IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
MARK L. PEARSON
CASE NO.: 2008-IA-01300-SCT
VERSUS
DAVID NUTT & ASSOCIATES, P.C. et al.
APPELLEES
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
GARY D. THRASH I MSB# 2
JOHN N. SATCHER, II I MSB~
SINGLETARY & THRASH-JACKSON, P.A.
POST OFFICE BOX 587
JACKSON, MS 39205-0587
(601) 948-7410
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
MARK L. PEARSON
CASE NO.: 2008-IA-01300-SCT
VERSUS
DAVID NUTT & ASSOCIATES, P.C. et al.
APPELLEES
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
The undersigned counsel ofrecord certifies that the following listed persons have an interest
in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the justices of the Supreme
Court and/or the judges of the Court of Appeals may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
William Liston, Esq.
Liston / Lancaster
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 645
Winona, MS 38967
William Liston, III, Esq.
Liston / Lancaster
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 22983
Jackson, MS 39225
Richard Freese, Esq.
FREESE & GOSS PLLC
20312 nd Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35203
Dennis Sweet, Esq.
SWEET & ASSOCIATES
158 East Pascagoula Street
Jackson, MS 39201
Edward Blackmon, Jr.
BLACKMON & BLACKMON
907 W. Peace Street
Canton, MS 39046-0105
N.S~,
11
::IL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGES
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS ....................................
1-11
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................... iii
LIST OF AUTHORITIES .................................................... iv-vi
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................ 1-2
ARGUMENT AND THE LAW ............................................... 2-12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................... 13-14
III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Authority
Page(s)
Allied Steel Corp. v. Cooper
(607 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1992) ............................................... 2
American Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Eugene H. Bloom Retirement Center, Inc.
1995 WL 1055805 (Va. Cir. Ct. March 8,1995) ................................ 5
Barrick v. Pratt
32 F.2d 732 (Ala. 1929) ................................................... 2
Bowen v. Cullman Bros., Inc.
414 F.2d 739 (Fla. 1969) .................................................. 2
Brown v. Leach
189 A.D. 158, 164 (NY 1919) ............................................ 5, 9
Carmichael v. Agur Realty Co., Inc.
574 So.2d 603 (Miss. 1990) ................................................ 2
Cooper v. Frierson
48 Miss. 300 (Miss. 1873) ................................................. 2
Crownshield Trading Corp. v. Earle
200 App. Div. 10,192 NYS 304 (NY 1922) ................................. 3,4
Evanovich v. Hutto
204 So. 2d 477 (Miss. 1967) ............................................... 7
Fortenberry v. Foxworth Corp.
825 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Miss. 1993) ........................................ 7
Jones v. Warren
70 Miss. 227,14 So. 25 (1892) ............................................. 7
Knight v. McCain
531 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1998) ............................................... 8
McCartney v. McKendrick
226 Miss. 562, 85 So.2d 164 (Miss. 1956) ................................... 10
IV
Mclver v. Norman
205 P.2d 137 (Oregon 1949) ............................................... 6
Missan v Schoenfeld
95 App Div 2d 198,465 NYS2d 706 (1" Dept. 1983) ............................ 7
OMP v. Security Pacific Business Finance, Inc.
716 F.Supp. 239 (N.D.Miss. 1988) .......................................... 6
Pfingstl v. Solomon
240 Ala 58, 197 So. 12 (Ala. 1940) ......................................... 9
Rice v. Williams
387 So. 2d 733, 735 (Miss. 1980) ....................................... 6,7,8
Roark v. Hicks
362 S.E.2d 711 (Va. 1987) ................................................. 5
Scurto v. Siegrist
598 So.2d 507, 509 (La.App. 1" CiT. 1992) ................................ 10, 11
Smith & Hitt Const. Co., Inc. v. Fowler
466 So.2d 896 (Miss. 1985) ............................................... 6
Stem v. Warren
185 A.D. 823 (N.Y. A.D. 11919) ........................................... 5
Union Nat '[ Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby
870 So.2d 1175, 1182 (Miss. 2004) .......................................... 2
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp.
