INTRODUCTION
After the disastrous events of 9/11, the Bush administration made the explicit commitment in
its 2002 National Security Strategy to fight terror and advance primacy for the United States.
Yet, in January 2004, he declared in his State of the Union Address, “We have no desire to
dominate, no ambitions of empire”. 1 Claiming to be divinely inspired by God, Bush
nevertheless embarked on a quest in the Middle East to fight the “axes of evil” and to spread
the imperial notions of freedom and democracy. 2 At first, Bush enjoyed immense popularity,
but as history shows, wars can transform people into heroes, but can also relentlessly crush
them. The longer the wars continued, the more lives were lost, the more negative publicity
Bush received both internationally and nationally. In May 2008, Bush’s approval rate reached
an all-time low, according to a CNN/Opinion Research survey, which indicated that 71
percent of the American public disapproved of Bush’s performance as president, suggesting
that he was the most unpopular president in modern American history. 3 Having served two
terms and being responsible for thousands of war casualties, the majority of Americans were
particularly looking forward to hearing George W. Bush finally give his resignation speech.
Marking the end of the “Bush Doctrine” and the beginning of a new and hopefully
brighter era, the notion of change was a central theme in the 2008 Presidential Elections. Out
of this strenuous campaign battle, Barack Obama emerged as victorious, indeed representing
change as the first black man to be elected U.S. president. As the leader of the most powerful
nation on earth, he faces a country in the midst of great difficulties. Bush has left Obama with
a problematic heritage, involving two still ongoing wars, an unprecedented deficit of nearly
490 billion dollars, and on top of that the worst economic crisis of this century. Hence, the
inevitable question arises of how the new president intends to solve these serious problems. In
his Inauguration speech, Obama discussed the difficulties ahead and once again managed to
mesmerize an audience with his words of hope, praising the old American values of “honesty
and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism”. 4 But
will he manage to live up to people’s expectations, or will he be remembered as the president
who succeeded in selling dreams, rather than actually realising them?
1
“State of the Union Address”, White House, 20 January 2004,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html>.
2
Rupert Cornwell, “Bush: God Told Me to Invade Iraq”, The Independent, 7 October 2005,
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bush-god-told-me-to-invade-iraq-509925.html>.
3
Paul Steinhauser, “Poll: More Disapprove of Bush Than Any Other President”, CNN, 1 May 2008,
<http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/05/01/bush.poll/>.
4
“Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address in Full”, BBC News, 20 January 2009,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/obama_inauguration/7840646.stm>.
1
The 2008 Presidential Elections reignited the debate on America’s role in the world. I
seek to complement this debate by means of a comparative analysis of a selection of most
recent works. I will explore how today’s political and academic experts on foreign policy
view America and its policies abroad, and how they appear to have tried to shape the new
president’s foreign policy, some of whom are key actors in the current Obama administration.
More specifically, I will discuss theories surrounding the concept of American Empire and
address questions, such as whether the five experts consider America to be an empire;
whether they believe the U.S. can, will and should pursue primacy; and how they think the
new president will likely and should conceptualise the future role of the Empire in global
politics. In this discussion, current threats to American primacy have been accounted for as
well, such as rising powers, terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the economic crisis. These
and other essential factors in the debate on the American Empire will be discussed in the
following chapters. However, first, I shall give a historiographical overview of the notion of
American Empire to clarify its changing definition due to changing historical conditions. I
will, then, use Walter Russell Mead’s four foreign policy schools to provide a broader
theoretical account of the rise, development and different perceptions surrounding the
American Empire. In addition, Mead’s theory serves to better comprehend and analyse the
five authors and their works, which will be discussed afterwards.
There are several contemporary books on American Empire, many of which, however,
do not link up with my research topic. Several topics were too specific, such as of Empire and
Dissent: the United States and Latin America (2008), Are we Rome?: the Fall of an Empire
and the Fate of America (2007), and Empire of Debt: the Rise of an Epic Financial Crisis
(2007). Due to topic specificity, other vital matters related to my topic are not (sufficiently)
addressed, such as America’s current and future strategy as Empire. Additionally, On Empire:
America, War, and Global Supremacy (2008) mostly concerns the past, and The State of the
American Empire: How the USA Shapes the World (2007) is more like a picture book, than an
actual academic work of research. The reasons for not having chosen prominent works, such
as Negri and Hardt’s Empire (2000), Chomsky’s Hegemony or Survival (2003), and
Ferguson’s Colossus (2004), as one of the central works of this thesis is, because—due to
their widely acknowledged academic importance—these authors’ main views about the
American Empire have already been included in the selection of four books, which this thesis
focuses on. In addition, my research concentrates on the most recent views, concerning the
latest developments in U.S. foreign policy that will affect the 2009-2012 Presidency.
2
Rather, my thesis will center on the following four works written by five authors,
which have been well-received publicly and give a broader, more inclusive account of the
concept of American Empire. Additionally, these works are among the most recently
published and contain the most up-to-date information on the American state of affairs, which
corresponds with my research angle, involving a contemporary focus. These works are
Madeleine Albright’s Memo to the President Elect: How We Can Restore America’s
Reputation and Leadership (2008); Dennis Ross’ Statecraft: and How to Restore America’s
Standing in the World (2007); and American Empire: A Debate (2007) by the two American
academics, Bradley A. Thayer and Christopher Layne; and, finally, American Power and the
Prospects for International Order (2008) by the British academic Simon Bromley. These
experts offer their predictive analyses and suggestions on what kind of role America will
likely play in global politics, and what kind of approach it should adopt with the aim of
preserving or advancing its (as well as other countries’) interests. Both the differences and
similarities between the authors’ perspectives will subsequently be examined and analysed.
Importantly, when the four selected books were published, the economic crisis of midSeptember had not yet occurred. The world’s largest economy has began to show weakness
due to a collapse of the housing market, the subprime mortgage turmoil, a serious credit
crunch, rising oil prices, and the severe inflation of the dollar. Many mortgages issued in
recent years were made to subprime borrowers, namely people who were financially unable to
repay the loan. When house prices began to drop in 2006-07, mortgage delinquencies and
foreclosures soared, and securities backed with subprime mortgages considerably decreased
in value. The result has been huge financial decline of many banks and financial markets,
bankruptcy and rising unemployment rates, tightening credit globally and increasing
government intervention. Clearly, this crisis has a further damaging affect on the reputation of
America and has raised additional questions on whether America will be able to remain world
leader, and whether the fall of this empire might be at hand. While the economic crisis is not
addressed by the authors, a range of various other important factors affecting America’s
power and status are discussed in the four works.
As a final note of clarification, since Barack Obama had not yet been elected at the
time when the books were written and published, in the analyses of the four works, I refer to
the U.S. president more generally as, for example, the “president elect” or “next president”.
3
1.
THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE
Before the four contemporary works will be discussed, this chapter will clarify the concept of
American Empire as well as its link to other related terminology. Subsequently, the historical
development of this notion and of America itself will be explored in order to explain how this
concept came into existence and has changed over time due to changing historical conditions.
Finally, an overview of a variety of theories about American Empire will follow, which were
prevalent in certain periods of American history.
1.1
AMERICA DEFINED
Several different terms have been used to define America, such as superpower, hegemony,
hyperpower, omnipower and, last but not least, empire. The term “superpower” in its current
political meaning was coined in the book The Superpowers: The United States, Britain and
the Soviet Union – Their Responsibility for Peace (1944), written by William T.R. Fox, an
American foreign policy professor. 5 Another word to describe America is “hegemony”, a
term that has existed since ancient Greek times and is broadly used to describe and explain
any kind of dominance of one social group over another. According to the prominent theorist
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), hegemony involves leadership that takes into account “the
interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is exercised, and it also
presupposes a certain equilibrium, that is to say that the hegemonic groups will make some
sacrifices of a corporate nature”. 6 This implies that the ruling group acquires some degree of
consent from the subordinate, as opposed to dominance purely by force.
However, several scholars of international relations argue that the U.S. is not a true
global hegemony, since it lacks the resources to impose dominance over the entire globe.
While the United States is dominant on political-military issues, it has little influence on
transnational relations by non-state actors and, for a while now, the euro has succeeded the
dollar in value. Moreover, other major powers have entered the stage of international power
as new or rising hegemonies, including China, Russia, India, and the European Union.
Though the term “hegemony” is still used, after the end of the collapse of the Soviet Union,
some political commentators felt that a new term was needed to describe the United States’
position as the only remaining great power. In addition to “the lone superpower”, two new
terms were subsequently invented. American political commentator Ben Wattenberg coined
the term “omnipower” in 1990 and the British journalist Peregrine Worsthorne used the term
“hyperpower” in 1991, which was popularised by the French Foreign Minister Hubert
5
6
The term “superpower” was first used in 1920 to describe electrification, rather than a powerful country.
Chantal Mouffe, ed., Gramsci and Marxist Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979) 86, 87.
4
Védrine in his public attacks on America, beginning in 1998. 7 These two latter terms can be
used interchangeably with superpower.
Finally, the concept of empire is often used to refer to the United States. According to
the Oxford Dictionary, the term “empire” can be defined in three ways. An empire is “an
extensive group of states ruled over by a single monarch or ruling authority”, a “supreme
political power”, and “a large commercial organization under the control of one person or
group”. 8 Strictly speaking, an empire contrasts with a hegemony, as the latter form of rule
implies a degree of consent. Likewise, in a federation, a country requires mutual agreement of
other nations that also retain autonomy. More specifically, American Empire is a
controversial term referring to the dominant political, economic, military and cultural
influence of the United States. This notion has been subject to various interpretations, ranging
from modern liberal theorists opposing what they consider to be aggressive policy, to
neoconservatives who believe the U.S. is an innocent or benevolent empire, which must strive
to maintain an imperial role, to Marxist theorist who regard imperialism as a product of
capitalism. The previously mentioned terms can be used as synonyms of the term empire, yet,
reflect a different focal point. In the case of the term empire, one might say that the emphasis
lies on its imperial status and objectives, such as spreading its power over the world.
1.2
THE BEGINNING
Since Independence Day (1776), early writers and politicians sometimes called their newly
sovereign country an empire. However, this alluded to the tradition, deriving from ancient
Rome and revived in the era of the Reformation, by which empire merely meant fully
sovereign state without connotations of imperialism and colonisation. Over a century old, the
concept of American Empire in the general sense of the word flourished during and,
especially, after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Ever since this burst of conquest and
intervention, the U.S. has been characterized as an empire. The War took place between April
and August 1898 and was principally concerned with the liberation of Cuba. When America’s
demand for Cuban independence was rejected by Spain, America decided to annex Spain’s
remaining overseas territories including the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. On
December 10th 1898, the signing of the Treaty of Paris gave the United States control of these
three territories and made Cuba a U.S. protectorate. The Spanish-American War marked the
beginning of an age of United States colonial power, as the U.S. has greatly increased its
international power since then. The Republic of Hawaii was annexed at the request of its
7
8
“Omnipower” is derived from the word “omnipotent”, which means almighty, invincible, and godlike.
“Empire”, Oxford University Press, 2009, <http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/empire?view=uk>.
5
president (1898), American Samoa was acquired via the Treaty of Berlin (1899), and from
1903 to 1979 the Panama Canal Zone was under U.S. control, and under joint U.S.Panamanian control from 1979 to 1999. In addition, the Virgin Islands were purchased from
Denmark in 1917 and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, including the Northern
Mariana Islands, was gained after World War Two. Despite several conquests, America’s
colonial imperialism was short-lived and limited in scope compared to other classical imperial
powers, such as France, Japan and Britain, who ruled large foreign empires for centuries. In
contrast, the U.S. rapidly granted sovereignty over the following decades.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term imperialism was coined in the
second half of the 19th century with regard to the then still eminent British Empire. It was first
widely applied to the United States by the American Anti-Imperialist League, founded in
1898 to oppose the Spanish-American War and subsequent colonisation. This movement
attacked U.S. foreign policies for turning towards empire by annexation on economic, legal,
and moral grounds, and drew on George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, who warned
against foreign adventures and external expansion, seeing an overseas empire as a threat to
republican virtue and freedom. 9 Many of the League’s leaders were conservative Democrats,
who believed the country would soon wake up to the wrongness, the foolishness, and the
essentially un-American nature of a policy of aggressive foreign expansion. A leader and
founding member was Mark Twain, a prominent American author, who defended the
League’s views in the New York Herald of October 15th 1900 in the following manner.
I have read carefully the treaty of Paris, and I have seen that we do not intend to free,
but to subjugate the people of the Philippines. We have gone there to conquer, not to
redeem. It should, it seems to me, be our pleasure and duty to make those people free,
and let them deal with their own domestic questions in their own way. And so I am an
anti-imperialist. I am opposed to having the eagle put its talons on any other land. 10
However, the Anti-Imperialist League began to decrease in strength. Despite its anti-war
record, it generally did not object to U.S. participation in World War One, though several
individual members did oppose intervention. The League finally disbanded in 1921.
A variety of factors appeared to have spurred United States expansion, such as the fact
that the U.S. had completed its occupation of available territory in North American, and so
sought to expand it overseas. In addition, as the industry and agriculture of the U.S. had
grown beyond its need for consumption, powerful business and political figures believed, that
9
“Washington’s Farewell Address 1796”, 2008, Yale Law School, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp>.
10
R. Titta, “Mark Twain and the Onset of the Imperialist Period”, Internationalist Group, September/October
1997, <http://www.internationalist.org/marktwain3.html>.
6
foreign markets were essential to further economic growth. There were also several texts,
which were used as support for overseas expansion, such as the poem by the English poet
Rudyard Kipling “White Man’s Burden” (1899), subtitled “The United States and the
Philippine Islands”, even though the poem included warnings of the costs involved and
pointed at the responsibility that comes with power. Similarly, Frederick Jackson Turner’s
Frontier Thesis (1893) was used as to promote further expansion to maintain the “American
spirit”. 11 That same year, Turner also spoke at the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition,
where he mournfully declared that the West was closed, but that “American energy will
continually demand a wider field for its exercise”, implying approval of overseas expansion. 12
Additionally, in The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 (1890), Alfred T.
Mahan proposed three factors crucial to America’s ascension to world power, namely the
construction of a canal in South America (later influencing the decision for the construction of
the Panama Canal), the expansion of the U.S. naval power, and the establishment of a
trade/military post in the Pacific to stimulate trade with China. 13 These texts might well have
intensified the drive for expansionism and stimulated the desire to extend U.S. power.
Significantly, the prevalence of what is now considered racism in some schools of
American political thought needs to be accounted for as well, concerning Darwin’s theory of
evolution and natural selection, Ernst Haeckel’s “biogenic law”, John Fiske’s conception of
Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, and Josiah Strong’s call to “civilize and Christianize” in his
Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis (1885). 14 All of these theories
implied that the Anglo-Saxon race was superior to other races and, thus, had the innate or
God-given right to rule over other races and conquer their lands. This presumed superiority is
also closely tied to exceptionalism, which will be discussed in the next section.
1.3
EXCEPTIONALISM
The notion of American exceptionalism also plays a key role in defining the American
Empire, as it is a significant part of its essence and can be seen as an explanation for why and
how America has emerged as an empire. The concept was coined by the French philosopher
and historian, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) who believed that the United States differed
qualitatively from other developed nations in terms of its Puritanical origin, entrepreneural
11
Turner’s Frontier Thesis praised America’s westward expansion as a means to create a national identity.
Michael W. Kidd, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History”, University of Virginia, 30
September 1997, <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~Hyper/turner/chapter1.html>.
13
Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Project Gutenberg, 24 September
2004, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13529/13529-h/13529-h.htm>.
14
The German biologist and philosopher, Haeckel, proposed that the embryonal development of an individual
organism followed the same path as the evolutionary history of its species.
12
7
spirit, Constitution, historical evolution, and ethnic composition. Tocqueville also said “Let us
cease then to view all democratic nations under the mask [i.e. example] of the American
people”. 15 However, during the 20th century, right-wing politicians changed its meaning by
using the term as a justification for America’s supposed superiority. More recently, the term
has been applied to describe the Bush II Administration, which according to many critics
seemed to view the U.S. as being above or an exception to the law.
American exceptionalism appears to have its roots in Puritanism. Many early Puritan
settlers believed in a theology of Special or Divine Providence, which entailed the notion that
God had chosen them to build a new Jerusalem in the New World and that they should lead
other nations, according to the Christian faith. This notion is closely linked to the phrase “City
upon a Hill”, originally derived from the Bible and used by the Puritan leader John Winthrop
in his sermon “A Model of Christian Charity” (1630), suggesting that the Puritan community
of New England should be an outstanding role model to the rest of the world. This idea was
employed to make way for settlers, and to murder and force Native Americans from their
lands. When the West had been occupied, the drive for territorial and economic gain was
continued in other parts of the world. The “City upon a Hill” phrase has continuously been
used to promote America’s exceptionality, such as by Kennedy, Reagan, and Sarah Palin. 16
The American War of Independence (1775–1783) is also said to have contributed to
the enforcement of exceptionalism. Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776) expressed the
belief for the first time, that America was not just an extension of Britain, but a separate land,
entitled to sovereignty. This belief was also closely tied to republicanism, the notion that
sovereignty belonged to the people, not to a hereditary ruling class. The United States is
considered exceptional, as it is not founded on a common heritage, ethnicity, or ruling elite,
but rather on a set of ideals, namely liberty, equality and the pursuit of happiness. America
was also seen as fundamentally different from its European ancestry, considering its
constitutional republicanism separating state and church. However, some critics claim that
there is nothing unique about the revolution, seeing that the English “Glorious Revolution”
was nearly a century prior to the American Revolution and led to constitutional monarchy.
Furthermore, American exceptionalism is connected with Manifest Destiny, a notion
that initially signified the belief that the American people were destined to move towards the
West. First used by Jacksonian Democrats in the 1840s, the term was employed to validate
15
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol II, 1840, full text on Project Gutenberg, Chapter 9.
Kennedy’s speech given on January 9th 1961, Reagan’s Farewell Address of January 11th 1989, and Palin in
the Vice-Presidential debate of October 2008.
16
8
the purchase of Western regions, involving the Oregon Territory, the Texas Annexation, the
Gadsden Purchase, and the Mexican Cession. In Turner’s Frontier Thesis (1893), he claimed
that America’s uniqueness stemmed from the frontier, namely the region between “civilized”
society and the “untamed wilderness”, a place where America’s vitality, resourcefulness and
determination blossomed to subsequently shape American identity. However, this “frontier
spirit” was not unique to the U.S., for example, given that all of the British imperial domains
involved pioneering work. The concept of Manifest Destiny was also used in the 1890s by
members of the Republican Party to promote the conquest of former Spanish foreign colonies,
which would happen during the Spanish-American War of 1898. In the early 20th century,
Roosevelt explicitly rejected territorial expansion, which was exchanged for interventionism.
Wilson continued this approach by proclaiming his mission to spread democracy across the
globe. In his 1920 message to Congress after World War One, Wilson stated “This is the time
of all others when Democracy should prove its purity and its spiritual power to prevail. It is
surely the Manifest Destiny of the United States to lead in the attempt to make this spirit
prevail”. 17 One might argue that it continues to influence political ideology today, considering
America’s “mission” to defend, promote and spread freedom and democracy internationally.
