Rice University
Nature-Reason-Justice in Utopia and Gulliver's Travels
Author(s): Eugene R. Hammond
Source: Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, Vol. 22, No. 3, Restoration and Eighteenth
Century (Summer, 1982), pp. 445-468
Published by: Rice University
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SEL 22 (1982)
ISSN 0039 3657
Nature-Reason-Justice in
Utopia and Gulliver'sTravels
EUGENE R. HAMMOND
The "reason" whichgovernsThomas More's Utopians and Jonathan
Swift'sHouyhnhnmshas made readers veryuncomfortable.In earlier
centuries,these readers often attacked More or Swiftfor believing in
"rational" solutions to social problems. But this century'sincreasing
interestin personae and in ironyhas allowed criticsto distinguishever
more sharplybetweenthe authors,More and Swift,and the spokesmen
fortheirutopian societies,Hythlodayand Gulliver.And each timenew
weaknessesare discoveredin eitherHythlodayor Gulliver,the possibilitiesincrease that the societiestheychampion were also conceived ironically. In addition, the authors' richlydetailed descriptionsof Utopian
and Houyhnhnmlifemake thesesocietiesespeciallyvulnerableto ironic
readings,once ironyis suspected,because each detail can be scrutinized
for adequacy. Now, after years of scrutiny, Utopia and Houyhnhnmland are rarelyregarded as models of virtue. Instead, virtueis
thoughtto be located in two individuals- Cardinal Morton and Don
Pedro - who seem to have survivedthe voracious specter of irony by
makingonlybriefappearances. Cardinal Mortonin Utopia judiciously
moderates the discussion of some argumentativedinner guests. Don
Pedro in Gulliver'sTravels showsgreat generosityto a sailor (Gulliver)
who has lost his wits. We cannot, however,fromthe qualities of these
two men, determinemuch about the values implicitin the worksas a
whole unless we extrapolate recklessly.But we can and should, while
recognizing that More and Swift were playful in their portraitsof
Utopians and Houyhnhnms,locate crucial values in Utopian and Houyhnhnm "reason." In both Utopia and Gulliver'sTravels, reason is intimatelylinked with the virtueof justice, and in each, the institutional
injusticeofcontemporarysocietyis pointedlysatirizedthroughcomparison withthe impressive(if not perfect)justice of an imaginary,rational
society.
Eugene R. Hammond, Associate Professorof English at the Universityof MarylandCollege Park, is studying irony, imagination, and civic humanism in the works of
Erasmus, Thomas More, andJonathan Swift.His articleon ironyin Erasmus's Praise of
Folly and Swift'sTale of a Tub will appear in Studies in Philology in 1983.
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446
GULLI
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Book one of Utopia is often called "The Dialogue of Counsel,"'
because its principal question, the question of whetherit is possible to
give ethical counsel to a European monarch, must be considered by
readersat theend ofbook twowhentryingto decide whethertheirnewly
acquired knowledgeof the Utopian commonwealthcan be put to any
practical use. But book one could as aptly be termed "The Book of
EntrenchedInjustice."2Each timeHythlodayis encouraged by "More"
and "Giles" to become a counselor, he responds not simply with a
refusal,but withan account of some injusticeso firmlyentrenchedthat
any attempton his part to advise (or to interveneon behalf of justice)
would be summarilydismissed. He reminds "More" and "Giles" how
littlemost monarchs care about the just administrationof theirkingdoms: "They care much more how, by hook or by crook, theymay win
freshkingdomsthan how theymay administerwell what theyhave got"
(U, p. 57). He contendsthat, while kingspretenda concern forjustice
by punishingthieveswithdeath, theyin fact encourage unjust customs
whichmake thieveryinevitable:soldiersdisabled in thekings'aggressive
wars are unable lawfullyto supportthemselves;tenantsare everywhere
beggared by avariciousand idle landlords; whole townsof laborersand
farmersare dispossessedby greedywool merchantswho care only to
enclose increased pasturage for theirsheep. Summing up, Hythloday
insiststhattheinstitutionof privateproperty,whichencouragessystematic exploitationofthepoor, is itselfpowerfulenough to ensureinjustice
no matterwhat advice a king is given.
Much of Gulliver's Travels, too, is pre-eminentlyconcerned with
problemsof entrenchedinjustice.In Gulliver'sreportson Europe to the
King of Brobdingnag and to his HouyhnhnmMaster, he observesthat
courtsoflaw existnotto providejustice,but to benefittheirown officers;
that civil and religiousleaders, afterbeing chosen for venal considerations, proceed to governwith the same motives;that the rich are left
freeto gorge themselveson the fruitsof the labor of the poor; and that
membersof Parliamentconsistentlyignore theirconstituencies,"sacrificingthe publick Good to the Designs of a weak and vicious Prince, in
'J. H. Hexter,More's Utopia: The Biographyofan Idea (New York: Harper and Row,
1965), p. 99. All referencesto Utopia in this essay are to The Yale Edition of the
Complete Works of St. Thomas More, 14 vols., 1963-, vol. 4: Utopia, ed. Edward
Surtz,S. J., andJ. H. Hexter(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1965), cited in both the text
and the notes as U. All referencesto Gulliver's Travels in this essay are to The Prose
WorksofJonathan Swzjft,14 vols., ed. Herbert Davis, vol. 11: Gulliver's Travels, rev.
edn. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959), cited as GT.
2See Ed Quattrocki, "Injustice, not Councilorship: The Theme of Book One of
Utopia, " Moreana 6, no. 31-32 (November 1971): 19-28.
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EUGENE
R.
HAMMOND
447
Conjunctionwitha corruptedMinistry"(GT, p. 130). Among therulers
met or mentionedin Gulliver'sTravels, only the King of Brobdingnag
showsany concernforjustice. The passion of the Lilliputian emperoris
to reduce "the whole Empire of Blefuscu into a Province"(GT, p. 53).
The King of Laputa pursueshis absolute ambitions,when necessary,by
crushing rebels under his flyingisland (GT, p. 171). The King of
Luggnagg forces all his callers literallyto "lick the Dust before his
Footstool" (GT, p. 204), poisoningthat dust ifhe so desires. And these
fictionalkingsare all surpassed as brutal warmakersby the European
monarchs,whose campaigns are recountedby Gulliverin bloody detail.
The horridYahoos ofbook fourare linkedmorespecificallyto kingsand
ministersthan to any other men. Afternoting that most Yahoo herds
have a "rulingYahoo . . . more deformedin Body, and mischievousin
Disposition,than anyof therest"(GT, p. 262), Swiftdrilyleaves it to us
to determine "how far this might be applicable to our Courts and
Favourites, and Ministersof State" (GT, p. 263).
In both Utopia and Gulliver'sTravels,the authorspoint to numerous
injustices;but at thesame timetheyattemptto shockus intorecognizing
that these injusticeshave been cleverlyinstitutionalized.Government
officialsin bothworksshownothingbut contemptforthejustice theyare
presumed to administer. They "think . . . that all justice is only a
plebeian and low virtuewhich is far below the majestyof kings"(U, p.
199). They consider"justice" to be simplya usefulword to be employed
to lull the people into the securityof thinkingtheyare well governed.
While each king acts completely"in his own interest"(U, p. 93), his
ministerstwistthe law unconscionablyto give his actions "an outward
mask of justice" (iustitiae . . . personam, U, p. 92).3 Ignoring the
welfare of the people, and proceeding entirelyby "Mystery,Refinement,and Intrigue"(GT, p. 135), theseministersengage theircountries
in warsto givethemselvesa pretextto collect taxes, or "to stifleor divert
the Clamour of the Subjects againsttheirevil Administration"(GT, pp.
245-46). The audacitywithwhichkingsand ministerspretendtojustice
while ignoringit findsits most strikingemblem in the royal seal of the
treacherousKing of Luggnagg. The impressionon his seal is one of "A
King liftingup a lame BeggarfromtheEarth" (GT, p. 216). The King of
Luggnagg has no regard for the public welfare. And yet Gulliverdescribeshis seal withoutany resentmentor even puzzlementat itsdeception.
Gulliver'smindlessresponseto such deception is not a unique frailty.
More and Swift both indicate that, as a result of this routine and
persistentdeception, people seem to have forgottenthe truemeaning of
3See also U, pp. 71, 103, and 241.
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448
GULLI
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justice. In book one of Utopia, Hythlodaydescribes a dinner given by
Cardinal Morton, at which one of the guestsbegins "to speak punctiliouslyof the strictjustice whichwas thendealt out to thieves"(U, p.61).
