Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
ISSN: 2161-0231 (Online)
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency Exclusively to
Combat Terrorism
Noah Waters, Ph.D. & Yvonne Doll, D.B.A.
ABSTRACT
Although there are a myriad of federal U.S. law enforcement agencies that are assigned to and
partner with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), no law enforcement agency is
exclusively dedicated to the task of fighting terrorism. Compelling data and sentiments of
professionals and experts in the field of antiterrorism (interviewed in 2011) supported the
establishment of a law enforcement agency or unit that is exclusively dedicated to
antiterrorism. Law enforcement’s role in the detection, apprehension, and adjudication of
suspected terrorists may require more concentration.
*Author Note: The reported research was conducted as part of the primary author’s doctoral
dissertation. The dissertation: Exploring the Concept of Dedicating a Law Enforcement Agency
Exclusively to Antiterrorism is available elsewhere.
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
2
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency Exclusively to
Combat Terrorism
Noah Waters, Ph.D. & Yvonne Doll, D.B.A.
Although a myriad of federal U.S. law enforcement agencies are assigned to and partner
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), no such agency is exclusively dedicated to
the task of fighting terrorism. In 2002, the DHS was established as the government’s lead
antiterrorism agency. However, despite the significant numbers of law enforcement agencies
assisting the DHS, gaps in counterterrorism services remain and large numbers of suspected
terrorists are not prosecuted. For example, over a nine-year period extending from January 2002
to February 2011, only six of the approximately 800 enemy combatants (i.e., suspected terrorists)
detained at Guantanamo Bay (GITMO) were convicted. The low conviction rate suggested gaps
in services from existing federal governmental agencies such as the DHS, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the State Department. Compelling data and sentiments of professionals
and experts in the field of antiterrorism (interviewed in 2011) support the establishment of a law
enforcement agency or unit exclusively dedicated to antiterrorism. Law enforcement’s role in
the detection, apprehension, and adjudication of suspected terrorists may require more
concentration.
Introduction
Premier federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, Department of Alcohol
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) are used to
investigate suspected terrorism, interdict guns and explosives, and apprehend the most wanted
criminals. However, these agencies are tasked with multiple responsibilities and duties.
According to Reaves (2004), the FBI is responsible for duties that range from the investigation of
corrupt government personnel, white-collar crime, organized crime, cyber crime, terrorism, and
espionage, to capturing bank robbers. The ATF monitors domestic gun sales, accountability and
expertise in matters involving explosive devices, and the oversight of alcohol and tobacco sales.
The USMS apprehends fugitives, secures federal courthouses, transports prisoners, and provides
protection for federal witnesses (Reaves, 2004). Even in light of these expanded duties and
responsibilities, these agencies cannot dedicate antiterrorism resources as a primary task.
The DHS is a Cabinet-level agency, not a law enforcement agency (DHS, 2008). The
DHS is described as having unfettered authority over the 22 agencies (including the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which has been reassigned under the DHS’s control
and described as partnering with law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI and local law
enforcement. The mission of the DHS is to address these six focal points: 1) Intelligence and
Warning; 2) Border and Transportation Security; 3) Domestic Counterterrorism; 4) Protecting
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets; 5) Defending against Catastrophic Threats; and 6)
Emergency Preparedness and Response (DHS, 2008).
Background
Historically, federal law enforcement agencies were established in response to
phenomenological changes, which affected domestic security (Daalder & Destler, 2002). On
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
3
September 24, 1789, to establish civil authority, President George Washington’s appointment of
the first 13 U.S. Marshals marked the nascence of the USMS (Turk, 2008). The United States
Park Police (USPP) was established in 1791 to protect national parks and federal buildings
(National Park Service, 2009). To address the problem of counterfeiting, the United States
Secret Service (USSS) was established on July 5, 1865, and began presidential protection duties
in 1901 after the assassination of President William McKinley (USSS, 2008). In 1908, the FBI
was established to perform investigations and was comprised of experts from all phases of
industry (FBI, 2009). The ATF was established in 1972 due to the growing use of firearms, gang
violence, incidents of arson (involving explosives), and to monitor tobacco and alcohol (Kurian,
1998). President Richard Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973 to
combat the growing global menace of drugs (DEA, 2009). The phenomenological impact of
terrorism on the United States suggests that concerns regarding safety and security may have
reached similarly high levels, prompting the formation of the USMS, USPP, USSS, FBI, ATF,
and DEA.
