《東吳哲學學報》第二十四期 (8, 2011), 1-21
© 東吳大學
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue:
On the Difficulties in Writing Philosophy*
Hua-Kuei Ho**
Abstract
Traditionally, Plato’s use of the form of dialogue is interpreted as an imitation of
oral conversation. In order to display philosophy as directly as possible, the form of
dialogue imitates a process of question and answer. The underlying thinking is that
the direct philosophical activity is oral, and any written dialogue can at best represent
philosophy indirectly. That is, the form of dialogue shows that Plato tries to avoid the
“indirectness” which is inherent in writing. In this paper, I will revise the above view
and argue that, though Plato complains about writing in the Phaedrus and Letter VII,
he does not avoid writing, nor does he exclude indirectness. His use of the form of
indirect dialogue highlights the indirectness of written words, and provides a
counter-example to the traditional interpretation. By “indirect dialogue,” I mean the
dialogue does not enter its main substantial discussion directly, but lets the substantial
part be read or retold by someone else indirectly. The Theaetetus is one example. Here
I will analyze its opening plot to explore Plato’s transgression of the boundary
between speaking and writing. The form of indirect dialogue works as an experiment
which breaks a fixed prejudice against writing and indirectness, and helps us to reflect
on Plato’s activity of writing philosophy and our own activity of reading philosophy.
Keywords: Plato, dialogue, writing, Theaetetus, philosophy
*
Received October 10, 2010; accepted February 14, 2011.
Proofreaders: Yi-Chung Chen. Mei-Cen Guo. Ya-Ting Yang
An earlier version of the paper was read in the Scientific Meeting of the Mediterranean Area
of the International Plato Society, at Facultat de Filosofia, Universitat de Barcelona, 27-9
October 2008. I wish to thank Satoshi Ogihara for his comments on the draft of that version;
I am also grateful to Ya-lan Liu and the late professor Wen-shiow Chen who read the earliest
version of the paper in Chinese in 2006.
**
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Chinese Culture University
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We read Plato. We learn Plato’s philosophy by reading his
writings—when we basically trust his written words. However, we also read
his distrust of writing in his writings. In the Phaedrus 274b-8b and Letter VII
341a-5a, 1 Plato casts a serious reflection on the difficulties of writing
philosophy. The crucial idea is that philosophy must be achieved after a
long live conversation, while writing can hardly accomplish it. For readers
of these passages, it is quite natural to suppose that a direct contact is better
than an indirect communication, and also that a direct live conversation is
an oral one.2 Along the line of thought, one may infer that Plato holds a
very negative position on writing as a whole. It becomes impossible to write
down philosophy in its true sense, because the vice of “indirectness” is
inherent in writing. The form of dialogue is thus considered an imitation of
oral conversation. It is a try within the limitation of writing to display
philosophy as directly as possible.
The frustration is that, although Plato’s dialogues represent very vivid
conversations,3 they are after all written words. We, as readers, do not
1
There is some controversy over the authenticity of Plato’s Letter VII in the twentieth century.
Levison, Moeton and Winspeak provide a careful stylometric analysis to investigate the
question whether it is by Plato (Levison, Moeton, & Winspeak, 1968: 309-325). Though the
analytical evidence shows that “the Seventh Letter should differ from most Platonic works but
resemble the Letter of Speusippus to Philip of Macedon”, the tone in the Seventh Letter is
utterly different from Speusippus (Levison, Moeton, & Winspeak, 1968: 321-324). Thus they
use “the writer” without identifying any figure to refer to the author of the Letter in their
conclusion (Levison, Moeton, & Winspeak, 1968: 324-325).
I am not going into the controversy. But as far as the theme here concerns, it is noteworthy
that defenders for the authenticity of Plato’s Letter VII may appeal to its echoing with Plato’s
criticism against writing in the Phaedrus (Morrow, 1929; Bluck, 1949). Actually the criticism
against writing in the Letter seems to favor speaking more than in the Phaedrus. Among recent
works, one may find that Rowe excludes the Letter from his reading of Phaedrus and considers
the Letter VII (and VIII) as spurious (Rowe, 2005: xxxii). This reminds readers to be more
careful when they read the criticism against writing in the two texts.
2
A contrast between oral and written words is often presumed. For example, Bluck among
others believes that Plato “draws a sharp distinction between oral guidance… and written
discourse…” (Bluck, 1949: 506) I will return to this issue in the third section below.
3
One may argue that not all Platonic dialogues are “vivid conversations.” Readers often feel
bored by the late dialogues unless they have philosophized themselves to a certain extent. It is
also easily found that the Apology is almost a monologue except for an interlude of the
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
3
converse directly with Plato the author personally. We can at best try to
converse with him indirectly through his (and others’) written words. 4
Then, is there still any serious significance in our own activity of reading
philosophy?
In this paper, I will argue that, though Plato is obviously aware of the
danger and limitation of writing, he does not avoid writing, nor does he
exclude indirectness. Traditionally, Plato’s use of the form of dialogue is
interpreted as an imitation of oral conversation. In order to display
philosophy as directly as possible, the form of dialogue imitates a process of
question and answer. That is, the form of dialogue shows that Plato tries to
avoid the indirectness which is inherent in writing. However, Plato’s use of
the form of “indirect dialogue” highlights the indirectness of written words,
and provides the traditional interpretation with a counter-example.
