members and together with Egypt and India,
involved herself into the Non-Aligned Movement. On the other hand, in
the context of the Cyrpus crisis, Turkey's bilateral relations with Greece
9G.S. Harris, Turkish- American Relations Since the Truman Doctrine [in:] M. Aydin, C. Erhan (edt.)
Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future, Routledge, London 2004, p. 68-69.
10H. Bagci, Turk Di$ Politikasinda 1950'li Yillar, METU Press, Ankara 2001, p. 24.
11N. Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: the History of a Distinctive
Alliance, Nova Science, New York 2003, p. 112-114.
got worse. These two factors were the direct reasons for the Balkan Pact's
failure12.
In the 1960s, the basic security guarantee for Turkey, i.e. close
relations with the USA, experienced temporary problems. As the Cyprus
conflict became a main concern of the Turkish political elite, the US
administration refused any support for Turkey in that matter because they
perceived this issue as a regional conflict between two sovereign states.
Later on, Ankara was to be also informed that in case of any military
conflict concerning Cyprus, Turkey had been forbidden to use any NATO
military equipment. Besides, in case of the Soviet threat caused by
Turkey's involvement in Cyprus, NATO was to remain neutral13.
Another issue was that after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US decided
to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkish territory. An agreement with the
Soviet government was signed without informing the Turkish authorities.
Although Turkey couldn’t protest harshly, it was clear for the country’s
political elites that an alliance with the US cannot be considered as a final
guarantor of the country’s security14.
These facts made Turkish governments search for new foreign policy
goals in the Middle East in terms of security. Unfortunately, it soon
became clear that this highly politically unstable region cannot provide
any security opportunities for Turkey. Revolution in Iran, Iraq-Iranian war
and Soviet aggression on Afghanistan proved that the Middle East was far
away from any security. Thus the US, despite several tensions in bilateral
relations, remained a crucial partner for Turkey in the whole Cold War
Period. It has to be said that in terms of security, Turkey was a key state
for several US administrations. This Islamic and democratic state was,
next to Israel, the most important ally, and a guarantor of American
influence in the Middle East. Summarizing, it has to be said that in the
Cold War period, Turkey's security was strictly linked with the USA.
Turkey was a part of the Western camp; her relations with the communist
countries were limited, especially after failure of the Balkan Pact.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union created
new possibilities for Turkey and also new potential threats. As the threat
from the united Eastern countries camp was a history, close military
relations with the US no longer needed to be a priority. Political changes
12H. Bagci, TGrk Di$ Politikasiiida...op.cit., p. 55.
13For details see: Johnson's Inonu Letter [in:] Middle East Journal, Vol 20, 1966, p. 386-393.
14N. Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship ...op.cit., p. 158.
in Turkey's surroundings made it possible for this country to search for
new opportunities of security strengthening and to play a key role in the
whole region. In that period Turkey intensified her involvement in the
Middle East and also negotiations with the European Union. On the other
hand, Turkey's importance for the US was soon to be proved again. One
can say that after the Cold War, Turkey remained a key partner for the
US, however became more independent from the US directly and more
involved into the NATO as a whole.
The end of the Cold War was followed by US intervention in Iraq
between 1990-1991. This conflict proved Turkey's importance for the US
and made her an important player in the Middle East. The Turkish
administration allowed US aircrafts to fly over Turkish territory; also US
troops were free to use military bases in Incirlik and Batman. The country
also mobilized 100,000 troops to the Iraqi border15. In fact, although
Turkey proved her importance as a US ally during the conflict, later
disappointment towards US policy become clearly visible among Turkish
society and political elites; economical losses due to international
sanctions and American- Kurdish cooperation, made Turkey uncertain and
were a serious threat in the potential security terms. All of these issues
were to be a reason for Turkish-US tensions during the second Iraqi
conflict in 2003.
In 2003, the Turkish Parliament did not agree with US troops using
Turkish territory during the Iraqi campaign. Although soon after
September 11 2001, Turkey supported the US in the struggle against
terror. The Turkish governments perceived a potential intervention in Iraq
as a threat for the stability of whole region. Also, the possibility of
Kurdish insurgency and their aims to create an independent state, were
perceived as a threat in Ankara. Thus, refusal of the Turkish government
to support US in their campaign was a turning point in bilateral relations16.
This step, made by Ankara, seriously damaged bilateral relations. Soon
after, the Turkish political elite decided to improve relations with the US
as with an ally that cannot be neglected. Later on, Turkish troops were
sent to Iraq as observers and Turkey did some steps with a view to regain
American trust.
15F.S. Larrabee, I.O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, RAND Corporation,
2003, p. 166.
16G.E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, United
States Institute of Peace Press, Washington 2008, p. 122.
Several changes in Turkey's internal policy are worth noting as they
had a particular impact on the country's foreign policy and security aims.
In 2002, a pro-Islamic party called Justice and Development Party (Adalet
ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) won parliamentary elections and created
government. This party rules Turkey until now, winning all later elections
with a majority of seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. During
AKP's rule in the 2000's, both integration with the EU and a new shape
for the policy towards the Middle East become key points in the party
programme. At that time, prime minister R.T. Erdogan's advisor, current
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, described the basic features of
foreign policy like this: “A balance between freedom and security, no
problems with our neighbors, multidimensional foreign policy, new
diplomatic discourse and harmonious diplomacy”17.
