The Shadow of Socialization: Narratives
about the World Economy and the
Intergenerational Divide in Mass
Attitudes Towards Economic
Globalization
Working Paper
Lukas A. Linsi
January 2017
The Shadow of Socialization: Narratives about the World Economy and the
Intergenerational Divide in Mass Attitudes Towards Economic Globalization ∗
Lukas Linsi
University of Amsterdam
[email protected]
Working paper version prepared for the 2017 Annual Conference of the Swiss Political Science Association, held
at the University of St Gallen on January 11-12. This is a draft version; please do not cite or distribute without
permission. Comments and suggestions most welcome!
ABSTRACT. Due to the dramatic expansion of global production chains over the past decades, mass
attitudes towards inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) have become a critical underpinning of the
global economic order. And yet, we still know remarkably little about what drives public opinion
towards IFDI. The few existing studies on the topic have focused on the role of individuals’ selfinterest, arguing that IFDI preferences are primarily determined by the material individual
consequences of more or less IFDI. However, there are good reasons to believe that it remains difficult
for individuals to actually know the personal economic implications of FDI inflows. Instead, this
article suggests that IFDI preferences are driven as much by individuals’ broader economic beliefs
and their perceptions of the economic meaning and consequences of IFDI as they depend on IFDI’s
actual material effects. To test this argument empirically, I take advantage of the rather radical change
in the portrayal of IFDI in predominant public economic discourses in the late twentieth century.
Building on the insights from socialization research, I theorize that individuals who passed their
formative years in a time period in which the narrative of economic statism was prevalent (roughly
the time-period between 1960s-1980s) hold more negative views of inward FDI than other
respondents, independently from their economic status, level of education or nationalist feelings and
taking various alternative channels through which age can affect IFDI attitudes into account. I first
analyze these predictions in two waves of a large encompassing cross-national survey conducted by
ISSP, finding strong evidence of an intergenerational difference in public opinion towards IFDI,
which closely corresponds to the specific theoretical predictions of the socialization argument. I then
proceed to investigate these findings further through an analysis of the responses to one of the most
fine-grained surveys on IFDI attitudes to date, which was specifically designed for this study and
conducted in the United Kingdom. The results from a causal mediation analysis strongly corroborate
the socialization hypothesis.
Keywords: Globalization; foreign direct investments; public opinion; socialization.
Word count: 11,910 (including references)
∗
For helpful comments and suggestions I am grateful to Leonardo Baccini, Jeffrey Chwieroth and
Beth Simmons, as well as workshop participants at the International Relations Research Seminar at
Harvard University. Joshua Kertzer and Martin Hearson provided useful advice for the conduct of
the survey. Financial support provided by the London School of Economics and the Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research (Vidi grant 016.145.395) is gratefully acknowledged.
2
Introduction
Over the past decades, cross-border direct investment flows have become an ever
more important feature of the global economy and, as a result, mass attitudes
towards IFDI are today a truly critical underpinning of the global political economic
order. And yet, our understanding of the determinants of public opinion towards
IFDI is still relatively poor. This gap is all the more significant because, although
economic experts around the world nearly unanimously embrace IFDI as a ‘good
thing’, public reactions to foreign MNCs are frequently less welcoming. Mirroring
the developments in research on attitudes towards trade, the few existing studies
evaluating the determinants of public opinion towards IFDI have focused primarily
on assessing the consistency of individual preferences with respondents’ imputed
self-interests. For example, the studies by Sonal Pandya (2010) or Faisal Ahmed et al.
(2015) show that richer, more educated and more highly skilled individuals - who
are arguably also more likely to benefit from the presence of foreign MNCs 1 - tend to
express somewhat more favorable views of IFDI than their less fortunate
counterparts. But although the detection of these patterns certainly form a valuable
contribution, they capture only one (relatively small) part of the observed total
variation in IFDI attitudes, leaving much else unexplained. To contribute to a more
complete understanding of the drivers of individual levels of skepticism towards
IFDI, this study proposes a novel theoretical argument that highlights the
This logic seems to be more compelling for specific subgroups of skilled labour and certain types of
IFDI rather than others. The various possible qualifications to this general hypothesis are not the
focus of this article, but it is interesting to note that other authors have developed the argument of
distributional consequences into the opposite direction, arguing that medium/low-skilled workers
are the main beneficiaries of IFDI (for example, Pinto 2013).
1
3
importance of economic ideas and public discourses about the economy – and their
changes over time - as partly independent drivers of individual economic
preferences, which have so far not been considered systematically by the existing
literature on attitudes towards economic globalization. Developing an argument that
is distinct from (but in principle compatible with) egocentric as well as sociotropic
explanations of economic attitudes, I emphasize the important role played by
interpretive frameworks in processes underlying the formation of individual
preferences. Acknowledging that individuals rarely possess all the necessary
information to evaluate the precise personal economic consequences of highly
complex economic transactions such as IFDI, I argue that individuals typically refer
to interpretive frameworks such as the economic narratives promoted by political
discourses, which provide ordinary citizens with cognitive shortcuts facilitating their
processing of information and the definition of their preferences. By channeling
individuals’ information processing in one way or another, interpretive frameworks
can thus become important drivers of individual preferences on their own right and
independently from whether individuals aim to maximize their own individual
well-being (as egocentric approaches contest) or that of their in-groups (as
sociotropic approaches have suggested). What is more, being contested political
objects, predominant interpretive frameworks are inherently unstable constructs,
which can change shape notably over time. And, this article argues, the resulting
changes in the ways in which they describe certain economic phenomena can, on
their own, substantively affect individual preferences towards the latter.
4
To test this argument empirically, I analyze the profound transformation of
predominant political discourses about the world economy in the aftermath of the
Cold War when, throughout the developed world, the state-centrism of economic
narratives (in its Keynesian or neoliberal variant) was rather abruptly abandoned,
which was an event with profound implications for the portrayal of IFDI in the most
prominent political discourses, as subsequent parts of this article elaborate in some
more detail. Furthermore, in order to identify the effect of this profound change in
the portrayal of IFDI in dominant discourses on mass attitudes towards IFDI, I
analytically leverage the systematic age-related differences uncovered by previous
research in social psychology, which has shown that individuals’ economic beliefs
are primarily formed during early adulthood and subsequently become less likely to
change as individuals grow older. I then test the specific predictions of this
argument, using two independent sets of public opinion surveys. The first analysis
relies on the results from two waves of a large cross-national survey conducted by
ISSP in over thirty (mostly advanced) economies. The second analysis complements
these findings with a representative national survey of the UK population, which
was specifically designed for this study, enabling me to study respondents’ FDI
preferences in a more fine-grained manner than it was previously possible. Overall,
the results lend strong support to the hypothesis of socialization. Three inter-related
findings in particular merit emphasis: First, I find a robust, statistically significant
and substantively meaningful inter-generational difference in IFDI attitudes, with
social groups who passed their prime period of socialization in the 1960s-80s
expressing clearly more negative views of IFDI than younger birth cohorts,
5
controlling for a wide range of control variables that take individuals’ economic
position and general political and ideological presuppositions into account. Second,
evidence from the in-depth survey conducted in the UK confirms that the broader
economic views associated to the narrative of economic statism are also significantly
more salient among these groups and a causal mediation analysis reveals that these
differences in economic beliefs absorb a very substantial part of the relationship of a
respondent’s birth cohort with her IFDI preferences. Thirdly, the UK survey also
demonstrates that public opinion’s skepticism towards IFDI is primarily targeted at
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) IFDI, while resistance towards greenfield IFDI is
generally much smaller.
As such, the article makes an important contribution to a better understanding of
mass attitudes towards IFDI and economic globalization more generally, while also
making some methodological advances for the field of ideational IPE research.
Although many observers of FDI have acknowledged that the perception of IFDI has
changed over time (for example, Safarian 1993, Vernon 1998, Jones 2002, Callaghan
2015), this article is, to the best of my knowledge, the first one to test these claims
empirically. And while previous research has produced some quantitative evidence
that economic ideas matter for the policy preferences of elites (especially Chwieroth
2007), this study presents one of the first quantitative analyses that systematically
tests the role of economic ideas and interpretive frameworks for the economic
preferences of non-elites. Lastly, against prevalent pessimistic predictions, the
findings also strike a modestly optimistic note about the possible futures of
economic globalization more generally.
6
The formation of individual preferences towards economic globalization and IFDI
While public opinion towards trade and immigration have received a fair amount of
attention in recent research, mass attitudes towards IFDI remain comparatively
understudied. Mirroring the earlier literature on trade and immigration attitudes
(Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Rodrik and Mayda 2005, Mayda 2006), a majority of the
few existing studies have focused primarily on assessing the role of individuals’
material self-interest and, more specifically, the consistency of the latter with the
theoretical predictions that can be derived from the factor-endowment model (for
example, Scheve and Slaughter 2002, Pandya 2010, Kaya and Walker 2012, Ahmed,
Bastiaens and Johnston 2015). What these studies have shown, as a whole, is that
individuals with higher levels of income and education tend to express somewhat
more favorable views of IFDI. Yet, although this undoubtedly constitutes an
important empirical finding, it leaves much else unexplained. On the one hand,
levels of income and education account only for a small part of the observed
variation in IFDI attitudes. And on the other hand, the underlying theoretical claims,
portraying the material economic consequences of IFDI as obvious and clear to the
mass public, are built on seemingly fairly strong assumptions. In effect, several
decades of scholarly research into the effects of IFDI on economic growth and
development have so far come to no conclusion whether the net effects of IFDI are
rather positive or negative 2. And when it remains difficult for economic experts to
establish the consequences of IFDI for an economy as a whole, it may be somewhat
problematic to assume that individuals are able to straightforwardly identify the
2
For overview of this literatures, see Meyer and Sinani 2009.