By “indirect dialogue,” I mean that the dialogue does not directly
begin with its main body of discussion that is led by its supposed leading
character(s). There are two (or more) layers of dialogues inside an indirect
dialogue. The outer layer is a conversation about the inner dialogue, while
the inner dialogue is what really constitutes the main body of discussion
which displays Plato’s philosophy. Among Plato’s authentic dialogues, there
are four such indirect dialogues—Phaedo, Symposium, Theaetetus, and
Parmenides. In these cases, the inner dialogue is read or retold by a
comparatively less important character which does not play a significant
role or even is not present in the inner dialogue. On the issue concerning
writing, the Theaetetus is an especially interesting case, for it is made explicit
question-and-answer between Socrates and Meletus, as John Cooper says in his brief
introduction to Apology in his edition of Plato’s complete works (Cooper & Hutchinson, 1997:
17). At any rate, the literary form of dialogue always presupposes the existence of
interlocutor(s) and thus presents conversation which is vivid, compared with treatises. Even in
the part of monologue in the Apology, Socrates is speaking to the jury. Besides, he complains
that he cannot refute his “first accusers” but “fight with shadows” (Apology 18d). This reveals
that he presupposes some interlocutors and intends to converse with them.
4
Readers of Plato are very possible to be readers of literature on Plato at the same time. Even
in the case that one does not trust Plato’s written dialogues at all, the clues to trace his
unwritten thoughts need to be justified by textual evidence in either ancient reports or modern
scholarly works, which are written words unavoidably.
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that it is written. In the Theaetetus, the leading character is Socrates. But
Plato arranges two other characters to play the introductory roles. By the
end of the prologue, it is not Socrates himself that is introduced into the
scene, but a written book. Strictly speaking, Socrates is not a character in
our dialogue, but a character in the written-down dialogue that is read aloud
by one of the characters in our dialogue.
Another good reason to choose the Theaetetus is that it is the source of
the well-known term “midwifery” (148e-151d). Socratic midwifery is to help
his interlocutor(s) to give birth to knowledge through their philosophical
conversation. The theme of this dialogue is “knowledge.” The main
discussion inside the dialogue shows how Socrates applies his midwifery to
Theaetetus, and the dialogue itself also shows how Plato applies his
midwifery to us the readers. At the same time, the digression passage
(172c-177c) in the Theaetetus strengthens the methodological aspect of this
dialogue. 5 In the passage, Socrates draws the distinction between
philosophers who pursue the real knowledge and law-court experts who
persuade audience by transmitting beliefs. This coheres with the crucial
distinction between knowledge and beliefs which is deeply discussed later in
the dialogue (from 187a to the end) and is woven into the whole dialogue as
a unified work of writing. In view of that, reading the Theaetetus is a good
experience which leads us to reflect on how we undertake philosophy.6
Soon in the first section, I will take the Theaetetus as an example of
indirect dialogue and analyze its opening plot (142a-3c), to elucidate Plato’s
attitude toward the relationship between readers and him. In the second
5
The methodological aspect of the “philosophical digression” and the literary form is explored
in Brumbaugh (1988). In that paper, Brumbaugh considers the digression as an abstract claim
of philosophical method and the literary form as a self-illustration of philosophical method.
Along the analysis on the Theaetetus among other dialogues, he argues that Letter VII shows the
same characteristic and it may help to establish the Letter’s authenticity.
6
For those who like to reflect on philosophy deeply, namely those who concern the issue of
“metaphilosophy,” it is worthwhile to see Griswold (1988). Griswold deals with several
contemporary views on the issue and particularly with Richard Rorty’s notion of
“conversation” between philosophy and its critics. He makes a Platonic reply to these
contemporary voices and argues that “if the defense of philosophy requires a conversation
with the critics of philosophy…, then it makes sense for a philosopher who agrees to all this
to write dialogues” (Griswold, 1988: 157).
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
5
section, I will argue that, Plato does not only use the form of indirect
dialogue, but also accept the concept of indirectness in general. Finally, in
the third section, I will re-examine Plato’s seeming hostility to writing, and
also attempt to make a reflection on our own activity of reading philosophy.
I. The Theaetetus as an indirect dialogue
The central part of the Theaetetus is a long discussion on “knowledge.”
Before entering into this part, our dialogue begins with a conversation
between Eucleides and Terpsion. 7 After a brief greeting, Eucleides
mentions that Theaetetus is dying of the wounds and sickness received in
battle and severe military circumstance. This poor man is being carried back
to Athens (142a-b). Eucleides and Terpsion grieve over Theaetetus’
imminent death, and recall that many years ago when Theaetetus was only a
youth, he had a brilliant discussion with Socrates (142c). Eucleides did not
hear the discussion himself. He heard it indirectly from Socrates. After so
many years, now Eucleides cannot give an oral report at once. But they can
read a notebook which was a memoir written down by Eucleides soon after
he heard Socrates’ relation (142c-d). He revised and corrected the notebook
several times, by consulting Socrates about places where he could not
remember clearly (143a). Then Eucleides and Terpsion go to the former’s
home and let a slave boy read out this notebook to them (143a-c). It is a
long discussion among Socrates, Theaetetus, and Theodorus, led by the
question “what is knowledge?” In this inner dialogue, Theaetetus submits
his definition of knowledge to Socrates’ cross-examination for three times.