In 2000, A. Davutoglu created a conception named “Strategic Depth”
(Stratejik Derinlik). Soon it became a new doctrine in AKP's foreign
policy making. According to its author, “Strategic Depth” is based on
depth in geographical and historical meaning. The geographical one
means Turkey's connection with many geographical regions due to her
location. It does not mean a problem, rather an opportunity to be involved
actively in many regional security initiatives. This theory does not
perceive Turkey as it was in past, as a bridge between East and West.
Turkey is rather considered as a central state, with independent regional
policy. The historical depth underlines Turkey's historical background,
and perceived her as an heir of the Ottoman Empire - i.e. Turkey is
historically responsible for the whole region and should be a guardian of
its geopolitical stability and also an important player in the global
politics18. It also needs to be said that Davutoglu's conception is a clear
example of the criticism towards kemalist ideology. This broad ideology
created by Ataturk in the 1920s, makes modernization and pro-western
orientation key issues in Turkey's foreign policy. Now, a move towards
the Ottoman past is no longer perceived as an obstacle towards
modernization but as a tool in foreign policy making19.
In the meantime, in the 1990s, Turkey intensified her relations with the
European Union. This whole process began in the 1960s but just
17M. Ózcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, Ashgate, Aldershot
2008, p. 100.
18For details see: A Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik, Kiire Yayinlan, Istanbul 2001.
19A. Rabasa, F.S. Larrabee, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica
2008, p. 76.
nowadays seems to have new impetus. During almost thirty years, Turkey
had been misled and finally in the 1990s, its possible accession becomes
reality. It is worth considering that possible accession was complicated by
collapse of communism and aspirations of the new countries about joining
the EU. The EU (former EC) decided to invite these states in the first line,
this step was thought to be a “return to Europe” for those countries.
Turkey once again was misled. It was obvious that several countries from
the invited ten were not as economically developed as Turkey and the
only reason for future accession was their geographical placement. On the
other hand, economic criteria are not the only ones. According to the EU
Summit in Copenhagen 1993, political criteria are also crucial. These are
mainly: achieving a stable democracy, maintaining rule of law, respecting
human rights and protection of minorities. Even today, Turkey still has
problems with some of them.
Two more dates are significant in Turkey’s process of integration with
the EU. In 1997, the Luxemburg Summit refused to consider Turkey as a
candidate. However, two years later in Helsinki, Turkey gained a status of
candidate and was offered a pre-accession strategy, which was reflected in
the Accession Partnership Document next year during the Nice Summit.
According to that document, there were several issues which Turkey
should have changed. Mainly, they were dealing with rather political
criteria than economical ones. Turkey seems to have a big problem with
matter of human rights. Although in 2002, the death penalty was
abolished and tortures were prohibited, it is still clear that changing of the
law and change of practice are two totally different things. These reforms
were warmly welcomed by the EU but according to the Progress Report
2002, the way for fulfilling Copenhagen Criteria is still long20.
Several other problems exist. Turkey still has economical problems
like low per capita income, high inflation, low foreign investment and an
extremely high public deficit, linked with slow privatization. Also,
problems of stability for Turkish democracy takes an important part - i.e.
questions of the role of the military in policy is still open. This is without
any doubt, something which the EU won’t accept. The minorities problem
also takes place - e.g. the ELTs eyes are focused on the fate of the Kurdish
minorit. Nowadays, Turkey has made some progress like legalizing
broadcasting and private tutoring in Kurdish in 2002. However, teaching
20Details of bilateral relations of the EC/EU and Turkey see: F. Sonmezoglu, Turk Di$ politik&sinm
analizi, DR Yayinlan Istanbul 2005.
in that language is still forbidden. Despite all of these issues, there are still
some fears within the EU. If membership will happen for Turkey, because
of her rapid population growth, she will be one of the biggest members.
There are several fears about that - questions about how it will influence
the EU is still open. On the other hand, after Turkey's accession, the EU
will have borders with such states like Syria and iran. This is also a cause
of several fears, as well as accepting a member country whose majority of
citizens are Muslim. The fact that Turkey was accepted as an official
candidate country in 2004, of course is significant; but on the other hand,
there are no doubts that the process of integration will be long and
sometimes painful for both sides.
All these let us assume that Turkey wants to be seen as an important
and influential player in the region and in global policy. Without any
doubt, Turkey has an ambition to assume the status of regional power in
the area. This has somehow been achieved while several Middle Eastern
countries look after Turkey as an important strategic partner and a country
that can be helpful in the relations with EU or USA.
It seems that Turkey will be consequent in her foreign policy which is
aimed at building good bilateral relations and secure international
environment. Without any doubts, after 11 September 2001, Turkey's
strategic importance due to her geopolitical location grew, and most
probably, she will try to make a tool from it. Also, current processes in the
Middle East are a new opportunity for Turkey. Ankara tries to be active in
the Middle East, which is perceived by the AKP's governments as a
traditional region of influence. Nowadays, it is clearly obvious that
traditionally good relations with Israel are questioned - Ankara aims at the
creation of good relations with several Arab countries instead, and
supports the Palestinian issue in her rhetoric. On the other hand,
independence processes are carefully observed by Turkish administration
- it seems that in terms of security, Turkey will continue her careful
security policy.
Summarizing, one can say that Turkey's security policy moved from
neutrality to an active role in the post-Cold War period. Again after the
collapse of the USSR, Turkey had new opportunities; relations with the
US developed a new dimension, and contacts with the EU, although
highly problematic, have been intensified. During the AKP period, Ankara
became focused on neighboring regions with a view to provide stability
and security. As it was said, Arab Spring means new opportunities for
Turkey, but also makes her concerned about security in the region.
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