SACRED COMEDY: RECONCILING RELIGION AND HUMOR
_______________
A Thesis
Presented to the
Faculty of
San Diego State University
_______________
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Interdisciplinary Studies
_______________
by
Sherry M. Shopoff
Fall 2012
iii
Copyright © 2012
by
Sherry M. Shopoff
All Rights Reserved
iv
DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my sister, Christy Shepard, a devoted evangelical Christian
who, un-knowingly, inspired this study. I am grateful for her willingness to assist me with
my thesis project and for the lessons of tolerance and humility I learned as a result of her
actions.
This thesis is also dedicated to clowns, tricksters, and fools everywhere who bestow
the powerful gift of laughter and remind us what ridiculous creatures we human beings really
are.
.
v
Something has gone wrong with our perception of the alliance between being religious and
having a sense of humor.
Doris Donnelly
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Sacred Comedy: Reconciling Religion and Humor
by
Sherry M. Shopoff
Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies
San Diego State University, 2012
In an increasingly globalized society, diverse religious groups interact as never before. This interaction has proven disastrous among groups who are polarized in their
absolutist ideologies and produce isolated extremist sects fuelled by nationalism and ethnic
alliances. Humor has been proven to be an effective tool in mediation and conflict resolution,
but difficulties arise in utilizing humor to mediate among Jewish, Christian, and Islamic
fundamentalist groups who, along with mainstream religion, have eliminated humor from
their doctrines and denigrated its spiritual value. Modern monotheistic religion is largely
divorced from the idea that laughter is as valid an expression of the sacred as solemnity. Yet,
humor is as intrinsic to the religious experience as it is to the human experience.
This study draws from a broad base of scientific and literary humor theory,
anthropology, history, religious studies, psychology, and sociology, that is presented in a
three-prong approach to uncover the humor in the Judeo-Christian Bible and the Islamic
Quran and Hadith, along with comedic religious practices. The works of theologians Conrad
Hyers and John Morreall delineate the tragic vision and comic vision as worldviews, which
inform modern religious ideologies and societal values, have been greatly utilized. Aristotle’s
Poetics is foundational to Hyers’ and Morreall’s studies, as it is herein, with particular
attention to Aristotle’s bifurcation of tragedy and comedy, the tragic hero and comic
characters, and a discussion of katharsis. A further consideration of katharsis is offered with
regard to modern psychological catharsis and post-Christian implications regarding
conversion. Also foundational to this study are the psycho-sociological studies of Vassilis
Saroglou on the effects of religiousness on humor. Religious and anthropological studies
examine the religio-aesthetic impulse and the evolution of religion from pre-historic
shamanism to the emergence of monotheism, including the development the High God/Sky
God and the Trickster. These archetypal deities are further analyzed with regard to the tragic
and comic modes and dualism. The culmination of this research provides a framework to
recognize and deconstruct the instances of humor, comedy and tricksterism within the JudeoChristian Bible, as well as the Islamic Quran and Hadith.
The conclusion posits that humor is both intratextual and intertextual and can,
therefore, provide an effective means to bridge communication and understanding between
diverse religious groups including fundamentalists. The increasing number of comedy acts
focused on dispelling religious stereotypes and creating interfaith alliances provides hope
that this process has begun to occur.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................x
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
THE STUDY OF HUMOR AND LAUGHTER .................................................................8
The Superiority Theory ............................................................................................9
The Relief Theory ....................................................................................................9
The Incongruity Theory .........................................................................................10
The Semiotic Theory..............................................................................................11
The Study of Laughter ...........................................................................................12
Studies on the Effects Of Crying ...........................................................................14
Humor Studies Related to Religion .......................................................................16
THE MODES OF TRAGEDY AND COMEDY...............................................................20
The Dilemma of Perspective ..................................................................................20
The Tragic Vision and the Comic Vision ..............................................................23
The Influence of the Warrior Culture ..............................................................23
Aristotle’s Role in the Bifurcation of Tragedy and Comedy ...........................24
The Tragic Mode....................................................................................................25
“Katharsis” and “Catharsis” ...........................................................................26
Catharsis and Conversion ................................................................................27
The Tragic Hero ...............................................................................................29
The Comic Mode ...................................................................................................30
Origins of Comedy ...........................................................................................30
The Comedic Plot ............................................................................................32
The Comic Stock Types ...................................................................................34
The Trickster ..............................................................................................34
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The Rogue ..................................................................................................35
The Fool /Jester ..........................................................................................36
The Clown ..................................................................................................37
The Simpleton ............................................................................................38
The Buffoon (Braggart) .............................................................................39
THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION ......................................................41
The Religio-Aesthetic Impulse ..............................................................................41
Early Concepts of God ...........................................................................................43
The Trickster ..........................................................................................................44
Liminality and Boundary-Crossing..................................................................45
Trickster as Culture Hero .................................................................................46
Mirroring and Disguise ....................................................................................47
Shamanic Initiation ..........................................................................................48
Sky Gods ................................................................................................................50
The Greek Sky Gods ........................................................................................51
The Canaanite Sky Gods ..................................................................................53
SACRED COMEDY .........................................................................................................58
Eastern and Western Perspectives .........................................................................58
Tricksterism ...........................................................................................................60
Comic Irony of the Old Testament ........................................................................61
The Comedy of Jesus .............................................................................................65
The Comedy and Tragedy of Islam .......................................................................75
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................82
Exclusion and Fundamentalism .............................................................................82
The Trickster as Mediator ......................................................................................85
Transcendent Humor ..............................................................................................87
Contemporary Christian Comedy ....................................................................87
Contemporary Jewish and Muslim Comedy ....................................................89
Interfaith Comedy Collaboration .....................................................................91
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................95
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
PAGE
Figure 1. Drama masks ............................................................................................................20
Figure 2. Freytag’s pyramid .....................................................................................................32
Figure 3. The Shaman of Les Trois Frères ..............................................................................44
Figure 4. Ganesha ....................................................................................................................59
Figure 5. Fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist thought .....................................................83
Figure 6. Rabbi Bob Alper performing with Azhar Usman and Nazareth Rizkallah ..............92
x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I wish to express my deepest appreciation to my husband, Phil, for
his unwavering support, encouragement, and seemingly endless patience.
Next, I want to thank the members of my thesis committee for their support and
encouragement during my long and often arduous progress toward completing a somewhat
overly ambitious self-designed Interdisciplinary program. Joseph Smith was extremely
helpful in providing me with sources for mythology and, in particular, pointing out
significant aspects of the relationship between the Sky God and Trickster. His mostly handsoff approach greatly enhanced my ability to weigh the relevancy of my mountainous research
and devise a structure for this thesis. Margaret Field greatly helped me begin the process of
developing a program, and has been exceptionally encouraging and supportive in all aspects
of this undertaking including helping me find a position at the University and accompanying
me on my field research trip in Taos, New Mexico. Rebecca Moore gave me invaluable
feedback, inspiration, and assistance during a particularly difficult time at the end of the
process.
I also wish to thank Linda Holler for her encouragement and direction in the early
stages of formulating my thesis and making me aware of my need to evolve beyond my own
biases in the subject matter. Also, Mark Freeman championed me within the Television and
Film department by allowing me to enroll in coursework and gain vital access to department
equipment, from which I would otherwise have been excluded.
Additionally, I would not have been able to complete this work without my
serendipitous association with Instructional Technology Services who provided me with
financial and moral support, expertise, and an opportunity to improve my skills in graphic
design and video production.
Finally, a word of thanks to my team of doctors who saw me through the most
harrowing time of my life, allowing me to schedule surgery around my school breaks, and
providing me with a deep sense of life’s fragility and absurdity that has informed this work
and my life in general.
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Laughter is a vital factor in laying down the prerequisite for fearlessness without
which it would be impossible to approach the world realistically.
Mikhail Bahktin
Religion and humor share many similar qualities and functions. Both are common to
every known society and are uniquely human. Religion and humor both deal with life’s
incongruities, provide some degree of social control, aid in binding communities together,
release emotional and psychological tension, elevate mood, and sometimes facilitate healing.
On the negative side, religion and humor also wield the power to be socially divisive,
promote fear and oppression, and serve as instruments of humiliation and cruelty. However,
for most of human existence religion and humor have not been considered as separate
expressions.
The purpose of this study is to explore the ways in which humor and religion are
compatible, if not interdependent. It is my hypothesis that the bifurcation of the modes of
comedy and tragedy corresponds with the bifurcation of religiosity and humor. The shared
anthropological and psychosocial origins of religious and dramatic expression, as evidenced
by indigenous traditions and the Dionysian festivals, ascribed sacrality to a worldview that
integrated both comedic and tragic perspectives. However, as religion evolved ideologically
and culturally through the adoption of monotheism and dualism, the formation of city-states,
warriorism, and the spread of Western rationalist thought, comedy (humor) became estranged
from the notion of “sacred.”
The Abrahamic faiths, in particular, have adopted a narrow tragic religious vision.
Nevertheless, an examination of Biblical and Quranic texts and obscured practices reveal
humor and a comic vision, which could be utilized to initiate a humor-based discourse
between polarized religious groups. The three present-day monotheistic religions – Judaism,
Christianity and Islam – all lay claim to “the one true god,” which has been the source of
2
great conflict and violence among them and the rest of the world for some time. Much of
their discord is rooted in ancient disputes, and intertwined with political interests that
undoubtedly play a significant role in the escalating tensions in the Middle East and among
American fundamentalist Christians, mainstream Christians, and the secular community. This
study, however, focuses on the underlying themes that dictate the necessity for these
religious groups to view their differences as oppositional rather than divergent.
As an interdisciplinary topic, a three-pronged approach is necessary to provide
foundations in humor and laughter theory, literary and mythological motifs and archetypes,
and religious history and anthropological practices that will provide the basis for an analysis
of sacred texts and religious practices with regard to their intrinsic humor.
Chapter Two provides an overview of the principal theories of humor and laughter.
The phenomenon of laughter, as well as humor, has garnered the attention of the great minds
of Western civilization beginning with Plato. Humor (or its dramatic expression, comedy)
has thus far eluded definition beyond the axiom that something is humorous because it makes
us laugh. However four basic theories of humor have developed over the past three millennia
beginning with the Superiority Theory, which propounds that humor occurs when one feels
himself superior to another and laughter is an expression of derision or scorn. The Relief
Theory views laughter as a ”safety valve” to release nervous or psychic tension. Jokes
provide relief from social restrictions and psychological stress. The Incongruity Theory
posits that humor is derived from surprise and contradiction, particularly the discrepancy
between one’s expectation and what manifests. The Semiotic Theory proffers linguistic
signification to analyze humor in various types of communication and logical problems
Societal beliefs and attitudes about laughter and humor correlate with religious beliefs
and ideology. Laughter itself is often the focus of humor research because it is an observable
phenomenon. Discussion of the psychological, physiological, and sociological aspects of
laughter and, conversely, tears provides an anthropological perspective on the ways in which
laughter has played a beneficial role in our survival as a species. Studies conducted by
Vassilis Saroglou shed light on the psychological and sociological effect of Christian
religiosity on humor appreciation and production.
Chapter Three lays the foundation for understanding the modern Western notions of
comedy and tragedy as they have been handed down from ancient Greek civilization through
3
mythology and dramatic literature. The Poetics by Aristotle is central to our present day
understanding of tragedy and comedy as dramatic literature, which informs our perspective
of the world. Whether an event or situation is considered tragic or comic depends greatly on
the outcome. As protagonists of our own stories, we experience the hero’s change of
fortunes, which may parallel the tragic paradigm or the comic paradigm but, most often, life
experiences are a combination of both. However, Aristotle’s distinctions between the tragic
and comic modes, particularly the ennobling of the tragic hero and debasement of the comic
protagonist,1 and the misinterpretation of Aristotle’s tragic katharsis have had far-reaching
societal and religious implications. Theologian Conrad Hyers refers to this worldview as the
tragic vision and also describes the corresponding comic vision.
Hyers’ concept of the tragic vision is adopted from a tragic paradigm that centers on
the trajectory of the tragic hero as he attempts to overcome an opposing force.2 Hyers posits
that the tragic vision serves the warrior-culture of modern western society by promoting the
idea that life is a constant battle to overcome obstacles and opposing forces. Patriotism, duty,
honor, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and, on the dark side, vengeance, are among the ideals for
which the tragic hero will fight, kill and die. Further, Hyers describes the tragic hero as an
extremist who will stop at nothing to advance his cause and seize victory (Spirituality 27-8).
According to Aristotelian thought, the audience is benefited by watching the tragic
hero suffer and fail through a kind of purgation process called “katharsis,” which has been
erroneously correlated with the modern post-Christian concept of psychological catharsis
preceding conversion. Thus, the purgatory effect brought about by empathy for the tragic
hero has been imbued with moral and religious overtones which equate tragic with sacred.
Because monotheism acknowledges only one deity who embodies all good, and that deity is
1
The comic protagonist cannot be accurately described as a hero according to Aristotelian thought.
However, the modern heroes of literature can be comic or tragic.
2
This view of tragedy as an imitation of the tragic hero within the action that causes his reversal of fortune
is not considered strictly Aristotelian, who is more concerned with “action and life” (Poetics V) and not the
hero’s humanity or personal struggle. See Jones, John. On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy. Stanford University
Press. Stanford: 1980. pp. 29-45. Hyers’ concept of the tragic hero is more in line with the Shakespearean tragic
hero, who, although influenced by Aristotle and Seneca, is primarily concerned with the internal and outward
struggles of humanity. See Bradley, A.C. Shakespearean Tragedy. MacMillan, London: 1919 p. 23.
4
associated with tragedy, it follows that tragedy is associated with that which is sacred and
comedy becomes associated with that which is profane and wicked.
The “comic vision” is the complement to the tragic vision in the same way that
satyr plays and comic parodies complemented the tragedies of the City Dionysia.3 The
comic hero is ignoble to begin with and, through his own failings in the face of opposing
forces, brings disaster on himself and others. The values championed by the comic hero
include joy, harmony, forgiveness, humility and reconciliation. However, the comic
paradigm is resolved through conciliation and synthesis resulting in an outcome greater
than the original status and beneficial for all. Hyers contends that adopting a comic
vision is the way around the conflict between diametrically opposed groups. However,
Hyers does not make it clear how this shift in worldview can occur.
The fourth chapter is concerned with religion and the human compunction
toward religiosity, which is interconnected with the compunction toward aesthetics.
Early religious expression and those who acknowledge more than one omnipotent deity
have been more receptive to the playful, contrary, and, often, subversive nature of
humor. Shamanism, as the oldest known religious practice, is highly theatrical and
shamans are widely known to be consummate and outrageous performers in the practice
of their rites. The ceremonial “clowns” of the Southwest Native American tribes are the
most elite and sacrosanct religious society within their community. The Trickster deity,
considered one of the earliest and most universal divine archetypal characters, is
buffoonish and mischievous, as well as rapacious. Trickster mythology encompasses
creation stories, etiological explanations and the instruction of social mores and taboos.
The Trickster, though often a miscreant and a fool like Coyote, also serves as a
benefactor or Culture Hero, such as Prometheus, providing boons toward civilizing
society, often through thievery or deception.
3
The City Dionysia (or Great Dionysia) was a religious festival held in Athens to honor the god Dionysus.
The festival included dramatic competitions in which tragedians, such as Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles,
in their respective times, wrote a trilogy of plays, which were performed in a daylong ritual peppered with
comedic interludes and capped with a satyr play mocking the preceding tragic trilogy.
5
The High God, a distant sky-bound creator or “first cause” of the universe, was
common to many indigenous religions, though not as ubiquitous as the Trickster. As animism
and shamanism gave way to polytheism, the High God evolved into an anthropomorphized
Sky God, who served as Supreme Ruler, Father, and King over the divine pantheons. The
Sky God (also Storm God and Mountaintop God) acquired warrior-like characteristics and
was required to conquer the universe. However, the relationships among the pantheonic
gods, as well as those between gods and mortals, retained a sense of playfulness. Trickery
was among the gods’ favorite pastimes, and vital to the creation and order of the universe.
Often a particular god, such as Hermes in the Greek pantheon or Loki in the Norse,
functioned as the Trickster in a constant interplay with the Sky God. This relationship
signified and maintained a universe balanced between chaos and order, or justice and mercy.
When monotheism emerged three millennia ago, a syncretism of the Canaanite High
God, El, and the Warrior Storm God, Yahweh, became the Israelite’s singular, all-powerful
god. Additionally, the Israelites vested their god and religion with authority over human
morality and El/Yahweh became omnipotent and the embodiment of all goodness. By
inference and decree, all other deities and their religious rites were designated as evil. The
Trickster was disgraced and repositioned as Yahweh’s polar opposite, the embodiment of
evil, Satan.
Levity, foolishness, deception, thievery, lust and other tricksterish behavior cannot be
eliminated from human behavior because the Trickster character is essentially a parody of
human behavior. With the institution of divine moral imperatives, trickerish behavior has
been relegated to a small corner of religious life centering around the spring festivals of
Purim, Carnavale and the Feast of Asses, if not completely eliminated from the sacred realm.
With the elimination of the balance provided by the ongoing interplay of the sacred and
profane, the religious mode of monotheism has become predominantly solemn, dogmatic,
and rigid. Religious beliefs, untempered by humor, become fixed exclusionary precepts,
which are fueled by literalism and evangelical zeal. Monotheistic ideology is largely anticomic, (Morreall, Comedy 78) with a strong tendency toward absolutism (Hyers, Spirituality
73).
Chapter Five explores the humorous aspects of religion, touching briefly on Hinduism
and Buddhism, but focusing primarily on Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The Judeo-
6
Christian Bible, the Islamic Quran and Hadith have intrinsically humorous passages and
stories that are often misinterpreted or, in the case of two key scriptures in the Quran, have
conflicting interpretations. In the pursuance of utilizing humor to promote tolerance between
the fundamentalist factions of these religious groups who value strict adherence to written
scripture, it is essential to recognize and acknowledge the intrinsic humor found within the
sacred texts.
The humor of the Jewish Torah (Old Testament) is primarily ironic but also utilizes
wordplay and puns in the original Hebrew, and reflecting the rich tradition of Hebrew poetry.
Yahweh, the God of the Old Testament, employs tricksterish methods in his dealings with
mankind and honors the tricksterish behavior of his chosen people. For example, Jacob uses
disguise and deception to claim his older brother Esau’s birthright, yet Yahweh blesses him
and makes him a patriarch of Israel.
The Christian Bible (New Testament) also boasts multiple layers of humor, most of
which is produced by Jesus, who is both comedic and tricksterish in the way he uses irony,
puns, exaggeration and other word play. He also exhibits several attributes of the trickster
such as lowly birth, liminality, twisted speech (parables) and playing the role of the fool.
Jesus’ interactions with his disciples, particularly Simon Peter, also have comedic and lighthearted overtones. Finally, Jesus’ role as the Second Adam returning humankind to paradise
also fulfills the “U” shape paradigm of comedy from Genesis to Revelations. Christianity,
then, would seem to have great potential as a religion with a comic vision. However, the
tragic themes of the New Testament – Jesus’ death as the sacrificial lamb, his derision toward
Sadducees and Pharisees, and the condemnation of non-believers – have come to greatly
outweigh the comic in modern interpretation.
Most English language scholarship surrounding humor in Islam focuses on the Arab
secular jesters such as “Ash’ab the Greedy” and “Jubā” popular in decadent Arabic society at
the rise of Islam in the seventh century. This opulent, fun-loving culture is often contrasted
with the early centuries of Islam whose adherents are characterized as harsh and joyless
fanatics. However, jester troupes, similar to the Italian Commedia dell’Arte, continue to
perform, even under the most strictly fundamentalist regimes. Like all jesters, they poke fun
at persons of authority, even religious, and provide light-hearted entertainment for the
community. The Hindu-based shadow-puppet ritual theatre of Malaysia has syncretically
7
adapted to Islam and also continues to thrive, which is particularly remarkable in light of the
stringent fundamentalist dictates against imagery and mysticism. The tolerance for nonorthodoxy reveals a flexibility that encourages harmony, both of which are characteristic of
the comic vision.
The Quran offers little mention of laughter or humor, and the two passages most cited
seem to contradict one another. However, the Quran is also the only text from the Abrahamic
tradition that specifies just treatment toward women and tolerance for Jews and Christians,
illustrating how far extremist ideologies can stray in their doctrines. While the Quran
culminates in a victory of an unimaginable scale over the rest of humanity, which is
thematically tragic, it also demonstrates an unmitigated positivism that is essentially
comedic.
The most convincing evidence of the comic vision in Islam is found in the Hadith (the
collected writings of the Companions of Muhammad), which describe the Prophet as a man
who loved to tease and joke with his friends and followers, roughhouse with his children, and
who laughed raucously. This characterization of Muhammad and his Companions is
regrettably overlooked by Westerners and Islamic Conservatives but is the key to affirming
the values of peace and tolerance intrinsic to Islam.
Chapter Six provides the conclusion presenting strategies that, first, address the
difficulties in promoting tolerance between rigidly exclusive fundamentalist groups.
Although the absolutist belief systems appear intractable, there is great variability with what
constitutes an absolute truth. The comic vision is not antithetical to absolutism but provides a
variable. Unfortunately, fundamentalist extremist groups are usually allied with and fueled
by secular political interests not served by tolerance between religious, ethnic, and national
communities.
Tricksterism, which deflects the tension between opposing parties are an effective
method in conflict resolution and can be utilized to approach religious conflict. Humor is
intrinsic to all three Abrahamic religions and needs to be emphasized in interfaith discourse.
Comedians representing these groups are making inroads to promote tolerance through
individual comedic acts and combined comedy tours. Although it is impossible to eliminate
all conflict, it is hoped that conflict can be managed and violence averted. According to actor
Alan Alda: “When people are laughing they’re generally not killing each other.”
8
CHAPTER 2
THE STUDY OF HUMOR AND LAUGHTER
No one doubts that the laugh is a sign of joy, just as tears are a sign of pain, and anyone who
pushes their curiosity further in the matter is a fool.
Voltaire
Despite the attention laughter and humor have garnered from some of the greatest
minds of Western civilization, there is still much controversy about what humor is or why
something is funny (Berger, Anatomy 20). Marianne LaFrance, professor of psychology at
Yale University asserts, “Humor seems to evade our best attempts to explain it, just as jokes
lose something when they are explained.” J.Y.T. Grieg lists eighty-eight theories in the
appendix to his book The Psychology of Laughter and Comedy. Published in 1923, his work
does not include the theories brought about by advances in scientific areas such as
physiology or neurology, which would substantially increase that number. Still, consensus on
the subject amounts to this: people laugh when they find something funny and, conversely,
something is considered funny when it makes people laugh. This tautological explanation is
indicative of the nature of humor and its connection to laughter. Although completely
enmeshed, laughter and humor are separate phenomena, which require separate study,
although one is never completely removed from the other (LaFrance 2).
This chapter will explore the four predominant theories of humor and laughter that
represent common threads within the myriad theories offered since the time of Plato:
Superiority Theory, Relief Theory, Incongruity Theory, and Semiotic Theory. Additionally,
the more recent psychological and neurological studies of laughter have prompted discussion
about its function in the evolution of humankind, especially in regard to communal bonding.
This is contrasted with studies regarding the social effects of crying. Special attention is
given to the research of Vassilis Saroglou, which specifically investigates the psychological
compatibility of religion and humor.
9
THE SUPERIORITY THEORY
The Superiority Theory is attributed to Plato and Aristotle, and was later adopted and
expanded upon by Thomas Hobbes and Henri Bergson. It describes laughter in the context
of power over or aggression against an object of ridicule. When one observes the misfortune
of another or gets the better of someone, the impetus to laugh is derived from feeling superior
to the object of the joke. Laughter is, therefore, always considered derisive or scornful.
