Piracy and the compromise of International Security
Assertions
The global environment of today contains phenomena known as transnational security challenges
which pose serious implications to the safety of many.1 Piracy is one such occurrence. There are
two areas in the world where the Latin phrase “Pirata este hostes generis” persists as a recurring
phantasm in the light of International Security. These are notably the Straits of Malacca and the
Gulf of Aden, where piracy is truly an enemy of all mankind2. As this is a paper under the broad
topic of International Security, the motivation of this essay is precisely to discover the effects
that these rogue actors have on the global world order. Namely, issues towards deterrence and
protection from these privateers will be mentioned, as well as the problems undergone by state
institutions in coordinating regional assistance and cooperation to ensure that international
shipping lanes remain safe for commercial use. With this in mind, the thesis assertion of this
essay claims that states must readily commit to cooperate towards the joint cause of tackling
piracy in order to successfully combat these belligerents. The features of these commitments
transcend national, legal and economic boundaries. However, given the realist and anarchic
world order, many obstacles are present in the fight against piracy.
Definition of piracy
Broadly speaking, piracy “may be said to consist in acts of violence done upon the ocean or
unappropriated lands, or within the territory of a state through descent from the sea, by a body of
men acting independently of any politically organized society3”. This is not to be confused with
that of a privateer, where the chief distinction is that the former “acts in his own interests and on
his own authority” while the latter “acts under the authority of a state that accepts or is charged
with responsibility for his acts4”. Of course, history is inundated with instances where the
categorization of these personnel proved to be very thwarting indeed (the Cosairs of the Barbary
1
Chalk, Peter. 2008. The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy and challenges for the
United States. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
2
Chaikin, Greg. 2005, “Piracy in Asia: International Cooperation and Japan’s Role” in Piracy in Southeast Asia:
Status, Issues and Responses, ed. Mark Valencia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 125.
3
“Draft Convention on Piracy,” American Journal of International Law 26 (1932) Special Supplement, 739-1013;
and L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 8th ed., ed. H. Lauterpact, vol. 1, Peace (New York:
Longmans,Green, 1955), 609. 4
Janice E. Thomson, 1994. Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 22.
1 Coast being one notorious example5). Nevertheless, a pirate may be identified as one committing
to his or her own individual action, without the command of any sovereign authority. According
to Anderson’s observations, general occurrences of piracy “exist as long as there are criminally
inclined persons and maritime zones of ineffective law enforcement”. Exacerbating this trend is
sustained economic poverty in a coastal region, “in which local traditional practice is more
respected than the law of remote central authority”.6 The effects of a void in authority and
sustained poverty in a seafaring region usually translate to a recurrence of piracy.
Both The High Seas Convention and Article 101 of United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOs) have been crafted to present modern definitions to categorize acts of piracy.
These documents define such operations to be acts of violence, depredation or detention which
are committed specifically for private ends on the high seas or in an area outside state
jurisdiction against the crew and/or passengers of a private craft or vessel and/or persons and/or
property onboard. Piracy could also mean the “act of voluntary participation in the operation of a
[vessel] with knowledge of facts making it a pirate [vessel]” or the simple “act of inciting or of
intentionally facilitating” the act.7 In isolation, piracy can be approached from the nuanced
perspectives of politics and economics. Piracy is largely a political act; a “protest against the
obvious use of state institutions to defend property and discipline labour”. Alongside this, it is
naturally “the theft of private property”, with implications as far as the economical perspective of
things are concerned.8 As piracy seeks to distort and manipulate world resources to its own
personal gain by engaging in violent means, it stands as a potent force to affect the global world
order.
The international effects of piracy
Piracy involves the loss of goods, personnel and revenue for companies around the world. A
recurring trend conducted by pirates is the capture of vessels and the apprehension of the crew
5
IBID, 44.
Anderson, J. L., 1995. Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation. Journal of
World History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall, 1995), 199. 7
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958. Article 15 AND United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982, Article 101.