Another significant argument of exceptionalism is America’s appeal to immigrants
from all parts of the world, because of its supposedly unusually high economic and political
opportunities and its extensive social mobility, involving the notions of the American Dream
and the Land of Opportunity. These related concepts essentially mean, that anyone can move
up the social ladder and escape from their class and family background to improve one’s
position in society, occupationally, geographically, and status-wise. However, this view
disregards America’s attempts to prohibit immigrants from entering the U.S., such the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and several subsequent immigration acts. Additionally, today,
America is no longer unique in its appeal to immigrants, as many other countries have
become at least as popular to immigrants.
During the Cold War, American exceptionalism was promoted by the media in
portraying American democracy fighting Soviet totalitarianism. More recently, this approach
has also been used by George W. Bush to distinguish democracies from dictatorships.
Whereas some critics suggest the theory of exceptionalism involves qualitative differences
from other nations instead of superiority over them, other critics claim that it is equivalent to
ethnocentrism and nationalist propaganda. Particularly due to the wars in the Middle East,
17
John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, “Woodrow Wilson”, The American Presidency Project, 2009,
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29561>.
9
American exceptionalism has met with strong opposition. In America on the World Stage
(2008), Gary Reichard and Ted Dickson claim that America is not exceptional by
emphasizing how U.S. development has always depended on other nations for commodities,
cultural values, and populations. 18 Thomas Bender desires to see the end of the revival of
exceptionalism, which he regards as an American defect. He argues that this attitude creates a
binary opposition of “us” and “them”, whereas he prefers to see the U.S. as “one global
interconnected with and interdependent with every other one”. 19 More critically, former
colonel Andrew Bacevich yearns for the end of exceptionalism in The Limits of Power: The
End of American Exceptionalism (2008). Initally a supporter of the Iraq war, Bacevich came
to resent America’s exceptionalist attitude due to many grave errors. He considers war in
general to be a counterproductive tool and predicts it will inevitably lead to overextension,
bankruptcy and ruin, while calling the army “an imperial constabulary” that “has become an
extension of the imperial presidency”. 20 The death of his only son, Andrew John Bacevich, a
first lieutenant in the U.S. Army, in Iraq in 2007 might have also influenced his opinion.
As a feature which continues to be intrinsically part of American culture, the
phenomenon of exceptionalism traditionally appears in every presidential public speech, in
which the U.S. president always implores God to bless America, without including the rest of
the world. On the 20th of January this year, Obama spoke the same words at the end of his
Inauguration speech. Yet, there were also other moments, where America’s belief in its
perceived uniqueness became evident, as Obama said
We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth. […] Its power to generate
wealth and expand freedom is unmatched. […] [T]hose values upon which our success
depends - honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity,
loyalty and patriotism - these things are old. These things are true. They have been the
quiet force of progress throughout our history. 21
Once again, exceptionalism was reflected in the American way of thinking, as Obama
emphasized America’s superior power, which is based on its perceived virtuous ideology.
18
“America on the World Stage”, Review, The Organisation of American Historians, OAH Newsletter 36; 1
(February 2008): 17, <https://oah.org/pubs/nl/2004feb/pdf/Feb04-OAH-NL.pdf>.
19
Thomas Bender, “No Borders: Beyond the Nation-State”, History News Network. 17 April 2006.
<http://hnn.us/articles/23913.html>.
20
Robert G. Kaiser, “Speaking Truth to a Superpower”, Washington Post, 31 August 2008,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/28/AR2008082802263_2.html>.
21
“Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address in Full”, BBC News, 20 January 2009,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/obama_inauguration/7840646.stm>.
10
1.4
THE ACADEMIC DEBATE
Discussions about the American Empire have been revived by the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, yet the academic debate dates several decades back. The aim of this section is to provide
an overview of several key perspectives, prevalent in certain periods of American history. On
a clarifying note, in the second to last paragraph of the previous section as well as in this
section, on a few occasions, secondary sources have been used, containing discussions about
primary sources as well as direct quotations from these sources. Since numerous theories
about the American Empire exist, only the most significant perspectives will be mentioned.
According to Steven Howe, professor of History and Cultures of Colonialism at the
Department of Historical Studies at University of Bristol (UK), few political words have had
such complex and contested histories as have “empire”, “imperial” and “imperialist”. 22 Howe
explains that after World War Two, these terms were almost always used negatively in
political theory, “frantically avoiding recognition of the imperialism that we in fact exercise”,
as the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr said in 1960. 23 Anti-imperialism and anticolonialism seemed to be the most supported ideologies in politics. Even the countries which
were generally thought to be empires rejected the label. Since the Statute of Westminster
(1931), British colonies were officially referred to as Commonwealth. This term had a more
positive ring to it than “colonies”, which was reminiscent of conquest by force and greed. The
Soviet Union rejected the term “empire” as well and insisted, according to Leninist thought,
that their expansionism was not imperial, as only capitalist states could be imperialist.
According to Howe, since the 1960s, the U.S. became the subject of anti-imperialist
academic theory. Liberal historians like William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko and
Walter LaFeber fiercely opposed U.S. involvement in “imperial” wars, especially the Vietnam
War. Reinhold Niebuhr also pointed at the dangers of imperialism, based on a combination of
arrogance and narcissism, and warned that this attitude might even pose a mortal threat to the
U.S. 24 Liberal theorists assert that imperialism is a product of politicians, rather than the
natural result of U.S. political or economic structures, and are antithetical to “true” U.S.
interests and values. Additionally, some critics used Marxist theories of economic
imperialism to reject American imperialism, claiming that business driven by capitalism,
materialism and greed controls government, such as Noam Chomsky and John Bellamy
22
Stephen Howe, “American Empire: The History and Future of an Idea”, Open Democracy, 12 June 2003,
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/history/2003/0612idea.htm>.
23
Michael Ignatieff, “The American Empire: The Burden”, New York Times, 5 January 2003,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B03E6DA143FF936A35752C0A9659C8B63>.
24
Ryan Lamothe, “America and the Eighth Deadly Sin”, Religion and Health 45; 4 (Winter 2006): 484.
11
Foster. Around the same time, more attention was directed at relationships or parallels
between declining European power and increasing American strength. Critics began to place
America’s relatively short period of colonisation in a longer historical trajectory and
presented comparative analyses between America and other empires, such as the Roman,
Tsarist and German Empires. Especially, historians of the British Empire have analysed
American imperialism for decades, arguing for or against comparisons between past British
power, of which more recent examples are Ferguson’s Empire (2003) and Colossus (2004).
As a groundbreaking essay among theorists of imperialism, in “The Imperialism of
Free Trade” (1953), Robinson and Gallagher make the distinction between a formal and
informal empire. They argued that America used to be a formal empire in the sense, that it
was a traditional form of imperialism, involving colonisation.25 Today, America would
qualify as an informal empire, seeing that it no longer seeks to increase its power in the world
by occupying territory and direct physical control of territories, except as a temporary
expedient in response to crisis, as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other analysts regard these wars as
an imperial quest, not with the primary intent to gain territory, but to spread American
ideology in the Middle East to create a safer situation for the U.S. as well as for its ally Israel.
Yet, in Stuart Miller’s view, as supposedly benevolent well-doers, Americans do not regard
their country as an empire due to their sense of innocence, which is essentially based on
ignorance. Miller believes that patriotic school texts, media, and speeches on which
Americans have been reared often omit or downplay, that the U.S. Constitution owes much of
its content to its British predecessor and the English philosophers John Locke and Thomas
Hobbes, who advocated the notions of freedom, independence, and self-determination. 26
Many analysts, such as Paul Kennedy in his groundbreaking The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers (1988), have claimed that America is an unrivalled giant and indeed its global
reach on a military, economic and cultural level is unparalleled. Remarkably, he predicted a
relative decline in U.S. power as well as increased military force by the U.S. He also warned
that continued deficit spending and overextention, especially for military purposes, would be
the most important cause of decline of any great power. In addition, he foresaw the emergence
of other powers in Asia, mainly China. 27 Indeed, it seems his predictions have come true.
Similarly, in Empire (2000), Hardt and Negri argue that the world has passed the era of
25
J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, “The imperialism of free trade”, The Economic History Review (1953). Though
designed to explain British policy in the Victorian era, it is applicable to both earlier British and modern
American foreign policy. Full text: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/gallagher.htm>.
26
Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation” The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) 1.
27
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988) Ch. 8, pp. 438-535.
12
imperialism and entered a new era. They claim that a new era of “Empire” is emerging,
namely a new global regime of international power and sovereignty, instead of a world ruled
by a singular sovereign nation. Yet, within this new “Empire” the United States shall still
occupy a privileged position. 28 Also, Georgetown professor Charles Kupchan argues in The
End of the American Era (2002) that America will not be able remain the world’s prime
superpower, predicting that the EU will be the great power to surpass the American Empire.29
Here, Robinson’s theory of “excentric imperialism” could be applied, which involves “a game
of rule that has to anticipate and respond to the actions of the competing imperial powers on
one hand and to the subaltern actors on the other”. 30 Given the growing economies of several
other countries, this imperial strategy might be used by America to maintain primacy.
Historians have also engaged in a dialogue on the “correctness” of terms, such as the
historian Archibald Paton Thorton (1921-2004), who argued against the coherence of the
concept of imperialism. He claimed that the term is “more often the name of the emotion that
reacts to a series of events, than a definition of the events themselves. Where colonization
finds analysts and analogies, imperialism must contend with crusaders for and against”. 31 The
overuse and abuse of the term “imperialism” makes it nearly meaningless as an analytical
concept, claimed Thorton. Nowadays, the notion of American Empire is employed from a
wider range of viewpoints. Though it is still favoured by political commentators, who hold a
negative view of America, sometimes it is employed approvingly, for example, by the
neoconservative analysts Dinesh D’Souza and Robert Kagan. 32 It is also increasingly used by
those who apply it in a neutral and descriptive manner, like Michael Ignatieff in “American
Empire: The Burden” (2003) and Charles S. Maier in Among Empires (2006). 33
As this chapter has shown, there are many views on the concept of American Empire
as well as other significant related terms, which often appear to have dissimilar meanings,
depending on the theorist’s own personal views, the historical context, and already existing
theories influencing the theorist’s point of view. This ongoing discussion will likely continue
and bring forth various new interpretations on the definition, rise and development of the
American Empire, presenting the scholarly and political world with complementing views.
28
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000): preface xi, xii.
Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era (New York: Knopf, 2002) 119-159.
30
James Tully, “Postcolonial Political and Legal Thought”, University of Victoria, 8 January 2008,
<web.uvic.ca/polisci/tully/courses/402S2008lectures.pdf>.
31
Archibald Paton Thornton, Imperialism in the Twentieth Century (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978) 25.
32
Stephen Howe, “American Empire: The History and Future of an Idea”, Open Democracy, 12 June 2003,
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/history/2003/0612idea.htm>.
33
Though written after the wars, Maier claims that the U.S. is primarily an empire of production and
consumption, rather than an empire characterized by military force. Among Empires: pp. 191, 238.
29
13
2.
MEAD’S SPECIAL PROVIDENCE
As a Senior Fellow of U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Walter Russell
Mead (1952) is considered to be one of America’s leading analysts of American foreign
policy. He regards himself as a lifelong Democrat, yet, remarkably, is a contributing editor of
the conservative magazine Worth, and has mostly written articles for right-wing journals, such
as The National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, The American Interest. 34 In 2001, Mead
published his Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World,
winning three prestigious awards, one of which being the Lionel Gelber Award for the best
book in English on International Relations in 2002. 35 The print run had begun a few weeks
before 9/11, which explains why there is no mentioning of this event in his book.
2.1
MEAD’S BACKGROUND VISIONS
The title of the book allows for various interpretations. For instance, it seems to reflect
Mead’s chief goal to dispel the myth, that the U.S. spent the 19th century in virtual isolation
and was unskilled in foreign politics. On the contrary, while refuting Otto von Bismark’s
comment, that “God has a special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of
America”, the writer asserts that the U.S. actually was a masterful practitioner of geopolitics
and diplomacy. 36 He also leaves open the possibility that America’s success might be due to
Special Providence, as he says “If a special providence is at work in American affairs, guiding
the country to continuing success, it is surely at work here” (Mead 86). Although the term is
hardly mentioned, Manifest Destiny could be applied here as well, as it also involves the
notion of a divine plan, yet stresses America’s expansionist conduct, spreading its power
internationally by means of imperialism and colonialisation. In addition, there might be a hint
of sarcasm in the title to debunk the traditional notion of Special Providence, which primarily
points at God as the sole entity directing and controling destiny. Instead, Mead emphasizes
human skill and resourcefullness, that have turned America into an empire. Though the writer
claims that his book does not belong in the category of triumphalist literature on the growth of
American power, it mostly praises America’s foreign policy skills and contains few critical
notes on where, when and how its foreign policy failed, which creates the impression that
Mead indeed sought to portray America as the exceptional mastermind in foreign politics.
34
For further details about Mead’s career see “Walter Russell Mead”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008,
<http://www.cfr.org/bios/3495/walter_russell_mead.html>.
35
Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001).
36
At the beginning of his book, Mead attributes his book to Otto von Bismarck and mentions this quote, which
might have been a cynical way of giving a counterargument to Bismarck’s claim in the form of an entire book.
14
His theory centers on the United States’ political system, involving the interplay of
four schools of thought, each of which represents the country’s social, economic and political
interests from different perspectives and to various degrees. 37 Mead calls these schools the
Hamiltonians, Wilsonians, Jeffersonians, and Jacksonians, which are based on key historical
figures and their policies, namely the first Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, and
three former U.S. presidents: Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson.
Though they are portrayed as stereotypes, Mead is aware that they were multifaceted and
complex in reality. Moreover, the schools are not intended as exact representations of each of
these figures and their political decision-making factors. In addition, while some people might
be broadly ideologically committed to one particular approach, others choose aspects from
several schools rather than adhering exclusively to one. According to Mead, these competing
schools have shaped foreign policy debates since the American Revolution and have brought
forth foreign policies, which have stimulated America’s growth to the extent, that “American
hegemony today is militarily supreme, culturally pervasive, technologically dominant, and
economically dynamic”, in other words, an empire (Mead 323).
Mead’s foreign policy schools are useful when discussing the notion of American
Empire, because the way in which this concept is defined, is largely based on how America
conducts foreign politics, as it influences the image people have of America. From a
historiographical point of view, it seems important to understand what main viewpoints have
always existed within U.S. foreign politics, as they partly explain how the notion of American
Empire came into existence and how people’s perspectives of the Empire have developed
over the centuries. Significantly, Mead points out that these schools are as fundamental today
as they were two hundred years ago, and are continuously evolving over time in response to
changing conditions. In addition to being a means of analysing the history of American
foreign policy, Mead claims that his four schools could also be employed to more adequately
anticipate, comprehend and address the challenges America will face in the future.38
Therefore, from a contemporary perspective, his categories are useful in analysing the current
and future role of America in world politics and, thus, of the current and future
conceptualisation of the American Empire. Additionally, Mead’s theories will be used to
obtain a more comprehensive account of the four contemporary works, and to see to which
category or categories the authors seem to belong, each of whom is occupied with the
question of what the empire’s future approach in global politics might likely be and should be.
37
38
Mead, Special Providence, 87.
Ibid. 90.
15
2.2
THE FOUR SCHOOLS
The first school that Mead discusses is the Hamiltonian school, which stresses the needs of
industry, open markets, as well as an international legal and financial order that facilitates
commerce. For example, the special relationship with Great Britain, that has remained a
feature of U.S. foreign policy to this day, is based on mutual trade interests and financial
ties. 39 Hamiltonian economic interests also focus on so-called “strategic” materials that are
available from limited sources, which concerned rubber in prior years, and oil today. Their
ideal view of the world involves the notion of a U.S. created world order, based on the
consent of free nations and attracted by mutual economic and security interests. Prospects for
peace and prosperity would be maximised for all participating nations. Hamiltonians believe
that economic profit at home will also benefit other countries, therefore, policy focussed on
stimulating economic growth is generally considered to be form of humanitarian aid. People
representing these political views are, for example, Teddy Roosevelt and George H.W. Bush.
The Wilsonians is also a globalist school in the sense, that they encourage the
international spread of American values, such as democracy, capitalism, rule-of-law, as well
as global institutions to prevent violence and protect human rights. 40 When facing the
possibility of war, the Wilsonians do not exclude it, but go to great length to prevent it,
strongly preferring soft power diplomacy as a means to solve conflict. Additionally, since a
democratic system and capitalism go together, Hamiltonians and Wilsonians often support
each other, as they both benefit from the provision of economic globalisation and an attractive
ideological justification for U.S. foreign policy. Yet, sometimes the two schools clash, for
example, as Wilsonian environmental principles can collide with Hamiltonian labour values.
Also, the first group supports NGO influence in international organisations, whereas the latter
advocates reliance on unilateral economic sanctions in international disputes. Moreover,
Mead claims that Wilsonians have a more inclusive attitude towards minorities, seeing that
they generally believe that “in the American hegemony, [idealistically] all nations and all
peoples are assumed to be, or at least capable of becoming, equal” (Mead 169). This school is
represented by political figures, such as Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter.
Whereas Hamiltonian and Wilsonian values could be characterised as internationalist
as well as interventionist, Jeffersonians and Jacksonians adopt a more isolationist stance as a
way of protecting U.S. interests. Jefferson wanted maximum powers in the hands of the
39
Mead, Special Providence, 115-119.
They promote international disputes resolution mechanisms and various international judicial bodies, such as
the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions, the International Red Cross program, codes of conduct on
treatment of prisoners, and the banning of mass destruction weapons.
40
16
people to safeguard democracy at home and prevent governmental corruption. Jeffersonians
use the government to counter economic power for the wealthy, supporting anti-trust and
consumer protection laws. Thus, they include elements of the political left as well as of the
right. In addition, Jeffersonians fear that foreign entanglements will strengthen government
and military and will, consequently, threaten domestic liberties. Interference in conflicts
abroad also leads to a massive increase in debt, which has been used as an argument against
wars from the Anglo-American War of 1812, to WWI, to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
National debt abroad involves the notion, that “a monetary aristocracy is as antidemocratic as
the blood aristocracy of Europe” (Mead 187). Similarly, this school opposes international
trade deals, as they are believed to enhance economic power. Antipathy for major commercial
interests have made Jeffersonians quick to recommend sanctions as an appropriate alternative
to war. Yet, when sanctions are not enough and war is unavoidable, they prefer “a gradual
approach to war: Turn up the thermostat up a little at a time […] with the last possible
application of force” (Ibid. 190). Overall, Jeffersonians stress caution in foreign affairs and
favour the least costly and dangerous methods of protecting America’s democratic system.
The policies of, for example, John Quincy Adams and Henry Kissinger align with this school.
Interestingly, the critic Arthur Schlesinger pointed out to Mead, that President Andrew
Jackson himself opposed nearly every aspect of the following school that will be discussed,
namely Jacksonianism, which might make one wonder why the school bears Jackson’s
name. 41 In his book, Mead acknowledges that using Jackson might lead to some confusion,
as he says that many of his followers were uneducated populists, whereas Jackson himself
was “a subtle, sophisticated, and in many ways surprisingly modern statesman” (Mead 91).