7
implications of more or less IFDI for their own personal situation, as this would
presumably depend on a large number of additional considerations that are
concealed by the abstract concept of ‘IFDI’ (such as the specific industrial sector of
the investments, their mode of entry, geographical location, the type of economic
activities undertaken at the affiliates, etc.). Furthermore, as Burgoon and Hiscox
(2004) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006, 2007) - pursuing similar lines of critique
with regards to studies assessing the determinants of attitudes towards trade and
immigration - have pointed out, an individual’s level of education or income may
proxy not only for her level of skills, but also, for example, the kind of economic and
political information that she is exposed to.
Building on this argument, more recent research on globalization attitudes have
begun to assess the role of nonmaterial factors in the formation of individual
preferences more systematically. In particular, the work by Mansfield and Mutz
(2009, 2013) has made important advances by demonstrating the strong influence of
cultural, normative and ideological dispositions (such as the degree of
ethnocentrism, feelings of national pride or more general views about international
affairs) on individual attitudes towards trade and offshoring. Instead, the role of
nonmaterial factors has so far been little explored in studies of attitudes towards
IFDI, although the findings of two recent survey-experimental studies hint in similar
directions: A series of survey-experiments conducted by René Lindstaedt and Nate
Jensen (2012) have revealed that respondents’ views of IFDI, independently from
their economic status, are strongly contingent upon the geographic origin of the
investment inflow, the exposure to a ‘jobs creation’ prime and considerations about
8
reciprocity in investment relationships. Focusing on the latter in the context of M&A
flows between the USA and China, Adam Chilton, Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley
(2016) have found further and more specific survey-experimental evidence
suggesting that considerations about fairness and perceptions of the national interest
play a crucial role in shaping public opinion towards foreign investment inflows.
Together, the strong evidence about framing sensitivity that these studies collect
seem to demonstrate fairly convincingly that individual IFDI preferences are in fact
less stable than strictly economistic arguments would make one believe.
The present analysis builds on these insights, but shifts attention to the role of realworld transformations in deeper ideational dynamics that go beyond the somewhat
idiosyncratic experimental framing effects that these studies demonstrate. More
specifically, the empirical investigation studies how political discourses about the
world economy – and the changes in the content of the latter – intervene in the
processes through which individual preferences are formed. I suggest that
individuals generally do not possess much information about the precise
consequences of more or less IFDI for their personal material well-being. Instead,
they rely on interpretive frameworks that provide them with cues, helping them to
define their general stance towards a highly complex economic transaction such as
IFDI by simplifying the issues that are involved in a specific way. In particular, as
the empirical investigation focuses on the IFDI attitudes of ‘ordinary’ citizens rather
than experts3, the type of interpretive framework that are at the center of attention
here, and which are elaborated in some more detail in the subsequent paragraph, are
3
Who are at the focus of the literature on the role of ‘policy paradigms’ in economic affairs.
9
political narratives or ‘folk-theories’ about the world economy 4; that is, the type of
economic knowledge that guide public debates about the economy and resonate far
beyond the discussions held among groups of economic experts.
It is important to note that this analytical focus is distinct from the one pursued by
investigations of sociotropic policy preferences and, at the same time, in principle
compatible with both sociotropic and egocentric arguments. The debates between
the sociotropic and egocentric literatures have focused on whether individuals
primarily care about the consequences of certain policies for the personal well-being
or, alternatively, to what extent they also take the implications of a policy for the
well-being of their social in-groups into account. The argument that is being pursued
here, instead, suggests that interpretive frameworks – and changes in them – will
affect individual preferences independently from whether they are primarily driven
by egocentric or sociotropic motives. For example, if predominant public discourses
about the economy describe IFDI as having negative consequences for the long-term
development of a national economy, this can lead individuals to adopt more
negative views of IFDI either because they worry that a deterioration of the national
economy as a whole will be bad for their personal well-being, or because it leads
them to think that IFDI will have negative consequences for the social groups they
care about. In either case, the way in which predominant economic narratives
describe the meaning and consequences of IFDI will affect how individuals construe
their preferences towards the latter.
4
For an overview of this literature, see Stanley and Jackson (2016).
10
A blessing or a curse? Political discourses about the (world) economy and the
meaning of IFDI
The transformation of economic ideas and discourses throughout the post-war era
and their implications for policy decisions have been subject to much debate. As a
variety of authors have demonstrated, ideational evolutions have been an important
force underlying the development of economic policies in recent decades, which
have critically influenced the framing of policy issues and actors’ policy preferences
as a result (f.e. Hall 1989, Blyth 2002, Abdelal 2007, Chwieroth 2010). Although the
implications of these ideational transformations for the portrayal of IFDI has so far
received relatively little systematic attention within this literature, the empirical
track record is clear and fairly striking (for a detailed treatment, see Linsi 2016).
The economic-ideational changes of greatest importance in shaping the evolution of
predominant interpretations of the meaning of IFDI consist of the profound
transformations in the understanding of spatial scales in the world economy in
public economic discourses, which have been described particularly forcefully in the
work by Bob Jessop (2003) and Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan (2004) amongst
others. While it is not possible to do any justice to the nuances of their sophisticated
arguments here, the well-known basic development that these authors describe
refers to the deep changes in the understanding of the relationships between
national economies and the world economy in dominant public economic discourses
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From the end of the Second World War into the
1980s, public debates about international economic policy were shaped by an
underlying narrative of economic statism. Although viewpoints were of course as
11
diverse then as they are today, there was a general consensus that the national
economy constituted the primary object of analysis and that the world economy
broadly represented a system consisting of several independent, and to some degree
autonomous, national units (cf. Mitchell 1998). Although the neoliberal discourse
that came to prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s forcefully challenged
associated notions about the responsibility of the state to actively manage the
economy, it largely upheld the notion of the national economy as the primary unit in
transnational economic affairs, advocating in essence the establishment of ‘free’
markets at the national level (Jessop 2003) 5. Instead, in the early 1990s, in the
aftermath of the Cold War, the narrative of globalization and competitiveness began to
emerge as a new powerful interpretive framework or economic folk-theory that
started to reconceptualize spatial understandings in the world economy in quite a
fundamental fashion (Cameron and Palan 2004, Fougner 2006, Davies 2014; also Hay
and Watson 2004, Schmidt 2007). Rather than as a network of relatively autonomous
national units, this new public economic discourse portrayed the economy primarily
as a system of “economic relationships that exist above and autonomously from
national economies” (Fougner 2006:174); in other words, the world economy came to
be described as a globally integrated economic system, within which, to put it
bluntly, national economies were delegated to being platforms of production whose
economic fate depended on their ability to attract globally mobile firms (cf. Porter
1990, Reich 1992).
In contrast to the preceding narratives, the neoliberal discourse was clearly more welcoming of
international integration. But rather than as a goal per se, international integration was sought
primarily to unleash external competitive forces as means to enforce the productivity and efficiency of
national industries.
5
12
The implications of this discursive shift for the social interpretation of the meaning
and desirability of IFDI was fundamental. Most importantly for our purposes, it led
to sharp changes in the perception of the importance of the nationality of corporate
ownership per se, the role of MNCs and, as a result, the declared goals of ‘industrial
policy’ (which, from the 1990s onwards, came to be gradually rebranded as
‘competitiveness policy’, cf. Lawton 1999).
Throughout the 1950s-80s, there was a broad consensus that the nationality of
company owners was an important issue and economic policy discourses strongly
emphasized that it was the strength of national industries, which figured as the key
driver of long-term economic growth and development. Accordingly, foreign
multinational companies – and especially foreign take-overs of domestic firms were regarded skeptically throughout the developed world. Although the potential
benefits of MNCs, such as the associated capital inflows and the potential transfer of
technology and managerial know-how, were widely recognized at the time,
politicians, journalists and economists from all political colors were concerned that
MNCs could not be trusted to act in the national interest and that they may
undermine the development of national industries. One of the most vocal
proponents of these views was the French journalist and centrist politician JeanJacques Servan-Schreiber, whose vivid description of the expansion of US MNCs in
Europe in his essay Le défi américain (originally published in 1967) turned into an
international best-seller 6. And although Servan-Schreiber’s claim that “foreign
investment imposes strict limitations on national development” (Servan-Schreiber
6
Selling close to one million copies in France alone and being translated into more than 15 languages.