504 F.2d 518 (Ga. 1974) .................................................. 2
Warren v. Chapman
535 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1987) ............................................. 5, 7, 8
v
Constitutions, Statutes, and Treatises
Article 3, § 31 of the Mississippi Constitution ....................................... 2
D.C. CODE § 41-129 ........................................................... 8
Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-39 ...................................................... 7
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-13-405 .................................................... 7
Miss. Code § 79-13-802 ......................................................... 8
46 Am. Jur. Joint Ventures, § 26, 31 ............................................ 9, 10
vi
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
MARK L. PEARSON
APPELLANT
VERSUS
CASE NO.: 2008-IA-01300-SCT
DAVID NUTT & ASSOCIATES, P.e. et al.
APPELLEES
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT MARK L. PEARSON
COMES NOW THE APPELLANT, Mark L. Pearson (hereinafter "Appellant" or "Pearson"),
and files his Reply Brief, and would respectfully show unto the Court the following, to-wit:
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellees rushed to the courthouse and filed a complaint alleging equitable claims, in the
improper venue of Madison County Chancery Court, when the actual dispute between the parties
involves matters oflaw that should be tried in the Circuit Court of Hinds County. Chancery courts
have limited jurisdiction and circuit courts have general jurisdiction. In this matter, the more
appropriate court is the Circuit Court of Hinds County where Pearson's claims for actual and
punitive damages can be litigated and tried before a jury. The precedent in Mississippi favors having
equitable claims brought before a Circuit Court when they are connected to a contractual relationship
or other claims tied to questions oflaw, such as in our case.
Honorable Patricia Wise, Chancellor of Hinds County, denied Pearson's request to a trial by
jury in her court (Appellant's R.E. 11). Since trials by jury are left to the discretion of the
chancellors in chancery courts, Pearson is being denied his substantive right. Pearson is entitled to
a trial by jury as provided by the Mississippi Constitution Article 3, § 31. Public policy of allowing
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a plaintiff "to choose his or her forum does not outweigh [a defendant's1constitutional right to a
jury". Union Nat'! Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So.2d 1175, 1182 (Miss. 2004). Pearson request
that this Court reverse the lower court's decision and allow Pearson to have a jury trial or in the
alternative to transfer the case to appropriate court for matters oflaw, the Circuit Court of Hinds
County.
ARGUMENT AND LAW
I.
The torts alleged in Pearson's Counter-Claim and the relief sought in the original
Complaint are governed by principles of common law and not based solely upon
equitable principles.
A joint venture has been characterized as a "single shot partnership". Allied Steel Corp. v.
Cooper, 607 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1992). However, it has been suggested that the relations and
obligations in a joint venture should be governed by principles of common-law partnership, even in
a jurisdiction which has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act, since the Act is not applicable for
such reasons as the venturers have not shown an intention to carry on a trade, occupation, or
business, or to create an agency relationship among themselves, such as when attorneys combine to
form a joint venture in the pursuit of a mass tort. A major distinction between a joint venture and
a partnership is that partners may not sue each other at law. Joint venturers are free to do so and are
not obligated to resort to an accounting as in the case of partners. See University Computing Co. v.
Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (Ga. 1974); Bowen v. Cullman Bros., Inc., 414 F.2d 739
(Fla. 1969); Barrick v. Pratt, 32 F.2d 732 (Ala. 1929). Joint venturers can proceed on legal claims
of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and loss profits, similar to the case at bar.
Upon dissolution of a joint venture, a winding up of affairs is required. Cooper v. Frierson,
48 Miss. 300 (Miss. 1873); Carmichael v. Agur Realty Co., Inc., 574 So.2d 603 (Miss. 1990). An
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equitable action for an accounting is a proper remedy for a party to a joint venture to recover his
share of the profits. However, where a partner has been excluded from a partnership, the partner
may seek equitable relief in the form of an accounting as well as an action at law for damages as a
result ofthe exclusion from the partnership. Crownshield Trading Corp. v. Earle, 200 App. Div.
10,15 (NY 1922).
This rule is succinctly stated by Rowley in his work on 'The Modern Law of Partnership'
(§ 769) as follows: "Where the term has expired or the excluding partner has put an end to the
business, the excluded partner has a right in action at law to recover as damages his share of the
profits." A partner who is excluded from the partnership by his copartner is entitled to bring an
action at law for lost profits. although an accounting was requested in an action in equity. {emphasis
added}.
A.
Joint Venturers are not obligated to resort only to an accounting but may
maintain an action at law for damages.