Mead agreed with Schlesinger, but nevertheless decided to keep the term, possibly for the
lack of a more appropriate prominent historical figure to represent this particular group of
Americans.
Jacksonian America is a folk community with a strong sense of common values and
common destiny. Jacksonianism or “trigger-happy cowboy diplomacy” holds (populist)
values in high regard, such as honour, independence, and courage. 42 This might seem noble,
however, Mead claims that of all of the foreign policy schools, the Jacksonian view actually
resembles classic European Realpolitik most, which is primarily based on practical
considerations of power, rather than on ideals, morals, or principles. In addition, they believe
41
Arthur Schlesinger, “Special Providence”, New York Times, 16 December 2001,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E3DB123CF935A25751C1A9679C8B63&n=Top/Refere
nce/Times%20Topics/People/S/Schlesinger,%20Arthur%20M.%20Jr.>.
42
Mead, Special Providence, 243.
17
government should primarily serve the middle classes by means of simple and direct policies,
although the Republican Party, which has many Jacksonian members, is often considered to
serve the interests of people with high incomes. Another central characteristic of Jacksonian
policy is its military might, which they do not use rashly, but when they do, it is carried out
“at the highest possible level of intensity” (Mead 221). Whereas the Jeffersonians emphasize
the First Amendment, the Jacksonians emphasize the Second Amendment, namely, the right
to bear arms as the best method to safeguard civil liberties. They often oppose extensive
government intervention, except for military projects. Jacksonians contend that “the ultimate
goal of American foreign policy should be […] to convert the present American hegemony into
a more durable system” by means of building a strong American military power (Ibid. 307).
Jacksonians are suspicious of “world order” initiatives, government infringement,
international law, and humanitarian interventions. 43 Their isolationist tendency to hinder
internationalist efforts offends Hamiltonians and Wilsonians, and their rejection of federal
initiatives in domestic economic and civil rights areas offends Jeffersonians. Importantly,
while the other schools may reject much of the Jacksonian way, Mead argues, that the
American Empire would not have been as powerful as it is now. The other schools also often
need Jacksonian support to achieve their goals. For example, in general, Jacksonians support
Jeffersonian isolationism; a strong Hamiltonian economic system to be benefited from; and
traditional Wilsonian values. Some political figures who link up with this school are William
Henry Harrison and John McCain.
As has been said, the works that will be analysed in the following chapters discuss the
future role of the American Empire in global politics. In so doing, one has to take account for
the state in which former president George W. Bush has left America. Mead relates Bush to
the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian schools, however, he only mentions him a few times, hardly
elaborates, and seeing that he wrote his book in 2001, it seems important to provide an
updated sketch of Bush, according to Mead’s theories to determine which school(s) match
him best. Before the events of 9/11, his foreign policy was distinctly marked by international
withdrawal, which is associated with Jeffersonianism. September 11th changed this, as a
strong response was expected from the president, resulting in military repercussions, perfectly
matching Jacksonian militancy. First, the wars echoed revenge and exhibition of dominance
but, as time passed, more emphasis was placed on the administration’s supposedly benign
intent, as it characterized its warfare as interventionist idealism, involving the spread of
43
Mead, Special Providence, 245.
18
freedom and democracy, typical Wilsonian ideals. In addition, the Wilsonian ideal of a free
society is connected with Hamiltonian support for free trade, thus, inevitably also adopting
Hamiltonian views. Though all schools seem define Bush’s foreign policy to a certain extent,
one could say that two have played governing roles, namely, the Jacksonian and Wilsonian
schools. Due to 9/11 and the subsequent wars, Bush will forever be known as a war president,
having used American ideals and values as a motive and justification for engaging in war.
2.3
ANALYSING AMERICA’S FUTURE
Mead suggests that in order “to avoid another era of potentially very dangerous strategic
gridlock, we will need a debate [about] American hegemony and its meaning for the national
interest” (Mead 325). 44 The writer, subsequently, mentions some questions, which he believes
are vital to the discussion of the American Empire, such as: where are its vulnerabilities and
strong points; how could the system be changed or reformed; and what is the point of the
American empire—to make us rich, to make us safe, or to build a better world? 45 Mead does
not attempt to answer any of these questions. Instead, he presents his four schools as a method
of engaging in this academic debate in order to find appropriate and adequate answers.
As he claims that the schools are inter-reactionary and interdependent, Mead
concludes that the United States needs to take account of all of the four schools in producing a
common strategy in order to maintain American primacy, which he refers to as a “strategic
elegance—a grand national strategy […] with the fewest risks and costs” (Ibid. 333). Though
a joint strategy, the writer argues that the Jeffersonians ought to have the most power.
Strategic elegance is the highest quality of the Jeffersonian mind and the supreme gift
of the Jeffersonian tradition. It is perhaps the single most-needed quality now […].
Jeffersonian grand strategists can and should harness sometimes inflated Hamiltonian
and Wilsonian eagerness for new world orders and grand legal and political structures,
while persuading Jacksonians of the real importance of pared-down, simplified, and
streamlined forms of American international engagement. (Ibid. 333)
According to Mead, particularly this school is essential to the American Empire, as it involves
measure and scepticism to prevent “overreaching” internationally, thereby, possibly causing
additional conflict and overspending, which ultimately do not serve American interests.
Here, one might say that Mead’s praise of Jeffersonian policy seems to reduce his
professional objectivity as an academic writer. However, from the reader’s perspective, one
might be interested to know his personal preferred political viewpoint, as one of America’s
44
45
When saying “another era of potentially very dangerous strategic gridlock”, Mead refers to the Cold War.
Mead, Special Providence, 323, 324.
19
leading analysts of American foreign policy. Yet, whereas he clearly states his preference for
a predominantly Jeffersonian approach, he does not provide Jeffersonians with strategic
advice on how to compete with the other schools and rule them. Mead claims that the schools
have “helped sharpen [his] ideas about what the aims of foreign policy should be in the
future” and that what the U.S. needs is an “elegant grand strategy, plainly expressed and
clearly reasoned”, yet, he does not say what particular form this elegant grand strategy should
take (Mead 90, 333). Mead, thereby, neglects to provide a specific plan containing
suggestions on how the American government could address certain foreign policy issues.
Furthermore, David M. Kennedy, history professor at Stanford University, argues that
Mead’s labelling produces several oddities, as “Wilsonians appear more than a century before
Wilson himself, and Hamiltonians morph from nineteenth-century protectionists to latetwentieth-century free-traders, without compromising the continuity of their foreign-policy
bloodlines”. 46 In addition, Kennedy points out that little effort is made to explain why the four
schools appeared in the Revolutionary era, what circumstances shaped their separate
characters, or why American culture has nurtured only those four schools and not others.
When pondering the future of the American Empire, Mead comments the following:
I do not know how long […] American supremacy will last, or if the world is due for a
second American century. I am not even sure that another century of American global
hegemony is what the American people should hope for. But the long and successful
record of this country’s unique […] foreign policy system gives me solid grounds for
believing that whatever else happens in the world, our foreign policy tradition offers
the American people real hope for a prosperous and democratic future. (Mead xviii)
Considering 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the economic crisis, in retrospect,
particularly the last sentence seems rather ironic now. Aside from the unforeseen, the lack of
critical observations of the history of American foreign policy; his subjective devotion to
Jeffersonianism; the lack of a strategic plan for Jeffersonians on how to obtain and maintain
the upper hand; and some historical and contextual inconsistencies, Mead has provided a
more inclusive insight of U.S. foreign policy, as it surpasses the traditional categories of left
and right, dove and hawk, internationalist and isolationist, unilateralist and multilateralist.
Moreover, Mead’s theories could help to obtain a broader understanding of why the
United States government, in charge of running an empire, has made and will make certain
foreign policy decisions, which consequently shape the way Americans as well as people
46 David M. Kennedy, “The American Way of Power”, The American Prospect, 25 March 2002,
<http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_american_way_of_power>.
20
from other countries perceive America and, thus, shape people’s developing interpretations of
the concept of American Empire.
As of January 20th 2009, Barack Obama has become the forty-fourth President of the
United States, in charge of leading the world’s prime superpower. Throughout the campaign,
Obama has been praised for his eloquent and energizing speeches, in which he has spoken of
dreams, hopes and ideals. The Wilsonian school clearly resounds in his words, yet whether
Obama will be able put idealistic principles into actions remains to be seen. Bush’s heritage
has made that task quite problematic, involving two wars, a huge deficit, and an economic
crisis. In his Inauguration speech, Obama also stated his preference for restraint over military
force, reflecting Jeffersonian prudence. Following Mead’s suggestion to apply his theory
prospectively, and given that Obama has surrounded himself with people from diverse
political backgrounds, perhaps a coalition of Wilsonian idealism to validate U.S. presence in
the Middle East; Jeffersonian caution to prevent overextension; Jacksonian military support to
round off the wars in Afghanistan as quickly as possible; and Hamiltonian economic backing
to address the current economic crisis might be implemented in his foreign policy plan in
order to address America’s problems most effectively. How, specifically, the president will
seek to protect the interests of the American Empire and its people, the future will tell.
Like Bush and Obama seem to broadly fit certain categories, so could Mead’s four
schools of thought be applied to the five authors, who and whose writings will be discussed in
the following chapter. Which school(s) in particular reflect(s) their interests and principles
best, will become clear in the subsequent analyses of their works.
21
3.
AMERICAN EMPIRE – A CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSION
This chapter is composed of four subchapters, following the four contemporary works that
will be analysed, with a specific focus on the concept of American Empire, namely Madeleine
Albright’s Memo to the President Elect, Dennis Ross’ Statecraft, Thayer and Layne’s
American Empire: a Debate, and Simon Bromley’s American Power. Key questions will be
discussed, such as whether these experts consider America to be an empire; whether they
believe it can, will and should pursue primacy; and how they reckon the new president will
likely and should conceptualize the future role of the American Empire in global politics.
3.1
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT - MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT ELECT:
HOW WE CAN RESTORE AMERICA’S REPUTATION AND LEADERSHIP (2008)
As a new presidential era was dawning, America longed for change, a key term used
throughout the presidential campaign. Former Secretary of State and best-selling author,
Madeleine Albright (1937), cleverly responded to this desire by offering her professional
advice to the president elect, concerning how to improve America’s reputation and leadership
after Bush. 47 “To many, the Statue of Liberty has been replaced in the mind’s eye by a
hooded figure with electrodes. In marketing terms, the American brand needs a makeover”,
says Albright. 48 By writing her book, Albright probably sought to promote the Democratic
agenda with the upcoming elections in mind and, implicitly, to support her friend Hillary
Clinton in the race for the 2009-2012 presidency. At the time of writing, Clinton still had a
fair chance at winning and if she had been elected president, Albright might once again have
been appointed Secretary of State. Instead, Barack Obama was elected president and Clinton
became Secretary of State, both of whom now have Albright’s support as their foreign policy
advisor.
3.1.1 THE PRESIDENT ELECT
Like the subtitle suggests, Albright has some serious criticism in store for George W. Bush
and indeed she does, as she holds him responsible for the state America is in. While
pretentiously equating his work with God’s plan, Bush damaged her country to the extent that
it is now marked by exhausted military power; damaged international economic leadership; a
record deficit; strained alliances in Europe and the Asian Pacific; and a tainted image of
America as a hypocrite with regard to nuclear weapons, human rights, and law. Albright even
seems to go as far as to implicitly call Bush a criminal, when she says “[i]f we attempt to put
47
I will use general terms such as “the next president” or “president elect”, as Obama was not yet President.
Madeleine Albright and Bill Woodward. Memo to the President Elect: How We Can Restore America’s
Reputation and Leadership (New York: Harper, 2008): 22-23.
48
22
ourselves outside the law, we invite others to do the same. That is when our moral bearings
are lost and the foundation of our leadership becomes suspect” (Ibid. 20-21).
When criticizing Bush, Albright does not aimlessly ventilate her frustrations. She
rather attempts to constructively point out exactly what he has done wrong, hoping that the
next president will not make the same errors when encountering similar situations, as this
would prevent America’s current state from declining even further. For instance, Albright
claims that Bush should never have invaded Iraq, because it is unacceptable to start a war
with a country, based on insufficient and inadequate evidence, supposedly proving that it has
serious plans to attack the U.S. Albright also claims that the Bush administration employed an
over-reliance on military force and, hence, abandoned America’s founding principles in the
process. Moreover, by disregarding the United Nations’ disapproval, Bush gave off he
impression that he did not value the opinion of others, a great number of which are important
allies. Ignoring America’s international partners is, in Albright’s view, unwise as America
should rather sustain good relationships, because it depends on them for their economic as
well as military support, especially while facing terrorist threat.
Albright contends that the next president must, first, “begin with the understanding
that our right to lead is no longer widely accepted. We have lost moral legitimacy. If we fail
to comprehend this, we will not know how to formulate a successful strategy” (Albright 22).
The president should, subsequently, safeguard America’s superior position by recapturing
what has been lost and proceeding from there, referring to the “lost” Clinton era. When
attacking Bush for having tarnished America’s credibility during the past seven years,
Albright implies that when Clinton was president and Albright was United States Ambassador
to the United Nations (1993-1997) and Secretary of State (1997-2001), America had a notable
reputation. Of course, this can be debated on, for example, when thinking of the Rwanda
massacre during which the U.S. did not try to stop the killings, and the unsuccessful military
intervention in Somalia which, to this day, is a country where chaos and conflict rule.
Nevertheless, Albright hopes America’s future will involve global diplomacy along the lines
of the Clinton administration. In her view,
Bill Clinton brought Kennedy-style zest to the task of governing in a time of danger—
expanding and reforming NATO, supporting debt relief for the poorest countries,
promoting democracy without trying to impose it, pursuing peace, and doing more
than any other leader to rally the world against international terror. (Ibid. 19-20)
Throughout her book, Clinton and Kennedy are mentioned as two exemplary presidents, who
executed foreign policy most capably and proficiently. Though Albright does not say so
23
explicitly, one gets the impression that Albright believes America needs a president who is a
mix of these two former presidents in order to restore America’s reputation and leadership.
Albright’s praise of Bill Clinton was to be expected, since she is a Democrat and
worked for him during his two-term presidency. Therefore, if Albright were to criticize Bill
Clinton’s foreign policy, she would then simultaneously criticize herself, and undermine her
own authority as a foreign relations expert and as the author of her book, of which the content
might then be perceived as less valuable and worthwhile reading. Another possible
explanation might be that by supporting his policy, Albright implicitly supported Hillary
Clinton as presidential candidate, suggesting that if Hillary Clinton were elected president,
she would implement a similar policy and, hence, would restore America as the empire it
once was under Bill Clinton’s presidency.
Obviously, as the leader and face of America, the president and his actions will
determine how the American Empire is viewed nationally as well as internationally.49 In
order to ensure America’s position as the chief superpower, in Albright’s view, the new
president of America should show moderation by attentively and patiently listening, which
demonstrates that he cares about and values the opinions of other countries. She also argues,
that it is important to be thorough about a country’s history, personalities, social and cultural
factors, risk to troops, potential cost to civilians, and whether certain plans are realistic and
feasible. It is essential to find the right balance between idealism and realism, in that, it is
good to have principles, but they need to be effectuated according to a realistic plan. Albright
seems to regard herself as a realistic Wilsonian, remarkably, comparing national security to a
hot-air balloon. She explains that “[w]ithout the helium of principles, there is no lift; without
the ballast of international interest, the balloon would never return to Earth” (Albright 39).
She also recommends to the next president to be knowledgeable of the qualities that
sustained past presidents, so he can tap into those qualities if a similar situation occurs. One of
the vital qualities that both Kennedy and Clinton mastered was the power of speech to convey
their message clearly, diplomatically and charismatically. The next president will need to
“master the art of reaching audiences of every description, exhibiting sympathy without
pandering, showing the way forward, and inviting listeners to come along” (Ibid. 293). He
should know how to persuade other countries to cooperate, while linking words about
universal aspirations to actions. Albright believes that if the next president acts accordingly,
the American Empire could once again be a role model to other nations, as it should. Surely,
49
On page 4, Albright explains that though using a male pronoun to refer to the president elect is an imperfect
solution, it is more charitable to the reader to choose a gender, rather than to write “his or her..” or “she/he”.
24
Obama seems to possess many if not all of these qualities, yet he still has to prove himself as
president, and whether he will be able to put America back on track towards benign primacy.
3.1.2 “EMPIRICAL” ANALYSIS
By blending lessons from the past with forward-looking suggestions, Albright hopes to return
America to “its rightful role as a source of inspiration across the globe”. 50 Though she does
not once mention the word “empire” with regard to America, this phrase evidently reflects
Albright’s preference to view America as such. Three questions remain, however: why does
Albright not refer to America as an empire; why does she believe it is America’s “rightful”
role to be an empire; and what exactly is Albright’s conception of the ideal American
Empire? With regard to the first question, the word “empire” mostly has a negative
connotation. Given that Albright only uses the word when referring to the communist empire;
the term is reminiscent of colonisation; and since every empire that has ever existed has
fallen, it seems obvious that she prefers not to link her country to negative associations of
despotism, oppression and ultimate downfall.
Albright does not elaborate on America’s supposed entitlement to primacy, as she
might consider it to be a given fact, not needing an explanation. It is possible that her
religious convictions play a part in this, as she might believe that it is America’s God-given
destiny to be the prime superpower.51 However, we also know Albright to be a very down-toearth and matter-of-fact kind of person. Therefore, a more likely explanation involves the
notion of the American Dream, as Albright might view America and its citizens as having
worked hard to find its way to the top and, therefore, its primacy is rightful in her view. This
latter possibility seems closest to Albright’s line of thought, since she idealistically calls
America “the land of opportunity”, and says that she considers herself to be “a life-long
believer in the American Dream” (Albright 14, 173). She herself could be seen as living proof
of this ideology, having entered the United States as an immigrant, and having worked her
way up towards becoming the most powerful woman of the world. 52
Central to understanding Albright’s proposed foreign policy is her ideal view of the
American Empire, which brings me to the third question of what kind of empire Albright has
in mind for America, when seeking to restore its reputation and leadership. In addition to
inspiring the world, using the word “restore” implies that Albright also hopes that America
50
Sleeve of Albright’s book, lines 9 to 10.
Albright is a member of the Episcopal Church, a middle way between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.
52
Albright learned the ways of foreign diplomacy by observing her father, Josef Korbel (1909-1977), a
prominent Czech Diplomat and chief advisor to the Czech president. Korbel also mentored Condoleezza Rice,
who succeeded in becoming the second female Secretary of State, Albright having been the very first.
51
25
will gain what has been lost. Longing for the good old days which, in her view, represent the
Clinton era and, more generally, post-war America, she claims that “[Americans] yearn to
restore the world as it was when America was riding its highest – having won the war,
demonstrated unparalleled economic and military prowess, and commenced building new
institutions to promote prosperity and preserve peace” (Albright 290). According to Albright,
the next president should try to restore America’s image to, once again, be admired
internationally as the glorious number one economic and military superpower, bringing
prosperity and peace to the world. Though she does not portray the America of the 1950s as
an empire, she does describe it as having qualities that are essential for a country to obtain if it
wants to fulfil the role of an empire, such as optimism (belief in progress), confidence,
courage and resilience.