Plato’s view was that we laugh at vice, particularly self-ignorance, in people who are
relatively powerless and our amusement is a kind of malice toward them. Further, laughter,
as an often uncontrollable phenomenon, was to be avoided for its propensity to cause selfabandonment (Plato, 388e).
Aristotle concurred with Plato’s belief that laughter was derisive, but stopped short of
condemning all laughter. Instead, Aristotle proposed moderation in joking and laughter. He
was disapproving of people who “try to be funny at all costs,” calling them “vulgar buffoons”
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book IV).
Thomas Hobbes advanced the Superiority Theory through his view that people are in
constant struggle with one another for power and, within this struggle; the failure of our
competitors is equivalent to our success. We are, therefore, always watching for signs that
we are better off than others or, conversely, others are worse off than we are. Laughter, then,
is the nothing more than an expression of our “sudden glory” when we realize that in some
way we are superior to someone else (Morreall, Laughter 19).
Henri Bergson developed the “social function” aspect of the Superiority Theory,
wherein humor and laughter serve to correct and control social behavior. According to
Bergson, “…we always find an unavowed intention to humiliate and, consequently, to
correct our neighbor…” (148). Bergson’s theory does not refer to the morality of a behavior,
but to the “social function” of that behavior within that society. Therefore, a virtue or a vice
may be comical, just as a tragic event may illicit laughter. Comedy “depends on the
conventions or prejudices of a particular group, not on a moral standard” (Grieg 270).
THE RELIEF THEORY
The Relief Theory is a popular and enduring theory of laughter that was put forth by
philosopher and sociologist Herbert Spencer in 1860 arguing that laughter serves as a “safety
10
valve” for relieving excess tension in the nervous system. Darwin’s “principle of the direct
action of the nervous system” strengthened this view (28). Sigmund Freud, who became its
greatest proponent, described laughter as a release of “psychic energy” (181-2).
According to Freud’s theory, when we laugh, we expend energy that is normally used
to keep forbidden impulses in check. Laughter is an expression of the relief felt when the
pressure is released. Freud further theorized that laughter represents an “economy of
expenditure” of thought and feeling, enabling a temporary release from the pressure of
inappropriate emotions, hostile and obscene urges, which safeguards the individual and
society (284).
It wasn’t until the mid-twentieth century when research had provided a greater
understanding of the way the nervous system worked that the expended energy theory was
challenged. Contemporary neurophysiological theories of humor were championed by the
research of Daniel Berlyne who found that two separate arousal mechanisms combine with
the activation of the reward and aversion systems of the central nervous systems to determine
the pleasure experienced in humor. These mechanisms are referred to as the arousal “boost”
mechanism, which elevates arousal to a level that is experienced as pleasurable, and a “jag”
mechanism that abruptly reduces a very high level of arousal. Laughter occurs as the result
of either high arousal beyond our normal tolerance, or a brief arousal followed by a sudden
'jag' when the arousal turns out to have been unnecessary (McGhee 14).
THE INCONGRUITY THEORY
Probably the most widely accepted theory of humor is the Incongruity Theory, which
holds that “all humor involves some kind of a difference between what one expects and what
one gets” (Berger, Anatomy 3). It is preferred by many modern humor theorists because it
seeks to characterize the formal object of amusement to describe “what something has to
have in order for us to find it amusing” (Morreall, Comedy 6).
The main proponents of the Incongruity Theory are Immanuel Kant, Arthur
Schopenhauer, and Søren Kierkegaard. The theory is first ascribed to Kant, who described
laughter as a reaction from the sudden transformation of expectation into nothing. Kant was
also the first to suggest that laughter (resulting from the recognition of incongruity) was
healthful (Morreall, Laughter 46). In Schopenhauer’s version of the theory, incongruity is
11
redefined as a “mismatch of our sensory knowledge of things and our abstract knowledge of
things” (qtd. in Morreall, Laughter 51). Kierkegaard described incongruity, and that which is
essentially comic, as contradiction, which requires an understanding of the contradictory
nature of the human condition (Oden 11) asserting “where there is life there is contradiction,
and wherever there is contradiction the comic is present” (Kierkegaard, CUP 459). His work
also addresses irony,4 as it relates to three essential spheres of life: the aesthetic sphere, the
ethical sphere, and the religious sphere.
Irony, according to Kierkegaard is a border territory between the aesthetic and the
ethical spheres, while humor borders the ethical and religious spheres. Humor, contends
Kierkegaard, “has a far more profound skepticism than irony, because here the focus is on
sinfulness, not on finitude...” but also “has a far deeper positivity...not by making man man,
but making man God-man (CUP 329). In this light, Kierkegaard describes Christianity as
“the most humorous view of life in world-history” (J and P).
THE SEMIOTIC THEORY
One of the most recent theories offered by Arthur Asa Berger, Professor of
Communication at San Francisco State University, refers to the fourth theory of humor as the
conceptual or ”semiotic theory,” which is also allied with the cognitive theory, and utilizes
linguistic methodology to analyze text (which are, in this case, jokes). In the semiotic theory,
says Berger, “humor is best understood as dealing with communication, paradox, play and
the resolution of logical problems” (Anatomy 5) The semiotical analysis identifies the
“signification” within a given text, and then analyzes the signification by “trying to elicit
polar oppositions or paired opposites that are implicit in any work.” At the same time,
attention is given to “the narrative function” of the text. Thus, semiotic analysis utilizes a
two-pronged investigative approach to uncover the paradigmatic and syntagmatic aspects of
the text, which reveals the manifest content and the latent content of the text. The
“syntagmatic” aspects of a text refer to the relationship between linguistic units in a
4
Irony is a type of humor that utilizes words to convey a meaning that is the opposite to the actual or
literal meaning, and implies a discrepancy between what is said and what is meant. Kierkegaard’s study of irony
concentrates on Socratic irony, which Kierkegaard views as the underlying element in Socrates dialectic
investigation.
12
sequence. “Paradigmatic” features are those relating to the set of substitutional or
oppositional relationships a linguistic unit has with other units. The identity of a linguistic
unit within a language is described by a combination of its syntagmatic and its paradigmatic
relations. (Berger, Anatomy 5).
Berger’s study in An Anatomy of Humor also yields a glossary of humor organized
within a taxonomy of humor technique consisting of four broad categories: logic, language,
identity and action. Briefly, logic humor is ideational; language humor is verbal; humor
involving identity is existential; and action humor is physical or non-verbal (Anatomy 17).
Humor techniques may be considered the methods for the delivery of humor. Berger has
catalogued them according to the broad categories listed above. They are, however, too
numerous to list here but will be referenced later in this paper as they are applied to an
analysis of biblical texts.
THE STUDY OF LAUGHTER
Laughter, as a manifestation of comedy, can provide insight into the nature and
function of comedy but cannot define it for the simple reason that people laugh and smile at
things that they do not find humorous. Laughter is a physiological phenomenon that is, at its
simplest, a motor response to psychological stimulus. It can be triggered by agreeable or
disagreeable situations, and emotions ranging from embarrassment to delight.
Psychologist and neuroscientist Robert Provine, studied over 1,200 “laughter
episodes” and determined that 80% of laughter is not based around humor. For example,
laughter can be brought on by non-humorous stimuli such as laughing gas or alcohol.
Tickling also causes a laughter response, and we laugh from being nervous, excited, tense,
happy or because someone else is laughing (38-47). Darwin also observed that laughter may
occur to mask rather than display emotions such as anger, shame, and fear (Darwin 212).
Chip Walter contends it is the social nature of laughter that makes it contagious (144).
People laugh in response to laughter, even if they do not know the original context. The
ability of laughter to cause laughter indicates that humans might have “auditory feature
detectors” – neural circuits that respond exclusively to this species-typical vocalization.
These detectors trigger the neural circuits that generate laughter. A laugh generator that is
initiated by a laugh detector may be why laughter is contagious. The most famous (and
13
extreme) example of this phenomenon occurred in 1962 in what is known as the “Tanganyika
Laughter Epidemic” which began in a little boarding school in the village of Kashasha in
what is now Tanzania, Africa. There was an initial event of laughter by a small group of
students, possibly due to a joke, but this laughter was unrelated to humor. Eventually, the
whole school was affected by the laughter. It then spread to other schools and villages,
affecting thousands of people for nearly a year. In this case, laughter was one of many
anxiety-related symptoms, including pain, fainting, respiratory problems, and rashes present
among the affected people. There were also attacks of crying along with the laughing
(Provine 38-47).
According to psychologist Matthew Gervais and anthropologist David Sloan Wilson,
scientists in their respective fields widely agree that laughter is universal among humans,
found in all cultures and individuals. There is also consensus, beginning with Charles
Darwin, that the that normal human being is very likely strongly genetically predisposed to
develop the ability to produce and perceive laughter (395-430). The fact that we cannot
consciously control laughter implies that it is not necessarily a highly cognitive function and
older than language (Walter 143; Gervais and Wilson 395-430). While there is no clear
practical reason why humans laugh, it may have a purpose related to human evolution as a
species and its reliance on sociability.
Although humans are the only species to laugh in large groups, laughter behavior
occurs in other species, including chimpanzees, apes, puppies, and rats. Among animals,
laughter seems to serve as a method of determining friend from foe. Animal laughter
behavior is produced only in positive social situations, such as physical play or tickling in
which social information is exchanged, hierarchy is tested, and bonding occurs (Provine 3847; Polimeni and Reiss 347-366). These functions correlate with human laughter behavior.
However, only humans seem to fully possess “the cognitive machinations necessary for
humor” (Provine 38-47).
The involuntary nature of laughter would seem to have drawbacks for early human
survival. First, it is noisy, which could attract predators and alert prey (Walter 144).
Vigorous laughter expends considerable physiological energy (McGhee 14) and causes us to
temporarily loose control both mentally and physically (Walter 144). The evolutionary
advantages, however, apparently outweigh the disadvantages. Principally, laughter is
14
pleasurable and, therefore, can be reinforced as behaviorally. It may have facilitated the
development of language through its association with conversation. It was suggested by
psychologist W.E. Jung that the fundamental evolutionary purpose of humor and laughter
was to facilitate cooperation between people (Polimeni and Reiss 347-366).
In summary, laughter, as a physiological phenomenon, creates social bonds, a sense
of well-being, and fosters community. It also helps define social boundaries, while aiding in
the navigation of contentious social situations. Derisive laughter, as outlined by the
proponents of the Superiority Theory, only exists within the context of human society but
serves the important function of “policing” behavior. Additionally, laughter caused by
embarrassment, fear and other negative emotions provides a release of negative energy, as
expounded by the Relief Theory results in a perpetuation of harmonious social interaction.
STUDIES ON THE EFFECTS OF CRYING
The antipode of laughter is crying. It is widely agreed by scientists in the fields of
psychology, sociology and neurology that both crying and laughing are similarly involuntary
physiological responses to stimuli (McGhee 14; McGinley 210-223). While other species
exhibit laughing behavior, humans are the only species who cry tears (Walter 165). One
may accompany the other and at times be mistaken for each other. However, laughing and
crying serve two entirely different psychosocial functions.
Hindriks and Vingerhoets’ study of the sociological states that the cry of an infant is
an autonomic response to discomfort that communicates a call (or cry) for assistance.
Likewise, crying that is rooted in the emotions communicates to others that one is suffering
and wants to receive attention (878-886). Paul McGinley concludes that if the call of crying
functions as language, then crying itself qualifies as a kind of language that, like laughter, is
older than language (210-223). The ability to communicate suffering and, simultaneously, a
need for assistance is obviously advantageous to survival. However, the social benefit of
crying is questionable. The nurturing and supportive response to crying is not motivated by
altruism as much as it is an attempt to relieve the discomfort of being in the presence of a
crying person (Hindriks and Vingerhoets 878-886).
Further, in a study by Hindriks, Croon and Vingerhoets, 530 subjects read six
vignettes where they encountered people who were crying and people who are not crying,
15
participants reported that they would “give more emotional support to” and “express less
negative affect” toward a crying person than a non-crying person, while regression analysis
revealed that the participants judged a crying person less positively and felt more negative
emotions in their presence (22-42). Therefore, while a nurturing bond is created between a
crying and non-crying person, the non-crying person’s ambivalence toward the crying
person, evidenced by the underlying negative opinion of the crying person, and the negative
emotional response elicited by the interaction with crying person, is not conducive to the
creation of a communal bond.5
Walter explains the psychological benefits of crying have to do with the type of tears
shed. There are three categories of tears: basal, reflex and psychic, which have different
chemical compositions. Basal and reflex tears are made up of globins, glucose, antibacterial
and immunological proteins, urea and salt. Psychic tears, however, have much higher levels
of proteins, potassium and manganese. Additionally, emotional tears are full of stress
hormones, (such as ACTH), and prolactin, which controls the neurotransmitter receptors that
controls the glands that release tears and, strangely, make it possible for women to produce
breast milk. Emotional crying literally flushes out the extra hormones and proteins in our
brain that saddened us in the first place: prolactin, manganese, and ACTH (167-8). The
psychological relief experienced after crying is real, at least temporarily. Crying also
releases leucine-enkephalin, a natural opiate-like substance that relieves pain, so the feeling
of sadness may persist or increase after “having a good cry.” Crying-related catharsis – relief
from distress, fear, anxiety, and other negative emotions – is achieved only if social support
is received during the crying episode, and a resolution to the event that caused the episode, is
a new understanding of the event is achieved. Further, there can be no suppression of crying
or shame from crying (Blysma, Vingerhoets, and Rottenberg, 1165-1187). Therefore, crying
5
These findings do not necessarily correlate with grief and mourning, which are affixed to cultural
attitudes and rituals. Grieving is often a communal act and ritual mourning is widely considered by
anthropologists, (including Durkheim, Van Gennep, Radcliffe-Brown and Feld), to serve the function of resocialization by affirming a bond between two or more persons, and reorganizing the social structure, in the
absence of the deceased, through the sharing of emotion and a common culture.
16
doesn’t necessarily have psychological benefit because crying will produce catharsis only
when certain conditions are met and incongruity is resolved. 6
HUMOR STUDIES RELATED TO RELIGION
Vassilis Saroglou provided the first empirical studies of the effect of religion on the
ability to create or produce humor. In this section, I have relied on Donald Capps’ “Religion
and Humor: Strange Bedfellows” to assist in summarizing the complex scientific work of
Saroglou, which is seminal to the study of humor, but requires a greater foundation in
psychological research than is possible here.
Saroglou hypothesized that there was an inherent mistrust of humor in many religions
and that humor would be negatively impacted by religion. Several studies had already shown
that humor was linked to an appreciation of incongruity, a playful attitude, a tolerance of
ambiguity, low conservatism and low dogmatism. Conversely, other studies had shown that
religion expresses the need for a reduction in uncertainty, avoidance of risk, orderliness and
control, moderate to high conservatism and moderate to high dogmatism. Also, while
aggression and sexual content are, to some extent, always present in humor, they are
discouraged in religion (Saroglou and Jaspard 33-46).
Saroglou’s studies were conducted using subjects recruited from students at a
Catholic university who were offered extra credit. In one study, he divided the subjects into
three groups. The first group was shown a religious video, while the second group watched a
humorous video. The third group served as the control group and was not shown a video.
The two experimental groups were then presented with the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration
Test, comprised of twenty-four pictures depicting frustrations in daily life situations. The
subjects were then asked to imagine how they would react in the depicted situations.
Following the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration Test, the participants were administered a
religious fundamentalism scale which investigates the importance of God, religious life and
6
Ritualized mourning provides social support as well as resolution and a greater understanding of the
event (death of a loved one) for the bereaved individual(s) who cry. According to the findings of the above
study, communal mourning rituals would fulfill the conditions under which a catharsis after crying may occur.
17
frequency of prayer based on a five-factor model of personality developed by H.J. Eysenck
(Capps 413-438).
The subjects who watched the humorous video spontaneously produced more humor
in response to the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration Test than those who saw the religious
video or those in the control group. However, their scores over the other two groups were not
statistically significant. Over time, as the effects of the video diminished, the group shown
the religious video scored significantly lower than the scores of the other two groups and
humor creation by the group shown the humorous video was significantly higher. There
were, however no significant differences in humor creation in relationship to religiosity or
personality traits except those with the trait of conscientiousness, who tended not to
spontaneously produce humor in response to daily frustrations. However, the main negative
influence on humor production was viewing the religious video (Capps 413-438).
Another study conducted by Saroglou utilized the Rosenzweig Picture-Frustration
Test and a humor questionnaire to measure the amount of humor production in two types of
religiosity, close-minded (fundamentalism) and open-minded (quest-oriented). The results of
the test revealed that the fundamentalist group scored lower than the quest-oriented group in
humor production, but comparably on the sense of humor questionnaire (Saroglou,
“Religiousness” 183-194). From these results, Saroglou hypothesized that the fundamentalist
group may have scored lower in humor production because it was based on frustration that
tends to produce ironic and even aggressive humor, which religiousness inhibits. However,
as summarized by Capps, the findings moreover revealed a greater congruity in general
between quest-oriented religion and humor production and appreciation. Humor, according to
Capps, introduces ambiguity and relativity into ideas, beliefs and hierarchies of values and
therefore subverts dogmatism and absolute truth claims upheld by fundamentalist groups
(413-438).
Finally, shifting focus from humor production to humor appreciation, Saroglou
investigated the influence of religiousness on humor appreciation in general, and with regard
to incongruity resolution, nonsense and sexual humor. The study concluded that religious
fundamentalism was negatively related to humor appreciation, incongruity resolution humor
and nonsense, whereas subjects oriented toward historical relativism and a critical attitude
toward religion were positively related to nonsense humor, showing preference for
18
incongruity resolution. However, consistent with earlier studies, the inhibitory impact of
religion on humor is no greater in persons with fundamentalist beliefs than high religiosity
(Saroglou, “Humor” 144-53).
It is necessary to point out that Saroglou’s research is confined to the study of
Christianity, but Saroglou claims that the basic considerations of the study rely on
personality, not religiosity. The “correlates of religiousness” (“Religion” 214), including the
constructs of close-mindedness, conservatism, the need for control and order, and the
prohibition of aggression and sexuality, are present in religions other than Christianity as is
the mistrust of humor. The ongoing debate in Islam as to the appropriateness of laughter and
humor reflects the division in Quranic scholarship over the interpretation of scripture.
Saroglou, concludes in a somewhat cynical tone:
Finally, we ask people who will react... insisting they know religious people with
a good sense of humor, to think twice: it is possible that religious people have a
good sense of humor despite their religiosity; and not necessarily because of it.
(“Religion” 214)
Humor and religion are similar in that they both deal with life’s incongruities and
suffering. However, in doing so, they employ very dissimilar methods that are, at times,
diametrically opposed. Religion seeks to be appropriate and consistent in all situations, but
humor challenges that which is considered appropriate and disrupts consistency (Capps 413438).
Of the major religions, Christianity and Islam are perhaps the most mistrustful of
humor. Because Saroglou’s research is specific to Christianity, the discussion here is also
confined to Christianity, although the general term “religion” is used and could be applied to
other religions.
The schism between humor and religion has practical and theoretical considerations.
First, religion and humor endorse different values. Religion values control, including selfcontrol, which inhibits spontaneity and lessens the inclination for risk-taking (Capps 413438). It relies on orderliness and predictability. It relies on rituals performed at regular
intervals with proscribed actions. Émile Durkheim’s sociological view of religion further
states that religion and the performance of common rituals also serves to bind a community
through a unified belief system (226). However, according to Saroglou, religion also
encourages conformity among its members, which inhibits humor (Religion 191-214).
19
Capps contends that the sense of control is antithetical to humor, because humor is
predicated on openness to playfulness, surprise, and incongruity. It values the willingness to
take physical and social risks (413-438). Hyers agrees, saying humor subverts order and
conformity, challenges authority and hierarchical notions (Spirituality 114).
It would seem that modern Western religion, influenced by rationalism and
empiricism, would respond to the scientific evidence that the benefits of laughter far
outweigh possible deleterious effects. However, the idea that sorrow and mourning are
somehow more sacrosanct than joy and levity is clearly a cultural bias that favors a tragic
worldview.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MODES OF TRAGEDY AND COMEDY
Tragedy is when I cut my finger. Comedy is when you fall into an open sewer and die.
Mel Brooks
THE DILEMMA OF PERSPECTIVE
The most pervasive modern ideas about tragedy and comedy are embedded in the
icon of the double masks symbolic of the dramatic arts. Each mask (shown in Figure 1)
possesses unique characteristics: one face has a furrowed brow and frowning mouth, while
the other features a wide grin and up-turned eyes. Although the design of the masks may
vary, the essence of the masks’ character does not. The disposition of its theoretical “wearer”
is considered to be either tragic or comic.
Figure 1. Drama masks. Source: Perelman, Grant. “dramamasks_1.jpg.” Student Theatre Australia. n.p., n.d. Web
image. 16 October 2012.
21
The tragic mask most succinctly exemplifies sorrow. It is a face frozen in the act of
weeping, intermingled with an expression of horror – perhaps in response to a devastating
loss. The comic mask characterizes a face that is engaged in crinkle-eyed, roaring laughter
with, perhaps, the glint of surprise. Their identical shape suggests the possibility that
although opposite, the masks are interchangeable. While the double masks symbolize the two
extremes of the spectrum of dramatic expression, they also imply that there is a range of
dramatic expression between them.
Aristotle’s Poetics provide additional characterization to the masks by deeming the
tragic character as greater than real life and the comic character as lower. Also, the
Aristotelian tragic character is noble, while the comic character is described as base, ugly and
ludicrous (IV). The influence of the Poetics on our ideas of comedy and tragedy will be
discussed at length below.
Life experiences are often characterized as “tragic” or “comic,” which is generally
understood as “sorrowful” or “joyful,” although within any given situation, one usually
experiences a mixture of the comic and tragic emotions. More often the description of a
situation as comic or tragic is an assessment of its outcome, just as Aristotle describes the
ending of a Tragedy “the chief thing of all” (Poetics VI). In varying degrees, a favorable
outcome is considered comedic and an unfavorable outcome is considered tragic.
However, it is the subjective standards or interests of the assessor that determines
what and why an outcome is favorable or unfavorable. In the face of so much ambiguity and
subjectivity, it is useful to utilize a paradigm based on the perspective of the protagonist to
distinguish between comedy and tragedy.
In tragedy, the protagonist fails to achieve a favorable outcome and, strictly speaking,
dies for his or her efforts to uphold an ideal or virtue. Sophocles’ character, Oedipus, is often
considered the ultimate tragic protagonist, as outlined by Aristotle – a noble man who
experiences a change in fortune from good to bad in a series of events within a plot (Poetics
VI). Oedipus attempts to escape his prophesied destiny, but his actions unknowingly bring
about his downfall: loss of his throne and the slow death of banishment. He, further, inflicts
blindness on himself and, beyond his own demise, passes on a legacy of suffering and death
to his entire family.
22
The protagonist in a comedy achieves a favorable outcome and lives “happily ever
after,” which often means he or she attains an outcome that exceeds expectations. In
Shakespeare’s comedy “Twelfth Night,” Viola, the female protagonist, must overcome a
shipwreck and the loss of her family, subsequently requiring her to protect herself by
disguising her identity and gender. Nevertheless, in this adverse situation she manages to
win the heart of her true love, is reunited with her lost brother, gains a new family, and
garners wealth and position in the bargain.
If one were to gauge his or her position on the spectrum between tragedy and
comedy, it would seem that, given a choice, one would always gravitate toward the comedic
experience. However, this is not necessarily the case. Whereas the comedic outcome
provides a tangible resolution of conflict and immediate good fortune, the tragic outcome
carries the promise of a greater good fortune: the reward of afterlife. This, then, is the point
of intersection with religion, which deals with that which is beyond the tangible world.