13
1979:61) may have resonated particularly well among the French public, similar
views and concerns were extremely widespread across the globe, as the paper trails
on the topic accumulating in the 1960s-1980s (in academia, newspaper archives,
national parliamentary debates or policy documents from the EC or UN), as well as
the many adopted policy initiatives designed to regulate MNCs and to reduce the
perceived adverse consequences from IFDI, attest (cf. Safarian 1993, Sagafi-Nejad
and Dunning 2008, Linsi 2016). At the same time, it is also important to note that the
public discourse about IFDI at the time was not only negative. In particular, it made
a distinction between greenfield and M&A IFDI. Consistent with the emphasis of the
perceived critical importance of national industries as key drivers of the long-term
development of a national economy as a whole, the hostility towards IFDI was
channeled primarily at M&A IFDI - which were seen as a clearly more imminent
threat to the former - rather than greenfield investments. Michel MauriceBokanowski, French Industry Minister at the time, put this distinction rather bluntly
in a speech held in 1965 in which he referred to a theory of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ IFDI to
announce that “[t]he present policy of the Finance Ministry is that take-overs by
foreign firms [i.e. the ’bad’ FDI] will in future generally be forbidden, while the
creation of new productive concerns with advanced technology [i.e. the ‘good’ FDI]
is regarded more warmly” (Financial Times 1965).
The neoliberal discourse that emerged in the USA and the United Kingdom in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, describing international competition and economic
integration as a generally positive development, adopted a less hostile stance
towards foreign MNCs. Yet, at the same time, it did maintain a clear national-level
14
orientation. International economic integration was still considered to be a choice
rather than a given; and international competition was welcomed, in particular,
because it was seen as a force enhancing the productivity and efficiency of national
industries, which ultimately remained at the heart of economic policymakers’
attention7. Accordingly, although foreign MNCs were increasingly seen as actors
that may strengthen rather than weaken domestic firms, the presence or attraction of
IFDI was not yet portrayed as a desirable thing per se (cf. Capie et al. 2005, Linsi
2016).
In contrast, the narrative of globalization and national competitiveness that started
to become very prominent in political discourses about the economy in the early
1990s (cf. Petersen 2010) – as Figure 1 suggests -, led to more fundamental changes in
the portrayal of the economic role of foreign MNCs and IFDI. Critically, the
narrative of globalization emphasized the inevitability of processes of transnational
economic integration, as the economic relevance of national borders, the discourse
claimed, was rapidly vanishing in what was considered to be an increasingly
globally integrated economic system (cf. Fukuyama 1992, Ohmae 1990).
Political discourse towards IFDI in the UK and US in the 1980s are discussed in more detail in Kang
(1997) and Augar
7
15
Figure 1. The number of publications indexed in Google Scholar on ‘economic
sovereignty’ and ‘economic competitiveness’ as a share of the total number of
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1
publications on the ‘economy’ over time, 1970-2010
1970
1980
1990
Year
Economic sovereignty
2000
2010
Economic competitiveness
SOURCE: Own calculations based on data from Google Scholar.
Although empirical analyses strongly suggest that the processes of economic
globalization constitute gradual and relatively slow-moving internationalizing
trends rather than a radical break with the past (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1999) and
despite the evidence that economic systems (cf. Ghemawat 2013) as well as firms (cf.
Rugman 2005) remain (until today) more strongly embedded within national
boundaries than the narrative of globalization suggests, public economic discourses
about inward FDI changed notably in the early 1990s. Rather than as an economic
‘problem’ or a ‘challenge’ for the development of national industries, IFDI were
increasingly described as an opportunity and a symbol of economic success. The
16
previously hotly debated topic of the nationality of company ownership gradually
lost political salience (cf. Callaghan 2015) and investments by foreign MNCs – in
stark contrast the notions prevalent in the 1960s-1980s - were instead increasingly
seen as a ‘vote of confidence’ of global markets (The Economist 2000) or even a
‘source of national pride’ (The Economist 2004).
Implications
It is clear that this brief summary can only touch the surface of these complex
developments in political discourses about the economy, which would deserve
many conceptual and cross-national qualifications that cannot be elaborated here
(for a fuller treatment, see Linsi 2016). But, stripped to its bare bones, the essential
empirical phenomenon that the remainder of this article focuses on consists of the
move in predominant public economic discourses away from the nation-state
towards the global economy per se as the primary ordering force in the world
economy, and the associated decline of the portrayal of IFDI, and M&A IFDI in
particular, as a ‘threat’ for national economic development. The question that this
development gives rise to is whether it led to observable changes in individuals’
preferences towards IFDI.
More specifically, the conjecture underlying the argument presented so far would
predict that, all else equal, individuals who have been more exposed to the narrative
of economic statism hold more negative views of IFDI than individuals with a
relatively greater exposure to the narrative of globalization, simply because the
17
former describes the role of foreign MNCs for national economic development far
more critically than the latter.
Empirical strategy: age-dependent processes of economic socialization
To test this argument empirically, I would ideally want to track the evolution of
public opinion towards IFDI over time from the 1960s to the 2000s. Yet, the lack of
data with such long time series 8 makes it impossible to test the argument directly.
Instead, pursuing a strategy that is similar to the one followed by Ronald Inglehart
in his seminal work The Silent Revolution (1977), I use obvious differences in the
degrees of exposure to the narrative of economic statism among various age cohorts
as a proxy to test the argument indirectly. In essence, this strategy exploits the key
insight generated by a firmly established stream of literature in social psychology
and sociology, which has consistently found that most of the political and economic
core beliefs that individuals hold are formed during late adolescence and early
adulthood when individuals have been found to be relatively open to adopt new
ideas, whilst their susceptibility to change attitudes decreases gradually
subsequently (see Glenn 1974, Krosnick and Alwin 1989, Alwin, Cohen and
Newcomb 1991, Giuliano & Spilimbergo 2014). This relationship between age and
individuals’ mental or normative flexibility has been observed in a variety of issue
Public opinion surveys on attitudes towards FDI have been conducted for a long time. They were in
fact more common and frequently of higher quality in the 1960s and 1970s – when FDI was seen as a
political ‘hot topic’ – than they are today. (See, for example, the collection in John Fayerweather, Host
National Attitudes toward Multinational Corporations (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1982).) However, the
problem is that the various surveys are not consistent over time as they use different questions and
different samples over time.
8
18
areas and the literature has forwarded a number of explanations why people become
less likely to change their views as they grow older. Jon Krosnick and Duane Alwin
(1989) list thee reasons in particular: a biologically driven process of cognitive decay
that makes the absorption of new information more difficult for older people;
individuals’ reliance on previous experiences as anchors that create psychological
stability, which naturally decreases the proportional impact of new information as
the total number of previous experiences grows; and the observed tendency towards
decreased social engagement with increasing age, which tends to concentrate
individuals’ social networks among individuals from the same cohort, thereby
reducing the likelihood of being exposed to new norms or beliefs prominent among
younger cohorts.
While the relevant literature agrees on the existence of this broad pattern, there is
some debate about the exact degree of difference in relative mental flexibility during
adolescence and early adulthood as opposed to later stages in life. At the risk of
oversimplification, the contending perspectives can be labelled, respectively, as the
‘impressionable years hypothesis’ (IYH) and the ‘increasing persistence hypothesis’
(IPH) (cf. Krosnick and Alwin 1989: 416). According to the former, individuals are
unlikely to change core beliefs after the completion of early adulthood. In contrast,
the latter contends that individuals keep adapting their beliefs and attitudes to
general societal trends throughout their life cycle, although their susceptibility to
change attitudes decreases gradually as they age.
Aside of these ongoing debates, the central insight produced by this field of research
consists of the repeated observation that “the historical environment in which a
19
young person becomes an active participant in the adult world shapes the basic
values, attitudes, and world views formed during those years” (Krosnick and Alwin
1989: 416) and that these core beliefs acquired during early adulthood typically
shape
individuals’
views throughout their
lifespan.
Accordingly,
because
population-level exposures to newly emerging norms or social beliefs differentially
affect different age groups, the literature portends the existence of persisting
differences in public attitudes among groups of individuals who grew up in the
same historical context, so-called cohort effects.
Applied to the theoretical argument pursued here, this insight suggests a clearly
defined prediction: namely, that individuals who passed their early adulthood in a
time-period in which the narrative of economic statism was highly salient will, all
else equal, hold less favorable views of IFDI – and of M&A IFDI in particular - than
younger individuals who passed their prime period of economic socialization in a
historical context in which the narrative of globalization was predominant. Although
the age-span of ‘early adulthood’ has never been conclusively defined, following the
landmark study of Theodore Newcomb and his collaborators (Alwin, Cohen and
Newcomb 1991), most studies in the field operationalize it as the period roughly
between the age of 18 and 25 years and I follow this standard practice in the
empirical analysis below. Hence, situating the decline of the discourse of economic
statism and the rise of the globalization narrative around the year 1990, the basic
age-related prediction of the argument of socialization is that individuals born
before the mid-1960s – that is, individuals who turned 25 years old before 1990 –
20
ceteris paribus have more negative views of IFDI, and in particular of M&A IFDI, than
individuals born later.
The main challenge in testing this hypothesis is to differentiate the age-related
patterns of socialization from other age-related mechanisms that can lead older
respondents to express more negative views of IFDI. In particular three potential
alternative mechanisms need to be considered: (i) the possibility that individuals’
prospects of being themselves employed by a MNC in the future decrease as they
grow older; (ii) a natural trend towards conservatism with increasing age; and (iii)
that younger people – for similar reasons as those just discussed – are more likely to
update their beliefs about IFDI according to new information about actual changes in
the material nature of IFDI flows (that is, a dynamic akin to rational learning about
material changes).
