Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984
Author(s): Jack Snyder
Source: International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 108-146
Published by: The MIT Press
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Relations JackSnyder
Civil-Military
and the Cultof the
Offensive,1914 and
1984
Military technology
should have made the Europeanstrategic
balance in July1914a model of
defiedthosetechnological
but offensive
stability,
military
strategies
realities,
and instatrappingEuropeanstatesmenin a war-causing
spiralofinsecurity
bility.As the Boer and Russo-JapaneseWars had foreshadowedand the
GreatWar itselfconfirmed,
prevailingweaponryand means of transport
favoredthe defender.Tactically,
strongly
withering
firepower
gave a huge
advantageto entrencheddefenders;strategically,
defendersoperatingon
theirown territory
could use railroadsto outmaneuvermarchinginvaders.
each of the majorcontinental
Despite these inexorableconstraints,
powers
beganthewarwithan offensive
campaign.Thesewarplansand theoffensive
an important
and perhapsdecisive
behindthemwerein themselves
doctrines
used by
cause ofthewar. Security,
notconquest,was theprincipalcriterion
the designersof the plans, but theirnet effectwas to reduce everyone's
securityand to convinceat leastsome statesthatonlypreventive
aggression
could ensuretheirsurvival.
Even ifthe outbreakof war is takenas a given,the offensive
plans must
failedto achieveitsambitiousgoals
stillbe judged disasters.Each offensive
and, in doingso, createdmajordisadvantagesforthestatethatlaunchedit.
Germany'sinvasionof Belgiumand FranceensuredthatBritainwould join
a blockade.Themiscarriage
theopposingcoalitionand implement
ofFrance's
ill-conceivedfrontalattackalmostprovidedthe marginof help that the
Schlieffen
Plan needed. Though the worstwas avertedby a last-minute
railwaymaneuver,the Germansnonethelessoccupied a key portionof
France'sindustrialnortheast,makinga settlement
based on the statusquo
ante impossibleto negotiate.Meanwhile,in East Prussiatheannihilation
of
an over-extended
that
Russianinvasionforcesquanderedtroops
mighthave
RobertJervis,WilliamMcNeill,CynthiaRoberts,and StephenVan Evera providedhelpful
book,TheIdeology
commentson thispaper,whichdrawsheavilyon theauthor'sforthcoming
MakingandtheDisasters
of1914(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity
oftheOffensive:
Military
Decision
Press,1984).
University.
in thePolitical
Science
Department,
Columbia
Jack
Snyder
is an Assistant
Professor
International
Security,Summer 1984 (Vol. 9, No. 1) 0162-2889/84/010108-39
$02.50/1
?) 1984 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.
108
Civil-Military
Relations
1109
been decisiveifused to reinforce
theundermanned
advanceintoAustria.In
each case, a defensiveor morelimitedoffensive
strategy
would have leftthe
statein a morefavorablestrategic
position.
None ofthesedisasterswas unpredictable
or unpredicted.
It was notonly
seers like Ivan Bloch who anticipatedthe stalematedpositionalwarfare.
GeneralStaffstrategists
themselves,in theirmorelucid moments,foresaw
theseoutcomeswithastonishing
accuracy.Schlieffen
directeda war gamein
whichhe defeatedhis own plan withpreciselythe railwaymaneuverthat
Joffre
employedto prevailon the Marne. In anotherGermanwar game,
which actuallyfellinto Russian hands, Schlieffen
used the advantageof
railwaymobilityto defeatpiecemealthe two prongsof a Russianadvance
aroundtheMasurianLakes-preciselythemaneuverthatled to theencirclementof Sazonov's Second Armyat Tannenbergin August1914.Thisis not
to say thatEuropeanwar plannersfullyappreciatedthe overwhelming
advantagesof the defender;partlytheyunderratedthose advantages,partly
theydefiedthem.The pointis thatour own 20/20hindsightis not qualitathatwas achievableby thehistorical
tivelydifferent
fromtheunderstanding
1
protagonists.
Whythenwere these self-defeating,
war-causingstrategies
adopted?Alin each case strategic
thoughtheparticulars
variedfromcountryto country,
was skewedby a pathologicalpatternofcivil-military
relations
policymaking
thatallowedor encouragedthemilitary
to use wartimeoperationalstrategy
to solveitsinstitutional
problems.Whenstrategy
wentawry,itwas because
a penchantforoffensehelped the military
to preserveits auorganization
to simplify
tonomy,prestige,and traditions,
its institutional
routines,or to
resolvea disputewithinthe organization.
As further
discussionwill show,
itwas notjusta quirkoffatethatoffensive
servedthesefunctions.
strategies
On balance,offensetendsto suitthe needs of military
better
organizations
thandefensedoes, and militaries
normallyexhibitat leasta moderateprefforthatreason.Whatwas special
erenceforoffensive
and doctrines
strategies
about the period beforeWorldWar I was thatthe state of civil-military
relationsin each of the major powers tended to exacerbatethat normal
offensive
bias, eitherbecause the lack of civiliancontrolallowedit to grow
1. GerhardRitter,The Schlieffen
Plan (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 60, note 34; A.A. Polivanov,
Voennoedelo,No. 14 (1920), p. 421, quoted in JackSnyder, The IdeologyoftheOffensive:
Military
DecisionMakingand theDisastersof1914 (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1984), chapter 7.
International
Securityj 110
uncheckedorbecausean abnormaldegreeofcivil-military
conflict
heightened
theneed fora self-protective
ideology.
In part,then,the "cult of the offensive"of 1914 reflectedthe endemic
preference
of military
organizationsforoffensivestrategies,
but it also reflectedparticular
circumstances
thatliberatedor intensified
thatpreference.
The natureand timingofthesecatalytic
circumstances,
thoughall rootedin
in each country.Indeed,
problemsof civil-military
relations,were different
ifwar had brokenout as lateas 1910,theRussianand Frencharmieswould
bothhave foughtquitedefensively.2
Germanywas the firstEuropeanpowerto commititselfto a wildlyoverambitiousoffensivestrategy,movingsteadilyin this directionfrom1891
when Schlieffen
became the Chiefof the GeneralStaff.The root of this
pathologywas the completeabsenceof civiliancontroloverplans and doctrine,whichprovidedno checkon the naturaltendencyof maturemilitary
and dogmatizedoctrinesthatsupportthe
organizationsto institutionalize
of novelty
organizational
goals of prestige,autonomy,and the elimination
and uncertainty.
Often,as in thiscase, itis offensethatservestheseinterests
best.3
Francemoved in 1911froma cautiouscounteroffensive
strategy
towards
a outrance.
therecklessfrontal
The rootsof
assaultprescribed
by theoffensive
thisdoctrinecan also be tracedto a problemin civil-military
relations.The
Frenchofficer
corpshad alwaysbeenwaryoftheThirdRepublic'sinclination
the
towardsshorterand shortertermsofmilitary
service,whichthreatened
professionalcharacterand traditionsof theirorganization.Toutingthe offensewas a way to containthisthreat,sinceeveryoneagreedthatan army
based on reservistsand short-service
conscriptswould be good only for
defense.The DreyfusAffair
and theradicalmilitary
reforms
thatfollowedit
heightenedthe officer
corps'need fora self-protective
ideologythatwould
justifythe essence and defendthe autonomyof theirorganization.The
extremedoctrineof the offensive
servedpreciselythis function,
d outrance
helpingto discreditthe defensive,reservist-based
plans of the politicized
2. One reason that the war did not happen until 1914 was that Russian offensivepower did
not seriouslythreatenGermanyuntil about thatyear. In this sense, the factthatall the powers
had offensivestrategiesin the year the war broke out is to be explained more by theirstrategies'
interactiveconsequences than by theircommon origins.
3. Snyder, Ideologiy
oftheOffensive,
chapters 1, 4, and 5. I have profitedgreatlyfromthe works
of Barry Posen, The Sourcesof MilitaryDoctrine(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1984), and
Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War" (Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof California,Berkeley,
1984), who advance similararguments.
Relations
Civil-Military
I 111
"republican"officers
who rantheFrenchmilitary
underciviliantutelageuntil
the Agadircrisisof 1911. Given a freerrein in the harsherinternational
climate,GeneralJoffre
and theYoungTurksaroundhimused theoffensive
doctrineto help justifya lengthening
of the termof serviceand to reemphasize thevalue of a morehighlyprofessionalized
army.4
Russia'sdrift
towardsincreasingly
overcommitted
offensive
plansbetween
1912and 1914was also abettedby the conditionof civil-military
relations.
The problemin this case was the existenceof two powerfulveto groups
withinthemilitary,
one in theGeneralStaffthatfavoredan offensive
against
Germanyand anothercenteredon the Kiev military
district
thatwantedto
attackAustria.Forceswereinsufficient
to carryoutbothmissions,but there
was no strong,centralizedcivilianauthority
who could or would enforcea
rationalpriority
commensurate
withRussian means. Lackingfirmcivilian
direction,the two military
factionslog-rolledthe issue, each gettingto implementitspreferred
offensive
butwithinsufficient
troops.5
It mightbe argued thatthese pathologiesof civil-military
relationsare
unique to the historicalsettingof this period. Civiliansmay have been
in a way thathas been unequaledbeforeor since.
ignorantofmilitary
affairs
The transition
in thisperiodof theofficer
corpsfroman aristocratic
casteto
a specializedprofessionmayhave produceda uniquelyunfavorable
combinationof theill effects
ofboth.Finally,socialchangesassociatedwithrapid
industrialization
and urbanizationmayhave provideda uniquelyexplosive
reinforced
settingforcivil-military
relations,as class conflicts
civil-military
Evenifthisis true,however,thesamegeneralpatterns
conflicts.6
maypersist
butwithlesserintensity,
and understanding
thecircumstances
thatprovoke
moreintensemanifestations
theirrecurrence.
mayhelp to forestall
Such a recurrence,
whetherintenseor mild,is not a farfetched
scenario.
As in 1914,today's military
technologiesfavorthe defenderof the status
counterforce
quo, but the superpowersare adoptingoffensive
strategiesin
Likemachinegunsand railroads,
defianceofthesetechnological
constraints.
survivablenuclearweapons rendertrivialthe marginaladvantagesto be
gained by strikingfirst.In the view of some, this stabilizingeffecteven
neutralizeswhateverfirst-strike
advantagesmay existat the conventional
level, since the fearof uncontrollable
escalationwill restraineven the first
chapters2 and 3. See also Samuel Williamson,The Politicsof
4. Snyder,IdeologyoftheOffensive,
GrandStrategy(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1969).
chapters 6 and 7. See also A.M. Zaionchkovskii,Podgotovka
5. Snyder, Ideologyof theOffensive,
voine(Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926).
Rossiik imperialisticheskoi
6. Van Evera, "Causes of War," chapter 7, explores these questions briefly.
International
Security
1112
steps in that direction.Since the would-beaggressorhas the "last clear
chance"to avoid disasterand normallycares less about the outcomethan
the defenderdoes, mutualassured destruction
worksstrongly
forstability
and the defenseofthe statusquo. In thisway,theabsolutepowerto inflict
punishmenteases the securitydilemma.All statespossessingsurvivable
second-strike
forcescan be simultaneously
secure.7
Even those who are not entirelysatisfiedby the foregoingline of argument-and I includemyselfamongthem-mustnevertheless
admitthe reeffect
thattheirrevocable
straining
powerto punishhas had on international
tendsto workfor
politics.Caveats aside, the prevailingmilitary
technology
stability,
yetthe strategic
plans and doctrinesofbothsuperpowershave in
important
ways defiedand underminedthatbasic reality.As in 1914,the
dangertoday is thatwar will occurbecause of an erroneousbeliefthata
disarming,offensive
blow is feasibleand necessaryto ensurethe attacker's
security.
In orderto understandthe forcesthatare erodingthe stabilityof the
balance in our own era, it maybe helpfulto reflecton the causes
strategic
and consequencesof the "cultof the offensive"
of 1914. In proceedingtowardsthisgoal, I will discuss,first,how offensive
strategies
promotedwar
in 1914and, second,why each of the majorcontinental
powersdeveloped
offensive
military
strategies.Germanywillreceivespecialattention
because
the Schlieffen
the European security
Plan was the mainspringtightening
dilemmain 1914,because thelessonsoftheGermanexperiencecan be more
broadlygeneralizedthanthoseof the othercases, and because of the need
to correctthe widespreadview thatGermany'smilitary
was deterstrategy
mined by its revisionistdiplomaticaims. Afterexaminingthe domestic
sourcesof military
strategyin Germany,France,and Russia,I will discuss
relationsand strategies
theeffect
ofeach state'spolicieson thecivil-military
ofitsneighbors.A concludingsectionwillventuresomepossibleapplications
Sovietmilitary
doctrine.
ofthesefindingsto the studyofcontemporary
War
HowOffense
Promoted
Conventional
wisdomholdsthatWorldWarI was causedin partbyrunaway
have been remarkand politicalscientists
warplans,buthistorians
offensive
7. The best and most recent expression of this view is Robert Jervis,The Illogicof American
NuclearStrategy(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1984).