“And yet who today describes Americans in such flattering terms?”, asks Albright
(Ibid. 132). When describing America and its citizens, Albright says that whereas “[p]owerful
myths emerge from revolution and resistance [such as the industrial revolution], present-day
America is identified with privilege and the status quo” (Ibid.). She adds that it is hard to call
America courageous, when it is so very advantaged, as it consumes
a quarter of the world’s resources with 4 percent of the population and can afford to
spend as much on defense as the rest of the world combined. Though we are still
admired for our scientific and material accomplishments, even friends have become
reluctant to follow our lead. In the language of the playground, many feel that we have
become too big for our britches; they want us brought down a peg. (Ibid. 133)
Acknowledging that the U.S. has alienated its allies, Albright points out that a good
relationship with its allies is a vital necessity in order for America to be that glorious empire.
When describing the relationship between America and its overseas neighbour
Europe, and when comparing the two, she says that many European countries feel, that
it is unhealthy to have a single superpower. Iraq reinforced this view, but even before
the U.S. invasion, many Europeans did not look upon America as quite civilized. After
all, the Unites States has one of the world’s largest prison populations, a horrifying
murder rate, a fascination with guns, and the curious notion (in some quarters at least)
that candidates for high offices should prove their toughness by executing people.
Where American mythology centers on the role of the heroic individual, the modern
European sensibility concerns itself with societies acting humanely. American
morality demands, that everyone be given a chance; European morality demands, that
everyone be given a share of what society has to offer. (Ibid. 158)
A high prisoner and murder rate, a gun fascination and the death penalty are, of course, all
matters that concern home policy. Therefore, Albright cannot be expected to restore
26
America’s reputation in that particular field. However, she can help to improve America’s
negative image on the level of foreign politics, by means of offering the president elect her
advice on how to engage in international relations. Albright appears to be well aware, that in
order to improve America’s reputation, the next president “must first acknowledge that
America has fallen behind” to, then, present the world with policy that will show respect for
its allies, and which will offer them opportunities to benefit from (Albright 166).
During her career, Albright has frequently referred to America as “the indispensable
nation” (Ibid. 20-1). She explains that this term was not meant arrogantly, but rather captured
the reality that most large-scale initiatives required at least some U.S. input. In addition, she
“hoped the phrase would create a sense of pride among Americans, so we would be more
willing to invest in overseas projects and less reluctant to take on tough assignments” (Ibid.).
Apparently, Albright sought to encourage America to be a proud nation, yet this suggests that
it was not proud enough already. Generally, however, Americans are stereotypically
perceived as very proud and nationalistic, perhaps even to the extent of being considered
arrogant. Therefore, encouraging its citizens to be even more proud, than they are already
believed to be, does not seem to be in America’s best interest, as it confirms rather than
debunks a negative stereotype. Albright also says, that she wants Americans to invest in
overseas projects and tough assignments but, again, does not clarify her view. Not clearly
formulating one’s thoughts leaves room for wrong impressions. For example, combining the
word “pride” with the notion of America intervening in other countries has a negative
connotation. Seeing that Albright wants America to be regarded as a noble and peaceful
empire, Albright could have been more specific by saying, that she wants America to invest in
overseas projects, involving providing humanitarian aid. Being more specific, in this case,
could help to mend America’s reputation, which ultimately is Albright’s goal.
Furthermore, she recommends that America should refrain from using violence as a
means to achieve its goals, as she considers it to be “the bluntest instrument in the foreign
policy toolbox. In recent years, America has developed a reputation for being too quick to call
on its arsenal. In many countries, we are now thought to be the world’s leading threat to
peace” (Ibid. 92). As she prefers to view America as a peaceful empire, Albright suggests that
the next president should “restore America’s vocation as an architect of peace” (Ibid. 145).
This statement seems to be problematic in three ways: firstly, the word “vocation” is similar
to “rightful” (mentioned earlier: p. 25) in that they both imply a certain entitlement, as if
America were destined to spread peace across the world. Secondly, the view of America as
“an architect of peace” appears to be more romantic and nationalistic than realistic, given its
27
violent history. Additionally, the desire to act peacefully could clash with the desire to be an
empire, because aspiring to remain an empire involves continuing to compete with and
surpass others, which could have negative consequences for other countries economically as
well as politically, thereby, possibly disturbing rather than preserving peace.
According to Albright, “[t]he same polls that show a decline in our popularity also
suggest that the globe is not eager for a superpower rival to emerge—China’s military
ambitions are viewed with suspicion, Russian leaders are distrusted; Iran’s president is
positively disliked” (Albright 24). Apparently, America still is the preferred superpower,
though its image as well as its leadership requires serious improvement. In order to refurbish
the American Empire, Albright also offers her expert advice to the president elect on how to
assemble a first-rate foreign policy team; anticipate actions of other key countries; make full
use of presidential power without excesses; and revive America’s commitment to its founding
ideals. However, there appear to be five principle threats to American primacy, which it needs
to overcome, which are terror and the rise of anti-Americanism in Arab and Muslim worlds;
erosion of international consensus on nuclear proliferation; growing doubts about the value of
democracy; deteriorating globalisation due to a growing gap between the rich and the poor;
and America’s tendency to isolationism and withdrawal. 53 While Albright believes that most
Americans prefer to and should mind their own business, America should not allow threats to
grow either. Hence, if America is passive, alternative powers will fill the void.
3.1.3 AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE MAKEOVER
In addition to the Iraq war, under president Bush the United States has rejected several
multilateral agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the
Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel land mines (mines for use against humans rather than
vehicles), the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
concerning systems used in defending areas against nuclear weapons delivered by missiles.
Bush’s foreign policy could be characterised as predominantly unilateral, one of the main
factors that led Bush to fail as an international leader as well as seriously damage America’s
reputation, according to Albright. In order for America to be the empire it once was,
international support is a vital ingredient, as she says that “[o]ur alliances in Europe and Asia
are among our most valuable national security assets and should be treated as such” (Ibid. 92).
Hence, what Albright recommends to the next president in order to restore America as the
empire it used to be before Bush entered the scene, is to adopt a multilateral approach.
53
Albright, Memo to the President Elect, 23.
28
ESSENTIAL ALLIES
Albright regrets that the sense of a united America and West has been weakened, because the
fewer allies America has, the weaker it looks and in fact is. She, therefore, recommends that
the next president focuses on the three biggest European countries for support, seeing that
Merkel, Brown and Sarkozy are keys to a European strategy to achieve transatlantic unity.
“The quartet of Euro-Atlantic leaders […] can create a new foundation for global progress
through the restoration of mutual trust and the implementation of cooperative projects”,
argues Albright (Albright 166). In public speeches, the president should also emphasise the
U.S., Canada and Europe as a common enterprise, reflecting the image of powerful countries
standing strong together. While distancing himself from Bush’s unilateralism, the president
needs to acknowledge the mistakes that have been made and not deny them, for that will only
further deteriorate America’s relationship with the international community.
The president also needs most of Latin-America to engage with the U.S. in a common
enterprise, as they share a colonial upbringing and a commitment to constitutional democracy.
Although it is likely that there will remain a continuous dissatisfaction directed at America, it
should nevertheless commit to supporting governments that place a high priority on
alleviating poverty by ensuring that the benefits of expanded commerce and outside
investment are broadly shared, argues Albright. Financial support could also help to prevent
political upheaval and fury, which would otherwise be bound to happen when there is lack of
employment, combined with a high birth rate. Additionally, to prepare for the Fifth Summit of
the Americas to be held in Trinidad in 2009, intended to unite Latin-America and the U.S.,
Albright recommends four steps. 54 First, a charismatic and clever envoy should ensure that
America’s interests in the region and knowledge about it are communicated every day.
Second, the president should acknowledge that America’s so-called war on drugs is
ineffective. Third, the Cuban embargo should be lifted to increase contacts between the U.S.
and Cuba at every level. Finally, if the president speaks to the Trinidad community in a way
that truly inspires hope, “Latin America will be on your side”, predicts Albright (Ibid. 176).
RUSSIA’S PRIDE & PREJUDICE AND THE ASIAN CENTURY
In order to have a productive relationship with Russia, Albright suggests accommodating
Russian pride in order to develop a common agenda on global security, involving “fighting
terrorism and cutting our nuclear arsenals while discouraging other countries from developing
54
The Summit of the Americas was launched by Bill Clinton in 1994 to engage Latin-America in a common
enterprise, focussing on vital issues, such as education, development, good governance, crime, and democracy.
29
their own” (Albright 209). America should also encourage intergovernmental, academic, and
cultural engagement, because the more the U.S. knows about Russia, the more it could keep
possible threats in check. At the same time, America should stand by its principles and insist,
that Russia does not challenge the independence of its neighbours. 55 America should also
keep a close check on possible Russian arms sales in the Middle East; support advocates of
democracy and human rights within Russia; and worry that Russia and China might put aside
past differences and join forces to counterbalance U.S. power.
When dealing with Asia, it is important to proceed carefully to avoid a possible clash
of modernity and tradition. Instead of commanding or using force, it would be wiser to act as
a friendly referee. The advantage of this tactic is that, in this way, America could keep a close
eye on every important player. China, for example, is experiencing immense economic
growth. Although it still lacks behind America, given the speed in which China is
progressing, America needs to stay on top of its game to prevent China from possibly toppling
America as the world’s superpower, in the future. Albright claims that “[n]ow, more people in
more countries have a favourable view of China than have a favourable view of the United
States” (Ibid. 191). However distant the Chinese threat might be, the next president needs to
observe China’s developments, in order keep ahead and remain the chief empire. Likewise,
North-Korea should be kept in check as well. The president elect should try to stabilize NorthKorea in the sense, that it does not threaten its neighbours or America, yet should do so
without violence. According to Albright, despite its nuclear arms, North-Korea does not pose
a real threat because it is isolated, however, it could become dangerous if it believed it were
threatened. With regard to Japan, America could try to push the idea of a new constitution to
enable and welcome the development of a modern Japanese military force, as Japan has the
money and skill to be a formidable ally in maintaining stability in East Asia.
Furthermore, America should keep an eye on the rising powers in South Asia. India is
growing and developing at a China-like rate and might eventually become a powerful nation.
Given this likelihood, Albright argues that this country should become a strategic partner. In
order to achieve this, the president should visit India straight away in first term, rather than
wait until the second term, which was the mistake Bush made. Additionally, the U.S. should
seek to settle the conflict between Pakistan, India and Kashmir, so that it no longer provides a
pretext for Pakistani militants. Since Pakistan borders with Afghanistan, it would be
strategically convenient if America would also make Pakistan its ally. To realise this, the
55
After Russia invaded Georgia on 8 August 2008, the U.S. government supported Georgia, because it aspires to
be a well-functioning democracy and NATO-member and, therefore, the U.S. commanded Russia to withdraw.
30
president must admit past mistakes, and stress what America can do for Pakistan in terms of
public education, economic issues, and so on. Significantly, the U.S. needs to treat Pakistan
and India with equal respect, and publicly discuss terrorism as a joint problem to be dealt with
on a multilateral basis, so that America stands stronger in the fight against terror, also in the
eyes of terrorists. The U.S. should also stay true to its principles by saying that the U.S. is
looking forward to welcoming Pakistan as a democracy, while making clear that it has no
intention of imposing a democratic system on Pakistan. Unlike Bush proclaimed, Albright
asserts that America does not have a sacred calling “to extent democracy across the globe, but
that [it does, however,] have an obligation to safeguard its own democratic system and to help
those who seek [its] help in building the brand of democracy” (Albright 295).
ONE IRAQ IS ENOUGH
When discussing Iraq, again, Albright emphasizes the importance of multilateralism. She
argues that America can regain footing in the Middle East and Persian Gulf only if the U.S.
agenda is supported by its allies, and if it can be reconciled with the needs of other key
countries. This approach would demonstrate that America takes its allies seriously, while it
would also serve as a means to establish trust, which is essential in negotiations. However,
even if America manages to regain footing, it will be impossible for the new president,
whoever he will be, to end chaos in Iraq. After some decades have passed, ensuring stability
might be a feasible goal, but not within the four or eight years the next president will be in
power. Therefore, what the president needs to do is to issue damage control to prevent the
current situation from escalating further. The more chaos intensifies and is allowed to spread,
the more difficult it will be to control and stabilize the situation. Yet, there are three possible
obstacles that need to be reckoned with and prevented from happening: the Sunni-dominated
region could become recruiting ground for Al Qaeda; future Iraqi governments may yield to
Iran and threaten Israel; and Iraq might ignite a region-wide war. Hence, America should try
to stabilize the dividing-progress of Iraq, involving giving the northern part of Iraq to the
Kurds, the southern region to the Shiites, and the middle region to the Sunnis.
With regard to Iran, Albright considers it wisest to refrain from attacking it, because
this would only worsen the situation in the Middle East. Moreover, bombing Iran would cause
America to lose the Shiites as an ally, since they are more or less on amicable terms with Iran.
Albright rather recommends to keep negotiating to persuade it to stop building nuclear arms.
In so doing, one should however not behave as their superior, but rather leave Iran’s pride and
31
dignity intact. 56 Whether or not America manages to come to some sort of agreement with
Iran, when America and Iran are negotiating, at least Iran would not be attacking Israel.
Albright is clearly against a war with Iran, yet she does not exclude this possibility either if
and when Iran sends away IAEA inspectors; or is again caught engaging in nuclear weaponsrelated activities; or if Iran is directing or financing terror attacks against the U.S. “Under any
scenario”, argues Albright, “our position will be stronger if we have worked with our allies
each step of the way and if other major countries understand that we have given Iran every
chance to resolve differences without violence […] one Iraq is enough” (Albright 248-9).
MIDDLE EAST’S ROLLER COASTER
One might consider the vicious circle of violence in the Middle East to be like a never-ending
roller coaster. “As you take office, the pursuit of Middle East peace seems quixotic, reserved
for dreamers” says Albright to the president elect (Ibid. 252). Still, she asserts that it is the
president’s task as the leader of the world’s superpower to inspire Israeli and Arab officials to
resume thinking about peace, and compare that to all the violence and numerous casualties
they have experienced these past years. Even if the president does not succeed, what is
important is how he fails. He should make use of the opportunity to restore America’s
reputation as an honest broker, and as a country that cares about the lives and well-being of
everyone in the region. He should talk with leaders of the Jewish American community every
couple of months, as well as with American Arab representatives. To achieve the
establishment of permanent borders, the president should listen, take each party’s wishes
seriously, and find ways to meet their needs as best as possible, while emphasizing the logic
of peace, which ultimately is what everyone desires, according to Albright.
Albright suggests two complementary solutions to establish peace in the Middle East
which are, however, difficult to realize. Firstly, Israel could return to its pre 1967-borders,
which would isolate Hamas. Secondly, negotiations between Israel en Syria should be
reopened. The extra advantages of this second approach are, that it would push Iran to the
sidelines and bring Syria closer to its fellow Arabs; and Hezbollah would lose its reason for
being in Libanon if peace broke out with Israel. But there are two weaknesses in this second
strategy, the first one being that Syria must be held accountable for Hariri’s murder or be
56
On July 19th 2008, the Bush administration presented Iran with a two-week deadline, forcing Iran stop its
uranium enrichment process. The Iranian government refused to accept the notion of a deadline and maintains it
will not meet the demand. The Iranian president considers the deadline to be proof of America’s arrogance and
hypocricy, as well as an insult to Iran as it undermines its sovereignity and integrity.
32
exonerated, and the second weakness is that Syria probably will not sign an agreement until
the Palestinian authorities sign it, because it values Arab public opinion. 57
At times, it seems that Albright attempts to be an impartial referee, for example, when
she contends that “Israel can’t achieve lasting security by killing, jailing, and fencing off its
enemies and that Palestinians can’t create a viable life for themselves through terrorism”
(Albright 267). Nevertheless, Albright does not appear to hold a neutral standpoint. The fact
remains that Israel is America’s ally whereas the Palestinian government is not, which is
reflected in her words. Albright calls Palestinian suicide-bombers terrorists, yet does not use
similar terminology to refer to the Israeli government and its war crimes. For example, when
explaining each party’s response to violence, Albright says that “[f]or the Israelis, this means
using its power to prevent, deter, and punish attacks. For the Palestinians, this means fighting
each other for the right to be top gun and then turning that gun on Israel” (Ibid. 253). This
statement seems to portray Israel as the victim defending its people, whereas she describes the
Palestinians as power-hungry aggressors, initiating violence.
However, Albright does not completely support every Israeli military action, such as
Israel’s attack on Lebanon in 1982. She also suggests that one way of solving the conflict is
for the Israeli government to return to its pre 1967-borders, yet, not once does she literally say
that Israel has unrightfully taken Palestinian land. Overall, she appears to have more criticism
on the Palestinians than on Israel, which makes sense given that the Palestinian government is
no democracy, and houses terrorists who seek to destroy America’s ally. However, if the next
president chooses to adopt Albright’s partial views on this matter in favour of Israel, then how
can the U.S. successfully mediate between the Israeli and Palestinian governments? Like any
other American president, the new president will be viewed with suspicion by the
Palestinians, but there are no other candidates to act as mediator. America considers it its task
as world leader to step to the plate and solve the conflict. In other words, an American referee
(whether partial or not) is all the Palestinians have and will have to work with, a problematic
situation that seems to be the only way to establish peace and stability in the Middle East.
ISOLATING AL QAEDA
As we have learned from the Twin Towers and Pentagon attacks, Al Qaeda is a dangerous
enemy and should not be underestimated. Albright claims that homeland defence money and
the American military cannot defeat Al Qaeda and its allies. “Both can slow them down,
57
Rafik Hariri was Lebanon’s prime minister but became known as a martyr, when he was killed by a car bomb
that may or may not have been planted by Syrian agents.
33
however, and the military can and should cause pain”, says Albright (Albright 274). However,
U.S. military violence and Muslim casualties are used by Al Qaeda as a PR-tool to promote
Muslim martyrdom and to craft new fighters, while generating negative publicity against
America. Therefore, if America were to refrain from such actions Al Qaeda would lose,
however, that will not always be possible. The unavoidable dilemma in this case is, of course,
that while Albright does not want to fuel the fire, she does not want terrorism to grow either.
“I worry”, says Albright, “that our enemies will try, in the initial days of your
presidency, to show that they are still relevant and that the fight is still on” (Ibid. 273).
Therefore, what Albright suggests to the president is to keep them down by destroying
terrorist cells and by barring the creation of training grounds, where terrorists operate and
prepare. Likewise, he should prevent civilian deaths as much as possible, which Al Qaeda
will use as propaganda to tarnish America. Additionally, if the president’s words and actions
show that he is listening to others and actually cares about what others have to say, Albright
believes that the negative perceptions many people have of America will eventually change
for the better. If the president consistently maintains this approach, the current image of the
American Empire will eventually improve over time.