Hythlodayis incensedthatthisman can so complacentlyequate law and
punishmentwith "justice." He responds: "This manner of punishing
thievesgoes farbeyondjustice and is not forthe public good" (U, p. 61).
Hythlodayuses the seeminglyredundant phrases "goes far beyondjustice" and "is notforthepublic good" in orderto remindtheman thatthe
goal of "justice"should be the "public good" and not simplytheenforcement of king-servinglaws. 4 In Gulliver's Travels, also, casual and
deceptiveuse of the term"justice" has obliteratedthe originalmeaning
of the termfrommemory.Gulliver,when he returnsforthe last timeto
England, feelshe mustdefendhimselfagainstthe charge thathe did not
claim any new land for His Majesty. He firstdescribes the typical
procedures formaking such a claim:
A Crew of Pyratesare drivenby a Stormtheyknownot whither;
at lengtha Boy discoversLand fromthe Top-mast; theygo on
Shore to rob and plunder; they see an harmless People, are
entertainedwithKindness,theygive the Countrya new Name,
theytakeformalPossessionofit forthe King, theysetup a rotten
Plank or a Stone for a Memorial, they murder two to three
Dozen of Natives, bring away a Couple more by Force for a
Sample, returnhome, and get their Pardon.
(GT, p. 294)
Having evoked thesecallous and cruel practices,Gullivermerelysayshe
has "conceived a fewScrupleswithrelationto the distributive
Justiceof
Princes upon these Occasions" (GT, p. 294). Swift,like More, uses
deliberateredundancyto showthatthe term'justice" has been emptied
ofitsmeaning. By specificallyreferringto 'Justice"as "distributive,"he
focusesour attentionon thegrotesquelyunequal "distribution"offavors
betweenthenativesand theEnglishpirates.True justice in such matters
is far fromanyone's concern.
More and Swiftsuggest,throughthe policies theyascribe to Cardinal
Mortonand the King of Brobdingnag,how some of the currentinjustice
mightbe ameliorated. But in addition theyconfrontthe problem that
the image of justice in people's minds is being systematicallydefaced.
Each createsa vividimage of a fictionalland in whichjustice is ensured
bythesocial structure(in bothUtopia and Houyhnhnmlandfactionsare
4The fact thatjustice is more oftenpretended than practiced is a recurrenttheme of
Hythloday's. See U, pp. 70, 80, 200, and 240.
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EUGENE
R.
HAMMOND
449
unknown,the laws are fewand simple, all membersof societyare cared
for,virtuousconduct is rewarded withsocial esteem, and vicious persons-including, to his dismay, Gulliver-must forfeittheir citizenship). Each takes extraordinarycare to describe his fictionalsocietyso
that it will not easilyfade fromthe reader's memory.We do not easily
forgeta societyin which men and women inspect each other before
marriage;nor do we forgetone in whichhorsesthreadneedles withtheir
hooves. Swiftwas acutely conscious that More's Utopia provided the
model forhis givinga fictionalsocietyextraordinarylife. In the prefatoryletterto Gulliver'sTravels, Gullivercomplains about his readers:
"some of themare so bold as to thinkmyBook of Travels a meer Fiction
out of mine own Brain; and have gone so far as to drop Hints, that the
Houyhnhnmsand Yahoos have no more Existencethan the Inhabitants
of Utopia" (GT, p. 8). The point,ofcourse,is thattheHouyhnhnmsand
Yahoos have fullyas much imaginativeexistence as do the Utopians.5
In the fictionalsocietiesof Utopia and Houyhnhnmland,More and
Swifthave created memorable images of simplicity,utility,fellowship,
and justice whichreadersare encouraged to compare withthe "justice"
in their own lands. Swift'sGulliver ferventlywishes that the Houyhnhnmscould come to Europe to teach "the firstPrinciplesof Honour,
Justice, Truth, Temperance, publick Spirit, Fortitude, Chastity,
Friendship,Benevolence,and Fidelity,"because onlythenames of these
virtues,he says, "are still retained among us" (GT, p. 294). More's
Hythloday,several timesin his peroration,dares his audience to compare the justice of Utopia with the presumedjustice of other lands: "I
should like anyone to be so bold as to compare thisfairness[in Utopia]
withtheso-called justiceprevalentin othernations,among which,upon
mysoul, I cannot discoverthe slightesttrace ofjustice and fairness"(U,
p. 239).
The model ofjusticewhichMore and Swifthave chosenfortheirlands
is not immediatelyobvious. Utopia and Houyhnhnmland bear little
resemblanceto themostfamousofjust societies,Plato's Republic, where
justice resultsfroma divisionof labor among those personsmostsuited
foreach kind.6They also differsignificantly
fromeach other. Because
5SeeJohnTraugott, "A Voyage to the Houyhnhnms," SR 69 (Autumn 1961), rpt. in
Swift: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Ernest Tuveson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 143-69.
6"The citywas thoughtto be just because threenatural kinds existingin it performed
each itsown function."Plato, Republic, 4. 435b, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed.
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series 71 (Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1961), p. 677. Although Utopia and Houyhnhnmland differin structure
fromPlato's Republic, theyofcourse share many traitswithit. For the parallels between
Plato's Republic and More's Utopia, see Edward Surtz, "Utopia as a Work of Literary
Art," U, pp. clvi-clix. Parallels between Plato's Republic and Swift'sHouyhnhnmland
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450
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the Houyhnhnmsare naturallyvirtuouswhile the Utopians muststruggle withrecognizablehuman frailties,much of thedescriptionofUtopia
is taken up witheducational methodsforimprovingthe citizenry.The
Utopians require a considerable array of governorswhile the Houyhnhnmsmake do withtheirquadrennial council. The Utopians have a
strictreligionwhichaids themin thepursuitofvirtue;theHouyhnhnms,
with no need for moral authority,have only a rather vague natural
religion.The Utopians have numerousneighborsand thereforerequire
a complex war policy; the Houyhnhnmsare so isolated that theyhave
neverencounteredany neighbors.But the inhabitantsof both societies
follow"nature" and "reason" religiouslyand hereinlies our clue to the
model of justice that theyrepresent.
The standardsofUtopia and Houyhnhnmlandare definedin remarkably similar terms.The Utopians "define virtueas livingaccording to
nature" (U, p. 163). The Houyhnhnms"are endowed by Nature witha
general Dispositionto all Virtues"(GT, p. 267). The Utopians believe
that a person "is followingthe guidance of nature, who . . . obeys the
dictatesofreason" (U, p. 163). The grand maxim of the Houyhnhnmsis
"to cultivateReason, and to be whollygoverned by it" (GT, p. 267).
They believe that "Nature and Reason [are] sufficientGuides for a
reasonable Animal" (GT, p. 248). The distinctivefeaturesof the terms
"nature" and "reason," as theUtopians and the Houyhnhnmsuse them,
are: 1) that nature is idealized and taken to be a reliable normative
standard; and 2) that reason is in perfectaccord with nature. These
featuresare preciselythose found in the philosophical writingsof the
Stoics, who at the same time regarded nature and reason as terms
correlativewithjustice.
Neitherreason (ratio, logos) nor nature (natura, physis)has in itself
any necessaryconnectionwithjustice, nor indeed any normativevalue.
The Greek termlogos referredto various powers of the mind, among
them speech, speculative reasoning, and intuitiveperception. Only
when qualified by the adjective orthosdid logos have unquestionable
moral overtones.Physis(nature) was mostoftenused by the Greeksas a
comprehensivetermto describethephysicalworld. To philosopherslike
Aristotleor theEpicureans, thisphysiswas chaotic and morallyneutral:
"The virtues,"as Aristotlesays,"are engenderedin us neitherbynature
(ara physei) nor yetin violationof nature (para physin); nature givesus
the capacityto receivethem(pephykosi),and thiscapacityis broughtto
maturitybyhabit."7 The Stoic cosmologywas the firstclearlyto idealize
have been discussed byJohn F. Reichert, "Plato, Swift,and the Houyhnhnms," PQ 47
(April 1968): 179-92.
7Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, 2. 1, trans. H. Rackham, The Loeb Classical Library
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962), p. 71.