Relations
| 113
Civil-Military
ably imprecisein reconstructing
the logicof thisprocess.Theirvagueness
has allowedcriticsofarmscontrollers'
obsessionwithstrategic
instability
to
deny thatthe war resultedfrom"the reciprocalfearof surpriseattack"or
fromany otherby-product
of offensive
strategy.8
StephenVan Evera'scontribution
to thisissue takesa majorstep towardsidentifying
the manifold
ways in whichoffensivestrategiesand doctrinespromotedwar in 1914. I
would add onlytwo pointsto his compellingargument.The firstidentifies
some remainingpuzzles about the perceptionof first-strike
advantagein
1914;thesecondelaborateson Germany'sincentiveforpreventive
attackas
the decisiveway in whichoffensivemilitary
strategyled Europe towards
war.
Van Everacitesstatements
thatEuropeanmilitary
and behaviorindicating
and politicaldecision-makers
believedthatthe firstarmyto mobilizeand
strikewouldgaina significant
advantage.Fearingthattheirownpreparations
in all of
werelagging(or hopingto geta jump on theopponent),authorities
thecountriesfeltpressedto takemilitary
measuresthatcutshorttheprocess
of diplomacy,whichmighthave convergedon the solutionof a "halt in
Belgrade"ifgivenmoretime.Whatis lackingin thisstoryis a clearexplanationofhow themaximumgain or loss oftwodays could decisivelyaffect
theoutcomeofthecampaign.
Planningdocumentssuggestthatno one believedthata two-dayedge
would allow a disarmingsurpriseattack.Plannersin all countriesguarded
againstpreemptiveattackson troopsdisembarking
at railheadsby concentratingtheirforcesout of reachof such a blow. The onlyinitialoperation
thatdepended on thiskindof preemptive
strikeagainstunpreparedforces
was the Germancoupde mainagainstthe Belgiantransport
bottleneckof
Liege. As the Julycrisisdeveloped,the GermanGeneralStaffwas caused
someanxietyby theprogressofBelgianpreparations
to defendLiege,which
oftheSchlieffen
jeopardizedthesmoothimplementation
Plan,butMoltke's
In any
attitudewas not decisivelyinfluenced
by thisincentiveto preempt.9
event,it was Russia thatmobilizedfirst,and thereis littleto suggestthat
was decisivein thiscase either.Prewarplanningdocumentsand
preemption
8. Even the usually crystal-clearThomas Schelling is a bit murkyon this point. See his Arms
and Influence(New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1966), pp. 221-225. For a critic,see Stephen
Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring
Quarterly,
Peter Rosen, "Nuclear Arms and StrategicDefense," Washington
1981), pp. 83-84.
9. UlrichTrumpener,"War Premeditated?German IntelligenceOperations in July1914," Central
EuropeanHistory,Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 1976), p. 80.
International
Security| 114
staffexercisesshow thatthe Russiansworriedaboutbeingpreempted,but
tooksufficient
precautionsagainstit.Theyalso indicatethatpreemption
was
notparticularly
fearedifAustriawas embroiledin theBalkans-preciselythe
conditionsthatobtainedin July1914. On the offensive
side, however,the
incentive
to strikefirst
mighthavebeenan important
Van Everapoints
factor.
out thatthedifference
betweenthebestcase (mobilizing
first)and theworst
case (mobilizingsecond) was probablya net gain of fourdays (two gained
plus twonotlost).GiventheRussians'aimofputtingpressureon Germany's
rearbeforethe campaignin Francewas decided,fourdays was nota negligibleconsideration.
To save justtwodays,theRussianswerewillingtobegin
theiradvance withoutwaitingforthe formation
of theirsupplyechelons.
Thus,timepressureimposedby military
exigenciesmayexplainthehasteof
thecrucialRussianmobilization.
It shouldbe stressed,however,thatit was
neither"thereciprocalfearofsurpriseattack"northechanceofpreempting
theopponent'sunalertedforcesthatproducedthispressure.Rather,it was
the desireto close Germany'swindow of opportunity
againstFrancethat
gave Russiaan incentiveto strikefirst.10
A second elaborationof Van Evera'sargument,whichwillbe crucialfor
understanding
the followingsectionsof thispaper,is thatoffensive
plans
notonlyreflected
thebeliefthatstatesare vulnerableand conquestis easy;
theyactuallycaused the statesadoptingthemto be vulnerableand consequentlyfearful.Even the Fischerschool, which emphasizes Germany's
"graspingfor'WorldPower"' as the primarycause of the war,admitsthat
in 1914was also due to the huge
Germany'sdecisionto provokea conflict
Russianarmyincreasesthenin progress,whichwould have leftGermanyat
Russia's mercyupon theircompletionin 1917.1"This impendingvulnerabil-
operatsiia:
sbornik
dokumentov
10. Russia, 10-iotdel General'nogo shtaba RKKA, Vostochnoprusskaia
(Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1939), especially p. 62, which reproduces a Russian General Staff
intelligenceestimate dated March 1, 1914. Van Evera's quotations suggest that decision-makers
in all countriesexhibitedmore concern about being preempted than seems warrantedby actual
circumstances. One explanation may be that the militaryoversold this danger as a way of
which was clearlya concernamong
guardingagainst the riskof excessive civilianfoot-dragging,
the French military,at least. Another possibilityis that there was a disconnect between the
operational level of analysis, where it was obvious that no one could disrupt his opponent's
concentration,and the more abstractlevel of doctrine,where the intangiblebenefitsof "seizing
the initiative" were nonetheless considered important. See Snyder, Ideologyof the Offensive,
chapters2 and 3.
11. The Germans saw the planned 40 percentincrease in the size of the Russian standing army
as a threatto Germany's physical survival,not just a barrierforeclosingopportunitiesto expand.
This is expressed most clearly in the fear that the power shiftwould allow Russia to force a
Civil-Military
Relations
1115
ity,thoughrealenough,was largelya function
oftheSchlieffen
Plan,which
had to stripthe easternfrontin orderto amass the forcesneeded to deal
with the strategicconundrumsand additionalopponentscreatedby the
marchthroughBelgium.If the Germanshad used a positionaldefenseon
the shortFranco-German
borderto achieveeconomiesof force,theycould
have handledeven the enlargedRussiancontingents
plannedfor1917.12
In theseways, offensivestrategieshelped to cause the war and ensured
that,when war occurred,it would be a worldwar. Prevailingtechnologies
should have made the worldof 1914an armscontrollers'
dream;instead,
ofstrategic
military
plannerscreateda nightmare
instability.
Uncontrolled
orMilitarized
Civilians?
Germany:
Military
The offensive
characterof Germanwar planningin the yearsbeforeWorld
and outlook
WarI was primarily
an expressionoftheprofessional
interests
of the GeneralStaff.Civilianforeignpolicyaims and attitudesabout internationalpoliticswereat mosta permissivecause of theSchlieffen
Plan. On
war plan was morea hindrance
balance,the GeneralStaff'sall-or-nothing
the diplomats'strategy
thana help in implementing
of brinkmanship.
The
reasonthatthemilitary
was allowedto indulgeitsstrategic
preferences
was
notso muchthattheciviliansagreedwiththem;rather,it was because war
planningwas consideredto be withintheautonomouspurviewof theGeneral Staff.Militarypreferences
were neverdecisiveon questionsof the use
offorce,however,sincethiswas notconsideredtheirlegitimate
sphere.But
indirectly,
warplans trappedthediplomatsby handingthema bluntinstrumentsuitableformassive preventivewar, but ill-designedforcontrolled
coercion.The military'suncheckedpreferenceforan unlimitedoffensive
betweenGermanmilitary
and themismatch
and diplomaticstrategy
strategy
wereimportant
rootedin theproblemof civilcauses of strategic
instability
relations.This sectionwill tracethose rootsand point out some
military
implications
relevantto contemporary
questions.
The Schlieffen
Plan embodiedall of the desideratacommonlyfoundin
fieldmanualsand treatiseson strategy
written
officers:
itwas an
by military
revision of the status quo in the Balkans, leading to Austria's collapse. See especially Fritz
Fischer,WarofIllusions:GermanPoliciesfrom1911 to1914 (New York:W.W. Norton,1975; German
edition 1969), pp. 377-379, 427.
chapter4.
12. This is argued in Snyder, IdeologyoftheOffensive,
International
Security
| 116
offensivecampaign,designedto seize the initiative,
to exploitfleetingopand to achievea decisivevictory
portunities,
by therapidannihilation
ofthe
opponents'military
forces.Warwas to be an "instrument
ofpolitics,"notin
the sense thatpoliticalends would restrainand shape military
means,but
along lines thatthe GeneralStafffoundmorecongenial:war would solve
thetangleofpoliticalproblemsthatthediplomatscould notsolve forthemselves. "The completedefeatof the enemyalways servespolitics,"argued
GeneralColmarvon der Goltz in his influential
book, TheNationin Arms.
"Observanceofthisprinciplenotonlygrantsthegreatest
measureoffreedom
in the politicalsphere but also gives widest scope to the properuse of
resourcesin war."'13
slow mobilizaTo do this,Schlieffen
soughtto capitalizeon therelatively
tionof theRussianarmy,whichcould notbringitsfullweightto bear until
the second monthof the campaign.Schlieffen
reasonedthathe had to use
to decisivelyalterthe balance of forcesin
this "window of opportunity"
Germany'sfavor.Drawingon precedentsprovidedby Moltke'scampaigns
of1866and 1870as wellas his laterplansfora two-front
saw
war,Schlieffen
thata rapid decisioncould be achievedonlyby deployingthe bulk of the
Germanarmyon one frontin orderto carryout a grandioseencirclement
maneuver.Francehad to be the firstvictim,because the Russians might
intotheirvastspaces. WithParisat risk,
spoiltheencirclement
by retreating
had concluded
theFrenchwould have to standand fight.By1897,Schlieffen
thatthis schemecould not succeed withouttraversing
Belgium,since the
in Alsace-Lorraine
Franco-German
frontier
was too narrowand too easily
defendedto permita decisivemaneuver.In thematureconceptionof 1905,
mostoftheGermanarmy(includingsomeunitsthatdid notyetexist)would
marchforthreeor fourweeks throughBelgiumand northern
France,encirtheFrencharmy,and thenboardtrainsfortheeastern
clingand destroying
thefewdivisionsleftto coverEast Prussia.
frontto reinforce
forwhichwe
Even Schlieffen
was aware thathis plan was "an enterprise
"14
are tooweak. He and his successor,theyoungerMoltke,understoodmost
ofthepitfallsofthismaneuverquitewell:thegratuitous
ofnew
provocation
the possibilityof a rapid Frenchredeenemies,the logisticalnightmares,
in Germany
13. GerhardRitter,
TheSwordandtheScepter:
TheProblem
ofMilitarism
(CoralGables:
Universityof Miami Press, 1969; German edition 1954), Vol. 1, p. 196, citingDas Volkin Waffen
(5th ed., 1889), p. 129.
14. Ritter,
Schlieffen
Plan,p. 66.
Relations
| 117
Civil-Military
theGermanflankmaneuver,thenumericalinsufficiency
ploymentto nullify
to wane with
ofthe Germanyarmy,thetendencyof theattacker'sstrength
everystepforwardand thedefender'sto grow,and thelackoftimeto finish
withFrancebeforeRussiawould attack.The GeneralStaffclungto thisplan
not because theywere blindto its faults,but because theythoughtall the
Austriain 1912,theywentthroughthe
were worse.To mollify
alternatives
Planpointedtowards
oftheSchlieffen
motionsofgamingouta mirror-image
theeast,concludingthattheFrenchwould defeattheweak forcesleftin the
Rhinelandlong beforea decisioncould be reachedagainstRussia.15What
theGeneralStaffrefusedto considerseriouslyafter1890was thepossibility
ofan equal divisionoftheirforcesbetweenwestand east,allowinga stable
withAustriaagainstRussia.
defensiveagainstFranceand a limitedoffensive
in 1915and that
thatGermanyused successfully
(Thiswas the combination
theelderMoltkehad resignedhimselfto in the 1890s.)
theGeneralStaffplayedsomewargames
Aroundtheturnofthecentury,
conclusion
based on a defensivein thewest. These led to theembarrassing
overwhelming
even a modest
thatthe Frenchwould have greatdifficulty
defensiveforce.In futureyears,whengameswiththispremisewereplayed,
theGermandefenderswereallottedfewerforces,whileBelgiansand Dutch
force.Stackingthe deck againstthe
were arbitrarily
added to the attacking
abstract
but also in Schlieffen's
defensiveappearednot onlyin war-gaming
of doctrine.Even some Germancriticscaughthimapplying
expostulations
a double standard,arbitrarily
grantingthe attackeradvantagesin mobility,
whereastherealityshouldhave been quitetheopposite.16
In short,Germanwarplanning,especiallyafter1890,showeda strongbias
in favorof offensiveschemesfordecisivevictoryand againstdefensiveor
morelimitedoffensive
schemes,eventhoughthelatterhad a greaterprospect
thatGermany
ofsuccess.Thisbiascannotbe explainedawaybytheargument
would have been at an economicdisadvantagein a longwar againstRussia
on a quickvictory.As the actualwar
and hence had to gambleeverything
hit upon economic
Schhleffen
showed, this was untrue.More important,
rationalizations
forhis war plan onlyafterit had alreadybeen in place for
years.Moreover,he activelydiscouragedseriousanalysisof wartimeeconomics,decidinga priorithatthe onlygood war was a shortwar and that
15. Louis Garros, "Preludes aux invasions de la Belgique," Revue historiquede l'armee(March
chapter4.