Many government agencies play a role in mitigating the viability of terrorism and in
bringing those responsible for such crimes to justice (May, Jochim, & Sapotichne, 2011). Yet,
low conviction rates of suspected terrorists and enemy combatants suggested that involving a
myriad of government agencies has proven unsuccessful. Furthermore, Posner and Kayyem
(2006) described the DHS as a smorgasbord of existing agencies. Further suggesting, it would
be more viable to create a whole new agency, rather than change the culture of counterterrorism
practices within the FBI. Concerns remain over individuals suspected of terrorism against the
U.S. and its citizens, who avoid prosecution due to the lack of evidence or law enforcement
participation (Greenberg & Freifeld, 2007).
Of the approximately 800 suspected terrorists that were detained at GITMO from January
2002 to February 2011, only six of these individuals were convicted (Larson, 2011). Given the
low conviction rate of suspected terrorists at GITMO (due to a lack of evidence), there appears to
be a definitive need to examine current adjudication processes (Kellerhals, 2008). Posner and
Kayyem (2006) proclaimed that the United States could benefit from establishing a new
counterterrorism agency and addressing concerns regarding our approach to containing and
prosecuting suspected terrorists.
Additionally, Kellerhals (2008) provided insight, which suggested the failures in
convictions at GITMO were due in part to a lack of evidence. Intelligence agents, possessing the
only shreds of evidence to support criminal trials, are often unable to testify because of their
need to remain anonymous. The detaining of prisoners for years, without testing the legality of
their detentions, or the disallowing of prisoners to exercise habeas corpus rights, have prompted
the release of many suspected terrorists (Kellerhals, 2008). Complaints from groups such as the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) about the torture of prisoners have made convictions
against detainees less probable (Duffy, 2008).
Problem
Despite numerous law enforcement agencies assisting the DHS, significant gaps in
counterterrorism services remain and large numbers of suspected terrorists avoid prosecution
(Posner & Kayyem, 2006; Tully, 2008). The conviction rate of GITMO detainees suspected of
terrorism has been low (Larson, 2011), reinforcing why the degree of counterterrorism
intervention in such cases should be enhanced. Posner and Kayyem (2006) suggested that in
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
4
order to counter the high level of stealth, education, skill, and talent exercised by terrorists (e.g.,
such as those involved in the 9/11 attacks); a new counterterrorism agency must be established to
compliment the current role of the DHS.
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the American Bar Association
Reaves’ (2004) description of the FBI’s multiple duties suggested a saturation of
responsibilities, indicating why the agency was not able to mandate or dedicate antiterrorism
resources as a primary task. The FBI is currently the primary domestic law enforcement agency
assigned to antiterrorism. Posner and Kayyem’s (2006) analysis of the FBI’s strategy in fighting
terrorism suggested that law enforcement’s role in fighting terrorism must be enhanced. Even
though the FBI has a long and proud history of serving as the nation’s premier law enforcement
agency (FBI, 2009), many contend there is a need to study the conceptual benefits and
drawbacks of establishing a law enforcement agency whose primary responsibility is
antiterrorism.
There is more to consider when detaining enemy combatants and suspected terrorists than
simply locking them up and throwing away the key (American Bar Association [ABA], 2003).
According to the ABA (2003), the United States should extend enemy combatants the
opportunity for meaningful judicial review and “Congress and the Executive Branch should
consider how the policy adopted by the United States may affect the response of other nations to
future acts of terrorism” (para. 4). The ABA (2003) asserted that we must resist the dangers of
overreaction and undue trespass on individual rights, lest we lose the freedoms, which are the
greatness of America. The treatment of enemy combatants on U.S. soil may affect the treatment
of Americans detained by other nations, quasi governments, or terrorist organizations (ABA,
2003). The implication of offering detainees a judicial process rooted in fairness and evidence is
apparent.
Department of Homeland Security and Missing Security Agencies
The reorganization of 22 federal agencies began on March 1, 2003 (Mitchell & Pate,
2003). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) lost its autonomy and Cabinetlevel status and was placed under the DHS’s control. The Secret Service, U.S. Customs, and
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were brought under the control of the DHS, but
the DHS was not assigned a law enforcement agency exclusively dedicated to antiterrorism
(Mitchell & Pate, 2003). Although the FBI’s National Domestic Preparedness Office and
numerous Health and Human Services offices were transferred to the DHS, the FBI (considered
the lead antiterrorism agency) was not assigned to the DHS (Mitchell & Pate, 2003).