Morreall claims that comedy, tragedy, and religion have always been intertwined
(Comedy 3). Religion is not so much a third mask, but an added dimension to the spectrum of
human experience and, moreover, our perception of that spectrum that is imbued with
religiosity. Masks are ubiquitously used in religious practices and rituals from the Buddhist
Noh theatre, to the Pueblo Kachina dances, to Yoruba shamans, to the masquerades of Purim
and pre-Lenten Carnivale. Likewise, the actors of the tragedies and comedies performed in
honor of Dionysus wore masks that reflected the ritual aspect and meta-reality of the
performances. Masks epitomize ambiguity, allowing the wearers to simultaneously become
the characters they portray (including gods) in a literal and symbolic way.
Comedy, tragedy and religion all focus on the problematic side of life and the
“disparity between the way things are and the way they should be” (Morreall, Comedy 4).
The tragedies and comedies performed for Dionysus sought to bring about fertility, in the
same way the performance of shamans seek healing, and performance of a Catholic’s act of
contrition seeks redemption. Reinhold Niebuhr holds that both humor and faith address the
incongruities of life in a more general way. (Niebuhr 135).
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THE TRAGIC VISION AND THE COMIC VISION
According to Hyers, the tragic vision pervades our society and its values due to the
tremendous influence of Greek tragedy, Persian dualism and warrior culture on Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam (Spirituality 20). The tragic vision holds us in the tragic paradigm of
conflict, polarity, and heroic quests. This adversarial pattern typifies relationships on all
levels: between nations, races, religions, as well as the relationships between men and
women and across generations. The human psyche is generally viewed as an internal struggle
between contending forces, while biological evolution is viewed as an unrelenting struggle
for the “survival of the fittest” (Spirituality 23).
The Influence of the Warrior Culture
The warrior culture and the tragic vision are virtually inseparable. The warrior’s onus
is to conquer or be conquered, and the tragic vision provides the noble cause, an abstract
ideal, to impel the warrior to go into battle. Religious historian Nathan O. Hatch’s studies of
sermons from colonies during the Revolutionary War trace the American notion of freedom
and liberty as sacred. As preached from the pulpits, the American Revolution was “God’s
cause” and America was considered God’s nation while Britain was characterized as evil.
Victory in the war against Britain became synonymous with God’s victory over the antiChrist in an apocalyptic vision (407-430). American patriotism and militarism continue to be
infused with Christian religious and eschatological themes, which are essentially tragic and,
therefore, fraught with absolutist ideological precepts.
The ensuing collision between two divergent causes perceived as sacred and noble
necessarily leads to opposition and conflict. The tragic vision requires an outcome in which
one oppositional force is the victor and the other is vanquished. The Warrior Hero, guided by
the tragic vision, is compelled to battle to the death in defense of his cause – honor, loyalty,
duty, sacrifice. The comic vision serves to temper the mission of the Warrior Hero and
provide a situation in which compromise is possible. Open conflict and violence may be
averted if the Warrior Hero is open to awareness beyond the tragic vision and the
compunction to kill or be killed. As author and poet Robert Bly admonishes: “Never give a
sword to a man who can’t dance.”
24
Hyers asserts that the comic vision diffuses the polarization and conflict of the tragic
vision by reinterpreting the perception of opposition and interjecting the noble virtues of
tragedy with other virtues such as playfulness, laughter, lightheartedness, and flexibility. It
does not deny the existence of opposition or dualism, but seeks to attain equilibrium and the
presumption that the fundamental state of things is harmonious, not contentious (Spirituality
25). Therefore, opposition need not be interpreted tragically if there is an ability to see that
both sides of the conflict are part of a larger whole, which the comic vision points to as our
shared human condition. The character of the Warrior Hero can be redefined to include the
values of the comic vision.
Aristotle’s Role in the Bifurcation of Tragedy and
Comedy
Aristotle’s Poetics provides much of the foundation for our discussion of tragedy and
comedy. Writing in the 4th century BCE, Aristotle also provides a unique purview of the
Dionysian festivals with respect to tragedy, comedy and religion in early Western
civilization. The profound influence of the Poetics on Western dramatic art and literature is
unquestionable. However, it is also arguable that Aristotle’s treatise has equally influenced
the religious ideology of Western civilization.
The most significant aspect of the Poetics is Aristotle’s bifurcation of comedy and
tragedy (VI), although religious practices at that time included both comedic and tragic
elements. Comedy and tragedy, according to Hyers, were not seen by Aristotelian thought to
be addressing the same issues, and tragic catharsis and comic catharsis were divergent and
incompatible. While tragedy possessed nobler attributes and uplifting qualities, comedy was
conversely condescending and base (Hyers, Spirituality 18-19).
Aristotle’s perspective may have been influenced by his position of teacher to the
Athenian upper class and their disdain for the obscene Dionysian rustic processions (Poetics
III). It is also possible that Aristotle’s observations regarding tragedy and comedy may not
be fully understood in absence of the portion of the Poetics regarding comedy. Finally, it is
important to consider Aristotle’s strong rationalist and empiricist predilection. Regardless,
the Aristotelian tragic vision is predominant in Western civilization regarding matters of state
and religion since the first millennium CE. Understandably, the scholarship of the Poetics is
25
prodigious. However, it is also equally contentious. Gerald Else describes it as a “blood(y)
trail of debate, dissension, and misunderstanding” (139). Our attention here primarily
concerns the concept of katharsis, the purgation of “fear and pity” (Poetics VI), which is a
particularly thorny patch on the trail of scholarship. Therefore, we will tread lightly,
employing a few of the broad-based assumptions referencing the scholarship of Gerald Else,
W.A. Pickard-Cambridge, Walter Burkert, Stephen Halliwell, and Scott Scullion.
Additionally, Hegel’s The Theory of Tragedy, referenced primarily through the work of A.C.
Bradley and D.W.M. Barker, has been particularly useful and illuminating, along with the
insight of Conrad Hyers and John Morreall.
THE TRAGIC MODE
Hegel claimed that tragedy rationalizes suffering (Barker 74). However, based on the
etymology and origin of tragedy, it is also valid to say that tragedy ritualizes suffering.
Aristotle describes a link between the Dionysian dithyrambs and comedic satyr plays to the
tragic drama performed each year at the City Dionysia. Merkelbach and West define the
etymology of “tragedy,” which translates either as “goat song,” “song of the goats,” or
Eratosthenes’ “song around the goat,” would seem to refer to some form of ritual
performance in which sacrifice and mourning are enacted (175-190). It is reasonable to
conclude that a central religious theme of tragedy similarly has to do with purification
through blood sacrifice. Aristotle explains tragedy as a mode wherein the mimesis
(imitation) of the action of the tragic hero’s agon (struggle, conflict) arouses empathy in its
audience, evoking a katharsis of negative emotions. The mimesis of the tragic hero’s agon
functions as a ritual similar to purification through blood sacrifice. Katharsis describes the
result as a means taken to cleanse away bloodguilt—"blood is purified through blood"
(Burkert 56).
For Aristotle, katharsis seems to be the main purpose of tragedy and he gives great
attention to the description of the ideal hero and tragic plot that evokes the proper emotional
response from its audience to achieve it. In the Poetics, Aristotle specifies that the tragic hero
is “better than found in the world” (II), and of “high repute and great good fortune” (XIII),
which happens to coincide with the great royal houses and “the splendid men of such
families” (XIII). He is, according to Northrop Frye, “somewhere between man and
26
god…wrapped in the mystery of their communion with that something beyond which we can
see only through them” (208). The tragic hero also embodies lofty ideals and “bloodless doctrines” and “intangible concerns,” such as honor, duty, pride, and revenge, for which he is
willing to sacrifice himself and “unlimited persons or properties” (Hyers, Spirituality 30).
The ideal tragic plot, according to Aristotle, is one in which “even without seeing the
action, a man who just hears what is going on shudders and feels pity.” The hero, though
grandiose, must be “first and foremost morally good” (Poetics XIV). If he were to simply
succumb to evil (or “bad fortune”), it would cause a “sense of outrage” in the audience
(Poetics XIV). The change in fortune, according to Aristotle, must occur through an
innocent mistake or flaw (hamartia). Like the prized goat chosen for sacrifice, the tragic
hero has no power over his destiny, but is chosen solely to submit. Hamartia is necessary
because it enhances the tragic effect of his fall, which ritualistically addresses those parts of
life which humans continue to find most problematic: innocent suffering and the neverending tension between free will and destiny.
“Katharsis” and “Catharsis”
Despite Aristotle’s attention to katharsis, he gave no definition or description as to its
meaning. The conflicting scholarship surrounding Aristotle’s katharsis centers on whether it
refers to purgation or purification of the emotions evoked by tragedy. Stephen Halliwell’s
examination of pre-Aristotelian occurrences of the katharsis word-group yields four main
categories: (1) medical purgation, discharge and secretion, (2) religious and ritual
purification, (3) the effect of Pythagorean music, and (4) its metaphoric cognates (185-7).
Aristotle’s katharsis, therefore, could have been akin to medical (psychological) cleansing.
However, the katharsis pertaining to religious or ritual purification also would have been
unlikely to involve the expression of emotion, particularly in light of Aristotle’s assertion in
Politics that katharsis (brought about by music) is beneficial for people of strong emotions or
enthralled in religious ecstasy (Murnaghan 755-773; Butcher 230-31). Finally, the katharsis
evoked by Pythagorean music is also more related to healing than to emotionality. Aristotle
seemed to view katharsis simply as the dissipation and subsequent healing of the strong
emotions evoked by the mimesis of the tragedy.
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The modern notion of “catharsis” preserves the idea of purgation as a medical
concept, but emphasizes the psychotherapeutic discharge of repressed emotions and
behaviors. In the psychotherapeutic cathartic process the subject is induced to vicariously reexperience a traumatic event with partial cognitive detachment. Edward Canda describes
catharsis as the release of repressed painful emotions and anxiety provides immediate
therapeutic benefits and effectuates a transformation in which “increased health in
intrapersonal and interpersonal health is actualized” (209). Catharsis, in this setting, is a
method used as a healing ritual to achieve transformation, which is not an end in itself but, in
the language of drama, the inciting action that moves the plot forward to the next level.
Catharsis and Conversion
Snow and Machalek explain conversion as a psychological experience in which a
radical personal change occurs. The biblical use of the term includes the Hebrew word shub
and the Greek words epistrepehin, strephein, and metanoia, which indicate “a dramatic
change, a turning from one view-point to another or a return to principles from which one has
strayed.” The theological perspective associates this with the attainment of an enlightened
state associated with the conception of a deity (167- 190). Katz adds that with the discharge
of painful emotions, psychological catharsis removes the ego’s defenses (163-204) and
serves as the prelude to conversion. Hepworth and Turner’s study of criminals observed in
the act of confession concludes that confession used both in law and religion and serve as the
transformative agent between guilt and contrition (31-49). Eliciting emotional confessions
from persons who have been subjected to prolonged deprivation and social pressure has been
demonstrated to be effective in achieving the final stage of brainwashing (Katz 163-204),
which essentially constitutes a manipulated conversion.
The conversion of Saul of Tarsus to the Apostle (or Saint) Paul is perhaps the most
significant event in Christianity outside of the crucifixion of Jesus and demonstrates the
catharsis to conversion process. Saul is on the road to Damascus when he sees a “light from
heaven” and falls to the ground. He hears a voice identified as Jesus asking why he (Saul) is
persecuting him and is told to “enter the city and you will be told what you are to do.” Saul
discovers he has been blinded and his travelling companions take him to Damascus where he
stays for three days without eating or drinking. Meanwhile, a disciple named Ananias has a
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revelation that he is to go to Saul and lay hands on him to cure him of his blindness. Then
“...something like scales fall from his eyes, and his sight (is) restored.” He is immediately
baptized and stays with the disciples several more days before he began proclaiming Jesus as
the Son of God. Soon after, “the Jews plotted to kill him,” and “the disciples were afraid of
him because they did not believe that he was a disciple” (New Revised Standard Version,
Acts 9:3-19).
The story of Paul’s conversion provides some insight as to how the idea of katharsis
may have become Christianized. First, Paul’s psychological experience is consistent with the
conversion process described above. He is traumatized by his vision, as noted by his physical
collapse. He is then deprived of his sight, rendering him powerless, and is further deprived
of food and water for three days.
Paul’s transformation (baptism or conversion and metanoia) is preceded by a
cathartic experience involving a personal revelation from a deity. This has become the model
for Christian conversion, which is central to Protestant faiths that rely on a personal
revelation of Jesus as the sole means of salvation. The convert is purged of sin through the
blood sacrifice of Jesus and is resurrected (born again) as a new being who is in direct
communion with an all good, moral, just, and loving God. The convert is now expected to
embody these values and live a more virtuous life.
It is reasonable to conclude that Aristotle’s concept of katharsis has been
reinterpreted according to Christian ethics. Kassim describes the dissemination of
Aristotelian philosophy to Jews through Maimonides, to Christians by Thomas Aquinas, and
Muslims by Avicenna and Averroes in the Middle Ages (2-3). Ideas about tragedy, based in
Greek warrior culture, could have easily integrated into their respective religious ideologies.
For example, Acts 16:26 details Paul’s miraculous escape from prison in which a violent
earthquake caused all the doors to be opened and everyone’s chains unfastened.
This story bears many similarities to the prison escape of Dionysus and his maenads’
in Euripides’ tragedy Bacchae performed at the City Dionysia several centuries earlier. Both
stories serve to reaffirm divine eminence over mortal constraints and the requirement of
mortals to acknowledge this and pay homage.
However, an argument may be made to associate katharis with a process described by
Aristotle in Politics “whereby the emotions become better attuned to the perception of
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reality, and consequently, better disposed toward virtue” (Halliwell 197). This concept of
katharsis could correlate more with societal rather than religious values but, moreover, man’s
disposition with law as expounded by Hegel.
Hegel posited that katharsis is not so much about experiencing sympathy with the
tragic hero and releasing negative emotions as it is about the rational and ethical
reconciliation that occurs after the negative emotions pass away and there is “the glimpse of
eternal justice” (qtd. in Barker 74). Hegel’s concept of katharsis correlates with the tragic
paradigm, which, according to Northrup Frye, culminates in an “epiphany of law” from
which the hero provokes or inherits a situation of enmity he must avenge. In this way, the
tragic hero upsets the order of nature, which encompasses both the tangible and invisible
worlds, and must be counter-balanced. The overarching natural law of tragedy may be
interpreted as two-fold: first, the omnipotence of fate and, second, the imperative of moral
law (Frye 208-10).
The Tragic Hero
Tragedy, more than comedy, is associated with heroism. The tragic hero is more than
the protagonist of the tragic plot, however. The tragic hero is the tragic plot. Unlike the
comic hero who comes in a variety of types, the tragic hero is always a warrior, described by
Bonnefoy as “defined by war” and “who is defined by war and the battles he does and does
not wage” (116). In classical and Shakespearean tragedy the tragic hero is nearly always the
supreme leader, such as king, general, or head-of-state whose extreme and deleterious actions
stem from his official duties or functions. Aristotle advises poets to create the characters of
tragedy by following the example of a good portrait painter: “reproducing the distinctive
form of the original…a likeness true to life and yet more beautiful” (Poetics XV). The tragic
hero elevated above the common level and deals with matters pertaining to abstract ideals
rather than practical considerations. Although his actions directly impact others, he usually
acts alone, keeping his own counsel and disregarding advice and assistance offered to him
that differs from his own a priori plan. The hallmark of the tragic hero is his absolute
conviction that nothing, not even death, must deter him from his mission.
According to Hyers, the hero, as a warrior, sees life in terms of “polarities,
oppositions, contradictions and their collisions” and engages in actions involving conflict,
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confrontations, power clashes, and heroic struggles (Spirituality 20). The tragic hero,
singularly focused and compelled to prevail, will undertake extreme measures to defeat his
opposition. Under the pressure of the escalating conflict and polarization, the tragic warrior
hero seems unaware of his increasing vulnerability and danger of his position and continues
to uphold his ideals, regardless of the situation that inevitably leads to his defeat or sacrifice.
A. C. Bradley, in his discussion on Hegel’s theory of tragedy, states that the conflict
within tragedy results from both sides resolutely battling to further their own “just” cause so
that “the tragic conflict is not merely one of good with evil, but also, and more essentially, of
good with good” (91). According to Bradley, Hegel describes the tragic hero’s situation as
one in which the hero decides “in favor of the one ethical pathos that alone suits their
finished nature” and “must come into conflict with the equally justified ethical power that
confronts them” (91).
THE COMIC MODE
While tragedy is concerned with issues of power, justice, vengeance, and other
abstract ideas, comic values are concerned with the day-to-day preoccupations of life, such as
family, leisure, and romance. Existence is seen more in terms of play and game, rather than
work or war. The comic vision possesses an appreciation for the foibles of being human (28),
and seeks common ground, occupying a kind of neutral space between competing forces, to
reveal the humanity common to both.
Origins of Comedy
Aristotle describes comedy as: “an imitation of inferior people not, indeed, in the full
sense of the word bad, but the laughable is a species of the base or ugly” (Poetics V). The
earliest expression of Athenian comedy is found in the Dionysian rustic festival processions,
which were, essentially, fertility rites. Participants, or revelers, celebrated by carrying
phalluses, singing ribald satirical songs, drinking wine to excess, and behaving lewdly and
promiscuously. As the processions traveled from village to village, the revelers flung insults
and made obscene jokes about onlookers and each other. They also enacted skits that
satirized the well-known personages, members of the on-looking crowd and their fellow
participants (Sutton 2; Rothfield 6).
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The dubious etymology of “comedy” is descriptive of its value to fourth-century
Athenians. According to Merriam-Webster, the word comedy is derived from the Greek
komoidia: a combination of kômos, meaning “to revel” and aeidein, meaning “to sing.”
Another etymology comes from a Greek word kômaî, which comes from the word for
“village.” Aristotle preferred this definition (Poetics III), concluding that “comedians were
so-called not from the revel or kômos, but because they toured the villages when expelled
from the town in disgrace” (Stott 3-4). Finally, “Komos” is also the name of a minor fertility
god, who was worshiped as the god of coitus. While Dionysus, also a fertility god, was
associated with the orgiastic/mystical aspects of the sex act, Komos was associated with the
act of physical animalistic rutting.
The songs and skits of the rustic festival, according to Aristotle, were the precursor to
the “satyr plays,” performed at the City Dionysia and the cultic dithyrambs – songs that were
recited and danced in praise of Dionysus – as the forerunner of tragedy. The celebrants in the
rustic festivals were farmers and peasants, slaves, freedmen, and women, all of lower social
and economic class. Very likely, they were coarse and uneducated people, or, in Aristotelian
terms, “base and ugly” or “ludicrous” (Aristotle, Poetics V).
In the Aeschylean years (approx. 499 - 437 BCE) of City Dionysia, the structure of
the dramatic festival competition required the appointed tragedian (e.g. Sophocles) to submit
four plays: three tragedies and a comedy or “satyr” play performed over the course of a day.
The satyr play capped the day’s presentations and mocked the action of the unremitting
seriousness of the unfolding drama as it advanced toward its inevitable tragic conclusion. In
Hegel’s dialectic model of thesis/antithesis/synthesis, it is the comedy following the tragedies
and not the tragedies themselves that provided “synthesis” and resolution of the protagonist’s
agon.
Edwin Good describes the Greek comedic plot structure as based on the interaction
between two character types: the eiron, or ironical man, and the alazon, the imposter. The
plot is very simple. The alazon is a pompous fool who pretends to be more than he is. The
sly and cunning eiron pretends to be less than he is. The conflict is resolved by the “pricking
of the alazon’s bubble, and the triumph of the eiron” (14). Comedy first occurs when the
true natures of the alazon and eiron are exposed and then watching the alazon be exposed
and deflated by the machinations of the eiron.
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This simple plot type is known as “low comedy.” The alazon invariably slips on a
banana peel, while the eiron may miss it. A modern example of an eiron type is Chaplin’s
“Little Tramp,” who appears to be at the mercy of anyone in power but, in the end, succeeds
in topping them. An excellent example of the blustering alazon character is Walt Disney’s
Donald Duck. Although he is ever humiliated and defeated, he remains impressed with
himself and puffs him-self up again and again. The modern concept of comedy, like tragedy,
is presumed to be centered on the character/hero rather than the action or plot. However,
comic characters are vulgar, base and marginalized individuals who somehow manage to
prevail against the powers that oppress and oppose them.
The Comedic Plot
The five-part narrative structure developed by German dramatist and novelist Gustav
Freytag, illustrated in Figure 2, applies, in part, to both tragedy and comedy plots and
described the five-act play structure utilized by Seneca, Terrence, Plautus, and Shakespeare.
The five parts of the structure are described as follows: (1) a situation with tensions or
implicit conflict (Exposition), (2) implicit conflict is developed (Rising Action), (3) conflict
reaches height; frequently an impasse (Turning Point), (4) things begin to clear up (Falling
Action), (5) problem is resolved, knots untied (Conclusion).
Figure 2. Freytag’s pyramid. Source: “File:Freytags
pyramid.png.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. Wikimedia
Foundation, Inc. 10 Sept. 2012. Web. 23 Oct 16 2012.
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The difference between the comic and tragic versions of this paradigm pertains to the
fortunes of the protagonist or, in more Aristotelian terms, the outcome of the action. The
tragic plot follows the shape of the pyramid in that the plot begins with the hero’s misfortune
followed by his noble efforts to overcome his situation, which fails. The comic narrative, as
Northrop Frye theorized, is a “U” shape which consists of a plot in which the action sinks
into “deep, and often potentially tragic complications, and then suddenly turn(s) upward into
a happy ending” (qtd. in Whedbee 7). The action begins with a harmonious society, which is
challenged and tested by events or actions with tragic implications. However, unlike tragedy
that ends with the downfall of the hero, comedy swings upward at the end. The harmonious
society is reinstated and bettered by the resolution of the conflict through a grand
reconciliation wherein, as Aristotle described, even the deadliest of enemies “quit the stage
as friends at the close, and no one slays or is slain” (Poetics XIII).
In a literary exploration of the Bible, the shape of the “plot” is a significant indicator
of mode in which it is written. The Christian Bible could be interpreted as having a comedic
“U” shape, beginning with the Garden or the harmonious ordering of the universe. “The Fall”
of Adam sets into motion the downfall of mankind, outlined in the struggles of the Hebrew
nation and culminating in the crucifixion of Jesus, when all hope leaves the world. However,
by considering Jesus as the protagonist of the Christian Bible, his story achieves the upward
swing of the “U” with the Resurrection. Because Jesus’ sacrifice (The Crucifixion) brings
redemption to all who believe and provides them with an eternity in paradise, they too have
an upswing into a “U” shaped “happy ending.” The universally accepted Pauline
Christology identifies Jesus is the “Second Adam” who brings mankind back to the Garden
(Somerville 56).
It is only the unredeemed non-believers, Satan and his minions, who meet a tragic
end: death, destruction, and eternal punishment as the result of righteous judgment. The
question is, then, who is the antagonist of the Bible story, Satan or unbelievers? Either way,
there can be no reconciliation or accord as resolution to the plot, so the Bible is not a true
comedy. However, it is not a true tragedy either, because there is reconciliation and accord
for believers. Therefore, it is ironic that so much Christian ideology, particularly
fundamentalism, focuses so much attention on the tragic aspects of the Crucifixion, the end
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of days, Armageddon, and the destruction of the world rather than the hope of the
Resurrection, the establishment of the New Jerusalem and Jesus’ reign as Lord of the
Universe.