8
Thomson, 1994., 46. 6
2 for ransom, resulting in more financial loss as countries either adhere to the demands or dispatch
personnel to assist the hostages. The goods that the pirates acquire also usually amount to a fare
sum of money, especially if they contain valuable resources such as petroleum, freight goods or
arms. In certain cases, Pirates “share their loot with the local communities, thus earning
themselves some protection from the authorities9”, thus justifying their existence to continue
their operations.
The illegal distribution of valuable resources has sparked fears in the international community
that pirates may fuel an underground black market of arms trade. Also, there is no stopping these
belligerents from collaborating with terrorist organizations, fuelling them with necessary
equipment to conduct organized acts of violence in various parts of the world. In this case, a
notable example would be the pirate capture and subsequent demands for ransom of the “Faina,
a Ukrainian owned ship carrying thirty-three T-72 tanks along with grenade launchers,
ammunition, and other material reportedly designed for Kenya’s armed forces10” To take a
humanitarian perspective, piracy may result in the hampering of such efforts, much to the demise
of those in need. For impoverished countries such as Somalia, the hijacking of aid vessels
implies the loss of essential goods to their final destination with the goal of alleviating hunger
and poverty in the region.
As all ships commonly share international waters and shipping lanes, it is not unusual for pirates
to hijack vessels of which the property or personnel hail from different parts of the world,
making piracy the business of every country with seafaring vessels. In today’s globalized world,
many Multi-National Companies or MNCs have affiliates, personnel and resources from all over
the world. This invariably elevates piracy from a regional issue of security to one of international
security. In order to combat modern pirates, many strategies are employed and they are almost
always spearheaded by state actors.
Piracy in the Malacca Straits
9
Gershman, John. Is Southeast Asia the Second Front? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Jul- Aug 2002): 69.
Gettleman, Jeffrey. 2008. Tensions Rise over Ship Hijacked off Somalia. The New York Times. September 28.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/world/africa/29pirates.html (accessed June 2, 2010). 10
3 Piracy in Southeast Asia is particularly notorious in the Straits of Malacca. Here, the number of
attacks have accounted for approximately 53% of all worldwide incidents from 1992 to 200411.
The intensive use of this channel for more than 50,000 seafaring vessels each year easily builds
seafaring traffic into a chokepoint. As a result, ships considerably reduce their speed to ensure
safe passage, thus greatly increasing their exposure to boarding and possible hijack. Furthermore,
security onboard is compromised as many of today’s shipping companies employ “skeleton
crews” of only half a dozen personnel as a means to cut costs, limiting whatever
counteroffensive the crew may be able to muster, should the need arise.
The nature of pirate attacks in Southeast Asia usually involve hit-and-run strategies, where pirate
crews use automatic weapons to assault the personnel of a shipping vessel and assume the
acquisition of the goods onboard. While these common ‘sea-robbers’ form the vast majority of
Southeast Asian piracy, organized pirate gangs are in existence. These syndicates attack
medium-sized cargo ships and tankers. In such incidents, it is usually common for the crew
onboard to be held hostage for ransom. In other cases, the “entire vessel is hijacked by pirates
and is then turned into a ‘phantom ship’”12; that is, a ship that has its flag of registry and
identification details deliberately altered at sea.
Many of the activities linked to piracy originate from coastal areas with primitive technology and
deficient infrastructure. However, the incentive of entering into a pirate profession may lie in the
economic condition of the region. The economic fluctuations of the region, most notably the
1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), have caused a forced devaluation of numerous regional
currencies such as the Thai Baht. In the struggle to sustain one’s wages, piracy suddenly
becomes a profession for the unemployed and poverty stricken. With the justification to sustain
one’s family and protect the local population, the heinous profession suddenly becomes an
acceptable means of survival. This is very much the case in Indonesia. Here, the country
accounts for 51% of reported SEA piracy incidents and 27% of worldwide ones from 1992 to
11
Young, Adam J. 2007, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies, Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p. 134.