To differentiate between these three alternative mechanisms and the mechanism of
socialization, I refer to a method of graphical pattern analysis - originally proposed
by Paul Baltes and Robert Blanchard and his colleagues (Baltes 1968, Blanchard 1977)
-, which suggests mapping out the specific theoretical predictions of each
mechanism and to evaluate the consistency of these theoretical relationships with the
patterns actually observed in the data. For that purpose, Figure 2 plots the
theoretically expected age-related patterns predicted by each one of the four
mechanisms. To reflect the structure of the actually available data (discussed in more
detail below), the plot illustrates the theoretical relationships of the different
mechanisms under the assumption that we dispose of two survey waves (t1 and t2),
which were both undertaken after the change in narrative had taken place at t0. The
21
x-axis shows respondents’ year of birth (i.e. respondents’ age decreases as we move
from left to right) and the y-axis the probability that they express a negative view
towards foreign companies. The specific patterns predicted by the employment
prospects and natural trend towards conservatism hypotheses, illustrated in plot 1 in
Figure 2, are essentially the same: both predict that the probability of a respondent
expressing negative views of IFDI increases gradually 9 as she grows older and that
the IFDI skepticism of respondents of the same birth cohort tends to increase from t1
to t2 due to the process of ageing unfolding in the meantime. The specific predictions
of the hypothesis of age-dependent learning about structural changes are
theoretically more closely related to the hypothesis of socialization. The key
difference among the two is that the former relates to a process that – as far as this
can be assessed based on the available empirical evidence from relevant studies in
the field 10 - unfolds gradually over time, while the latter refers to a process marked
by a rather abrupt rupture around the year 1990, as discussed previously 11. In
essence, the specific prediction of the hypothesis of learning about structural
changes, depicted in Plot 2 in Figure 2, predicts that older birth cohorts hold more
negative views of IFDI than younger peers because the former are less likely to take
new information about changes in the nature of operation of MNCs (such as an
increasing geographical diversification of sources of IFDI, a growing R&D-intensity
of IFDI-related activities and an associated movement towards higher-value adding
For the sake of simplicity, I assume here that the effect of ageing is linear. Non-linear extensions can
be elaborated easily from the illustration.
10 For example, Cantwell (1995), Yorgason (2007).
11 In addition, a further difference among the two, which is exploited in the UK survey analysis
below, is that while key structural changes in the operation of MNCs over time should in principle
affect the nature of greenfield and M&A IFDI in a similar way, following the discussion above, the
hypothesis of socialization predicts the age-effect to be notably greater for M&A IFDI attitudes than
greenfield IFDI.
9
22
activities and more skill-intensive employment opportunities at MNCs’ affiliates
abroad, etc.) into account; that the attitudes of respondents from the same birth
cohort become more positive from t1 to t2 (in contrast to the predictions derived from
the employment prospects and natural trend towards conservatism hypotheses); and
that the size of a birth cohorts’ decrease in IFDI hostility from t1 to t2 shrinks with
increasing age because older birth cohorts are less likely to be affected by new
information than younger ones. Finally, plots 3a-c in Figure 2 illustrate the
theoretically predicted pattern of a birth cohort-effect driven by the mechanism of
socialization. According to the IYH (illustrated in plot 3a), respondents who passed
their years of prime socialization in a period in which the public discourse of
economic statism was predominant, will express notably more negative views about
IFDI than respondents who completed their early adulthood after the globalization
narrative had risen to prominence; furthermore, the IYH also predicts that the
difference among these two groups remains largely constant over time (i.e. it does
not vary from t1 to t2). Instead, the IPH – illustrated in plot 3b - suggests that, to a
gradually decreasing extent, the rise to prominence of the globalization narrative
also affects the IFDI attitudes of birth cohorts who completed their prime period of
socialization before the 1990s. More precisely, it predicts that individuals who spent
their early adulthood in a time period in which the statist narrative was still
predominant will subsequently partly adopt the views of the globalization narrative,
but that the degree to which they do so decreases as they grow older (and their
attitudinal flexibility gradually declines). Moreover, it predicts a difference in the
responses from the same birth cohorts from t1 to t2: the longer that individuals are
23
exposed to a new narrative, the greater the chances become that they will adopt the
views it advocates, but this effect gradually decreases as they grow older. In
probably the most realistic scenario in which the mechanism of socialization lies
somewhere between the ideal-typical IPH and IYH hypotheses, the combined effect
– illustrated in plot 3c – suggests three key patterns: Firstly, respondents who turned
25 12 before the rise to prominence of the globalization narrative in the early 1990s –
in other words, respondents who were born before the mid-1960s – express notably
less favourable views of inward FDI than respondents born later. Secondly, in
contrast to the employment prospects or natural trend towards conservatism
hypotheses, the socialization mechanisms suggests that there should be no notable
age effect among cohorts born after the mid-1960s: as they were not previously
primed by the statist narrative, their views on inward FDI should be roughly similar
and not change much over time as they grow older. Thirdly, for the birth cohorts
born before the mid-1960s, it suggests that the degree to which they adopt the views
of the new narrative decreases as a function of age, but – similar to the learning
about structural changes hypothesis but in contrast to the employment prospects
and natural trend towards conservatism hypotheses – increases from t1 to t2 as their
exposure to the new narrative persists.
As discussed, this is a somewhat arbitrary cut-off point. In the analysis below I use five-year
periods, which allows for some more flexibility.
12
24
Figure 2. Theoretical relationship between respondents’ year of birth and IFDI
attitudes according to the discussed alternative age-related mechanisms
Empirical analysis
To test the argument of socialization empirically, I perform two analyses that build
upon each other. The first analysis combines conventional regression techniques
with the method of graphical visualization just presented to investigate the
consistency of the age-related predictions of the socialization argument in a broad
cross-national perspective (of primarily advanced economies). In turn, the
25
subsequent analysis complements these findings with an in-depth survey of a
representative sample of 700 respondents from the United Kingdom, which was
specifically designed for this study, enabling me to assess the relationship between
individuals’ economic views, period of socialization and attitudes towards different
types of IFDI in a more fine-grained manner.
Multi-country analysis
To examine the presence of these patterns in individual attitudes towards FDI in a
large cross-national sample, I use the results from the International Social Survey
Programme’s (ISSP) 2003 and 2013 surveys on national identity, which asked 45,993
respondents from 34 countries 13 in 2003 and 45,297 respondents from 33 countries14
in 2013 a variety of questions about their identity and their views on foreign cultures
and international issues.
Statistical model
To analyze the data, I apply a multi-level (hierarchical) probit model with random
intercepts allowing for within-cluster dependence, which takes the nesting of
individuals in country-clusters into account and lets the constant vary from country
They are: Austria, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Czech Republic, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Latvia,
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia,
Slovakia, Taiwan, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and South Africa.
14 They are: Belgium; Croatia; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany;
Great Britain, Hungary; Iceland; India; Ireland; Israel; Japan; Republic of Korea; Latvia; Lithuania;
Mexico; Norway; Philippines; Portugal; Russian Federation; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain;
Sweden, Switzerland; Taiwan, Turkey; United States.
13
26
to country and which splits the implicit error term into a country-level component
that is shared by all individual respondents from the same country and an
individual-level component that is unique to each respondent (cf. Rabke-Hesketh
and Skrondal 2012). The dependent variable is a dummy variable 15 which is equal to
one if a respondent ‘agrees’ or ‘strongly agrees’ with the statement that “Large
international companies are doing more and more damage to local business in
[COUNTRY]” 16. The main independent variable is Birth cohort, an individual-level
categorical variable dividing respondents into cohorts according to their year of
birth in five-year intervals (i.e. born between 1929 and 1933, 1934-1938, etc.).
Generally, the oldest cohort is used as the reference category. Furthermore, I include
a number of control variables at the individual as well as the country-level. At the
respondent-level I control for an individuals’ gender, household income, level of
education, feelings of national pride, and information whether they are employed in
the private or public sector. At the country-cluster-level I control for the size of an
economy, GDP per capita, GDP growth rates and the size of the stock of inward as
well as outward FDI relative to GDP. The definition of all these variables, their
distribution, coverage and the rationale for their inclusion are summarized in Table 5
in the appendix.
I here choose a binary rather than an ordinal specification because the latter corresponds to the logic
of the exercise of graphical visualization.
16 See question 7a in ISSP 2003 questionnaire and question 6a in ISSP 2013 questionnaire.
15
27
Results
Table 1 presents the main results of the two-level probit regressions. Column 1 and 2
show the estimation results for the 2003 and 2013 surveys separately. Column 3
shows the estimations based on the merged dataset that includes both survey waves
simultaneously. The table shows the results including respondents from all countries
for which the surveys were conducted (cf. footnotes 13 and 14 above) 17. Information
about respondents’ household income is not provided for about a quarter of the
sample and responses regarding education levels and nationalist feelings is missing
for a few thousands observations, reducing the total combined sample from an
original 82,193 to 54,064 respondents (for more details on missing observations, see
Table 5 in the appendix).
Turning to the results, nearly all individual-level control variables are aligned with
findings of earlier studies on the individual determinants of economic preferences: a
higher household income as well as higher levels of education are associated with a
more positive view of FDI, while the expression of nationalistic feelings,
employment in the public sector and female gender (the latter only in the 2003
survey) are significant predictors of more hostile attitudes towards inward FDI. The
association of the included country-level covariates generally point in the same
direction in both surveys, although curiously the associations are statistically
insignificant in the 2003 survey but significant (without exception) in the 2013
survey. Altogether, they suggest that respondents from larger economies are
Note that dropping the few non-OECD economies included in the ISSP surveys does not affect the
main results.