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EUGENE
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nature and reason and to make both moral norms. The Stoics use the
term"nature" to refernot to the physicalworld,but to the spiritwhich,
in theiropinion, permeatesand sustainsall things.8Rejecting counterargumentsfrom Epicurean philosophers,the Stoics insistedthat this
nature (or, spiritof the world) is perfect,and theyconfinedevil to the
realm ofnon-being. Epictetusremarkscryptically:'Justas a markis not
set up in orderto be missed,so neitherdoes the natureof evil arise in the
universe."9The ethical goal of the Stoics (as expressedby Epictetus) is
therefore"to keep your moral purpose in a state of conformitywith
nature,"'0 "to learn nature and to followher.""
To followreason is, in theStoic view,preciselyequivalent to following
nature. The intimateconnection between reason and nature in Stoic
thoughtstemsfromtheirbelief in nature as a permeatingspirit. The
Stoics used severalnames interchangeablyforthisspirit;'2one of them
was reason. And since theybelieved thatthisreason existsin men as well
as in theworldas a whole, theydeterminedthata man, whentrulyusing
his reason, is perceivingthe divine reason, or nature'swill. The will, or
law, of thisideal nature is perfectjustice.13 In the Stoic view, therefore,
the exercise of reason is profoundlyethical. To use one's reason is to
acknowledgeone's neighbor'sneeds as well as one's own: "What the will
of nature is may be learned froma considerationof the pointsin which
we do not differfrom one another."''4 Marcus Aurelius includes the
ethical attribute, "love of one's neighbor," as one of the principal
8One of the interlocutorsin Cicero's De Natura Deorum quotes the demonstrationof
the Stoic Zeno that the world is indeed animate: " 'Nothing,' he says, 'that is inanimate
and irrationalcan give birthto an animate and rational being; but the worldgivesbirth
to animate and rational beings; thereforethe world is animate and rational.' " De
Natura and Academica, trans. H. Rackham, The Loeb Classical Library (New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933), p. 145.
9Encheiridion27 in Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, The Manual,
and Fragments,2 vols., trans. W. A. Oldfather,The Loeb Classical Library(New York:
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), 2:507.
l Enchemdion 13, Loeb 2:493.
l Enchezridion 49, Loeb 2:533.
"2Thesenames include nature, God, Zeus, creativefire(pneuma), destiny,order, and
many others. "Stoici dicunt non esse nisi unum deum et unam eandemque potestatem,
quae pro ratione officiorumvariis nominibus appelatur." Servius, ad Verg. Georgica
1.5, fragment1070, in Hans von Arnim, ed., Stoicorum VeterumFragmenta, 4 vols.
(Lipsiae: B. G. Teubneri, 1905), 2:313. Cited by E. Vernon Arnold, Roman Stoiclsm
(New York: The Humanities Press, 1958), p. 221n.
13Ciceroprefaces his discussionofJusticein De Legibus with the words, "I shall seek
the root of Justice in Nature, under whose guidance our whole discussion must be
conducted" (1.6.20). De Re Publica and De Legibus, trans. Clinton Walker Keyes, The
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), p. 318.
'4Encheiridion 26, Loeb 2:505.
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attributesof the rational soul. And he concludes, "rightreason differs
not at all fromjustice."'5
The Stoic attitudetowardnature and reason has had a lastingappeal
to WesternChristians.The thoughtof several early Church fathersOrigen, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria-is permeated as much by
Stoic as by Christian ideas. Thomas Aquinas appeals repeatedly to
nature and to reason. With only two significantmodifications (he
regards the spiritof nature as an agent of the Christian God; and he
explains the corruptionof human nature not in terms of individual
failuresofthemoral will,but in termsofweaknessdue to originalsin), he
can be said to have integratedthe Stoic attitude toward nature and
reason into orthodox Christianthought.'6
Christianshave always feltcompelled to criticizethe Stoics fortheir
even when borrowingtheirideas. More and Swiftwere
self-sufficiency,
no exceptions. More calls the Stoics "factitious wisemen" (facticios
sapientes) in De TristitiaChrzsti,'7but in his Dialogue of Comfort,he
says that the writingsof the pagan philosophers,while they "are not
to be taken for our phisicians," nevertheless"some good
suffycyent
druggeshaue theyyetin theirshops / forwhich theymay be suffridto
dwell among our poticaryes."''8Similarly,Swiftlaughs that "the Stoical
Scheme of supplyingour Wants, by lopping off our Desires; is like
cuttingoffour Feet when we want Shoes."'19And he questionsin one of
hissermonswhethertheStoic idea thatvirtueis itsown rewardis not "too
abstractedto become an universalinfluencingprinciplein the world."20
recommendsthata
But in hisLetterto a Young Gentlemanhe forcefully
youngdivinemake the worksof the heathen philosophers"a considerable Part ofyourStudy."'I And whenconsolingStella on a lifewell spent,
he stoically reminds her that her recollected virtue should "shoot a
radiant Dart, / To shine throughLife's declining Part."22
More's Utopians, then, are followinga long-standing,and not necessarilyun-Christiantraditionwhenthey,like the Stoics,"definevirtueas
livingaccording to nature" (U, p. 163), and when theycite nature as
15Meditations11.1, in WhitneyJ.Oates, The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers(New
York: Random House, 1940), p. 571.
16"Treatiseon Law," in The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, 3 vols.,
trans. Fathersof the EnglishDominican Province(New York: Benziger Brothers,1947),
1:993-1161.
"Complete Works, 14, pt. 1, ed. Claience Miller, p. 243.
"Complete Works, 12, ed. L. L. Martz and F. Manley, p. 11.
19"Thoughtson Various Subjects," Prose Works, 1:244.
20Prose Works, 9:244.
21Prose Works, 9:74.
22ThePoems ofJonathanSwift,ed. Harold Williams, 2nd edn., 3 vols. (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1958), 2:764.
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EUGENE
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their authorityfor living simply,for pursuing pleasure, for choosing
theirreligion,and forcolonizingforeignlands. The Utopian regardfor
nature is a regard for nature as the Stoics saw it, for an all-good,
creative, and sustainingdeitywhich embodies the laws of nature, and
thus makes plain the duties of man.23 The Utopians show no special
reverenceformere physical"nature." They divide theirland fromthe
mainland by digging up the connectingisthmus. They transplantan
entireforestto a sitemore economicallyconvenient.They improvetheir
"naturallybarrensoil . . . byartand industry"(U, p. 179).24 Usingone's
reason to improvephysicalnature is regarded as honoringthe spiritof
nature which reason follows.
The Utopian eagernessto improveupon physicalnature extendseven
to the realm of livingbeings. For example, theydevelop an incubation
method for hatching chickenswhich has the amusing consequence of
chicks waddling afterthe human beings theyregard as theirmothers.
T. S. Dorsch has called thispractice of incubation "unnatural,"25and
he interpretsitsinclusionas a clue fromMore that the Utopians are not
consistentin applying theirprinciple of adherence to nature. But the
Utopians are not committedto an unreconstructednature. They follow
the law of nature which calls for the common good. If more efficient
chicken production enhances the common good, then incubation is
"natural" in the Utopian sense. Similarly,the primaryunit of Utopian
society is the family,26but the family is not rigidlydetermined by
physical fatherhoodand motherhood. If a Utopian mother dies or is
sickly,her child is nursedby a volunteerwho is kind enough to take the
place ofthemother,and henceforth"the child who is thusfosteredlooks
on his nurse as his natural mother"(U, p. 143).27 The nurse earns the
rightto be a motherby her love and care, not simplyby givingbirth.
Similarly,if a son wants to take up a professionother than that of his
father,he becomes a memberof a familywherehis chosen professionis
23TheUtopians use the termsnature and God interchangeably(U, p. 217). They share
the Stoic assumption that nature is inherentlygood and kindly(U, pp. 151, 165).
24Alice B. Morgan, in "Philosophic Reality and Human Construction in Utopia,"
Moreana 10, no. 39 (September 1973):15-23, refersto these effortsto improvephysical
nature as the work of benevolent human artifice. I agree, though I would call these
effortsnot "artifice"but attemptsto realize the ideal nature which the Utopians follow.
25T. S. Dorsch, "Sir Thomas More and Lucian: An Interpretationof Utopia, "A rchly
fir das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen, 203 (1967):349-63, rpt. in
Twentieth CenturyInterpretationsof Utopia, ed. William Nelson (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 91.
26"ex familijs constet ciuitas" (U, p. 134).
2"More's Latin, "Qui educatur, nutricemparentisagnoscit loco" (U, p. 142), does not
in thiscase use the word natura, but the translator'suse is justified. To acknowledge a
nurse as a mother is surelyto alter custom in order to serve a more spiritual "nature."