Daalder and Destler (2002) pointed to weaknesses in the homeland security approach
involving the DHS’s inability to include all government agencies that perform homeland security
missions. The most important agencies are not included in the DHS (e.g., Department of
Defense (DOD), Department of Justice (DOJ), FBI, Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and additional components of the intelligence community (Daalder & Destler,
2002).
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
5
Gaps in Counterterrorism Services
The low prosecution rate of GITMO detainees not only points to profound gaps in
counterterrorism services, but also in the need for more robust counterterrorism intervention
strategies (Posner & Kayyem, 2006). Within the last decade, the absence of crime scene
investigations and evidence prompted the release of hundreds of suspected terrorists (Tully,
2008). The recidivism rate of suspected terrorists participating in jihad against Americans points
to gaps in counterterrorism services. Approximately one in every seven detainees released from
GITMO engaged in acts of terrorism or militant activity against the United States (Bumiller,
2009).
Gaps in counterterrorism services have prompted policymakers to prepare military units
to respond to major domestic terrorist attacks and have raised fears about the increasing
militarization of law enforcement. In 2008, the 3rd Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team,
fresh from combat duties, operated inside the United States for tasks including civil unrest and
crowd control (Watson, 2008). These forces were armed with both lethal and non-lethal
weapons. An estimated 4,700 service members were trained and placed on standby status for
domestic operations (Watson, 2008). Military troops such as the 3rd Infantry Division were
capable of responding to an event the size of 9/11 or larger.
The U.S. Government has followed trends that increase the militarization of domestic law
enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which prohibits military law enforcement from
acting in a capacity of domestic law enforcement, was changed under the John Warner Defense
Authorization Act and signed by President George W. Bush on October 17, 2006 (Watson,
2008). Under the John Warner Act of 2006, the president could employ armed forces to restore
public order in any of the 50 United States (Watson, 2008).
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Role in Combating Terrorism
The DHS is the Cabinet-level agency tasked with leading matters of homeland security,
but it is dependent on the successes and failures of an independent agency of the DOJ. The FBI
falls under control of the DOJ and is designated as the nation’s lead counterterrorism agency
(Reaves, 2004). Reaves contended, even if the FBI were under the control of the DHS, it is
doubtful the FBI could dedicate counterterrorism resources as a primary task. The FBI’s lead
counterterrorism role is not without cost; there have been trade-offs. Agents have been assigned
to counterterrorism roles, while other roles like those involving white-collar crimes are limited
(Shukovsky, Johnson, & Lathrop, 2007).
Since the massive restructuring of the FBI after 9/11, thousands of white-collar criminals
across the country are no longer being prosecuted in federal court (Shukovsky et al., 2007).
Approximately five years after the massive transfer of agents to counterterrorism roles, there
were dramatic reductions in traditional FBI investigations involving sophisticated fraud,
embezzlement schemes, and civil rights violations (Shukovsky et al.). The number of whitecollar crimes being investigated by the FBI steadily declined. In 2000, the Bureau brought
approximately 31,000 cases to federal prosecutors; by 2005 the cases presented to prosecutors
dropped by 34%, to 20,000. Between 2000 and 2005, FBI agents pursued 65% fewer civil rights
investigations, including hate crimes and allegations of police abuse (Shukovsky et al.).
Between 1999 and 2007, the quantity of FBI agents increased from approximately 11,000 to
12,575; most of the additional agents assigned were new to the Bureau (Shukovsky et al., 2007).
Since the restructuring of the Bureau after 9/11, victims of financial crimes who experienced
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
6
losses of less than $150,000 had little chance of their cases being investigated by the FBI
(Shukovsky et al.). Shukovsky et al. reported the aggregate of financial fraud cases involving
Americans who experienced losses under $150,000 totaled billions of dollars.
Resource Development International Federal Bureau of Investigation Illustration
Scam artists know that local law enforcement agencies are often incapable of
investigating and prosecuting scams occurring outside jurisdictional boundaries, due to time
constraints, a lack of personnel, and cost. In 2002, 1,000 individuals invested roughly 70 million
dollars in a scam known as Resource Development International, led by two men involved in
criminal activity in the Tacoma, Washington area. Although the victims of this scam strongly
urged the FBI to investigate, the two men faced no local or federal charges (Shukovsky et al.).
The district attorney’s office in Santa Clara, California ended up taking the case after an elderly
victim from the San Jose area came forward. The scam artists, identified as a father and son
team James and David Edwards were sentenced to 27-year prison terms in the California state
prison. As this case illustrated, transferring large numbers of agents from white-collar units to
counterterrorism units resulted in larger numbers of white-collar criminals scamming Americans
out of billions of dollars, with impunity.