As Albright has mentioned before, it is vital for a president to be knowledgeable of a
country’s history as well as of social and cultural factors. In her view, Bush wrongly claimed
that every angry group of Muslims is a terrorist threat, and disregarded the fact that in many
cases, these groups (Al Qaeda, Taliban, followers of Sadam Hussein, mullahs in Iran,
Hezbollah and Hamas) are mortal enemies. Albright argues that Bush, thereby, missed the
opportunity of turning them against each other. Moreover, the next American president should
make unequivocally clear, that the U.S. is fighting terrorist rather than Muslim terrorism,
because terrorism is inherently un-Islamic. America’s enemy is Islam’s enemy too, argues
Albright, as Al Qaeda murders Muslims and perverts the Islamic faith. Other weak elements
are that it lacks an intelligible economic or political agenda and that its radical vision is too
narrow, thus, general support for its beliefs does not exist. In short, America needs to prevent
Al Quada from gaining ground by means of carefully aimed military actions as well as Public
Relations strategies to tackle their ideology, while presenting itself as a caring rather than
imperialistic power, backed by its international allies. “If Al Qaeda is exposed and isolated”,
says Albright, “it will cease to grow” and eventually fade away (Ibid. 275).
34
3.1.4 MULTILATERAL LEADERSHIP
The main point Albright appears to make is, that the future president can only restore
America’s reputation and leadership as the number one empire by means of multilateralism,
rather than George W. Bush’s unilateralism, from which America’s tarnished image stems.
America needs the support of its allies in order to be the kind of empire Albright aspires it to
be: the world’s leading superpower as well as a political and economic companion to other
countries, while representing and promoting the founding ideals on which America was built,
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, nowadays, more often referred to by using the terms
of freedom and democracy. However, according to Albright, “foreign policy is to persuade
others to do what we want or, better yet, to want what we want” (Albright 61). When
comparing American foreign politics to billiards, she also says that “[a]dherence to all rules
and courtesies is advised, but you always have the option—as in billiards—of bopping your
opponent over the head with a stick” (Ibid.). Moreover, Albright asserts that “we will not be
respected if we are always holding doors and saying, ‘after you’”, while claiming that
“leadership […] need not be overbearing or shrill [either]; better to be quietly persuasive,
firmly in the right, and fair” (Ibid. 293).
Forming a cooperative companionship seems to be difficult to combine with
America’s desire to be the number one empire, as the first notion is associated with
communication on equal footing and consensus, whereas the latter implies superiority over
other countries. This raises the question of how there can be actual equality and consensus,
when the U.S. is the most powerful and seeks to maintain its primacy. Wanting to be a leading
superpower means pursuing its own interests and persuading others to follow, which could
clash with the interests of other countries. This has happened in the past and will,
undoubtedly, be bound to happen in the future. Therefore, like Albright argues, it seems
crucial for America to adopt and maintain a multilateral approach, in the sense that it listens
to and respects other countries, and sincerely attempts to find mutual solutions to mutual
problems. When consensus seems unachievable, America should keep negotiating, instead of
forcing its will on others, as the possibility to dominate is never a prerogative to do so. In
addition, being the embodiment of the notions of freedom and democracy, while
simultaneously disregarding the Geneva Conventions, are two clashing images that creates the
impression that America is a hypocrite and untrustworthy leader. Moreover, selfishly chasing
one’s own interests might satisfy America’s desire on the short term, but will create long-term
difficulties, for this would jeopardise its relationship with its allies, on whom the U.S.
depends in order to maintain its position as the most powerful nation in the world.
35
3.2
DENNIS ROSS – STATECRAFT: AND HOW TO RESTORE
AMERICA’S STANDING IN THE WORLD (2007)
The title of Ross’ book reflects several parallels between his and Albright’s work, namely,
their possible common aim to apply for the then still available 2009 Secretary of State
opening, and their obvious goals to promote the Democratic agenda with an eye on the
presidential elections, and give their expert advice on how to rekindle America’s past glory
and properity as a superpower to whomever is interested in U.S. foreign politics, evidently
also including officials, such as the new president. 58 As both Ross and Albright are
Democrats and have worked for the Clinton administration, they share similar beliefs. In
order to provide a meaningful analysis, this chapter will rather concentrate on where Ross’
view deviates from that of Albright, and why this is significant to the discussion of the
American Empire.
Like Albright, Dennis Ross (1948) is experienced in the field of foreign affairs. He
served as the director for Middle East policy planning under President George H. W. Bush
and special Middle East coordinator under President Clinton. As envoy and chief negotiator,
Ross played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process.
Interestingly, Ross has worked closely with Albright and, like her, he currently teaches at
Georgetown University and serves as one of President Obama’s senior advisors on foreign
affairs. 59 In addition to being Ziegler distinguished fellow of (WINEP) Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, a pro-Israeli think tank, Ross is the chairman of a new Jerusalem-based
think tank, the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute. 60 His Jewish roots and ties have
raised questions on the fairness of his negotiations with regard to Palestine, yet, Ross’ articles
have been published by pro-Israel as well as pro-Palestinian sources. Likewise, some critics
were surprised to find, that Ross had become one of President Obama’s advisors, seeing that
he has cooperated with neoconservative organisations, such as PNAC and United against
Nuclear Iran, a diplomatic dichotomy reappearing in Statecraft. 61
Whereas Albright is more straight-forward and bold in her repeated attacks on Bush,
Ross tends to formulate his words more carefully, sometimes even implicitly. For example, he
says that “Bush […] knows how to speak to the American idiom in foreign policy—
something, not surprisingly, that gave his approach a ring of authenticity to many Americans”
58
Like Albright, he never refers to the United States as an empire or hegemony as that would be unpatriotic.
Massimo Calabresi, “Obama’s Conservative Mideast Pick”, Time, 16 July 2008,
<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1823145,00.html?xid=rss-topstories>.
60
“Dennis Ross”, Wikipedia, 8 November 2008, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Ross>.
61
PNAC (Project for the New American Century) is a neoconservative organisation that supports, for example,
the advancement of American primacy by means of greater militarisation.
59
36
(Ross 16). This sentence might be read as an objective analysis, but one could also say it
contains the implicit message, that Bush’s approach was not by any means sincere or candid.
More significantly, while Albright accuses the Bush II administration of being unilateralist,
Ross claims that “no administration is ever entirely unilateralist or multilateralist” (Ross 5).
He emphasizes that Bush recommended a multilateral approach for dealing with Iranian and
North-Korean nuclear programs, whereas Albright stresses Bush’s refusal to negotiate with
Iran, reflecting unilateralism. According to Ross, Bush tried to practise multilateralism, but
practiced it poorly and failed, which implies that the Bush administration intended to act
multilaterally. Albright rejects this view, as she claims that Bush never sought to pursue a
multilateral strategy, but had already decided to attack Iraq, regardless of U.N. views. If Bush
truly sought multilateral agreement, he would have made a real effort, argues Albright.
Remarkably, Ross considers Bush Jr. to be an idealistic Wilsonian, even though he
portrays Woodrow Wilson as his role model. 62 On the one hand, Bush’s policy indeed sought
to promote and spread American ideals, involving the idealistic notion that democratising Iraq
would, subsequently, lead to the democratisation of the rest of the Middle East. However,
Bush avoided engaging in collective international agreements, as he did not want American
power and sovereignty to be restrained. 63 Moreover, it could be said that a true idealist is
committed to certain values and principles. Many critics say that Bush hardly fits this image,
as it is commonly thought he had the calculated aim to first and foremost gain control and
power in the Middle East, rather than to nobly end tyrannical oppression in Iraq for the sake
of its people. Albright adds that although Democratic idealism was summoned to explain Iraq,
what led America there was incompetence, as “Bush overran the signposts commonly
associated with idealism—respect for international law, deference to the United Nations,
cooperation with allies, and attention to the principles of just war” (Albright 38, 39). Their
difference of opinion as to whether Bush is a Wilsonian set aside, both Albright and Ross
agree that the Bush administration has proven to have been incompetent.
3.2.1 STATECRAFT: NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION
According to Ross, what was fundamentally lacking in Bush’s policy was the understanding
of the essence of well-conducted statecraft, involving the adequate use of
the assets or the resources and tools (economic, military, intelligence, media), that a
state [possesses] to pursue its interests and to affect the behavior of others, whether
friendly or hostile. It involves making sound assessments and understanding where
62
63
Dennis Ross, Statecraft: and How to Restore America’s Standing in the World (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007): 14.
Ibid. 15.
37
and on what issues the state is being challenged and can counter a threat or create a
potential opportunity or take advantage of one. Statecraft requires good judgement in
the definition of one’s interests and a recognition of how to exercise hard military or
soft economic power to provide security […] of one’s citizens. (Ross p. x)
Ross focuses on the two most crucial instruments of statecraft to serve America’s national
security interests, both of which are means of soft power, namely, negotiation and mediation.
Given Ross’ experience as a negotiator in the Middle East conflict, it is not surprising that he
refers to the tool of negotiation as the prime tool for the conduct of foreign policy and for the
exercise of statecraft. He says that it can shape the right mind-set for carrying out statecraft,
and can resolve crises and avert or end wars, yet Bush used minimal diplomacy and
negotiation, because “conducting negotiations or a dialogue with certain adversaries has been
seen as legitimising them and weakening [the US]” (Ibid. 176).
Instead of telling or educating others on what is necessary, Ross prefers the method of
persuading rather than dictating, asserting it is imperative to realise that
negotiations are about mutual adjustment. […] Our values do not get in the way of
negotiations, but our self-image does. We see ourselves as selfless, as adopting
positions that represent only a higher good. American ‘exceptionalism’ is deeply
embedded in our national psyche […]. If we act only out of a higher purpose, how
easy is it to compromise with those who don’t ? (Ibid. 175)
In other words, for negotiations to be successful, the new administration should set is aim for
consensus and should reflect an open and respectful, rather than condescending attitude.
Likewise, mediation is an important tool of statecraft which, in Ross’ view, has been
underused, as only one case can be named where Bush mediated successfully, leading to the
end of the north-south conflict in Sudan. Mediation is vital, since it concerns using a
negotiation process to reconcile differences and conflicts between others by finding a solution
they cannot find themselves. It is cheaper than military intervention, can prevent bloodshed,
can build the legitimacy of American international intervention, hence, boost the image of the
American Empire. Generally, mediation can be effective only when each party realises it
cannot win, the costs of conflict are too high, and that the struggle should end. 64 Additionally,
Ross attempts to dispel the myth, that mediation requires strict neutrality. He argues, “for a
power such as the United States […], it is rare that we would have such distance from a
conflict that our interests between warring parties would be equal” (Ibid. 228). What really
matters, according to Ross, is being an effective broker in the sense, that (s)he can alter the
behaviour and meet the needs of both parties. Likewise, he rejects the commonly accepted
64
Ross, Statecraft, 223.
38
notion that mediators should keep emotional distance. On the contrary, “it is precisely their
passion that sustains them in the face of the inevitable difficulties”, says Ross, seeing that
passion produces perseverance, commitment and determination, which are essential in trying
to resolve a historic conflict with high stakes and deeply embedded grievances (Ross 230).
3.2.2 APPLYING STATECRAFT
With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Ross mentions certain measures that need to be
taken into account, which Albright does not. In addition to promoting calm, the three most
significant suggestions are, that Hamas has to cooperate actively with Fatah to pre-empt
attacks against Israelis; that international forces need to be brought into Gaza (rather than just
Israeli forces); and that there should come an end to the Israeli siege of Gaza by means of a
declaration or resolution by the UN Security Council, that “would mandate new peacekeeping responsibilities for the Palestinians and for the international forces there” (Ibid. 274).
Additionally, whereas Albright suggests a small supervisory Euro-Atlantic quartet, composed
of the U.S., and the three main European players (Merkel, Brown and Sarkozy), more
broadly, Ross refers to the U.S., the Europeans, the UN, and possibly the Russians as the chief
actors in a US-led mediation effort, focussed on mending the Middle East conflict.
What is remarkable is that although Ross believes Russia could play a role in forming
an international political block, he refrains from giving his advice on how the new
administration should approach Russia, while Albright on the other hand devotes an entire
chapter on U.S.-Russian relations. Ross is undoubtedly aware, that Russia is an important
player in global politics as a large country that possesses considerable amounts of gas and oil,
and is building its economic and military might with the aim to become a great empire once
again. Yet, by only mentioning Russia in historical perspective, he neglects to offer his view
on what America might expect from this country in the future, and what America’s response
should be. This gives off the impression that Ross does not consider Russia to be of enough
importance to American interests, a view Albright obviously disagrees with.
Furthermore, unlike Albright, Ross was a noted supporter of the Iraq war. After 9/11,
Ross supported the PNAC, which advocated overthrowing Saddam Hussein, even if he were
not tied to the terrorists. Ross was one of the political figures, who signed the PNAC-letter
“Statement on Post-War Iraq”, which was issued on the 19th of March 2003, the day before
the Iraq invasion. This letter states that the “successful disarming, rebuilding, and democratic
39
reform of Iraq can contribute decisively to the democratisation of the wider Middle East”. 65
He still agrees with the Iraq invasion, but rejected the way in which the Bush administration
executed the mission, telling the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July 2007:
The problem has been that the president […] presided over an administration that has
consistently sought to employ only minimalist means. Trying to get by on the cheap
has characterized the administration’s approach whether it was in Iraq or Afghanistan
or even on pushing a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 66
In his book, Ross explains Bush’s failure as a result of inadequate understanding of statecraft.
With regard to Iran, both Albright and Ross believe in the power of negotiation, yet,
do not exclude the possibility of war. In Statecraft, Ross considers war to be a final resort,
which should be used only after America has shown its people “and the world that we have
credibly exhausted all other means” (Ross 318). Yet, Ross appears to have become
increasingly aggressive on this issue, unlike Albright. For example, Ross participated in
WINEP’s Presidential Task Force on the Future of U.S.-Israel Relations, a study group which
composed the June 2008 report Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen U.S.-Israel
Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge. This report states that Iran “hovers above all
other items on the U.S.-Israel agenda” and that the next U.S. president should, therefore,
immediately set up a policy forum to discuss ways of compelling Iran to cease its nuclear
activities. 67 Ways of exercising influence would involve diplomatic engagement, political and
economic pressure, “coercive options (such as an embargo on Iran’s sale of oil or import of
refined petroleum products)”, and preventive military action as well. 68 The latter means to
compel Iran could be backlash in that it might lead to war and terrorist attacks.
Ross was also involved in producing the September 2008 report Meeting the
Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development, which was convened by the
Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC). This report asserts that the new U.S. president should
increase the country’s military presence in the Middle East, which would include “expanding
strategic partnerships with countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia in order to maintain
operational pressure from all directions”. 69 In addition, “if all other approaches—diplomatic,
65
“Statement on Post-War Iraq”, Project for the New American Century, 19 March 2008,
<http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-20030319.htm>.
66
“Beyond Iraq: Envisioning a New U.S. Policy in the Middle East”, Global Security.Org, 19 July 2007,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070719-ross.htm>.
67
“Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen U.S.-Israel Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge”,
The Presidential Task Force on the Future of U.S.-Israel Relations, June 2008,
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=293>, Download PDF-file.
68
Ibid.
69
Bipartisan Policy Center, Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development,
September 2008, <http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/8448>.
40
economic, financial, non-kinetic—fail”, the new President might seriously have to consider a
U.S. military strike, that would “have to target not only Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but also
its conventional military infrastructure in order to suppress an Iranian response”. 70 In short, if
Iran does not permanently abandon its nuclear program, war should follow.
Like Albright, Ross suggests not to underestimate China, and to keep a close eye on it.
Yet, whereas Albright focuses more on why China is no immediate danger, Ross discusses
how China might eventually threat U.S. interests. Thus, the two authors do not contradict one
another, but rather have different focal points. Ross claims that China is working to foster an
environment in Asia that promotes its interests and minimizes America’s, and that China is
aggressively reaching out to African countries, offering low-interest loans and grants totalling
several billion dollars. Hence, he believes America’s most fundamental aim should be to
ensure, that China seeks to counter the dangers of radical Islam, terrorism, environmental
degradation, energy shortages, global poverty, and crime in order to keep China in check. 71
This subsequently raises the question of how this objective can be realised.
“First, we must help make China an integral player in an open, stable international
system—meaning that it has stature, recognition, rights, but also responsibilities”, asserts
Ross (Ibid. 330). Statecraft must be designed to reassure the Chinese leaders, and to stress
mutual dependency. Therefore, he suggests establishing a common “agenda of issues—oil
access, radical Islam, the environment, the economy, and security—in bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms, […] gradually reducing the perceived need to hedge” (Ibid. 331). A
specific example of how this agenda could be effectuated is to bring China into the
International Energy Agency, involving multilateral agreements to minimise the danger of
potential oil supply disruption. While serving the needs of both parties, this act shows that
America does not seek to interfere with China’s access to oil. Ross presents multilateralism,
led by the U.S., as the solution “to mitigate the inherent mistrust, the points of friction, and
the naturally competitive instincts that otherwise may produce conflict”, thereby, further
legitimising U.S. presence in the East as well as America’s status as superpower (Ibid. 332).
In sum, Ross and Albright have corresponding visions of the American Empire in the
sense, that they both consider America to be a superpower and that it should continue to
pursue primacy for however long this is feasible. They also agree on vital matters, namely, the
need for multilateral diplomacy and the promotion of democracy by example, rather than by
force. However, this comparative analysis has also revealed several essential differences
70
71
Ibid.
Ross, Statecraft, 329.
41
between the two officials, involving their foreign policy strategies for the Middle East, Russia
and China. Since Obama enjoys the support of both Ross and Albright as two of his senior
advisors, it would be interesting to see if their views will appear in his foreign policy, and if
these plans will indeed help to restore the international reputation of the American Empire.
42
3.3
AMERICAN EMPIRE: A DEBATE (2007)
Like American primacy continuous to occupy the minds of politicians, so is it an ongoing
topic of debate in the academic arena. In American Empire: A Debate, the American
conservative academics Bradley A. Thayer and Christopher Layne engage in a debate about
whether America should pursue primacy. These realist theorists share a common interest in
American foreign policy and international relations, yet have clashing opinions on which
particular grand strategy would serve America’s interests best. Following the way the book
has been structured, first, Thayer’s case for American primacy will be examined, after which
Layne’s arguments against the American Empire will be explored.
Remarkably, in the preface, the writers tell the readers to decide for themselves, which
of the two grand strategies will best serve America’s interests, implying that specifically
Thayer’s and Layne’s perspectives are the only two grand strategies to choose from. 72 Rather,
as Albright, Ross and other theorists have shown, other adequate strategies or combinations of
existing strategies could also be implemented in the next president’s foreign policy. Whether
they said this to impress their readers and sell copies, or out of the mistaken assumption that
only they hold the key to America’s well-being, or both, their perspectives nevertheless form
an interesting contribution to the contemporary debate on the American Empire.
3.3.1 THAYER’S CASE FOR THE AMERICAN EMPIRE
Bradley Thayer is professor at the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies of Missouri
State University. As an international and national security affairs senior analyst, he has
written about wars and warfare, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and U.S. national security
policy. 73 In a nutshell, Thayer argues that America’s grand strategy should be to remain the
world’s superpower, because he reckons that maintaining primacy is the best way to
guarantee that America’s interests are protected and advanced. In order to remain world
leader, he suggests that America should use its military and economic hard power as well as
its ideological soft power in order to provide security abroad, which will also safeguard
America’s security at home. Thayer’s argument has been structured in three sections. First, he
provides background information, explaining why America is considered to be an empire;
second, he addresses the question of whether America can remain dominant in the world; and
third, whether it should strive to retain its prominent place in global politics.