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practiced. Again the Utopians interpretthe spiritual father-sonrelationship,and not physicalfatherhood,as the natural norm.
For the Utopians, the most importantprinciple of nature, the principle which ensuresjustice among them, is the Stoic principle that all
human beings are bound in "natural fellowship"(U, p. 163).28 The
Utopians derivethisprinciplefromnature's impartiality.They believe
that"no one is raised so farabove thecommon lot ofmankind as to have
his sole personthe object of nature'scare, seeing that she equally favors
all whomshe endowswiththesame form"(U, p. 165). Man's responsibilitynot to harmhisfellowsholdsfortheUtopians (as it does forthe Stoics)
even beyondnational boundaries. In thisway theydiffermarkedlyfrom
the citizensof Plato's Republic, who regardnon-Greeksas "enemies by
nature."19For the Utopians, the fellowshipof nature renderstreaties
redundant: "What is the use of a treaty,theyask, as though nature of
bind one man to another" (U, p. 197), "as
herselfdid not sufficiently
thoughpeoples whichare divided bythe slightintervalof a hill or a river
were joined by no bond of nature" (U, p. 199).
The law of "natural fellowship"does not simplyrestricthostility.It
demands generosity.It demands that one place the public good above
all personal concerns.30Utopian societygenerouslyheeds the responsibilitiesof natural fellowship.The Utopians share both theirwork and
the rewardsof theirwork: theyprovidehousing,good food, and health
care for everyone;theykeep no hereditaryslaves; theydo not restrict
hard labor to certainclasses; and theyopen intellectualand governmental careers to all that show an aptitude. Their public officials"live
togetherin affectionand good will" (U, p. 193).3l
2'Cicero stressesthis aspect of nature in De Officiis,1.16.50: "naturae principia sint
communitatis et societatis humanae." De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller, The Loeb
Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), p. 52.
29Republic 5.470c, Dialogues, p. 709.
30"AsPlato has admirably expressed it, we are not born forourselves alone, but our
countryclaims a share of our being, and our friendsa share" (Cicero, De Officiis1.7.22,
Loeb, p. 23).
31"Conuiuuntamabiliter" (U, p. 191). The Utopians do not interpret"fellowship"as
meaning precise equality. In the Utopian households, "the oldest . . . rules. . . . Wives
wait on theirhusbands, children on theirparents, and generallythe youngeron their
elders" (U, p. 137; see also U, p. 141). Fellowshipand mutual concern actuallyseem to be
increased by this moderate hierarchy,for the hierarchyaids in maintaining an order
which is beneficial to all. There are cases, too, in Utopia, when fellowshipis suspended.
Upon conviction, criminals in Utopia are treated as slaves. And the Zapoletans, a
murderousrace, are treatedalmost as beasts. The Utopians hire the Zapoletans, "whom
theywould jeopardize rather than their own citizens" (U, p. 149), to fightin the first
ranks when theymust go to war. The Zapoletans forfeittheirrightto equal treatment
when theythemselvesignore the natural law: "forgettingboth kinship and friendship,
theyrun one another throughwiththe utmostferocity"(U, 207). The inferiorstatus of
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The Utopians are as readyto befriendthecitizensofforeigncountries
as theirown neighbors.They are anxious to save the lives of foreigners
even in time of war. Philip Dust, in criticizingthe Utopian state, finds
thisfellowshipnaive and contradictory."How," he asks, "can a country
which refusesto make treatieson the ground that nature binds men in
natural union account for nature not preventingwar in the first
place?"32But thisapparent contradictionis resolvedifwe recall that in
the Stoic cosmology,whichMore's Utopians follow,the guidingspiritof
nature is ethicallyperfect,but not all-powerful. This nature indeed
binds men together;but man can subvertthe intentionof nature's law
by followinghis pride ratherthan his reason. When, inevitably,some
men choose to oppose nature by making war, the Utopians attemptto
minimizethe consequences. They enterthe war on the side theydeem
just. They conclude thewar as quicklyas possible. They take no pride in
theireffortunless theysave lives.
One of the practiceswhich the Utopians justifyas natural has, in the
light of subsequent Britishcolonial policy, been subjected to rigorous
scrutiny.The Utopians send out excess citizensas colonists,and expect
thecoloniststo fightfortheirnew land ifthenativesresistthe incursion:
"They considerit a mostjust cause forwar when a people whichdoes not
use its soil but keeps it idle and waste neverthelessforbidsthe use and
possessionof it to otherswho by the rule of nature ought to be maintained by it" (U, p. 137). Might the Utopian justification-ex naturae
casuistryjustifyingimperialism?If
praescrzito - simplybe self-serving
so, theethicalstructureoftheirsocietybased on "nature"mightbegin to
crumble. But, as Marie Delcourt has pointed out, if the land is truly
"waste" (uacuum) and the citizens trulyexcess (and moles, or "vast
throng,"in the phrase "plus aequo moles intumuerit,"U, p. 136, seems
to indicate thattheyare), the act is indeed justifiedby thepraescrzfitum
naturae thatland should be used to feedpeople when theyare hungry.33
The principle that land should be cultivated to feed the hungrywas
certainlyimportantto More. In book one and again in the perorationhe
sharplycriticizesthose who deny the people sustenance by enclosing
farmland to increase their profits.The prospect of starvation from
one. It is not improbable thenthat,on the
overpopulationis a terrifying
criminals and Zapoletans seems to violate Utopian practice of fellowship, but their
treatment is justified by a second fundamental principle of justice-that virtue be
rewarded and vice punished. Utopian use of the Zapoletans, however presumptuous,
does not necessarilyviolate the spiritof justice.
32"AlbericoGentili'sCommentarieson Utopian War," Moreana 10, no. 37 (February
1973):35.
33Marie Delcourt, "Le Pouvoir du Roi dans l'Utopie, " Melanges offertsa M. Abel
Lefranc . .par ses eleves et ses amis (Paris: Librairie E. Droz, 1936), pp. 101-12.
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grounds of preventingstarvation,More saw Utopian colonization as
just. Moreover, if the Utopian invocation of nature here to justify
colonizationis indeed an example of casuistry,it is a unique example.
The law of nature is nowhereelse invoked to justifya questionable or
self-servingpractice. One cannot too easilyconclude that itsuse here is
evidence that More intended us to question the Utopian natural ideal.
Swift'sHouyhnhnms,like the Utopians, follow"nature" in the Stoic
sense of the term,although the term"nature" is used in various senses
throughoutGulliver'sTravels. F.R. Leavis, in his famousessayon "The
Irony of Swift,"cites the word "nature" as a paramount example of
Swift'scarelessnesswithwordsand concepts: "it is not great intellectual
forcethatis exhibitedin his indifferenceto the problemsraised- in, for
instance,the Voyageto theHouyhnhnms- by his use of the concept, or
theword,'Nature'. "3 Leavis is correctthatSwiftuses "nature" in several
differentsenses,even withinthe final voyage. But those senses can be
distinguishedand theirpurposes explained.
Probably the most frequentuses of the word "nature" in Gulliver's
Travels are those associated withGulliver'srepeated problemswithhis
bodily processes, euphemisticallytermed "the Necessities of Nature"
(GT, p. 29).35 These instances,along withthe Houyhnhnmpuzzlement
(upon recognizing that Gulliver wears clothes) that "Nature should
teach us to conceal what Nature has given" (GT, p. 237), serveSwift's
satiricalend -"to mortifypride"36-by evokingembarrassmentat elementsofour naturewhichwe are powerlessto alter. The natureto which
theyreferis no ideal. The alternativeof acting more "naturally"in this
regard is neither desirable nor socially possible. But Swift'sstrategy
leaves us vaguelyuncomfortableabout possibledifferencesbetweenour
own nature and "nature" as a moral standard.
Swift'swittiestuse of the word "nature" occurs in his portraitof the
invertedEnglishsystemofjustice. Gulliverexplains that to judge justly
would be, foran Englishmagistrate,unnatural. He has "knownseveral
of them to have refuseda large Bribe fromthe Side whereJusticelay,
rather than injure the Faculty, by doing anythingunbecoming their
world of English
Nature or theirOffice"(GT, p. 249). The topsy-turvy
justice includes the lawyersas well as the judges: "My lawyer being
practiced almost fromhis Cradle in defendingFalshood; is quite out of
34F. R. Leavis, The Common Pursuit(London: Chatto & Windus, 1958), pp. 86-87.
