IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)
Volume 21, Issue 9, Ver. 1 (Sep. 2016) PP 01-08
e-ISSN: 2279-0837, p-ISSN: 2279-0845.
www.iosrjournals.org
Identity crisis, State vulnerability and ungoverned space in the
Sahel region of Africa: implications for Nigeria national
security
Roosevelt O. Idehen
Department of International Relations and Strategic Studies Igbinedion University, Okada.
Abstract:-The ungoverned spaces of the Sahel region represent the physical areas where there is absence or
weak capacity of states to make representation culminating in pervasive national identity crisis. This work
interrogates the ethos of ungoverned space in Nigeria in relations to decades of misrule, neo patrimonialism and
prebendalism in the governance process. The paper, relying on “Competitive control theory” describes the
unfolding paranormal context between competitive actors (state and groups) Leveraging on the gaps in the
governance system within the country. the work concludes that the seemingly lack of government presents in the
ungoverned space engulfing the Sambisa forest in North Eastern Nigeria has created a weak link in Nigeria‟s
national security. Criminal syndicates and terrorist organizations like Boko Haram have leveraged extensively
on this weak link to champion anti state crusade within the region enjoying massive covert support from local
indigenes. The work therefore recommends a bottom up re-orientation on national identity through the
educational curriculum.
Key words:- criminal syndicate, national identity, national security, Sahel region, ungoverned space
I.
INTRODUCTION
“Ungoverned space” represents a general condition of weak to nonexistent State authority in a defined
geographic area (Menkhaus 2007) . It is a term commonly used to describe the vulnerability of state by share
description of the absence of capacity to make representation in certain locality within a state. It defines the
degree of weakness or fragility of a state to the extent of non-physical presence of state apparatus or extremely
week and compromisable presence of state structures to alternative governance mechanism dominated by local
native authorities and war lords more vulnerable to penetration and sometimes overwhelmed by illicit networks.
“Ungoverned space” encapsulates both physical and non-physical area where there is an absence or
weak capacity of state political will to exercise control such as the Sahel region, where terrorists have exercise
dominance, or the Niger delta, where oil bunkering and other criminal activities are pervasive, or the maritime
areas of the African coastal waters in the Gulf of Guinea dominated by criminal syndicates. The term is intended
to describe in its simplest form, physical and non-physical policy space lacking effective state sovereignty and
control (Piombo2007, Hazen 2010). It depict the degree of state penetration of society measured in terms of the
presence or absence of state institutions, physical infrastructure, social and cultural resistance to state
penetration, the prevalence of an informal economy, and the extent to which the state has a monopoly of
violence ( Rabasa et. al. 2007) .
1.1 The Sahel region of Africa
The Sahel is a semi-arid region between the Sahara (desert) and the savannah to the south, extending
from Senegal to Sudan. The region covers parts of northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali,
northern Burkina Faso, extreme south of Algeria, Niger, extreme north of Nigeria, central Chad, central and
southern Sudan, and northern Eritrea (UNDP 2014) , it is one of the world‟s poorest region with patchy
Development or non-existent. It represents the “eco-climatic and biogeographic zone of transition in Africa
between the Sahara Desert to the north and the Sudanian Savanna to the south”. Having a semi-arid climate, it
stretches across the south-central latitudes of Northern Africa between the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea.
The Sahel region occupies the front burner in contemporary debate of West‟s counter-terrorism
campaign featuring prominently on global security discuss and has become one of the international hotspot for
mushrooming of divers‟ criminal network including providing safe haven for terrorist groups ( Lind, 2009,
Anderson, 2015) . The region is inundated with several poorly policed borders creating a vast area of porous
borders and desert with transregional dynamics linking criminal and radical political groups.
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Identity crisis, State vulnerability and ungoverned space in the Sahel region of
However, the region is very rich in hydrocarbons, uranium and gold mostly distributed in rural and
border areas. These resources are largely untapped and have generated a lot of interest from US, EU and China
(Crisis Group Africa Report, 2015). Despite this natural endowment the region‟s population is deeply
impoverished. This paradoxical situation is a condition of gross resource mismanagement, corruption and
leadership ineptitude given rise to a system of predation in governance matrix, this is particularly pronounce
where there are no central state presence.