The Comic Stock Types
The first distinction between tragedy and comedy in Aristotle’s view is that comedy
portrays men as worse than in life and tragedy portrays them as better (Poetics II). However,
while there is essentially one tragic heroic type there are significant variations to the comedic
hero. This section will introduce some of the archetypal comic characters, who have endured
in dramatic art and literature since the time of Menander although Roman comedy was
responsible for establishing them as “stock characters” utilized in Western comedy to the
present day. The characters listed in this section are primarily adapted from Conrad Hyers’
The Spirituality of Comedy and Wallace Swortzell’s history, Here Come the Clowns.
THE TRICKSTER
The Trickster is the quintessential comic hero, who subsumes the other comedic
types, and is perhaps, their forebear. He is undoubtedly the most ancient archetypal character,
found ubiquitously in the myths and folklore of indigenous tribes throughout the world and is
associated with shamanism recorded as far back as 13,000 BCE in the cave paints of Les
Trois Frères, France. Although there are variations in the attributes and characteristics of the
Trickster among the various cultures in which the character is found, there are several nearly
universal traits.
The Trickster deity is most often male and, as his name implies, he is wily, clever and
deceitful. He possesses a “double nature” and is alternately lazy and energetic, ingenious and
inept, ingenuous and disingenuous. He is a master of camouflage and disguise and possesses
the ability to shape-shift. He is associated with animals and is often manifested as an animal,
such as the Southwest Native American Coyote or the West African Yoruba Spider, Eshu.
The Trickster may also be combination of man and animal, such as the Hindu Ganesha. In
whatever guise, he has the instincts of an animal and, although seemingly indestructible, is
driven by a primal need to survive. However, according to Kerényi, survival is a game for
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the Trickster, not a battle, which he plays by the simple rule that when he takes whatever he
wants by whatever means he can contrive (184).
This includes operating outside of “the fixed bounds of custom and law,” and “ruled
by lust and hunger.” Thus driven by unbridled base animal instincts, the Trickster is “forever
running into pain and injury, cunning and stupid in action” (Kerényi 184).
Another significant aspect of the Trickster, says Babcock-Abrahams, is his liminality.
He is, by necessity, is a loner and a wanderer, independent of temporal and special
boundaries and socially marginalized (147-186). The Trickster’s liminal position facilitates
his role as mediator between two entities or worlds, which also contributes to his function as
a culture hero who aids humankind with civilizing boons, such as Prometheus’ gift of fire to
mortals.
Swortzell places the advent of the Trickster in dramatic art in Roman Comedy as the
Tricky Slave (17). Plautus’ play, titled for the character of the Tricky Slave, Pseudolus,
provides an example who uses cunning and deception in service to his master, Calidorus, by
procuring for him the object of his desire, Phoenicium.
THE ROGUE
The Rogue is essentially a sociological manifestation of the Trickster, but requires
mention for the significant role he plays in the New Testament as Judas Iscariot.
The Rogue is usually portrayed as an ordinary citizen without power, wealth, or
social standing, who is either caught up in a world of opposing forces or of harsh
indifference, and learns to live by his wits to survive. Therefore, the Rogue remains
independent and self-reliant, ever pragmatic and vigilant in his search for an opportunity to
better himself socially or monetarily. The real problem for the Rogue, as Hyers notes, is to
keep from being enlisted or trampled in “the tragic flay of conflicting powers,” be it political,
religious, or nationalistic (Spirituality 54). He usually fails, providing us with a lesson about
greed and foolish ambition. For this reason, the Rogue possesses a certain wisdom and
pathos and teaches about the superficiality and self-deception of society.
The Rogue, as connoted by his name, is unique. He is both tragic and comic or,
stated another way, not quite either. He acts with the determination of the tragic hero and,
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likewise, fails in his quest. Yet, his base position in life, his haplessness, and his sharp wit
place him in the comic mode.
It is not surprising, then, that the Rogue is often a controversial character. Judas
Iscariot, who betrayed Jesus for financial gain and to secure his position of safety is widely
reviled in the Christian community. Yet, without Jesus’ death there would be no resurrection
and, in the end, Judas did not benefit from his act. Further, Judas serves as an example of the
evil of turning away from faith, his hanging reenacted annually in by many Christian sects.
THE FOOL /JESTER
Beatrice Otto describes the universal phenomenon of the Fool during the Medieval
period and Renaissance in Europe, China, India, Japan, Russia, and Africa, who were
associated with court jesters (B. Otto). However, there is a distinction to be made between
what could be termed a “natural fool” and a “licensed fool.” The natural fool is innately dimwitted or mad and, as an innocent, excused for his misconduct. Natural fools were seen as
“touched by god” (B. Otto). A court jester is a licensed fool in that his lunacy and
misconduct are permitted by decree. The fool refuses to accept any pretension or demarcation
seriously, and refuses to fit into the established conventions or hallowed structure of any
human sphere (Hyers, Spirituality 111). Therefore, the natural fool challenges the structures
and conventions of faith, while the licensed fool challenges the institutions of power.
The Jester’s role in court was to serve as the scapegoat for court jokes, and to portray
the king in comic caricature. He was required not only to make the king laugh but also to be
the object of laughter. As the comic alter ego of the king, he was allowed to violate all
proprieties, deflate pomposity and royal taboos, humorously profaning the sovereign
dominion and its absolute supremacy. The court jester was, in fact, entertainment for hire, yet
he wielded great power in his capacity as “truth teller” to the king, and provided a vital comic
restraint for “the inherently tragic possibilities of royal power and authority’ (Hyers,
Spirituality 111).
Paterson, in his article on Fools in the Bible, describes the pejorative references to
fools by Solomon and the Psalmist as weak and morally depraved (13-16). However, there
are many instances of Holy Fools in the Bible, acting as a fool for the sake of piety. The
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tradition of the Holy Fool, however, is older than the Bible and found throughout religious
practices going back to shamanism.
The Holy Fool does not generally rail against the hierarchy as the jester does,
although some are quite out-spoken, such as Isaiah, Hosea, and John the Baptist. Jesus, also,
sometimes bears the epithet “Holy Fool.” The Holy Fool does not serve the function of a
licensed fool (jester) in the monotheistic religions. Therefore, the Holy Fool would fall under
the category of a natural (or supernatural) fool.
THE CLOWN
A Clown is always immediately recognizable as a Clown, yet he is also a character of
great ambiguity, reflecting our own internal and external selves, our own ambiguous
identities. In his article, “The Clown as the Lord of Disorder,” theologian Wolfgang Zucker
says their most significant feature is self-contradiction (306-316). Hyers describes clowns as
“childlike, yet adult; human, yet nonhuman; over-sexed, but non-sexual, “delight makers,”
yet “disturbers of the peace” (Spirituality 132). The Clown is always in disguise indicating
his unique position straddling two worlds. The ceremonial clowns of the Southwest Pueblo
tribes exemplify this dichotomy by painting themselves in black and white stripes.
The Clown has the two-fold role of breaking all taboos and receiving all the
punishments for it. As the comedic counterpart to the hero, the Clown must pay for
challenging the nomos of the gods but, instead of falling in a grand manner like the tragic
hero, he lives to see another day, debunking heroism and the ridiculing the value of the noble
heroic cause. According to Hyers: “His disorderliness is not just misbehavior, a lapse or a
lack of discipline; rather it is the expression of a contempt for, and a principal opposition to
all order” (Spirituality 122). Outwardly, the Clown brings laughter and joviality but also
inspires contempt and fear for the function he fulfills in providing social control.
Anthropologist Adolpho Bandelier wrote the most comprehensive study of the
ceremonial clowns of the southwest tribes in 1890. The current political climate of these
tribes has closed off access to much of their religious practices and knowledge, precluding
scholarship. Because of this, I have employed the published observations of public
ceremonial dances by Edna Fergusson, as well as non-published observations gleaned from
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an interview with American Indian Studies professor Margaret Field and my own observation
of San Geronimo feast day at the Taos pueblo on September 30, 2006.
Bandelier describes the Navajo Koshare (“Delight-Makers”), as wielding great power
to root out and punish tribal members who break the laws of their community sacred clownlike meaning (32). During the ceremonial dances they call out unacceptable behavior in the
tribe through mockery of the hapless offender. Greater offenses can result in ransacking the
offender’s home (141). Margaret Field describes incidences she has observed over several
years of attending ceremonial dances throughout the southwest where the offender is thrown
into a nearby river. She also reports their role as “bogeyman” to keep children in line (Field).
In my personal observations of the Taos Chiffonete, I witnessed frightened children being
taken from the arms of their mothers and taken to the edge of the river by the clown who
feigns throwing them in. Also a young Indian boy was surrounded by the entire Chiffonete
group and covered in silly string that he had been wantonly spraying around the pueblo
making a nuisance of himself.
As observed by Erna Fergusson, the Koshare are consummate entertainers at
ceremonial dances, who perform outrageous skits and parodies that mock the solemnity of
the dance, prominent members of the community, and white people (32, 43). They require
offerings from the tribe, which they will extract forcefully, if not giving willingly or
generously enough. This largesse is then redistributed by the Koshare according to the needs
of particular individuals or families within the tribe (Field).
While there has not been a sacred function for the clown in the monotheistic faiths,
there are instances of sanctioned clowning. The medieval “Feast of Fools” lampooned the
clergy and the liturgy, amid a raucous festival of drinking and feasting. Following the “Jesus
movement” of the seventies, clown ministries began to spring up, which departed from the
subversive aspects of clowning. Currently, the clown ministries’ function is primarily to
evangelize children, and to visit the sick in hospitals as a healing ministry (Kerman 9-16).
THE SIMPLETON
The Simpleton exists in natural time and flow, which often counters the pace and
direction of the human endeavor. When faced with a complex situation, usually the result of
human conflict, the Simpleton is likely to wait for the situation to work itself out, meanwhile
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engaging in another activity of a frustratingly fundamental nature, such as eating a sandwich,
taking a nap, or picking the petals from a daisy. After conditions clear, the Simpleton
continues on his way as if all that had transpired were part of the journey.
In contrast with the machinations and maneuvering of the Trickster or the Rogue, the
Simpleton represents the meek as inheritors of the earth. As illustrated by Hyer’s analysis of
the character of children’s literature Ferdinand the bull, the Simpleton does not pursue anything beyond what is already within his grasp so already has all that he needs (Spirituality
200). His world is one of unquestioned appreciation for the tiny morsels that happen to fall
into his lap, rather than the grand cuisine of the banquet table. Unlike the Fool, the Simpleton
is guileless. According to Hyers, he is child-like in his sense of wonderment and innocence,
projecting harmlessness and purity (Spirituality 198).
The Simpleton is significant to this study because he is innately at one with nature
and himself. He is a spiritual creature in the vein of a Zen master who lives in the moment,
outside of time and the needless swirl of drama in day-to-day life. Schloegl quotes Zen
Master Sozan: “Hide your good deeds and keep your functioning secret. Look like a
simpleton or fool” (79).
However, the Simpleton’s detachment is not achieved through mental discipline, it is
through lack of mental capacity, as exemplified by Forrest Gump. The dichotomy of the
Simpleton is that while he may be naïve and none-too-bright, he often demonstrates
exceptional wisdom and spiritual acuity. Most importantly, the Simpleton amuses us with
his hapless meanderings, but he also draws upon our compassion in a way no other character
does.
THE BUFFOON (BRAGGART)
The Buffoon, and his close relation, the Braggart, is a comedic character, but is not a
comic hero. The buffoon is an old Italic stock character who, in Roman comedy, served as
the derisive target of the archetypal “tricky slave” or “parasite.” Though not comic himself,
the Buffoon is essential as a foil to the comic hero as the alazon mentioned above. The
Braggart is, as his name implies, a vainglorious, humorless blowhard, whom the Greeks
called an alazon. His behavior reveals him to be utterly self-absorbed, and, often, a
scoundrel, willing to use force to accomplish his will. He boasts of accomplishments and
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achievement, which are either overly embellished or pure fiction. As the soldier, he fabricates
stories about glorious feats in battle.
The Braggart or Buffoon is a member of the dominant hierarchy within a particular
society. The Buffoon was sometimes the paterfamilias of the Roman and, later, Italian comedies, who presented an obstacle to their offspring’s romantic aspirations. Unlike the Braggart,
the Buffoon is largely an inept or ineffectual man who happens to hold a position of power,
which he may hide behind, in his efforts to gain the upper hand and obstruct the comic hero
from succeeding in his quest.
The Braggart demonstrates the negative aspects of the warrior and the perversion of
warrior values. It is just desserts for the Braggart, therefore, that he is brought low by vulgar
and ludicrous types, who are representative of the most powerless groups within society.
This type of bloodless coup and non-confrontational oppositional discourse are
fundamentally comic and central to the comic vision.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION
I’ve often thought that the gigantic secret of God is mirth.
G.K. Chesterton
THE RELIGIO-AESTHETIC IMPULSE
There are many theories about the origin of religion, which exists in virtually every
human society. Every religion has its own concept of god, which is continually changing.
According to theologian Karen Armstrong, creating gods is something that humans have
always done and will likely continue to do (4). There is a strong likelihood that even the
earliest humans began “linking the visible, everyday world with powerful unseen forces and
spirits” (Noss and Noss 3). However, what compels us to conceive of an unseen cosmic
being or devise a cosmology can only be theorized. Geneticist Dean Hamer has suggested
that humans inherited a “God Gene,” which predisposes them to religiosity. Journalist
Richard Wright, author of The Evolution of God, argues that religion, along with compassion,
are products of natural selection that facilitate the success of social units necessary for human
survival.
Archaeologists including Pettitt and DeFleur have written about discovered evidence
of human ritual activity dating back to the Neanderthals, including intentional burial of
bodies in arranged positions accompanied by what may be grave goods (Pettitt 1-19), and defleshed bones, which could indicate ritual clean bone burial (DeFleur et al.128–131). Tobias
focuses on the use of red ochre, found widely among burial sites was used for ritual burial
and, it is believed, body painting since the Middle Stone Age (85-92). However, a recent
article entitled “Neanderthal ‘Make-up’ Containers Discovered” describes a report from the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences determining that the discovery of shells
containing pigment residue indicates Neanderthals wore makeup comprised of complex
mixed pigments as long ago as 50,000 years (BBCNews). Although much of Neanderthal
cultural practices remain a mystery, the Cro-Magnons of the Upper Paleolithic era left a rich
legacy of paintings, carvings, and molded clay figures that reveal a religio-aesthetic impulse.
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Aside from the belief that religious ideas are revealed to us by spirits or deities
themselves, or that humans were created with religious knowledge (Winzeler 53), our
impetus toward religiosity stems from both a rational need for explanations about the world
and existence and from a non-rational need for transcendent revelatory experience that is
evoked through creative participation with our environment. At the core of religion is a need
to understand why bad things happen and why good things happen and to find a means to
improve the ration of good to bad. What springs from these queries, according to Richard
Wright, are explanations that cannot be easily challenged (466-7). The primary impetus
toward seeking explanations most likely lies in our desperate human need to control our
environment. These explanations, creatively embellished and ritualized, form a rational
framework for religious practices that attempt to provide control over the natural world by
manipulating god. However, religiosity itself, that which embraces religious ideas, springs
from experience that is essentially non-rational. In The Idea of the Holy (Das Heilige),
Rudolf Otto describes this as the “numinous,” which creates a sense of dependency on
something objective and external (“wholly other”) to ourselves that is greater than ourselves
(Durham).
The modalities of numinous experience described by Otto are threefold: the feeling of
terror (and trembling) before the awe-inspiring mystery (mysterium tremendum), the majesty
(majestas) “that emanates an overwhelming superiority of power,” (Eliade 9) or
“overpoweringness” (Durham) and the mysterium fascinans, which describes the powerful
attraction or fascination with the mystery that transports, as described by Rudolph Otto, like a
“strange ravishment” the “Dionysiac element in the numen” (Streetman 370).
Although the numinous experience may be a spontaneous reaction to a natural
occurrence, it is also cultivated by shamans and mystics, as well as artists, aided by an
induced or spontaneous psychological break from the practical world, resulting in what the
Greeks called “divine madness.” The numinous state can be compared to a primordial ooze
of undifferentiated religiosity and artistic imagination from which springs the myths, rituals,
and ceremonial performance that comprise religious belief systems. The social function of
religion is to bind the community together by reinforcing common beliefs and traditions.
The earliest religious system, shamanism, demonstrates the way in which the numinous
inspires and fosters the practical aspects of religion.
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EARLY CONCEPTS OF GOD
The shaman serves his community as a healer, a diviner, and as one who sacralizes
the natural world, fulfilling the role of practitioner and hierophant in the religious life of the
community. He is, most importantly, the intermediary between humans and the gods who
control their destiny.
The first evidence of the shaman is found in the cave of Les Trois Frères, France,
dating back some 13,000 years. A painting on the wall of the cave depicts an animal-like
man who is masked and posed in ritual movement, believed to represent an animal spirit
(Figure 3). As members of small hunter-gatherer bands, the essential function of shamans of
the Paleolithic Period was to demonstrate an ability to control nature, particularly the
successful hunt, through supernatural knowledge and acts, described by anthropologists such
as Sir James Frazer as “magic.”
The shaman also represents an early attempt by humans to conceptualize an entity
outside themselves and the natural world that could make things happen. As personified by
the shaman, this entity most closely resembles the Trickster, a primal human/animal
amalgam who is considered the oldest and probably the most ubiquitous deity in extant and
ancient indigenous religions.
At the same time, many early cultures conceived of another very different kind of
deity, referred to as a High God or Sky God because of his association with the sky. The
High God is utterly removed and indifferent to the natural world and the affairs of humans,
although he is often thought to be its creator. He is, as we shall discuss later, replaced by
another type of Sky God that is associated with the natural forces of the sky: storms,
lightening, thunder and rain.
The Trickster and the High/Sky God seem polar opposites. However, as they evolved
within human societies they often served similar functions (such as creator), shared traits
(like deception and cunning), and often worked interdependently in an ongoing colloquy
about the laws of nature and the human condition. Understanding the nature of these two
archetypal deities and the way in which they have evolved into modern monotheism is
essential understanding the way in which relations between different religious groups have
become adversarial.
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Figure 3. The Shaman of Les Trois Frères.
Source “Le Sorcière de les Trois Frères.”
Drawing of cave painting.
Iceagesymbols.com. Introduction. n.p., n.d.
Web. 16 Oct. 2012.
THE TRICKSTER
The Trickster, according to anthropologist Paul Radin, has “always existed” (128).
Many Trickster epithets use the descriptor “old.” Jung describes the Trickster as the most
ancient psychological archetype representing the dark, primal forces buried within the human
psyche, the essence of our undifferentiated, animalistic, preconscious state of being (136).
The Trickster’s voracious appetites for food, sex and life itself, mirrors the carnal desires that
drive our survival. The Trickster also embodies an essential aspect of human experience that
is otherwise difficult to define and understand: chaos, ambiguity, and paradox. The Trickster
personifies the inescapable ludicrousness of the human condition contending with the push
and pull of survival.
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The popularity of Trickster deities, mythology, and folklore, however, is also related
to the humorous entertainment he provides. While there is dark rapacious side of the
Trickster, there is also a whimsical and hapless buffoon whose clever plots usually backfire
in an amusing way. The conflict within the story is resolved through reversals, surprise,
exaggeration, absurdity and other comedic conventions that provoke shared laughter, a
powerful agent for psychological and emotional well-being, and community-building.
For this reason, Benjamin contends, Trickster stories, perhaps more than any other
mythological motif, help people “cope with the insurmountable and uncontrollable forces in
their lives” (82). Tricksters act out behaviors and impulses that may have been long ago
repressed through socialization or evolutionary necessity, vicariously providing forbidden
pleasure. In doing so, the Trickster also exposes the dark, unsavory, and embarrassing
aspects of the human condition by falling victim to the greater forces of nature, the
community, and, most often, the consequences of his own actions. The Trickster’s
punishment or comeuppance satisfies our sense of justice, and reinforces our sense of right
and wrong. Zucker likens the Trickster to the Clown, who has a two-fold role of breaking all
taboos and receiving all punishments for it (306-316). At the same time, Trickster’s ultimate
survival has redemptive power that is life-affirming.
Liminality and Boundary-Crossing
The Trickster’s dominion is the marginal space between two geographical, social,
existential, or intellectual loci and his nature reflects this state of liminality. For example, a
Trickster is both human and animal, human and divine, child and adult, male and female,
living and dead. Often the Trickster serves as intermediary between these and other dual
entities. Moreover, the Trickster is the reification of intermediary movement, particularly
transformative movement between thresholds, and of movement itself. Therefore, the
Trickster necessarily possesses a double vision.
An important aspect of the Trickster is constant movement and wandering. Trickster
stories nearly always begin with Trickster “walking along” and coming upon something or
someone that intrigues him – leading him into his next exploit or adventure. The wandering
aspect of Trickster is important as a fulfillment of his role as messenger – one who is always
between two places. Social critic and mythologist Lewis Hyde describes Trickster as the
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“lord of in-betweens” who serves as an intermediary to the threshold between two boundaries
(6).
The Greek deity Hermes is highly representative of the Trickster who is always at the
threshold. Hermes embodies a perpetual youth – no longer a child, but who never matures to
manhood. Hermes serves as the messenger to the other Olympians and, with his winged
sandals and a traveler’s cap, he is perpetually moving. Bonnefoy states that the roads
between destinations and their boundaries, along with the travelers who cross boundaries to
arrive at their destinations, are his dominion (186).
Bonnefoy further describes Hermes as a deity who also represents the movement
within the exchange of goods, both as god of merchants and of thieves, which derives from a
story that takes place on the day of his birth. Out for stroll, he absconds with a herd of
Apollo’s cattle and makes them walk backward to cover their tracks, then hides them and
returns to his cradle. Far-seeing Apollo catches the culprit, who now pretends to be an infant,
and intends to punish him, but Hermes offers him the lyre he created earlier and performs the
first act of barter, establishing the boundaries of exchange (188).
Ironically, according to Kerényi, Tricksters are considered enemies of the boundaries
that they guard (189). This is a vital function for the trickster in his service as psychopomp
and as messenger between two worlds. In the same way Hermes escorts the souls of living to
the underworld, the sacred clowns of the Pueblo Indians escort the Kachinas to and from the
earth in season and who often thought to represent dead souls (Fergusson 32).
Hyde says that if the way to a Trickster’s destination is barred, he will cross the
boundaries through “seemingly asocial actions” such as theft, deceit, and even murder (9).
Although these acts constitute another form of boundary-crossing by breaking social and
moral taboos, they can also sometimes be “a necessary evil” for maintaining the fragile
balances between sustenance and starvation, individual and community, birth and death that
forestall extinction of humankind. In the same way, Tricksters maintain the balance between
human and god or man and animal by delineating their positions.
Trickster as Culture Hero
As the myth is told in some traditions, the Greek Titan Prometheus is charged by
Zeus to create mankind. Like Yahweh of the Bible, Prometheus forms man from clay and
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breathes life into him. Prometheus, however, unlike Yahweh, does not possess omnipotent
and omniscient power. Zeus is the supreme being of the Greek pantheon. Prometheus is an
ambiguous figure – a Titan who helped Zeus overthrow Kronus, his brother and fellow Titan,
and usher in the reign of Zeus and the Olympic pantheon.
As Bonnefoy tells the myth of how mortals received fire from Prometheus, mankind
and the Gods ate and dwelled together in a paradisiacal land called Mekone until the day
Prometheus was chosen to create the first sacrificial distribution. Prometheus first infuriates
Zeus by attempting to trick him into taking the sacrificial portions consisting of bones and
glistening fat, to provide humans with the meat stuffed inside a beast’s stomach. As a result,
man is barred from Mekone and must now fend for himself without the aid of sacred fire.