Finally, all the three definitions prove inadequate. The dialogue ends in
aporia (143d-210d).
In the opening conversation (the outer dialogue), Eucleides and
Terpsion listen to a slave boy who reads a written book (the inner dialogue)
to them. Thus the dialogue is woven from both two kinds of
communication, speaking and writing. For speaking, we have a pair of roles,
the speaker and the listener; as for writing, we have another pair of roles,
7
Eucleides and Terpsion are from Megara. They seem close to Socrates and appear in the
occasion of Socrates’ death (Phaedo 59c). Thus they are not laymen passing-by, but have good
background to participate a philosophical discussion.
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the writer and the reader. These four roles actually overlap and switch over
with one another in the case here. This obscures the distinctions among
them and accordingly obscures the boundary between speaking and writing.
Let us analyze the story layer by layer. The first inmost layer of
dialogue is the oral discussion among Socrates, Theaetetus and Theodorus.
It consists of spoken words. All the three people are both speakers and
listeners. The second layer is Eucleides’ hearing from Socrates’ report. It is
also spoken. Only Socrates plays the role of speaker, while Eucleides is the
listener. The third layer is the slave boy’s reading of Eucleides’ notebook. It
consists of written words. Eucleides is the writer, while the boy is the reader.
The fourth layer is Terpsion and Eucleides’ hearing from the slave boy’s
recitation. It becomes oral again. The boy is the speaker, while Terpsion
and Eucleides are the listeners. But in a certain sense, the real speaker is
Eucleides, because the boy speaks Eucleides’ words rather than his own.
On the other hand, Terpsion and Eucleides are the real readers, not the boy,
because the boy simply recites the book, not means to read it for himself,
whereas Terpsion and Eucleides “read” in the sense that they learn the
substantial content of the book through the boy’s recitation. So the fourth
layer is also an activity concerning writing. Terpsion is the reader, while
Eucleides is both the reader and the writer. In truth, all the four roles fall
upon Eucleides, for he is not merely both the reader and the writer of his
own book, but also a listener of the boy’s recitation, and the speaker
speaking behind the boy.
The slave boy is supposed to be a mere medium.8 The boy can be
considered totally irrelevant to the philosophical discussion in the inner
dialogue, except turning the written material into oral spoken words via his
recitation. His recitation shows that the boundary between speaking and
writing can be easily transgressed if speaking simply refers to an oral
presentation and writing to a literal one. Every literate person can read
written words aloud, and write down spoken ones. If the boy is not
8
Though it is possible to imagine that a slave boy may understand what he is reading very well,
no such clue provided in our dialogue and it is acceptable to ignore this possibility. To be fair
about Plato’s attitude toward slaves’ intellect, “a slave boy” may present a typical role which is
not properly educated, but still has the ability of thinking. See the case that a slave boy figures
out the answer to a geometry problem in the Meno.
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
7
available for recitation, Terpsion can read the very book silently. One may
either read or listen to the same dialogue as she pleases.
Consider the transgression of the boundary between speaking and
writing. The inner dialogue of the Theaetetus is said to be “the only” “record
of Socratic conversations” “which is supposed to be actually read”
(Waterfield, 2004: 136). 9 A similar transgression can be found in the
Phaedrus, when the excited Phaedrus recites Lysias’ article loudly to Socrates
(230e-34c). The difference is that Eucleides’ writing is a report of
philosophical dialogue, while Lysias’ a rhetorical speech. Even so, both
pieces are written, and can be transformed into material of speaking. One
may think that a written philosophical dialogue is closer to oral words.
However, in Athenian society, a rhetorical speech is meant to be presented
orally. Simply to choose an oral expression does not help in distinguishing
philosophy from rhetoric. The distinguishing characteristic must lie
elsewhere.
The transgression also shows that the relationship between the reader
and the writer can be exchanged with a relationship of the listener and the
speaker. Further, the writer does not need to correspond to the speaker, nor
the reader to the listener. This will lead to a fresh reflection on the concept
of authorship. See the fourth layer analyzed above: the boy is the speaker
and holds the book in his hands physically, but one of his listeners,
Eucleides, is the writer of the book. In the intellectual sense, Eucleides is
the one who really holds the book. A direct reader of the book is not
necessarily more authoritative than a listener.
Who is the most authoritative on a text? The author, one may answer.
But what is an author? Plato says that the author of our inner dialogue is
Eucleides, but we say that Plato is the real author. Isn’t it also possible that
Plato plays a similar role as Eucleides? Or, Eucleides plays a similar role like
9
This is in the sense of Plato’s writing, not in the historical sense.
For reference, there are pieces which are written by people other than Socrates and also are
read. For example, Zeno’s book is read (Parmanides, 127c-d), and Lysias’ written speech is
recited (Phaedrus, 230e-4c, see below).