Nigeria specially presents a classical case where decades of misrule, neo patrimonialism and
prebendalism has dominated the process of state governance. The northern region of the state appear to be the
worst hit, agriculture which is the main stay in the northern region is severely weakened as with many of other
peripheral areas, creating a circumstance of depravity amongst the people. This scenario presents an alarming
case of joblessness, poor health care, weak infrastructures and irresponsive institutions in the country. The state
education system is poorly funded and underperforming presenting a region with the lowest literacy rates in the
country. Millions of children are sent to koranic school called “Almajiri”, a school of dormant and un-informed
children in the north whose only means of survival is the dependents on zakat (alms begging) (Idehen 2015).
This is the recruitment population for terrorist groups in the northern part of Nigeria. It is this myriad condition
of state weakness that has created identity crises amongst the people in north eastern Nigeria.
.
The seemingly lack of government presents in the ungoverned space engulfing the Sambisa forest in
north eastern Nigeria has created a weak link in the chain of Nigeria‟s national security. Criminal syndicates
and terrorist organizations like Boko Haram have leveraged extensively on this state weakness to champion anti
state crusade within the region enjoying massive covert support from local indigenes who had often time traded
their national loyalty. This extremist organization, capitalizing on the deep sense of injustice have exploited the
region‟s endemic poverty and marginalization to radicalized the indigenes providing a more juicy sense of
inclusiveness as a trade off values for the people.
Moreover, in the Central Sahel, illicit networks and some international terrorist organisations such as
Al-Qaida and Boko Haram have instituted their own overlapping governance systems where the state is weak
or absent ( Dowd, 2013) targeting states with certain conditions such as Weak institutions, cyclical
environmental shocks, vast ungoverned spaces, fragile economies and poverty (Rabasa et al,2007).
Community-based structures, Islamist movements, and criminal networks have successfully exploited these ad
hoc governance systems, aligning with the interest of local compradors and powerbrokers to gain a foothold
hence the ungoverned space of the Sahel remain one of the transit routes of criminal activities such as, human
trafficking, smuggling and terrorist safe haven (OECD, 2015).
II.
THEORETICAL DISCOURSE
This paper relies heavily on the “Competitive control theory” as its frame work of analysis. This thesis
draws extensively from the fundamentals of the ungoverned space debate which explore the dynamic of existing
paradigm of “competition and control” by state and non-state actors within the ungoverned space. This describes
the unfolding paranormal context between competitive actors (state and groups) who have leverage on the weak
links created by poor governance system in a geographic space within a territory.
Competitive control theory is a useful way of describing the competition that exist between state and
non state actors in ungoverned space ( Fall 1965 ). In the works of Kilcullen (2013), the theory of competitive
control is “an irregular conflicts (that is, in conflicts where at least one combatant is a non-state armed group),
the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, and
wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that population and its residential areas.
Simply put, the idea is that populations respond to a predictable, ordered, normative system that tells them
exactly what they need to do, and not do, in order to be safe.”
Both Kilcullen and Fall describe a normative “competitive control” system as that system where the
actor (state or non-state) that establishes a “wider range of capabilities, covering more of the spectrum from
persuasion to coercion, will be stronger and more resilient.”( Kilcullen, (2013). in a null shell, “competitive
control” holds that:“Non-state armed groups, of many kinds, draw their strength and freedom of action primarily
from their ability to manipulate and mobilise populations, and that they do this using a spectrum of methods
from coercion to persuasion, by creating a normative system that makes people feel safe through the
predictability and order that it generate..”
( Kilcullen, 2013) reminiscence of the “carrot and stick”
phenomenon. In this sense competing actors do not “create normative systems.” Rather, they contest, with the
objective of exerting control of some set of activities already described by a fixed “full coercion-persuasion
spectrum” that is defined by identified functions of governance. (Fisher and Mercado 2014)
The concept of “competitive control” codifies the perception of the counterinsurgent in relations to a
population suffering from gap in governance. Insurgency in this context refers “an organized movement aimed
at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” Insurgents
modus of operation rely on the use of terror as their medium of communications to the general public especially
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Identity crisis, State vulnerability and ungoverned space in the Sahel region of
constituted authority with the intension to creating “liberated zones,” where they establish a “counter-state.”
Unlike terrorists, who in most cases are isolated from the mass of the population, insurgents sometimes have
substantial popular support and achievable aims.
III.
SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SAHEL
The security in the Sahel region of Africa is inextricably linked. Meaning that insecurity in one part of
the region can quickly become a security threat in another and the state within this region share some common
features, beginning with Porous borders, limited or non existence of government presence and capacities. The
security challenges worsened with the crisis in Libya, Northern Mali, central Africa Republic and northern
Nigeria. The 2011 “Arab Spring” that engulf most of the Arab nations including Libya unleashed an army of
heavily Armed fighters in to the Sahel region coupled with the rebellion from northern Mali dominated by the
Tuareg rebel groups. The region has become saturated with influx of dangerous weapons precipitating a
condition of vulnerability. Extremist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have
exploited this condition to create overriding power structure within the region. The most recent, with so much
dexterity and resilience is the Boko Haram, terrorizing the north eastern part of Nigeria.
Terrorists have found the Sahel region a safe haven for propagation and do also enjoy greater freedom
of movement and access to a larger pool of potential recruits and training opportunities. The region has become
a beehive of transnational criminal syndicates indulging in all sought of organized crime including smuggling
and trafficking in weapons, drugs and people.
3.1 Conflicts in the Sahel.
Violence across the Sahel increased substantially from 2012. These increases are largely due to Northern
Nigeria and Mali (see Figure 1). Northern Nigeria has been under siege by terrorist since 2009. Boko Haram
superimposed itself on the north eastern Nigeria, seizing territories, sacking communities and causing atrocities
to armless citizens of north eastern Nigeria.
Figure 1.
Source: Clionadh Raleigh and Caitriona Dowd (2013:6).
The increasing rise in the criminal activities of the Sahel has redefined America strategic interest in
Africa especially after 9/11. It has rapidly been considered as the “second front of the War on Terror in Africa”
(Keenan, 2004; Pham, 2010), so much so that the US actively participated in the geopolitical definition of the
region. Security is the underlining factor that helps create a geopolitical definition and regional security
complex (Morgan, 1997; Waever, 2003]. This definition of Sahel‟s regional borders overstepped local
perceptions and self-definitions, and determined the entry of this territory into the domain of geopolitics (
Brachet, 2013). Currently, Africa occupies a central position in America strategic interest and was appointed
with a new important role in the War on Terror. Africa as a continent play host to several fragile states and
ungoverned spaces, hence it is asserted that the US African strategic policy has been militarized with
AFRICOM serving as evidence of that phenomenon ( Francis, 2010; Thurston, 2012; Seeger, 2012).
3.2 Identity Crises in the ungoverned space
National Identity crises usually evolved from the challenges of failed or weak state, where state have evidently
abdicated it responsibilities or deliberately fail to make representation of national foothold in some quarters. It is
this summation that usually forms the characteristics of ungoverned states.
The expression of one's national identity is a display of the spirit of patriotism or nationalism
characterized by a deep sense of loyalty and national pride. However, an extreme expression can gravitate
towards chauvinism, which refers to the “firm belief in the country's superiority and extreme loyalty toward
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Identity crisis, State vulnerability and ungoverned space in the Sahel region of
one's country” (Ashmore, et al, 2001). National identity is viewed in psychological terms as "an awareness of
difference", a "feeling and recognition of 'we' and 'they' ( Yoonmi 2012). It is a social construction that defines
the identity of individuals, by reasons of share values and common identifications such as, national flags,
language, colors, nation's history, and “narcissism” for the purpose of invidious comparison (Freud 1930).
Conceptualizing national identity refers to the “emotion a person has with this identification, such as a sense of
belonging, or emotional attachment toward one's nation” (Tajfel, H and Turner, J.C 1986). National identity
requires a social psychological construction of an in-group as different and differentiated from the out-groups by
recognizing commonalities such as having common descent and common destiny. National identity, like other
social identities, engenders positive emotions such as pride and love to one's nation, and feeling of obligations
toward other citizens ( Henri 1978) and having a common threat or having a common goal, an act of solidarity
(Uko-Ima 2014). One of the challenges of national identity in Africa is the creation of the two public by the
incursion of colonial exigencies on the psych of Africans (the civic and the primordial public) (Ekeh 1975), The
division of loyalty between these two public makes it very easy to substitute national identification for other
identity that appear to enjoy the sympathy of their primordial identification. It is this dilemma that has created
the kind of compromise by local indigenes in North Eastern Nigeria with terrorist organization that have
leveraged on this existing gap in the locality. However, the theory of the two public as enunciated by Peter Ekeh,
which stems from the subversive incursion of colonialism with many problems due to the dialectical relationship
between the civic and the primordial society (Ekeh 1975) did not encapsulate the dynamics of ungoverned space
and its challenges as a precondition for the creation of double loyalty of citizens who are victim of colonialism.