Prometheus then steals an ember from Zeus’s hearth and conceals it in a fennel stalk to give
to man, who can now cook food instead of eating it raw like animals (92). Prometheus is
severely punished by Zeus, who has him chained to a mountain where an eagle comes each
day to eat at his liver (which grows back each night) for eternity. In another myth he is
eventually rescued by Herakles.
Prometheus’s puzzling actions serve two important purposes. First, Prometheus
creates an important distinction between man and the gods by wrenching them from the
idylls of Mekone and, causing them to labor for food, live for their “stomachs” and recognize
their mortality, which serves to maintain the proper order. He then provides mankind with
the civilizing agent that will distinguish man from animal. Finally, his actions bring about the
creation of woman, who, although given as punishment in the Greek tradition, enables
mankind to perpetuate his species and achieve a kind of immortality.
Mirroring and Disguise
At the same time, the Trickster’s rule-breaking activities provide a counter-example
of appropriate and productive human behavior. Berger states that when these actions occur,
they cause a reversal, as does a joke or a trick, in which the absurdity of the accepted order is
revealed, providing insights that are both amusing and profound (Anatomy 220). The humor
that enables such insight relies on the fact that Trickster usually ends up the hapless victim of
his nefarious schemes.
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The Siouan Heyóka warrior illustrates the contrary wisdom of the Trickster by
literally living life in reverse. Described by Howard, the Heyóka warrior rides horses
backwards, wears clothes inside out, and speaks in a backward language, essentially
providing a mirror for the community. The Heyóka warrior cult wears ceremonial masks to
demonstrate that they are part of the supernatural world. To prove they have mastery over
the natural world they perform a ritual trick involving taking a piece of meat from a kettle of
boiling water (254-258). Like the Koshare, the Heyóka are greatly revered, as well as feared
within their community.
The hallmark of a Trickster ploy is deception and, often, disguise. The Hebrew
patriarch Jacob disguises himself as his elder brother Esau, to obtain his father’s blessing and
usurps his brother’s birthright (New Revised Standard Version Gen. 27:18-29). Likewise,
Tricksters are powerful shape-shifters who change into animals, plants, human beings, and
inanimate objects, depending on what they deem necessary to acquire the object of their
desire. Radin describes one story from the Winnebago Trickster Cycle in which
“Wakdajunkaga” fashions a vulva out of clay, makes breasts from elk’s kidneys, puts on a
dress and becomes a beautiful woman who marries and bears children (20). His ability to
readily and effectively change shape attests to his essential amorphousness. Trickster, in
whatever form he takes, is a manifestation of the vast creative chaos that underlies all
existence, the undifferentiated substance of life, the clay of humankind.
Shamanism is the closest religious expression of the Trickster, but do not serve as
priests of a Trickster deity. Shamans become transmogrifications of the Trickster himself.
Shamanic religion continues to be practiced within indigenous tribes throughout the world,
including North America. Although shamanism presents a fascinating topic that has inspired
a prodigious body of academic and non-academic study, this discussion will focus narrowly
on shamanic initiation and ritual performance.
Shamanic Initiation
Shamanic initiation varies from culture to culture and even between tribes within
close proximity of each other. In general, the hunter-warrior cultures value the individual
above the group, which became more pronounced in the transition to agriculture in the
Neolithic Period. The culture of hunters/warriors, as an interdependency of individual skills,
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necessitates an individualized as well as communal vision of social purpose. The solitary
vision quest is characteristic of hunter tribes such as the North American Algonquin and
Siouxan nations, the African Maasai, and the Siberian Yakut. However, according to
folklorist and full-blooded Yakut G.V. Ksenofontov, within his tradition only those who have
shamans in their lineage can receive the “gift” or vision to undertake the shamanic vocation.
Because it has been passed down generationally, in “an unbroken chain of shamanistic
tradition” over many centuries (qtd. in Campbell, Primitive 251-52), we have an insight not
only into the initiation of modern day shamans, but also that of the shamans of prehistory.
Ksenofontov’s account in Campbell explains that the qualified candidate must
experience a spontaneous severe mental crisis, resembling a nervous breakdown, triggered
not by neurosis, but by a profound revelation of what we may describe as an extreme
numinous experience, which may be spontaneous and or induced by initiation rituals
involving fasting and isolation in a sacred but ominous location, such as a cave that has been
mythologized as the habitation of a demon or as the locus of a live burial. The initiation rite
implies a death and rebirth, such as the death of the child who is reborn as the adult, but also
a break from the natural world and social order. The prolonged and often painful
psychosomatic death of the initiate causes a transmogrification of the natural body and
psyche. He (or she) is no longer completely human and resides simultaneously in the natural
and supernatural world, the rational and the numinous (Primitive 262-265). The double
vision of the shaman is necessary to fulfill his function as intermediary between the natural
and supernatural.
When the initiate shaman is sufficiently healed of his ordeal, he is taught the secrets
of his craft, which is “by way of art” (Primitive 265) and combines training in sleight of
hand, incantation, drumming, and storytelling (Eliade qtd. in Kehoe 37) which often includes
singing, acting, dancing, the creation of costuming, props and special effects (Charles 95122). By utilizing the artifice of performance,7 the shaman is able to evoke the experience of
the numinous that lends power to his rituals. At the same time, it creates a mantle of
7
The performative qualities of shamanic rituals evidenced by the cave paintings of Les Trois Frères
combined the accounts of traditional indigenous shamanic rituals point to a root base from which theatre and
religious ritual originate simultaneously.
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otherworldliness, which serves to provide a protective marginalization from the rest of the
community, and holds him separate from routine interactions and pedestrian concerns
(Campbell, Primitive 254).
The double vision and marginalization of the shaman mirrors the Trickster in many
ways. The deception and cunning painstakingly learned and practiced by the shaman serve
his community through healing, but also as an arbitrator who negotiates the chaos upon
which human survival is precariously perched to bring order and control. The shaman’s
trickery ritualizes transformation of the mind, body and spirit of the individual and binds the
community in a common perception of the world.
SKY GODS
As the Trickster crawled out from the shadows of the earth, another deity hovered in
the vast, unfathomable sky. One can only envision early humans’ awe of the ever-changing
light, color, and character of the sky that could alternatively produce gentle rain, ravaging
storms, blinding light, utter darkness, showers of snow or searing, dry heat. In our presentday modern and technologically advanced world, we remain powerless over what the sky
may produce and are often as vulnerable as our ancestors to its effect. Therefore, it is no
mystery why the concepts of god and sky have been and continue to be intertwined.
Wilhelm Schmidt theorized in The Origin of the Idea of God that the earliest concept
of God was one Supreme Deity who was the “First Cause of all things” and may have been a
pre-cursor to monotheism. (Armstrong 3). The “High God,” to differentiate from the “Sky
God,” is a deus otiosus (“neutral god” or “idle god.”) He is thought to be the sole creator of
all things, including the heavens, the earth, and humankind. He is generally conceived to be
masculine (or genderless) and his most frequent title is Father. Though omnipotent and
omniscient, he is believed to have withdrawn from his creation and is therefore inaccessible
to prayer or sacrifice. (“deus otiosus”).
According to Ken Dowden, as new gods are created, new religious myths and
practices pertaining to a re-conceptualized deity may overlay the old, identifying one god
with another in a syncretic relationship. However, the underlying religious phenomenon is
often not so much replaced as competed for by different religions (190). While this may be
true of many religions across the globe and throughout time, it is a particularly significant
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factor in the current adversarial climate in which Judaism, Islam and Christianity exist, and
which this paper seeks to address. Therefore, our discussion of the Sky God will center on
the Indo-European and Semitic Sky Gods Zeus, Baal and Yahweh, respectively, who are
related syncretically to a High God, Ouranos/Kronus or El. Baal, Yahweh, and Zeus are
associated with the sky and weather, and retain the attributes of creator, father and supreme
god. However, significantly, the Sky Gods, unlike the High God, are anthropomorphic and,
therefore, intrinsically more accessible. The Sky Gods can be supplicated, receive sacrifice
and are the recipients of devotion and cultic practices. As supreme ruler, the Sky God also
acquired an identity as king of the gods in the pantheonic traditions.
The Canaanite and Greek pantheons consist of highly structured familial hierarchies
in which there is a Supreme God, with shared characteristics of the High God and Sky God,
and a consort who are parents to all (Canaanite/Israelite) or some (Greek) of the other gods.
The pantheon is arranged in tiers, which is strictly generational in Canaanite polytheism (M.
Smith 43) and somewhat generational in the Greek. The Supreme God, then, is much like a
king, and is therefore subject to a succession, in which the son succeeds the father. In both
traditions the Supreme God possesses attributes of a Warrior God. Still associated with the
sky, the Warrior Sky Gods, such as Yahweh and Zeus, possess the powers of Storm Gods,
who are able to harness the elements such as clouds, rain, and lightening to defend their
realm or mete out punishment and retribution. The contrast in the succession myths of Zeus
and lack of succession of Yahweh provides insight into the nature of the monotheistic god
currently worshipped in the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions.
The Greek Sky Gods
Hesiod’s Theogony provides a narrative in which a double succession of father to son
occurs, both involving violence and treacherous acts. It begins with Ouranos, the protogenos
representation of heaven is quasi-anthropomorphic in that he acts in human ways: he is born,
copulates, prevents the birth of his children, and speaks (prophesy). He also has physical
genitalia, a feature that brings about his dethronement. His wife, Gaia, devises a plot and
enlists the help of her children. The “youngest, boldest, and wiliest among her children, the
shrewd and cunning Kronos” (Bonnefoy 74), who hates his father, agrees to her plan. Gaia
provides Kronos with a knife to castrate Ouranos, severing him (the heavens) from his wife,
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Gaia, (the earth). In some accounts of the myth, Ouranos is loses his anthropomorphic form
and becomes a disembodied High God who is indifferent and powerless. In other accounts,
he and Gaia participate in aiding their daughter, Kronos’ wife, Rhea, in a plot to overthrow
Kronos. When Zeus takes power, however, Ouranos is held permanently aloft by Atlas and
serves only as a personification of the distant starry shell of heavens, as the Greeks perceived
it.
Kronos is considered the First Ruler or king of the universe, bringing order to the
chaos of creation. However, as Bonnefoy points out, Kronos’ act of treachery and violence
against his father in his accession to power also sets in motion a succession in which “the
struggle for domination is likely to be repeated and reemerge with each new generation”
(76). So it is that in the second succession, Kronos’ youngest son, Zeus, is aided by a ruse
perpetrated by his mother, Rhea. Zeus is kept hidden from Kronos by Rhea until he reaches
manhood, whereupon he marshals a cohort of his siblings (the second pantheonic tier),
defected Titans, and Gaia’s monster children to go to battle against Kronos and the first tier
Titans in a battle called the Titanomachy. The defeated Kronos is imprisoned in Tartarus,
and is eventually commissioned by Zeus to rule over spirits of the great Greek heroes at the
edge of the universe. In varying myths, Zeus battles with giants (the Gigantomachy) and a
serpent-like creature, Typhon, who embody disorder (Dowden 36) and the potential to
“return to the primordial chaos” (Bonnefoy 77).
The stories of gods at war resonated with a Bronze Age audience, who were
embattled with each other and nature. In particular, the battle between the patriarchal Sky
God and a creature of watery chaos, often feminine, was a familiar and important narrative.
It is necessary for Zeus to prove himself as an ultimate warrior before he is enthroned as king
of the universe. He demonstrates his unrivaled strength and indomitability in battle, by
acquiring the primordial powers of thunder and lightning as weapons and forging crucial
alliances with gods of the first and second tier. However, Zeus’s victory is not attributable to
sheer brute strength, but to “shrewdness, skill and deceit.” There is no absolute hierarchy,
says Bonnefoy, so “wily intelligence and alert shrewdness” are essential qualities for a ruler
to protect his sovereignty (76).
Whereas the hegemony of Kronos addresses the struggle between order and disorder,
Zeus addresses the struggle between order and power. Kronos creates order through disorder
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and Zeus establishes law through rebellion. Under Zeus’s dominion, order and power are
now predicated on the need for justice. According to Bonnefoy, “Zeus combines in his
person the highest power and a scrupulous respect for justice” (78).
Paradoxically, it is Tricksterish rapaciousness, cunning, and deceit that ensure Zeus’
position as supreme ruler. Once enthroned, Zeus continues to utilize disguise and deception
to satisfy his sexual appetite by shapeshifting into animals (a swan, a bull, a cuckoo),
impersonating a king and a satyr, and transmogrifying into a flame and a golden shower of
light. The offspring of his dalliances results in heroes and demigods, as well as the Olympian
god, Dionysus. Thus, tricksterish behavior continues to be rewarded under the new mandate
for law and justice, which implies that tricksterism falls within the boundaries of the law and
is just.
The Sky God deity is above the law he establishes and the Trickster operates outside
or on the edge of the law. The Sky God interprets the law and dispenses justice, providing
himself with supreme power and giving some latitude for tricksterish behavior, though
primarily his own. However, tricksterism is punishable for deities such as Prometheus and
Hermes although their acts may benefit humanity (such as Prometheus bringing fire) or
contribute to the established order (such as Hermes’ role as hierophant), if the tricksterish
acts do not affirm the supremacy of the Sky God, who has little concern for mortals or their
quality of life.
The Canaanite Sky Gods
The Ugaritic myths are the primary source for Canaanite polytheism, which preceded
Israelite henotheism (belief in one god without denying the existence of others), and the
eventual adoption of monotheism. The proximity of Ugarit in time and place with ancient
Israel provides an insight into the indigenous deities of Western Semitic peoples (M. Smith
5) and the influence of Canaanite religion on Israelite religion and the eventual creation of
the Hebrew Bible.
According to L’Heureux, the Canaanite god El’s epithets describe a god of
extraordinary power including: “Creator of Created Things,” “the King, the Exalted Father,”
“the King, the Father of Luminaries.” The latter epithet, related to “ gleam” or “shine,” may
be derived from a Semitic root that is related to the Arabic ‘ilah, Aramaic ‘alah, and Hebrew
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elah, referring to lightning. “El” and its variants can also be translated as simply “God” (1618).
Dowden says that when new religious myths and practices pertaining to a reconceptualized deity overlay the old, identifying one god with another in a syncretic
relationship, the underlying religious phenomenon is often not so much replaced as competed
for by different religions (190). According to Fontenrose, the three Abrahamic religions,
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, have appropriated some conceptual form of El, who is also
associated with the Greek Kronos by Philo of Byblos in Phoenician mythology and
sometimes with Ouranos (277-279).
As was common to Bronze Age Mesopotamian mythologies, the Ugaritic pantheon is
organized as an assembly of gods described in Mark Smith’s examination of Ugaritic texts.
Centered around El, it is sometimes referred to as the “circle of El” or the “Divine Council.”
One of the main activities of the assembly is feasting, which serves as a “backdrop to
narrative action” (45). It is structured in four tiers, but our concern here is with the two upper
tiers. The first tier is comprised of El, who holds the highest office and wields ultimate
authority. He is joined by his consort and co-creator, Athirat, who may also influence his
decisions. Athirat successfully petitioned on behalf of Baal to obtain permission to build a
palace, and participate in the decision-making process such as choosing Baal as El’s
successor (45).
The second tier consists of the next generation of gods, descendents of El and
Athirat, described as the “the seventy sons of Athirat.” Among this generation are Anat,
Yamm, Mott, and Yahweh. All seventy sons are associated with geographical regions, and
have a general designation of “great gods.” Baal is also included in this grouping, but is
referred to as “the son of Dagon” not El. Paradoxically, Baal is able to claim some familial
relationship with El, however, and refers to him as “father” (M. Smith 45). The narratives
concerning conflict and battle feature the second tier deities, who are also associated with
nature and natural phenomenon, and who correlate with geographical regions.
The dearth of Ugaritic mythology obscures the nature of the succession from the High
God El (or Ilu) to the Sky God Baal. L’Heureux says that while there is evidence of
“tension” between El and Baal that surrounds the granting of permission by El for Baal to
build a palace (temple), there is no extant narrative in which Baal attacks El and deposes or
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dethrones him, although there has been scholarly conjecture that the missing fragments of the
clay tablets upon which the Ugaritic myths were inscribed, contained an episode in which
Baal (Storm), Yamm (Sea), and Mot (Death) dethroned El and divided the world between
them (18-19). Coogan, however, contends that the parallels between Baal’s victory over
Yamm with Marduk’s victory over Tiamat and, finally, the recounting of Yahweh’s victory
over the sea in the book of Job and other scattered verses, would suggest a rivalry between
brothers for the right to succession (77-78). Further, Coogan points out that El’s preeminence begins to dissipate as Baal ascends to power, although he seems to approve of the
succession and pays homage to Baal’s power. When Baal is defeated by Mot (Death), El
mourns: “Baal is dead; what will happen to the peoples” (109). Finally, El has a prophetic
dream about nature being restored to fecundity, which he interprets as a sign of Baal’s return.
Like a doting father, El sends the Sun Goddess to look for Baal, whose return portends his
accession to Supreme Ruler. El, like Kronos and Ouranos, becomes otiosus, and Baal “the
Conqueror,” the “Rider of the Clouds” takes the throne, but not by dethroning El. According
to L’Heureux, Baal acquires many of the epithets and characteristics of El but, suggested by
the evidence that El continued to have a distinct cult during the time that the Baal cult
dominated, Baal does not entirely replace El (67).
Simultaneously, however, Yahweh, a minor warrior storm god associated with a
region in South Arabia and pantheonic son of El, began to emerge as a major cultic deity who
eventually challenged and condemned the cult of Baal and abandoned the role of El’s heir.
There is no accession story for Yahweh in either the Ugaritic texts or the Hebrew
Bible, although the Genesis stories owe much to earlier Mesopotamian, Babylonian and
Egyptian traditions. The emergence of Yahweh as the Supreme God is a complex
syncreticism with El and, to a certain extent, Baal. The scholarship in this area is far from
consensus, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the various theories
surrounding the writing of the Hebrew Bible. According to L’Heureux, however, it can be
broadly inferred from the intertwining references to Yahweh and El as the god of the
Israelites that Yahweh absorbed many of El’s attributes and epithets (59).
The lack of an accession narrative and, moreover, the conquest of the warrior-god
over ancient cosmic enemies, is a departure from the traditional Bronze Age mythology. The
Genesis stories represent a powerful shift in the way God (as El or Elohim or Yahweh) would
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be perceived. Creation transpires without conflict and without personification of the ancient
watery cosmic enemy, which enhances the power of a god who simply speaks and his will is
accomplished in the Creation story of First Genesis. Mark Smith says this presentation is
especially powerful for an audience steeped in the traditional narratives of the “warrior-god’s
victories over the ancient cosmic enemies,” because it “assumes that the audience knows how
such stories convey its deity’s mastery over the universe,” which contributes to a
“monotheistic vision” (38).
The monotheistic vision evolved slowly. Israelite religion was henotheistic, which
acknowledged the existence of other deities, while worshiping only one. L’Heureux explains
that “Elohim,” is both the Hebrew word for “gods” and the name of the one God of Israel.
Evidence in the Old Testament indicates that throughout the time the Hebrew Bible was
being formed El traditions were dominant among the Canaanites (67). Baal, also, continued
to have a large and active cult (59). There is no consensus as to how Yahweh came to absorb
the El cult, or whether Yahweh is identical to El. However, it is evident that there was an
apparent affinity between Yahweh and El primarily because, as Yahwism emerged, Yahweh
never “split off” from El to become a distinct deity. Additionally, there is no polemic against
El, as there is against Baal, particularly in Deuteronomy, where the shift to monolatry
becomes codified (58-60) in what is considered a “Yahweh-alone” movement of the 7th
Century BCE and to a distinct class of scribes educated in a Judean “wisdom tradition”
(Barton and Muddiman 136).
The reification of the Sky God as the One God of monotheism precludes the existence
of other deities, including all the female goddesses and the Trickster. The attributes of
Yahweh (which, for the sake of simplicity, we will not differentiate from El) continue to
correspond with a warrior-god, the lawgiver, and master, creator and destroyer of the
universe. He is less distant than the High God, interacting with the nation of people with
whom he has chosen to create a covenant and to establish a divine moral code. The Trickster
is, thus, banished from divinity and relegated to the depths of earth and human psyche from
which he came.
Caldwell states that in the Hebrew and Christian Bible the Trickster is transmogrified
into Satan, the adversary of Yahweh (32). The existence of Satan resolves the problem of
where evil comes from when the universe is controlled by one all-powerful and all-good god;
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because Yahweh embodies all good, then Satan necessarily embodies all evil. There is,
however, no longer an embodiment of that which is simply incongruous. Incongruity is,
therefore, adjudged good or evil, serendipity or misfortune. Although the Trickster may be
removed from the sphere of the divine, tricksterish acts and personages persist in the realm of
the sacred texts.
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CHAPTER 5
SACRED COMEDY
God is a comedian, playing to an audience too afraid to laugh.
Voltaire
EASTERN AND WESTERN PERSPECTIVES
Evidence of humorous intention and embracement of the comic vision are prevalent
in world religion, although in some more than others. In general terms, the more doctrinally
rigid belief systems and hierarchically organized ecclesiastical institutions tend to be less
engaged with the comedic aspects of religious experience. Theologian John Morreall’s
exploration of the tragic and comic elements in world religions in Comedy, Tragedy and
Religion concludes that Eastern religions/philosophies (Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism,
and Taoism) subscribe to an essentially comic vision while the Western monotheistic
religions are chiefly tragic. Morreall contends that this is due to the Western “heroic concern
with the individual amid suffering” (71).
In Eastern religious thought, the problem of suffering has little to do with sin or
hamartia but is caused by ignorance or a “faulty perspective” (Morreall, Comedy 50).
Suffering is an inevitable part of existence and, according to the precepts of Buddhism, it is
our desires and attachments to life that cause us to suffer. Therefore, the way out of suffering
is through detaching from desire to achieve enlightenment.
According to Morreall, Western thought deals with suffering oppositely, as something
to be resisted, or battled and overcome. However, even at that, for Christians, Muslims, and
Jews, suffering cannot be eliminated unless it is God’s will and with God’s assistance,
resulting in salvation or redemption. The Western heroic model is the individual’s noble
struggle against suffering. But in Eastern thought, the hero can escape suffering by letting go
of the illusion of the individual self (Comedy 53).
The alternate view created through detachment is similar to that created by humorous
incongruity, which disengages from the familiar to offer new possibilities. Zen Buddhism
employs the nonsensical koan to intentionally create this disruption with the logic of the
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familiar world and provide the opportunity for enlightenment. According to Niebuhr, “a
sense of humor is a by-product of self-transcendence” (qtd. in Morreall, Comedy 140) and
enlightenment is often accompanied by laughter, both occurring with the same abruptness.
Thus, according to Blyth, while most religions tolerate laughter, Zen requires it (201).
Hinduism also holds to the principle that suffering is avoidable through
transcendence. Suffering is tied to karma, which, through rebirth, will eventually result in a
fortunate outcome. At the same time, says Morreall, Hinduism retains its pantheon in which
deities such as Krishna are characterized by their child-like playfulness and trickery (Comedy
56). The popular deity Ganesha, son of Shiva, is highly revered as “the Remover of All
Obstacles,” yet he is a somewhat ridiculous and deeply incongruous character. As portrayed
here in Figure 4, Ganesha has an elephant’s head and a human body with a large girth and is
most often portrayed riding on a rat. The interplay between the gods of the Hindu pantheon,
like the Greek, is mischievous but harmless in that the end effect is always beneficial.