1949), pp. 37-38; Frencharchivaldocuments cited in Snyder, IdeologyoftheOffensive,
16. Friedrichvon Bernhardi,On War ofToday(London: Rees, 1912), Vol. 1, p. 44.
International
Security| 118
the only way to end a war quicklywas to disarm the opponent decisively.17
These conclusions were not in themselves unreasonable, but Schlieffen
reached them before he did his analysis and then arranged the evidence in
order to justifyhis preferredstrategy.
The explanation forthe General Staff's bias in favorof offensivestrategy
is rooted in the organizationalinterestsand parochial outlook of the professional military.The Germans' pursuit of a strategyfor a short, offensive,
decisive war despite its operational infeasibilityis simplyan extremecase of
an endemic bias of militaryorganizations.Militariesdo not always exhibita
blind preferenceforthe offensive,of course. The lessons of 1914-1918had a
tempering effecton the offensiveinclinations of European militaries,for
example.18Still, exceptions and questionable cases notwithstanding,initial
research indicates that militarieshabituallypreferoffensivestrategies,even
though everyone from Clausewitz to Trevor Dupuy has proved that the
defenderenjoys a net operational advantage.19
EXPLAINING
THE OFFENSIVE
BIAS
Several explanations forthis offensivebias have been advanced. A number
of them are consistentwith the evidence provided by the German case. A
particularlyimportantexplanation stems fromthe division of labor and the
narrow focus of attentionthat necessarilyfollows fromit. The professional
trainingand duties of the soldier forcehim to focus on threatsto his state's
securityand on the conflictualside of internationalrelations. Necessarily
preoccupied with the prospect of armed conflict,he sees war as a pervasive
aspect of internationallife.Focusing on the role of militarymeans in ensuring
the securityof the state,he forgetsthatothermeans can also be used towards
that end. For these reasons, the militaryprofessionaltends to hold a simplified, zero-sum view of internationalpoliticsand the nature of war, in which
wars are seen as difficultto avoid and almost impossible to limit.
RustungsDeutschlands
wirtschaftliche
undKriegsvorsorge:
Friedenswirtschaft
17. LotharBurchardt,
vor 1914 (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1968), pp. 15, 163-164.
bestrebungen
18. However, this effectshould not be overdrawn. BarryPosen, SourcesofMilitaryDoctrine,has
recentlydemonstratedthatthe Frenchcollapse in 1940 was due not to a Maginot Line mentality
but to the overcommitmentof forcesto the offensivecampaign in Belgium.
19. Possible biases in civilianviews on offenseand defensehave not been studied systematically.
For Trevor Dupuy's attempts to analyze quantitativelyoffensiveand defensive operations in
and War (New York: Bobbs-Merrill,1979), chapter 7,
World War II, see his Numbers,Predictions
and otherpublications of his "HERO" project.
Civil-Military
Relations
I 119
When the hostilityof others is taken for granted, prudential calculations
are slanted in favor of preventivewars and preemptive strikes.Indeed, as
German militaryofficerswere fond of arguing,the proper role of diplomacy
in a Hobbesian world is to create favorableconditionsforlaunching preventive war. A preventivegrand strategyrequires an offensiveoperational doctrine. Defensive plans and doctrines will be considered only afterall conceivable offensive schemes have been decisively discredited. Under
uncertainty,such discreditingwill be difficult,so offensiveplans and doctrineswill frequentlybe adopted even if offenseis not easier than defense
in the operational sense.
The assumption of extremehostilityalso favors the notion that decisive,
offensiveoperations are always needed to end wars. If the conflictof interest
between the parties is seen as limited, then a decisive victorymay not be
needed to end the fightingon mutually acceptable terms. In fact, denying
the opponent his objectives by means of a successful defense may suffice.
However, when the opponent is believed to be extremelyhostile, disarming
him completelymay seem to be the only way to induce him to break offhis
attacks. For this reason, offensivedoctrines and plans are needed, even if
defense is easier operationally.
Kenneth Waltz argues that states are socialized to the implications of
internationalanarchy.20Because of theirprofessionalpreoccupationsmilitary
professionalsbecome "oversocialized." Seeing war more likelythan it really
is, theyincrease its likelihoodby adopting offensiveplans and buying offensive forces.In this way, the perceptionthatwar is inevitablebecomes a selffulfillingprophecy.
A second explanationemphasizes the need of large, complex organizations
to operate in a predictable, structuredenvironment.Organizations like to
work accordingto a plan thatties togetherthe standardoperatingprocedures
of all the subunits into a prepackaged script. So that they can stick to this
script at all costs, organizations try to dominate their environmentrather
than reactto it. Reactingto unpredictablecircumstancesmeans throwingout
the plan, improvising,and perhaps even deviatingfromstandard operating
procedures. As BarryPosen points out, "takingthe offensive,exercisingthe
initiative,is a way of structuringthe battle."21 Defense, in contrast,is more
reactive, less structured,and harder to plan. Van Evera argues that the
20. Kenneth N. Waltz, TheoryofInternational
Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
21. Posen, SourcesofMilitaryDoctrine,chapter2.
International
Security
1120
will prefera taskthatis easierto plan even ifit is moredifficult
military
to
In Russia,forexample,regionalstaffs
executesuccessfully.-2
complainedthat
the GeneralStaff'sdefensivewar plan of 1910lefttheirown local planning
problemtoounstructured.
Theyclamoredforan offensive
planwithspecified
linesofadvance,and in 1912theygotit.23
The Germanmilitary's
bias fortheoffensive
mayhave derivedin partfrom
thisdesireto structure
theenvironment,
butevidenceon thispointis mixed.
The elderMoltkedevelopedclockwork
mobilization
and railtransport
plans
leadingto offensive
operations,but he scoffedat the idea thata campaign
plan could be mapped out step-by-step
fromtheinitialdeployment
through
to the crowningencirclement
battle.For him,strategy
remained"a system
of ad hocexpedients . . . , the development of an originalidea in accordance
withcontinually
Thisattitudemayhelptoexplain
changingcircumstances."24
his willingnessto entertain
when his preferred
defensivealternatives
offensiveschemesbeganto looktoounpromising.
The Schlieffen
Plan,in contrast,
was a caricatureof the linkbetweenrigidplanningand an unvarying
commitment
to the offensive.
Even here,however,thereis some evidencethat
fitspoorlywiththehypothesisthatmilitaries
becauseitallows
preferoffense
themto fightaccordingto theirplans and standardoperatingprocedures.
WilhelmGroener,the GeneralStaffofficerin chargeof workingout the
logisticalpreparationsforthe Schlieffen
Plan, recognizedfullwell thatthe
taut,ambitiousnatureof the plan would make it impossibleto adhere to
normal,methodicalsupplyprocedures.Amongofficers
responsibleforlomustbe so greatthatin difficult
gistics,"thefeelingofresponsibility
circumstancespeople freethemselvesfromproceduralhindrancesand take the
responsibility
foractingin accordancewithcommonsense."25 Nonetheless,
it is difficult
to ignorethe argumentubiquitouslyadvanced by European
writersthatdefenseleads to uncertainty,
military
confusion,passivity,and
incoherent
of the armyand the
action,whereasoffensefocusesthe efforts
mind of the commanderon a single,unwaveringgoal. Even when they
understoodthe uncertainties
and improvisations
requiredby offensive
opofthe
erations,as Groenerdid, theymaystillhave fearedtheuncertainties
defensivemore. An offensiveplan at least gives the illusionof certainty.
22. Van Evera, "Causes of War," chapter 7.
23. Zaionchkovskii,PodgotovkaRossiik imperialisticheskoi
voine,pp. 244, 277.
24. Quoted by Hajo Holborn, "Moltke and Schlieffen,"in Edward M. Earle, ed., Makers of
ModernStrategy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1971), p. 180.
25. Papers of Wilhelm Groener, U.S. National Archives,roll 18, piece 168, p. 5.
Relations
Civil-Military
1121
Another possibility,however, is that this argument for the offensivewas
used to justifya doctrine that was preferredprimarilyon other grounds.
French militarypublicists invoked such reasoning more frequently,for example, during periods of greaterthreatto traditionalmilitaryinstitutions.26
Other explanations forthe offensivebias are rooted even more directlyin
the parochial interestsof the military,includingthe autonomy,prestige,size,
and wealth of the organization.27The German case shows the functionof
the offensivestrategyas a means towards the goal of operationalautonomy.
The elder Moltke succinctlystated the universal wish of militarycommanders: "The politicianshould fallsilentthe momentthatmobilizationbegins."28
This is least likelyto happen in the case of limitedor defensivewars, where
the whole point of fightingis to negotiate a diplomatic solution. Political
considerations-and hence politicians-have to figurein operational decisions. The operational autonomy of the militaryis most likelyto be allowed
when the operational goal is to disarm the adversaryquicklyand decisively
by offensivemeans. For this reason, the militarywill seek to forcedoctrine
and planning into this mold.
The prestige, self-image,and material health of militaryinstitutionswill
prosper if the militarycan convince civilians and themselves that wars can
be short,decisive, and socially beneficial.One of the attractionsof decisive,
offensivestrategiesis thattheyhold out the promiseofa demonstrablereturn
on the nation's investmentin militarycapability.Von der Goltz, forexample,
pushed the view that "modern wars have become the nation's way of doing
business"-a perspective that made sense only if wars were short, cheap,
and hence offensive.29
The German people were relativelyeasy to convince
of this, because of the powerful example provided by the short, offensive,
nation-buildingwars of 1866 and 1870, which cut through political fetters
and turned the officercorps into demigods. This historicalbackdrop gave
the General Staffa mantel of unquestioned authorityand legitimacyin operationalquestions; it also gave them a reputationto live up to. Later, when
technological and strategiccircumstanceschallenged the viabilityof their
chapter 3, citingespecially Georges
26. See the argument in Snyder, Ideologyof the Offensive,
Gilbert,Essais de critiquemilitaire(Paris: Librairiede la Nouvelle Revue, 1890), pp. 43, 47-48.
27. Posen and Van Evera, in analyzing organizationalinterestsin this way, have drawn on the
categories laid out by Morton Halperin, BureaucraticPoliticsand ForeignPolicy (Washington:
Brookings,1974), chapter3.
28. Quoted by BernardBrodie, Warand Politics(New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 11.
29. Quoted by Van Evera fromFerdinand Foch, The Principlesof War (New York: Fly, 1918),
p. 37.
International
Security1122
formulafora short,victoriouswar, General Staffofficerslike Schlieffenfound
it difficultto part with the offensivestrategicformulaethat had served their
stateand organizationso effectively.
As Posen puts it, offensemakes soldiers
"specialists in victory,"defense makes them "specialists in attrition,"and in
our own era mutual assured destructionmakes them "specialists in slaugh"30
ter.
THE EVOLUTION
OF GERMAN
WAR PLANNING
The foregoingargumentscould, forthe most part,explain the offensivebias
of the militaryin many countries and in many eras. What remains to be
explained is why this offensivebias became so dogmatic and extreme in
Germanybefore1914. The evolution of the General Staff'sstrategicthinking
from1870 to 1914 suggests thata tendencytowards doctrinaldogmatismand
extremismmay be inherent in mature militaryorganizations that develop
under conditions of near-absolute autonomy in doctrinal questions. This
evolution, which occurred in three stages, may be typicalof the maturation
of uncontrolled, self-evaluatingorganizations and consequently may highlight the conditions in which doctrinalextremismmight recur in our own
era.31
The firststage was dominated by the elder Moltke, who established the
basis tenetsof the organizationalideology ofthe GermanGeneral Staff.These
were the inevitabilityand productive nature of war, the indispensabilityof
preventivewar, and the need foran operational strategythat could provide
rapid, decisive victories.Moltkewas the creator,not a captive ofhis doctrines
and did not implementthem in the manner of a narrow technician.He was
willing to thinkin political termsand to make his opinion heard in political
matters.This practicehad its good and bad sides. On one hand, it allowed
him to consider war plans thatgave diplomacy some role in ending the war;
on the other, it spurred him to lobby forpreventivewar against France in
1868 and against Russia in 1887. Moltke thoughthe understood what international politics was all about, but he understood it in a militaryway. In
judging the opportune momentforwar, Moltkelooked exclusivelyat military
factors,whereas Bismarckfocused primarilyon preparingdomestic and foreign opinion forthe conflict.32
30. Posen,Sources
ofMilitary
Doctrine.