The question of national loyalty by my calculations is situated in the inclusive peculiarities of modern Africa
state whose gamut of internal contradictions has created a group of alienated. These groups often times find
expression in ethnic chauvinism or regions identifications. This identification acts as a social psychological
enclave for the creation of the in-group within the general group which ultimately creates alienation from the
state that renders the areas vulnerable to insurgency and manipulation by actors who feed off and aggravate
social tensions. Criminal networks may thus become power-holders, by either entering into or overpowering
state institutions. The creation of the two public not just as a consequence of colonial incursion, perforating the
age long pre-colonial African socialism but simply as a byproduct of the lack of political will or share weakness
in the management of state affairs that denies effective and visible state presence in terms of state infrastructures
in certain geographic locality presenting a loose ends (weak link) in the chain of nation development. This crack
constitute the epidemics of state vulnerability to outside social forces who oftentimes presents a more inclusive
social indices to this „weak links‟ with the intention to creating an in-group from the general group. The new
social group derives their solidarity from the magnifications of the weakness of the general group and the share
absence or poor general state presence in their locality as exacerbated by penetrating illicit networks. These
conditions oftentimes create psychological template or frame for transferred loyalty from the general group to
the new group under the leadership of illicit network or terrorist groups crisscrossing the ungoverned spaces in
the international system such as the Sahel region of Africa. This accounts for the deep solidarity and deep rooted
loyalty of the indigenes of northeastern Nigerians to the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria.
In northern Nigeria, decades of state mismanagement fostered deep alienation. The population,
traditionally prone to religious conservatism and an ethnic sense of identity, has been easily subdued by radical
groups. Boko Haram, the most violent, has used weapons and intimidation to win local acquiescence but also at
times introduced a collective presence and group identity that replaced the absent state. Fragile loyalty to the
central state is further weakened in parts of the Central Sahel where many ethnic groups straddle borders.
Identities there are forged on a local rather than national level, and frequent trans-boundary movements
reinforce the disconnect from the central state (Crisis Group Africa Report N°168 2010)
3.4 Ungoverned space a condition for failing state
The rhetoric‟s of ungoverned space is significantly related to the axiom of failed or failing state which
depicts absence of effective state sovereignty and control over a given geographic territory. The implication for
state sovereignty as implied in this context has to do with the strategic and progressive state collapse from the
purview of weak state institutions to inability to respond to institutional challenges by state structures. Many of
the conditions that favour this axiom relate to conditions of poor governance of history. Rotberg (2002: 86 )
cited in ( Uzodike and Maiangwa 2012) argues that in the taxonomy of failed state the state‟s legitimacy
collapses:
“Once the state‟s capacity to secure itself or to perform in an expected manner recedes, there is every reason to
expect disloyalty to the state on the part of the disenchanted and aggrieved citizens. Logically, many transfer
their allegiances to their clan and group leaders, some of whom gravitate towards terrorism as they strive to
secure communal mandate. Mobilizing support from both external and local supporters, the terrorists seek out
havens in the more remote and marginalized corners of failed states where they blend in, more comfortably in
the prevailing chaos associated with state failure” ( Uzodike, and Maiangwa 2012 ).
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Identity crisis, State vulnerability and ungoverned space in the Sahel region of
The challenges of failed state or failing state in the Nigeria context is not restricted to the outburst of
Boko Haram or the restive youth of the Niger Delta neither is the resentment limited to the movement for the
actualization of the sovereign state of Biafra MASOB and other pockets of nationalist movements scattered
around the country. It is pervasive and endemic, born out of decades of misrule and exploitation by the
dominant class. However, the focus on Boko Haram stems from the adoption of terrorist mechanism as a means
of communicating it deep seated resentment for the Nigeria state. A large population who harbor this resentment
expresses it in one way or the other as Adibe (2012) argues that:
[…] the Nigerian state, contrary to the media hype, is regarded as the enemy, not just by Boko Haram, but by
several Nigerians and groups, each attacking it with as much ferocity as Boko Haram’s bombs, using whatever
means they have at their disposal: politicians entrusted to protect our common patrimony steal the country
blind, law enforcement officers see or hear no evil at a slight inducement, government workers drag their feet
and refuse to give their best while reveling in moonlighting, organized labour, inducing university lecturers in
public institutions go on indefinite strikes on a whim while journalists accept ‘brown envelops’ to turn truth on
its head or become uncritical champions of a selected anti-Nigerian state identity. What all these groups have in
common with Boko Haram is that they believe that the premise on which they act is justifiable and that the
Nigerian state is unfair to them, if not an outright enemy (cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012).