A former Justice Department official (a law professor at UC Berkeley), John Yoo (2007),
stated that the FBI is too large and bureaucratic to effectively fight terrorism. Yoo (2007)
compared the FBI to an oversized company that investment groups either streamlined or broke
up into smaller companies. Yoo believed Washington’s reaction to crisis has added more layers
to bureaucracies that are already overwhelmed. Dealing with drug trafficking, insider trading on
Wall Street, copyright violations, and industrial espionage, the FBI is too busy to grapple with
Internet-savvy terrorists (Yoo, 2007).
Methodology
A qualitative phenomenological methodology was used to extract experiences regarding
terrorism, while examining what these experiences meant for those who had professional
knowledge or expertise regarding terrorism. Individual experiences allowed for the extraction of
general or universal meanings to be derived (Moustakas, 1994). A phenomenological
methodology was used to elicit an empirical approach, in order to obtain comprehensive
descriptions that portrayed the experiences of participants. The phenomenological research
design explored the views and opinions of individuals considered experts in the field of
antiterrorism-law enforcement. The human scientist determines the originality and underlying
structures of an experience by interpreting the situation in which the experience occurs
(Moustakas, 1994).
Research participants
Study participants were limited to experts in the field of antiterrorism and law
enforcement residing within the United States. To ensure the validity of the study, considerations
for participation in the study included professionalism or expertise in the field of antiterrorism, a
minimum of three years working in the field of antiterrorism, expertise in law enforcement,
experience adjudicating suspected terrorists, or academic insight. Study participants were
selected based on availability, professional exposure to judicial and law enforcement practices
that directly affect strategies to abate terrorism, and academic expertise in the field of
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
7
antiterrorism. The sample size was 17 participants. Participants were identified by reputation,
level of expertise, and professional experience regarding the phenomenon of terrorism.
Professional classifications of participants (e.g., federal judge, federal agent, military law
enforcement officer, and federal prosecutor) were used to identify and select participants who
possessed expertise and professional insight regarding terrorism. Study participants averaged 11
years of experience in their respective fields.
Data collection and analysis
Primary data collection for the study involved three interview questions. Broad-based
questions were asked, allowing study participants to offer in-depth answers, without imposing
undue influence (Moustakas, 1994). The exploration of the research questions included the lived
experiences of 17 antiterrorism experts or law enforcement professionals and their perceptions
and opinions on the rationale, effectiveness, and limitations of dedicating a law enforcement
agency exclusively to antiterrorism.
Data analysis software (EZ-Text) was used to analyze transcribed recordings of
interviews and assisted the researcher in identifying common themes and perspectives identified
from personal experiences and archival resources. The data collected provide a descriptive
analysis of the subject. Themes and patterns were used as evidence to support findings for
interpretation and presentation in the study. As described by Moustakas (1994), the van Kaam
method was used to: list relevant terminology, identify core themes, group related themes,
validate applied themes, provide transcripts, provide tailored descriptions of participants’
experiences, and construct a thematic context.
Findings
Interview question #1. Can the United States benefit from establishing a federal law
enforcement agency that is exclusively dedicated to fighting terrorism, both domestically and
internationally?
Twelve of the 16 (75%) participants who gave yes-or-no responses to Q1 expressed that the
United States could benefit from establishing some sort of agency, taskforce, or unit exclusively
dedicated to fighting terrorism. One participant did not answer yes-or-no, but responded by
stating, “We have one.” Three of the four participants who answered no, also expressed that
establishing a law enforcement agency exclusively dedicated to fighting terrorism would be
detrimental to the United States. Participants A, G, and L believed the proposed agency would
be detrimental because it would interfere with relationships that have been established between
the FBI, DOJ, and local law enforcement agencies. Participant L indicated a centralized
antiterrorism agency would decrease the antiterrorism efforts and participation of law
enforcement agencies.
Participant G (experience as an Assistant U.S. Attorney and terrorism prosecutor) stated
that such an agency would never occur in reality. Twelve participants described the concept as
beneficial to the United States.
Participant F (experience as a federal agent) also believed such an agency would never
occur in reality. All 17 participants acknowledged the importance of law enforcement as a tool
in fighting terrorism. Fifteen of the 17 participants described terrorism as a growing threat to
national security. Participant L (Ivy League professor of emergency management and terrorism)
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
8
indicated terrorism could become less of a threat in the future and the proposed agency would
not serve a need. Participant N (federal judge) believed the proposed agency would offer
benefits but did not offer comments regarding growing threats of terrorism.