17
28
somewhat more hostile towards inward FDI while respondents from economies with
a higher GDP per capita and a higher stock of outward FDI tend to express fewer
concerns. The association of economic growth rates is in an unexpected negative
direction, suggesting that macroeconomic difficulties (i.e. lower growth rates) are
associated with more rather than less hostility towards FDI. The stock of inward FDI
is weakly positively related in the 2003 survey but negatively (and statistically
insignificantly) in the combined dataset.
The variables of main interest are the fourteen birth cohort categories at the top of
the table 18. As a whole, the birth cohort variables clearly and consistently show that
younger birth cohorts are less strongly opposed to inward FDI than older
respondents. More specifically, opposition towards FDI seems to decrease gradually
as we move from the oldest respondents towards younger cohorts until the cohort
born in 1964-68 at which point we observe a small ‘jump’ in the magnitude of the
associated decrease in FDI hostility after which the size of the cohort effect roughly
stabilizes at around -0.22 in the combined sample (which is an effect of similar
magnitude as having a university degree or expressing nationalistic views). Overall,
this pattern corresponds closely to the theoretical expectation of a cohort effect
induced by socialization as discussed above.
Note that the birth cohort groups at each end of the spectrum are merged so that there are at least
1,000 respondents in each group.
18
29
Table 1. Main results of multi-country analysis
Born before 1929
1929-33
1934-38
1939-43
1944-48
1949-53
1954-58
1959-63
Individual-level
1964-68
1969-73
1974-78
1979-83
(1)
2003 survey
Reference
category
0.01
(0.05)
-0.04
(0.05)
-0.04
(0.05)
-0.07
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.04)
-0.08+
(0.04)
-0.09*
(0.04)
-0.17***
(0.04)
-0.17***
(0.04)
-0.21***
(0.05)
-0.21***
(0.05)
(2)
2013 survey
Reference
category
-0.00
(0.05)
-0.05
(0.05)
-0.07
(0.05)
-0.06
(0.04)
-0.10*
(0.05)
-0.15**
(0.05)
-0.15***
(0.05)
-0.11*
(0.05)
-0.13**
(0.05)
-0.12*
(0.05)
-0.19***
(0.05)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.08***
(0.02)
-0.18***
(0.02)
0.22***
(0.02)
0.09***
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
1984-88
Born after 1988
Household income
(ln)
Secondary degree
University degree
Nationalism
Public sector
Female
-0.12***
(0.01)
-0.13***
(0.02)
-0.20***
(0.02)
0.32***
(0.02)
0.08***
(0.02)
0.04**
(0.02)
30
(3)
Merged
Reference
category
0.01
(0.05)
-0.08+
(0.04)
-0.09*
(0.04)
-0.13**
(0.04)
-0.13***
(0.04)
-0.15***
(0.04)
-0.17***
(0.04)
-0.24***
(0.04)
-0.23***
(0.04)
-0.22***
(0.04)
-0.23***
(0.04)
-0.20***
(0.04)
-0.27***
(0.05)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.11***
(0.01)
-0.20***
(0.02)
0.27***
(0.01)
0.09***
(0.01)
0.03*
(0.01)
Country-level
GDP (ln)
GDP per capita
(thousands)
Growth
Inward FDI
Outward FDI
𝜎𝑣
ρ
Log-likelihood
Countries
Respondents
0.03
(0.03)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.26
0.06
-15731.71
30
25,401
0.12***
(0.03)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.06*
(0.02)
0.01+
(0.00)
-0.00+
(0.00)
0.24
0.06
-18142.34
32
28,663
0.00
(0.02)
-0.00+
(0.00)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00***
(0.00)
0.30
0.08
-33939.63
41
54,064
NOTES: Probit coefficients displayed. Standard errors in parentheses. Constant omitted; + p<0.1, *p <
0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.
To examine the pattern in more detail, I first assess the statistical significance of the
theoretically predicted break in the data for cohorts born before/after the mid-1960s
and then plot the average predicted probabilities for each cohort separately. Table 2
shows the results from a series of Wald tests, which assess the statistical significance
of the difference between the coefficient estimated for the 1964-68 cohort and those
of all other birth cohorts in the estimations that are based on the merged dataset
(Model 3 in Table 1). As a reminder, the IYH would predict FDI attitudes of cohorts
who passed their early adulthood during a period in which the statist narrative was
predominant (i.e. those born before the mid-1960s and having turned 25 years old
before 1990) to be different from those who passed their prime period of politicaleconomic socialization in the 1990s and 2000s (i.e. those born in the mid-1960s and
later who turned 25 after the 1980s) when the globalization narrative was salient; at
31
the same time, if the hypothesis is correct, attitudes should be similar among cohorts
who grew up in a similar ideational environment (i.e. those born before the mid1960s and those born after). The results from the series of Wald tests in Table 2
suggest that this is indeed the case: the estimated coefficient for the 1964-68 cohort is
statistically significantly different from the coefficients of all older cohorts, but not
statistically significantly different from the estimated coefficient for all younger birth
cohorts.
Table 2. Chi-square Wald test statistics assessing significance of difference in
coefficient for 1964-68 cohort and coefficients of all other birth cohort categories
1964-68
1964-68
1929-33
1934-38
1939-43
1944-48
1949-53
1954-58
34.03***
23.45***
26.07***
15.28***
18.56***
11.88***
1959-63
1969-73
1974-78
1979-83
1984-88
>1988
7.56**
0.05
0.23
0.16
1.07
1.37
NOTE: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001.
To assess the more nuanced theoretical predictions deriving from the combination of
the IYH and IPH illustrated in Figure 2 above, I next calculate and plot the cohortspecific predicted probabilities based on the regression analyses conducted above.
The results are illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the average predicted probability
for an individual born into a specific birth cohort to express a negative view of
inward FDI, taking into account the cohort-specific distribution of all individual- and
country-level confounders included in the regressions.
32
Figure 3. Average predicted probability to express a negative view of the impact of
multinational companies by birth cohort, taking into account all covariates at
individual and national level listed in Table 1
Predicted probability
75
70
2003 survey
65
60
2013 survey
55
50
Birth cohorts
The pattern remarkably closely resembles the theoretical expectations of the
combined socialization effect illustrated in Figure 2 above: Predicted average
attitudes of each birth cohort consistently became more favourable for all cohorts over
the ten years that elapsed between 2003 and 2013 (which is consistent with the
predictions of the hypothesis of socialization and structural change, but not the
hypotheses of employment prospects or a natural trend towards conservatism) and
it provides evidence for a rupture in IFDI attitudes for respondents born
before/after the mid-1960s (which is consistent with the hypothesis of socialization,
but not the hypothesis of structural change).
33
In-depth survey
In order to further corroborate these findings, I have conducted an in-depth study of
public attitudes towards IFDI with a nationally representative sample
of 700
respondents 19 from the United Kingdom through the professional opinion research
firm Survey Sampling International. The survey was fielded in October 2016. The
questionnaire included a variety of questions eliciting respondents’ views of IFDI
and the associated positive and negative aspects in a more fine-grained manner. The
empirical analysis presented below focuses in particular on comparing individuals’
views of greenfield and M&A IFDI.
As the distribution of responses represented in Figure 4 illustrates, the results from
the survey suggest that individual attitudes towards greenfield and M&A IFDI
follow rather different patterns. Although the finding that individuals express a
much more favourable view of foreign companies ‘building new companies’
(greenfield IFDI) rather than ‘buying up already existing local companies’ (M&A
IFDI) is not surprising per se, this is as far as I know, the first scholarly study of
public opinion towards IFDI to assess these differences systematically 20.
The responses of 34 participants had to be excluded due to fraudulent answering patterns, reducing
the final sample size to 666 participants.
20 The differentiation between greenfield and M&A IFDI was, however, taken into account in a survey
on globalization attitudes conducted by the Pew Research Center (2014).
19
34
Figure 4. Distribution of responses to the questions 25 and 26: Do you think it is
good or bad if foreign companies ‘build new companies here’ [greenfield IFDI] or
‘buy up already existing local companies’ [M&A FDI]
A comparison of individual attitudes towards the two types of IFDI is particularly
useful for the purposes pursued here for two reasons: Firstly, as discussed above, the
statist economic discourse was not just hostile towards IFDI in general, but
especially towards M&A IFDI. Accordingly, a comparison of attitudes towards these
two types of IFDI is useful to differentiate the effect of individuals’ exposure to the
narrative of economic statism on their view of a specific type of economic transaction
from their hostility towards foreign companies (or foreigners) more generally.
Secondly, the comparison also provides additional leverage to further adjudicate
between the hypothesis of narrative change and the alternative explanation of
35
material changes in the nature of IFDI. While the hypothesis of socialization refers in
particular to M&A IFDI, the hypothesis of learning about structural changes should
in principle apply equally to attitudes towards greenfield and M&A IFDI21.
Accordingly, while the former predicts the cohort effects to be significantly stronger
for M&A than greenfield IFDI, the latter predicts them to be similar.