Thus, the whole concept of national identity therefore exist only in the pages of news papers and the
constitution whose derivatives negate it true sense of national constitution, flooded with lies and by share
reasons of it imposition. Those believe to champion the course of Nigeria nationalism are those who have
profited treacherously from the tragedy of it composition and had profligately head tenaciously to the common
patrimony at the expense of the general good. Hence the tiny dominant economic class who has remained
circulated within the corridor of power since 1960 have successfully created two classes of citizens in Nigeria;
those who are extremely rich and the class of extremely poor, reminiscence of the Marxian classification of
society into bourgeoisies and the proletariat. Moreover, this classification is without prejudice to ethnic
nationality. Thus, it is common to find people of the economic class from the North, East and West in a
ceremony organized by wealthy families in the South South geopolitical zone. The same applies to such
ceremonies in the other zones because they share a common denominator. Often, the weapons of ethnic and
religious differences are wielded when there is a perceived mortgage of interest or when the interests of the
personality in questions are threatened. Otherwise they align easily across the geopolitical zones for the purpose
of sustained predation.
IV.
IMPLICATION FOR NIGERIA NATIONAL SECURITY
The narrative on the Nigeria national security in this context encapsulates the state centric axiom and
the human security calculus. The implication of the weak link in the governance system of the ungoverned
space of the Sahel region spell doom for the national security apparatus; the Army ,Police, DSS etc and the
existential necessity of the people especially of North Eastern origin.
4.1 Human security impacts
The human security impact of terrorism cut across economic social and psychological life of the
people. Terrorism generally exerts heavy pressure on national economies. This involves direct economic cost
resulting from the physical damage to infrastructures and economic assets and loss of foreign direct investment
from the securitization of the economic space. On the global scale It has been estimated that “world GDP
decreased by a whopping US$3.6 trillion in 2002 as a direct and indirect consequence of terrorist activities in
2001” (Sunday Trust 2012). The global supply chain logistics which has witnessed astronomic increase is not
left out in the impact factor arising from insurgencies and terrorism. Transportation cost associated with more
security check points, with long queues on airports and highways due to the security checks portend negative
impact on the external trade of emerging economies like Nigeria.
4.1.1 Economic
In Nigeria, the new focus on fighting terrorism would mean diverting scarce budgetary resources from
essential development projects to defense and security. New market-based instruments such as „catastrophe
bonds‟ have also been introduced to ameliorate risk from terrorist activities. In the industrial economies, the
estimated extra spending on security by government and the private sector by 1% of GDP is forecast to result in
a 0.7% fall in GDP output, which further complicates national fiscal balances and growth prospects.
For nations that have manifested symptoms of state failure the consequences of insurgencies and terrorism are
unimaginable. The outburst of Boko Haram terrorism has virtually crippled economic activities in the north
eastern part of Nigeria. Companies have relocated out of the region for fear of falling victim of terrorist
activities. In Kano alone an estimated 126 industries have closed down (Sunday Trust 2012). Many foreign
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Identity crisis, State vulnerability and ungoverned space in the Sahel region of
nations have warned their citizens about the risk of staying or even doing business in Nigeria due to security
challenges, Nigeria have lost substantial inflow of FDI.
4.1.2 Humanitarian
There are also the challenges of humanitarian fallout of terrorism, there are now scattered IDP camps
(internally displaced persons) housing thousands of displaced people mostly women children in Nigeria. The
humanitarian crises had spread to neighboring countries. The unspeakable terrorist organization had become a
major threat to many of the Sahel communities and countries. An estimated 100,000 had fled to the Diffa region
of Niger and some 10,000 are in Chad and Cameroon.
4.1.3 Social
There are also the social impacts that have crippled social activities in the northern part of Nigeria.