Participant P (federal agent) offered short, one-two-or-three word answers. Participant P
stated, “We have one,” when asked if the United States can benefit from establishing a federal
law enforcement agency exclusively dedicated to fighting terrorism, both domestically and
internationally. Participant P did not elaborate.
The overlapping concurrent themes in Figure 1 represent the most salient benefits
described by the participants who answered yes to Q1. Although dedication, focus, and
concentration to one mission were characterized as the most common emerging themes,
participant emphases regarding individual themes were not symmetrical. Levels of intensity
regarding individual participant’s sentiments to emerging themes varied among the participants.
Figure 1 does not include all of the benefits characterized by the participants who answered yes
to Q1.
Figure 1. Benefits to establishing a dedicated agency.
H: Create One Set of Instruc5ons F: Present System Not Working B,C,D,E,J,M,N, and O: Dedica5on Focus Concentra5on to One Mission I: Efficiency Benefits K: Taskforce May Offer Benefits The overlapping, concurrent themes emerged representing the most salient drawbacks
described by the participants who answered no to Q1. These emerging themes were: (a)
reduction in information sharing, (b) interference to existing law enforcement relationships, and
(c) decreased efficiency. It should be noted: participant-emphases regarding individual themes
were not symmetrical, meaning levels of intensity regarding individual participant’s sentiments
to emerging themes varied among the participants. The three themes did not include all the
drawbacks characterized by the participants who answered “no” to Q1.
Interview question #2. What existing problems and gaps in services from existing
agencies, such as the DHS, FBI, and State Department, should be addressed by antiterrorism
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
9
professionals regarding the concept of establishing a federal law enforcement agency that is
exclusively dedicated to fighting terrorism?
Of the 17 study participants, 12 indicated significant gaps existed among government
agencies. Participant G (Assistant U.S. Attorney involved in the prosecution of suspected
terrorists) was the only participant who suggested the FBI and the DOJ adequately minimized
gaps in services among government agencies. Participant K (military and civilian prosecutor)
and Participant N (federal judge) answered: “Not sure.” Participant L (Ivy League professor of
emergency management and terrorism) did not answer the question. Participant P, again,
(federal agent) answered, “We have one.” However, he would not elaborate.
Participant A’s (FBI agent assigned to counterterrorism) excerpts of open-ended
responses to Q2 were: “Maybe you would be doing it because it was the right thing to do;
however, there is no way to get around it -- there are always going to be rivalries.” Participant A
expressed that adding another law enforcement agency would add more rivalries and would not
benefit the mission of combating terrorism, either domestically or internationally. Participant A
attributed gaps in services to rivalries (e.g., turf wars). Other participants stated such rivalries
were due to gaps in services among government agencies.
Figure 2 represents the most salient characteristics described by participants who
affirmed gaps among government agencies. The levels of intensity varied among participants
regarding sentiments to variables that contribute to gaps in services. Figure 2 does not include
all the characteristics described by the participants who affirmed gaps existed among government
agencies.
Figure 2. Variables contributing to gaps in services.
Variables Contribu5ng to Gaps in Services Sharing Informa5on Turf Wars Funding Overlap of Missions Poli5cs Mul5ple Defini5ons of Terrorism Training The lack of information sharing was the most frequently mentioned problem that
respondents attributed to gaps in antiterrorism services among government agencies. Eleven of
the 12 participants who affirmed existing gaps also indicated the sharing of information
remained a problem among government agencies. Within the group of 12 participants who
expressed gaps in services existed, Participant A (FBI agent assigned to counterterrorism) was
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
10
the only respondent who did not mention sharing of information as a contributor to gaps in
services.
Participant F’s (federal agent) excerpts of open-ended responses to Q2:
I know from first-hand and talking to colleagues that they bump into terrorism all the
time and things that verge on terrorism, all the time, during the course of their normal
investigations. As a matter of course, they either have to hand-it-off to the FBI (which
they are reluctant to do for bureaucratic reasons) or they don't hand-it-off at all -- so the
thing never gets investigated.
Participant O (federal agent) affirmed colleagues come across situations and things that
verge on terrorism during the course of their normal investigations but do not always hand-themoff to the FBI. Participant O indicated when this occurs the situations and things are not
investigated. Participant O characterized the working relationships with the FBI as discouraging.