31. Van Evera uses the concept of the self-evaluatingorganization, drawing on the work of
JamesQ. Wilson.
32. Ritter,Swordand Scepter,Vol. 1, pp. 217-218, 245.
Civil-Military
Relations
1123
thekeyfigurein the secondstageoftheGeneralStaff'sdevelSchlieffen,
opment,was muchmoreofa technocrat
thanMoltke.Not a founder,he was
a systematizer
and routinizer.
Schlieffen
dogmatizedMoltke'sstrategic
preceptsin a way thatservedthe matureinstitution's
need fora simple,standardizeddoctrineto facilitate
the trainingof youngofficers
and the operationalplanningof the GeneralStaff.In implementing
thismoredogmatic
and his colleagueslacked Moltke'sabilityto criticize
doctrine,Schlieffen
fundamental
assumptionsand tailordoctrineto variationsin circumstances.
Thus, Moltkeobservedthe defender'sincreasingadvantagesand decided
thatthe day of the rapid, decisivevictorywas probablygone,
reluctantly
that"two armiespreparedforbattlewill stand oppositeeach
anticipating
"33 Schlieffen
other,neitherwishingto beginbattle.
witnessedeven further
developmentsin this directionin the Russo-JapaneseWar,but concluded
only thatthe attackerhad to redoublehis efforts."The armamentof the
armyhas changed,"he recognized,"but the fundamental
laws of combat
remainthe same,and one oftheselaws is thatone cannotdefeattheenemy
without attacking.
"'
a technician,Schlieffen
Seeing himselfas primarily
gave politicalconsiderationsa lesserplace in his workthanhad Moltke.Again,thishad both
never lobbied for
good and bad consequences.On one hand, Schlieffen
preventivewar in the way Moltkeand Walderseehad, thinkingsuch decisionswerenothis to make.Whenasked,ofcourse,he was notreluctant
to
tellthe politicalauthorities
thatthe timewas propitious,as he did in 1905.
On the otherhand, Schlieffen
had a morezero-sum,apoliticalview of the
conductof warfarethandid theelderMoltke.Consequently,his war plans
excludedany notionof politicallimitations
on the conductof war or diplomaticmeansto end it.35
the problemsof civiliancontrolof the military
in stagesone
Contrasting
and two,we see thatthefounders'generation,
beingmore"political,"chal1871-1890,Ferdinand von Schmerfeld,
33. Helmuth von Moltke, Die DeutschenAufmarschpldne,
ed. (Berlin:Mittler,1929), p. 122ff.
34. The quotation is from an 1893 comment on an operational exercise, quoted by 0. von
Rundschau(Sonderheft,1938), p. 18,
Zoellner, "SchlieffensVermachtnis,"Militarwissenschaftliche
but identical sentimentsare expressed in Schlieffen's"Krieg in der Gegenwart," DeutscheRevue
(1909).
35. Brodie, Warand Politics,p. 58, reportsa perhaps apocryphal statementby Schlieffenthat if
his plan failed to achieve decisive results, then Germany should negotiate an end to the war.
Even if he did say this, the possibilityof negotiations had no effecton his war planning, in
contrastto that of the elder Moltke.
International
Security1124
lenges the politicaleliteon questionsof the use of force,but as ifin comin itswarplanand self-control
pensation,is morecapableofself-evaluation
ning.The technocratic
generation,however,is less assertivepolitically
but
also less capableofexercising
politicaljudgmentin itsown work.The founders' assertiveness
is themoredramaticchallengeto politicalcontrol,butas
theGermancase shows,Bismarckwas able to turnbackthemilitary's
direct
lobbyingforpreventivewar, whichwas outsideof the military's
legitimate
relapurvieweven by theSecond Reich'sskewedstandardsofcivil-military
tions.Much more damagingin the long run was Schlieffen's
unobtrusive
militarism,
whichcreatedthe conditionsfora preventivewar much more
did.
surelythanMoltke'sovertefforts
A thirdstage, which was just developingon the eve of WorldWar I,
combinedtheworstfeaturesofthetwopreviousperiods.Exemplary
figures
in thisfinalstagewereErichLudendorff
and WilhelmGroener,productsof
a thoroughgoing
socializationto the organizational
ideologyof the German
GeneralStaff.Groener,describinghis own war collegetraining,makes it
clearthatnotonlyoperationalprinciplesbutalso a militaristic
philosophyof
lifewerestandardfarein theschool'scurriculum.
Thesefuturefunctionaries
and leadersoftheGeneralStaffweregettingan intensivecoursein thesame
kind of propagandathatthe Armyand Navy Leagues were providingthe
generalpublic.Theycame out ofthistraining
believingin thephilosophyof
totalwar, demandingarmyincreasesthat theirelders were reluctantto
pursue and fearingthat"weaklings"like BethmannHollwegwould throw
away thearmy'sgloriousvictories.36
An organizational
explanationforthisthirdstagewould pointto theselfoftheorganizational
effects
amplifying
ideologyin a mature,self-evaluating
unit.An alternative
explanationalso seemsplausible,however.GeoffEley,
in his studyofright-wing
in Wilhelmine
radicalnationalism
Germany,
argues
thatemergingcounterelites
used nationalpopulistcauses and institutions
liketheNavyand ArmyLeaguesas weaponsaimedat thepoliticalmonopoly
retainedby the morecautioustraditional
elite,who werevulnerableto criticismon jingoisticissues.37Thispatternfitsthecases ofGroenerand Ludenofthe
who weremiddle-classofficers
dorff,
seekingthefinaltransformation
(Madison: The State
andtheImperial
German
Army
William
Groener
36. Helmut Haeussler, General
HistoricalSociety of Wisconsin, 1962), p. 72.
andPolitical
Bismarck
Changeafter
theGerman
Right:RadicalNationalism
37. GeoffEley, Reshaping
(New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1980).
Relations
Civil-Military
1125
old Prussianarmyinto a mass organ of totalwar, whichwould provide
upwardmobilityfortheirown kind. GermanWar Ministers,speakingfor
resisted
elementsin the armyand the state,had traditionally
conservative
more
bourgeois
would
bring
the
army,
which
largeincreasesin the size of
soldiersintotheranks;itwouldalso
officers
intothemessand working-class
privilegedtax statuswould be broughtinto
cost so muchthattheJunkers'
to know whether
question.This alternativeexplanationmakes it difficult
or whether
self-amplification
organizationalideologiesreallytend toward
as theFrench
motivation,
variantsonlyoccurfromsomeparticular
extremist
case suggests.
THE MISMATCH
BETWEEN
MILITARY
STRATEGY
AND
DIPLOMACY
miloffensive
It is sometimesthoughtthatGermanyrequiredan unlimited,
because Germancivilianeliteswere hell-benton overturning
itarystrategy
the continental
balance of power as a firststep in theirdrivefor"World
Plan was simplythe tool needed to
Power." In this view, the Schlieffen
goal,aroundwhicha nationalconsensus
high-payoff
achievethishigh-risk,
Thereare severalproblems
ofbothmilitary
and civilianeliteshad formed.38
no inputintothe
withthisview. The firstis thattheciviliansmade virtually
to theunsupportedassertionsof some
strategic
planningprocess.Contrary
againstRussia
theshiftfromMoltke'splan fora limitedoffensive
historians,
plan fora moredecisiveblow aimedat Francehad nothingto
to Schlieffen's
do withthefallof Bismarckor the "New Course"in foreignpolicy.Rather,
Schlieffen
saw itas a technicalchange,stemming
froman improvedRussian
chosen
abilityto defendtheirforwardtheaterin Poland. Norwas Schlieffen
had
Schlieffen
he preferred.
to head theGeneralStaffbecauseofthestrategy
simplybeen thenextin lineas deputychiefunderWaldersee,who was fired
primarily
because he dared to criticizethe Kaiser's tacticaldecisionsin a
Later,when ReichChancellorvon Billowlearnedof Schliefmockbattle.39
his reactionwas: "iftheChiefof
fen'sintention
to violateBelgianneutrality,
believes such a
Staff,especiallya strategicauthoritysuch as Schlieffen,
measureto be necessary,thenit is the obligationof diplomacyto adjustto
von
it and prepareforit in everypossibleway."40In 1912ForeignSecretary
38. See, forexample, L.L. Farrar,Jr.,Arrogance
and Anxiety(Iowa City:Universityof Iowa Press,
1981), pp. 23-24.
39. Ritter,Schlieffen
Plan, pp. 17-37; Norman Rich and M.H. Fisher, eds., The HolsteinPapers
(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1963), Vol. 3, pp. 347, note 1, and 352-353.
40. Ritter,Schlieffen
Plan, pp. 91-92.
International
Security
1126
Jagowurged a reevaluationof the need to cross Belgian territory,
but a memo
fromthe younger Moltke ended the matter.41In short, the civilians knew
what Schlieffenwas planning to do, but theywere relativelypassive bystanders in part because militarystrategywas not in theirsphere of competence
and legitimateauthority,and perhaps also because they were quite happy
with the notion that the war could be won quickly and decisively. This
optimismalleviated theirfear that a long war would mean the destruction
of existing social and economic institutions,no matter who won it. The
decisive victorypromised by the SchlieffenPlan may have also appealed to
civilianelites concerned about the need forspectacular successes as a payoff
for the masses' enthusiasticparticipationin the war. Tryingto justifythe
initial war plan from the retrospectivevantage point of 1919, Bethmann
Hollweg argued that "offense in the East and defense in the West would
have implied that we expected at best a draw. With such a slogan no army
and no nation could be led into a strugglefortheirexistence."42Still, this is
a long way fromthe totallyunfounded notion that Holstein and Schlieffen
cooked up the SchlieffenPlan expresslyfor the purpose of bullyingFrance
over the Morocco issue and preparing the way for "Welt Politik."43The
SchlieffenPlan had some appeal forGerman civilianelites,but the diplomats
may have had serious reservationsabout it, as the Jagow episode suggests.
Mostly, the civilians passively accepted whatever operational plan the militarydeemed necessary.
If German diplomats had devised a militarystrategyon theirown, it is by
no means certain that they would have come up with anything like the
SchlieffenPlan. This all-or-nothingoperational scheme fitpoorly with the
diplomatic strategyof expansion by means of brinkmanshipand controlled,
coercive pressure, which they pursued until 1914. In 1905, forexample, it is
clear thatBuilow,Holstein, and WilhelmII had no inclinationto riska world
war over the question of Morocco.
"The originatorsof Weltpolitik
looked forwardto a series of small-scale,
marginal foreignpolicy successes," says historian David Kaiser, "not to a
major war."4Self-deterred by the unlimitedcharacterof the SchlieffenPlan,
41. Fischer, War ofIllusions,p. 390.
42. Konrad Jarausch,TheEnigmaticChancellor(New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1973), p. 195.
43. This is implied by Martin Kitchen, The GermanOfficerCorps (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1968), p. 104, and Imanuel Geiss, GermanForeignPolicy,1871-1914 (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 101-103.
44. David E. Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," Journalof Modern
History,Vol. 55, No. 3 (September 1983), p. 448.
Civil-Military
Relations
1127
theyhad fewmilitary
toolsthattheycould use to demonstrate
resolvein a
in risk-taking.
competition
The navyoffered
a meansforthelimited,demonstrativeuse of force,namelythe dispatchof the gunboatPantherto the
Moroccanportof Agadir,but the armywas an inflexible
tool. At one point
in thecrisis,Schlieffen
toldBulowthattheFrenchwerecallingup reservists
on the frontier.
If thiscontinued,Germanywould have to respond,setting
offa processthatthe Germansfearedwould be uncontrollable.45
Thus, the
Germanmilitary
postureand war plan servedmainlyto deterthe German
diplomats,who did notwanta majorwar even thoughSchlieffen
toldthem
the timewas favorable.Theyneeded limitedoptions,suitableforcoercive
diplomacy,not unlimitedoptions,suitableforpreventivewar. With the
Schlieffen
Plan,theycouldnotevenrespondtotheopponent'sprecautionary
moveswithoutsettingoffa landslidetowardtotalwar.