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Plato! 10 This is not to doubt Plato’s authorship at all, but our
over-dependence on the authority of authorship. The rich significance of
the Theaetetus is undeniable. The significance of a text should not change as
the author is differently identified.11 Take Homer’s epic poetry. In spite of
that the authorship of the Iliad and Odysseus is so controversial,12 these two
masterpieces remain extremely influential shining literature treasures. Even
if Eucleides plays Plato’s role, to be the author, the excellence of the
epistemological enquiry shown in the dialogue is still undeniable. Roles of
reader, writer, listener and speaker are merely roles. No role stands for
absolute authority.13
II. Plato’s acceptance of indirectness
Plato does not only use the form of indirect dialogue, but also accept
the concept of indirectness in general. Indirectness is inherent in writing.
Readers do not converse with the writer directly. Writing is always
“second-handed” in this sense. However, indirectness should not hinder us
from reading philosophy, no matter the indirectness comes from writing or
second-handed hearing. In the inner dialogue in the Theaetetus, Socrates and
his interlocutors have lively conversations on some second-handed material
10
Cooper says in his introduction to the Theaetetus: “Since ancient sources tell us of Socratic
dialogues actually published by Euclides, it is as if, except for the prologue, Plato is giving us
under his own name one of Euclides’ dialogues!” (Cooper & Hutchinson, 1997: 158)
11
This echoes Plato’s claim that it does not matter who the speaker is, even if the speaker is a
tree or rock, provided the words say the truth (Phaedrus 275b-c).
12
There have been disputes on Homer’s date, place and life since antiquity. Besides, whether
“Homer” is a single poet and whether it is the same poet who composed both the Iliad and
Odyssey are serious questions in classical studies (Bowra, 1961: 435-437).
13
The idea that the author is not absolutely most authoritative on a text can be considered
consistent with Derrida. Derrida plays with Plato’s metaphor of “pharmakon” (see n.24 below)
and exposes how the signification of the word has gone stray from “the intentions of an
author” or “what someone meant-to-say [un vouloir-dire]” (Derrida, 1981: 95). However, please
note the other side of my point here: since no role stands for absolute authority, there is no
role so authoritative to exclude the author completely. In this position, I will not cut off the
connection between author’s vouloir-dire and what the text says.
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
9
like Protagoras’ doctrine (151e ff.), the dream theory (201d-6b) and so on.14
Theaetetus’ third definition is also heard from someone else (201c). The use
of second-handed material shows Plato’s acceptance of indirectness, which
urges us to think further about what really matters when we read or listen to
a philosophical material.
Consider the example of Protagoras’ doctrine. The Protagoras’
doctrine that “man is a measure (μέτρον) of everything” is proclaimed in
his written work, The Truth.15 Socrates connects this doctrine to Theaetetus’
first definition that knowledge is perception (αἴσθησις) and leads a
complicated cross-examination. During their discussion, Protagoras the
writer is impossible to appear in person, because he is dead at that time. But
Plato tries to make the discussion on Protagoras’ doctrine very lively. We
see Socrates playing Protagoras’ role16 to ask and answer questions.
At 154c, Socrates poses a question to Theaetetus by this “if Protagoras
or someone else asks you….” At 158e, Socrates asks in Protagoras’ voice
“Oh, Theaetetus, if it would be different in every respect….” At 162d,
“against these, Protagoras or his representative asks, ‘Oh, excellent boys
and old people….’” At 164e, Socrates describes Protagoras’ doctrine as an
orphan and takes the responsibility to help it.17 When Socrates speaks in
14
Only philosophical uses are considered here. (That is, words barrowed from Homer, Pindar
etc. are excluded.)
15
The clause is cited at 152a; and the title of the book is mentioned at 161c, 162a, 171c, and as a
pun referring both the book and “the truth” as a general term at 152c and 170e.
16
Plato makes the character Socrates to imitate Protagoras and play his role here. But the
role-playing and imitation seem to be what Socrates criticizes in the Republic 2-3 (393c ff.). A
hint to solve the difficulty lies in 396c-d: the decent person would like imitate the good person
most. Then, by this standard, is Protagoras worthy of imitation since Socrates likes to speak in
his voice? For now, my answer is “yes.” Although Socrates refutes Protagoras’ doctrine in the
Theaetetus, the doctrine is obviously regarded as important philosophy and the relevant
discussion extends so long (151d-186e, totally 35 Stephanus pages).
17
Protagoras’ doctrine is an “orphan” because its father Protagoras is dead. One may find a
similar metaphor that written piece is an offspring of the writer and needs its parent to help at
the Pheadrus 275a-e. Desjardins notices the same metaphor of “fatherless offspring” in these
two texts. She also notices that the offspring in the Theaetetus is their spoken account of a
doctrine, while in the Phaedrus a written piece. Both cases need supportive interpretation
(Desjardins, 1988: 111). A noteworthy point in our passage here is that Socrates is not the
parent of Protagoras’ doctrine. That is, Plato obviously allows people other than its parent to
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Protagoras’ voice, he is trying to defend the orphan doctrine against his
own position actually. In this manner, Socrates explores the possible
significance in the doctrine and makes his cross-examination fairer.
Following this statement, from 165a, Socrates speaks in Protagoras’ voice
when the doctrine confronted with problems. At 166a, he imitates
Protagoras to say words to himself: “This capable Socrates….” At 168e-9a,
he even urges Theodorus to do the same thing! Theodorus does not like to
join the conversation, but Socrates’ way of talking makes Theodorus
involved within the philosophical discussion. All these are cases which
show how Socrates represents the writer to converse with others.
