New Scenario for KASSERINE
The Battle of Kasserine Pass
BY VANCE von BORRIES
Historical Summary
Early on the morning of 19 February
1943 General Erwin Rommel received
his orders from Comando Supremo:
while von Arnim conducted holding
attacks in the north, Rommel would
form Group Rommel, take charge of
10th and 21st Panzer Divisions and
Kampfgruppe DAK, and strike toward
Thala and from there to Le Kef. Even
though he still had some choices,
Rommel was enraged that he had no
clear acceptance of his plan of a
greater strategic enveloping movement through Tebessa to Bone in
Algeria. Knowing that the opportunity of surprise would soon pass, he
decided nevertheless to move at once
on Thala.
Rommel sent a message to von Arnim
requesting armored units be placed
formally under his control, but von
Arnim again refused; he claimed,
untruthfully, that many tanks were
under repair. Regardless, Rommel
ordered an operation, Operation Tidal
Wave (Sturmflut), of two general
attacks: 21st Panzer (Col. Hildebrandt)
to push through Sbiba and then on to
Ksour. At the same time, Kampfgruppe
DAK (Gen. Buelowius) would capture
Kasserine Pass, 25 miles southeast of
Sbiba. In the meantime, 10th Panzer
(Gen. Baron von Broich) was to
concentrate at Sbeitla, ready to
support the success of either 21st
Panzer or Kampfgruppe DAK.
British 1st Army commander, Lt.-Gen.
K.A.N. Anderson, deployed his
troops to hold Tebessa, Thala, the
Sbiba Pass, and all main exits westwards into Algeria from Tunisia. At
Kasserine Pass a scratch force was
deployed under command of Lt-Col.
A.T.W. Moore consisting of Moore's
19th Combat Engineer Regiment, 1st
Battalion/ 26th RCT, 33rd Field
Artillery Battalion, 805th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, and minor units,
with a battalion of US 39th RCT on
the way.
By patching and intermingling of
units Anderson strove to meet the
coming onslaught. The cost was a
blurred command structure, confused
responsibilities, and a deluge of
adjustments. These virtually overwhelmed US II Corps commander
Lt-Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall's HQ
recently removed from its rock-hewn
safety near Tebessa to an advance post
at Kouif. Alerted by the recon
activities, Fredendall telephoned Col.
Stark (commander, US 26th RCT): "I
want you to go to Kasserine Pass right
away and pull a Stonewall Jackson.
Take over up there." Stark was
amazed: "You mean tonight General?" "Yes, immediately; stop in my
CP on the way up." Through fog and
swamping rain, Stark finally relieved
Moore at 0730 on the 19th.
Kasserine pass (at about 2000ft) was
dominated on the right by Djebel
Semmama (4,447ft) and on the left by
the highest peak in Tunisia, Djebel
Chambi (5,064ft). A metalled road
from Kasserine, some five miles away,
bisected the pass, emerging on the
northwestern side to cross the huge
basin of scrub, cactus and low
outcrops of rock whose clay soils
became gluey in wet weather,
known as the Bled Foussana, to go
northwards to Thala. A southern
unmetalled branch ran off from a fork
just east of the narrows to Djebel el
Hamra where a trail led towards
Tebessa. The main road crossed the
Hatab River, during dry weather no
more than a stream in the bed of the
pass, on a bridge that Moore's
engineers had already destroyed. A
belt of 3000 anti-personnel and antitank mines was laid hastily across
both roads shortly after they forked,
and demolitions in the narrows of the
pass were planned to stop enemy
armor at the eastern end, which
Moore planned to discourage still
further by using his artillery. Much of
the 26th Infantry was astride the road
to Thala while his engineers, who had
no combat experience, blocked the
minor road. In all, less than 2,000
infantry held a thin line astride the
two roads for a total front of about
three miles covering the exit from the
pass, the heights on both sides being
defended only by patrols.
When leading troops of
Aufklarungsabteilung 33 (Reconnaissance Battalion 33) from Kampfgruppe
DAK first appeared, not all defensive
measures had been completed and the
general plan, to compress the attackers into a narrow channel and destroy
them there, was not understood by
many of Moore's troops. So green
were the engineers that their first sight
of the enemy, on the afternoon of 18
February, set some off in panic to the
rear from where some were rounded
up and returned to their posts, but as
morale sank others simply vanished in
the fog and rain that night.