12
Liss, Carolin. 2007, The Privatization of Maritime Security- Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a rock
and a hard place? Perth, Western Australia: Murdoch University Working Paper, pp. 3. 4 2004.13 This observation strongly warrants the need for stronger domestic legislation to combat
rising rates of pirate attacks so as to restore the monopoly of legitimated violence to the state of
Indonesia alone.14
Parallel to this was the simultaneous lack of state funding for governments to adequately patrol
their own territorial coastlines.15 Moreover, political relations of the region fuel the persistence
of piracy. The maritime environment of Southeast Asia is anarchic and essentially self-help in
nature. There is no overarching authority to enforce and regulate sea lane security. Differing
claims to jurisdiction over the seas abound in different countries, with the geography of the
region racked by boundary disputes which ultimately influence which country is responsible to
the security of the area.16 Varying interpretations of maritime law also exacerbate the lack of
committed involvement in inter-state regimes governing maritime security.
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden
The Gulf of Aden is a narrow waterway which connects both the Indian Ocean and the Arabian
Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It flows through the Suez Canal, one of the world’s most
important shipping lanes. Nicknamed the ‘pirate alley’, the Gulf of Aden is also famous for its
frequency of pirate attacks. Over the years, the International Maritime Organization has reported
that during between 2005 and 2007, pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden have exceeded the attacks
along the combined seas of the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. The cause of pirate
notoriety is obvious; Somalia lacks an adequate government infrastructure to control and subdue
these actors. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was established in the year
2000, possesses a limited amount of control over the country’s land territory, much less its
territorial waters. The proliferation of widespread regional conflict has also provided a cover for
pirates to execute their activities freely and without restraint.
As a result of such lawlessness,
piracy has become an unchecked and lucrative occupation for one desperate to make a living.
Sometimes, pirate claims to the purpose of their belligerence may seem legitimate and under the
13
Young, 2007, 135.
IBID, 57.
15
Chalk (2008), 11.
16
Bateman, Sam. 2007, ‘Building Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia: the Promise of International Regimes’ in
Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, ed. Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan, Routledge, New York, 97. 14
5 premise of protecting their livelihoods. In several incidents, those apprehended for actions of
piracy have claimed to be acting along the premise of deterring overfishing along the coastline,
an issue that has been taken advantage of by foreign fishermen since the Somalia disintegrated
into ruin.17
Many of the pirate attacks along the Gulf of Aden involve belligerent vessels harassing Cruise
Liners with small arms fire, jeopardizing aid deliveries to the region, as well as apprehending
crews of recreational, fishing or aid operations as hostages. Typically, captured vessels are
swiftly steered into Somalian waters and anchored off landing points. These areas are usually
established “pirate command centers”. Many pirate incidents involve the attackers apprehending
their victims using small buoyant craft. Other tactics that the pirates employed are even more
sophisticated and aggressive. Several of these involve the use of larger ‘mother ships’ located
well offshore and in deeper waters. These larger vessels provided a platform from which the
pirates would launch smaller and faster ‘skiffs’ to attack unwary vessels. Most notable are the
incidents involving the MV Rozen (a chartered vessel of the World Food Programme that was
seized in February 2007) and the Victoria (another chartered vessel seized in May 2007). The
most recent confrontation in May 2010 involved the hijack of a Moscow University Oil Tanker
by Somali pirates approximately 800km off the Somali coast.18 Another insidious tactic that has
recently emerged is what is known as “swarm tactics”, where large groups of pirates try to
simultaneously flood the Somali basin, preventing naval and security personnel from engaging
all of them at once.19
Combating piracy and the problems encountered
The contemporary and conventional prerequisite towards combating piracy is the expansion and
modernization of a state’s naval capabilities. This form of military spending is varied among the
different Southeast Asian countries, and has “triggered fears of a naval arms race” since the
17
Guifoyle, Douglas and Colin Warbrick and Dominic McGoldrick. 2008, ‘Piracy off Somalia: UN Security and
Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional Counter-piracy efforts’ in International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, p. 691.
18
BBC News. Pirates attack Russian Oil Tanker off Somali Coast.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8661816.stm (accessed May 6, 2010)
19
BBC News. Navies struggle with ‘swarming’ pirates.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8598726.stm (accessed May 7, 2010) 6 1990s. However, these efforts towards continued naval expansion slowed during the 1997 AFC,
owing to the damage of many economies. In any case, the countries of Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand and the Philippines currently have relatively advanced naval capabilities which work
alongside coastguards and maritime agencies to patrol the relevant waterways.