Terrorism erodes inter-communal trust and destroys the reservoir of social capital that is so vital to building
harmonious societies this has contributed to the reinforcement of a downward spiral of further impoverishment.
Unfortunately, the crippling social effect of insurgency and terrorism is pervasive and not limited to the northern
states. The ungoverned space of Niger delta where insurgencies have reduced social activities to near zero and
the Eastern axis where kidnapping has taking a toll on the environment has also been a chronic victim of social
crippling due to insecurity. Currently, it is considered a great risk to stand in companies of more than four for
fear of terrorist attack in the north eastern Nigeria or to drive on a luxury car in the south east and south south
Nigeria for fear of kidnapping. This is a condition of siege which the Nigeria people have to grapple with for a
long time.
4.1.4 Psychological
Insurgencies and terrorism have generally created an atmosphere of fear and tension in Nigeria. There
is a great psychological depression in the system resulting from insecurity. The jingles and advert especially on
the Nigeria televisions have contributed to the heightened psychological tension associated with insecurity. The
fear of cars with tinted glasses, bags indiscriminately drop on the ground or a heavily bearded Muslim brother
constitutes a greater challenge to the social cohesion originally known with the people.
All these challenges are consequences of a weak link in the governance process created by the inability to make
representation in the ungoverned space of the Sahel region of Nigeria. The nation currently grapples with the
challenges of keeping the nation together. Nobel laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka has recently pointed out that
“Nigeria is already at the verge of disintegration” mutual suspicion has heightened amongst the ethnic
nationality especially between northerners and southerners as the dreaded Boko Haram phenomenon is believed
to be associated with northern greed for power. The country stands at that twilight zone in which any wrong
move or misguided action could spell disaster.
V.
CONCLUSION
The challenges of ungoverned space spell doom for most developing countries like Nigeria. The
question here is not the reason why the government has created a weak link in the development process which
most thinkers ascribed to the largeness of the country, but on the faint will to preserve the entity called Nigeria
by Nigerians. This paper has x-rayed the fact that the crisis of nationalism in Nigeria is pervasive and endemic.
If Boko Haram did not adopt the wholesale murder of defenseless people in the name of Jihad, they would
probably have had the majority of Nigerian youths on their side by now. The failures of government and the
prevailing culture of impunity have alienated the vast majority of Nigerians from the political system. However,
the general taxonomy of ungoverned space with it attendance consequence have had a toll on the Nigeria system
were a potion of north eastern state of the federation is playing host to terrorist groups with both overt and
covert solidarity from the indigenes of this locality. This misplaced loyalty as has already been discoursed arose
out of what I called national identity crisis where there is a juxtaposition of loyalty between the state and
primordial settings. The later often takes primary and more important place in the loyalty calculation due to
perceived state neglect and failure to have national foothold in some locality of the federation.
It is this absence of governance presence that led to the establishment of alternative governance
structure in the Sahel region .These alternate governance structures impact upon the social function of a given
space by influencing the local population. This is achieved through the spread of ideology, the provision of
social services and welfare, employment opportunities, and in some cases, intimidation. Criminal networks
often play a pivotal role in the local community because they become de facto powers within sovereign voids;
offering new „forms of local protection and legitimacy‟. Furthermore, non-state actors recognize the
effectiveness of governance that enfranchises the dispossessed by recruiting local agents and integrating local
forms of resistance with wider struggles.
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Identity crisis, State vulnerability and ungoverned space in the Sahel region of
Some of the question that troubled the „same mind‟ is the circumstance surrounding the kind of tacit
connivers of local indigene with criminal syndicate whether in the ungoverned space of north eastern Nigeria or
the communities within the creaks of the Niger delta. The willingness to trade national identity for some form of
clandestine identification dominated by criminal groups is of great concern. It is this condition of vulnerability
that constitutes national security threat far more than the onslaught of Boko haram.
Therefore, if the conditions of vulnerability of the Nigeria state are predicated, as in the narrative on the
asphyxiation of the Nigerian people due to failure of the leadership to genuinely engage the development
process and to consciously make representation in some quarters of the state, then indeed there are copious
issues with the national security.
I therefore recommend a radical governance reappraiser and a radical national identity campaign
beginning from the Nursery educational system. In doing this, national identity and loyalty or nationalism
should be embedded in the educational curriculum of Nigeria.
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