Furthermore, an additional innovative feature of the survey is that it also includes
questions aimed at eliciting individuals’ broader economic views, and in particular
their agreement with key claims promoted by the discourse of economic statism;
information, which enables me to complement the investigation with a causal
mediation analysis.
Main analysis: Greenfield vs. M&A IFDI
Empirical model
The answers to the questions about greenfield and M&A IFDI on a five-point scale
(from 1=’very good’ to 5=’very bad’), as illustrated in Figure x above, constitute the
two dependent variables. Building on the preceding analysis, the main independent
variable is a dummy variable designating all individuals born before 1965 who,
following the argument outlined above, passed their prime period of economic
socialization before the rise to prominence of the globalization discourse. In
addition, a number of control variables are also included. Information about
At least I do not know of any study suggesting that the relevant material changes in the nature of
IFDI (e.g. R&D intensity, ‘quality’ of jobs, etc.) were more pronounced for M&A than greenfield IFDI.
21
36
respondents’ level of education, household income, the skill-intensity of their current
employment as well as a dummy variable indicating whether they (or an immediate
family member) are or have been employed by a foreign MNC are included to take
theoretical arguments related to individuals’ self-interest into account. To account
for alternative cultural or ideological drivers of IFDI attitudes, information about
respondents’ national identity (‘British’ vs. ‘English’, ‘Scottish’ or ‘Welsh’), partisan
preferences, their stance on Brexit, the salience of nationalist views unrelated to
economic issues 22 as well as their gender are also included. All variables, their
distribution and the theoretically expected relationships to IFDI attitudes are
described in more detail in Table 6 in the Appendix. Corresponding to the nature of
the dependent variables, the estimation procedures are specified as ordered probit
models with robust standard errors.
Results
The results are presented in Table 3. Models 4-5 assess the determinants of public
skepticism towards greenfield IFDI and models 6-7 attitudes towards M&A IFDI.
Models 4 and 6 include the ‘standard’ control variables most commonly used by
previous studies; models 5 and 7 include the full set of controls. Higher levels of
Following Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 2013), the variable nationalism index is comprised of the
aggregate score of individuals’ level of agreement with the following three statements: “I would
rather be a citizen of my country than of any other country in the world”; “In the United Kingdom,
our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others”; and “[t]he world would be a better
place if people from other countries were more like the British”. The index ranges from 1 (respondent
disagrees strongly with all three statements) to 13 (respondent agrees strongly with all three
statements).
22
37
household income are associated negatively with individuals’ skepticism towards
greenfield as well as M&A IFDI, while the expected negative relationships of higher
levels of education and skills are weaker and mostly statistically insignificant. The
female gender dummy is associated with less favorable views of greenfield as well
as M&A IFDI, with the relationship being stronger for the former. The expected
positive association of the nationalism index is much weaker than expected. Instead,
the inclusion of alternative variables proxying for cultural and ideological beliefs
substantively improves model fit: more centrist voters express somewhat more
favorable views, while respondents with subnational identities and supporters of
Brexit expressing significantly more skeptical views of IFDI. Most importantly for
our purposes, the results strongly confirm the hypothesis of socialization: controlling
for the demographic and ideological variables discussed above, cohorts born before
1965 do not express more negative views of greenfield IFDI than younger peers, but
they are clearly more skeptical of M&A IFDI.
38
Table 3. Main results from the UK survey analysis
Skepticism towards Greenfield
IFDI
(4)
(5)
Skepticism towards M&A IFDI
(6)
(7)
Pre-1965 cohorts
-0.11 (0.10)
-0.11 (0.12)
0.34*** (0.10)
0.30** (0.11)
Education
GCSE
A-Levels
Undergraduate
Postgraduate
Reference
-0.19 (0.13)
-0.19 (0.13)
-0.29+ (0.17)
Reference
-0.10 (0.14)
-0.04 (0.14)
-0.19 (0.19)
Reference
0.02 (0.12)
0.02 (0.13)
0.06 (0.16)
Reference
0.05 (0.13)
0.16 (0.14)
0.24 (0.19)
Reference
-0.24 (0.16)
-0.31+ (0.16)
-0.43** (0.16)
-0.46* (0.20)
-0.11 (0.21)
-0.48+ (0.26)
Reference
-0.08 (0.18)
-0.15 (0.19)
-0.27 (0.18)
-0.40+ (0.22)
0.09 (0.23)
-0.40 (0.31)
Reference
-0.21 (0.16)
-0.28+ (0.17)
-0.28+ (0.16)
-0.27 (0.19)
-0.55** (0.19)
-0.25 (0.23)
Reference
-0.01 (0.17)
-0.15 (0.18)
-0.12 (0.18)
-0.16 (0.20)
-0.37 (0.21)
-0.09 (0.28)
Reference
-0.01 (0.12)
0.10 (0.13)
Reference
-0.04 (0.13)
0.09 (0.14)
Reference
-0.13 (0.12)
-0.18 (0.12)
Reference
-0.25* (0.13)
-0.30* (0.13)
Household income
<15k
15-25k
25-35k
35-45k
45-65k
65-85k
>85k
Skills
Low
Medium
High
MNC employee
-0.14 (0.13)
-0.06 (0.13)
Political ideology
Left
Centre-left
Centre-right
Right
Populist Right
Reference
-0.28 (0.18)
-0.42+ (0.23)
-0.34+ (0.18)
0.02 (0.23)
Reference
-0.13 (0.19)
-0.32 (0.24)
-0.06 (0.20)
0.06 (0.24)
Brexit support
0.18 (0.12)
0.36** (0.11)
Local identity
0.24* (0.11)
0.19+ (0.10)
Nationalism
index
0.02 (0.02)
0.002 (0.02)
-0.02 (0.02)
-0.06* (0.02)
Female
Pseudo-loglikelihood
0.41*** (0.10)
-651.09
0.40*** (0.11)
-531.98
0.17+ (0.09)
-791.25
0.09 (0.11)
-648.32
Observations
563
471
559
469
NOTES: Probit coefficients displayed. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant omitted; + p<0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p<0.001.
39
Causal mediation analysis
Finally, I further assess the relationship between individuals’ period of socialization
and their skepticism towards M&A IFDI through a causal mediation analysis
(CMA). Basic statistical techniques for CMA were popularized by Baron and Kenny
(1986) in the late 1980s and the corresponding methods have been further advanced
more recently by Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto (2011). In essence, CMA
techniques allow researchers to go beyond merely testing the theoretical consistency
of patterns of association between a proximate cause and an outcome variable by
explicitly modeling the intermediate steps intervening in the hypothesized causal
chain. The simple procedure to test mediation, as suggested by Baron and Kenny
(1986), essentially consists of three steps: Researchers have to provide evidence (i)
that the proximate cause X is correlated with the mediating variable (or mediator) M;
(ii) that M is correlated with the outcome Y; and (iii) that the inclusion of M reduces
the correlation between X and Y, while the correlation between M and Y remains
strong. The advances by Imai et al. (2011) have adapted this logic to the potential
outcomes framework and provided general algorithms that are able to assess these
steps in a more robust manner.
In the case at hand, respondents’ year of birth constitutes X. It is a proximate cause
because it doesn’t affect the outcome directly, but - if the proposed argument of
socialization is correct - because a respondent’s year of birth proxies for an
individual’s degree of exposure to the discourse of economic statism. The individual
salience of statist economic views thus constitutes the critical intermediate variable
M, which I have so far argued for in theoretical terms, but without testing its
40
presence empirically. In order to do so, I included three questions in the survey,
which asked respondents about their degree of agreement with three different
statements adapted from Servan-Schreiber’s Le défi américain, the best known
formulation of the discourse of economic statism, that together aim to capture the
rationale against M&A IFDI promoted by the discourse. Specifically, the questions
asked respondents to indicate on a five-point scale how strongly they (dis-)agree
with the following statements: “To guarantee the long-term prosperity of our nation,
we cannot just rely on the international economy. Our government has to think in
national terms and defend our economic sovereignty”; “For the good of the national
economy, it is essential to have strong domestic companies that are owned by UK
nationals”; “Foreign companies cannot be trusted to act in our national interest.”
Based on the answers to these questions, I then created the economic statism index,
which aggregates individual responses on a scale from 1 (respondent strongly
disagrees with all three statements) to 13 (respondent strongly agrees with all three
statements).
In order to test whether and to what extent the observed birth cohort effect in M&A
attitudes is mediated through differences in the salience of economic statist views
among cohorts born before and after the mid-1960s, as the socialization argument
posits, I then follow the steps outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) and corroborate
the findings using the algorithms provided by Imai et al. (2011). The results are
summarized in Table 4. Models 8-9 perform the steps outlined by Baron and Kenny
(1986), using for the prediction of the outcome the same ordered probit specification
as above. Models 10 and 11 follow the procedures outlined by Imai et al. (2011),
41
using the associated mediation package in Stata (cf. Hicks and Tingley 2011). Because
the software does not support ordered models or the inclusion of categorical
variables, the models are here specified as linear OLS regressions. As the table
shows, the results of the ordered probit and linear regression specifications are
highly consistent with each other. Models 8 and 10 test the association between the
birth cohort variable and individual respondents’ overall level of agreement with the
three statements encapsulating the discourse of economic statism. To reduce the
potential for post-treatment bias, the main results only include those control
variables, which are not clearly endogenous to M (the economic statism index). This
being said, the main results also hold when including the full set of control variables
used above, as Table 7 in the appendix shows.