35See also GT, pp. 23, 94, and elsewhere.
36JohnHawkesworth,The WorksofJonathanSwift,Dean of St. Patrick's,Dublin, 24
vols. (London: C. Bathurst, 1765-1775), 2:410n. Hawkesworth's phrase is cited by
Charles Peake, "The Coherence of Gulliver's Travels," in Swift,ed. Claude J. Rawson
(London: Sphere, 1971), p. 178.
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his Element when he would be an Advocate forJustice,which as an
Office unnatural, he always attemptswith great Awkwardness,if not
withIll-will " (GT, p. 249). These legal officials,in the thoroughnessof
theirinstitutionalizedcorruption,no longer distinguishthe customary
fromthenatural. Their bizarredissociationofnature and justice constitutes a tellingcriticismof the profession.
Gulliver'suse of the termnature in the firstthreebooks of Gulliver's
Travelsis Aristotelianratherthan Stoic. When he describesthe Lilliputians as following"the great Law of Nature . . . to propagate and
continue the Species" (GT, p. 60), or when he notes that his "natural
Love of Life" (GT, p. 157) was quickened by his firstglimpseof people
on Laputa, he is not speakingof any law of nature based on a reasoned
plan. The naturehe refersto does not prescribe,as it does forthe Stoics
or the Utopians, an ethical standard. It merelydefinesactions in which
the human will plays little or no part. In book two, Swiftpointedly
criticizesGulliverforaccepting thisamoral nature as a sufficientmoral
guide. When Gulliverpicksup a Brobdingnagianbook which"treatsof
the Weakness" ofman, and draws"severalmoral Applicationsusefulin
the Conduct of Life" (GT, p. 137), he dismissesthe inquiryas a waste of
effort.He regards any such "Quarrels we raise with Nature" as "illgrounded" (GT, pp. 137-38). Gulliveraccepts an amoral nature in this
case in orderto avoid makinganymoral effort.The obvious inadequacy
of the "nature" he accepts makes us hesitatewhen we discoverin book
four the certaintyof Gulliver'sHouyhnhnmMaster that "Nature and
Reason were sufficientGuides fora reasonable Animal" (GT, p. 248).
The Houyhnhnmswould seem to be making the same mistakeas Gulliver. But since the Houyhnhnmsby etymologyare "the Perfectionof
Nature" (GT, p. 235),37thisnature is as reliable a norm forthe Houyhnhnmsas it was forthe Stoics (and the Utopians). The Houyhnhnms
have no reason to distrusta nature which has endowed them with "a
general Disposition to all Virtues" (GT, p. 267).
The "nature" followedby the Houyhnhnms,like that followedby the
Utopians, prescribesnatural fellowshipand the common good: "They
willhave it thatNature teaches themto love the whole Species" (GT, p.
268). The Houyhnhnmstake this responsibilityseriously.Critics and
readers too seldom note that "Friendshipand Benevolence are the two
principle Virtues among the Houyhnhnms" (GT, p. 268).38 Their
37Manyreaders, e.g. Paul Fussell in The Rhetorical World of Augustan Humanism
(New York: OxfordUniv. Press, 1965), p. 71, have interpretedthe Houyhnhnmetymology as having been invented for purposes of self-aggrandizement. But the evidence
whichfollowsindicates that theydo live up to the standard theyare said here to embody.
38Houyhnhnm"benevolence" is often contrasted with genuine affection, and regarded as inferior.But "benevolence" in the eighteenth centurymeant considerably
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458
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friendshipcan be seen in their visits to dying friends,their love of
conversation,and theirharmonyin thestateofmarriage. Their benevolence is evident from their hospitality.The Houyhnhnms make all
strangersfeel"at home" (GT, p. 268). Gulliver'sHouyhnhnmhost,even
upon the arrivalof a neo-Yahoo (Gulliver), does not hesitateto express
"the Concern he was in, that [he] had nothing to eat" (GT, p. 232).
Houyhnhnm benevolence can also be seen in their providingfor any
fellowHouyhnhnmsthat happen to be in need, in theireducation of
Houyhnhnmfemalesas well as males, and in theircare not to overburden theirnumbers throughindiscriminatebreeding.39
The natural fellowshipof the Houyhnhnmshas been much maligned; their capacity for showing as much affectionfor a neighbor's
offspringas for their own, and for showing as much friendshipand
benevolence to their whole species as to their spouses, is regarded by
many critics as bizarre and unnatural. Before criticizingthe Houyhnhnms,though, we should recall that much of the behavior satirized
earlierin Gulliver'sTravels exemplifieseitherabsurd or horribledisregard fornatural fellowship.The furiousLilliputian civil war between
the Big-Endians and the Little-Endians is the moststrikingexample of
pointlesshostility.The Lilliputians are rivalled in such hostilityby the
race oflawyers,which,accordingto Gulliver,engages in "a Confederacy
of Injustice,merelyforthe Sake of InjuringtheirFellow-Animals"(GT,
p. 251). Most damning of all, Gulliverreportsthat among his people
"theTrade ofa Soldieris held themosthonourable ofall others:Because
more than the benign neglectwhich it has come to mean today. Witnesstheselines from
Pope's Essay on Man, in which benevolence is equated with charity:
Self-love thus push'd to social, to divine,
Gives thee to make thyneighbor's blessing thine.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Grasp the whole worlds of Reason, Life, and Sense,
In one close systemof Benevolence:
Happier as kinder, in whate'er degree,
And height of bliss but height of Charity.
Epistle IV, lines 353 -60.
39As in Utopia, natural fellowship in Houyhnhnmland does not mean absolute
equality. The Houyhnhnms maintain a class structure based on shape, color, and
qualities of mind. Gulliver's Master points out to him that ignoring such distinctions
"would be reckoned monstrousand unnatural" (GT, p. 256). In addition, Houyhnhnm
"Reason . . . maketh a Distinction of Persons, where there is a superior Degree of
Virtue" (GT, p. 268). This distinctionis the same one that allows the Utopians to
sacrificeZapoletans ratherthan theirown citizensin time of war. Since justice requires
not only natural equality, but reward forvirtue and punishment forvice, the aims of
these two aspects of justice must be carefullyweighed.
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a Soldieris a Yahoo hiredto killin cold Blood as manyofhisown Species,
who have never offendedhim, as possiblyhe can" (GT, pp. 246-47).
There are manydefinitionsof a soldierwhichat least sound acceptable.
But thisone achievesitshorrorby accentuatingthenatural fellowshipof
the species which the soldier is so ruthlesslyviolating.
In Gulliver'sown adventureswith Europeans, he is oftenfrustrated
because he cannot depend upon the spiritof fellowshipin others. His
seeminglynatural assumption,while on his thirdvoyage, that a Dutch
strangerwould treat him with courtesy,proves wholly erroneous: "I
Spoke Dutch tolerablywell; I told him who we were, and begged him in
Considerationof our being Christiansand Protestants,of neighboring
Countries,in strictAlliance, thathe would move the [pirate]Captains to
take some Pity on us. This inflamed his Rage" (GT, p. 154). Much
chastenedbythisincident,Gulliver,thoughhe stillassumesthatfellowship is natural, is more cautious when he next encountersEuropeans at
sea. This time his captors are Portuguese: "I told them, I was born in
England, fromwhence I came about five Years ago, and then their
Countryand ours were at Peace. I thereforehoped theywould not treat
me as an Enemy,since I meant themno Harm, but was a poor Yahoo"
(GT, p. 286). Gulliver'ssense of his vulnerabilityto the arbitrarytiming
of a declaration of war between two governmentsmakes the same
comment on governmentalmeddling as does the Utopian rejection of
treaties.Human fellowshipis a natural rightwhich no governmentis
empowered to violate.
The naturalfellowshipoftheHouyhnhnmsis not customary.It means
the sacrificeof romanticlove. But it would certainlypromote greater
co-operation (and justice), and thus it is quite "natural" in the Stoic
sense. The concern for fellowshipshown by the Utopians and the
Houyhnhnmsbreaksdown the barriersof pride (including familypride
and lovers'pride) which all of us erect; thisfellowship,far frombeing
absurd, is thepersonalvirtuethatmakes possiblethe social justice in the
Utopian and Houyhnhnmsocieties.