Then in the “table-turning” (περιτροπή) passage, Socrates starts to
converse with Protagoras. From 170a, Socrates calls Protagoras in the
vocative case (Πρωταγόρα) as if he is in front of him. At 171d,
Protagoras is almost summoned up: “his head would emerge from the
ground here, as far as the neck, he would refute me much as talking
nonsense…” After the digression of a contrast between philosophers and
law-court experts (172c-7c), at 178b-e, Socrates calls Protagoras back to
their conversation and uses the vocative case again. All these are cases
which show how Socrates makes the writer to converse with him.
In this way, Socrates gives life to the written words. Protagoras
becomes the first, second and third person in the same dialogue: he is the
“I” in Socrates’ mouth when Socrates is defending him, the “you” in
Socrates’ mouth when Socrates is objecting him, and the “he” since he is
not an interlocutor who is actually present in the discussion.
Plato’s acceptance of indirectness becomes clearer in the cases that the
source of words is dead, no matter it is a writer or a speaker, since the death
cuts off the possibility of direct contact. See two other indirect dialogues,
the Phaedo and Symposium. The main body of the dialogue Phaedo is led by
Socrates. But Plato tells readers from the beginning, Socrates is dead. The
last conversation between Socrates and friends is retold by Phaedo who was
there when Socrates drank the poison in jail. Phaedo likes to recount it,
because, as he says, “to be reminded of Socrates, either speaking of him
help it (to have a lively conversation with readers). This means, when written or spoken words
need of interpretation, the interpretation may come from people other than their authors.
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
11
myself or hearing from someone else, is always my greatest pleasure” (58d).
Both speaking of Socrates and hearing from others are pleasing! So an
indirect hearing should not spoil the pleasure. A similar point is made by
Apollodorus in the Symposium. The inner dialogue between Socrates and
friends was told by Aristodemus to Apollodorus, and now is told by
Apollodorus to an unnamed friend.18 Apollodorus is very happy to recount
it, because, as he says, “in any words about philosophy, whether I make
them myself or hear from others, aside from thinking it benefits me, I get
marvelous pleasure” (173c).
A famous and interesting message in the Phaedo is that Plato himself
was not there (59b). That is, even the author Plato has to hear the
conversation from someone else indirectly.19 However, what Plato gains
from the indirect hearing is, as I believe, no less pleasing and much more
philosophical than people who heard from Socrates on the day directly.
The other side of the acceptance of indirectness is a critical thought on
the “directness.” Plato knows well that the “directness” is not a guarantee
that the addressee will receive the speaker’s knowledge. See the Symposium.
When Agathon invites the philosopher to sit by him, “so that by a contact
with you I will benefit from your wisdom that occurred to you at the
porch,” Socrates replies with harmless irony:
18
The philosophical significance of the formal feature of this double indirect speech in the
Symposium has been more discussed in these two decades (Gill, 1999: xviii-xix; Hunter, 2004:
22-29; Cooksey, 2010: 26-29).
19
In earlier studies, Plato’s absence seemed an issue about the liability and accuracy of his record.
A. E. Taylor argues that “[t]hough Plato is careful to mention and account for his own
absence, it is quite certain that he must have been fully informed of the facts, since the
statement that he spent some time after the death of Socrates with Eucleides and Terpsion at
Megara comes to us on the excellent authority of his own pupil Hermodorus” (Taylor, 1966:
176). However, in recent decades, the liability and accuracy becomes less significant. For the
Phaedo is not treated as a “record,” but one of representative works of Platonic theory of
Forms (Kraut, 1992: 7-9). C. C. W. Taylor even supposes that “Plato’s claim to have been
absent from Socrates’ final scene is as much a matter of literary convention … and that in all
probability Plato was actually present.” Plato’s writing down his own absence is “to distance
Plato from the narrative” (Taylor, 1998: 35-36). To interpret it along this line, Plato
strengthens the indirectness by distancing himself from Socrates’ last conversation.
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How nice it would be! Oh Agathon, if the wisdom would be such
thing that could flow from the fuller into the emptier among us,
only if we contact with each other, just like water in the cups
flowing through the wool from the fuller into the emptier. (175d)
Wisdom is impossible to flow in a totally passive “cup.” The enquiry of
knowledge cannot depend on a direct contact only. Even if the greatest
philosopher appears in front of us, speaks directly to us, we may fail to
understand her. Directness is not unconditionally superior to indirectness.
It does not guarantee our success in enquiring knowledge if we
over-depend on it like a passive empty cup.
III. Facing the difficulties in writing philosophy
Therefore, “indirectness” does not need to be a vice.20 The form of
indirect dialogue is like an experiment that shows how the boundary
between speaking and writing can be transgressed; the positive attitude
toward indirect material in the Theaetetus, Phaedo and Symposium shows that
Plato accepts indirectness and does not prefer directness unconditionally.
This means, writing, as a kind of “indirect” communication, is not always
bad. But how shall we understand Plato’s hostility to writing in the Phaedrus
and Letter VII?
To clarify this, let us turn to the famous passages against writing in
these two texts.