At 0800 on the 19th Aufk. 33
attempted a surprise breakthrough,
but the defenders were alert. Stark's
undermanned defences held. Next,
Buelowius committed in a late
morning attack Oberst Menton's two
battalions of Panzer Grenadier
Regiment Afrika, one to the Thala (or
right) side of the pass and the other to
the Tebessa (or left) side, both
supported by 88mm guns. On the
right the two companies of his second
battalion were detailed to gain the
dominating heights. Led by
Oberleutnants Schmidt and Buchholz,
these veterans scaled soaring cliff
faces and ridges, skillfully avoiding
American artillery and small arms
fire. Far below, however, Menton had
underestimated both the Americans
and the particular demands of
mountain warfare by confining the
main body of his troops to the bed of
the pass, where they came under
effective American artillery fire. His
attack collapsed along the Wadi
Zebbeus. Just after noon Buelowius
added tanks of I/ 8 Pz.Rgt but still
could not make progress.
Before visiting 21st Panzer at Sbiba,
Rommel stopped at Buelowius' HQ at
Kasserine at 1300 hours. He ordered
Buelowius to put in an outflanking
attack and undoubtedly pressed the
urgency of the attack. Buelowius
assured Rommel he would have the
pass before the end of the day. At
about 1520 a force of infantry and
tanks attacked, ran into minefields on
their northern approach, and were
then hit by shells, anti-tank rounds
and machine-gun fire. Another effort
failed when American engineers
fought back and knocked out five
tanks.
Now Buelowius switched to infiltration tactics. Beginning at about 1530
hours small groups worked their way
from the heights along both sides of
the pass and cut behind defensive
positions. By around dusk they had
encircled and captured about 100
Americans defending the Thala road.
One US engineer company broke and
fled. One of the three rifle companies
of 1/26 Infantry was cut off and the
battalion command post was surrounded thereby putting the other
two companies out of command
control. By midnight the situation was
entirely fluid, some troops were
holding out, others were fleeing, and
many were missing.
Meanwhile on the 19th, Kesselring
arrived at von Arnim's HQ to find out
exactly what had happened, suspecting that 10th Panzer had not been
released, which of course would limit
Rommel's scope of operations.
Rejecting von Arnim's alternative
proposals for an attack on Le Kef he
radioed urgently to Rommel, ordering
him to disregard Comando Supremo
and make for the important nerve
center of Tebessa, declaring it could be
by-passed in an enveloping attack.
Late that afternoon Rommel decided
to quit the attacks on Sbiba and
resume the offensive the next morning
at Kasserine Pass and he would send
10th Panzer to help. At dusk he set off
to find 10th Panzer.
Hearing the sounds of the Kasserine
battle from 35 miles away at Thala,
Brigadier C.A.L. Dunphie, 26th
Armoured Brigade, hurried to see
Stark who seemed confident that the
German attack could be held.
Dunphie was alarmed at what he
took to be the imminent breakdown
of Stark's defenses and told
Anderson that a counter-attack
should be mounted but, with few
reserves other than two poorly
armed regiments of tanks,
Anderson instead sent his
New Designer's Scenario: The Battle of Kasserine Pass
Brigadier General Staff, Colin
McNabb to review the situation. But
McNabb would not release Dunphie's
brigade to the pass as it was then the
only reserve to block the way to Le
Kef and the situation seemed quiet
enough. Knowing nothing of the true
situation, there seemed to McNabb no
cause for immediate alarm. By
contrast, Fredendall had already sent
Stark the 3rd Battalion, 6th Armored
Infantry. It arrived between 0100 and
0300 hours of the 20th. From 26th
Armoured a smaller force was sent, a
detachment commanded by Lt-Col.
A.C. Gore, appropriately called 'Gore
Force.' It arrived to take up a position
towards the pass that same night. Its
advance party, a squadron of 56
Reconnaissance Regiment, reported
the road to Kasserine as full of
retreating Americans and their
transport.
Stark had thought the combined
group, 3/ 6 Armored Infantry and
Gore Force, would suffice to restore
the situation in a counter-attack.
Dunphie was reluctant to commit to
action. Regardless, an attack was set
for 1100 hours but Gore Force, along
with some US tanks and tank destroyers, advanced early to attack, Major
Beilby in charge, and without the
3/ 6th, but ran straight into a German
attack. Beilby was wounded soon in
this action but he moved from tank to
tank as his force engaged German
armor. British coordination broke
down and the attack failed. The 3 / 6th
nevertheless attacked alone and
successfully up into Djebel Semmama
gaining those heights.
Believing he had 10th Panzer under
way behind him, Rommel returned to
his HQ at Feriana on the 19th at 1900
hours. He had instructed Buelowius to
break through the pass that night and
then punch left along the Tebessa
road, but this had not been accomplished. In the mist and dampness of
the morning of the 20th at 0730, he
went forward into the pass to see for
himself what had to be done. Two
miles before the entrance Rommel
found Menton who reported the
Americans still held the high ground.