Outside the scope of state resources is the utilization of private companies employed in the fight
against piracy. These companies have been working in the region for decades now. A notable
company is Glenn Defense Marine (Asia) which functions out of operating centers around Asia,
including Singapore, Hong Kong and Indonesia. There has been a spike in the number of
companies similar to Glenn Defense which operate in the world today, especially after 9/11
attacks that portended the likely incidence of possible maritime terrorist attacks. These Private
Security Companies (PSCs) are part of the recurring worldwide trend towards the outsourcing
and privatization of security services.
Combating piracy on a regional scale already possesses numerous problems, much more an
international effort. The lack of cooperation between states, the very actors who share the same
capitalistic interests regarding shipping lanes, intensifies the crux of the dilemma. Furthermore
are the nuances of judicial codifications which further encrypt the limitations to security forces
that may be mobilized to curb the thwarting problem. Below is a further elaboration on the scope
of these problems encountered while combating piracy.
Judicial limitations
The specifics of what constitutes a pirate itself, as written in UNCLOs and the 1958 High Seas
Convention, already provide the basis to which limitations are projected. For instance, the issue
on piracy as defined as an act that is committed “for private ends” can be opened up to numerous
interpretations. With regards to this specific denotation, Guifoyle states that “the words ‘for
private ends’ must thus be understood broadly. At least one national court decision has sensibly
applied this approach and found that violence in international waters committed by one private
vessel against another in pursuit of political protest still constituted piracy”.20 The judicial red
20
Guifoyle (2008), pp. 694.
7 tape clouds the categorization of what is deemed to be an act of piracy, thereby hindering
relevant authorities to gain a warrant to apprehend and prosecute individuals who are allegedly
“pirates”.
Another significant restriction to combating piracy is the numerous classifications that limit
boundaries of geography at sea. For instance, the categorization of “High Seas” or “International
Waters” refers to all waters that swirl beyond a country’s territorial waters and Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). Pirate attacks that are committed against vessels in such territorial
waters are not considered piracy, but are relegated by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) into the grey area of “Armed Robbery against Ships”; to which hijacking may fall be
classified. Strangely, piracy is not included in this classification. Moreover, the “enforcement
jurisdiction to all States in international waters does not extend to pursuing pirate vessels into the
territorial sea of any State21”. The engagement of hot pursuit from the perspective of a foreign
vessel must cease as soon as it crosses into such territorial waters. These limitations in the Rule
of Law have allowed pirates in Southeast Asia and Somalia to cunningly evade search-anddestroy tactics employed by state actors.
To counter these constrains, influential bodies have issued warning statements to advise sailors
to exercise their own discretionary caution. In May 2007, for instance, The International
Maritime Bureau issued a statement to warn ships to stay and remain at least 200 nautical miles
from the Somali Coast. Such guidance has two main justifications: 200nm is far enough to
remain relatively out of reach from pirate vessels as they lack the resources to remain far out in
the high seas. Also, once ships venture into Somali waters, international law mandates that they
cannot rely on the assistance of foreign patrols without the permission of the local government,
one which has been fragmented and resourcefully ill-equipped for almost two decades.22
On June 2, 2008, attempts were made to improve international legislation for the apprehension of
pirates in territorial waters (particularly in the Gulf of Aden) under Resolution USR1816. This
was passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The resolution clearly determined
21
22
IBID. IBID, 692.