72
Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer, American Empire: a Debate (New York: Routledge, 2007): preface p. x.
73
For further details on Thayer’s career, see “Professional Staff”, National Institute for Public Policy, 2006,
<http://www.nipp.org/thayer.php>.
43
GOD BLESS AMERICA
Like has been said when discussing Albright’s book, the negative connotation of the term
“empire” is confirmed by Thayer, when he says that “American leaders almost never use the
“E word” (Thayer 4). According to Thayer, using this term would generate resistance against
America, “and thus would ultimately be damaging to its continuation. Also, not mentioning
the word helps to ensure that U.S. political leaders are careful not to be “gratuitously arrogant
or boastful” (Ibid.). While he clearly discards boasting as damaging a person’s integrity,
Thayer himself engages in this kind of behaviour extensively. Though he does not brag about
his own accomplishments, he certainly takes his patriotic attitude to extremes, one might say,
to the extent of worship and, consequently, loses track of the point he seeks to make
sometimes, which is that America should maintain primacy. His patriotism also explains his
impulse to defend his country, which he does by portraying the U.S. as a victim of other
countries’ resentment and jealousy, since it is the world’s number one superpower. Yet, this
point of view seems to be too limited. To an extent, these sentiments might play a part in
conflicts between the U.S. and other nations, but to suggest that envy of its status as empire is
the principle reason of discord seems implausible. Rather, one might say that the way in
which America wields its power to advance its interests, as well as clashing interests might be
what gives rise to anger and frustration directed at the United States.
When reading Thayer’s overabundant praise of America, it seems he prefers to be
Alex in Wonderland, rather than provide a critical examination of America’s current state of
affairs. 74 For instance, when imagining America to be a person, Thayer names a number of
celebrities, such as Donald Trump accredited for his enormous wealth; Mike Tyson for his
ability to throw hard punches; George Clooney for his charisma and charm; and Britney
Spears for her many fans. Undoubtedly all of these people have positive qualities yet, perhaps
apart from Mr. Clooney, not all of them seem to be the right choice to portray America most
positively. Trump has filed for bankruptcy several times; Tyson showed disrespect for boxing
rules as well as his opponent when biting off his earlobe; and Britney Spears might still have
the support of her fans, but is generally known for her superficiality and low IQ. Although
Thayer emphasises these people’s positive qualities, the negative aspects which they are
known for will inevitably reflect on Thayer’s beloved American Empire as well. Therefore,
selecting this group of people to represent America does not seem to be a wise decision and,
moreover, does not give a professional impression either.
74
Reference to Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865), a novel written by the English author Charles
Lutwidge Dodgson, better known under the pseudonym Lewis Carroll.
44
Furthermore, whereas it is a fact that America still possesses superior military and
economic power, Thayer also claims that America is ideologically superior. Especially
considering the ongoing war in Iraq, which is generally considered to be illegitimate warfare,
claiming ideological superiority seems hardly appropriate. Throughout his writing, he mainly
focuses on the positive aspects of America’s history and its contemporary status without, for
example, mentioning its considerable financial deficit.75 In my view, in order to write a wellgrounded case, one also has to take possible counterarguments under consideration and
present arguments to debunk them. By neglecting to tackle arguments, which opposing
theorists might use to attack Thayer’s stance, one might say the author fails to build a strong
case. The impressive facts about America’s enormous power certainly underline that America
is an empire, yet do not provide the reader with new information, as it is a commonly known
fact that America is indeed a superpower. Moreover, by predominantly illustrating the sunny
side of America, Thayer neglects to provide a more complete and realistic account and,
thereby, does not seem to uphold the very realistic line of thought, which he claims to follow
as a supposedly realist theorist. On the positive side, however, one could argue that Thayer’s
writing adequately serves its function as an introductory chapter, as it provides historical
background information, which could be used as a stepping-stone towards better
comprehending the theories that will be discussed in Christopher Layne’s essay.
Thayer continuous his defence by claiming, that America is not an empire in the
traditional imperialistic sense of the term, in that it occupies others. While asserting the
United States’ supposed uniqueness, Thayer argues that the U.S. “is not interested in the
expansion of territorial control by conquering territory and imposing colonial rule. It is
interested in promoting the political and economic well-being of its allies” (Thayer 7). This
sounds most noble and although American colonial rule indeed seems to be a thing of the
past, America still seeks to increase its influence and power geographically, perhaps not
though colonialism, but rather by means of spreading culture, democracy, and free market
economics. Moreover, to suggest that America engages in this strategy to ensure the wellbeing of others seems too idyllic, and also contrasts with what Thayer claims to be the central
purpose of American grand strategy, namely to first and foremost ensure America’s interests.
He adds that the United States influences the foreign policies of other states, while leaving
domestic policies alone. Yet, this argument seems illogical, because introducing democracy
and free trade will inevitably affect a country’s foreign domestic policy as well.
75
Published in 2007, Thayer could not have accounted for the economic crisis of mid September 2008.
45
Moreover, when Thayer names territories that America has occupied in the past, he
only mentions examples of peaceful occupations, and asserts that America’s occupations were
short in comparison with the British and Roman empires, which occupied lands for hundreds
of years, thereby, seeking to portray America as a benign empire, rather than as the violent
empire America is commonly considered to be today. Additionally, Thayer emphasizes that
the American military has a “mini-State Department”, stressing that military force is not
America’s main tool to control other countries, drawing attention away from the current wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq (Thayer 5). Significantly, he later contradicts himself in another
boastful moment, saying that this particular department is in fact far from miniscule, given
that U.S. government “spends roughly $420 billion a year on defense” (Ibid. 14).
When explaining and possibly justifying America’s tendency towards attaining
primacy, Thayer refers to the American Revolution, which he refers to as the spirit of 1776.
He argues that the Founding Fathers envisioned the expansion of its territory as well as its
ideas, of which the latter still exists today. This spirit has left its mark on America
historically, culturally as well as financially. For example, Thayer invites the reader to have a
look at “the Great Seal of the United States on the back of the dollar bill. The mottos on the
seal of the United States are Annuit coeptis (God has blessed this undertaking) and Novus
Ordo Seculorum (A New Order for the Ages)” (Ibid. 11). In Thayer’s view, these phrases
truly capture the spirit of America’s founding and mission. Apparently, the ancient-old
notions of Providence and Manifest Destiny still affect contemporary academics’ beliefs and
opinions. However, whereas these terms mostly concerned territorial expansion, now, at least
according to Thayer, the American Empire mostly engages in ideological expansion abroad.
CAN AMERICA REMAIN AN EMPIRE?
Thayer claims America will remain world leader at least for the foreseeable future, namely the
next 30 to 40 years. However, he acknowledges that like any preceding empire, the American
Empire will eventually fall, as another hegemon will rise. Thayer subsequently presents the
reader with three variables on which the duration of the American Empire depends: “first, its
hard and soft power capabilities; second, the actions of other countries; and third, its will to
continue its empire” (Ibid. 12). The writer then proceeds by extensively describing American
hard power, involving its military supremacy and economic might. Thayer devotes many
pages to these two forms of hard power, presumably again out of patriotic sentiments.
When discussing the actions of other countries and specifically the threats that the
United States is now confronted with, he mentions China and the EU for they have the
46
potential economic power to supplant the U.S. Yet, remarkably enough, Thayer then goes on
to dismiss them as current threats, as it will take a long time for China to catch up on the U.S.
economically. China’s development is held back by its “one-child policy”, having led to the
considerable increase of the elderly population, as well as the imbalance between the sexes. 76
Thayer thinks the EU will not pose a threat, as its political values are largely those of the
United States. In addition, he presents three major socio-economical reasons why the EU
could not supplant the U.S.: first, the costs of expansion are too big; second, the EU is
prevented from being rich due to high government intervention policy (social safety net
costs); third, the aging EU workforce and the risks of Muslim immigration to EU identity. 77
Though Thayer’s assumption that China and the EU will not catch up on America as possible
candidates for empire any time soon indeed seems valid, by first calling China and the EU
current threats to American primacy to, subsequently, say America should not lose a night’s
sleep over it, at least not on the short term, is inconsistent and weakens his case.
The third threat that Thayer mentions is the eminent danger of Islam Fundamentalist
Terrorism. Like Albright, Thayer stresses that the War on Terror is at root a war of ideas, and
that this battle of ideas must be won by America. He claims America should extinguish all
known training camps from Germany to Kenya. Most terrorist organisations that have ever
existed have finally been defeated which is, so Thayer predicts, what is likely to happen to Al
Qaeda as well. 78 Thayer also says that the U.S. stands a good chance of winning this
ideological battle, since it has been successful in the past as well, such as during World War
Two and the Cold War. Yet, considering that Al Qaeda has an entirely different culturalhistorical background and pursues different objectives, to assume that the defeat of the nazi
and communist regimes will guarantee the defeat of Al Qaeda seems too optimistic.
Additionally, the writer says that Al Qaeda has vulnerabilities like any other terrorist
organisation, yet remarkably then fails to mention these vulnerabilities to, subsequently,
formulate a possible strategy to defeat them and protect America’s interests.
Although the media show disaster and bloodshed, Thayer is convinced that the war in
Iraq will one day be won, seeing that progress has been made: it has a government and a
constitution; its infrastructure is being rebuilt; America enjoys the support from much of the
Iraqi population; the insurgency is weakened; Iraqi military and police forces are getting
progressively better as they have learned much from U.S. military; and Iraq now has
76
Mostly among the poor agricultural population, boys are preferred over girls to perform hard physical labour.
Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer, American Empire, 34.
78
Ibid. 41.
77
47
intelligence forces to infiltrate the insurgency and fight it from within. Still, much has to be
done though, acknowledges Thayer. The Iraqi government still has to make many economic
and political reforms, and needs to root out existing corruption. Additionally, Thayer suggests
that the Iraqi military must maintain guerrilla tactics against insurgency by means of
“reconnaissance, infiltration, hit-and-run tactics, and surprise ambushes” (Thayer 114). The
government also has to make clear, that those in the guerrilla movement will be welcome if
they defect, and will not suffer repercussions. Importantly, the writer says that Americans
must realize that Iraq is no pawn, but rather a free and independent nation, despite many
Iraqis’ contrasting view. Thayer adds that if the transformation into a democracy turns out to
be unachievable, alternatively, the U.S. should settle for a pro-American Iraqi government,
yet does not suggest ways to realize this kind of government. 79 Considering the pace at which
socio-economic and political development is occurring, Thayer estimates it will take at least
13 years for the insurgency to have been defeated. Even if there had been no economic crisis,
his views seems too optimistic to be considered a feasible objective.
When addressing Layne’s point of view, which will follow directly after Thayer’s
case, Thayer seems to ridicule his colleague by undermining his masculinity as he claims, that
Layne favours a so-called defensive “Goldilocks” strategy of having just enough power, not
too little nor too much, rather than adopting an offensive strategy to obtain as much power as
America can (Ibid. 104). 80 Instead of letting events be shaped by other countries and waiting
for terrorists to come to the United States, Thayer wants to take the fight to the terrorists, and
wants the U.S. to be as powerful as it can be in order to exercise the most control in the world.
He says that “due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over,
to reassure its allies, and to dissuade states from challenging it. From this power also comes
respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times” (Thayer 105). The first
part of his claim seems reasonable, considering America’s technological and scientific
superiority, which people may well respect and admire. However, the last sentence appears to
be slightly over-romanticized, given that Bush’s foreign policy has led to considerable
resistance abroad as well as at home. Therefore, to imply that American power automatically
comes with respect and admiration, while ignoring prevalent criticism surrounding Iraq,
seems rather unrealistic. Moreover, respect is not gained unconditionally, but has to be earned
through good management of that power, at which Bush has obviously failed.
79
Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer, American Empire, 115.
Term coined by Richard J. Samuels in his article “Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy”, The Washington Quarterly
29.4 (2006): 111-127.
80
48
SHOULD AMERICA PURSUE PRIMACY?
Thayer believes America should definitely pursue primacy, seeing that U.S. power protects its
citizens and draws countries closer to the U.S. in wanting to be its ally, which further
increases America’s power and influence. He says that if someone doubts whether more
power is better, (s)he should “just ask the citizens of a country that had been conquered. […]
These countries would prefer to posses greater power to improve their security” (Thayer 105).
Yet, Thayer should then also ask the same question to all of the countries that America has
ever invaded. In many cases, their answers might contrast with Thayer’s positive assumption.
The writer also argues that by spending billions of dollars on defence, the U.S. is actually
doing other countries a favour, as they consequently can spend less money on defence,
knowing that America will provide military support if necessary. However, another reason
why other countries only spend a fraction of their budget on defence might be, that they
consider it more important to spend more on domestic issues, unlike America.
With America being World Empire, the writer argues it has done and could do more
good in the world in the sense, that America provides stability and order. Thayer says that if
America would cease being world leader, “arms races, vicious security competition, and wars
would result” (Ibid. 108). He adds that America is more powerful and more secure, than it
was during the Cold War. Seeing that America has more allies now than it had back then, this
seems to be a valid point. Yet, Thayer fails to debunk 9/11 as a counterargument. Apart from
the attack on Pearl Harbour, America has never experienced an attack on its citizens of such a
magnitude. Thayer proceeds by arguing that its considerable power also enables America to
keep China in check, as the writer assumes it has set its goal on eventually replacing America
as the world’s superpower. And with America as world leader, its democratic system could be
spread globally, involving more democratic countries on America’s side, which would entail a
reduced chance at international conflict. Thayer also claims that America’s primacy would
further increase economic prosperity in, for example, the Third World.
While he says that “states advance their self-interest” and that “self-interest is usually
intertwined with a humanitarian impulse”, paradoxically, Thayer describes the United States
as a noble and benign nation (Ibid. 108). For example, the writer argues that “when you
reflect on all the countries who have been hegemons, the U.S. is the most accommodating and
helpful the world has seen” (Ibid. 109). Thayer describes this is a most praiseworthy act, yet
to put this argument into context, there has never been wealthier hegemony, therefore, it is not
surprising that the U.S. has outspend previous hegemons. Thayer underscores America’s
giving nature by mentioning that, since the Cold War, America has engaged in over fifty
49
humanitarian operations worldwide. Though impressive, it does make one wonder where
Bush and his humanitarian aid were after Hurricane Katrina had destroyed thousands of
homes and left many Americans deprived and destitute. Thayer does, however, mention the
Darfur crisis involving a death rate of between 98,000 and 181,000 people to illustrate what
can happen if America does not intervene. He, thereby, emphasises the importance of having
America as the global power, while this example could simultaneously be seen as implicit
criticism on the Bush II administration, which neglected to provide (timely) aid. 81
Thayer ends his case by saying that “the key question for the future is not how
Muslims, Europeans, or others will perceive the American Empire. Rather, it is ‘How should
Americans want our empire to be remembered?’” (Thayer 47). In other words, whether
America will remain an empire lies in the hands of its citizens, and will be decided by how
they will direct America’s future. Indeed, it is largely up to America to decide how it will act
with regard to other countries, how it will shape its future, and how exactly it will formalize
its grand strategy to maintain global leadership. Importantly, however, other nations’ concerns
and interests should not be disregarded. Like Albright would argue, how others perceive the
American Empire is essential, as it stands stronger in the world by being able to rely on the
support of its international allies in its desire to maintain primacy.
3.3.2 LAYNE’S CASE AGAINST THE AMERICAN EMPIRE
In contrast to Thayer, Christopher Layne argues that pursuing primacy is not in America’s
best interest, and believes this grand strategy will eventually backlash, as it will lead to
domestic insecurity, rather than security. As a professor at Texas A&M University’s George
Bush School of Government and Public Service, Layne teaches international relations theory
and American foreign policy. 82 In American Empire, first, he places the debate about primacy
and empire in historical context and examines the theoretical foundations of current American
strategy. Second, Layne attempts to show why the pursuit of primacy is counterproductive for
the United States. Third, he examines the imperial component of American strategy, with
specific focus on the desire for regime change and democratic transformation abroad. While
discussing these main issues, Layne elaborates on the costs and drawbacks of American
hegemony to support his case against the American Empire.
81
U.S. troops were primarily concerned with the Iraq War, yet several critics claim that, since New Orleans is
predominantly populated by Afro-Americans, taking immediate action was not high on Bush’s priority list.
82
For further details concerning Layne’s career, see “Christopher Layne”, The Bush School of Government and
Public Service, 2007, <http://bush.tamu.edu/faculty/clayne/>.
50
SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Although many critics like Thayer as well as Layne consider America to be an empire, Layne
conveys that most Americans would not agree, for several reasons: first, because the United
States gained independence by rebelling against Britain’s imperial rule; second, since
Woodrow Wilson’s time, the U.S. has presented itself to the world as an opponent of
(European) imperialism and anti-colonialism; and third, Americans tend to think that empire
involves land-grabbing and flag-planting in overseas territories. Layne argues, however, that
from its inception, the United States has been a nation driven by imperial ambitions
and a corresponding sense of national mission. […] Until the war between the States,
America’s territorial expansion was confined to the North American continent and did
not take place overseas, which may explain why Americans tend not to think of this
period of U.S. history as an age of American imperialism. (Layne 59)
Moreover, Layne explains that one might say there are two kinds of imperialism: formal
imperialism involving the acquisition of colonies, and informal imperialism concerning an
empire’s use of its military and economic muscle (hard power), as well as its culture and
ideology (soft power) to create and maintain compliant or, better, friendly regimes in foreign
territories. America has mostly been associated with informal imperialism, specifically
involving free trade, democracy promotion, and regime change.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has dominated international politics,
and American primacy became a much-debated topic. 83 For the last fifteen years, whether
strategic primacy is beneficial for the U.S. has been a subject of debate. After 9/11, however,
the debate about primacy merged with another debate, as mostly neoconservatives urged the
U.S. to use its primacy to construct a new unipolar American Empire to stand stronger in the
world, facing terrorist threat. 84 According to Layne, the concepts of American primacy and
empire are based on two key propositions, derived from international relations theory:
that attaining, and keeping, overwhelming hard power—that is, primacy—is the
strategy best calculated to ensure U.S. security; and that the United States should
promote regime change abroad, because a world composed of democracies will be
more stable and peaceful than a world in which ‘rogue states’ are allowed to exist (a
proposition derived from so-called democratic peace theory). (Ibid. 53)
Layne regards the March 2003 invasion of Iraq as the first step towards democratic
transformation in the Middle East, as he explains that today’s American Empire distinguishes
itself “by its geographical focal point—the Middle East—and by its breathtaking ambition of
transforming the Islamic world” (Ibid. 60).
83
84
The Soviet Union collapsed between 1989 and 1991.
Unipolarity as opposed to multipolarity, an international system composed of three or more great powers.