At Phaedrus 274b, Socrates divides his discussion into two parts: the
part before 274b is about speaking (λόγων πέρι), 21 while the part
20
This claim is comparatively conservative—one may go further as Annas who says Plato
“employs various strategies of indirectness” in her inspiring brief introduction to Plato (Annas,
2003: 76). She begins her introduction from “Arguing with Plato” (Annas, 2003: 1-11). This
happens to be an excellent example of philosophical activity which the paper aims to
recommend. See the conclusion passages below.
21
Actually the word “λόγων” is not restricted to a narrow meaning of “speaking.” It may refer
to any kind of word, discourse, argument and so on. The translation “speaking” are found in
Nehamas & Woodruff (1997: 551), Fowler (1990: 561), Rowe (2005: 61) etc. But there can be
some alternative translations: Hackforth’s is “speech” (Hackforth, 1952: 154). Waterfield’s is
“rhetorical” (Waterfield, 2002: 67). The Chinese translation by Chu, Guang-chian is “修辭
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
13
afterwards is about writing (γραφῆς πέρι). Based on the contrast between
speaking and writing, we read his hostility to writing and his preference of
speaking to writing. 22 In the Letter VII, the author 23 mentions that
Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, wrote a book on what he and Plato talked
about. Dionysius’ confidence of his writing provokes Plato’s criticism: Plato
says that he has no writing (σύγγραμμα) about those things, because
philosophy “cannot be put into words” (ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν),
but requires a long continued association (συνουσίας). In the association,
the light is kindled inside and the soul nourishes itself (341a-c). Then Plato
states the weakness of writing (341a-5a).
These passages are philosophically influential. One may respond with
a question: Aren’t they themselves written? The self-referential question
leads into two readings. The first is Derrida’s well-known claim—Plato
undermines his criticism against writing by his own writing.24 Besides, the
criticism against writing supposes that there are spoken words behind
written words, and also inner thoughts behind spoken words, however the
inner something is eventually suspicious.25 The second goes in the opposite
direction—since the written words are not trustworthy, Plato might put his
serious thoughts into unwritten oral words. This presumes that there are
some deeper thoughts behind written words and encourages a pursuit of
(rhetoric)” (Chu, 2000: 167). The French translation by Moreschini & Vicaire is “les discours”
(Moreschini & Vicaire, 1998: 141).
22
To translate “λόγων” here to “speaking” may easily form a contrast between “speaking” and
“writing.” However, as said in the previous note, “λόγων” does not need to be translated
into “speaking.” (Yet an alternative translation does not mean that the translator would agree
not to contrast speaking with writing. For example, Hackforth interprets the passage by “the
superiority of the spoken word” which contrasts speaking with writing sharply.) Recent
studies tend to soften the contrast here. This will be discussed soon later.
23
It is possible that the author is not Plato (See n.1). I use the name “Plato” to refer the author
in our discussion below only for convenience.
24
See Derrida’s stimulating reflection on “Plato’s pharmacy” (Derrida, 1981: 61-171). Derrida
plays with the double meanings of the Greek word τὸ φάρμακον (pharmacy)—medicine
and poison, because Plato’s analogy that writing is “pharmacy” of memory in the myth of
Theuth in the Phaedrus 274c-5b hints at the double meanings.
25
That is, the “logocentrism” called by Derrida.
14
《東吳哲學學報》第二十四期 (8, 2011)
Plato’s unwritten doctrine.26
The readings rely on a strong attack on writing in Plato. However, the
assumed contrast between speaking and writing is arguable. Or, at least,
compared with this formal contrast, there should be some more important
reflections on human communication either in spoken or in written words.
Plato never says straightforward that the desired λόγος must be oral. The
texts do show Plato’s complaint about writing. But it is noteworthy that
Plato’s complaint is not concerning writing merely. The keyword which
seems to draw a boundary line between speaking and writing in the Phaedrus
is “λόγων πέρι” (about speaking). Yet “λόγος” does not need to be
oral.27 There is a piece of textual evidence that Plato must use the word in a
wider sense—the phrase “τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ” (the written words,
277e). The word “λόγος” is qualified by the word “written.” Thus the
usage of the word “λόγος” in the context, as far as its meaning is involved,
is impossible to exclude writing.
One may find that recent studies in Plato tend to soften the contrast
between speaking and writing in the texts at issue. Rowe is an example. He
emphasizes that λόγοι may be spoken or written (Rowe, 2005: 88 n.207)
and “will not exclude written ‘speech’” (Rowe, 2005: 84 n.157). Another
good example is Szlezák’s Reading Plato, one of the most significant works
on the issue of Plato’s writings. Szlezák explains that, although written
communication “must be measured” by spoken communication (this makes
his position different from Rowe’s), Plato’s search of criteria of λόγος is
“for what is spoken as well as what is written” (Szlezák, 1999: 40). Read
along the line of thought, the claim in the Letter VII that philosophy
26
The idea of the unwritten doctrine can be traced back to Aristotle. At Physics 209b11-17,
where Aristotle is discussing the abstract metaphysic issue of τόπος, he mentions Plato’s
unwritten doctrine and says that it is different from what is said in the written dialogue Timaeus.