8 that the “incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in the territorial waters of
Somalia and the high seas off the coast of Somalia… constitute a threat to international peace
and security in the region23”. What is relevant at this point is the material that is presented in
Operative Paragraph 7, where the Resolution asserts that “for a period of six months from the
date of this resolution, States cooperating with the TFG in the fight against piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia… may enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the
purpose of repressing acts of piracy”. Furthermore, sub clause B of Operative Paragraph 7 calls
for “all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery” inside the territorial waters
of Somalia.24
Although the content of Resolution 1816 attempts to nip the problem in the bud, there are several
inherent weaknesses to the document. The first is that the article clearly undermines the
capabilities of the Somali TFG, implicitly stating that it requires the additional equipment,
personnel and tactics from foreign hands to combat the problem of piracy in its local area. The
second is that only the state actors that are nominated by the TFG may be seen to be
‘cooperating’ and hence be permitted to take action against the belligerents. Furthermore, the
words “all necessary means” cannot “encompass striking at pirate command centers on land” or
“arresting pirates after their return to shore. Such action will still require the TFG’s specific
authorization.”25 Finally, while UNSCR 1816 may provide security agents of nominated member
states with enforcement jurisdiction to apprehend the pirates, the document does not provide
these agents with prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction to try and convict the pirates. Clearly,
after attempts to equip foreign agents with the mandate necessary to combat piracy, the hands of
these agencies still remain tightly bound.
Resource limitations
The lack of resources, equipment and personnel logically pose a major hindrance to combat
piracy. A shortfall of trained crew and shipping vessels to adequately patrol vast areas of
23
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1816.
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/UNSCR_1816-_SIT_IN_SOMALIA.pdf (accessed May 6, 2010)
24
IBID.
25
Guifoyle (2008), pp. 695. 9 waterways present pirates with the opportunity to conduct their activities virtually free of any
hassle. Usually, the security responsibilities fall into the hands of the nearest legitimate state, as
codified by the High Seas Convention and UNCLOs. However, the impotency of some of these
states to assume such responsibilities causes other state actors with vested interests at hand to
step in and assume the role of security providers. Somalia for instance has virtually no ability to
provide a passable agency to ensure the safety of its waterways. This has resulted in the influx of
state actors and regional actors willing to inject resources to combat piracy and uphold the
security of the area.
Along the Straits of Malacca, the spectrum of naval capabilities and differing magnitudes of
security resources amongst the relevant nations pose numerous problems in the adequate fight
against piracy. This occurrence has also presented possible strains to the relations between the
various state actors in question. Leading the naval armament is Singapore, with her relatively
small area of territorial water and her disproportionate but effective fleet that accounts for her
reputable safety. Across the causeway, Malaysia has been successful towards allocating
resources towards equipping its naval capabilities. However, rampant corruption within the
agency operations and the lack of coordination among numerous agencies (such as the Royal
Malaysian Police (Marine), the Royal Customs and Excise Department, the Marine Department,
and the Royal Malaysian Navy, among others) cause hindrances towards initiating swift
counterattacks against the sabotage effects of local pirates, should the need arise.
More pressing dilemmas plague other countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.
These countries have persistently weak economies that have been crippled by the effects of
regional and world economic crises such as the AFC and the recent US financial crisis of 2008.
Corruption amongst security personnel in these countries is also rampant. In Thailand, for
instance, many military and policemen are involved in sideline activities other than their
professional jobs. More often than not, this involves the drug trade. The Philippines also has such
a problem. Ironically, although this country has one of the world’s most extensive waterways, it
is also the region’s weakest in terms of naval capability.26
26
Liss, Carolin (2007), pp. 26.
10 In today’s post 9/11 world order, the existence of PSCs amidst government sanctioned security
agencies is not a rare sight. However, uncertainties abound when governments outsource their
security responsibilities to these PSCs. In many cases, the reputation and credentials of the PSC
is linked to past combat experience of the company’s employees and founders, of whom are
usually military personnel. However, it is unclear as to whether these personnel are truly
equipped and up to the task at hand. Coupled with such credential ambiguities are legal, ethical
and practical problems that might arise when these foreign PSCs work in tandem with the local
forces or the local population.27 A typical example would be the amount of discretionary force
that personnel may use to engage suspected belligerents. Regardless of the outcome, the state is
ultimately responsible for the actions of these PSCs, however good or ugly. Clearly, the influx
of more actors poses a hindrance to the combat against piracy.