While an accounting may be necessary to determine certain profits and debts related to the
fruits of a joint venture, the remedy of maintaining an action at law for damages resulting from the
actions of a co-adventurer is not abolished by an accounting. In the case of Crownshield Trading
Corp. v. Earle, 200 App. Div. 10, 192 NYS 304 (NY 1922), Crownshield and Earle entered into a
joint venture for the purchase and sale of quicksilver and other commodities. Earle was to provide
the financing for the joint venture while both parties were to share the duties of selling the
commodities and then share in the losses and profits arising from such transactions equally. Id. at
11. Crownshield and Earle entered into a contract with the United States; however, immediately
following the execution of the contract, Earle attempted to exclude Crownshield from the joint
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venture and refused to pennit Crownshield from participating in the business dealings with the
United States as previously agreed to between the parties in their joint venture agreement. [d. at 13.
Earle continued its business relationship with the United States earning commissions from the
business transactions; however, Earle did not pay Crownshield its one-half of the commissions as
previously agreed. [d. at 14. The court found that Crownshield was entitled not only to an
accounting but that it was entitled to an action at law to seek damages resulting from Earle's breach
of contract (joint venture agreement) including but not limited to lost profits, loss of business
revenue during the tenn and damages resulting from the wrongful dissolution of the joint venture
prior to the tenn. [d. at 15. In our case at bar, an accounting will simply show what Nutt et aI. has
done with the Kuhlman litigation settlement funds, what expenses, costs and fees have been
disbursed. An accounting will not resolve Pearson's claims for damages resulting from Nutt et aI.'s
breach of contract whethernegligent or intentional, wrongful retention of attorney's fees, lost profits
past and present and claim for punitive damages. An accounting is just the first step in the process
for Pearson to determine the minimum amount of attorneys fees and damages he has sustained as
a result of the co-adventurers' (Nutt et aI.) actions. Pearson should not be deprived a jury trial
simply because an accounting may be a necessary step in the long process of detennining his rights
and damages.
B.
Pearson's claim was not ripe for suit until the joint venture was complete and
a winding up of affairs had occurred.
In our case, Pearson's cause of action did not accrue and the time for the statute oflimitations
did not begin to run on his claim against Nutt, et aI. until the Nutt group settled the Kuhlman
litigation on July 5, 2005 without the consent and consultation of Pearson and subsequently when
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Nutt et al. failed to pay Pearson his agreed upon share of the profits. The case law is clear, the
statute ofiimitations regarding a joint venture does not commence until the joint venture is complete,
even if the co-venturers lawfully dissolve the venture. American Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Eugene
H Bloom Retirement Center, Inc., 1995 WL 1055805 (Va. Cir. Ct. March 8,1995). Pearson had the
right to wait for the joint venture to be complete before suing for his share of the profits. A suit by
Pearson against Nutt el al. prior to the Kuhlman settlement and final accounting offunds would have
resulted in the legal impossibility of each joint venturer being both a plaintiff and defendant in the
same action. Id. at *2. The fiduciary relationship between joint venturers begins with the formation
of the joint venture and continues until the enterprise has been completely wound up and terminated.
The statute ofiimitations begins to run onjoint ventures' claims against each other at the completion
ofthe winding up of the affairs of the dissolved enterprise. Roark v. Hicks, 362 S.E.2d 711 (Va.
1987). In our case, the winding up of affairs concluded when the Kuhlman litigation reached
settlement and profits of said litigation were distributed to the members ofthe joint venture, except
Pearson.
Ajoint venture is limited to a specific enterprise or object, as the case at bar, the joint venture
terminates when the object for its existence has been completed even if the members sought to expel
a participant. In our case, we have a contractual relationship that does not terminate until the
litigation settles. It is a well settled rule that joint venturers owe the duty ofutrnost good faith to
their coadventurers, and that until the joint adventure is abandoned a joint venturer can not act for
himself. If a joint venturer continues and accrues the benefits that would have become due to the
joint venturer, then he will be liable to his coadventurers in the amount previously agreed upon.