The nature,then,whichtheUtopians and theHouyhnhnmsfollow,is
a structured,purposive nature, one which directs the Utopian and
Houyhnhnmcitizensas to how to live withtheirfellows.We should not
forgetthatreason,much morefrequentlycited bycriticsas thestandard
of Utopian and Houyhnhnmbehavior,gains itsmoral authorityin both
Utopia and Houyhnhnmland from its conformitywith this nature.
Reason in Utopia perceivesthesame truthsofnature- theexistenceof a
benevolentGod and the natural fellowshipof all men- as it did forthe
Stoics and forThomas Aquinas. And it entails the Stoic responsibility:
"to help all othermen" (U, p. 163). The similarethical orientationof
Houyhnhnm reason has often been ignored, perhaps because when
Houyhnhnmreason is defined,it is definedprimarilyin termsofwhat it
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is not: "Neitheris Reason among thema Point problematicalas withus,
whereMen can argue withPlausibilityon both sides of a Question; but
strikesyouwithimmediateConviction;as itmustneeds do whereitis not
mingled, obscured, or discoloured by Passion and Interest" (GT, p.
267). Since the most unusual aspect of Houyhnhnmreason as defined
hereis its"immediateConviction,"thisimmediacyhas been emphasized
to the exclusion of its ethical dimension. Houyhnhnmreason has frequentlybeen seen as unique, as dangerouslydeistic, or as linked with
Descartes's "rational intuition"of clear and distinctideas.40
The association with Descartes is specious. Swiftmocks Descartes's
"rational intuition"in the Tale of a Tub because it doesn't take into
considerationthe workingsof other people's reason. Houyhnhnm"rational intuition,"by contrast,is common and respectsthe needs of the
community. The distinctionbetween common reason and personal
reasonis made bySwifthimselfin his sermon"On the Trinity":"Reason
itselfis trueand just, but theReason ofeveryparticularMan is weak and
wavering,perpetuallyswayed and turnedby his Interests,his Passions,
and his Vices.' In book four of Gulliver's Travels, men use their
(corrupted,personal) reason to increase theirnatural vices, to develop
more destructiveweapons of war, to subvert "general Reason" and
"commonjustice" (GT, p. 249). The Houyhnhnms,usingtheir"general
Reason" (a shared reason whichSwiftequates with"commonjustice"),
always act not for theirown good, but for the good of theirspecies.
The Houyhnhnmsmay resemble deists in theirreliance on reason.
But the dangers Swiftsaw in deism were occasional, and do not seem
relevantto the Houyhnhnms,who are remote both fromChristianity
and fromdesiresforself-aggrandizement.Swiftoftencondemned deism
(when compared with orthodox Anglicanism) as the firststep toward
unbeliefand a consequentfreedomfrommoral discipline. But religious
orthodoxyis not a serious issue in Gulliver's Travels. The Lilliputian
emperor professesthe religion of the Brundecral but the text of the
Brundecral becomes a pretextforfaction, and nothingin his religion
restrainsthe emperor fromsuch outrageouslyunjust plans as that of
torturingGulliverto death while publishinghis own "Lenity and Tenderness" to the world (GT, p. 72). The admirable charactersin Gulliver'sTravels-Don Pedro, the Brobdingnagian King, Lord Munodi,
40See, for example, Gordon McKenzie, "Swift: Reason and Some of its Consequences, " in Five Studies in Literature,Univ. of California Studies in English,vol. 8, no.
1 (Berkeley:Univ. ofCalifornia Press, 1940), p. 104, and Samuel Holt Monk, "The Pride
of Lemuel Gulliver," SR 63 (anuary-March 1955), rpt. in Milton Foster, ed., A
Casebook on Gulliveramong the Houyhnhnms(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961),
p. 242.
4'Prose Works, 9:166.
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Glumdalclitch,and thesextumvirateofworthiesin Glubbdubdrib- are
no more overtlyreligiousthan the Houyhnhnms.There is no indication
in the work that any religious standard higher than the nature and
reason of the Houyhnhnmsshould be appealed to.
Finally, Houyhnhnm reason is not unique; the idea of reason as
immediateconvictiondid not originatein the seventeenthor eighteenth
century.Reason for the Stoics (and even for Plato) is a perception of
ideal nature. If one is uninhibitedby "Passion or Interest,"that is, by
formsofselfishness,thisperceptionwillbe immediate. The mostprominentcharacteristicof Houyhnhnmreason is itsStoic inseparabilityfrom
virtue.The Houyhnhnmsattributeman's general corruptionto "gross
Defects in Reason, and by consequence, in Virtue" (GT, p. 259).
Houyhnhnm reason, fosteringvirtue and natural fellowship,enables
them to achieve a just Stoic state.
Even if it be granted that the Utopian and Houyhnhnmsocietiesare
based -on Stoic standards of reason, nature, and justice, the idea that
More or Swiftwould ask us to admire, or even accept, such societiesis
still open to question. The most frequent criticismsof Utopia and
Houyhnhnmlandby criticswho interprettheselands ironicallyare that
the Houyhnhnmsare cold and passionless,that the Utopians are calculatinglyefficient,and that both societiesseverelyrestrictpersonal freedom. It is argued that thereis no Utopian we can admire as much as we
do Cardinal Morton, that there is no Houyhnhnm that can compare
with Don Pedro de Mendez. These criticismsare justified, at least in
part; but at the same time, they fail to acknowledge that the same
society,even ifit is fictional,cannot maximizeboth commonjustice and
individual freedom.
The sacrifices required of individuals in Utopia and in Houyas manyhave made themout
hnhnmlandare not so severeor restrictive
to be. The authorityof Ricardo Quintana's The Mind and Art of
JonathanSwift(1936) has contributedmuch to thewidespreadidea that
theHouyhnhnmsare cold and lackingin emotions.Quintana writesthat
in book fourof Gulliver'sTravels "the lifeof reason . . . is givenmerely
an intellectual statement,for though we understand the admirable
Houyhnhnmswe are notmoved bythem,and thisnot because horsesare
an inappropriatesymbolbut because ideal civilizationas conceived by
Swiftis an emotionlessthing."42Samuel Holt Monk's expressionof the
same point is rhetoricallydesigned to denigrate the Houyhnhnms.He
writesthat "The Houyhnhnmsare the embodiment of pure reason.
They know neither love nor grief nor lust nor ambition."43 Monk's
42Ricardo Quintana, The Mind and Art ofJonathan Swift(London: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1936), pp. 319-20.
43Monk,p. 241.
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orderingofthepassions- love, grief,lust,ambition- is significant.The
controlof lust and ambition by reason we all admire. And most of us
would accept the control of griefby reason. But by placing love, a
passion we value, in the firstand most prominentpositionafterstating
that the Houyhnhnmsembodypure reason, Monk is implicitlyarguing
thatsince theirreason suppressessuch an admirable quality, it mustbe
flawed. The Houyhnhnms,however,are not withoutpassions, though
"theirWants and Passions are fewerthan among us" (GT, p. 242). The
virtuesof the Houyhnhnmsinclude not merelyself-limitingones like
temperance and chastity(and even those show public spirit as they
preventadultery,jealousy, and overpopulation), but openly generous
and public-spiritedones likefriendshipand benevolence. Houyhnhnms
carrythesevirtuesfartherthan anyhuman does, showing"Affection"to
all children, and, pace Monk, "love" to the "whole Species" (GT, p.
268). Althoughthe Houyhnhnmpracticeof thesevirtuesis infrequently
dramatized,we do see repeated examples ofthesorrelnag's affectionfor
Gulliverand of general kindnessshown to Gulliverby his Houyhnhnm
Master.
In Gulliver's Travels it is the ministersof state, and not the Houyhnhnms, who lack the conventional passions. Gulliver thinkshe can
please the reasonable Houyhnhnms by describing the extraordinary
control which governmentministerskeep over their passions. These
ministers,he says, are "whollyexempt fromJoyand Grief, Love and
Hatred, Pityand Anger." A minister"makesuse ofno otherPassionsbut
a violent Desire of Wealth, Power, and Titles" (GT, p. 255). The
Houyhnhnms,of course, are not impressed. It is preciselythese selfseeking passions which Houyhnhnm reason has no part of. Houyhnhnmreason is definedas " not mingled, obscured, or discoloured by
Passion and Interest"(GT, p. 267). But it is essentialto see that in this
definition,"Passion and Interest"are nearlysynonynms,and represent
selfishdisregardforothers.Houyhnhnmreason being an instrumentof
justice, it opposes notpassionsper se, but thosepassionswhichendanger
the common good. Whatever coldness it seems to have is directed
primarilyagainst a warmlypassionate love of oneself.