Figure 4. Ganesha. Source: “Ganesha: A
Universally Loved Archetype.” Mind
Science News. Pillai Center. 24 Aug.
2010.Web. 16 Oct. 2012.
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According to some myths, Ganesha, lost his human head when his father Shiva cut it
off. To assuage his mother, Parvati, Shiva brought him back to life and gave him an elephant
head because it was the only one available. The elephant head, however, is central to his
divine purpose. First, the incongruity of the elephant-headed man as a divinity “stills the
rational mind…forcing one to look beyond outer appearances.” Though having an elephant
head would seem to indicate the opposite, Ganesha is also the god of wisdom and intellect,
who wrote the Mahabharata with his broken tusk (Marchand). His absurdity is what makes
him extraordinary and provides him with the attributes that are most venerated and, therefore,
most beneficial to his worshippers.
TRICKSTERISM
Most indigenous religions, characterized by variations and combinations of animism,
shamanism, pantheism and polytheism, subscribe to a comic vision even if they are a warrior
culture. One attribute that is common to these categories of religion is the presence of a
Trickster deity. As previously discussed, the Trickster provides a way for people to identify
with the uncertain and arbitrary nature of life. People engage with their particular Trickster
deity in a deeply humorous way that would be inappropriate for communion with other
deities. The ambiguous Trickster is not perceived as entirely divine, though, because he is
intrinsically carnal and an exemplar of human foibles.
Therefore, just as it is permissible for the Trickster to act inappropriately, express
repressed thoughts and emotions, and break taboos, it is permissible to engage with the
Trickster outside of social norms or religious propriety. The Trickster may be deemed
inferior and repulsive in one situation, sympathetic and sincere in another. One may apply the
taxonomy of humor theory to tricksterism in multiple ways. Trickster humor falls within the
category of the Superiority Theory because it actuates social control. It also serves to relieve
psychological tension, as propounded in the Relief Theory, by vicariously (and harmlessly)
breaking taboos. Finally, the Trickster embodies incongruity, ambiguity and paradox,
providing a means to identify with that abstruse part of existence.
Although the Trickster was eliminated as a deity in the emergence of monotheism,
tricksterism continued to surface as divine compunction and sanctified mortal behavior.
Despite the essentially tragic vision of western monotheist religions, religion scholars and
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theologians have increasingly sought humor and a comic vision in the Bible, which includes
tricksterism but also employs other humor techniques and conventions.
COMIC IRONY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT
In the introduction to his iconoclastic book, Ken’s Guide to the Bible, Ken Smith
describes Yahweh as the scariest thing in the Bible (16). According to Smith, Yahweh seems
to be motivated primarily by a need to maintain a tenuous position as:
...the one true god whose most defining characteristic is either inconsistency or an
incomprehensible logic in His dealings with humanity. He arbitrarily enforces
His own strictures based on no apparent moral or ethical standard and, with the
same caprice, dispenses rewards or penalties according to whomever pleases Him
or whom He has chosen to favor. (16)
In so far as Yahweh, as the central character of the Old Testament, incongruously
says one thing and, apparently, means another, it follows that the humor of the Old
Testament is primarily ironical.
According to Gilhus, at the rise of the cult of Yahweh and the adoption of
monotheism, women were excluded from participation in sacred ritual. The practices of the
Syrians and Canaanites included worship of the earth goddess and fertility rites, based on the
cycles of nature. These rites were sexual and included bouts of intense weeping when Baal
left the earth in autumn followed by ecstatic joy and laughter when he returned in spring.
Unlike the Canaanite god, Baal, “Yahweh did not indulge in comedy and joyful laughter, and
erotic ritual laughter was considered an abomination” (22-23). The early priests of Yahweh
condemned these practices, along with any acknowledgement of an earth goddess or worship
of Baal.
Gilhus says Yahweh was not a god of nature, but a god of history. The laughter of
Yahweh is derisive, rather than ecstatic or joyful, used to mock and ridicule, and “the biting
irony of the prophets belongs to the same context; the aim was to mock the destruction of
Yahweh’s enemies” (22-23).
Good characterizes irony is a language humor technique associated with the
superiority theory and “corrective humor.” It is explicitly or implicitly critical, pointing out
an incongruity between what “is” and what “ought” to be (Gilhus 30). A distinguishing
characteristic is its “stance in truth,” albeit “the truth” as the ironist sees it. According to
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Gilhus, it is “the vision of truth (that) prevents ironic criticism from being sarcastic or
nihilistic” (31). However, the use of double-edged speech, saying one thing and meaning
another, risks the failure of this recognition in its hearers, the misunderstanding of the
ironist’s criticism, and, consequently, a literal interpretation of the content of the statement
(31). This begs the question as to how much of Yahweh’s ludicrous dictates and capricious
behaviors were misinterpreted as literal, when their intention was ironical.
At the same time, it is not difficult to see why the violent and seemingly arbitrary
devastation found in the Old Testament would be interpreted as tragic, which, may be
attributed to misunderstanding the intended irony of a situation. However, many stories from
the Old Testament are clearly constructed as comedy. Likewise, comic character types and
techniques abound.
The creation stories of Genesis are widely regarded by Bible scholars as containing
two authoring voices called the Yahwist (“J”) and the Priestly writer (“P”). These stories
have been traditionally interpreted as tragic, bolstered in no small part by Milton’s epic
Paradise Lost, published in 1667. However, the two accounts fit easily into the comic
structure and contain many comedic elements.
In the first chapter of Genesis, Whedbee states, God provides “a hospitable context
for comedy” thematically in the act of bringing order to chaos, light to darkness, and the
overall appraisal of the creation as “good,” a word that is used repetitively to describe each
stage of formation (21). The orderly and beneficent world of God’s creation correlates with
the well-ordered and integrated society required for the first act of comedic plot structure.
The comic spirit revels in new life, fertility, and the expansiveness within the creative act.
According to Bible scholar, Daniel Russ: “The account unmistakably indicates that God
created a world pregnant with comic overtones” (qtd. in Whedbee 22). The potential for
comedy is signaled by the presence of incongruity that is “a pre-condition for comedy” (22).
Whedbee goes on to say that the source of incongruity in the creation stories lies in
“the paradoxical relationship” between the creator God and humankind, who are alike, in that
humans are created in the image of the creator, but unalike, in that humans are not divine
(22). The tension in an inequitable relationship, where one side holds absolute power over
the other, has inherent tragic and comic implications, redolent of the eiron and the alazon.
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The presence of incongruity and potential irony establishes the second criteria for comedy.
However, as Whedbee asks: “Is the joke on God or humanity?” (30)
Adam, himself, is an ambiguous creature, made from the dust of the earth and divine
breath (New Revised Standard Version, Gen. 2:7). He is given the task of caring for the
garden and giving a name to “every living creature” (New Revised Standard Version, Gen.
2:19). He is also invited “to eat freely of every tree of the garden” except one: the fruit of the
Tree Of The Knowledge Of Good And Evil, “for in the day that you eat of it, you shall die”
(New Revised Standard Version, Gen. 2:16-17). Adam, however, as we all well know, does
eat of that tree, eventually fulfilling the role of an eiron, and, further, functioning as a clown.
Adam is also somewhat of a clown who cannot resist doing the one thing that he is
not supposed to do. His act of eating the fruit is a god-like action that juxtaposes his inner
identity, born of the breath of God, over his outer earthen form, in the same way that a clown,
painted and costumed, parodies the behavior of a king. Both actions contradict the
established order and expose its shortcomings. Also, like a clown, Adam and his helpmate
are driven off for disrupting the nomos of the garden.
Traditionally, this event has been considered deeply tragic, because it marks the split
between man and God and eventually results in death for Adam and his helpmate. However,
the conclusion of this story does not meet the criteria for tragedy because there is some
reconciliation between Adam and God who, in providing them with clothes for their
nakedness, shows a continuing concern and relationship. More importantly, in the face of
God’s judgment and the prospect of death, Adam affirms life by naming his wife Eve (life),
“because she was the mother of all living” (New Revised Standard Version, Gen. 3:20). This
can be construed as either an act of defiance or an assertion that a new order has been
established – the upswing of Frye’s “U”- shaped plot structure. In either light, Adam has
succeeded in exposing God as less omnipotent and omniscient than He presents Himself to
be (in the nature of the alazon).
Just as Adam possesses many of the characteristics of the clown, Jacob is widely
regarded as a trickster and also has roguish tendencies. The name “Jacob” literally translates
as “heel grabber” referring to the story of his birth wherein he was born holding onto the heel
of his brother, Esau. According to Susan Niditch, Jacob’s birth is consistent with the
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trickster’s characteristic “unusual birth” (qtd. in Whedbee 95). The story is prophetic, as
Jacob cheats Esau out of his birthright.
Analyzing the text semiotically, one would find a theme of “doubleness” or duplicity,
beginning in the birth story with its twin motif. Jacob and Esau are twins, but opposite in
appearance, personality and intelligence. There are also the two sisters, Rachel and Leah,
who become Jacob’s two wives, two handmaidens who become secondary wives, two sevenyear stints working for his father-in-law. Duplicity implies incongruity, but also disguise,
which is how Jacob steals his brother’s birthright.
In this story, Jacob plays the role of the trickster to Esau’s role of simpleton. Esau is
noted to be a “skillful hunter” and “a man of the field,” in contrast with Jacob who “lives in
the tents” (New Revised Standard Version, Gen. 25:27).
As the story goes, one day Jacob is cooking a stew when Esau returns from the fields.
He asks for some stew, but Jacob refuses to give him stew unless Esau trades him for his
birthright. Esau agrees and walks away with a full stomach and no inheritance (New Revised
Standard Version, Gen. 25:26-33). Jacob, however, must still get his father’s blessing. When
Isaac, now old and infirm, calls for Esau to give him his blessing, Jacob responds, covering
his arms with animal furs, mimicking Esau’s hairiness, to fool Isaac (New Revised Standard
Version, Gen. 27:18-29). The classic comic triad of trickster, dupe and innocent victim would
seem more likely to occur in theatrical text than a sacred one, but even more ludicrous is the
fact that Jacob not only succeeds in obtaining his blessing, but it doesn’t seem to matter to
God that he used deception to get it.
The injured party here is, of course, Esau. At first, he is intent on killing Jacob, but
Rebekah intervenes and sends Jacob away to ensure his safety. In the end, Esau
magnanimously welcomes Jacob and his family home after fourteen years, which provides
the upswing of the comedic plot arc.
A unique characteristic of Yahweh’s involvement in the affairs of humans is His last
minute rescue or reversal of a potentially tragic situation. In classical theatre, this type of
ending is called a deus ex machina or “god from machine,” named for an actual machine
used by Greeks and Romans that lowered actors playing gods onto the stage. This type of
ending never quite seems to fit within the logic of the play, and therefore seems contrived.
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The deus ex machina is a mainstay of comedy, as it mobilizes the upswing away from a
tragic ending.
One of the most extravagant examples of Yahweh’s last minute interventions occurs
in the story of Isaac and Abraham. Yahweh tells Abraham to take Isaac “to the land of
Moriah and offer him as a burnt offering on a mountain that I will tell you” (New Revised
Standard Version, Gen. 22:2). It is a horrific request. However, in the case of Isaac, whose
name means laughter, and who was the long awaited child of Abraham and Sarah who
Yahweh, Himself, claimed to have put into Sarah’s womb, is almost inconceivably ironical
(New Revised Standard Version, Gen. 21). Having tested Abraham’s devotion, Yahweh
relents at the last moment by providing and allowing him to substitute a ram. Yahweh’s
penchant for deliverance, often in connection with sacrifice, is incongruously comedic
compared to His assiduously tragic nature.
Irony can be tragic or comic. Tragedy moves toward the inevitable and the credible.
It does not conceal anything and, in its dramatic form, the irony comes from the audience
knowing what is going to happen while the characters do not. Therefore, according to
Northrop Frye, “when the tragic ending comes, it impresses us as inevitable and we say to
ourselves, ‘yes, that kind of thing can and does happen,” and in that way reconcile ourselves
with the tragic ending. In comedy, however, there is always an element of the unexpected
and a reversal. Like the deus ex machina, what we often get is a gimmick, “some card up the
writer’s sleeve” where the action is suddenly twisted away from the approaching tragic
consequences and into the happy ending (196).
The twist delivered by Yahweh in the story of Isaac occurs again in the story of Jesus
who is allowed to die but is then resurrected. The tragic sacrifice is transformed into joyous
rebirth. Nevertheless, the story of Jesus has been interpreted by most Christian dominations
as tragic with particular focus on his suffering and sacrifice. However, Jesus is arguably the
most comedic personage of the Bible.
THE COMEDY OF JESUS
Knapp contends that the question of whether or not Jesus possessed a sense of humor
did not seem to merit much consideration until the twentieth century and has been more often
deemed irreverent or trifling than a topic worthy of inquiry (201-207). The reasons for this
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eschewal have to do with the way Christians have interpreted the New Testament and the
way in which the gospels were written.
Elton Trueblood argues in The Humor of Christ that Christians have overlooked
Jesus’ use of humor due to “a misguided piety that has made us fear that acceptance of His
obvious wit and humor would somehow be mildly blasphemous or sacrilegious” (166). As a
result, we have developed a false character of Jesus who is “mild in manner, endlessly
patient, grave in speech, and serious almost the point of dourness” (167). This is in large part
due to the emphasis that has been placed on the “tragedy of the crucifixion” and the events
leading up to it (170). This emphasis, though, is not without cause.
Knapp says the process through which Jesus’ teachings were recorded involved a
compacting of the oral transmission, a gradual selection of salient points, and a rejection of
those considered non-essential, which would naturally tend to eliminate lighter thoughts or
off-hand expressions (201-207). The gospels provide spare and often contradictory details
about Jesus’ life, and the argument can be made that Jesus’ life is far less significant than
Jesus’ death in Christian ideology. The mission of the apostles, including the writers of the
gospels, was to evangelize, which would shape the ways in which the accounts of his
teaching and his life are characterized.
The gospel of Mark, according to Louis Ruprecht, is “performed” in a Greek tragic
form, structured as a Hegelian vertical tragedy, in which the collision of wills occurs in
Gethsemane. The gods will fate, and destiny is what man makes of that fate (2). Jesus
wrestles with his fate, praying to the “Father, (Abba) for you all things are possible, remove
this cup from me: yet, not what I want, but what you want” (New Revised Standard Version,
Mark 14:36). Jesus, from all indications, is met with silence that continues through the
crucifixion as Jesus cries out from the cross, “My God, my God (Eloi), why have you
forsaken me?” (New Revised Standard Version, Mark 15:34).
Mark introduces definitive statements of God at the beginning, middle, and end of
what Ruprecht describes as his performance in true Aristotelian fashion. The “extraordinary
communion Jesus enjoys with God” as his “Beloved Son” (New Revised Standard Version,
Mark 1:11, 9:7) along with Jesus’ unmitigated faith in prayer, sets up “carefully cultivated”
expectations that God will respond and rescue Jesus (Ruprecht 11-12). The most ancient
authorities, according to the New Revised Standard Bible, end Mark at chapter sixteen, verse
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eight with the frightened disciples gathered outside the empty tomb, with a tragic or, at
minimum, ambiguous outcome. Mark is the only gospel that doesn’t provide an ending,
which, according to Aristotelian form, anticipates comedy to resolve or synthesize the
tragedy (Ruprecht 1-25).
The presence of tragic themes in the New Testament does not preclude the presence
of comedy, however. Comedy is the complement of tragedy, not the opposite. The tragedy
of Gethsemane and Golgotha does not abrogate the humor found elsewhere in the New
Testament. Nor does the fact that the gospels and the Christian church make little indication
of Jesus’ humor mean that it non-existent. The proponents of re-envisioning Jesus’
character with wit and mirth have grown exponentially over the last half of the twentieth
century.
There is probably no category of comic type that has not been assigned to Jesus by
scholars and theologians who advance the comic vision of Christianity. Hyers and Morreall
particularly have applied secular comedy taxonomy and conventions to Christological studies
and the tone of Jesus’ ministry. Reinhold Niebuhr, Donald Capps, Asa Berger, Elton
Trueblood, Samuel Joeckel and others have explored the implications for Christianity in
adopting a comic interpretation of New Testament writings. Additionally, those mentioned
above and others, such as Earl F. Palmer, provide discussion of Jesus’ sense of humor and
laughter and, with Stewart, the identification of Jesus and subsequent Christian sects known
as the “Holy Fool.”
The wit and humor of Jesus described by Trueblood possess the attributes of irony
and exaggeration, which fall under Berger’s classification of language humor. Trueblood
provides an example of ironic humor in Jesus interactions with Simon Peter, whom Jesus
nicknames “Rocky” (Petros) though in the gospel accounts, Simon Peter is particularly
wavering in his faith. The use of irony may be suggestive of the Superiority Theory. The
incongruity of Peter’s name with his nature would presumably cause laughter. Joeckel
observes that the Superiority Theory would presume that this laughter was scornful and
possibly aggressive (415-433). However, Trueblood contends that Jesus was not capable of
“bitterness or the attempt to harm” and posits that this sort of ironic humor leads to
“unmasking of error and, thereby, the emergence of truth” (Trueblood qtd. in Joeckel 418).
The question of what sort of ironic humor denigrates and what sort liberates would have to be
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contextual. Joeckel contends that Jesus’ message of compassion and humility would be
contrary to a sense of superiority through the negation of another’s folly or aggressive humor
(415-433). Also to be considered is the close relationship between Jesus and his most
beloved disciple that would preclude the intent to harm. However, there are many instances
in which Jesus’ humor could be considered subversive and aggressive when aimed at those
opposed him and his mission.
Acting as the “Son of God,” “Lord of the Sabbath,” and “Messiah,” Jesus is able to
break the law of Judaism and God, thereby challenging the nomos.8 His actions, such as
turning over the tables of the moneylenders, and words of derision toward all manner of
authority are less subversive than his claim to be the Son of God and, potentially, the
Messiah, which flies in the face of the Jewish expectation of the Messiah as a great Warrior
King from the line of David, who will lead them out of oppression and establish a Jewish
empire. A Nazarene carpenter riding on the back of an ass accompanied by his followers,
who are members of the lower class and unsavory elements of society, riding in triumphal
procession to reclaim Jerusalem is utterly ludicrous.
Jesus spared no derision or scorn when it came to Scribes and Pharisees. Trueblood
observes that the entire chapter of Matthew 23 consists of a public tirade against them
without the veil of irony. Rather, Jesus openly insults them using derogatory epithets such as
“hypocrites,” “blind guides,” “blind fools,” and “brood of vipers” (New Revised Standard
Version, Matt. 23:13, 16, 17, 33) and describes them as “white washed tombs... full of the
bones of the dead and all kinds of filth” (27). Trueblood points to these passages as
examples that Jesus possessed a robust wit, which was bound to elicit laughter. Jesus’ remark
that the scribes and Pharisees “strained out the gnat but swallowed a camel” (New Revised
Standard Version, Matt. 23:24) surely must have caused a titter among the crowds and his
disciples if for no other reason than its sheer ludicrousness due to the camel’s extreme size in
their world view, and cloven hoof, rendering it non-kosher (24).
As illustrated in the above example, Jesus was also inclined to employ hyperbole,
which was particularly abundant in Hebrew poetry as well as in common speech (Palmer 66;
8
It should be noted here that Jesus does not see himself as breaking God’s law, but fulfilling it by
embodying the nomos, and rectifying the failure of mankind to obey the nomos.
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Schökel 168). Jesus transmitted his teachings orally, using the poetic idioms and rhythms of
his culture, the same as found in the books of the Old Testament. Berger defines hyperbole,
as an exaggeration that is not intended to be understood literally and combined with absurdity
it becomes humorous (Anatomy 34). Hyperbole, according to Ballantine, is similar to humor
in that it has the effect of surprising an audience, which causes an immediate reaction (such
as laughter), and creates a strong impression (446-456).
There are several examples of hyperbole in Jesus’ rhetoric such as “it is easier for a
camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God”
(New Revised Standard Version, Luke 18:25). Other hyperbolic rhetoric is found in his
admonishment to pluck out an eye or cut off a hand (or foot) and throw it away if it causes
you to sin (New Revised Standard Version, Matt. 5:29, 30 and 18:8, 9); to “take the log out of
your own eye, (so) you can see clearly to take the speck out of your neighbor’s eye” (New
Revised Standard Version, Matt. 7:5); and, finally, to forgive not “until seven times; but,
until seventy times seven” (New Revised Standard Version, Matt. 8:22).
Jesus’ teachings also abound in parables, metaphors, and paradoxes that, constructed
ambiguously, defy literal interpretation and lend themselves to humor (Ballantine 446-456).
His expressions are imaginative and clever, while his interactions with others reveal a quick
wit, such as in Matthew 22:17 when Pharisees attempt to trick him into incriminating himself
by asking whether it was legal to pay tribute to the emperor. He obtained a coin and asked
whose likeness was on it, answering them to pay to the emperor the things of the emperor
and to God what is God’s, thus, according to Knapp, slipping out of the trap (201-207), but
making the point that tribute must be paid to God as king. Kirkland contends that Jesus’ use
of parables, which also translated as “riddles,” is probably the most notable and significant
characteristic of his teachings (1-21).
Parables are used pedagogically to illustrate an abstract lesson, such as a moral or
religious principle, through a succinct allegorical story or material comparison. In a sense,
the teacher (or teller) masks instruction, which may address uncomfortable truths with vital
knowledge or wisdom, behind that which is familiar, less threatening and more palatable.
Like a joke, a parable may seem trite on the surface. However, a profound or universal truth
lies beneath, which may be difficult or impossible to access directly. The parable, then, is
not intended to obfuscate but to illuminate. Jesus’ use of parables, however, serves the dual
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purpose of revealing truth and shrouding the truth, creating a tricksterish paradox, through
which he simultaneously includes and excludes.
In the Synoptic Gospel accounts of Jesus’ telling of “the Parable of the Sower” Jesus
tells his listeners, with slight variations between the gospels, that whoever has ears to hear,9
even though he is aware that most, if any, will not be able to understand (hear and hear) the
parable. The disciples, also, are unable to understand what his parable is about (New Revised
Standard Version, Mark 4:10: Luke 8:9) or why he is speaking in parables (New Revised
Standard Version, Matt. 13:10) and need explanations, which Jesus provides to them in
private (New Revised Standard Version, Mark 4:33-34). Jesus also tells the disciples that they
are allowed to know “the secrets of the Kingdom of God,” (New Revised Standard Version,
Luke 8:10) even though the disciples are unable to “hear” or “perceive” the parables
themselves.
In Matthew’s account, Jesus tells the disciples that he speaks in parables to fulfill the
prophesy of Isaiah, reifying his divinity. The accounts in Mark and Luke do not mention the
prophesy but reiterate: “...I speak in parables so that looking, they may not perceive and
listening, they may not understand” (New Revised Standard Version, Luke 8:10), and “so that
they may not turn again and be forgiven” (New Revised Standard Version, Mark 4:12).
Although Jesus’ intentions here have been the subject of much theological and Christological
debate, there is consensus is that Jesus purposely shrouds his truth in mystery, which creates
a separation between those who can comprehend his truth and those who cannot. There is
also evidence that the parables can surprise someone into comprehending the truth, by
abruptly upending their entrenched false assumptions.
Jesus’ ultimate paradoxical dilemma is that he is the truth he reveals and he must
preserve his liminality to do so. Thus, Jesus often seems to be negotiating a position from
which he can assert his divinity while maintaining his humanity. This is illustrated by Jesus’
position in a boat on the sea speaking (in parables) to the crowd on the shore. He does not
stand on the water like a divinity but neither does he sit in the sand with the mortals. His use
of parables shields him from the world, but also shields the world from him.