Eight of the 16 participants who answered Q2 indicated turf wars contributed to existing
gaps in services. Participant F (federal agent) believed turf wars remained one of the biggest
problems. Participants indicated turf wars promoted an atmosphere that discouraged information
sharing among government agencies.
Seven of the 16 participants who answered Q2, including Participant G (Assistant U.S.
Attorney involved in the prosecution of suspected terrorists), expressed that funding would be a
problem. Participant G believed the proposed agency would cost billions of dollars and would
never become a reality. Participants expressed concerns about potential battles over funding.
Four of the 16 participants who answered Q2 expressed an overlap of information
gathering and activities created gaps in services. Although the DHS exists, no clearinghouse
exists, which would allow multiple government agencies to come together to focus on the
problem of terrorism. Separate databases of information are created, but are not shared.
Participant C (law enforcement officer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and adjunct professor) provided
the following open-ended excerpt of responses to Q2; “ Probably the fact that we need and don't
have one specific clearing house; an agency of that type would give us one place where that type
of information would rest, instead of being spread among so many agencies.”
Two of the 16 participants who responded to Q2 believed politics could create gaps in
services. Participant E (law enforcement officer, professor, and academic specializing in
homeland security) conveyed, as the premier U.S. counterterrorism agency, the FBI should be a
part of the DHS and that the separation between the FBI and the DHS creates gaps in services.
Participant E believed not assigning the FBI to the DHS is an example of a logistical
enhancement that was overridden by politics.
Multiple definitions of terrorism among government agencies may also contribute to gaps
in services. Participant H’s (professor specializing in homeland security who offered in-depth
insight which influenced law enforcement’s counterterrorism policies) excerpts of open-ended
responses to Q2:
First step -- we have to agree on a single definition for the term. Internally, we have
multiple definitions -- the DHS has one, the FBI has a different one, the State Department
has a different one. These multiple definitions make it impossible for any law
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
11
enforcement agency to clearly enforce the law, when you cannot clearly define the crime
that is being committed.
Participant J (military, law enforcement officer, and academic) believed a lack of training
increased gaps in services. Insufficient numbers of certified military criminal investigators, or
none at all, may be assigned to combat areas. Evidence, witnesses, and information vital to the
detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists may not be gathered. Missed opportunities to
pass on important evidence, witnesses, and information to agencies such as the FBI and the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) contribute to gaps in services.
Interview question #3. Do serious problems exist in the fight against terrorism, due to
gaps in counterterrorism services from existing agencies such as the DHS, FBI, and State
Department?
Participant G (Assistant U.S. Attorney involved in the prosecution of suspected terrorists)
indicated that no significant gaps exist among existing agencies such as the DHS, FBI, and State
Department. Participants D (military in Iraq and Afghanistan, capture of suspected terrorists,
and law enforcement officer) and Participant L (Ivy League professor of emergency management
and terrorism) did not answer this question. Participant K (military and civilian prosecutor)
stated, “Not sure.” Participant N (federal judge) believed gaps existed, but was not sure and did
not know what those gaps were. Participant N believed the adjudication of terrorism is relatively
new to the U.S. and to U.S. courts. The federal judges who preside over terrorism cases may not
have years of experience trying terrorism cases or may not have developed an opinion about the
meaning of the terrorism phenomenon. The remaining 13 participants believed gaps existed
among agencies such as the DHS, FBI, and State Department.
Themes emerged based on analysis of the interview responses and triangulation between
the four groupings of participants who answered yes, no, not sure, or those who did not answer.
The most commonly reported response was that most study participants believed serious
problems exist in counterterrorism services due to gaps in services. Three study participants,
who did not support the proposed agency idea, indicated fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task
Forces (JTTFs) would close gaps in services. Confidence in fusion centers and JTTFs emerged
as a common theme among the majority of participants who did not support the proposed
agency.
Participant A’s (FBI agent assigned to counterterrorism) excerpts of open-ended
responses to Q3:
There are always going to be gaps, and that is one of the responsibilities of the fusion
centers is to fill those gaps -- those are going to be the agencies that collect the
information -- whether it comes from federal, state, or local police departments -- and
then making sure that information gets shared. Without becoming a fascist state, nothing
is going to prevent us from preventing all crime or terrorism. I think there are things in
place today to fill those gaps as are humanly possible.