51
Significantly, the writer stresses that the call for regime change and the promotion of
democracy abroad is not new in U.S. foreign policy, considering that they have been key
features of American policy since Woodrow Wilson’s time. More recently, the “enlargement”
of democracy was central to the Clinton administration’s grand strategy. Moreover, Bill
Clinton made it clear that the U.S. had the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of nondemocratic states, another parallel between his foreign policy and that of George W. Bush.
Whereas many people tend to regard Republican and Democratic policies as quite different
from one another, Bush as well as Clinton both had American primacy on their minds. More
importantly, Layne claims that America’s post-9/11 imperial Middle Eastern policy had
already been planned before the events of 9/11, as neoconservatives have always had “a long
track record of virulent, ideologically tinged hostility to Islamic fundamentalism” (Layne 60).
In his view, they used 9/11 as an opportunity to change their imperial views for the Middle
East into actual U.S. policy. “9/11 was both the catalyst, and the pretext, for the United States
to put this policy into effect”, claims Layne (Ibid. 61).
KEY THEORIES: OFFENSIVE VS. BALANCE OF POWER
According to the writer, realist theory concerning American foreign policy concerns the clash
of two contending visions of America’s proper role in the world. The first theory is called
“offensive realist” theory, which entails the notion that primacy provides security in other
countries as well as in America. Also, its overwhelming power serves to dissuade others from
challenging it, and alleviates uncertainty about other states’ intentions and about the present
and future distribution of power in the international system. Layne sums up this theory as the
belief, that “a great power should grab all the power it can get” (Ibid. 62). From his choice of
words, one can conclude that Layne definitely does not prefer this first vision.
He rather appears to favour the second theory, which strongly contrasts with the first
and is called “balance of power realism”, involving the preference for a policy of restraint in
American foreign affairs (Ibid. 63). The argument behind this theory is, that if one state
becomes too powerful, it threatens the security of other states. Other great powers will,
consequently, react to this by increasing their military capabilities (internal balancing) and/or
enter into alliances with other great powers (external balancing) to stop it, which Layne calls a
“global geopolitical backlash” (Ibid. 52). Obviously, 9/11 could be seen as an example of this
kind of backlash. Therefore, Layne argues that as long as the U.S. uses its global primacy to
impose its ideology, it will remain the target of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.
52
Moreover, the writer argues against America’s supposed need to pursue global
primacy in order to gain security, as he claims that it already is secure. The U.S. has a
convenient geographical position, being safely separated from others by two oceans, having
weak neighbours, as well as significant military power. Others who argue in favour of
primacy say no other states could surpass the U.S., and that they have no need to compete,
because they do not perceive American primacy as threatening. Layne disagrees given that
history shows that primacy always ends up in ruins. Leading primacists acknowledge that, at
best, American primacy will not last much beyond 2030. Competitors are already emerging,
such as China, the EU, Russia, and India. Also, Layne asserts that U.S. ability to reassure
others of its benevolence is limited by its enormous power, as some states will eventually
believe that they are harassed by America. Therefore, Layne argues that “the real issue is not
if American primacy will end, but how soon it will end” (Layne 64).
OFFSHORE BALANCING CHINA
With specific regard to China, Layne predicts that if America maintains the course of
primacy, it will inevitably clash with China, because this country will most likely refuse to
accept domestic political liberalisation or American primacy. He assumes the U.S. will use its
hard power to remain an empire and prevent China from emerging as a great power.
Considering that China wants to be reunited with Taiwan, while Taiwan desires to be
independent, the U.S. could use Taiwan as an excuse to take on China in a preventive war.
Layne argues, that “beyond the arguments that Chinese military action against Taiwan would
undermine U.S. interests in a stable world order and constitute ‘aggression’, ideological
antipathy toward China and support for a democratising Taiwan would be powerful incentives
for American intervention” (Ibid. 75). Apart from preventive war, Layne believes there is no
other way to prevent China’s rise as a major power; it can only slow China down.
Instead, America should stop imposing economic interdependence and free trade, as
this will only accelerate the pace of China’s growth. The U.S. must rather reduce China’s
export surplus to deprive it of hard-currency reserves that Beijing uses to import high
technology and to invest in building up its economic and technological infrastructure
(which, in turn, contributes to the modernization of China’s military). Washington also
should tightly regulate the direct outflow of critical advanced technology from the
U.S. to China in the form of licensing, offset, or joint venture agreements. (Ibid. 74)
In addition to China’s rejection of economic interdependence and free trade, Layne also
refutes the likelihood that democracy will successfully be exported, for China would never
embrace a democratic governmental system. Instead, Layne recommends the adoption of an
offshore balancing strategy as the key component of a new geopolitical approach. He explains
53
that under this approach, a regional East Asian power balance would become America’s first
line of defence against China. Seeing that this country threatens its neighbours (Japan, Russia,
India) far more than it threatens the U.S., these nations should bear the responsibility of
balancing against Chinese power in order to prevent Beijing from dominating East Asia.
RATIONALISING IRAN
According to Layne, the same neoconservatives who conjured war with Iraq are pushing for
war with Iran. Their concerns are that if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, three bad scenarios
could happen: it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; it might supply nuclear
weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in
the region or to engage in aggression. Layne dismisses all three scenarios, as he claims that
the three countries that might be a threat to the United States are, in fact, not. Egypt would not
try to obtain nuclear weapons, because it depends on America’s economic assistance; Saudi
Arabia is not likely to find WMD on the black market, as this market is under US
surveillance; and Turkey is constrained by NATO-membership and its quest to EUmembership. In addition, if Iran were to supply weapons to terrorists or intimidate its
neighbours, it would run the risk of annihilation by an American retaliatory strike. Iran would
not endanger itself, for it desperately wants to secure the survival of its regime, argues Layne.
Furthermore, Layne considers it unlikely that the U.S. will declare war on Iran, since it
cannot pinpoint all of Tehran’s nuclear facilities and, thus, cannot destroy it or inflict longterm disruption. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons. Bombing Iran would also make the situation in Iraq more difficult, since Iran has an
alliance with the Shiites. Additionally, an attack would meet with strong international
resistance from Russia, China, and Europe, and make the Persian Gulf and Middle East even
more unstable. Hence, what Layne suggests is that “rather than preventive war and regime
change, the best policies for the United States with respect to Iran are the tried and true ones
of containment, deterrence, and diplomatic engagement” (Layne 82).
IRAQ
Similar to Albright, Layne calls the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq “The most
damning indictment of American Empire” (Ibid. 83). According to the writer, the
neoconservative Bush II administration regards the democratic transformation of the Middle
East as the way to exterminate Islamic extremism and terrorism, as Bush believed that a
democratic Iraq will trigger a process of democratization in the region. Yet, Layne claims that
the American intelligence services concluded, that the U.S. policy of containing and deterring
54
Saddam Hussein was working; that there was no link between Saddam and 9/11; and that he
did not posess WMD. 85 Layne says that if the Bush administration had allowed the UN
weapons inspectors more time to complete their task, it would have been evident that Iraq had
no WMD capabilities.
While Bush assumed the Iraq war to be short and effective, Layne argues that Bush
should have known better for at least three reasons: the use of military force by outside
powers to impose democracy rarely works; military occupations seldom are successful; and
the preconditions for a successful democratic transformation did not exist in Iraq. 86 Layne
asserts that the desire for democracy should come from within the state making the transition
smooth, rather than being imposed by an outside power. He proceeds by addressing the
widespread agreement, concerning the factors that conduce successful democratic transitions.
These include a modern market-based economy; absence of hostility between ethnic
or religious groups; a political culture that is hospitable to democracy; and a vibrant
civil society. Another important factor is the capacity of state institutions to perform
their tasks effectively. Iraq met none of these criteria. (Layne 92)
Layne subsequently criticizes the Bush administration for having had no understanding of the
issues and challenges involved in democratic transformations. He argues that if it did, it
would have realized that Iraq was an unsuitable candidate for democratization, and that
America’s power to bring about region-wide democratic transformation was an unattainable
objective. If the Bush administration had based performed careful study of democratic
transitions generally, and Iraqi history specifically, they would have known this. “Instead,
they led the United States into the geopolitical quicksand of Iraq”, says Layne (Ibid. 93).
ECONOMICS AND EMPIRE
Though many people have claimed that they had not anticipated an economic crisis, it appears
that Layne did foresee recession. In order to be a successful empire, Layne claims that
America needs to find the right balance between security and economic stability, which is not
the case now. Whereas Thayer argues that America is a strong economic power, Layne points
at various problems the American economy faces. Layne refers to Paul Kennedy’s book, The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), which ignited a major debate involving the
sustainability of American primacy. Now, it seems that the problems America was facing in
the eighties have re-emerged. “Once again”, claims the writer, “the United States is running
endless federal budget deficits, and the trade deficit has grown worse and worse” (Layne 123).
85
86
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer, American Empire, 91.
55
He explains that the U.S. still depends on capital inflows from abroad, with China fast
replacing Japan as America’s most important creditor “to finance its deficit spending, finance
private consumption, and maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic
system’s reserve currency” (Layne 123). As the U.S. borrows more and more to finance its
budget and trade deficits, private investment is likely to be crowded out of the marketplace,
affecting the economy’s long-term health. Excessive defence spending squeezes on federal
spending and, thereby, on the quality of domestic programs, such as: health care, education,
infrastructure and research, “which are all crucial to keeping the Unites States competitive in
the international economy”, argues Layne (Ibid. 124). Like has been repeatedly since the
economic crisis, Layne argues that America cannot continue to live beyond its means.
Now that America is in recession, of course, it also needs to keep the skyrocketing
costs of the Iraq quagmire in check by ended the Iraq occupation as quickly and efficiently as
possible. However, if America wants to stay on top, it needs to get its economy back on track
in order to be able to afford the expansion of its military, which Layne argues it will need in
order to meet likely future commitments, possibly involving conflicts with North Korea, Iran,
and China. The situation could get worse, as Layne claims there are signs that indicate that
“OPEC may start pricing oil in euros and that the dollar could be supplanted by the euro as
the international economy’s reserve currency” (Ibid. 123). If this happens, the U.S. could not
afford to remain an empire. Layne concludes that, at some point in the future, American
primacy will come to an end because of its consistent economic decline. On the short term,
however, America could prolong its primacy on the condition that America is willing to pay
higher taxes, reduce consumption, and cut back on defence. However, this does not seem to
be a realistic probability, since most Americans resent paying taxes, high consumption is
economically and culturally rooted, and a high defence budget is considered necessary, given
America’s international commitments, such as the ongoing war in Iraq.
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF EMPIRE
In his 2005 Inaugural Address, Bush George W. Bush declared “The best hope for peace in
our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world”. 87 Yet, Layne claims that “an imperial
foreign policy is antithetical to the flourishing of democracy and liberty here in the United
States”, given that Bush disrespects the Constitution, domestic and international law, and civil
liberties (Layne 126). He mentions several examples of civil rights violations, such as the
87
“President Sworn-In to Second Term”, White House, 20 January 2005,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html>.
56
reinstated NSA (National Security Agency) to eavesdrop on telephone calls and email traffic
inside the U.S., on which no judicial oversight rests and, thus, cannot be held accountable.
Another instance involves The Patriot Act, under which the Bush administration uses
so-called National Security Letters in order to secretly survey and gather information of U.S.
residents and visitors, who are not alleged to be terrorists or spies. Again, this measure is not
accounted for by law as The Patriot Act prohibits the addressee from disclosing to anyone it
was received or from contacting a lawyer and challenging the letter’s legality.
The FBI uses national security letters to obtain the very kinds of information about
citizens’ lives that historically has been protected by the Fourth Amendment’s
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, including phone records,
correspondence, financial information and even the books a citizen checks out from
the library, or the movies a citizen rents from a video store. (Layne 127)
Layne adds that real conservatives (supposedly such as himself, and unlike Bush) know that
this kind of power puts civil liberties at risk. More importantly, however, he attacks Bush for
dragging one of the most vital principles of America through the mud, namely democracy. 88
The writer also discusses the Bush administration’s rights violations of “enemy
combatants” in internment facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq,
and the Bagram air base in Afghanistan. The detainees fall entirely outside of the U.S. law
system as well as outside the purview of the Geneva Conventions. The U.S. is not required to
charge them with a crime, afford them legal counsel, or bring them to trail. In addition, Layne
claims that the Bush administration has intentionally structured its policies to allow the torture
of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. Likewise, he believes Bush has authorized the use of hardcore torture by assigning the CIA to establish secret prisons abroad, and to hand over
prisoners to countries “where interrogation techniques are not limited by legal niceties” (Ibid.
128). Hence, Layne accuses Bush of having tarnished the image of the Empire.
To mobilize support for its policies, Layne claims that a climate of fear has been
created to convince America, that spreading democracy globally is the only way of preserving
the nation’s security. It also manipulates society by shaping public opinion, called “perception
management”, a fancy term for sophisticated lying, says Layne (Ibid. 129). Examples of this
kind of manipulation involve the claim that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction
and that he was (partly) responsible for 9/11. Layne, therefore, concludes that the assumed
openness of American democracy, as well as the notion that policy-makers can be held
88
In 2008, Congress considered proposals to restrict the FBI’s freedom to perform investigations by, for example, requiring
that the FBI destroys information that has been illegally obtained; and to allow the recipient of a letter to file a civil lawsuit if
the missive is found to be illegal or without sufficient factual justification. Source: Carrie Johnson, “Lawmakers Want FBI
Access to Data Curbed”, 15 April 2008, The Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/04/14/AR2008041402664_pf.html>.
57
accountable for their actions appear to be nothing more than a sham, under Bush’s rule. He
suggests that America should abandon its imperial policy of promoting democracy abroad
and, instead, direct its attention to practicing democracy at home in the United States.
TOWARDS A NEW GRAND STRATEGY
In order to add authority and value to his grand strategy, Layne refers to prominent American
foreign policy thinkers, such as Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, and Waltz, and claims that
all of these realist thinkers acknowledged, “that power has both a seductive and corrupting
effect on those who wield it—even the United States” (Layne 131). These prominent theorists
all have underlined the dangers of American primacy and have suggested, that the U.S. should
rather pursue a grand strategy of prudence and self-restraint. Layne believes that primacy
leads to a crusading mentality and self-righteousness, that America should rather try to avoid.
The writer also directs his criticism specifically at Wilsonianism (or American
liberalism), the foundation upon which the new American Empire is built. In his view, this
ideology is based on the fear that unless America can remake the world in its own ideological
image, it “might have to accept curtailed political liberties and economic regimentation at
home in order to ensure its security in an ideologically hostile world” (Ibid. 133). While
Wilsonianism is commonly associated with an ideology of tolerance, it actually aims to
eliminate other ideologies and worldviews by supplanting them with American democracy
and economic prosperity. Moreover, by labelling other regimes as outposts of tyranny or
member of an axis of evil, such states naturally fear for their lives and, thus, resort to
acquiring WMD capabilities and supporting terrorism. Wilsonianism leads to confrontation
and antagonism, as it separates supposedly “good” states from “evil” states. In fact, argues
Layne, it has changed the U.S. into the very “national security state”, as it was called during
Cold War, that the grand strategy of becoming World Empire was supposed to prevent.
Prudence and self-restraint is what Layne recommends to the U.S. government if it
wants to avoid primacy’s negative geopolitical and domestic consequences. In short, he
proposes two possibilities to constrain America: ideally, a roughly equal distribution of power
internationally; and more realistically, a changed domestic political system that will prevent
dangerous and unnecessary military interventions abroad. Layne claims that self-restraint can
be developed only, if at all, by engaging in an intellectual debate about the consequences of
primacy and empire and about America’s strategic options, and only if that debate carries over
into the public policy arena. Layne hopes that a new generation of realists will make the case
against the American Empire and its dangers, as well as for a new U.S. grand strategy.
58
3.3.3
THAYER VS. LAYNE
Both Thayer and Layne agree that America is an empire, but whereas Thayer means this in
the patriotic sense of the word, Layne uses this term to stress America’s perceived oppressive
regime towards other countries. Both writers also believe that America is no longer an empire
in the traditional imperialistic sense of the word. It has engaged in colonial expansion in the
past, a method of spreading American power and influence, which has been exchanged for the
expansion of American ideology, economic interdependence and cultural influence. Yet,
whereas Thayer believes America should pursue primacy for however long this is possible,
Layne holds the view that this strategy will rather damage American interests and American
should, therefore, adopt a Jeffersonian off-shore balancing strategy.
The main difference between Thayer and Layne’s approach in defending their cases
involves realism. Although both writers claim to be realists, Thayer appears to be incapable of
upholding this approach, given his overenthusiastic patriotic attitude. His devotion seems to
blind him from making a solid case in favour of maintaining and advancing primacy, which
also reduces his objectivity and credibility as an academic. He extensively elaborates more on
why America has been and still is a great empire, rather than on why it would be in America’s
best interest to continue its pursuit of primacy. Additionally, he neglects to address criticism
surrounding Bush’s pursuit of power, giving the impression that he is commited to Bush and
his principly Jacksonian foreign policy. Though this is his fullest right, a professional critic
usually gives an analysis by weighing both pros and cons, and by argumentatively defending
one’s view and debunking counterarguments, rather than leaving them undiscussed.
In contrast, Layne has a more critical approach, supported by well-founded arguments.
Yet, what is remarkable is that despite Layne’s critique on Wilsonians, several of his views
correspond to those of Albright and Ross, in that, all of the three critics denounce the Bush
administration and its policies, and largely agree on how to address Iraq and Iran. The only
policy aspect where the three authors do not appear to see eye to eye is Albright and Ross’
Wilsonian belief in the importance of promoting American ideology across the globe, such as
freedom, democracy and free trade. Layne would prefer it if America kept its principles to
itself, as this might lead to conflict with other nations. To conclude, one might say that
although Layne appears to have built a stronger case, both writers convey two contemporary
and representative strategies in the ongoing debate on the American Empire. Though other
academics may complement the debate with additional theories and suggestions, ultimately,
the course on which the American Empire will be headed lies in the hands of the next
president and will be determined by what kind of grand strategy he has to offer the world.
59
3.4
SIMON BROMLEY - AMERICAN POWER AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
INTERNATIONAL ORDER (2008)
Whereas many European critics oppose American supremacy, Simon Bromley, professor in
Politics and International Studies in the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Open University in
Milton Keynes (UK), appears to support it. Giving America advice on how to maintain its
superior position, and expressing his admiration for the chief architect and beneficiary of the
liberal capitalist international economic order, he has a positive view of American primacy.
His admiration for the U.S. as the founder of capitalism probably stems from his interest in
economics, having published on the economy of the international oil industry, globalization
and international economic governance, as well as on U.S. power in international politics.89
3.4.1 THEORIZING THE EMPIRE
When defining the American Empire, Bromley first appears to put America in historical
perspective by comparing it to the British Empire and using Niall Ferguson’s Colossus
(2004). Ferguson claimed that there are three essential deficits, clarifying why the U.S. has
been a weaker empire than its British predecessor, namely because of its economic deficit not
due to military spending, but to Medicare/Medicaid and Social Security; its manpower deficit,
because the Pentagon does not engage in “nation-building”; and attention deficit (e.g.
allowing Pakistan to install the Taliban). 90 These are flaws that the British Empire apparently
did not have, according to Ferguson. Subsequently, Bromley draws on Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri’s Empire (2000), saying that “[e]mpire establishes no territorial centre of
power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers” and that American “power resides
ultimately in the multitude” (Ibid. 54). Bromley adds Guy Debord’s theory, that it rather is
“an integrated and diffuse apparatus of images and ideas that produces and regulates public
discourse and opinion” (Ibid.). 91 Combining these views, Bromley says that the American
Empire is a hierarchy of power within the capitalist world, which relies on the rest of the
capitalist world, rather than on its own imperialistic spread of power by annexing territory.