9
“He who has ears to hear, let him hear!” (New Revised Standard Version, Mark 4:9) “Let anyone who
has ears to hear listen!” (New Revised Standard Version, Luke 8:8)
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Jesus possesses several other characteristics of a trickster. He has an unusual birth and
lives as an outsider. He performs supernatural feats (miracles), and does not die, although
killed. He is not animalistic, but has an association with animals through his birthplace in the
stable, and he is lowborn according to the cultural standards. Jesus’ future apostle Nathaniel
asks him, “Can anything good come out of Nazareth?” (New Revised Standard Version, John
1:46). Jesus also lacks the voracious appetite typical of a trickster, who would never even
entertain the idea of celibacy, but it is interesting to note that Jesus is criticized several times
for eating and drinking excessively (New Revised Standard Version, Matt. 9:14-15, 11:19,
12:1-8; Mark 2:18-19, 23-28; Luke 5:33-34, 6:1-5, 7:34). After his resurrection, Jesus
reveals himself to his disciples asking if they have anything to eat (New Revised Standard
Version, Luke 24:41-43).
Jesus also acts the jester role of the trickster by subverting the status quo, mocking the
religious establishment, and uttering statements like “whoever exalts himself will be
humbled, and whoever humbles himself will be exalted” (New Revised Standard Version,
Matt. 23:12); “many who are first will be last, and the last shall be first and the first shall be
last” (New Revised Standard Version, Mark 10:31); and “Blessed are the meek, for they shall
inherit the earth” (New Revised Standard Version, Matt. 5:5). This theme of reversal where
the high are brought low, and the low brought high, is fundamental to comedy (Hyers,
Laughter 41). The claim to divinity as the Son of God and the Messiah is, therefore, the most
subversive and comedic aspect of Jesus. It is comedically appropriate that Simon Peter, the
most simple-minded of the apostles, was the first to recognize and declare Jesus the Messiah
and Son of the living God” (New Revised Standard Version, Matt. 16:16). For this
revelation, Jesus names him “the Rock” and, effecting another ironic reversal, decrees that
this is the Rock upon which he will build his church. He also bestows upon him the “Keys to
the Kingdom,” which Jesus holds in secrecy10, and powers that extend beyond the natural to
supernatural world (New Revised Standard Version, Matt. 16:19).
Interactions between Jesus and Peter consistently exhibit comedic characteristics. A
few examples, recounted here as comedic scenarios, illustrate the timbre of this association.
10
See above discussion of parables.
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First, Jesus, fully transfigured, walks across the stormy Galilean sea to the boat where Peter
and the other disciples struggle to make crossing. The other disciples are, understandably
shaken and fearful at the sight of this specter, but Peter asks Jesus to let him walk on water
with him. Peter steps out of the boat and walks toward Jesus, but begins to sink as he
becomes aware of his situation. Jesus rescues him, chiding him for losing faith and sinking.
They return to the boat together and the storm immediately subsides. After being duly
worshipped, Jesus and the disciples, presumably, go on their way (New Revised Standard
Version, Matt. 14:25-32).
In the next example, Jesus, facing his imminent demise, washes the feet of the
disciples in a gesture of their bond. Peter seems confused by this act, typically performed by
a woman or a servant, and asks Jesus if he plans to wash his feet. Jesus tells Peter that he is
and that he will understand his actions later. Peter, still apparently befuddled, refuses to
allow Jesus to wash his feet until Jesus tells him that either he washes Peter’s feet or he will
have nothing more to do with him. Peter, understanding that message clearly, agrees to not
only have his feet washed, but to get his head and hands washed as well. Jesus responds that
he will wash his feet and nothing more (New Revised Standard Version, John 13:2-10).
The final example is a more complicated story and less humorous but comedic in its
irony and in its positive outcome. Jesus tells the disciples he will not be with them much
longer and that where he goes they cannot follow. Peter, unsurprisingly, is dissatisfied with
Jesus’ vague description of his departure and asks him where he is going. Jesus again
answers ambiguously that he is going where he cannot be followed, but adds that he can be
followed later. Peter is, apparently, loathe to be left behind and insists he wants to come with
him now, and tries to bolster his position by proclaiming he will lay down his life for Jesus.
Jesus knows that this is an empty boast and tells Peter he will deny even knowing him three
times before morning.
Peter not only denies knowing Jesus, as predicted, but can’t even stay awake to keep
watch as Jesus requests (New Revised Standard Version, Mark 14:33, 37). Nevertheless,
Peter tries to save Jesus from arrest by attacking one of his captors with a sword, ironically
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cutting off an ear (New Revised Standard Version, John 18:10).11 Jesus, however, apparently
does not appreciate Peter’s valor and rebukes him for his action, then heals the ear,
apparently mid-arrest. After Jesus is resurrected, however, he and Peter are reconciled and
Jesus charges him with the mission of caring for Jesus’ followers, as Jesus had said he would.
The most significant aspect of Jesus’ trickster qualities with regard to this study,
however, is his liminality. Like the shaman, Jesus is initiated into his calling through
deprivation that causes a break between him and the natural world. This is not to say that
Jesus experienced the customary mental break of the shamanic initiate. However, Jesus did
renounce (as he later demanded of his disciples) his former life, ties to family and society,
and, to a great extent, his own humanity. In this liminal state, Jesus, like the shaman, can
serve as the mediator between the two.
Similar to the shaman’s duties, Jesus focuses much of his attention on healing and
performing exorcisms. However, he also performs demonstrations of mastery over the
natural world with miracles such as calming the storm (New Revised Standard Version, Matt.
8:23-27; Mark 4:35-41; Luke 8:22-25), walking on water (New Revised Standard Version,
Matt. 14:22-33; Mark 6:45-52; John 6:16-24), and feeding a multitude of people from a few
loaves of bread and fish (New Revised Standard Version, Matt. 14:13-21; Matt. 6:30-44;
Luke 9:10-17; John 6:1-15 and Matt. 15:29-39; Mark 8:1-10). He often miraculously
provides sustenance for his followers, but other miracles, such as cursing the fig tree, finding
the coin in a fish’s mouth to pay tax, and turning water into wine are more difficult to
contextualize. In a comic purview, the latter holds the most significance.
The first miracle Jesus performed in the book of John took place at a wedding in Cana
soon after he began his ministry. Utilizing a composite of the four accounts, Jesus would
have already been baptized and recognized as the Son of God by John, (New Revised
Standard Version, Matt. 3:13-17, Mark 1:9-11, Luke 3:21-22, John 1:29-34) and endured his
forty days of fasting and the temptation of Satan in the wilderness (New Revised Standard
Version, Luke 1:13, Mark 1:12-14, Matt. 4:1-11) at which time he returned to Galilee.
11
See discussion of parables above.
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On the third day, there was a wedding in Cana of Galilee, and the mother of Jesus
was there. Jesus and his disciples had also been invited to the wedding. When the
wine gave out, the mother of Jesus said to him, “They have no wine.” And Jesus
said to her, “Woman, what concern is that to you and to me? My hour has not yet
come.” His mother said to the servants, “Do whatever he tells you.” Now
standing there were six stone water jars for the Jewish rites of purification, each
holding twenty or thirty gallons. Jesus said to them, “Fill the jars with water.”
And they filled them up to the brim. He said to them, “Now draw some out, and
take it to the chief steward.” So they took it. When the steward tasted the water
that had become wine, and did not know where it came from (though the servants
who had drawn the water knew), the steward called the bridegroom and said to
him, “Everyone serves the good wine first, and the inferior wine after the guests
have become drunk. But you have kept the good wine until now.” Jesus did this,
the first of his signs, in Cana of Galilee, and revealed his glory; and his disciple
believed in him. (New Revised Standard Version, John 2:1-12)
Grassi and Haupt agree that conventional scholarship pertaining to this passage
interprets it as an allegory for the establishment of a new covenant between God and man
through Jesus (Grassi 131-136; Haupt 75-83). Additionally, Flowers states that some
scholarship suggests that the story of the wedding has no historical basis and is built from
Synoptic verses, such as putting new wine in old wineskins, and the wine of the Kingdom
(207-236). There is also the consideration that John may have been influenced by the
Dionysian mysteries.
Henry Staten lays out the arguments of Rudolph Bultmann and C.K. Barrett in
support of a link between the miracle at Cana and the mysteries, which he finds highly
suggestive. Quoting Barrett, Staten says not only is Dionysus “the cause of miraculous
transformations of water into wine” but also Philo spoke of the Logos in “pseudo-Dionysiac
terminology” (50). Additionally, Staten notes Bultmann’s reference to the records of the
early church, which dates the marriage as raking place on January 6th, coinciding with the
Dionysian feast. January 6th was also later celebrated with the Feast of the Ephiphany (50).
Considering, also, that the miracle at Cana is the only miracle that has no parallel in the
Synoptic tradition and that “John makes it the first of Jesus’ miracles, as Lazarus will be the
last,” Staten concludes, “the Dionysian associations are particularly striking” (50).
In “The Fourth Gospel and the Struggle for Respectability,” Ernest Cadman Colwell
describes Christianity as disreputable and odious to Roman society. Jesus and his followers
were associated with the lower classes and, worse, accused of being magicians for the many
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miraculous healings and exorcisms that he had performed. According to Colwell, the story
of Jesus’ career was especially repugnant to the cultured pagans of Roman society who
considered magic a “monstrous art” and legislated against it and its practitioners repeatedly.
John made it a point in his writings to remove the offending sinners, tax collectors,
prostitutes or other immoral sorts as well as accounts of exorcisms and limits the number of
miracles (286-305).
The performance of the miracle at the wedding at Cana has a ritualistic quality not
found in most of Jesus’ other miracles, which could revert to the Dionysian mysteries.
Insinuating Jesus into this kind of familiar narrative and associating him with a popular deity
would undoubtedly aid in assuaging some of the rancor toward him and his followers. If
Jesus is performing magic, he is performing domestic, sustenance-giving magic associated
with the ecstatic properties of wine, which is far less threatening to Roman society (Colwell
286-305). Setting the story in a wedding celebration would also tend to lessen resistance
toward it, as weddings are commonly associated with comedy. Frye observes that comedies
often conclude with a wedding celebration uniting the hero and heroine in the formation of a
new and inclusive society (163-165). At the same time, weddings celebrate joy, love,
romance, harmony, accommodation, and hope for the future, which are qualities valued by
the comic vision. Whether created by divine inspiration or John’s machinations, the story of
the miracle at the wedding at Cana has immense comic potential.
If we should apply the U-shape comedic paradigm devised by Northrop Frye to the
Bible, we would designate the Bible as a comedic. It begins with an idyllic world, a world
where man is integrated with nature and the divine, a “fall,” as the curve of the “U” turns
downward, and then is restored to the things he lost. In Judaism, it is a restoration of Israel,
which is to be restored at the end of history. The Christian Bible focuses on Adam who,
symbolically, loses the tree and the water of life. Says Frye, “On practically the last page of
the Book of Revelation, the prophet has a vision of a tree and the water of life restored to
man” (22). Jesus, as the “Last Adam” provides reconciliation and synthesis.
THE COMEDY AND TRAGEDY OF ISLAM
Ze’ev Maghen provides a comprehensive argument in “The Merry Men of Medina:
Comedy and Humanity in the Early Days of Islam,” based on the classical sources of the
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Islamic canon, that there was much humor and jocularity among Muhammad and his
followers, which is intrinsic to the foundations they laid for Islam. Maghen contends that
modern Western scholarship has overlooked the humor in the Quran and Hadith because of
Westerners’ long held beliefs that Islam is not only devoid of humor but is “humor’s
diametric antithesis and nemesis” (284). English language scholarship regarding the
humorous characteristics of Muhammad’s personality has been scant described by Maghen
as mere passing and brief allusions made by authors who were treating other matters (282).
As examples, Maghen cites Franz Rosenthal acknowledgement that Muhammad was known
to be “cheerful,” Charles Pellát’s mention that Muhammad “laughed and joked on several
occasions,” and quotes Ulrich Marzolph elaboration:
The Prophet Muhammad...was quite a humorous person himself. He is known to
have taken particular pleasure in playing funny pranks (on) his contemporaries,
occasionally laughing so intensely his molar teeth showed. (282)12
Instead, scholarship, led by Rosenthal in Humor in Early Islam, has focused on
second and third century of Islam and Arabic jesters such as “Ash’ab the Greedy” and “Jubā”
who, as popular comedians and entertainers of “free and fun-loving” Arab culture, are
contrasted with Alfred Von Kremer’s description of “the morose and fanatical legalists and
theologians of Islam (who) sought to plunge the whole world into the dark by-paths of
ascetic seclusion” (Maghen 282-3).13 However, according to Maghen, the ideal Muslim
community, as framed by Muhammad and His Companions, is “relaxed, cheerful,
jocular...feisty and frolicsome (278).”
Islamic beliefs about the value of humor are ambiguous, based on the scriptures of the
Quran, and the example of the Prophet Muhammad recorded in the Hadith. There are
passages that alternatively seem to condemn and to extol humor and laughter. The Quran
says, “...it is He (Allah) who grants laughter and tears” (The Holy Quran 53:43). Marzolph
claims that according to Islamic beliefs, if Allah created and intended laughter, it is within
12
See Rosenthal, Franz. Humor in Early Islam, Leiden: E.L. Brill, 1956. Pellát, Charles. “Seriousness and
Humor in Islam.” Islamic Studies 2 (1963) 353-362; Marzolph, Ulrich. “The Qoran and Jocular Literature.”
Arabica 47/3 (2000) 478-87.
13
See Von Kremer, Alfred. The Orient Under the Caliphs, trans. Khuda Bush. Philadelphia: Porcupine
Press, 1920.
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the scope of human behavior (335). However, contextualized in the commentary by Sunni
scholar Imam al-Qurtubī, the pro-humor interpretation is even stronger:
The Prophet, may God’s peace be upon him, once passed a group of his
Companions and they were laughing. He turned to them and said: “If you knew
what I knew you would laugh little and weep much!” He walked on and Gabriel
appeared to him, and said: “Oh Muhammad! God says to you: “Verily it is He that
makes men laugh and makes them weep.” The Prophet returned to those
Companions and said: “I hadn’t walked forty steps when Gabriel appeared to me
and commanded me: ‘Go back to them and say: “It is God who makes men laugh
and weep!” (qtd. in Maghen 294)14
Maghen’s rendering of the passage has Muhammad walking along thinking, perhaps
about the serious portent of the Final Hour for humanity when he is jarred by the
“comparatively frivolous behavior of his knee-slapping disciples, and reprimands them.” God
then reprimands Muhammad for being “a killjoy and spoiling the party” as there is a time to
laugh and a time to weep and “God is responsible for and therefore present in both
activities.”
The number of incidences in which Muhammad is portrayed as laughing, smiling and
joking in the commentaries is staggering. He is also found “regularly urging his followers to
“...let down their hair and make merry with friends, parents, spouses, children, and the family
as a whole.” Another commentary by Ghazzi describes the Companions coming to
Muhammad to discuss a funny fellow among them in a condemnatory tone and were told by
the Prophet: “You may be surprised to hear that he will laugh all the way into heaven” (qtd.
in Maghen 294).15
Clearly laughter and humor are not themselves problematic for the Islam that
Muhammad envisioned. However, certain types of laughter and humor were condemned by
the Quran and, ostensibly, Muhammad, such as laughing at others derisively, sarcasm,
ridicule, and using derogatory nicknames (The Holy Quran 49:11) because of the damage it
causes to the unity of the community of believers (Marzolph 335).
For this reason, there is much discussion about the type of laughter Muhammad
expressed. According to the Hadith, although Muhammad liked to laugh, he never laughed
14
Qurtabī, Jāmi’, XVII, 92.
15
Ghazzi, Murāh, 21.
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aggressively. He would “smile benevolently, giggle understandingly, or laugh as an act of
relief.” He was also reported to have laughed raucously or “until one could see his molar
teeth.” He also enjoyed playing harmless practical jokes (Marzolph 335), which will not be
reviewed herein for the reason expressed by Franz Rosenthal: “the humor of a civilization
different from ours as a rule does not seem humorous” (qtd. in Maghen 285).
Maghen points out that the second passage that is often used to bolster Islam’s antihumor propensity has to do with the occasion when Muhammad cautions Abū Hurayra to
“laugh little, for too much laughter kills the heart” and declaring that “buffoonery is a
temptation of the devil and subterfuge of caprice.” This reproof is mitigated when brought
into the context of other narratives that claim Abū Hurayra was unrestrained in his jesting
(277-340). According to Marzolph, Muhammad seemed to favor the kind of moderation
Aristotle proposed in Ethics, which was translated into Arabic in the ninth century (335).
Further, Marzolph says that the early Islamic author, al Jahiz, argued for a balance
between seriousness and humor, proposing that serious matters should be discussed “as long
as readers or listeners could focus their attention,” then to present humorous narratives to
“liven up serious discourse” and provide a relaxing interlude before returning to serious
topics (335). This, too, bears a resemblance to the Greeks practice of interspersing comedy
with tragedy at the City Dionysia.
Humor, jokes and jesters flourished in early Islamic culture, including anecdotes
about the Islamic tenets and caliphs.16 A five-volume encyclopedia of anecdotes and jokes
compiled by al-Abi includes comic types such as parasites and greedy persons. Marzolph
observes that the topics of jokes included crazy and stingy people, transvestites and
homosexuals, preachers, thieves and fanatics. Al-Abi’s encyclopedia also chronicles a
“considerable degree of tolerance in terms of a humorous approach to the contradictions of
social life (336). Perlmann says there were several notable jesters, but the earliest was Ash’ab
the Greedy, who performed in Medina. Ash’ab the Greedy’s humor shows a “frivolous slant
against political and religious powers...misapplication of scriptural verses, and jokes about
traditions” (441).
16
Literally, “successor” or “representative,” caliphs are the successors of Muhammad and a topic that
divides the Sunni, Shi’ite and Kurdish muslims for ideological and historical reasons.
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According to Beeman, similar performers perpetuate these traditions that continue to
nurture the comic vision, through theatrical productions performed primarily in rural areas
(506-526) as well as in the Islamic diaspora. Chelkowski concurs, stating:
Despite the strong and consistent objections of Islamic theologians to the
representational arts, indigenous theatrical forms such as puppetry, shadow plays,
improvised comedies, traditional storytelling and even passion plays have not
only existed but thrived in Islam for centuries. These theatrical modalities have
been related to holidays, seasonal and religious festivals and occasions such as
weddings, births and circumcisions. (45)
In a study of humor performance and its effect on audience interaction, Beeman
observed traditional rural Iranian improvisational theatrical performances over a period of
three years (506-526). While the study itself is not salient here, the observations of the
performances illuminate the comic traditions that co-exist with modern conservative Islamic
doctrine.
The primary character is a clown figure dressed and made-up to contrast the other
characters who generally consist of a hajji (merchant), a woman (played by a man), a youth,
a king, courtiers and other specialized roles, such as a doctor. The characters and
improvisational nature of the performances, Chelkowski says, bear great similarity to the
Italian Commedia dell’Arte (45-69). The quality of the performance depends on the
interaction of the performers, particularly the clown, who is the central character of the
performances, and “fulfills the classic, universal role of the trickster” (Beeman 506-526).
Beeman observes that the clown usually plays a servant who torments the authority
figure with “inappropriate answers, repeating directions and names incorrectly... mocking,
satirical or ribald commentary... taunts or insults” (506-526). Rural comedy contains a good
amount of explicit body and sexual humor mostly directed at the authority figure. Not unlike
the Athenians’ attitude toward the rustic processions, urban audiences tend to find the rural
performances vulgar and distasteful.
Beeman posits that watching the sexual acts humorously dramatized in bawdy scenes,
such as the clown mistakenly sleeping with the hajji’s wife, or physical situations with
homosexual overtones provide a release of tension for Iranian audiences who are “extremely
embarrassed,” if not prudish, about discussing sexual matters. Likewise, the clown’s
dismantling of the social hierarchy, political structures and normative social relationships,
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which would imply religious strictures, provides an additional venting of social tension (506526).
On the other side of the world, Osnes writes, some traditional Malaysian shadow
puppet theatres have adapted to a conservative Islamic government by modifying their
performances to de-emphasize their mystical aspects, and serve “only” as entertainment. The
urban areas, in particular, tend to be more widely fundamentalist and some dalangs
(puppeteer) are now commissioned by the government to present propaganda plays (112116).
Osnes explains that the Hindu-based traditional shadow puppet performance, wayang
kulit, is steeped in mysticism and ritual that is strictly forbidden by Islamic law. In the
tradition, the dalang, is thought to be possessed by the spirits of the puppets and given
esoteric knowledge that expresses itself through the characters. In the rural areas, villagers
tend to “turn a blind eye” to the contradictions between their customs and Islamic law, which
is circumvented by a reading of the Quran at the beginning of the performance. Also, an
explanation is given by the dalang that Allah is the original dalang and there is “only one
light source but many shapes in the puppets, so too there is only one god and many worldly
manifestations.” Most dalangs consider themselves Muslims, and do not deny the doctrines
of Islam. While continuing to hold on to non-orthodox side beliefs, they do not consider
themselves heretics (112-116)
Islam considers the Quran the culmination of a series of prophesies beginning with
Adam, then Abraham, Moses, David, Jesus and, finally the Prophet Muhammad. Unlike
Jesus, Muhammad does not claim to be the Son of God or a Messiah, but the last prophet
(Messenger) of Allah (The Holy Quran 33:40), who is the same One True God of the Torah
and the Bible. The Quran builds upon the Torah and Christian Bible, rejecting some
teachings and expanding on others, including the stories of the Hebrew patriarchs discussed
earlier, prophesies, shared literary and religious motifs. Allah, unlike Yahweh, does not have
the characteristics of a Warrior Sky God, although “the King” is among his ninety-nine
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attributes. More similar to El, he resembles the distant omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent
High God. 17
Islamic militarism, similarly found in early Judaism and Christianity, aligns it with
the tragic vision, which Morreall attributes to the “wider pattern of patriarchy” (Comedy,
125). However, even fundamentalist Islam does not fully embrace the tragic vision. The total
submission to Allah that is central to Islam also precludes the questioning of and protest
against suffering, which is at the heart of the tragic paradigm. While Quranic texts may be
contradictory and interpretations vary, most Islamic teachings expound the equality of human
beings and advocate tolerance for Jews and Christians. Further, the Quran contains the only
monotheistic scripture that declares the equality of women, sets out their rights, and includes
doctrines regarding the treatment of others, particularly those who are most vulnerable. For
example, one of the Five Pillars of faith requires almsgiving to the poor. Additionally,
Morreall says, Islam emphasizes family and community, maintaining a social vision of life
(Comedy, 124-127). For these reasons, Morreall allows that Islam does possess many aspects
of the comic vision.
Of the three Abrahamic monotheistic traditions, Islam has the most positivist outlook.
Unlike the Old Testament’s “teleological procession beginning in bondage and ending in
exile” and the Gospel’s focus on the tragedy of the crucifixion, “the sacred literature of
Islam, according Maghen, constitutes a prelude to and presentiment of...political, military,
economic, and spiritual victory on an almost unimaginable scale” (279). This vision, steeped
in warrior culture, is naturally discomfiting to non-Muslims for whom it has tragic
ramifications.
While the humor is inextricably bound to religious traditions, the comic vision is not.
However, there is nothing in the sacred texts to preclude the adoption of a comic vision.