Threats to state sovereignty
Another factor that is counterproductive towards curbing piracy is the inertia of state actors to
dispatch resources to combat these security threats in various regional “hot spots”. The main
reason for this is the reluctance of countries to compromise the sovereignty of their neighboring
states, fuelling tension within the region due to an increase in military presence. This is along a
realist school of thought. In Southeast Asia for instance, there is no regional hegemon to direct or
spearhead the policy formulation process. Although other foreign powers such as China and
Japan have a vested interest in the security of shipping lanes, these statements would fail to
address the need to safeguard littoral states’ sovereignty. While Japan may aid in equipping the
region with the necessary technology and aid in beefing up patrolling efforts, the feasibility of
unilateral involvement contradicts the inherently competitive nature of states in a world from a
realist perspective. Furthermore, China would never agree to extensive Japanese involvement,
rendering the solution unfeasible and even potentially destabilizing.28
Perhaps the protection of state sovereignty may be found in the institutions that the Southeast
Asian countries create to establish their own form of security. The regional body of the
27
28
IBID. Kivimaki, Timo. 2001 ‘The Long Peace of ASEAN’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No.1, pp. 5 - 25
11 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was founded on this very principle of nonintervention for the protection of each member nation from another’s influence. However, this
foundation in their ethos usually hinders the achievement of goals stipulated by the association,
which is to safeguard national and regional interests. In the face of these regional norms towards
non-intervention, the lack of cooperation between littoral states is arguably the result of path
dependency along a Southeast Asian and specifically an ASEAN philosophy. The skepticism
that Littoral states have of multilateral solutions is therefore a projection of their ingrained
identity to advocate the belief of non-intervention.29
The limitations of idealistic transnational cooperation
Piracy as a threat is transnational in nature. It involves this personnel “travelling between and
operating in more than one country30,” with the potential of sabotaging people from more than
one country. As such, cooperation between governments around the world is a crucial and
pragmatic solution to dispel pirate attacks. In the Gulf of Aden, the Multinational organization
known as Combined Task Force 150 involve global naval assets of participant countries which
patrol an international waterway, a corridor designated by the IMO. Inter-regional organizations
such as NATO and the EU also play a significant contribution in combating suspected pirates in
the Gulf. Among the participating nations are countries from Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey,
the United Kingdom and the United States.31 However, the task of the marine sentinels is an
uphill one. The success of these naval campaigns is not dependent on how many pirates are
apprehended, but by how few incidents occur in the years to come. To achieve this, resources
have to be continuously poured into the region. This may sap the funds and supplies of
participant countries in efforts to bolster the fight against regional belligerents. The sustainability
of such an operation, which is wholly dependent on the cooperation of countries around the
world, remains to be seen.
The interest that states have in participating in such peace ventures is not without other
disconcerting affairs. For Japan, the contribution to international peace cooperation activities has
29
IBID, 16.
Liss, Carolin (2007), 9.
31
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS. 2008. NATO fleet sails toward Somalia to guard against Piracy. October 22.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/world/africa/23nato.html (accessed June 2, 2010) 30
12 resulted in a conflict of interest with the nation’s codified ideals, particularly their post-war
constitution. The country sees the need to combat piracy in order to protect its self interests at
sea. It has even proposed establishing a military base in Africa to serve as a deployment position
against pirates. However, this runs against the clauses of the 1947 Japanese Constitution, which
do not permit the use of military power in foreign land and sea territories.32 The plain negation
towards the adherence of state constitution may jeopardize the legitimacy of the current Japanese
government. To some, it may even spark concerns of growing global influence that the country
may want to exert, bringing forth its legacy as an Imperialist power. What remains certain is that
the increase in military presence will undoubtedly compromise the amount of trust countries
have in each other.