But it is a minority interpretation to value the unwritten doctrine more than Plato’s written
works (Rowe, 2005: xxvi n.12; Kraut, 1992: 24).
27
See n. 22 above; also see Rowe (2005: xviii): “Socrates’ description of his own performance,
that it ‘allowed us perhaps to grasp some truth, though maybe also it took us in a wrong
direction,’ will in that case apply to any logos….” and Guy Samama’s note on 274b: «En voilà
assez pour les aspects techniques du discours, parlé comme écrit…. Il faut d’abord
comprendre ‘discours’ au sens le plus large (écrit et oral)….»(Moreschini & Vicaire, 1998: 203
n.123).
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
15
“cannot be ‘put into words’ (ῥητὸν)” does not only point out the limit of
written words, but also of spoken words. Philosophy needs a long
continued association (συνουσίας). It may be some closer personal
relationship beyond a verbal communication and it takes time.28 Such a
long continued association cannot be defined by language, neither spoken
nor written. Plato is aware of the limit of language. The object of his
reflection includes both speaking and writing.
This may justify Plato’s activity of writing philosophy and our activity
of reading his works, partly. A traditional defence of Plato’s writing is to say
that his dialogues are written in a similar form to a live conversation. That is,
the form of dialogue imitates Plato’s dialectic.29 But this interpretation
wants for some clarification. If the dialogue is an imitation, it is a
second-choice because it is after all not a direct conversation. This cannot
justify the value of philosophical writing and reading unless one admits
some value of “indirectness.”
It is important to note that Plato does not avoid indirectness. If Plato
writes only direct dialogues, it may be supposed that the philosopher has
tried to avoid “indirectness” as possible and only allow the unavoidable
layer of “indirectness”—his own writing. But the form of indirect dialogue
provides a counter-example: for it is Plato’s own design to make it “more
indirect,” and it is completely avoidable if Plato means to avoid it. Besides,
as pointed in the section II above, Plato accepts indirectness and on the
other hand does not think directness to be a guarantee of knowledge. He
accepts indirect material to let his characters establish lively discussions.
28
Time is a point. The length of communication does matter. At Phaedrus 272c-3c, Plato draws a
distinction between the longer path toward the truth and the shorter route which is chosen by
those who only care about what is convincing. The same position is explored in the Gorgias
and Theaetetus. Plato says clearly that it is impossible to teach people important matters in a
short time (Gorgias 455a). He also extends several pages to explain that the real philosopher
needs leisure to pursue the truth and knowledge, while orators or experts in law-courts make
arguments quickly, hurried on by the water-clock, to give audience mere beliefs (Theaetetus
172c-7c).
29
The typical view is presented in the anonymous Prolegomena in Platonis Philosophiam 15: “Plato
adopted the dialogue form because it imitates dialectic. For just as dialectic proceeds by
question and answer, so the dialogue is composed of characters questioning and answering”
(Irwin, 1995: 7).
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This is helpful especially when the original writer or speaker has passed
away. Though the written dialogue is after all “indirect,” readers should not
be disappointed but try to earn opportunities to practice a long continued
association with the philosopher in a certain sense.
Eventually, we are confronted with the real question under Plato’s
criticism against writing—what kind of writing and reading may help in “the
long continued association?”
As for the part of writing, one would like to suggest that Plato’s
dialogues may help us to practice “the long continued association.” The
main difficulty of writing philosophy is due to a lack of questioning and
answering. Plato’s criticism against writing in the texts has peculiar targets,
speeches of Lysias and other orators in the Phaedrus, and writings of
Dionysius and any writers with the same confidence in the Letter VII.
Whether it is written is not the point. The point is these writings lack of
questioning and answering. It is very reasonable to reject an oral speech if it
is spoken by a persuasive orator but suffers the same problem; on the other
hand, it is also reasonable to accept a written work if it is written by a
dialectical truth-seeker with questioning and answering.
As for the part of reading, let us reflect on our own activity of
reading Platonic texts and ask ourselves honestly: can we directly converse
with Plato? No. It is not possible, nor for Plato to converse with Socrates
after his death, nor for Socrates and Theaetetus to converse with Protagoras
at the time in the Theaetetus. Philosophers are mortal and limited human
beings. They simply cannot provide everyone opportunities to have direct
touch with them, even if we were Plato’s contemporaries.30 For those who
cannot associate with him directly, his dialectic must be communicated in
an indirect way, either through speaking or through writing. What we shall
warn ourselves is this: simply to see characters questioning and answering in
30
At this point, it is interesting to see Sharpe’s study on Lacan’s psychoanalysis reading of
Plato’s Symposium (Sharpe, 2009: 535-547). Lacan is Sharpe’s contemporary, while Plato is not
Sharpe’s nor Lacan’s contemporary. But they “encounter” with Plato in a sense. Sharpe, one
who reads Plato quite deeply, tries to show us an active reading of Plato by Lacan. Even
though Lacan’s reading is “strikingly different from the way the Symposium is usually
understood,” such an active reading is essential, as Sharpe conceives, “[i]f classical philosophy
is not to continue to decline” (Sharpe, 2009: 545).
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
17
the dialogue is not a dialectic practice. Such kind of passive hearing or
reading lacks of questioning and answering and becomes a mere imitation.