Thus, the Empire is an essentially deterritorialized field of economic and cultural
relationships, as its economic and cultural power is more pervasive than its political influence.
Three matters need to be addressed here. Although Bromley refers to America’s
superior military power in subsequent chapters, remarkably, when defining the concept of
American Empire he neglects to mention its considerable military strength, which evidently
89
“Dr Simon Bromley”, The Open University, <http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/staff/peopleprofile.php?name=Simon_Bromley>.
90
Simon Bromley, American Power and the Prospects for International Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008) 49.
91
Guy Ernest Debord (1931-1994) was a French Marxist theorist, writer, and filmmaker.
60
has played a major role in the rise of the Empire as well as in its current status in global
politics. For example, Bromley mentions Chomsky’s view in Hegemony or Survival (2003),
in which Chomsky argues that the primary principle of U.S. foreign policy, rooted in
Wilsonian idealism and carried over from Clinton to Bush II, is America’s perceived mission
to perpetuate its own world dominance, based on the imperative of military supremacy. 92 Yet,
Bromley does not clearly say whether he agrees with Chomsky, though U.S. military might
has clear been a chief feature characterizing America, due to the wars in the Middle East.
Secondly, Bromley claims that America exercises the most influence economically
and culturally, yet describing its political influence as both exterior and inferior to its
economic and cultural power. However, one could argue against this view, as America’s
political, economic and cultural powers appear to be intrinsically linked. One might say that
the values and principles on which American politics are based also influence and shape
America’s liberal economy (free-trade), and cultural messages (i.e. Nike’s slogan “Just Do
It”, reflecting America’s entrepreneurial spirit), considering that the essential notions of, for
instance, freedom and democracy appear to be part of the essence of all of the three ways in
which American power operates within and beyond U.S. territory.
Finally, the third matter involves Bromley’s view, that part of what makes America an
empire is its enormous economic power. Though the United States was not yet officially in
recession, at the time of writing the book, America’s economic power had already been
steadily declining for a while. According to Bromley, the problem the American Empire faces
is the incongruity between its great military might and declining economic power, which
consequently limits its political control. In this light, Bromley explores a range of challenges
to U.S. dominance in American Power and the Prospects for International Order, while
chiefly concentrating on the geo-politics of oil, the weakening of the dollar, and the rapid
growth and industrialization of China. 93
3.4.2 OIL DEPENDENCY
When discussing American power, the United States’ attempt to control world oil is often
believed to be a key issue. Significantly, Bromley argues that the scarcity of oil is not of
serious concern for the near or far future, as long as there are substitutes for the secondary
energy it produces. In Bromley’s view, the alternatives are not that costly and could be made
available in a matter of several decades. Therefore, engaging in a war with the aim of gaining
further control of oil supplies is not necessary. The real danger for the world economy, so he
92
93
Bromley, American Power, 62.
Bromley’s book was published on the 24th of June 2008, so before the economic crisis of mid-September.
61
says, is not that oil resources will be exhausted any time soon, nor the technically viable
substitutes, but that the international oil and energy industries make a smooth transition
beyond oil more complicated than it need be. In other words, oil and energy companies might
view alternatives to be a threat to their business and might, therefore, obstruct the transition
process. Bromley believes that substitution will take place only if there is a sustained period
of higher-priced oil in order to make alternatives economically attractive.
Bromley refers to studies that show that currently available technology can produce
the energy an expanding world economy needs for the next century, and that technologies
exist to effectuate a steady transition to a predominantly electricity- and hydrogen-based use
of secondary energy. Apparently, this could be done at a cost roughly comparable to oil at
$40-50 per barrel in 2004/5 prices, that is, substantially lower than the price the world
economy was bearing in 2006/7. 94 Bromley views the future quite optimistically as he says,
that if the world economy begins to run out of oil, there are plenty of alternative substitutes,
money will be made in developing alternatives, and capital accretion and innovation will
move forward to new sources of energy.
3.4.3 THE DOLLAR’S FUTURE AND THE CHALLENGE OF CHINA
Written before the economic crisis of mid-September 2008, his views still bear relevance to
the debate on the future of the American Empire. Bromley argues that the ability of the
American authorities to control the future of the dollar on a unilateral basis is now greatly
decreased. The rise of the Euro, and the EU’s progressing monetary and financial integration,
as well as the surpluses of emerging Asia constrain U.S. ability to exploit the dollar.
Therefore, in order to sustain the dollar’s international role, the United States will have to
cooperate with others, suggests the writer. Here, his perspective corresponds particularly to
those of Albright and Ross, who advocate multilateralism as the key approach in maintaining
American primacy. However, whereas Albright and Ross do not take into acccount the fall of
the Empire as an eventual likelihood, Bromley does.
In order to prolong or even maintain primacy, leading American realist analysts have
advised the U.S. to abandon its economic engagement with China and adopt a policy of
containment intended to prevent China from toppling America as the world’s prime
superpower. The notion of containment, evidently, reminds one of the Cold War and the
competitiveness between the U.S. and Russia. Yet, the essential difference is that whereas the
U.S. restrained Soviet power, because it sought to overthrow an international capitalist
94
Bromley, American Power and the Prospects for International Order, 146.
62
economic order, China wants to join it. Bromley argues against containment and claims it is
pointless to pursue containment of China or to pursue zero-sum (or negative-sum) rivalry
against it, given the emergence of industrial capitalism in Asia and wider Asian geopolitics. 95
Assisting the rise of China’s economic power will bring changes and challenges, but
confrontation with or retreat from Asia, would only damage U.S. interests, argues the writer.
Though the U.S. is no longer the only major power economically, but rather part of the
“economic multi-polarity” as Bromley calls it, militarily, the U.S. remains an unrivalled giant.
Despite its great military strength, war as a means to compel China and Russia is not feasible.
Outside of deterioration of inter-capitalist relations, another argument that he raises is that
[s]eeking military primacy over a range of powers – Western Europe, Russia, China,
India, etc – when the strategic alignments among them are varied and changeable, and
when all are part of a world market that can only be governed by common enterprise,
does not translate into political leadership. (Bromley 200)
In other words, if United States military power is not based on collective interest and is
regarded as serving U.S. self-interest alone, then it will cease to bring forth the consensual
leadership it requires. U.S. leadership constitutes commitment to maintaining stability in
Europe and Asia, which has to accommodate the interests of the U.S., Europe as well as Asia.
Moreover, Bromley points out that states will only engage in mutually beneficial cooperation
if the distribution of the resulting gains does not adversely affect the states concerned.
3.4.4 OFF-SHORE MULTI-POLARITY AND SELF-RESTRAINT
By drawing on a few theorists, whose perspectives align with his, Bromley gives his view on
American supremacy. Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that the long-term strategic alternatives for
America are “either to engage in a gradual, carefully managed transformation of its own
supremacy into a self-sustaining international system, or to rely primarily on its national
power to insulate itself from the international anarchy that would follow a disengagement”
(Ibid. 202). 96 In other words, the U.S. should either give up supremacy and gradually merge
into the international system as a more or less equal participant, or withdraw from
international affairs as much as possible by focussing predominantly on the U.S. itself, either
way excluding the possibility that America will be able to maintain its superior position in the
long run. Brzezinski’s words imply a preference for the first option, which links up with G.
John Ikenberry’s theory, that “order itself – built on the complex fusion of capitalist and
95
In economic theory, zero-sum describes a situation in which a participant’s gain or loss is exactly balanced by
the losses or gains of the other participant(s).
96
Polish-American political scientist and statesman who served as U.S. National Security Advisor to President
Jimmy Carter (1977-1981). He currently is professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University’s
School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
63
democratic systems that cut across the advanced industrial world – is no longer supported by
American power and leadership alone” (Bromley 203). 97 Bromley agrees with Ikenberry in
the sense, that he considers the 21st century to be an era of global empire, where there
essentially is no American Empire, but rather an empire of capitalist democracy, a reality to
which America must adjust. Bromley points out that in the following decades the key to
America’s hierarchal position will be determined by how the it seeks to manage the tensions
between economic multi-polarity and military uni-polarity, and that this will be as much
determined by domestic American politics as by the actions of powerful actors in the rest of
the world.
Furthermore, China and Russia are dependent on world markets, as they will gain/lose
from increased/diminished economic integration. However, there is no guarantee that a steady
expansion of capitalist democracy will occur. Rival forms of capitalist development, conflicts
between liberal and authoritarian political forms, and geopolitical differences are possible. In
addressing rivalry and America’s rank within international competition, Bromley agrees with
Stephen Walt, professor of International Affairs at Harvard University, that the key aim for
the U.S. is to adopt an off-shore balancing role in order to stop other powers individually or
collectively from balancing against the it, thereby, preserving American primacy, a view
corresponding with Christopher Layne’s perspective (previous chapter). At least for the
foreseeable future, Bromley believes it is likely that the United States will exercise its
political influence to prevent mutually damaging economic rivalries from developing.
While this off-shore balancing system has been designed to secure American interests,
it has equally served the interests of other powerful players, argues the writer. With the rise of
other powers, the United States will increasingly lose the ability to make unilateral decisions.
Becoming more dependent on other countries, the U.S. will need to coordinate more with the
leading capitalist powers in the rest of the world. The United States still has a greater ability
to determine the nature of this coordination than others, but it nonetheless presupposes
collective benefits. However, there are no guarantees that common interests will be realized,
as the project of a liberal capitalist international order does not eliminate uneven distribution
of power among the major political players. In Bromley’s view, American liberal capitalism
seeks to empower civilians and the economy on a worldwide basis. More specifically,
[i]t is an attempt to manage or mitigate questions of geopolitics and coercive power by
subordinating as much of state activity and inter-state relations as is possible to the
97
Professor of Politics and International Affairs and U.S. Foreign Policy at Princeton University.
64
‘laws’ of the market and the rights of property, on the assumption that, au fond, these
laws serve the mutual interest. (Ibid. 206)
However, the paradox of U.S. power is, that its economic strategy is now part of a multi-polar
world, while its military policies are still aimed at supremacy and unilateral action.
Thus far, Bromley claims that active balancing against the United States is not yet
occurring, yet there are real indications of soft balancing, which is defined by Stephen Walt as
follows: soft balancing “does not seek or expect to alter the overall distribution of capabilities.
Instead, soft balancing is the conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain
outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences” (Bromley 206). Examples of soft balancing are the
actions of France; Germany and Russia resisting Iraq’s weapons program; and diplomatic
engagements between Russia and China, Russia and Iran, and China and Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, Asia is emerging where U.S. power is not entirely institutionalised, and terrorism
as well as nuclear proliferation are still real threats. Hence, the world as well as America’s
primacy face a series of challenges, making the prospects for a stable future uncertain.
As Iraq has shown, American militarism is not the answer. In his view, U.S. military
pre-eminence can only be effectively part of political leadership, when it advances the
interests of an expanding, liberal capitalist economic order. United States military power can
be exercised unilaterally in certain circumstances, argues Bromley, but it will only contribute
to U.S. hegemonic leadership when it addresses the common interests of dominant capitalistic
centres and their international economic relationships. Again, although the term is not literally
mentioned, multilateralism plays an essential role, yet Bromley keeps open the possibility for
unilateral military action, if necessary. Given that the U.S. will likely continue to pursue
military supremacy, the United States will need to exercise self-restraint. If the U.S. learns to
restrain itself consistently, conditional on the similar restraint of other countries, it is likely to
achieve far more for its own interests, than if it pushes others into opposing positions.
Seeing that the United States is still the most important actor in international politics,
the only danger to this regime in the foreseeable future is the United States itself, argues
Bromley. If it does not adjust its unilateral strategy to current developments, such as the rise
of other powerful nations, and pursues its interests at the expense of the other major centres of
economic power, it will squander its political leadership. In sum, the writer conceives the U.S.
as an empire and supports its supremacy on the condition, that it is backed by a foreign policy
composed of political multilateralism, Hamiltonian economic multi-polarity, and Jeffersonian
off-shore balancing and military restraint. In Bromley’s view, this combination is the most
adequate recipe for prolonging the existence of the American Empire, which importantly
65
would also serve the political and economic interests of many other nations, as they are part
of the same capitalist system, based on international economic interdependence.
CONCLUSION
From its conception during the Spanish-American war of 1898 till today, the notion of
American Empire has changed in meaning due to altering historical conditions, and has been
the topic of debate discussed by politicians as well as academics. Questions such as “Is
America an Empire?” have passed and still pass review. Seeing that they seek to improve
America’s image as policy-makers, and the concept of empire is reminiscent of oppression
and ultimate downfall, Albright and Ross avoid referring to the U.S. as such. They rather
describe their country in more positive terms, such as “leader” and “role model”. Only the
three academics explicitly call America an empire. Thayer uses the term in a praising manner,
emphasizing America’s superiority on an economic, military, and moral level. Layne, on the
other hand, draws on the term’s negative connotation to stress its selfish, domineering and
violent attitude towards other countries. Bromley chooses a middle road, admiring America as
the founder of the liberal capitalist system, yet maintaining a critical eye on its current and
future foreign affairs. All of the three scholars agree, however, that America is no longer an
imperial power in the traditional sense, that it engages in colonial rule. Rather, they view it as
a country committed to spreading freedom and democracy across the globe. In fact, the two
more critical analysts, Layne and Bromley, believe the term imperialism could still be applied
to America, essentially following Williams’ theory of “imperialism of idealism”.
Other vital questions in the debate of American Empire are “Can, will and should
America pursue primacy?”. All of the authors believe that America can and will continue to
pursue primacy. Albright and Ross refrain from discussing eventual downfall, as they might
firmly believe in America’s invincibility, and as it might also give their advice a sense of
futility, weakening the strength and effect of its content and purpose. On the other hand, the
three scholars estimate that America will keep its status as empire at least for the next couple
of decades, as history has shown that every empire that has ever existed eventually fell.
Concerning the question whether America should seek to maintain its position as world
empire, Albright, Ross and Thayer are strongly in favour of this goal, as they assert it would
be in the best interest of America as well as the rest of the world. Yet, Layne and Bromley
hold opposite views. Layne attempts to warn his readers of the dangers of the pursuit of
primacy, as it could lead to extra conflicts abroad, an increased deficit, the neglect of
domestic problems and, thus, to the quickened downfall of America. Bromley does not reject
American primacy, but agrees with Layne in the sense, that primacy along the lines of the
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Bush II administration harms, rather than serves the interests of the American people, and
claims that if America wants to remain world leader, it needs to adopt a different strategy.
As this thesis has shown, depending on the critic’s socio-historical background and
personal beliefs, various different notions exist on what the best approach should be to
maintain, advance or reduce America’s influence around the globe. Which strategy will be
adopted and effectuated will determine America’s role in foreign politics and, thus, whether
America can still be called an empire and, if so, to what degree. Though never explicitly said,
Thayer supports Bush’s policies as the best means to ensure the continuance of the American
Empire, which deeply contrasts with the perspectives of the other four authors. The ongoing
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to many military and civilian deaths, which has brought
the majority of public opinion as well as the other four critics to strongly prefer soft power
over hard power. While denouncing Bush’s predominantly unilateral policies, they point at
the crucial necessity of multilateralism and diplomacy in order to preserve U.S. interests.
However, the analysts have different views on which method would be most suitable and
effective. As policy-makers, Albright and Ross appear to have a more involved “hands-on”
approach, whereas Layne and Bromley stress caution and suggest restraint combined with offshore balancing, focussing more on solving domestic rather than foreign issues, although they
also acknowledge the importance of foreign diplomacy.
Considering the rise of other major powers, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation, U.S.
primacy could be threatened, while the current economic crisis already seems to have
destabilised America’s pedestal. The degree of prosperity or weakness measurable in the U.S.
economy evidently also influences people’s views on whether America can be considered an
empire and, if so, how long its supremacy might last. In his Inauguration speech, Obama has
said that America is “ready to lead once more” by means of “sturdy alliances and enduring
convictions”, involving diplomacy and ideology which he believes to be more powerful and
effective, than military violence. 98 Clearly, Obama wants America to remain the number one
superpower. Yet, in order to be respected as a leader, America’s reputation and leadership
need to be restored, like Albright and Ross have pointed out. Obama has made clear that he
understands this necessity, saying “our power grows through its prudent use; our security
emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of
humility and restraint. We are the keepers of this legacy”. 99 Obama also reached back to
98
“Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address in Full”, BBC News, 20 January 2009,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/obama_inauguration/7840646.stm>.
99
Ibid.
67
successes of the past, such as the Battle of Trenton in 1776 during the War of Independence,
to give Americans the strength and courage to deal with the problems the future will bring.
With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms
may come. Let it be said by our children’s children […] that we did not turn back nor
did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried
forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations. 100
F
No doubt that Obama is a charismatic speaker, yet beautiful words alone cannot solve
the crisis America faces today. Stabilising Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the economy will
likely be a long-during process, yet making the right decision in the right situation can help to
slowly but steadily improve America’s current state of affairs. Fortunately, he has surrounded
himself with experienced professionals, such as Albright and Ross, whose preference for
diplomacy and multilateral leadership as a means of ensuring American primacy will
probably affect the president’s decision-making. Importantly, they will also offer their
guidance to Hillary Clinton in her new task as Secretary of State. So far, the spotlight has
been aimed at Obama, but the quality of America’s relationship with the rest of the world lies,
to a large extent, in Hillary’s hands as well. In a public statement, she announced her strong
commitment to diplomacy, indeed, along the lines of Albright’s and Ross’ point of views. So
far, the only fly in the ointment might be her husband’s global foundation, which might
compromise her position, as donations from foreign governments and multinational
corporations could be regarded as bribes in exchange for certain decisions on Hillary’s part.
Evidently, her ties to her husband’s foundation require great transparency.
Will the new administration succeed in restoring America’s image nationally as well
as internationally? Will America continue to be viewed as an empire, and will it be able to
afford the status of empire in a time of crisis and competing rising powers? Many critics have
claimed that, at least, Obama could not perform worse than Bush, yet no one foresaw what
happened on September 11th. Albright has also expressed her concern that America might be
the target of terrorism once again early on in Obama’s presidency. Obviously, no one knows
exactly what the future holds in store, however, the administration can anticipate and counter
possible dangers to America’s primacy by keeping threats in check, mending the pieces Bush
has left behind, and dealing with new issues most thoughtfully and appropriately. The future
of the American Empire will, in part, be shaped by the foreign policy decisions the Obama
administration will make and how these will be executed. This, in effect, will influence how
people both nationally and internationally perceive America, essentially involving an ongoing
100
Ibid.
68
debate, shaping the notion of American Empire with multiple and varied opinions, beliefs and
theories, to which this thesis has hopefully made a useful contribution.
69