42
Table 4. Main results from the causal mediation analysis
OLS predicting
mediator,
categorical
Ordered probit
predicting
outcome
OLS predicting
mediator, linear
OLS predicting
outcome
(DV=economic
statism index)
(8)
(DV=M&A
scepticism)
(9)
(DV=economic
statism index)
(10)
(DV=M&A
scepticism)
(11)
Economic
statism index
0.21*** (0.03)
Pre-1965 cohorts
0.78*** (0.18)
0.17+ (0.10)
Education
GCSE
A-Levels
Undergraduate
Postgraduate
Reference
-0.29 (0.22)
-0.30 (0.24)
-0.19 (0.32)
Reference
0.09 (0.13)
0.14 (0.13)
0.14 (0.15)
Household income
<15k
15-25k
25-35k
35-45k
45-65k
65-85k
>85k
Reference
-0.62* (0.28)
-0.73* (0.32)
-0.85** (0.32)
-0.52 (0.37)
-1.11* (0.43)
-0.46 (0.44)
Reference
-0.09 (0.17)
-0.15 (0.17)
-0.11 (0.16)
-0.21 (0.19)
-0.39+ (0.20)
-0.22 (0.24)
0.18*** (0.02)
0.83*** (0.18)
0.18* (0.09)
-0.12 (0.10)
0.04 (0.04)
-0.07 (0.06)
-0.04 (0.03)
-0.002 (0.132)
-0.09+ (0.05)
Skills
Low
Medium
High
Reference
0.48** (0.21)
-0.11 (0.27)
Reference
-0.23+ (0.12)
-0.17 (0.12)
Female
Model fit
-0.15 (0.18)
R-square: 0.09
0.21* (0.09)
PLL: -745.54
-0.25 (0.18)
R-square: 0.06
0.22* (0.08)
R-square: 0.18
Observations
ACME
561
555
555
555
0.15
Direct effect
0.18
Total effect
0.33
% mediated
NOTES Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant omitted;
***p<0.001.
43
+ p<0.1,
0.46
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
The results from both analyses provide strong evidence that a substantial part of the
observed birth cohort difference in M&A attitudes is indeed due to differences in the
salience of statist economic beliefs among the two groups, as suggested by the
socialization hypothesis. Statist economic beliefs are much more salient among
individuals who completed their prime period of economic socialization before the
1990s (see Models 9 and 11), and the size of the birth cohort coefficient is reduced by
about half (from above 0.3 in Models 7-8 to 0.17 in Model 10) and its statistical
significance drops significantly when the mediator is included. The algorithms
provided by Imai et al. confirm this result, suggesting that about half of the total
birth cohort effect is mediated through differences in statist economic beliefs.
44
Conclusions
Early studies of preferences towards economic globalization strongly emphasized
the role of individuals’ expected personal material costs or benefits of greater
economic integration, while more recent contributions, going beyond the rather
narrow underlying conceptualizations of self-interest, have highlighted the
importance of considerations about the fate of individuals’ social in-groups.
Although studies in the latter field have explicitly acknowledged that an evaluation
of the personal consequences of highly complex economic transactions typically
remains a far more difficult task than egocentric approaches implicitly suggest, they
have tackled the implications of this only indirectly. In contrast, the present study
attempted to address this question more explicitly in theoretical terms by engaging
with the very important - and so far neglected - role that prominent public
discourses about the world economy play as socially shared interpretive frameworks
that provide individuals with cues and cognitive shortcuts, helping them to define
their preferences towards such a complex phenomenon as economic globalization.
Examining the case of attitudes towards IFDI, I have shown strong, robust and
highly consistent evidence from various surveys, employing several complementary
strategies and a variety of specifications that birth cohorts who passed their prime
period of economic socialization in a time during which the narrative of economic
statism was prominent, several decades later still express notably more skeptical
views of (M&A) IFDI than younger peers, independently from their economic and
educational status and other ideological and cultural dispositions. As such, the
article provides strong evidence suggesting that interpretive frameworks shape mass
45
attitudes towards economic globalization and are thus of greater analytical
importance than previous research has tended to accord to them.
At the same time, the findings also casts some doubts about the more strongly
articulated hypotheses about the rise of populism and the backlash against economic
globalization among voters in advanced economies in most recent years. The
evidence examined in this study does not lend support to these claims. On the
contrary, it shows that, all else equal, younger voters tend to express clearly and
systematically more favorable views of IFDI. In this light, and to the extent to which
this pattern is also observable in other areas of globalization (a question that this
investigation cannot address), the apparent electoral success of anti-globalization
rhetorics in recent years may indeed as well represent a ‘last gasp’ of a vanishing
world-view rather than the return of economic nationalism (cf. Sandbu 2016).
46
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APPENDIX
Table 5. Description of variables used for ISSP analysis
Variable
AntiMNE
(Dependent
variable)
Birth cohort
dummies
Definition
Dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent strongly agrees or
agrees with the statement that “Large international companies
are doing more and more damage to local businesses in
[COUNTRY]”; 0 if neither agree nor disagree, disagree or
disagree strongly
Respondents’ year of birth derived from reported age at the time
of the interview, transformed into five-year birth cohort groups
as described in text.
Household
income (ln)
Log of individuals’ reported household income, converted to
euros according to exchange rates indicated by ISSP (2003) or
xe.com (2013) if euro isn’t local currency (absolute values in some
countries, midpoints in others)
Secondary
degree
2003: Dummy equal to 1 if degree=3 (higher secondary
completed), 4 (above higher secondary level) or 5 (university
50
Data source
Descriptives
V41-Q7a in ISSP 2003
ISSP; V40-Q6a in
ISSP 2013
2003: 1=21,306;
0=13,785; missing
observations=3,345
2013: 1=23,012;
0=16,992; missing
observations=3,753
Variable AGE in ISSP
2003 and 2013
2003: min=15, max=98,
mean=47.3; missing
observations=199
2013: min=15, max=79;
missing observations=0
Country-specific
variables INCOME –
Family income in
ISSP 2003 and
ISSP2013
2003: min=1.06,
max=11.48, mean=6.87;
missing
observations=8,517
Variable DEGREE in
ISSP 2003 and ISSP
2003: 1=21,179;
0=21,179; missing
2013: min=0, max=13,7,
mean=7.07; missing
observations=10,505
Expected
relationship
-
Negative: as
discussed in text
Negative: wealthier
individuals more
supportive of
globalization (f.e.
Rodrik and Mayda)
Negative: more
educated
degree completed), 0 if 0 (no formal qualification), 1 (lowest
formal qualification) or 2 (above lowest qualification)
2013
2013: 1=28,867;
0=14,546; missing
observations=344
2013: Dummy equal to 1 if degree=3 (upper secondary), 4 (post
secondary, non-tertiary), 5 (lower level tertiary) or 6 (upper level
tertiary); 0 if 0 (no formal education), 1 (primary school) or 2
(lower secondary)
University
degree
Nationalism
Public sector
Variable DEGREE in
ISSP 2003
2003: Dummy equal to 1 if degree=5 (university degree
completed), 0 if 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4
2003: 1=6,214; 0=32,054;
missing
observations=168
2013: 1=12,045;
0=31,368; missing
observations=344
2013: Dummy equal to 1 if degree=5 or 6
Dummy equal to one if respondent strongly agrees or agrees
with statement “I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than
any other country in the world”
2003: dummy = 1 if wrktype=1 (work for government) or 2 public
owned firm, national industry); 0 if wrktype=3 (private firm) or 4
(self-employed)
V19-Q4a in ISSP
2003; V17-Q3a in
ISSP 2013
Variable WRKTYPE
in ISSP 2003; variable
TYPORG2 in ISSP
2013
Variable SEX in
ISSP2003 and
ISSP2013
2003: dummy=1 if sex=2 (female); 0 if 1(male)
51
2003: 1=27,955; 0=9,421;
missing
observations=1,060
2013: 1=30,378;
0=12,253; missing
observations=1,126
2013: dummy=1 if TYPORG2==1 (public employer); 0 if
TYPORG2==2 (private employer)
Female
observations=168
2003: 1=10,711;
0=27,725; missing
observations=0
2013: 1=11,346;
0=32,411; missing
observations=0
2003: 1=20,573;
0=17,849; missing
observations=14
individuals more
supportive of
globalization (f.e.
Hainmueller and
Hiscox)
Negative: more
educated
individuals more
supportive of
globalization (f.e.
Hainmueller and
Hiscox)
Positive: individuals
with more
nationalist feelings
more likely to
oppose globalization
(f.e. Mansfield and
Mutz)
Positive: public
sector employees
less likely to benefit
personally from
MNCs
Positive (cf. Burgoon
and Hiscox)
2013: 1=23,392;
0=20,361; missing
observations=4
WB WDI
GDP (ln)
Log of size of GDP in 2003/2013
2003: min=23.3;
max=30.1; mean=26.3;
missing
observations=1,836
2013: min=23,4;
max=30.4; missing
observations = 1,897
WB WDI
GDP per
capita
(thousands)
GDP per capita in thousand USD in 2003/2013
2013: min=1.6;
max=88.3; mean=29.9;
missing
observations=41,860
WB WDI
Growth
Annualized rate of GDP growth in percentage points
Inward FDI
Inward FDI stock as a share of GDP in percentage points
2003: min=1.6; max=84;
mean=31; missing
observations=1,836
2003: min=-0.9,
max=8.42, mean=2.7,
missing
observations=1,836
2013: min=-1.67,
max=7.06; mean=1.65;
missing
observations=1,836
UNCTAD Stats
52
2003: min=2.09;
max=136.3; mean=36.6;
missing
Positive: larger
economies less
dependent on
international
economy
Negative: net effect
of IFDI found to be
more positive in
high-income than in
middle-income
economies (cf.