Brown v. Leach, 189 A.D. 158, 164 (NY 1919)(citing Mayv. HettrickBrothers Co., 181 App. 3,13;
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Stem v. Warren, 185 A.D. 823, 831(N.Y. A.D. I 1919). Even when a joint venture is tenninated
from the standpoint of further prosecution of the venture, it remains in existence nevertheless for the
purposes of accounting and settlement. McIver v. Norman, 205 P.2d 137 (Oregon 1949); Smith &
Hitt Canst. Co., Inc. v. Fowler, 466 So.2d 896 (Miss. 1985); OMP v. Security Pacific Business
Finance, Inc., 716 F.Supp. 239 (N.D.Miss. 1988).
In Rice v. Williams, 387 So. 2d 733, 735 (Miss. 1980), as in this case, there were cross claims
for accounting of profits after a partnership/joint venture was terminated with the partner in
possession of the funds and the books claiming the statute of limitations had run on the other
partner's claim that he had not been paid his appropriate share of the profits. The partnership began
in 1967. In 1972, they agreed to different salary and profit sharing terms. Rice retired on December
31, 1975. Rice filed suit sometime after that. The issue was whether the statute oflimitations had
run on his claim that Williams had overpaid himself and underpaid Rice from 1972 to 1975.
Williams claimed the three year statute applied and had run on claim for an accounting from 1972
to 1975.
The court rejected Williams' statute oflimitations defense pointing out that there is no hard
and fast rule as to when the statute oflimitations runs on the right of a partner to have an accounting.
When the right of action to sue for the settlement of partnership affairs accrues depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Because as between themselves partners are trustees, the
statute of limitations will not run against their liability to account to each other during the
continuance of the partnership. It may begin to run from the time that nothing remains to be done
except to settle the affairs of the partnership, or from the date when the duty of the accounting
partner to have the partnership or venture in a condition for its complete settlement occurs. But
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under no circumstances does the statute oflimitations for an accounting begin to run until after the
dissolution of the partnership or joint venture. fd citing Evanovich v. Hutto, 204 So. 2d 477 (Miss.
1967); see also Missan v Schoenfeld, 95 App Div 2d 198, 465 NYS2d 706 (1" Dept. 1983)(statute
oflimitations did not bar any claims going back to the beginning ofthe partnership over a decade
earlier in an action by an ousted attorney following settlement of a major case and dissolution of the
partnership). Moreover, because ofthe prior fiduciary relationship between partners of a tenninated
partnership, the statute oflimitations is tolled between them until a full and final accounting can be
had. fd; see also Fortenberry v. Foxworth Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Jones v.
Warren, 70 Miss. 227,14 So. 25 (1892) (statute oflimitations has nothing to do with a case for an
accounting between partners).
While Williams claimed in Rice that the three year statute oflimitations applied to an action
for accounting between partners, the Rice court never validated that argument. They simply found
that the statute didn't begin to run until shortly before the suit was filed. On the other hand, there
are earlier Mississippi cases holding that the ten year statute oflimitations in Miss. Code Ann. §
15-1-39 applies when the claim is one for an accounting offunds which should be regarded as being
held in trust by one fonner partner/joint venturer which rightfully belong to another fonner
partner/joint venturer.
The Unifonn Partnership Act contains no statute oflimitations of its own. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 79-13-405(c). In Warren v. Chapman, 535 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1987), a law finn dissolution case, the
court held that the adoption of the Unifonn Partnership Act did not change the fonnerrule that when
a winding up of affairs is necessary, the statute does not begin to run immediately upon dissolution
but is deferred until after the business of the partnership is concluded. To the contrary, the Unifonn
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Act specifically provides that after dissolution "the partnership is not terminated, but continues until
the winding up of the partnership affairs is completed." D.C. CODE § 41-129; Miss. Code § 79-13802. The Warren court also pointed out that requiring a departing partner attorney to institute a
protective lawsuit at dissolution would encourage unnecessary, premature, and excessive litigation.
Also in keeping with the general rule set out in Rice v. Williams that when the right of action to sue
for the settlement of partnership affairs accrues depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case, Warren held that by defining the circumstances when there was a right to an accounting, the
Uniform Partnership Act does not necessarily also define when a cause of action for an accounting
has "accrued" in a particular case.
While there may be many types of partnerships where it is possible to determine the value
of the various rights at the time of, or shortly after a partner takes action that ends a partnership, the
situation is considerably different in the case of attorneys working solely on a contingent fee basis.