17
Some Islamic sects such as the Alevi of Turkey and Kurdistan, and the Sufi do not strictly conceptualize
Allah as a High God. The Alevi, like the Shi’ite, regard Allah as the “latent breath” of creation and part of a
trinity with Muhammad (as the prototypical human) and Ali (divine light). The Sufi, who are essentially
Islamic mystics, believe that Allah’s divine presence permeates all life and is accessible through acts of
devotion.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
A little nonsense now and then is relished by the wisest men.
Willy Wonka
EXCLUSION AND FUNDAMENTALISM
The Abrahamic monotheisms share a common discursive structure which has an
underpinning of antagonism toward what Erlewine describes as “the Other, or, at least, the
otherness of the Other” (10). At the same time, fundamentalism, based on strict adherence to
sacred text and absolute beliefs, necessarily increases opposition to the principles of
pluralism and religious tolerance, and the need for separation from and exclusion of “the
Other.” According to Hyers, the resulting social and ideological isolation, overlaid with the
tragic vision, provides an environment conducive to extremism (Spirituality 2).
Picket and Brewer write that the problem is compounded by the fact that groups, such
as religious communities and denominations, do not form in isolation. They are dependent
upon the conformity of their membership, which is defined by differences with other groups
(95). Newcomers, such as new converts, are particularly prone to overly zealous exclusion
and conformity to preserve their position of inclusion with the group (99). Meanwhile, on
the other side of the divide, Twenge and Baumeister propound that social exclusion increases
aggression and self-defeating behavior while reducing intelligent thought and pro-social
behavior in those excluded (41). August says that the tragic vision is fully realized in this
situation as it has become associated with modern despair, and the expression of the “crisismentality of our time” (August 87). According to Herriot, fundamentalism has, as its central
and defining feature, reactivity to modernism (7) and is, likewise, firmly entrenched in the
tragic vision.
The following diagrams (Figure 5) illustrate the psychological differences between
fundamentalist thought and non-fundamentalist thought. The shaded diagram illustrates
Intratextual fundamentalist thought wherein the sacred texts and the absolute beliefs derived
from the tests exclude outside influences (Hood et al. 24). Their belief systems are
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Figure 5. Fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist thought. Source: Hood, Ralph W.,
Jr., Hill, Peter C., Williamson, W. Paul. The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism.
New York: Guilford P, 2005. Print.
authoritarian because the intratextual reading of the texts often demands absolutes. In the
relationship shown, the texts are considered absolute authority and, therefore,
fundamentalism is inherently authoritarian (Hood et al. 25).
The diagram for Intertextual non-fundamentalist thought reflects virtually all modern
thought and that which fundamentalists oppose. The circle is a broken line suggesting that
permeable boundaries exist in the thought process of nonfundamentalists and the arrows
illustrate peripheral beliefs extend outward but also filter inward to influence the
understanding of the texts and relative truths, as long as the “evidence” of those truths and
the authoritative texts is supported (Hood et al. 26).
Intertexuality, consistent with the comic vision, fosters change and openness (Hood,
et al. 26). However, it is erroneous to conclude that fundamentalism is a closed system of
beliefs. Those who have studied fundamentalism have observed that nothing seems more
variable than the perception of absolute truth. Fundamentalist groups exhibit no hesitancy
about separating when a disagreement arises over the meaning of scripture, contrary to
expectations, indicate their openness to change and re-examining interpretation of sacred
texts. A flexibility of thought is also demonstrated by the fact that fundamentalists can and
do coexist with nonfundamentalists (Hood, et al. 27).
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Nevertheless, fundamentalism is greatly responsible for the problem of religious
polarization, extremism, and the expression of the tragic vision. Complicating the matter is
the present day reunification of religion and politics sought by fundamentalist groups
attempting to quash secularism and, particularly, liberalism, in an effort to return to a premodern society. Herriot states that fundamentalist groups with “nationalist and/or ethnic
features” are more likely to engage in violent activity” (2), who may be aided by secular
political interests
If the comic vision is not antithetical to the more stringently delineated ideologies of
intratextual fundamentalism then it is not likely to be antithetical to the more loosely
delineated intertextual non-fundamentalism or, essentially, the majority of religious
ideologies. There are several factors that would indicate an openness to the comic aspects of
the sacred among the Abrahamic monotheistic religions, with which we are primarily
concerned, and their fundamentalist sects.
In the previous chapter, we explored the instances of humor within the respective
sacred texts of the Abrahamic monotheistic religions, which can be interpreted in an
intratextual as well as an intertextual perspective. Saroglou’s study, discussed earlier, found
that humor production and appreciation were significantly diminished after viewing a
religious video rather than a humorous video. Saroglou concludes that the response to the
videos was related to personality rather than religiosity. Further, he found no evidence that
there was a significant difference between the responses of subjects with a high degree of
religiosity and those who were fundamentalist.
The nature of the religious video used in the study is not revealed. However, the
scope of his study pertained to Christianity and, in particular, Catholicism. Given modern
Christianity’s overwhelmingly broad and deeply entrenched acceptance of the tragic vision, it
is likely that the religious video shown to the subjects reflected some degree of a tragic
perspective, which could also have had an influence on the responses of the subjects.
Regardless, the plethora of studies undertaken by many disciplines has concluded that
human beings, religious or not, fundamentalist or not, possess an innate sense of humor. This
trait, with its evolutionary and societal benefits, may hold the key to decreasing polarization
and diffusing extremism through its simple reminder that we are all unavoidably trapped in
the human condition. This revelation, of course, may cause sorrow rather than joy, but
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sorrow is often the prelude to laughter and once laughter is shared, whether it is between two
or more individuals, or an individual and his own existence, a bond is created.
Conflict resulting from issues of religious belief cannot be resolved through logic and
reasoning, because they are not essentially intellectual issues. Religious doctrine and
theology can be argued at length but religious questions are, finally, answered through faith.
When people of opposing fundamentalist ideologies come into conflict, there is no possible
ideological compromise. Humor and laughter, as essential human qualities, transcend (or
underlie) all human conceptions of ideology, nationality, ethnicity, religiosity, and
modernity. The question is: how do we access our propensity for humor amid the rigid
strictures of religious boundaries? In accessing humor as part of our basic nature, we also
access the harbinger and personification of that aspect of our nature: the Trickster.
THE TRICKSTER AS MEDIATOR
The interjection of the Trickster at this point may seem incongruous and confusing.
This has been the quintessential reaction to the appearance of the Trickster since shamans
first donned masks in the Paleolithic era; or when clowns roll into an arena amid dangerous
feats of skill performed by larger-than-life heroic figures; or an unexpected reversal in a
fictional or real-life situation that provokes involuntary laughter. The Trickster is generally,
but not exhaustively, contextualized as a mythological and folkloric character, a
psychological archetype, or a prototypical clown. As a mythological character, the Trickster,
as half-mortal and half-god or related to the Sky God, serves as intermediary between the
gods and humans, bringing civilizing boons to humankind. Further, the Trickster also
mediates between the order (laws) established by the Sky God and the difficult incongruities
of applying them to the world of mortals. The Trickster myths provide an effective model for
conflict resolution utilized by professional mediation facilitators, Robert D. Benjamin and
Michele LeBaron, in Bringing Peace into the Room.
According to Benjamin, the primary purpose of the mediator and the trickster is not to
stop conflict, but to survive and manage it (80). Susan Niditch adds that the trickster enables
the survival of the characters and parties (qtd. in Benjamin 83). This is not always an easy
task, as we have seen in unsuccessful negotiations on the news and depicted in films inspired
by the inherent drama of the mediator’s task. The ultimate challenge, according to Benjamin,
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is to mediate between “immovable objects and irresistible forces” (80), a description that
may be aptly applied to the collisions that occur between divergent absolutist religious
groups and between absolutist religious groups and secular society.
According to Benjamin, the Trickster’s approach is effective because he will use any
means, regardless of rules and moral propriety in pursuit of survival (80). Sometimes he is
straightforward and aggressive, other times addled, often deceptive, and, at times, plain
crazy. The Trickster “thrives on conflict, alternately causing or resolving it” and, therefore,
can provide “a model for the effective management of the natural energy generated by
conflict” (82), which may be squandered or harnessed to facilitate conciliation.
LeBaron claims that feigned or sincere confusion about entrenched positions and
boundaries injects the situation with ambiguity and doubt that “undermines the some of the
presumed certainty” (85) which creates an opening for something to occur that “weaves the
rent fabric back together” with the mediator providing the space between the weft and warp
(147). This speaks to the liminal quality of the mediator as well as a significant aspect of the
Trickster. The Trickster’s subversion of the status quo simultaneously provides an
opportunity to see ourselves and our situations differently. Our naïveté, ineptitude, and
foolishness are exposed along with the ridiculousness of our constant attempts to be in
control and to remain fixed in a position, even after it has been revealed as nonsensical. Like
the emperor with no clothes, we would often rather construct an illusory world that maintains
our status than face the essential truth of our humanity, as stated by Bonnefoy: mortals,
unlike gods, are born to die (105).
Blaesser relates Gerald Vizenor’s description of the Trickster as liberating the mind
through comic discourse (137). Benjamin adds that through “plant(ing) notions that
alternatively disturb, unsettle, and undermine entrenched thinking” the Trickster reminds us
of the often terrifying uncertainty and chaos that comprises our existence (110). Absolutism,
so long as it can withstand the “irresistible forces,” provides insulation from uncertainty and
chaos. However, society, either secular or ecclesiastic, requires a certain measure of built-in
chaos to persist (Benjamin 108). Therefore, we must allow humor to serve its purpose in
providing illumination about life’s incongruities and transforming existential despair to
delight.
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TRANSCENDENT HUMOR
For Trickster humor to succeed, it must be inclusive and non-threatening, especially
when criticism is leveled at powerful or well-defended entities, which is why it is a tool best
wielded by an underdog. The Abrahamic monotheist traditions are so rife with underdogs,
tricksters, and underdogs who become tricksters, it would seem obvious that the base and
ludicrous are as significant to religious life as the high and mighty. Comedy, though not
necessarily tricksterish, is making inroads into religious life in both fundamentalist and
nonfundamentalist contexts.
Contemporary Christian Comedy
Journalist Electra Draper interviewed fundamentalist comedian Brad Stine who
spearheaded a comedy tour comprised of Christian comedians called “The Apostles of
Comedy.” They primarily perform at churches and are particularly concerned with
performing “clean comedy,” eliminating foul language and sexual innuendo in support of
their faith. According to comedian Jeff Allen, “we’ve got churches’ trust we won’t step over
the line” (Draper).
This un-tricksterish brand of humor is laudable in its effort toward creating levity and
community-building. However, humor that is developed to stay within institutional
boundaries and censored topics is unlikely to touch upon the deeper aspects of the human
condition. Draper provides a comment from a 39-year-old Christian man who is happy not
to have to go to comedy clubs and laugh at things he didn’t believe in. “It’s guilty laughter,”
he reports. “It’s fun to come out to something like this and not have to worry about it”
(Draper).
This comment is revealing of the underlying anxiety of fundamentalists attempting to
live in a world they are not allowed to engage in and the harsh incongruity they negotiate
every day. This would be a topic for trickster humor and is, in fact, tackled in Brad Stine’s
act with the comment: “If the truth offends you, that’s your problem. Christianity is not a
religion of convenience” (Draper). The failure in this humor to illuminate is that it isn’t funny
so much as it is derisive.
Stine’s humor, although edgy, is deeply rooted in maintaining the status quo of
Evangelical Christianity and its alliance with political conservatism. Draper quotes Stine as
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claiming: “My people started this country, and too bad if you don’t like it.” Stine, she goes
on to say, believes that his “Christian tribe” is under attack by popular culture (Draper).
Green also observes that much of Stine’s rhetoric is aggressive and militaristic, filled with
rails against “pretty much anyone who doesn’t believe that the Bible is the literal truth”
(Green).
Stine’s humor is more in line with that of a Sky God than a Trickster. Adam Green,
who interviewed Stine for the New Yorker, reports that one of Stine’s more enduring jokes
mocks a non-believer: “Well, what are you saying – I should just believe in Jesus so I don’t
go to Hell?” Stine whispers “Pretty much,” to a “huge laugh and round of applause” (Green).
However, Stine’s humor does serve a tricksterish purpose, as Sky Gods may be inclined to
do, by critiquing the behavior inside his circle. Green’s article tells of Stine’s comment
about churches that organize Harry Potter book burnings. Says Stine: “Here’s a good rule of
thumb: if Hitler tried it – maybe go the other way” (Green). Stine is also a harsh critic as the
mild-mannered, peace-loving version of Jesus, endorsing the aggressive, confrontational
“table-tipping Jesus” (Green) as a role model for Christian men, which is compatible with the
tragic vision.
In contrast, the most tricksterish Christian humor comes from Tyler Perry and his
alter ego, Madea. As described by Ruth LaFerla in an article for the New York Times, Madea
is a “pistol-packing, weed-puffing matriarch in a flowered housedress” (LaFerla), played by
Perry in drag. Perry is a self-described Christian and long-time member of a Baptist Church
in New Orleans. His characters are representative of the lower levels of black society who
“curse, swap insults, chase booty and smoke crack” which has drawn criticism from
conservative Christians and the Black community (LaFerla). However, Perry claims his
motivation is to have people see his movies and be healed, and that the message of his work
is unabashedly about morality and redemption (LaFerla). “As long as people walk away
from my shows feeling better, as long as they’re made whole...I don’t care how I lure them
in” (Perry qtd. in LaFerla).
Perry’s social marginalization, use of disguise, base humor and desire to heal are
indicative of the Trickster. A final consideration is the incongruity between his mission and
his opulence of his personal lifestyle. He is ambitious and hopes to someday own his own
island. Meanwhile, According to LaFerla, Perry sees no contradiction between Christian
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values and his Rolls Royce. He, in fact, in true Trickster fashion sees it as his entitlement for
being a good Christian (LaFerla).
Contemporary Jewish and Muslim Comedy
The long tradition of Jewish and Yiddish humor in the secular arena may have found
its first expression in the Purimshpil, which, according to the Encyclopedia Judaica,
translates literally as “Purim play,” which was performed at the traditional family meal
during the festival of Purim as early as the mid-16th century (1396). The term describes a
monologue or group performance in which the performer sometimes appeared in costume.
The presentations were mostly rhymed phrases or parodies taken from the Book of Esther or
other liturgical and sacred texts (1402).
Today, Jewish humor is at the core of mainstream American humor. According to
Berger, a generation ago, eighty percent of American comedians were Jewish although they
only constituted about three percent of the population (Jesters 3). Jewish comedians have
alternately identified themselves and their humor as Jewish in their acts, or “de-Semitized"
themselves by changing their names and avoiding Semitic references. However, according to
Cohen, Jewish comedians in the Fifties and Sixties, driven, perhaps, by the grief of the
Holocaust and the pride in establishing the state of Israel, embraced their identities and
traditional self-deprecating humor, resulting in a widespread philo-Semitic sentiment among
their own people and gentiles that has been referred to as “the Yiddishization of American
Humor” (8).
The vast majority of popular and successful comedians modern American comedians
are Jewish. A small sampling includes Sid Caesar, Milton Berle, the Marx Brothers, Lenny
Bruce, Mel Brooks, Woody Allen, Jerry Seinfeld, Jon Stewart, Sarah Silverman, Sacha
Baron Cohen, and Billy Crystal. Because Jewish humor is so deeply embedded in American
humor, it is not always recognizable as having an ethnic identity. Any direct references to
Jewish culture are often appropriated as pop culture or assimilated into the American
vernacular. This demonstrates the efficacy of Jewish self-deprecating humor used by
immigrants to assimilate into American culture (Pang) became a reciprocal assimilation.
Modern Jewish humor, Cohen says, “is born out of the vast discrepancy between
what was to be the ‘chosen people’s’ glorious destiny and their desperate straits” (1). Wolfe
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maintains the plight of Jews in the time of Nazi Germany engendered a particular type of
Jewish humor that falls into the category of black humor and gallows humor (Wolfe). Selfdeprecating humor and gallows humor, in which “condemned men make light of their
impending fate” (MacHovec qtd. in Wolfe) provided Jews a shield against the horrors of
their situation and, at the same, provided them with a means to resist their tormenters, if only
psychologically, although Viktor Frankl identifies humor as one of the “soul’s weapons” in
the struggle for self-preservation (Cohen 57). Joking about what is “truly horrible” is “a way
of distancing ourselves from it” (Oring qtd. in Wolfe 8) and provides a means with which to
transcend adversity. In this sense, the function of humor is very close to that of religion if
one were to regard jokes as prayers and laughter as expressions of faith.
In an article about the PBS documentary Stand Up: Muslim American Comics Come
of Age, Fatemeh Fakhraie writes that it is in the “desperate straits” of the post September
11th backlash against Muslims and Middle Eastern/South Asian communities, Muslim
comedians are making an entré into the American mainstream (Fakhraie), though MuslimAmerican humor is certainly in its infancy. While much of their comedy, according to
comedian Maysoon Zayid, is the same as “any immigrant group that tried to make it in
America, that tried to integrate, that tried to rage against discrimination” (qtd. in Fakhraie).
There is no question that American Muslims have experienced harsh discrimination and
oppression in the decade since the attacks in 2001.
Mel Watkins, former writer and editor for the New York Times Book Review, was a
panelist for a session entitled “Blacks, Jews and the Comedy of Subversion” at the Chicago
Humanities Festival in November 2009, covered by journalist Kevin Pang. According to
Watkins, it is likely that Muslims will go the way of other oppressed cultures, specifically
Jews and African Americans, who have used humor to make sense of their “absurd social
situations” in which the two possible reactions are “going crazy or laughing at it” (Watkins
qtd. in Pang). The intersection of African-American humor and Jewish humor is subversion
according to Watkins, characterized by:
...an anti-authoritarian streak, in which comedy ridicules grandiosity and
hypocrisy. There’s a sarcastic quality and a substantive quality (rooted in
everyday circumstances such as food and wealth). And there’s a tendency in
black and Jewish humor to mock religion but at the same time reaffirm its values
and beliefs. (Pang)
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There is evidence already that the humor that Muslim communities use to deal with
their current plight, as evidenced by the spate of young Muslim comedians, will produce a
future generation of great American comedy. Strides have been made in overcoming
stereotypes of Muslims as extremists, aided in no small way by young comedians of Middle
Eastern descent who exploit their experiences with racial profiling for humor, such as Ahmed
Ahmed’s routine about the humiliations of trying to get through airport security.
Additionally, Muslim comedy tours, such as Axis of Evil, and comedy troupes, such
as Allah Made Me Funny, (whose tag line is “Muhammad was a joker”) are also helping to
break down stereotypes and open up pathways of communication between Muslims and the
mainstream American culture.
With regard to the Public Broadcasting Stand Up: Muslim American Comics Come of
Age, Fakhraie noted that she particularly enjoyed seeing “different types of Muslims without
placing value judgments of their varying levels of observance,” at a time when Muslims are
disproportionately shown in the media while in the middle of prayer (Fakhraie), subtly
fostering the misconception that Muslims are religious extremists and, therefore, terrorists.
Jennifer Ludden interviewed comedian Azhar Usman for National Public Radio in
2011. According to Usman, non-Muslims who come to his comedy shows are shocked to
learn that “Muslims can be funny, that there is a tradition of humor within Islam,” (qtd. in
Ludden) and that, basically, Muslims are human like themselves. Adds comedian Preacher
Moss of Allah Made Me Funny, in response to interviewer Jennifer Ludden’s comment that
their show feels like comedy as therapy: “...laughter is one of the few things spiritual that
you can say is free” (qtd. in Ludden).
Interfaith Comedy Collaboration
Of the inroads humor has made in the religious landscape the efforts of comedian and
rabbi, Bob Alper, and his comedy act, consisting of himself, a Muslim comedian, and an
evangelical Christian comedian, demonstrates the way in which religion and humor work in
concert to transcend conflict. The concept was originally developed by Alper’s publicist to
promote Alper’s career, not peace and religious tolerance. However, the novelty act, which
began with Alper’s first partner, Ahmed Ahmed, in a Philadelphia synagogue quickly took
on deeper meaning, particularly in light of the escalating violence in the Middle East. In an
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interview by William Lobdell for the Los Angeles Times, Ahmed says that although he was
“scared to death” at that first performance, “it became a calling...it’s a gesture of peace, a
gesture of healing” (qtd. in Lobdell).
Alper’s act now includes Azhur Usman as his Muslim counterpart, who also performs
at mosques and other Muslim venues he describes as the “Kebab Comedy Circuit” and with
the Allah Made Me Funny comedy tour. Marek Fuchs of the New York Times reported that
more recently a Christian evangelical comedian, Nazareth Rizkallah, added to the act. They
are pictured together with Alper (left) and Usman (center) in Figure 6, performing an Irish jig
onstage for the “furtherance of world peace” (Fuchs).
Figure 6. Rabbi Bob Alper performing with Azhar Usman and Nazareth
Rizkallah. Source: Fuchs, Marek. “Jesters of Different Faiths Use Laughs
to Bridge the Divide.” New York Times. 31 May 2008. Web. 2 May 2011.
Currently performing as the Laugh in Peace Tour, Alper and Usman sometimes work
with Baptist minister Susan Sparks, adding yet another dimension to the diversity of the act.
Each comedian performs a half-hour set followed by a question and answer session with the
three performers. The performances shy away from politics, which, according to Usman, can
sometimes “become like the elephant in the room.” However, avoiding the “trapdoor that is
politics” is necessary to accomplish the goal, expressed by Rizkallah, “to have a good show
and make a gesture of peace” (qtd. in Fuchs).
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While it can be argued that avoiding politics in the show can be construed as
censorship, it also serves to maintain focus on the non-political aspects (religious and
humanitarian) of a conflict that has been increasingly exacerbated by politics and interests of
state. Alper describes the show as “edutainment” that strives to break down negative
stereotypes (qtd. in Muslim Entertainment).
Training materials for the Conflict Research Symposium at the University of
Colorado state that stereotypes in a conflict situation are usually negative. The opposing
party is viewed in increasingly hostile terms and, as communication is cut off, people make
generalizations based on “sketchy and often erroneous information.” Additionally, they
project their own faults on to the other group and prefer to see themselves as good and the
other side as bad. Eventually, a strong “enemy image” is formed that views everything the
other side does as wrong or evil, while they themselves are right and good (Conflict Res.
Symposium).
Humor may be used to reinforce stereotypes, but can also be used to deconstruct.
According to Sparks, each member of the show has his own unique perspective as a Jew, a
Muslim and a Christian, that gets people laughing together. Nothing is better than seeing a
member of “the other” community as “warm, affable and funny” for breaking down negative
stereotypes, according to Alper, “When people laugh together, they can’t hate” (qtd. in
Muslim Entertainment).
Just as comedy provided relief and synthesis for the cycle of tragedies presented at
the City Dionysia, it can similarly aid in the reconciliation of the tragic impasse between
competing religious ideologies. Religion and humor are not, as Saroglou surmised, a priori
incompatible, although some adjustments in modern monotheistic religious thought must be
made in order to embrace humor rather than disapprove or merely tolerate it. When asked by
Muslim Entertainment reporter to choose who between Jews, Muslims and Christians is the
funniest, Alpers claimed that Jews have such a long tradition of humor it must be in their
DNA, while Christians and Muslims “are funny partly because they are going against type”
(qtd. in Muslim Entertainment). Sparks, however, asserts that between her partners, Azhar
and Bob, it is a tie, but Christians are by far “the losers hands down.” She says, “I am trying
desperately to help my people, but...” (qtd. in Muslim Entertainment).
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It is this type of discourse that creates an opening for a much greater tolerance
between people of divergent beliefs and cultures. It is only a small and, perhaps, wistfully
hopeful opening, of course. But like the tiny car that rolls into the spotlight of the circus
arena to disgorge an impossible number and array of clowns, a small opening may be
enough.
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