This mismatchbetweenmilitary
and diplomaticstrategy
dogged German
in 1912
policydown through1914.BethmannHollwegdescribedhis strategy
as one ofcontrolledcoercion,sometimesassertingGermandemands,sometimeslullingand mollifying
opponentsto controlthe riskof war. "On all
he explained,"without
fronts
we mustdriveforwardquietlyand patiently,"
Bethmann'spersonalsecretary,
KurtRiezler,
havingto riskour existence."46
der
explainedthis strategyof calculatedriskin a 1914 volume,Grundziige
A kindof crossbetweenThomasSchellingand NormanAngell,
Weltpolitik.
Riezlerexplainedthatwars were too costlyto actuallyfightin the modern,
interdependent,
capitalistworld.Nonetheless,statescan stilluse the threat
of war to gain unilateraladvantages,forcingthe opponentto calculate
whethercosts,benefits,and the probability
of successwarrantresorting
to
force.His calculationscan be affected
in severalways. Arms-racing
can be
forwar-that is, a bloodless
as a substitute
used, a la Samuel Huntington,
way to show the opponentthathe would surelylose ifit came to a fight.
Brinkmanship
and bluffing
can be used to demonstrate
resolve;faitsaccomplis
and salamitacticscan be used to shiftthe onus forstartingthe undesired
willnotworkifone
warontotheopponent.But,Riezlerwarns,thisstrategy
is greedyand impatientto overturnthe balance of power. Opponentswill
iftheysensethattheirvitalinterests
areat stake.Consequently,
fight
"victory
45. Holstein to Radolin, June28, 1905, in HolsteinPapers,Vol. 4, p. 347.
46. Jarausch,EnigmaticChancellor,pp. 110-111.
International
Security
| 128
belongs to the steady, tenacious, and gradual achievementof small successes
... without provocation."47
Although this may have been a fairapproximationof Bethmann's thinking
in 1912, the theory of the calculated risk had undergone a major transformation by July1914. By that time, Bethmann wanted a major diplomatic or
militaryvictoryand was willing to risk a continentalwar-perhaps even a
world war-to achieve it. Fait accompliand onus-shiftingwere stillpart of the
strategy,but with a goal of keeping Britainout of the war and gaining the
support of German socialists, not with a goal of avoiding war altogether.
The SchlieffenPlan played an importantrole in the transformationof
Bethmann's strategyand in its failureto keep Britainneutralin the Julycrisis.
Riezler's diary shows Bethmann's obsession in July1914 with Germany's
need fora dramaticvictoryto forestallthe impendingperiod of vulnerability
thatthe Russian armyincreases and the possible collapse ofAustria-Hungary
would bring on.48 As I argued earlier, the SchlieffenPlan only increased
Germany's vulnerabilityto the Russian buildup, strippingthe eastern front
and squandering forcesin the vain attemptto knock France out of the war.
In this sense, it was the SchlieffenPlan that led Bethmann to transformthe
calculated-risktheoryfroma cautious tool of coercive diplomacy into a blind
hope of gaining a major victorywithoutincurringan unwanted world war.
Justas the SchlieffenPlan made troubleforBethmann's diplomacy, so too
German brinkmanshipmade trouble for the SchlieffenPlan. The Russian
armyincreases, provoked by German belligerencein the 1909 Bosnian crisis
and Austrian coercion of the Serbs in 1912, made the German war plan
untenable.49The arms-racingproduced by thisaggressive diplomacywas not
a "substituteforwar"; rather,it createda window ofvulnerabilitythathelped
to cause the war. Thus, Riezler (and Bethmann)failedto consider how easily
a diplomatic strategyof calculated brinkmanshipcould set off a chain of
uncontrollableconsequences in a world of militaryinstability.
47. Andreas Hillgruber,Germany
and theTwo WorldWars(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress,
1981), pp. 22-24; J.J.Ruedorffer(pseud. for Kurt Riezler), Grundziigeder Weltpolitik
in der
Gegenwart(Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,1914), especially pp. 214-232; quotation fromJarausch, EnigmaticChancellor,pp. 143-144.
48. Jarausch,EnigmaticChancellor,p. 157.
49. P.A. Zhilin, "Bol'shaia programma po usileniiu russkoi armii," Voenno-istoricheskii
zhurnal,
No. 7 (July1974), pp. 90-97, shows the connectionbetween the 1913 increases and the Balkan
crisis of 1912. He also shows that this project, with its emphasis on increasing the standing
armyand providingrail lines to speed its concentration,was directlyconnected to the offensive
characterof Russia's increasinglyovercommitted,standing-start,short-warcampaign plan.
Civil-Military
Relations
| 129
Even the transformedversion of the calculated-risktheory,implemented
in July 1914, was ill-served by the SchlieffenPlan. If Bethmann had had
eastern-orientedor otherwiselimitedmilitaryoptions, all sortsof possibilities
would have been available for defending Austria, bloodying the Russians,
driving a wedge between Paris and St. Petersburg, and keeping Britain
neutral. In contrast,the SchlieffenPlan cut short any chance for coercive
diplomacy and ensured that Britainwould fight.In short,under Bethmann
as well as Billow, the SchlieffenPlan was hardlyan appropriatetool underwritingthe brinkmanshipand expansionistaims of the civilianelite. Rather,
the plan was the product of militaryorganizationalinterestsand misconceptions that reduced internationalpolitics to a series of preventivewars. The
war plan were, first,to reduce the coercive
consequences of the all-or-nothing
bargainingleverage available to German diplomats, and second, to ensnare
German diplomacy in a securitydilemma that forced the abandonment of
the strategyof controlledrisks. Devised by militaryofficerswho wanted a
tool appropriateforpreventivewar, the SchlieffenPlan trapped Germanyin
a situationwhere preventivewar seemed like the only safe option.
In summary, three generalizations emerge fromthe German case. First,
militaryorganizations tend to exhibita bias in favorof offensivestrategies,
which promoteorganizationalprestigeand autonomy,facilitateplanning and
adherence to standard operating procedures, and follow logically fromthe
officercorps' zero-sum view of internationalpolitics. Second, this bias will
be particularlyextremein mature organizationswhich have developed institutional ideologies and operational doctrines with little civilian oversight.
Finally, the destabilizing consequences of an inflexible,offensivemilitary
strategyare compounded when it is mismatchedwith a diplomatic strategy
based on the assumption thatriskscan be calculated and controlledthrough
the skillfulfine-tuningof threats.
France:Civil-Military
TruceandConflict
France before the Dreyfus Affairexemplifiesthe healthiestpatternof civilmilitaryrelations among the European states, but afterDreyfus, the most
destructive.In the formerperiod civilian defense experts who understood
and respected the militarycontained the latent conflictbetween the professional armyand republicanpoliticiansby strikinga bargain that satisfiedthe
main concerns of both sides. In this setting,the use of operational doctrine
as a weapon of institutionaldefense was minimal, so plans and doctrine
International
Security
| 130
were a moderate combination of offense and defense. Afterthe Dreyfus
watershed, the truce broke. Politiciansset out to "republicanize" the army,
and the officercorps responded by developing the doctrine of offensive
a
outrance,
which helped to reverse the slide towards a militarysystembased
overwhelminglyon reservistsand capable only of defensiveoperations.50
The French army had always coexisted uneasily with the Third Republic.
Especially in the earlyyears, most officerswere Bonapartistor monarchistin
their political sentiments, and Radical politicians somewhat unjustifiably
feareda militarycoup against Parliamentin supportof PresidentMacMahon,
a formerMarshal. The militaryhad its own fears,which were considerably
more justified. Responding to constituentdemands, republican politicians
graduallyworked to reduce the lengthof militaryservicefromseven to three
years and to break down the quasi-monasticbarriersinsulatingthe regiment
fromsecular, democratictrends in French society at large. Militaryprofessionals, while not averse to all reform,rightlyfeareda slipperyslope towards
a virtual militia system, in which the professional standing army would
degenerate into a school for the superficial,short-termtrainingof France's
decidedly unmilitaryyouth. War college professorsand militarypublicists
like Georges Gilbert,responding to this danger, began by the 1880s to promote an offensiveoperational doctrine,which they claimed could only be
implementedby well-trained,active-dutytroops.51
This explosive situationwas well managed by nationalistrepublicanleaders
like Leon Gambetta, leader of the French national resistance in the second
phase of the Franco-Prussian War, and especially Charles de Freycinet,
organizer of Gambetta's improvised popular armies. As War Ministerin the
1880s and 1890s, Freycinetdefused militaryfearsand won theiracceptance
of the three-yearservice. He backed the militaryon questions of materiel,
autonomy in mattersof militaryjustice, and selectionof commanders on the
basis of professional competence ratherthan political acceptability.At the
same time, he pressed formore extensive use of the large pool of reservist
manpower thatwas being createdby the three-yearconscriptionsystem,and
the militarywas reasonablyaccommodating.In thiscontextof moderatecivilmilitaryrelations,war plans and doctrinewere also moderate.Henri Bonnal's
50. Presentingsomewhat contrastingviews of Frenchcivil-military
relationsduring this period
are Douglas Porch, March to theMarne: The FrenchArmy,1871-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1981) and David B. Ralston, The Armyof theRepublic:The Place of theMilitary
in thePoliticalEvolutionofFrance,1871-1914 (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967).
51. See, forexample, Gilbert,Essais, p. 271.
Civil-Military
Relations
1131
"defensive-offensive"school was the Establishmentdoctrine,reflectedin the
cautious, counteroffensivewar plans of that era.52
Freycinetand other republican statesmenof the militantneo-jacobin variety cherished the armyas the instrumentof revanche and as a trulypopular
institution,with roots in the leveeen masse of the Wars of the Revolution.
Though he wanted to democratize the army, Freycinetalso cared about its
fightingstrengthand morale, unlike many later politicians who were concerned only to ease theirconstituents'civic obligations. His own moderate
policies, respectfulof militarysensitivitiesbut insistenton key questions of
civilian control, elicited a moderate response from militaryelites, whose
propensityto develop a self-protective
organizationalideology was thus held
in check.
The deepening of the Dreyfus crisis in 1898 rekindled old fears on both
sides and destroyed the system of mutual respect and reassurance constructedby Freycinet.The military'spersistence in a blatant miscarriageof
justice against a JewishGeneral Staffofficeraccused of espionage confirmed
the republicans' view of the army as a state within the state, subject to no
law but the reactionaryprinciplesof unthinkingobedience and blind loyalty.
When conservatives and monarchistsrallied to the military'sside, it made
the officercorps appear (undeservedly) to be the spearhead of a movement
to overthrowthe Republic. Likewise, attacks by the Dreyfusardsconfirmed
the worst fears of the military.Irresponsible Radicals were demanding to
meddle in the army's internal affairs,impeaching the integrityof future
wartime commanders, and undermining morale. Regardless of Dreyfus's
guilt or innocence, the honor of the militaryhad to be defended forthe sake
of national security.
The upshot of the affairwas a leftwardrealignmentof Frenchpolitics. The
new Radical governmentappointed as War Ministera young reformistgeneral, Louis Andre, with instructionsto "republicanize" the army. Andre,
aided by an intelligencenetworkof Masonic Lodges, politicized promotions
and war college admissions, curtailed officers'perquisites and disciplinary
powers, and forced Catholic officersto participatein inventoryingchurch
property.In 1905, the termof conscriptionwas reduced to two years, with
reservistsintended to play a more prominentrole in war plans, field exercises, and the daily lifeof the regiment.
52. Charles de Freycinet,Souvenirs,1878-1893 (New York: Da Capo, 1973).
International
Security
| 132
thegroupof
In thishostileenvironment,
a numberofofficers-especially
"YoungTurks"aroundColonelLoyzeauxde Grandmaison-beganto reemphasize in extremeformthe organizational
ideologypropoundedearlierby
Gilbert.Itselementsreadlikea listoftheerrorsofPlan 17:offensive
a outrance,
mysticalbeliefin groupelanachievedby long servicetogether,denigration
of reservists,
estiand disdainforreactivewar plans drivenby intelligence
mates.Aided by the AgadirCrisisof 1911,GeneralJoffre
and othersenior
figuresseekinga reassertion
ofprofessional
military
values used theYoung
Turks'doctrineto scuttlethereformist
plansofthe"republican"commander
in chief,VictorMichel,and to hound him fromoffice.Michel,correctly
anticipating
the Germans'use of reservecorpsin the openingbattlesand
the consequentextensionof theirrightwingacrossnorthern
Belgium,had
soughtto meet this threatby a cordondefense,makingintensiveuse of
Frenchreservists.Even middle-of-the-road
officers
consideredruinousthe
organizational
changesneeded to implementthisscheme.It was no coincidence thatGrandmaison'soperationaldoctrineprovideda toolforattacking
Michel'sideas point-by-point,
withouthavingto admittoo blatantlythatit
of Michel'sreservist-based
was the institutional
implications
plan thatwere
its most objectionableaspect.53Having servedto oust Michelin 1911,the
Grandmaison
doctrinealso playeda role(alongwiththetrumped-up
scenario
of a Germanstanding-start
a returnto the three-year
attack)in justifying
termof servicein 1913.The problemwas thatthisideology,so usefulas a
tool forinstitutional
defense,became internalizedby the FrenchGeneral
erroneoustenets.