The Utopians face similarcharges of coldness. Their domestic relations,however,are not lacking in warmth.Their good will is evidentin
theirsharedfeasts,theirgenerouscare ofthe sick,and theireagernessto
adopt and care fororphans. But theirwarmthand human concern do
seem to vanish in the section describingtheirmilitarypractices. The
apparent contradictionsof thissectionhave aroused considerablesuspicion about the Utopian ideal. Afterintroducingthe sectionof Utopian
militaryaffairsby assertingthat the Utopians regard war "with utter
loathing"(U, p. 199), Hythlodayproceeds to describe the considerable
attentionthat theypay to militaryaffairs.Hythlodayhas expressedin
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book one his objectionsto the keeping of mercenaries,yethe describes
here how the Utopians regularlyemploy Zapoletans to fightforthem.
The Utopians hold that it is beneath man's dignitynot to believe in the
immortalsoul, yetthey"do not care in the least" how many mercenary
Zapoletans are killedin theirservice(U, p. 209). In addition, theybribe
enemyciviliansto killtheirownleaders, and theywillgo to war on behalf
of a friendlynation on theseeminglyflimsypretextthattheirmerchants
have been treated unjustly. Citing less evidence than the foregoing,
T. S. Dorsch concludes that "everythingrelatingto the Utopians' attitude to war and methodsof conductinga war is describedwithan irony
that could scarcelybe missed."44 The ironywhich Dorsch perceivesis
not, however, pervasive. Along with these questionable practices,
Hythlodaydescribesmanywhich are obviouslyhumane. The Utopians
employanymeans possibleto avoid bloodshed: theyuse abstentionfrom
trade ratherthan war to punish wrongs;theydo not avenge theirown
economic loss withwar; theycelebrate bloodlessvictoriesfarmore than
bloody ones; theyneverpursue a vanquished enemy,or seek booty, or
harm a civilian.
This sectionon Utopian militaryaffairsis themostproblematicin the
work. If More intended that the section be interpretedironically,the
noble Utopian practiceswould seem to serveno purpose. If thesectionis
a mixtureofthoroughlyadmirable and thoroughlydespicable practices,
it is incoherent. It can be read, however,as a mixtureof thoroughly
admirable and possibly admirable practices, all of which stem from
application of the principlesofjustice. Firstof all, the Utopian interest
in militaryaffairsis not in itselfsurprising.Even a just state will be
surroundedby avariciousenemies;45it must thereforehave a well-considered war policy and a well-prepared citizenry.Plato's Republic,
Lycurgus'sSparta, and thejust state described by Cicero in De offzizis,
are all concerned with militaryaffairs, and all try to develop just
standards for using militaryforce. The Utopian interestin military
affairsis no more intense than the interestsof its predecessors. The
Utopian employmentof Zapoletan mercenariescan also be justified.
Hythlodayobjects in book one to the keeping of mercenaryarmies for
two reasons: theyare a menace to the citizenryin time of peace; and
theirveryavailabilityencourages a prince to go to war. The Utopians
avoid both these evils. They never use mercenarieswithin their own
and theyonlyhiremercenariesaftera war has been declared.
territory,
44Dorsch, p. 93.
45The last words of Hythloday'sperorationmake clear the external threatto Utopia:
"not all the envyof neighboringrulers,though it has ratheroftenattemptedit and has
always been repelled, can avail to shatteror to shake that nation" (U, p. 245).
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All the otherseeminglyironicUtopian war practicescan be defended
by an appeal to some principleofjustice. The Utopian willingnessto go
to war to punish a countrywhichhas treatedthe merchantsof Utopian
allies unjustlyis perhaps theirleast defensiblepolicy, but even it is an
attempt to deter injustice. And the Utopian practice of assassinating
enemy princes is arguably more just than are standard practices of
"honorable" warfare.More knewthatHythlodaywas takingan unusual
positionin encouragingassassination.He acknowledgesthat the idea is
"elsewherecondemned as the cruel deed of a degeneratenature" (U, p.
205)." But although the Utopian practice is not in keeping with traditional customsof "honor," Hythloday'sdefenseofitsjustice is plausible:
"by the death of a few guiltypeople theypurchase the lives of many
harmlesspersonswho would have fallenin battle, both on theirside and
thatof the enemy"(U, p. 205). The Utopian methodof wagingwar can
be interpretedas an attemptnot onlyto restorethejust balance between
king and subject, but to improve the prospectsof fellowshipbetween
nations by puttingthe kingswho startwars in greaterjeopardy. More
clearly distances himselffromHythloday,and suggestsat the end of
book twothatall thesemattersshould be furtherdiscussed. But no single
Utopian policy is withoutquestion absurd or immoral.
Criticsare disturbed,finally,by the apparent harshness,the lack of
freedom, implicit in the rule of reason in Utopia and Houyhnhnmland.47The Houyhnhnmshave no choice but to obey a decree of
their assembly; the Utopians are constantlyunder the eyes of some
authority,and theirsecond offenseat any one of a number of crimes
means immediate death. Even the freedomof thoughtof the Utopians
and the Houyhnhnmsseemsto be severelyrestricted.The Houyhnhnms
can thinkof nothingbut what is reasonable; the Utopians are silenced if
theypromoteunusual viewson mattersof politicsor religion. Readers
are not attractedby the thoughtof membershipin such societies. E. E.
Reynolds'scomplaint against Utopias -"They are all marked by overregimentationand would be verydull countriesin which to live"48mustbe grantedto be apt. But More and Swifthave made the workings
of reason in Utopia and Houyhnhnmland so direct that coercion is
46See Cicero, De Officiis,1.13.40, Loeb, pp. 42-45, where assassinationis condemned
as unjust. Alberico Gentili, a sixteenth-centuryjurist who disapproved of the Utopian
practice, cites several classical philosophers and jurists who criticize the practice of
assassination. De Iure Belli Libri Tres (1612), trans.JohnC. Rolfe, 2 vols., The Classics
of International Law (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933), 2:167.
47See,forexample Robbin Johnson,More's Utopia: Ideal and Illusion (New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1969), p. 106.
48E. E. Reynolds, Saint Thomas More (New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1954), pp.
92-93, rpt. Nelson, p. 113.
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minimized.The citizensofHouyhnhnmlandare alreadyreasonable and
theyneed no coercion; 49 thecitizensof Utopia are so close to reason that
most of them do not sense coercion. JohnTraugott attemptsto define
the workingsof reason in Utopia with the followingimage: "As the
heliotrope to the sun, is each rational will in Utopia to justice."50
Actually,theheliotropeimage applies more to Houyhnhnmlandthan to
Utopia. Gulliver'sMaster Houyhnhnm followsthe will of the general
assemblyas a heliotropedoes the sun; he makes no choice. Nor is the
assembly'sdecision to banish Gulliver questioned by the sorrel nag,
thoughhe has become greatlyattached to Gulliver.Similarly,a Houyhnhnmsuffersno inner conflictwhen he is provided witha spouse. He
looks upon it "as one of the necessaryActions in a reasonable Being"
(GT, p. 269). There is no conflictwhateverin Houyhnhnmlandbecause
any purelyselfishinterestis obviated by the clear possessionof reason.
Guided by such reason, the Houyhnhnms have almost no need of
government.Problemsexistonlywhennew circumstancesarise(like the
arrivalof Gulliver). Even so, once a decision is made upon principle,a
Houyhnhnm would never want to do anything that the will of all
forbade. On the otherhand, the decisionsof a Utopian citizenare not
involuntary.The Utopians do have personalpassionsand interests;some
of them do commit adultery,and must be punished. All of them are
watched so closelythat theyhave littleopportunityto act viciously.But
More does not emphasize the coercion in a way that would tempt the
reader to findthe pictureironic. On the contrary,the freedomswhich
theUtopian systemmakespossibleare frequentlycalled to mind. We are
told that a Utopian can choose to worka lifetime(ratherthan twoyears)
on the farms; that one can choose a profession,and even a second
profession,and practice the preferredone unless the state requires
eitherone ofthemin particular;thatone need not attendthecommunal
if he would ratherremain at
meal; that no one is sent to the infirmary
home; and thatUtopian leisureis dedicated to the freedomand culture
of the mind. The Utopians recognizethat theycannot be perfectlyfree
in this life, and they patiently await greater freedom in the next:
"Freedom, like all other good things,theyconjecture to be increased
afterdeath ratherthan diminishedin all good men" (U, p. 225).