Along the Straits of Malacca, combating piracy also requires the unbridled cooperation of both
littoral nations and other countries outside of the region. Though ASEAN has non-interference
policies of the domestic affairs of its member states (as elaborated on above), it still has played a
leading role in coordinating maritime security in the region. Most notably, ASEAN leaders in
2003 pledged their efforts towards the creation of a “security community” in the region; one that
would combat transnational threats such as maritime piracy and terrorism. Apart from these
initiatives, multilateral agreements have enhanced cooperation and official participation among
contributing countries. One such agreement, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAPP), was spearheaded by Japan; a
country with vested interests in protecting maritime traffic. Of special significance to this
particular arrangement is the establishment of the use of the Information Sharing Center, which
allows the distribution of important surveillance and information on belligerent activities. All
this is channeled with the intention of increasing cooperation among sixteen countries, including
member ASEAN states. However, two important countries have yet to pledge their contributions
to the ReCAPP. These are the nations of Malaysia and Indonesia, the latter which is responsible
for the bulk of pirate activity in the region. Another limitation to this collaboration is that the
ReCAPP only permits the sharing of important information about belligerent actors. It does not
32
Rozoff, Rick. 2010. Japanese Military Joins U.S. and NATO in Horn of Africa. Australia.to News. April 27.
http://www.australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2406:japanese-military-joins-usand-nato-in-horn-of-africa&catid=122:security&Itemid=169 (accessed June 3, 2010). 13 hold any further authority to apprehend the pirates, arresting the final effort to eliminate the
transnational threat. In the end, the self help nature of the anarchic world order persists, leaving
states with their own resources to patrol their designated territorial waters.33
Apart from regional efforts in pursuit of cooperation are bilateral agreements that facilitate state
collaboration. Bilateral agreements between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have been
introduced over the past decade to “conduct joint exercises at sea and to coordinate naval patrols
in the Malacca Straits34”. These have manifested in the creation of the MALSINDO coordinated
patrols of the Malacca Straits in 2004 by naval units of these countries. This evolved two years
later with the inclusion of the Eye in the Sky program (EiS). This involved the cooperation of
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand in the conducting of daily-run air patrols along the
Straits. Since April 2006, the efforts of MALSINDO and EiS have been brought together under
the broad network of the Malacca Straits Patrol Network. Despite such detailed fanfare, the
initiative has largely failed to decrease the amount of pirate cases. The patrols have been
criticized by the international community as merely being a sharing of each of the countries’
schedules and resources- nothing more. Indeed, preventing closer cooperation among the
countries is the recurring concern over their individual sovereignty. Regulations that restrict a
patrol’s entry into territorial waters are also another thwarting limitation.35
Conclusion
What is necessary is that the problem be nipped in the bud. Such a quandary lies in the sustained
effects of rampart poverty in coastal communities. Perhaps the real solution lies in the continued
waves of humanitarian aid and potential foreign investment that is injected to these areas,
equipping the locals with education, jobs and better livelihoods. In this respect, the incentive to
resort to illegal and violent means to survive decrease. In tandem with this is the increase of
penalties and legal punishments that deter one from resorting to piracy; one in which the costs of
engaging in these acts clearly outweigh the benefits. However, this requires the commitment and
cooperation of the relevant government and judicial authorities. Where such support is absent,
33
Liss, Carolin. (2007), 10-11.
IBID
35
IBID, 11. 34
14 states may have to resort to strengthening and utilizing multinational agencies in an attempt to
garner support from other countries towards the fight against piracy.
Inevitably, all solutions have their inherent limitations. What may be more useful will be for
nations to draw up specific aims and goals to fulfill along a specific timeframe. What remains
clear is the utmost need for the collaboration amongst states and the sharing of resources among
themselves to combat their elusive and versatile adversaries. Yet this remains a distant
achievement. Whether the world will see unbridled collaboration in the realm of international
security is a question that many may remain cynical of. In today’s context, states have yet to
learn to work together. Most of the time, efforts towards coordination fall short of action and
agencies are mostly talk shops. What remains a more feasible and convenient solution for
countries in the here and now is that they take care of their own interests, protect their own
citizens with the use of their own resources. Until the sweet ideal of liberalism is realized,
countries have to rely on their own resources for now in this largely realist, anarchic and selfhelp world order.
5250
Effects of piracy to Global World Order
1) Threat to sovereignty
15 2) Compromise of state enterprise
3) Fuzzy negotiations towards colluding to disarm the maritime threat
a. Non-acceptance of responsibility
b. Threaten sovereignty and legitimacy of a nation
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