Meyer and Sinani)
Positive: less
resistance towards
IFDI in times of
economic difficulties
Unclear: positive if
greater visibility of
MNCs leads to more
observations=1,836
2013: min=3.48,
max=170.5; missing
observations=3482
UNCTAD Stats
Outward FDI
Outward FDI stock as a share of GDP in percentage points
2003: min=0.18;
max=98.2; mean=26,4;
missing
observations=1,836
2013: min=4.06;
max=231.2; mean=42.3;
missing
observations=3,746
53
resistance; negative
if greater presence
means greater
familiarity with
MNCs
Negative:
Populations in
internationally
oriented economies
should be more
welcoming to IFDI
due to reciprocity
concerns
Table 6. Description of variables used for UK analysis
Variable
Greengoba
(DV1)
Magoba
(DV2)
Definition
Descriptives
Thinking about these two types of investment separately, do you think it is
rather a good or a bad thing for the UK economy if foreign companies build new
companies here? (Q25)
1: very good thing; 2: rather good thing; 3: neigher good nor bad thing; 4: rather
bad thing; 5: very bad thing
Keeping in mind this distinction and thinking about the two types of
investments described above separately, do you think it is rather a good or a bad
thing for the UK economy if foreign companies buy up already existing local
companies? (Q26)
1 = very good thing; 2 = rather good thing; 3 = neigher good nor bad thing; 4 =
rather bad thing; 5 = very bad thing
Number of respondents per
category:
1=194; 2=296; 3=145; 4=18;
5=7.
Dummy variable; 1=year of birth<1965
Number of respondents per
category:
1=52; 2=120; 3=251; 4=184;
5=48.
Missing observations: 0
Education
1=GCSE; 2=A-Levels; 3=Undergraduate (Bachelor’s degree or Graduate
certificate or diploma); 4=Postgraduate (Postgraduate certificate ore diploma,
Master’s degree or Doctorate)
54
NA
Missing observations: 11
1=353; 0=313.
What is the highest degree of education that you have completed so far?
NA
Missing observations: 6
Number of respondents per
category:
Old
Expected relationship
Number of respondents per
category:
1=208; 2=162; 3=180; 4=94.
Missing observations: 22
Positive: older
generations more
hostile towards IFDI
due to exposure to
economic statism
narrative
Negative: more
educated less hostile
towards globalization
(eg. Hiscox and
Hainmueller)
How much is the combined total annual gross income before tax of all members
of your household together?
Inchld2
Skills2
MNCempfam
2=less than £15,000; 3=between £15,000 and £25,000; 4=between £25,000 and
£35,000; 5=between £35,000 and £45,000; 6=between £45,000 and £65,000;
7=between £65,000 and £85,000; 8=more than £85,000
Missing observations: 51
Number of respondents per
category:
27 categories into skill-levels according to ONS guidelines:
1=281; 3=189; 4=159.
2=low-skilled; 3=medium-skilled; 4=high-skilled
Missing observations: 37
Have you ore one of your immediate family members ever been employed by a
foreign multinational company operating in the UK.
Number of respondents per
category:
1=148; 0=506.
Missing observations: 12
Adapted from Q11, Which political party did you support at the 2015 UK
General Election?
Brexit
2=92; 3=129; 4=117; 5=122;
6=63; 7=53; 8=39.
More specifically, which of the following occupational classification categories
best describes your current or most recent job?
1=Yes, 0=No
Partylr
Number of respondents per
category:
1=Left (SNP, Greens, Plaid Cymru, Sinn Fein, SDLP); 2=Centre-left (Labour);
3=Centre-right (LibDems, Ulster); 4=Right (Conservatives, DUP); 5=Populist
right (UKIP)
Number of respondents per
category:
1=47; 2=166; 3=47; 4=229;
5=75.
Negative: more skilled
people more in favour
of globalization (eg.
Rodrik and Mayda;
Pandya)
Negative: people
benefiting from
presence of MNCs less
likely to be hostile
towards them
Supporters of centrist
parties less hostile
than at extremes
Missing observations: 102
Adapted from Q12, Which side did you support in the referendum vote on
Britain’s membership of the EU held on 23 June 2016?
Number of respondents per
category:
1=Leave; 0=Remain or ‘Neither of the two’
1=333, 0=324.
55
Negative: wealthier
people more in favour
of globalization (eg.
Rodrik and Mayda;
Pandya)
Positive: supporters of
Brexit more likely to
be hostile towards
MNCs
Missing observations: 9
Local
Adapted from Q14, Which of the following best describes your national
identity?
1=subnational (English, Scottish, Northern Irish or Welsh), 0=British
Nationalism
Number of respondents per
category:
1=263; 0=373.
Missing observations: 30
Aggregate score of answers to questions 15, 16 and 17:
Mean: 8.18 (std dev = 2.67)
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Median=8
Q15: “I would rather be a citizen of my country than of any other country in the
world.”
Missing observations: 7
Positive: more local
identity associated
with stronger feelings
of nationalism
Q16: “In the United Kingdom, our people are not perfect, but our culture is
superior to others.”
Q17: “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were
more like the British”
Aggregate index ranges from 1=least nationalistic (strongly disagree with all
three statements) to 13=most nationalistic (strongly agree with all statements)
Number of respondents per
category:
Female
Dummy variable; 1=female gender
1=328; 0=338.
Missing observations: 0
Ecostatism
Aggregate score of answers to questions 29, 30 and 31:
Mean: 9.15 (std dev 2.11)
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Median: 9
56
Positive: ‘curious case
of female
protectionism’
(Burgoon and Hiscox;
Mutz and Mansfield)
Positive: people with
statist economic views
more likely to be
Q29: “To guarantee the long-term prosperity of our nation, we cannot just rely
on the international economy. Our government has to think in national terms
and defend our economic sovereignty.”
Q30: “For the good of the national economy, it is essential to have strong
domestic companies that are owned by UK nationals.”
Q31: “Foreign companies cannot be trusted to act in our national interest.”
Aggregate index ranges from 1=least statist (strongly disagree with all three
statements) to 13=most statist (strongly agree with all statements)
57
Missing observations: 12
opposed to IFDI
Table 7. Mediation analysis with full set of controls
OLS predicting Ordered probit OLS predicting OLS predicting
mediator,
predicting
mediator,
outcome
categorical
outcome
linear
Economic
statism index
Pre-1965
cohorts
Education
GCSE
A-Levels
Undergraduate
Postgraduate
0.23*** (0.03)
0.58** (0.22)
Reference
-0.26 (0.22)
0.05 (0.26)
0.14 (0.34)
0.21+ (0.12)
Reference
0.11 (0.14)
0.17 (0.14)
0.22 (0.19)
Household
income
<15k
15-25k
25-35k
35-45k
45-65k
65-85k
>85k
Reference
-0.75** (0.28)
-0.81* (0.31)
-1.05** (0.32)
-0.78* (0.37)
-1.2** (0.42)
-0.68 (0.45)
Reference
0.18 (0.18)
0.03 (0.18)
0.23 (0.18)
-0.03 (0.21)
-0.12 (0.22)
0.06 (0.28)
Skills
Low
Medium
High
Reference
0.38+ (0.23)
-0.36 (0.28)
Reference
-0.35*** (0.13)
0.23+ (0.14)
0.51* (0.23)
-0.17 (0.13)
MNC
employee
0.19*** (0.02)
0.56** (0.22)
0.19+ (0.10)
0.02 (0.10)
0.07 (0.05)
-0.11+ (0.06)
-0.02 (0.03)
-0.10 (0.14)
-0.13* (0.06)
0.49* (0.24)
-0.16 (0.12)
0.25** (0.08)
-0.02 (0.04)
Political
ideology
Left
Centre-left
Centre-right
Right
Populist Right
Reference
0.21 (0.35)
0.05 (0.44)
0.50 (0.34)
1.11** (0.42)
Reference
-0.22 (0.21)
-0.37 (0.25)
-0.18 (0.21)
-0.19 (0.26)
Brexit support
0.49** (0.20)
0.28** (0.11)
0.50* (0.20)
0.27** (0.10)
Local identity
0.27 (0.18)
0.15 (0.10)
0.29 (0.18)
0.14 (0.09)
58
Nationalism
index
0.11** (0.04)
-0.09*** (0.02)
0.11** (0.04)
-0.07*** (0.02)
Female
-0.009 (0.202)
0.08 (0.11)
-0.13 (0.20)
0.11 (0.09)
Model fit
R-square: 0.20
Pseudo-loglikelihood: 606.14
R-square: 0.16
R-square: 0.21
Observations
466
464
464
464
ACME
0.10
Direct effect
0.19
Total effect
0.29
% mediated
0.35
59