It cannot be denied that substantial coercion does exist in Utopia.
However, as C. S. Lewis has commented, "It is not love of libertythat
makes men writeUtopias."5' What makes men writeUtopias is seeing
49"They have no Conception how a rational Creature can be compelled, but only
advised or exhorted" (GT, p. 280).
50Traugott,p. 153.
51C. S. Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century,The Oxford Historyof
English Literature, 12 vols. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1954), 3:168.
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how men abuse thelibertythattheyhave. The restrictionand self-sacrifice which Utopian societies entail is not practiced for its own sake;
indeed itwould be easier to writea mere Land-of-Cockaigne storythan
a Utopian one. (Plato contraststhe "civiccommunity"hc is describingin
the Republic with a mere festivecommunity.52) The limitationson
freedomin Utopia and Houyhnhnmlandare in effectpostulated as the
necessaryconditionsfora fairershare of justice becoming available to
all. Swiftpassionatelyadmired Thomas More ("the only Man of true
Virtue that ever England produced"53), who sacrificed his personal
interests,and finallyhis life,forthe good of an institution(the universal
Church) which he saw as benefitingthe general welfare. The five
ancientswhom SwiftlinkswithMore as the sextumvirateof worthiesin
Glubbdubdrib all, like More, sacrificed their lives in the effortto
preserveor to re-establish a just society.54It is the same principle of
self-sacrifice,though not so heroicallyrealized, which is practiced by
the citizens of Utopia and Houyhnhnmland. Swift and More were
acutely aware of the necessityforbalancing one's own claims against
those of society.
The veryease withwhichthe Utopians and the Houyhnhnmsadapt to
theirsocieties,however,createsa problemforreaderslookingforideals.
To the extentthatthe Utopians and the Houyhnhnmsare so reasonable
that theydo not sense any coercion fromtheirsocieties, theybecome
paradoxically so much the less admirable as individuals. The Houyhnhnmsare the more extremecase. Since theymake almost no moral
choices, it has been suggestedthat theyare no more to be admired than
the Yahoos are to be blamed.55 Swift'sfirstbiographer,John Boyle,
stungby what he saw as misanthropyin the themeof Gulliver'sTravels,
fought back at Swift by attacking Swift'sHouyhnhnms: "They are
incapable of doing wrong,thereforetheyact right. . . . They act inoffensively,when they have neither the motive nor the power to act
otherwise."56Kathleen Williams has cited the same flaw-"they have
only the negativevirtueof blamelessness"-but she concludes not that
"Republic, 4.421b, Dialogues, pp. 662-63.
53Marginaliain Swift'scopy of Lord Herbert of Cherbury'sLzfe and Raigne ofHenry
VIII, Prose Works, 5:247.
54SeeM. M. Kelsall, "IterumHouyhnhnm: Swift'sSextumvirateand the Horses," EIC
19 (anuary 1969):35-45.
55"Althoughhe hated the Yahoos of this Country,yet he no more blamed them for
theirodious Qualities, than he did a Gnnayh (A Bird of Prey) forits Cruelty,or a sharp
Stone for Cutting his hoof' (GT, p. 248).
56JohnBoyle, Remarks on the Life and Writingsof Dr. Jonathan Swift,Dean of St.
Patrick's, Dublin (1751), rpt. in Swift: The Critical Heritage, ed. Kathleen Williams
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 127.
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Swifterred,but that he did not intendthe Houyhnhnmsto be an ideal:
"the handling of [the Houyhnhnms] seems to suggest not only the
remotenessbut the inadequacy by human standards, of the life of
Reason." Citing Gulliver's erratic behavior after leaving Houyhnhnmland, and the generositywhich Don Pedro chooses to show, she
argues that the "conscience" of Don Pedro, ratherthan the "reason" of
the Houyhnhnms,is the ideal toward which the workpoints.57In the
same way, Robbin Johnsonhas rejected Utopian reason as remoteand
inhumane compared withthe practical humanityof Cardinal Morton,
who promotesjustice in a difficulthuman environmentand not simply
in the easier world of Utopia.58
Williams and Johnson have undoubtedly discovered the least impeachable charactersin Gulliver'sTravels and Utopia. But theirinterpretations fail to account for the effectivenessof Houyhnhnm and
Utopian reason in ridiculingthe avaricious,proud, and unjustbehavior
ofmen. The mostcomprehensiveresponsethusfarto Williams'sviewof
the Houyhnhnmshas been that of R. S. Crane. He argues that the
Houyhnhnmstandard of reason is a reputable standard, that the contrastbetweenthe Houyhnhnmand the human waysof lifeprovesthat
man is not the animal rationale that he thinkshe is, and that the
principal issue of Gulliver'sTravels is "not of how men ought to govern
theiractions, but of what kind of creatureman, as a species, essentially
is, and what opinion, consequently,he is entitledto entertainof himself."59 But Gulliver'sTravelsis not simplyan insult. It does not neglect
theissueof"how men oughtto governtheiractions." Crane's interpretation, focusingas it does on the individual reason ratherthan the social
justice of the Houyhnhnms,places an unnecessarilywide gulfbetween
them and the human hero, Don Pedro de Mendez; also, by suggesting
that Swiftis criticizingour entire species, it stripsaway Don Pedro's
power to serve as a model of behavior.
We should not be forcedto choose betweenCardinal Mortonand the
Utopians, betweenDon Pedro and the Houyhnhnms.Cardinal Morton
and Don Pedro exhibit,in fact, the same virtuesas do the Utopian and
theHouyhnhnmsocieties.Morton'sconcernforjustice can be seen in his
even-handed moderationof disputes,and in his interestin Hythloday's
idea fora fairersystemof criminaljustice. Don Pedro appears in a less
political context, but he is the human being who best practices the
57KathleenWilliams, "Gulliver's Voyage to the Houyhnhnms," ELH 18 (December
1951):281, 284.
58More'sUtopia, pp. 57-59, 69.
59Reviewof "Three Ways of Looking at a Horse," by Martin Kallich, PQ 40 Uuly,
1961):429.
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Houyhnhnmlesson of disinterestedrational benevolence. When Gulliver,who learns to mimic the Houyhnhnmsbut never to understand
them, grudginglyacknowledges Don Pedro-"at last I descended to
treathim like an Animal whichhad some littlePortionof Reason" (GT,
p. 287)-Don Pedro has not shown"reason" in any sense withwhichwe
are now familiar.But he has shownno "littleportion"of friendshipand
benevolence,virtueswhichtheHouyhnhnmsregardas inseparable from
theirreason. The presenceofCardinal Mortonor ofDon Pedro does not
invalidate the criticismswhich More and Swifthave made of man's
behavior in general. Rare exceptionsdo not spoil a thesis. But neither
should theirappearance cause us to doubt the usefulnessof the Utopian
and Houyhnhnmideals.
Both Utopia and Houyhnhnmlandhave long sufferedfromassociationwith"ideal reason" ratherthan "ideal justice."60Since "reason" has
so many differentconnotations, many differentpurposes have been
attributedto the Utopians and the Houyhnhnms. Although Utopian
reason harmonizeseasilywithreligiousfaith,many have condemned it
for being a standard inferiorto that of faith. Although Houyhnhnm
reason is a means of achievingjustice, William Godwin is regarded as
ratherfreakish6lforfindingin Houyhnhnmsociety"a more profound
insightinto the trueprinciplesof politicaljustice, than [in] any preceding or contemporary author."62 Swift would have disagreed with
Godwin's optimisticbelief that men could ever be governed as the
Houyhnhnms are, but he would have been pleased, I think, with
Godwin'srecognitionthatthe Houyhnhnmsprovidea model ofpolitical
justice. More and Swiftare playful throughouttheir descriptionsof
Utopia and Houyhnhnmland.They do not suggestthose lands to us as
serious models. But in creating fictionsthat provoke us to recall the
authenticmeanings of the word "justice," theyare serious indeed.
60SeeCharles Peake, "Swiftand the Passions," MLR 55 (April 1960), rpt. Foster, p.
295.
6lIrvinEhrenpreis, The PersonalityofJonathan Swift(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1958), p. 101.
62WilliamGodwin, Enquiry ConcerningPoliticalJusticeand its Influence on Morals
and Happiness, ed. F. E. L. Priestley,3rd edn., 3 vols. (1798; rpt. Toronto: The Univ. of
Toronto Press, 1946), 2:209n.
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