Annoyed at finding an assault
commander directing from the rear,
Rommel took Menton with him right
into the pass and set up new headquarters there. Under Rommel's
orders, Menton's Panzer Grenadiers
along with Italians of the excellent 5
Bersaglieri Rgt. (Centauro Division)
attacked fiercely at 0830 hours under
cover of a large artillery barrage. For
the first time, Americans heard the
terrifying howl of German
Nebelwerfers, multi-barreled rocket
launchers capable of firing six heavy
high explosive shells in 90 seconds.
When von Broich arrived at 1030 at
Rommel's HQ at the Hatab River
bridge, Rommel was furious that none
of 10th Panzer accompanied him.
Rommel ordered von Broich to fetch
his troops himself. But the US
Engineers on the Tebessa side of the
pass were already in serious trouble;
by noon Germans were overrunning
Moore's HQ. With Kesselring now at
Rommel's HQ Rommel renewed the
attack that afternoon with all his
infantry and artillery and many of his
tanks. This proved decisive. By 1630
Rommel sensed the Allies were
withdrawing and ordered all available
troops through the pass. Increasing
pressure from the just now arriving
two battalions of 10th Panzer, now
committed behind the DAK and
Bersaglieri troops, unhinged the
Americans causing the defense to fall
to pieces. The remaining engineer
companies broke and ran. At the head
of 1st Battalion, 8th Panzer Regiment,
Hauptmann Hans-Gunter Stotten
broke through the pass towards
Tebessa.
At about 1830 hours Gore Force took
up defensive position with their left
flank against the mountains of the
Thala side of the pass. With anti-tank
guns and infantry dug-in, the mixed
Valentine and Crusader tank force
retired from one hull-down position
to the next, engaging infantry and
heavy self-propelled anti-tank guns
from Kampfgruppe DAK. One by one
the British tanks were destroyed, the
valiant Major Beilby dying in one, and
all anti-tank guns were lost. The
artillery was not lost but by nightfall
Gore Force was finished. Cut off on
Djebel Semmama were Stark's
infantry and 3/ 6 Armored Infantry,
the latter losing its armored personnel
carriers in the German advance. These
units had to break up and infiltrate
back to Allied lines near Thala.
Ironically, the Germans made
immediate use of the captured
halftracks to transport American
POWs to the rear.
The shattered remains of Stark Force
had already broken off and got away
in small groups towards Djebel el
Hamra. By nightfall (1915 hours) even
Stark's HQ was about to be overrun.
Even though lacking combat experience, Stark's troops, infantry, engineers, and gunners, had managed to
hold Rommel's veterans for 2 days
but, after losses of around 500 men,
they had had enough. With Kasserine
Pass firmly in German hands, the
situation was critical, would Rommel
now make for Tebessa or Thala?
15.7
Scenario #7:
The Battle of Kasserine Pass
For this new scenario use all
Kasserine rules, charts and tables,
as appropriate, unless an exception
is provided below.
15.71 Scenario Information.
a. Use only the map provided here
within C3i Magazine, Nr.15.
Map scale is about 0.35 miles
(0.56 km) to the hex.
Design Note: Kasserine Pass is narrow.
The scale had to change to show it
properly and to get close enough to the
action to make it interesting. With the
change in ground scale unit scale also
changes to reflect the way the battle was
fought, and this likewise forces a time
scale change.
b. There are eight turns; use the Turn
Record Track shown on the Set Up
Card.
c. Use historical weather as shown on
the Turn Record Track. Ignore
Lingering Mud rules for nonmotorized units.
d. Supply Sources
1. Axis: Hex 2304
2. Allied: Hexes 1010, 1012, and 1316.
e. A bridge is present at hexside 1112/
1213 even though it appears that only
a trail crosses the wadi at this point.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass: C3i Module for KASSERINE
15.72 Scenario Set Up.
a. Both players use the Set Up
information provided on the Set Up
Card provided with this scenario.
b. Place Allied units first.
c. Minefields. From the regular pool of
minefield markers delete four (+1)
minefields and one (+2) minefield. Of
the remaining nine, draw five
randomly and place them, unknown
to either player, on the hexes indicated. Neither player can construct
additional minefields.
Note: The additional combat units
provided with this scenario are used
only here; they are not intended as
replacements for units in regular play.
Some units from regular play are also
used.