There is even less ability to value the rights of the departing or expelled attorney when the
partnership is not a law firm with a mix of cases but is instead a joint venture for the purposes of
specific litigation that will all likely rise or fall at the same time. The single purpose litigationjoint
venture is the sort of exceptional case where it would be impossible to do any sort of meaningful
accounting until the litigation is concluded. In this situation, it would clearly be requiring
unnecessary, premature and excessive litigation to require Pearson to have sued to collect his share
of the attorney's fees within three years of April 15, 2002 when the cases were not even settled until
after that date. The law does not require the doing of futile and useless thing. Knight v. McCain,
531 So. 2d 590, 597 (Miss. 1998).
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C.
Nutt and the joint venturers could not terminate Pearson from the joint venture
without his consent.
Nutt et al. could not terminate Pearson from the joint venture without Pearson's consent and
none was given. In Brown v. Leach, it states "one partner cannot terminate the partnership and
continue the enterprise for his own benefit, nor can one partner exclude the other without his
consent. It may be terminated at any time by consent, but the consent must be mutual." Brown, 189
A.D. at 163 (citing Hardin v. Robinson, 178 App.Div. 724, 729; affd., 223 N.Y. 651).
Pearson first entered into a joint venture agreement with Harold J. Barkley, Jr. and Harold
J. Barkley, III in Late 1999 or early 2000. That joint venture then formed another joint venture
agreement with David Nutt & Associates, P.C. which was executed on November 3, 2000,
(Appellant's R.E. I). Prior to and subsequent to said agreement, Pearson was an active participant
in the Kuhlman Electric Company litigation and adamantly denies any allegation to the contrary.
Pearson specifically takes offense to the Appellees blatant libel and smear tactics wherein Appellees
repeatedly attack Pearson's character by referencing in their brief that Pearson was drunk andlor
belligerent at meetings and group sessions during the litigation of the Kuhlman Electric Company.
Pearson vehemently denies all such allegations and said allegations should be stricken from the
record. Pearson participated to the extent allowed by Nutt, et al. The April 15,2002 letter sent by
David Nutt & Associates, P.C.; Harold J. Barkley, Jr. and Harold J. Barkley, III was the first time
Pearson was contacted regarding the alleged lack of contribution and attempted termination,
(Appellant's R.E. 2). Nonetheless, without Pearson's consent the co-adventurers could not terminate
Pearson from the joint venturellitigation of the Kuhlman action. See 46 Am. Jur. Joint Ventures, §
31, Page 59; Pfingstl v. Solomon, 240 Ala 58, 197 So. 12 (Ala. 1940).
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D.
Joint venturers share in profits of the joint venture equally or by a
predetermined and agreed upon amount.
Joint venturers share in profits equally unless otherwise agreed upon; quantum meruit is not
applied to detennine the percentage of a joint venturers contribution or profits. In our case, Pearson
is entitled to the agreed upon percentage of profits/attorneys fees as outlined in the November 3,
2000 Joint Venture Agreement (Appellant's R.E. 1).
Benefits and profits resulting from a joint venture belong to the members as a whole and the
law implies an equal division of the profits without regard to any inequality of contribution. 46 Am.
Jur. 2d, Joint Ventures, § 26, Page 52-53. Division of profits and responsibilities, however, may be
changed through agreement and the members may limit their respective roles, contributions, and
profits accordingly. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Joint Ventures, § 26, Page 53. Even if a member having a
fixed and certain interest in the property is guilty of breaches making him liable for damages, he
cannot be excluded from the right to participate in the profits by unilateral action of the other party
or be held on doubtful evidence to have forfeited that right by his own free will. McCartney v.
McKendrick, 226 Miss. 562, 85 So.2d 164 (Miss. 1956).
In the case of Scurto v. Siegrist, 598 So.2d 507, 509 (La.App. 1" Cir. 1992), the court
discussed the division of attorneys's fees involving a contingency fee contract and the court opined
"the agreement regarding the division of the fee is a joint venture which gives the parties to the
contract the right to participate in the fund resulting from the payment of the fee by the client." Thus
a suit by an attorney to recover pursuant to that (joint venture) agreement is a suit based upon a
breach of contract and not a suit for the recovery of attorney's fees. [d. at 510 citing Duer & Taylor
v. Blanchard, Walker, O'Quinn & Roberts, 354 So.2d 192 (La. 1978). The Louisiana court
- 10-
concluded that attorneys who enter into a joint venture in pursuit of a legal claim which results in
a dispute over attorneys fees, the apportionment of fees is not based upon a quantum meruit basis
but is based upon the contract/joint venture agreement. Scurto v. Siegrist, 598 So.2d 507, 510.