Participant C (law enforcement officer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and adjunct professor)
believed gaps in services among government agencies allowed failed acts of terrorism, such as
those perpetrated by the Christmas Day Bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. Participant C
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
12
stated, “This goes back to the problem of information sharing. We have gaps in information
passing from one agency to another.”
Participant E’s (law enforcement officer, professor, and academic specializing in
homeland security) excerpts of open-ended responses to Q3: “The primary problem is that the
agency that is charged with antiterrorism is not a part of the department we've identified to fight
terrorism. That I think is huge.”
Participant F (federal agent) conveyed turf wars, information sharing, and agency
mandates negatively impacted the war on terror. Participant F suggested post-9/11 messages
sent by policymakers to top U.S. counterterrorism agencies indicated they had done a good job.
Participant F provided this excerpt of open-ended responses to Q3: “The two primary agencies
responsible for the attacks of 9/11 -- the FBI and, internationally, the CIA -- they were never
really censured. If anything, they were rewarded with increased mandates, with increased
budgets, with increased power.”
Participant I (law school graduate, professor, and academic specializing in homeland
security) expressed there were serious cultural and language gaps among governmental agencies.
Cultural gaps exist in understanding the nature of terrorism and in understanding those who
participate in acts of terrorism. Participant I gave the example of the 1990 assassination of Rabbi
Kahane in New York. During Rabbi Kahane’s murder investigation, evidence was found
detailing the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing plot, but the bombing plot was overlooked due
to a language barrier.
Discussion
Study results indicated participant experiences and perceptions regarding the concept of
dedicating a law enforcement agency exclusively to antiterrorism ranged from favorable to
unfavorable. The majority of interview question responses confirmed the existence of common
influences to conceptualizing a law enforcement agency (or unit), which is exclusively dedicated
to antiterrorism. After data collection, coding and categorizing analysis of data ensued where
emerging themes became transparent within the data.
The data analysis resulted in the identification of 18 themes (see Table 1). Eleven themes
indicated benefits of establishing a proposed federal law enforcement agency dedicated
exclusively to combating terrorism. Seven themes (e.g., 7 drawbacks or possible disadvantages)
emerged from the data (see Table 2). The emerging themes directly align with the results of the
interview data.
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
13
Table 1: Emerging Themes
Dedication, focus, and concentration to one mission
Present system is not working
Efficiency
Increase in information sharing
Create one set of instructions
Reduce turf wars
Reduce overlap in missions
Better chain-of-custody of evidence and presentation of witnesses
Training
Higher conviction rates
Enhanced verifiability to detain suspected terrorists
Table 2: Drawbacks of Establishing a Proposed Agency
Reduce information sharing
Interfere with relationships developed by the FBI
Decrease efficiency
Funding
Politics
Turf wars
Interfere with a working system
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
14
Research Conclusions
Key elements to fortifying the law enforcements antiterrorism function center around the
role of the FBI. Modifying an existing law enforcement agency or establishing a new agency to
supersede the counterterrorism role of the FBI may seem radical. One approach might be for the
FBI to establish a unit within the DHS, exclusively dedicated to antiterrorism, whose members,
including academics and specialists, are not rotated (similar to the New York Police
Department’s counterterrorism unit). Such a step might satisfy, to a degree, post-9/11 responses
to phenomenological changes that have affected law enforcement’s role in domestic security.
The FBI’s antiterrorism role would be unfettered, and antiterrorism resources would be dedicated
as a primary task.
In conclusion, the focus in writing this article was to examine possible benefits of
dedicating a federal law enforcement agency with the exclusive task of combating terrorism.
The host of federal U.S. law enforcement agencies assigned to and partnering with the DHS is
not working effectively to combat acts of terrorism on U.S. soil. Currently, no law enforcement
agency is exclusively dedicated to the task of fighting terrorism. Accordingly, the information
and lived experiences of study participants provided in this article are not intended as an
indictment of the FBI’s imperfections in combating terrorism, but rather, focus on improving the
role of law enforcement in combating acts of terrorism on U.S. soil.
About the Authors: Dr. Noah Waters served as a Maryland police officer for ten years -serving with the Pocomoke City and Prince George’s County Police Departments, respectfully.
He received a Ph.D. in Business Administration with a Specialization in Homeland Security
from Northcentral University and a Masters Degree in Criminal Justice from the University of
Maryland Eastern Shore. He is the author of a book about teaching crime prevention to children.
Correspondence to Dr. Waters: [email protected].