Staff,who based Plan 17 on itsprofoundly
in thestoryoftheoffensive
a
Obviously,thereis muchthatis idiosyncratic
outrance.
The overlappingof social and civil-military
cleavages,whichproessence" and auduced an unusuallyintensethreatto the "organizational
tonomyof theFrencharmy,mayhave no close analogin thecontemporary
era.Ata higherlevelofabstraction,
however,a broadlyapplicablehypothesis
may nonethelessbe gleanedfromthe Frenchexperience.Thatis, doctrinal
bias is likelyto become moreextremewheneverstrategicdoctrinecan be
used an an ideologicalweapon to protectthe militaryorganizationfrom
threatsto its institutional
interests.Undersuch circumstances,
doctrinebe53. An internalGeneral Staffdocument that was highlycriticalof Michel's scheme stated: "It
is necessary only to remarkthat this mixed forcewould require very profound changes in our
regulations,our habits, our tacticalrules, and the organizationof our staffs."Cited in Snyder,
Ideology
oftheOffensive,
chapter3.
Relations
| 133
Civil-Military
comes unhingedfromstrategic
realityand respondsprimarily
to the more
pressingrequirements
ofdomesticand intragovernmental
politics.
Russia:Institutional
Pluralism
andStrategic
Overcommitment
Between1910and 1912,Russiachangedfroman extremely
cautiousdefensive
war plan to an overcommitted
double offensive
againstbothGermanyand
Austria.The generaldirection
ofthischangecan be easilyexplainedin terms
ofrationalstrategic
calculations.Russia'smilitary
powerhad increasedrelativeto Germany's,makingan offensive
morefeasible,and thetightening
of
alliancesmade it moreobviousthatGermanywould deploythebulkof its
armyagainstFrancein the firstphase of the fighting,
regardlessof the
Russianwar plannersconpoliticalcircumstances
givingriseto theconflict.
sequentlyhad a strongincentiveto invadeGermanyor Austriaduringthe
Plan. AttackingEast
"windowof opportunity"
providedby the Schlieffen
Prussiawould put pressureon Germany'srear,thushelpingFranceto survive the onslaught;attackingthe Austrianarmyin Galiciamightdecisively
shiftthebalanceofpowerby knockingGermany'sallyout ofthewar,while
eliminating
oppositionto Russianimperialaimsin Turkeyand theBalkans.54
Whatis harderto explainis the decisionto invade both Germanyand
would have sufficient
forcesto
Austria,whichensuredthatneithereffort
achieveitsobjectives.At a superficial
leveltheexplanationforthisfailureto
set priorities
is simpleenough:GeneralYuriDanilovand the GeneralStaff
in St. Petersburg
wantedtouse thebulkofRussia'sforcestoattackGermany,
while defendingagainstAustria;GeneralMikhailAlekseevand otherregional commanderswanted to attackAustria,leaving a weak defensive
screenfacingEast Prussia.Each factionhad powerfulpoliticalconnections
and good arguments.
No higherarbitercould or would choosebetweenthe
contradictory
schemes,so a defactocompromiseallowedeach to pursueits
forces.At thislevel,we have a familiar
offensive
withinsufficient
preferred
"retaleofbureaucratic
Christmas-tree
politicsproducingan overcommitted,
"55
sultant.
54. Apart fromZaionchkovskii, the most interestingwork on Russian strategyis V.A. Emets,
Rossiis soiuznikami
Rossiiv period
mirovoi
voiny:
vzaimootnosheniia
pervoi
Ocherki
vneshnei
politiki
po
voprosamvedeniiavoiny(Moscow: Nauka, 1977).
55. On the characteristicsof compromisedpolicy,see WarnerSchilling,"The Politicsof National
Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Schilling et al., Strategy,Politics,and DefenseBudgets(New York:
Columbia UniversityPress, 1962), pp. 217-218.
International
Security| 134
At a deeperlevel, however,severalpuzzles remain.One is that"where
you sat"bureaucratically
was onlysuperficially
relatedto "whereyou stood"
on thequestionofstrategy.
Alekseevwas theChief-of-Staff-designate
ofthe
Austrianfront,so had an interestin makinghis turfthe scene of the main
an Austria-first
action.But Alekseevhad always preferred
strategy,even
when he had been posted to the GeneralStaffin St. Petersburg.
Similarly,
Danilov servedunderGeneralZhilinskii,the Chiefof Staffwho negotiated
a tightening
ofmilitary
cooperation
withFranceafter1911,so hisbureaucratic
perspectivemightexplainhis adoptionof the Germany-first
strategythat
to the GerFrancepreferred.
But Danilov'splans had alwaysgivenpriority
and value of
man front,even in 1908-1910when he doubtedthe reliability
Franceas an ally.56Thus, thislinkbetweenbureaucratic
positionand preferredstrategy
was mostlyspurious.
Bureaucraticpositiondoes explainwhy Alekseev'splan attractedwide
however.Theseregionalplandistrict
chiefsofstaff,
supportamongmilitary
nersviewedthecomingwaras a problemofbattlefield
operations,
notgrand
strategy.Alekseev'sschemewas popularwiththem,because it proposed
clearlinesofadvanceacrossopen terrain.Danilov'splans,in contrast,
were
a sourceof frustration
forthe commanderswho would have to implement
them.His defensive1910plan perplexedthem,because it offeredno clear
His 1913plan foran invasionof East Prussiaentailedall sorts
objectives.57
of operationaldifficulties
thatlocal commanderswould have to overcome:
inordinatetimepressure,thedivisionoftheattacking
forceby theMasurian
Lakes, and the defenders'one-sidedadvantagesin raillines,roads,fortifications,and riverbarriers.
betweenDanilov and Alekseevwere
Nonetheless,the main differences
intellectual,
notbureaucratic.58
Danilovwas fundamentally
about
pessimistic
Russia's abilityto competewithmodern,efficient
Germany.He considered
Russia too weak to indulgein imperialdreams,whetheragainstAustriaor
be given
Turkey,arguingthatnationalsurvivalrequiredan absolutepriority
to containing
theGermandanger.In 1910,thispessimismwas expressedin
his ultra-defensive
plan, based on the fearthatRussia would have to face
alone. By1913-1914,Danilov'spessimismtooka different
Germanyvirtually
form.The improvedmilitary
balance,the tighteralliancewithFranceafter
56. Zaionchkovskii,
Rossiik imperialisticheskoi
voine,pp. 184-190.
Podgotovka
57. Ibid., pp. 206-207.
58. See Schilling,"Politics of National Defense," forthis distinction.
Civil-Military
Relations
1135
Agadir,and tellingcriticism
fromAlekseevconvincedDanilovthata porcuNow his
and undesirablestrategically.
pine strategy
was infeasiblepolitically
nightmarewas that France would succumbin a few weeks, once again
alone. To preventthis,
leavingbackwardRussia to faceGermanyvirtually
he planneda hastyattackintoEast Prussia,designedto drawGermanforces
away fromthedecisivebattlein France.
aboutRussianprospects,supportingimpeAlekseevwas moreoptimistic
thata "sharp rap" would cause
rial adventuresin Asia and anticipating
Austriato collapse. Opponents of Danilov's Germany-first
strategyalso
tended to argue thata GermanvictoryagainstFrancewould be Pyrrhic.
Germanywould emergefromthecontestbloodiedand lackingthe strength
or inclinationfora second roundagainstRussia. A Russo-Germancondominiumwould ensue,pavingtheway forRussianhegemonyovertheTurkish Straitsand in the Balkans.59
the sourcesof
Availableevidenceis insufficient
to explainsatisfactorily
mayexplainDanilov'sextreme
thesediffering
views. Personality
differences
pessimismand Alekseev'srelativeoptimism,but thisbegs the questionof
whyeach man was able to gain supportforhis view. Whatevidenceexists
pointsto idiosyncratic
explanations:Danilov's plan got supportfromZhilthecommander-designate
inskii(it fitthe agreementshe made withJoffre),
of the East Prussianfront(it gave himmoretroops),and the GeneralStaff
abouttherabblewho
elitedisdainfulofand pessimistic
apparatus(a military
theirplans). Alekseevwon supportfromoperationalcomwouldimplement
the future
mandersand probablyfromGrand Duke NikolaiNikolaevitch,
and a quintessential
commander-in-chief
optimistaboutRussiancapabilities
theCzar, and thepoliticalpartiesseem to
and ambitions.The WarMinister,
factions
have playedlittlerolein strategic
planning,leavingtheintramilitary
to logrolltheirown disputes.60
Perhapsthemostimportant
questionis whytheoutcomeofthelogrolling
tofitthediminishedforces
was notto scaledowntheaimsofbothoffensives
twoavailableto each. In particular,
whydid Danilovinsiston an early-start,
pinceradvance intoEast Prussia,when the weaknessof each pincermade
themboth vulnerableto piecemealdestruction?
Whynot wait a few days
fran,ais(1871-1914), Series 2, Vol. XII, p. 695, and other sources
59. Documentsdiplomatiques
chapter 7.
cited in Snyder, IdeologyoftheOffensive,
60. Norman Stone, TheEasternFront,1914-1917(New York: Scribner's,1975), chapter1, presents
some speculations about factionalalignments,but evidence is inconclusive in this area.
International
Security| 136
until each pincercould be reinforced
by late-arriving
units,or why not
advanceonlyon one side ofthelakes?The answerseemsto lie in Danilov's
extremefearsabouttheviability
oftheFrenchand his consequentconviction
thatRussian survivaldepended on earlyand substantialpressureon the
Germanrear.This taskwas a necessity,givenhis outlook,somethingthat
had to be attempted
whetheravailableforceswereadequateor not.Trapped
by his pessimismabout Russia's prospectsin the long run,Danilov's only
way out was throughunwarranted
optimismaboutoperationalprospectsin
the shortrun. Like mostcornereddecision-makers,
Danilov saw the "necessary"as possible.
Thisis an important
themein theGermancase as well. Schlieffen
and the
an abilityto be ruthlessly
realisticabout the
youngerMoltkedemonstrated
of theiroperationalplans, but realismwas suppressedwhen
shortcomings
itwould call intoquestiontheirfundamental
beliefsand values. Schlieffen's
qualms about his war plan's feasibility
pervadeearlydrafts,but disappear
lateron, withoutanalyticaljustification.
He entertained
doubtsas longas he
but once he saw thatno further
thoughttheywould lead to improvements,
would resolvetheplan's remaining
he sweptthem
tinkering
contradictions,
underthe rug. The youngerMoltkedid the same thing,resorting
to blithe
optimismonlyon make-or-break
issues, like the seizureof Liege, wherea
realisticassessmentof the riskswould have spotlighted
the dubiousnessof
any strategyforrapid, decisivevictory.Ratherthan totallyrethinktheir
interests
strategic
assumptions,whichwereall bound up withfundamental
and even personalcharacteristics,
all of these strategists
chose to see the
"necessary"as possible.61
Two hypothesesemergefromtheRussiancase. The first
pointsto bureaucraticlogrollingas a factorthatis likelyto exacerbatethe normaloffensive
bias ofmilitary
In theabsenceofa powerfulcentralauthority,
organizations.
twofactionsor suborganizations
willeachpursueitsown preferred
offensive
thatare moddespitea dramaticdeficitof availableforces.Thus,offensives
overcomeratelyambitiouswhen consideredseparatelybecome extremely
mittedunderthe pressureof scarceresourcesand the need to logrollwith
61. Groener, writingin the journal Wissenund Wehrin 1927, p. 532, admitted that it had been
mere "luck" that an "extremelyimportant"tunnel east of Liege was captured intact by the
Plan, p. 166, documents Moltke's uncharacteristic
Germans in August 1914. Ritter,Schlieffen
optimismabout quickly seizing Liege and avoiding the development of a monumentallogistical
bottleneckthere. In the event, the Belgians actuallyordered the destructionof theirbridges and
rail net, but the orders were not implementedsystematically.
| 137
Relations
Civil-Military
otherfactionscompetingfortheirallocation.The Germancase showedhow
whenthemilitary
extremism
thelackofciviliancontrolcan producedoctrinal
is united;the Russiancase shows how lack of civiliancontrolcan also lead
is divided.
when themilitary
to extremeoffensives
The second hypothesis,whichis supportedby the findingsof cognitive
the feasiwill tendto overestimate
decision-makers
theory,is thatmilitary
bilityofan operationalplan ifa realisticassessmentwould requireforsaking
doctrinesare inextricabeliefsor values.62Wheneveroffensive
fundamental
the
blytiedto theautonomy,"essence,"or basicworldviewofthemilitary,
as possiblewillbe strong.
cognitiveneed to see theoffensive
Relations
andCivil-Military
on Strategy
Influences
External
The offensivestrategiesof 1914were largelydomesticin origin,rootedin
causes. To some extent,howand psychological
sociopolitical,
bureaucratic,
ever,externalinfluencesexacerbated-andoccasionallydiminished-these
offensivebiases. Althoughthese externalfactorswere usuallysecondary,
fortheirlessons about sourcesof leverage
interesting
theyare particularly
over the destabilizingpoliciesof one's opponents.The mostimportantof
theselessons-and theone stressedby Van Everaelsewherein thisissueis that offensetends to promoteoffenseand defensetends to promote
defensein theinternational
system.