Design Note: We are able to reuse some
old unit counters mainly because so many
units were split historically into smaller
groups. If we then adjust how units are
defined, we can realize savings. A good
example would be US 33 Field Artillery
Battalion. Because only two batteries were
present at first at Kasserine we can use
the regular game unit for these and then
show the third battery as a separate
counter when it arrived later.
15.73 Additional Special Restrictions.
a. Terminology
1. Armored means any unit represented by a vehicle silhouette. Armored
units are subject to mountain movement restrictions [see 15.73g], all
minefield effects, and shaded box
results.
2. Armor means any armored unit
with red Attack Strength. Only armor
units qualify for Combined Arms
Bonus.
b. Treat all US units as of the same
Formation as the Stark HQ.
Design Note: All these US units were
reassigned by US II Corps HQ to be
under command of Col. Stark. He did not
command the British units coming to his
aid, but could request certain actions.
c. Artillery Unit Range.
For this scenario regular range for an
artillery unit is double what is printed
on the unit counter. Extended range is
up to triple the printed range. When
any artillery unit is included in a
Coordination check that is firing at
extended range, add two (+2) to the
die roll for that Coordination check,
cumulative with other effects.
Design Note: Since most artillery units
are from regular play and map scale has
changed, artillery range must also change.
In some cases range would be even
greater, but the generally poor weather
conditions limited observation.
d. Command Range.
Increase to six hexes.
e. Strongpoints. The Axis player
cannot construct strongpoints. The
Allied player is limited to five
strongpoint markers.
f. Night Turns.
1.
Add plus two (+2) to ground
unit Combat Coordination checks
when attackers occupy more than
one hex.
2.
Add plus two (+2) to all
artillery Combat Coordination
checks.
3.
All Disrupted units are
subject to ER check to recover.
g. Mountains
1.
Additional Combat
Restrictions. No armored, motorcycle,
or reconnaissance unit can attack a
mountain hex through a non-road
hexside.
2.
Additional Movement
Restrictions. No armor, motorcycle,
reconnaissance, or orange-circle MA
unit can enter a mountain hex
through a non-road hexside whether
by movement, advance after combat,
or retreat.
3.
A motorized infantry unit can
enter and exit mountain hexes through
non-road hexsides using movement,
advance after combat, or retreat but it
must stop immediately as soon as it
crosses a non-road mountain hexside.
Design Note: Dj. Chambi was quite
rocky and this made movement particularly difficult; Dj. Semmama was similar
although it had some plateau-like areas.
This combines to make these mountains
more restrictive to movement at this scale.
h. Halftrack Transport units. Both
players have one halftrack transport
unit (Allied: T/ 6, Axis: T / K10). It is a
regular combat unit in all respects but
has the additional capability of
transporting other specific units. The
US unit can transport at one time any
number of the following three units:
G/ 6, H/ 6, or 1/6; the Axis unit can
transport only the 4/ K10 unit; no
it is transported, but its Efficiency
rating applies when on the transport
and conducting Combat Refusal,
Reaction Movement, or Overrun. The
transport unit can pick up the
transported unit at any time during
the turn; it then moves the unit with
the remainder of its movement
allowance. The transported unit
behaves as the transport unit at all
times while it is transported.
Design Note: Normally, we would skip
such a fine distinction of units, but two
situations make this piece necessary. First,
it was quite unrealistic to send halftracks
up mountainsides, but the infantry in
those halftracks could do it, and indeed did
do it. Because the infantry did dismount,
their halftracks became vulnerable to
capture and this did in fact happen.
Dismounted US infantry was cut off on
the mountain, Dj. Semmama, and in the
end had to break up into small parties and
infiltrate back to Allied lines; in game
terms, the unit was destroyed even though
the personnel were still under arms and
would soon reform.
15.74 Victory Conditions.
a.
The Axis player wins if by
the end of the scenario he has exited
at least five units off the map at hexes
1010, 1012, or 1316, or any
combination of these hexes. This total
is increased by one unit for every
Allied unit occupying a main or minor
road hex used as Supply Road for any
number of exited units.
b.
The Allied player wins if the
Axis player fails to achieve his
victory conditions.
15.75 Designer's Notes
Originally, this scenario was built
along with the regular game just to try
out Assault combat conditions and
some other rules. Benefiting from
occasional development then, it grew
into an interesting scenario on its own.
The problem was the considerable
change in ground scale caused it to be
very inconsistent with the regular
game and this is what caused it to be
omitted from the original game box.
This scenario remains an orphan, but
with the great interest in the regular
game, it is appropriate for inclusion
here. Let me take this opportunity to
thank Tony Curtis for reviewing this
scenario.