It does not matter whether it is an activity of speaking or of writing. If we
shall make our reading philosophy have any philosophical significance, it
must be itself an organic part of Plato’s dialectic. It revives only when both
the writer and readers participate in questioning and answering.
The dynamic process is required if we are to pursue Plato’s real
knowledge. Reread our indirect dialogue Theaetetus. The theme of the
dialogue is knowledge. It seems disappointing that the dialogue ends with
aporia and does not state a clear definition of knowledge for us. However,
rich literature on the dialogue shows that the writer and readers
communicate really much. It is living words. A clear-cut definition in either
spoken or written words can never replace this kind of λόγος. Plato
expects a good composition to be like an organic living creature (Phaedrus
264c). The form of dialogue which leaves room for disputes helps to
stimulate us to join the kind of λόγος and makes the living-creature-like
written work keep living. Scholars have paid attention to the internal
connection between Plato’s conception of philosophy and the literary form
of dialogue. As Schildknecht argues, Plato’s philosophy is non-propositional
knowledge which “cannot be conveyed directly, that is, by assignment to a
proposition-like textual construction,” but “can, in their full significance, be
conveyed only indirectly, that is, via literary form” (Schildknecht, 1996: 226).
The form of dialogue fits Plato’s thoughts on philosophy31 in this way. The
problem of writing shown in the Phaedrus and Letter VII tells us that Plato
himself is aware of the limit of language. He reminds us of the weakness
which is shared by both spoken and written words. Whenever words are
uttered or written down, they are open to misunderstanding. There is
always ambiguity in a text. But the very weakness also means that every text
is in need of interpretation (Desjardins, 1988: 117). Furthermore, “[i]t is
awareness of this constant need for interpretation that drives Plato to adopt
a special kind of vehicle for his philosophy—that of dramatic dialogue that
will not be forced to rely exclusively on its vulnerable discursive content”
31
That is, Plato’s “metaphilosophy,” a philosophical thinking on the nature of philosophy. Cf.
Griswold in n. 6 above.
18
《東吳哲學學報》第二十四期 (8, 2011)
(Desjardins, 1988: 121). In many cases, words are like “orphans” by Plato’s
metaphor in the Theaetetus and Phaedrus. They need of interpretation but
their “fathers” are absent. Readers are invited to take care of the orphans to
have their say, as we have seen in the passage where Socrates defends
Protagoras’ orphan doctrine.
Sum it up. In a philosophical activity, the dynamic mutual
communication is significant. We cannot separate writing from reading,
speaking from hearing. A mere imitation of “live conversation” in writing is
not sufficient. The real Platonic writing and reading does not imitate the
dialectic but itself is a practice of the dialectic. On the one hand, readers ask
the writer and characters questions and seek for answers from the text; on
the other hand, readers exchange their roles with the writer, or with
characters inside the dialogue, to be asked by questions written there, and
try to provide answers. In this way, all the distinctions between speaking
and writing, directness and indirectness, writer and reader, speaker and
listener become trivial. People in the real philosophical communication do
not care them too much, “ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος” (if only they hit
the truth), in Plato’s words (Theaetetus 172d).
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
19
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Hackforth, R. (1952). Plato’s Phaedrus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Sharpe, M. (2009). Hunting Plato’s Agalmata. The European Legacy, 14, 5: 535-547.
Schildknecht, C. (1996). Knowledge That the Mind Seeks: The Epistemic Impact of
Plato’s Form of Discourse. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 29, 3: 225-243.
Szlezák, T. A. (1999). Reading Plato (G. Zanker, Trans.). London: Routledge.
Taylor, A. E. ([1926] 1966). Plato: The Man and His Work. London: Methuen.
Taylor, C. C. W. (1998). Socrates. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waterfield, R. (2002). Plato: Phaedrus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waterfield, R. (2004). Plato: Theaetetus. London: Penguin.
Plato’s Theaetetus as an Indirect Dialogue
21
ߦٛဦ۞Ķมତ၆ྖķᄃࣰጯ३ᆷ۞݀ࢨĈ
ͽĮ঍ญ೩଀೻įࠎּ*
ң ൪ Ⴔ**
ၡ! ࢋ
傳統上認為，柏拉圖使用「對話」來書寫哲學，是因為書寫只能「間接」
呈現哲學，模仿口說問答寫成的「對話錄」，最能接近真正的哲學。本文所
要釐清的是，雖然柏拉圖的確指出了書寫的侷限，但在立場上他並不排斥書
寫，也不排斥「間接」。「間接對話」的書寫形式便是這一立場的證據。因
為，這種書寫形式非但不爭取「直接」，反而更凸顯書寫固有的「間接」性。
《泰鄂提得斯》便是一例。以此，本文將分析《泰鄂提得斯》的開場段落，
為柏拉圖在「書寫」議題上的哲學立場建立新解釋，重新審視讀者「間接」
藉由閱讀哲學書寫來進行哲學活動的意義。
關鍵詞：柏拉圖、對話錄、書寫、《泰鄂提得斯》、哲學
*
投稿日期：民國 99 年 10 月 10 日。接受刊登日期：民國 100 年 2 月 14 日。責任校對：
**
中國文化大學哲學系助理教授
郭玫岑、陳怡仲、楊雅婷。