One way thatoffensewas exportedfromone stateto anotherwas by
writings.The FrenchdiscoveredClausewitzin the 1880s,
meansof military
who
Germanmilitarists
of himby contemporary
readingmisinterpretations
same
At
the
time,
focusednarrowlyon his conceptofthe "decisivebattle."
theirhomeRussiantacticianDragomirovreinforced
readingtheretrograde
and morale.
grownoveremphasison the connectionbetweenthe offensive
a
theseideas underthe label of offensive
Russianwritingslaterreimported
of
Each
the
doctrine.
short-war
Germany
from
outrance,
while borrowing
the standardlessonsdrawn
citedtheothersin parroting
Europe'smilitaries
moredifficult
War:offensewas becomingtactically
fromtheRusso-Japanese
and sharing
None of thisshuffling
but was stilladvantageousstrategically.
of rationalesforoffensewas the initialcause of anyone's offensivebias.
offenseto everyoneelse; no one was justreceiving.
Everyonewas exporting
62. IrvingJanisand Leon Mann, DecisionMaking(New York: Free Press, 1977).
International
Security
| 138
Its main effectwas mutualreinforcement.
The military
could believe (and
argueto others)thatoffensemustbe advantageous,sinceeveryoneelse said
was somebodyelse's fault.63
so, and thattheprevalenceofoffensive
doctrines
The mainvehicleforexporting
offensive
strategies
was throughaggressive
policies,not offensiveideas. The aggressivediplomacyand offensivewar
plans ofone statefrequently
encouragedoffensive
strategies
in neighboring
statesbothdirectly,
by changingtheirstrategic
situation,and indirectly,
by
in the
relations.Germanbelligerence
changingtheirpatternofcivil-military
Agadircrisisof 1911led Frenchciviliansto concludethatwar was likelyand
thattheyhad betterstartappeasingtheirown military
bygivingthemleaders
in whichtheywould have confidence.Thisled directly
to Michel'sfalland
the rise ofJoffre,
Castelnau,and the proponentsof the offensive
a outrance.
in the Bosniancrisisof 1908-1909had a similar,ifless
Germanbelligerence
directeffecton Russia. It convincedAlekseevthata limitedwar against
Austriaalone would be impossible,and it put everyonein a receptivemood
whentheFrenchurgedthetightening
ofthealliancein 1911.64
BeforeBosnia,
modusvivendiwithGerpeople sometimesthoughtin termsof a strategic
many;afterwards,
theythoughtin termsof a breathingspellwhilegaining
forthe finalconfrontation.
Combinedwiththe Russians'growing
strength
realizationof the probablecharacter
of theGermanwar plan, thisled inexorablyto theconclusionsthatwar was coming,thatit could notbe limited,
and that an unbridledoffensivewas requiredto exploitthe window of
Plan's westwardorientation.
opportunity
providedby theSchlieffen
Caught
in thislogic,Russiancivilianswho soughtlimitedoptionsin July1914were
easilyrefutedby Danilov and the military.
Completingthe spiral,the huge
Russian arms increases provokedby German belligerenceallowed the
youngerMoltketo arguepersuasivelythatGermanyshould seek a pretext
forpreventivewar beforethose increasesreached fruitionin 1917. This
recommendation
was persuasiveonlyin the contextof the Schlieffen
Plan,
whichmade Germanylook weakerthanit reallywas by creatingneedless
enemiesand wastingtroopson an impossibletask.Withoutthe Schlieffen
Plan,Germanywould nothave been vulnerablein 1917.
In short,the European militariescannotbe blamed forthe belligerent
diplomacythatset the ball rollingtowardsWorldWar I. Once the process
began,however,theirpenchantforoffenseand theirquicknessto view war
chapters2 and 3.
63. Snyder, IdeologyoftheOffensive,
64. Ibid., chapter 7, citingZaionchkovskii,pp. 103, 350, and other sources.
Relations
| 139
Civil-Military
as inevitablecreateda slidetowardswarthatthediplomatsdid notforesee.65
Thebestplaceto intervene
to stopthedestabilizing
spiralofexportedoffense
was, of course,at thebeginning.If Germanstatesmenhad had a theoryof
civil-military
relationsand of the securitydilemmato help themcalculate
risksmoreaccurately,
theirchoiceofa diplomaticstrategy
mighthave been
different.
Ifoffensegetsexportedwhen statesadoptaggressivepolicies,it also gets
inwaysthatareindistinguishexportedwhenstatestrytodefendthemselves
In the1880s,theRussiansimproved
able frompreparations
foraggression.66
theirrailroadsin Poland and increasedthenumberoftroopstherein peacein orderto decreasetheirvulnerability
time,primarily
to Germanattackin
the earlyweeks of a war. The GermanGeneralStaffsaw thesemeasuresas
a sign thata Russian attackwas imminent,
so counseledlaunchinga preventive strikebeforeRussian preparationsproceeded further.Bismarck
thoughtotherwise,so the incidentdid not end in the same way as the
similar1914case. Severalfactorsmayaccountforthedifference:
superficially
Bismarck'sgreaterpoweroverthemilitary,
his lackofinterestin expansion
forits own sake, and the absence of politicalconditionsthatwould make
war seem inevitableto anyonebuta GeneralStaffofficer.
Perhapsthemost
importantdifference,
however,was thatin 1914 the youngerMoltkewas
a futureof extremevulnerability,
whereasin 1887 the elder
anticipating
a futureofstrategic
stalemate.Moltke,planningfor
Moltkewas anticipating
a defensein the west in any event,believedthattheGermanscould in the
worstcase holdoutfor30 yearsifFranceand Russiaforcedwarupon them.67
Althoughstatescan provokeoffensive
responsesby seemingtoo aggressive,theycan also inviteoffensive
predationby seemingtoo weak. German
hopes fora rapid victory,whetherexpressedin the eastwardplan of the
1880sor the westwardSchlieffen
Plan, always restedon the slowness of
Russia's mobilization.Likewise,Germany'sweaknesson the easternfront,
createdby the Schlieffen
artificially
Plan, promotedthe developmentof offensiveplans in Russia. Finally,Belgianweaknessallowed the Germansto
65. Isabel V. Hull, TheEntourageofKaiserWilhelmII, 1888-1918(New York: CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1982), discusses the effecton the Kaiser of his militaryaides' incessantwarnings thatwar
was inevitable.
66. Robert Jervis,"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," WorldPolitics,Vol. 31, No. 2
(January1978), pp. 199-210.
67. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (1962; rpt., New York: Dell, 1971), p. 38; see also
pp. 150-156, forMoltke's last war plan of February1888.
Auftnarschpldne,
| 140
International
Security
retaintheirillusionsabout decisivevictoryby providingan apparentpoint
ofentryintotheFrenchkeep.
States who want to exportdefense,then,should tryto appear neither
weak nor aggressive.The Frenchachievedthisin the early1880s,when a
made theman unpromising
forcepostureheavyon fortifications
targetand
an ineffective
aggressor.In the shortrun,thisonlyredirected
Moltke'soffensivetowarda morevulnerabletarget,Russia. But by 1888-1890,when
Russia too had strengthened
its fortifications
and its defensiveposturein
Poland generally,Moltkewas stymiedand became verypessimisticabout
offensive
operations.Schlieffen,
however,was harderto discourage.When
he simplyredirectedhis attention
attackingRussia became unpromising,
offensive
towardsFrance,pursuingthe leastunpromising
option.For hard
ofnon-provoccorecases likeSchlieffen,
one wonderswhetheranystrategy
and non-threatening,
could induce
ativedefense,no matterhow effective
abandoningtheoffensive.
SovietStrategy
andCivil-Military
Relations
In 1914,flawedcivil-military
relationsexacerbated
and liberatedthemilitary's
endemicbias foroffensivestrategies,creatingstrategicinstability
despite
military
technologiesthataided thedefenderofthestatusquo. Some of the
factorsthatproducedthisoutcomemayhave been peculiarto thathistorical
of militarystaffshad been a relatively
epoch. The fullprofessionalization
recentdevelopment,forexample,and bothciviliansand military
were still
modusvivendi.AftertheFirstWorldWar,military
gropingfora satisfactory
werefairly
well chastenedexceptin
purveyorsofthe "cultoftheoffensive"
Japan,where the phenomenonwas recapitulated.Our own era has seen
butmoremoderateversionsofthemilitary's
offensive
nothingthisextreme,
bias are arguablystillwithus. It willbe worthwhile,
to reiterate
therefore,
thekindsofconditionsthathave intensified
thisbias in thepast in orderto
assess thelikelihoodoftheirrecurrence.
bias is exacerbatedwhen civiliancontrolis weak. In GerFirst,offensive
manybefore1914,a long periodof military
autonomyin strategic
planning
of an offensive
allowed the dogmatization
doctrine,rootedin the parochial
interestsand outlookof the GeneralStaff.In Russia, the absence of firm,
unifiedciviliancontrolfosteredlogrollingbetweentwo militaryfactions,
exhibited
compoundingtheoffensive
preferences
byeach. Second,offensive
bias growsmoreextremewhen operationaldoctrineis used as a weapon in
Relations
| 141
Civil-Military
civil-military
disputesaboutdomesticpolitics,institutional
arrangements,
or
othernonstrategic
issues. The Frenchoffensive
a outrance,
oftendismissedas
some mysticalaberration,
is bestexplainedin theseterms.
Once it appears,an acute offensive
bias tendsto be self-replicating
and
resistantto disconfirming
evidence.Offensive
doctrinalwritingsare readily
transmitted
acrossinternational
boundaries.Moreimportant,
offensive
strategies tendto spreadin a chainreaction,sinceone state'soffensive
tendsto
createimpendingdangersor fleetingopportunities
forotherstates,who
mustadopt theirown offensives
to forestallor exploitthem.Finally,hard
of an offensive
will be raoperationalevidenceof the infeasibility
strategy
tionalizedaway when the offensiveis closelylinkedto the organization's
"essence,"autonomy,or fundamental
ideology.
I believethatthesefindings,
derivedfromtheWorldWarI cases, resonate
withthe developmentof Sovietnuclearstrategy
and withcertain
strongly
patternsin the U.S.-Soviet strategicrelationship.At a timewhen current
eventsare stimulating
considerableinterestin the stateof civil-military
relationsin theSovietUnion,thefollowing
areoffered
thoughts
notas answers
but as questionsthatresearchers
mayfindworthconsidering.
Sovietmilitary
doctrine,as depictedby conventionalwisdom,embodies
all of the desideratatypicallyexpressedin professionalmilitarywritings
thedevelopedworldsinceNapoleon. LikeSchlieffen's
throughout
doctrine,
itstressesoffense,
theinitiative,
and decisiveresultsthroughtheannihilation
on
of the opponent'sabilityto resist.It is suspiciousof politicallimitations
violencebased on mutualrestraint,
especiallyin nuclearmatters.Both in
to themilitary
writers
styleand substance,Sidorenkoreadslikea throwback
of the Second Reich,warningthat"a forestwhichhas notbeen completely
cutdown growsup again."68The similarity
is notaccidental.Not onlydoes
offenseservesome ofthesameinstitutional
functions
fortheSovietmilitary
as it did fortheGermanGeneralStaff,
butSovietdoctrineis to some degree
theirlineal descendant."In our militaryschools,"a 1937 Pravda editorial
and Ludendorff."69
Soviet
averred,"we studyClausewitz,Moltke,Schlieffen,
nucleardoctrinealso parallelspre-1914Germanstrategyin thatboth cut
The Sovietshave neverbeen
againstthegrainof theprevailingtechnology.
68. Quoted by Benjamin Lambeth, "Selective Nuclear Options and Soviet Strategy,"in Johan
(New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 92.
Holst and Uwe Nerlich, BeyondNuclearDeterrence
69. Raymond Garthoff,SovietMilitaryDoctrine(Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), p. 56.
International
Security
| 142
in a position to achieve anythingbut disaster by seizing the initiativeand
strivingfordecisive results; neitherwas Schlieffen.