CONCLUSION
Barkley and Nutt owed fiduciary duties to Pearson as a joint venturer. Nutt et aI. could not
terminate their ongoing fiduciary duties to Pearson with regard to his property interests in the profits
of the joint venture. When they settled the cases without notifYing Pearson and first received
attorneys fees, a part of which rightfully belonged to Pearson, the law imposed a constructive trust
on them which carried with it more fiduciary duties. Those duties as constructive trustees were
breached when they refused to pay Pearson his share of the fees they had begun to collect in 2005.
It is the breach of the winding up fiduciary duties upon receipt of the fees in 2005 which
gives rise to Pearson's claims for accounting and further gives rise to his legal claims for breach of
contract, lost profits and other damages. In such circumstances, the court has the authority to
provide relief in the form of an accounting, the imposition of a constructive trust over the fees due
to Pearson, and ifit finds the circumstances egregious enough, to award punitive damages. The ten
year statute of limitations applies to these claims. Even if a three year statute of limitations did
apply, it would not have run when Pearson filed his counterclaim less than three years after the
settlements were executed.
Pearson did not abandon the joint venture and he could not be excluded from participating
in the Kuhlman settlement without his consent. Nutt et aI. as co-adventurers are bound by case law
to share the profits among the joint venturers equally or bound by the contract terms of the joint
venture agreement to disburse the attorneys' fees accordingly. The attorneys' fees due and owing
- 11 -
Pearson are determined by contract or the laws concerning joint ventures. Moreover, the case law
is clear that quantum meruit is not the basis of determining what fees are owed to an attorney as a
result of a joint venture.
While it is true that the initial complaint is normally the basis of detennining where a case
will be heard, but in this case of blatant forum shopping, the defendant appeals in order to be saved
from an unfair and unbalanced administration ofjustice. A court of general jurisdiction will be more
likely to adjudicate the entirety of the claims in the most efficient way possible and allow a jury to
decide the issues. Public policy dictates that Pearson's Constitutional right to a trial by jury
outweighs plaintiff/appellees right to a choice of forum. The defendant prays that the decision of
the Hinds County Circuit Court be reversed and Appellant be awarded a jury trial before Honorable
Patricia Wise or in the alternative have the case transferred to the Circuit Court of Hinds County.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the
Z2~ of April, 2009.
MARK L. PEARSON, APPELLANT
BY:
BY:
SINGLETARY & THRASH, P.A.
His Attorneys
N·
D. THRASH/----~iiiii. . .
N. SATCHER, II / MSI
GARY D. THRASH,
JOHN N. SATCHER, II,
SINGLETARY & THRASH,
POST OFFICE BOX 587
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205
TELEPHONE:
(601) 948-7410
FAX:
(601) 353-0126
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Gary D. Thrash/John N. Satcher, II, attorneys for Appellant, do hereby certify that I have
this date caused to bemailed.viaU.S.Mail. a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Brief of Appellant and Record Excerpts to the following attorney for the Appellees:
Honorable Patricia D. Wise
Hinds County Chancellor
Post Office Box 686
Jackson, MS 39205-0686
William Liston, Esq.
Liston I Lancaster
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 645
Winona, MS 38967
William Liston, III, Esq.
Liston I Lancaster
Attorneys at Law
Post Office Box 22983
Jackson, MS 39225
Richard Freese, Esq.
FREESE & GOSS PLLC
2031 2nd Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35203
Dennis Sweet, Esq.
SWEET & ASSOCIATES
158 East Pascagoula Street
Jackson, MS 39201
- 13 -
Edward Blackmon, Jr.
BLACKMON & BLACKMON
907 W. Peace Street
Canton, MS 39046-0105
~',I,o(
So certified, this the '-~ of April, 2009.
\k. N. S~-:1L
, RYD. THRASH
JOHN N. SATCHER, II
GARY D. THRASH, MSB_
JOHN N. SATCHER, II, MSB#_ _
SINGLETARY & THRASH, P.A.
POST OFFICE BOX 587
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205
TELEPHONE:
(601) 948-7410
FAX:
(601) 353-0126
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