Dr. Yvonne Doll, a Walden University, Doctor of Business Administration (D.B.A.)
faculty member, is committed to lifelong learning. Not only has she personally followed this
path; she has also encouraged her direct reports, and now her students, to pursue learning
throughout their careers. During her 22-year career in the U.S. Army, she served as a security
officer in Germany, in the criminal investigation division in Hawaii, and, finally, as a teacher in
the leadership department where she taught students from all over the world. These roles led to
her transition as a full-time faculty member at Walden. She currently trains DBA faculty and is
the curriculum administrator for the DBA program.
References
American Bar Association (2003). Task force on the treatment of enemy combatants, criminal
justice section of individual rights and responsibilities report to the House of Delegates.
Retrieved from:
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aba/abatskforce103rpt.pdf
Bumiller, E. (2009, May 20). Later terror link cited for 1 in 7 freed detainees. The New York
Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21gitmo.html
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
15
Daalder, I. H., & Destler, I. M. (2002, July 19). Behind America’s front lines: Organizing to
protect the homeland. The Brookings Institution. Retrieved from
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/summer_defense_daalder.aspx
Duffy, H. (2008). Human rights litigation and the ‘war on terror.’ International Review of the
Red Cross, suppl. Human Rights, 90(871), 573-597. Retrieved from ProQuest database.
(Document ID: 217743790)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2009a). History of the FBI. Retrieved from
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/text.htm
Greenberg, K. J., & Freifeld, D. (2007, October). Terrorist trials, 2001-2007: Lessons learned.
The Center on Law and Security at the NYU School of Law. Retrieved from
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/08_TTRC2007Update1.pdf
Kellerhals, M. D. (2008, November 21). U.S. Court orders release of five Guantánamo Bay
detainees. Retrieved from http://www.america.gov/st/usgenglish/2008/November/20081121123332dmslahrellek3.461856e-02.html
Kurian, G. T. (1998). History of the ATF from Oxford University Press, Inc.- 1789-1998 U.S.
Retrieved from http://www.atf.gov/about/history/atf-from-1789-1998.html
Larson, P. (2011, February 23). The guilty plea could be the quickest way out of Guantanamo
Bay. Retrieved from http://medillonthehill.net/2011/02/a-guilty-plea-could-be-thequickest-way-out-of-guantanamo-bay/
May, P. J., Jochim, A. E., & Sapotichne, J. (2011). Constructing homeland security: An anemic
policy regime. Policy Studies Journal 39(2), 285-307. doi:10.1111/j.15410072.2011.00408.x
Mitchell, J., & Pate, J. (2003, April). The Department of Homeland Security: Goals and
challenges. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Retrieved from
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_29.html
Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
National Park Service. (2009). The history of the Park Police. Retrieved from
http://www.nps.gov/uspp/index.htm
Posner, A. P., & Kayyem, J. (2006, November 17). Does the United States need a domestic
intelligence agency? Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11990/does_the_united_states_need_a_domestic_intellige
nce_agency.html
Reaves, B. A. (2004). Federal law enforcement officers. (Bulletin No. NCJ 212750). Retrieved
from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs via:
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fleo04.pdf
Shukovsky, P., Johnson, T., & Lathrop, D. (2007, April 11). The FBI’s terrorism trade-off- Let
white collar crime go. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer. Retrieved from
http://www.seattlepi.com/national/311046_fbiterror11.html
Tully, A. F. (2008, December 9). Guantanamo confession requests raise questions. Radio Free
Europe. Retrieved from:
http://www.rferl.org/content/Does_Guantanamo_Detainees_Wish_To_Confess_Highlight
_Harsh_Detention/1357648.html
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5
Time to Assign a Law Enforcement Agency/Waters & Doll
16
Turk, D. (2008). United States Marshal Service: Historical perspective. Retrieved from
http://ouronesupremecourt.com/pdfArticles/U.%20S.%20Marshal%20Service%20Histori
cal%20Perspective.pdf
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008). History: Who became part of the Department?
Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (2009). DEA history. Retrieved from
http://www.justice.gov/dea/history.htm
U.S. Secret Service (2008). Secret Service history. Retrieved from
http://www.secretservice.gov/history.shtml
Watson, J. (2008, November 4). Two more U.S. military units assigned for homeland security.
Retrieved from http://www.prisonplanet.com/two-more-us-military-units-assigned-forhomeland-security.html
Yoo, J. (2007, March 21). Break up the FBI. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-yoo21mar21,0,2141152.story
www.jghcs.info [ISSN 2161-0231 (Online)
JOURNAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/ Volume 2, Number 5