There are also parallels in the political and historicalcircumstancesthat
permittedthe development of these doctrines.The Soviet victoriesin World
War II, like the German victoriesin 1866 and 1870, were nation-buildingand
regime-legitimating
enterprisesthatlentprestigeand authorityto the military
profession,notwithstandingStalin's attemptto check it. This did not produce
a man on horseback in eithercountry,nor did it allow the militaryto usurp
authorityon questions of the use of force. But in both cases the military
retained a monopoly of militaryoperational expertiseand was eithernever
challenged or eventually prevailed in practical doctrinal disputes. In the
German case, at least, it was militaryautonomy on questions of operational
plans and doctrinethatmade war more likely;directlobbyingforpreventive
strikescaused less troublebecause it was clearlyillegitimate.
While many accounts of the originsof Soviet nuclear strategyacknowledge
the effectof the professionalmilitaryperspective,they oftenlay more stress
on civiliansources of offensive,warfighting
doctrines:forexample, MarxismLeninism, expansionist foreignpolicy goals, and historicalexperiences making Russia a "militarizedsociety." Politicalleaders, in this view, promote or
at least accept the military'swarfightingdoctrine because it serves their
foreignpolicy goals and/orreflectsa shared view of internationalpolitics as
a zero-sum struggle. Thus, Lenin is quoted as favoringa preemptive first
strike,Frunze as linkingoffenseto the proletarianspirit.The militaryprinciple of annihilationof the opposing armed forceis equated with the Leninist
credo of ktokogo.70
Although this view may capture part of the truth,it fails to account for
recurrentstatementsby Soviet politicalleaders implyingthat nuclear war is
unwinnable, that meaningfuldamage limitationcannot be achieved through
superiorwarfightingcapabilities,and thatopen-ended expenditureson strategic programsare wastefuland perhaps pointless. These themes have been
voiced in the context of budgetary disputes (not just for public relations
purposes) by Malenkov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Ustinov. To varying
degrees, all of these civilian leaders have chafed at the cost of open-ended
warfightingprograms and against the redundant offensivecapabilities de-
70. Herbert Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 210-211;
Garthoff,SovietMilitaryDoctrine,pp. 65, 149.
Civil-Military
Relations
| 143
mandedby each ofseveralmilitary
suborganizations.
McNamaradiscovered
in theUnitedStatesthatthedoctrineofmutualassureddestruction,
withits
emphasison the irrelevance
of marginaladvantagesand the infeasibility
of
counterforce
damage-limitation
strategies,
had greatutility
in budgetarydebates. Likewise,recentdiscussionsin the SovietUnionon the feasibility
of
victoryseem to be connectedwiththe questionof how muchis enough.
Settingaside certainproblemsof nuance and interpretation,
a case can be
made thatthe civilianleadership,speakingthroughDefenseMinisterUstinov, has been using strategic
doctrineto justifyslowingdown the growth
ofmilitary
spending.In thecontextofarguments
aboutwhethertheReagan
strategic
buildupwillreallymaketheSovietUnionmorevulnerable,Ustinov
has quite clearlylaid out the argumentthatneithersuperpowercan expect
to gainanything
by striking
first,
sincebothhave survivable
retaliatory
forces
and launch-on-warning
capabilities.Thus, Ustinovhas been stressingthat
the importanceof surpriseis diminishingand that "preemptivenuclear
strikesare alien to Soviet militarydoctrine."Ogarkov,the Chief of the
GeneralStaff,has been arguingtheoppositeon all counts:theU.S. buildup
is trulythreatening,
theinternational
sceneis akinto the1930s,thesurprise
factoris growingin importance,
damagelimitation
is possible(though"victory"is problematic),and consequentlythe Soviet Union must spare no
expensein preparingto defenditself.71
Thisis somewhatreminiscent
oftheFrenchcase in WorldWarI, in which
civiliansand the militarywere using doctrinalargumentsas weapons in
disputeson otherissues. Two relateddangersarisein such situations.The
firstis thatdoctrinalargumentation
and belief,respondingto politicaland
their
in strategic
realitiesand become
lose
organizational
necessity,
anchoring
The secondis thata spiraldynamicin the political
dogmaticand extremist.
disputemaycarrydoctrinealongwithit. Thatis, thehardereach side fights
to prevailon budgetaryor organizational
questions,the moreabsoluteand
will
unyieldingtheirdoctrinaljustifications become.In thisregard,it would
be interesting
to see whethertheperiodsin whichSovietmilitary
spokesmen
71. Citations to the main statementsby Ogarkov and Ustinov can be found in Dan L. Strode
and Rebecca V. Strode, "Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National SecurityPolicy,"International
Security,Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall 1983), pp. 91-116. Quotation fromWilliam Garner, Soviet Threat
Perceptionsof NATO's Eurostrategic
Missiles (Paris: Atlantic Institutefor InternationalAffairs,
1983), p. 69, citingPravda,July25, 1981. I have benefittedfromdiscussions of the Ogarkov and
Ustinov statementswith Lawrence Caldwell, Stephen Coffey,CliffordKupchan, and Cynthia
Roberts,who advanced a varietyof interpretationsnot necessarilysimilarto my own.
International
Security| 144
were arguinghardestthat"victoryis possible"coincidedwithperiods of
sharpbudgetarydisputes.
Even if some of the above is true,the patternmay be a weak one in
comparisonwiththeFrenchcase. Ustinovis morelikeFreycinet
thanAndre,
and marginalbudgetaryissues do not carrythe same emotionalfreight
as
the threatsto organizational"essence" mountedin the Dreyfusaftermath.
Still,if we considerthat the Soviet case couples some of the autonomy
problemsoftheGermancase withsomeofthemotivational
problemsofthe
Frenchcase, a volatilemixturemaybe developing.
Anothercivil-military
questionis whetherSovietmilitary
doctrineis mismatchedwithSovietdiplomacy.On the surface,it mayseem thatthe awemachineand itsintimidating
offensive
doctrineare
inspiringSovietmilitary
apt instruments
for supportinga policyof diplomaticextortion.It may,
however,pose the same problemforSoviet statesmenthatthe Schlieffen
Plan did forBiilowand Bethmann.Sovietleadersmaybe self-deterred
by
the all-or-nothing
if the
characterof theirmilitary
options.72
Alternatively,
Sovietstryto pressahead witha diplomacybased on the "Bolshevikoperationalcode" principlesofcontrolled
pressure,limitedprobes,and controlled,
calculatedrisks,theymayfindthemselvestrappedby military
optionsthat
createriskswhichcannotbe controlled.
These problemsmay not arise,however,since the Sovietsseem to have
turnedaway fromKhrushchev'sbrinkmanship
diplomacy.In the Brezhnev
era, Sovietdoctrineon the politicalutilityof nuclearforcesstressedits role
as an umbrelladeterring
intervention
against"progressive"
politicalchange.73
Insofaras limitedoptionsand "salamitactics"are moreclearlyindispensable
forcompellentthan fordeterrentstrategies,thiswould help to solve the
Sovietdiplomats'mismatch
problem.The "lastclearchance"toavoiddisaster
would be shiftedonto the UnitedStates. This solutionto the diplomats'
72. Increased Soviet attentionto the "conventional option" since the late 1960s would seem to
have mitigatedthisproblem,but in factit may have compounded it. Militaryinterestin preparing
fora conventionalphase and acquiring capabilities forescalation dominance in the theatermay
derive more from obvious organizational motives than from a fundamental change in the
military'smind-setof "inflexibleover-response."In Soviet thinking,limitationsseem to be based
less on mutual restraintthan on NATO's willingness to see its theaternuclear forcesdestroyed
duringthe conventionalphase. This raises the nightmarishpossibilitythatthe Soviet leadership
could embark on war thinkingthat it had a conventional option, whereas in factunrestrained
conventional operations and preemptive incentives at the theaternuclear level would lead to
rapid escalation.
73. Coit Blacker,"The Kremlinand Detente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes, and Expectations,"in
Alexander George, ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry(Boulder: Westview, 1983), pp. 122-123.
Civil-Military
Relations
1145
problemmightcause problemsforthemilitary's
budgetrationale,however,
since strategicparityshould be sufficient
to carryout a strictly
deterrent
function.
The Germancase suggeststhatextremism
in strategic
thinking
maydepend
a greatdeal on institutionalization
and dogmatizationof doctrinein the
maturemilitaryorganization.If Roman Kolkowicz's"traditionalists"
are
equated withthe Moltkegenerationand his "modernist"technocrats
with
the Schlieffen
generation,do we finda parallelin the dogmatizationof
doctrine?BenjaminLambetharguesthatSovietdoctrineis quiteflexibleand
creative,
butso was Schlieffen
on questionsofhow toimplement
his strategic
tenetsunderchangingconditions.74
Creativity
withintheparadigmof decisive, offensiveoperationsmay coexistwithutterrigiditytowardsoptions
thatwould requirea changein thebasic paradigm.For example,theSoviet
groundforcesadapted creatively
in precision-guided
to improvements
munitions(PGMs) thatseemed to threatenthe viabilityof theiroffensive
doctrine;theydid notconsider,however,thatPGMs mightoffer
an opportunity
to giveup theirfundamentally
offensive
orientation.
As forthethirdphase
oforganizational
or Groener
evolution,are thereanyparallelsto Ludendorff
amongyoungerSovietofficers?
Aretheyforging
linkstoRussiannationalists,
whose social base AlexanderYanov describesin ways that are strongly
reminiscent
ofEley'saccountoftheultranationalist
Germanright?75
Anydiscussionoftheextremist
mustconsider
potentialofSovietstrategy
rethe strongrealityconstraint
imposedby the mutual-assured-destruction
ofsomejuniorofficers,
itseemsclear
lationship.Despitetherecklessrhetoric
thatwhenthehead oftheStrategic
RocketForcessaid in 1967that"a sudden
preemptive
strikecannotgive[theaggressor]a decisiveadvantage,"he knew
thatlaunch-on-warning
and the hardeningof silos made thistrueforboth
sides.76And todayOgarkovdoes notdenythata scot-free
victory
is imposremainsstrongin
sible. But despitethis,the themeof damage limitation
and we shouldremember
thoseWorldWarI stratSovietmilitary
thinking,
egistswho saw the "necessary"as possible,no matterhow realistically
they
did theiroperationalcalculations.
74. Lambeth, "Selective Nuclear Options"; Kolkowicz, The SovietMilitaryand the Communist
Party(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1967).
75. Alexander Yanov, DetenteafterBrezhnev(Berkeley: Instituteof InternationalStudies, Universityof California,1977).
p. 69.
76. Garner, SovietThreatPerceptions,
International
Security| 146
Finally,how have the policiesof the UnitedStatesaffected
the developmentof civil-military
relationsand strategic
doctrinein theU.S.S.R.? Some
analystsargue thatthe Ogarkov-Ustinov
debatesended in May 1983with
Ustinov'scapitulation,
at leaston thelevelofrhetoric.
Althoughleadership
reasonmayhave been the
politicsmayhave been a factor,a moreimportant
Reagan "Star Wars" speech and the Reagan defenseprogramgenerally.77
Echoingthe developmentsin Francein 1911,risinglevelsofexternalthreat
to win thedoctrinalargumentand achieveits
mayhave helpedthemilitary
institutional
issues tiedto thedoctrinaldispute.This
aimsin theunderlying
and
episode mayalso be seen as the latestroundof a processof exporting
re-importing
warfighting
strategies.The impactof Sovietcounterforce
doctrineson the Americanstrategicdebate in the 1970sis obvious;now the
fruitsof our conversionare perhapsbeingharvestedby Ogarkovin Soviet
debateson military
budgetsand operationalpolicies.
relationsin theSoviet
Whateverthepreciserealityofcurrent
civil-military
the
World
War
I
cases
revealed
Union,patterns
by
suggestthatthe Soviet
several"riskfactors"thatcouldproducean extremevariant
Unionmanifests
bias. The historicalparallelfurther
of the military's
endemicoffensive
sugrolein determining
geststhattheactionsofrivalstatescan playan important
how these latentrisksunfold.Aggressivepolicieswere liableto touchoff
theselatentdangers,butvulnerability
also tendedtoencouragetheopponent
to adopt an offensivestrategy.Posturesthatwere both invulnerableand
non-provocative
gotthebestresults,buteven thesedid notalwaysdissuade
dogmaticadherentsto the "cultof the offensive."
AlthoughSovietpersistdoes
ence in workingthe problemsof conventional
and nuclearoffensives
of a Schlieffen,
nuclearweapons pose
recallthe dogged single-mindedness
a powerfulrealityconstraint
forwhichno truecounterpart
existedin 1914.
are
Consequently,if the twin dangers of provocationand vulnerability
avoided,thereshouldbe everyhope ofkeepingSoviet"riskfactors"under
control.The currentdriftof the strategic
competition,
however,makesthat
nota small"if."
77. Settingthese debates into the contextof U.S.-Soviet relationsare Lawrence T. Caldwell and
RobertLegvold, "Reagan Through Soviet Eyes," ForeignPolicy,No. 52 (Fall 1983), pp. 3-21.