The Militarization of the State in Latin America
Author(s): Michael Lowy, Eder Sader, Stephen Gorman
Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4, State and Military in Latin America
(Autumn, 1985), pp. 7-40
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633892 .
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The Militarizationof the
State in Latin America
by
Michael Lowyand Eder Sader*
TranslatedbyStephenGorman
havebeena characteristic
featureofLatin
dictatorships
Military
caudillos
America'spoliticalhistorysincethetimeof themilitary
O' Higgins,
andothers)wholedtheprocessesof
(Bolivar,San Martin,
century.
of the nineteenth
at the beginning
nationalemancipation
dictators
havebeenone oftheresources
Since thatepoch,military
utilizedby the dominantclasses to imposeorderduringtimesof
crisis.
the meansof
regimesconstituted
military
Afterindependence,
Latertheseregimes
werethe
ofcolonialism.
offtheremnants
finishing
within
theemancipathe"plebeian"tendencies
meansforrepressing
thatthreatened
the oligarchicsociety.Ultimately
tionmovements
theformation
ofnationalstatesin
theywerethemeansforimposing
mostbackward
tendencies
oftheoligarchy's
thefaceoftheseparatist
oftheneworder,
thecaudillosgaveway
fractions.
Withestablishment
theoligarchy
tomorestablepoliticalsystemsthatbetterrepresented
as a whole(Halpenrn
Donghi,1969).
as theprimary
exporteconomiesofmanycountries
Inthiscentury,
ofprofound
crisisandas thesocialstrugbegantodisplaysymptoms
became
regimes
becamemoreviolent,
military
glesthatthisprovoked
Itwas nolonger
interests.
an instrument
forsafeguarding
established
the
andmaintaining
a matter
a neworderbutofdefending
ofimposing
*Michael Lowy is Research Director at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique(CNRS-Paris) and Lecturer at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales. Eder Sader is Lecturerin Sociology at the Universityof Sao Paulo. The
translationwas substantiallycompleted by the late Stephen Gorman,who taughtat
NorthTexas State Universityand who was the authorof several books on Peru and
Central America. It was thenfinishedby Robert Dash, who accepts fullresponsibilityforany errors.This is an updated and expanded versionof an articlethatappeared
firstin Revue Jiers-Monde(Paris) in October-December 1976 and then appeared in
CuadertnosPoliticos (Mexico) in July-September1977.
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 47, Vol. 12 No. 4, Fall 19857-40
? 1985 Latin AmericanPerspectives
7
8
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
existing
one,andtherefore
military
tyrannies
becamethenorminthe
mostbackward
regions.
Whentheprocessofurbanization
provoked
a
ofthebasesofpoliticalpower,itwas oftenfrom
theranks
broadening
of the militarythat the leaders of an antioligarchic
movement
emerged,as withthetenientes(a civilian-military
oppositionmovement)ofBrazilinthe1920s,Marmaduke
Grovein Chilein1932,and
JacoboArbenzin Guatemalain 1944.
By theendofWorldWarII thesechangeshadbeenconsolidated,
ingeneralduringthe1930s,andundertheimpactofthedemocratic
ideologythathad contributed
to the victoryover the Nazis, the
number
ofmilitary
dictatorships
haddiminished
notably.
The North
American
EdwinLieuwin(1964a:8) countednomorethan
sociologist
seven governments
out of twentyin the regionruledby military
in 1947.
officers
thelasttwenty
Nevertheless,
during
yearsorso, therehasbeenan
of militaryregimes,a progressive
unprecedented
multiplication
anda massiveinflux
of
elimination
of"representative
democracies,"
members
oftheofficer
corpsintothepoliticalarena.Together
with
countries
frequently
governed
bytheirmilitaries
(suchas Boliviaand
the CentralAmericanrepublics),some nationswithlongcivilian
traditions
havebeenaffected
as well.Brazil,inwhosehistory
there
had neverbeena military
regimeinthestrictsenseoftheterm(the
Estado Novo of GetulioVargas,1937-1945,
was nota military
dictatorship,
properly
speaking)has nowbeengovernedbyitsmilitary
formorethantwenty
withdemocratic
years;andChileandUruguay,
traditions
ofa Europeantype(orofa Europeaninclinaparliamentary
tion),also foundthemselves
subjectedto militarized
power.
Militarypowercan be definedas a formof statein whichthe
military
hierarchy
(thehighestandintermediate
levelsoftheofficer
inthepoliticalrealm-thatis, it
corps)occupiesthecentralpositions
within
the
controls
theessentialgovernment
postsandthetopoffices
stateapparatus(ministries,
oflargestateenterprises,
directorships
andkeyadministrative
itcanbe said
positions).Giventhisdefinition,
thattheoverwhelming
of thepopulationof thecontinent
majority
livestodayundera military
regime.
Whatpreciselyis meantby themilitarization
of thestate,or the
ofthearmy?According
to Lieuwin,we mustdisabuse
politicization
ourselvesofthemyththatthearmedforcesinLatinAmericaconsti" Thatthisis an errorbecomes
tutean essentially
institution:
military
evidentwhenwe examineitsrealfunctions.
Therearetwo-and only
two-legal militaryfunctionsfor an armedforcesorganization,
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
9
to defendthenationfromexternalaggression
andto defend
namely,
thegovernment
bypreserving
internal
order"(Lieuwin,1964b:95).
Butaccording
toLieuwin,theLatinAmerican
armedforcesconfront
constitutional
no externalenemiesand,ratherthandefending
govhave tendedwithconsiderablefrequency
to overthrow
ernments,
is notvery
them.Fromour perspective,
however,thisdistinction
one areboth
meaningful:
a government
andoverthrowing
Defending
of the armyto
political acts. It is impossibleto call the intervention
defenda "constitutional"
government
apoliticaland purelymilitary
whenitis repressive
(e.g.,theeventsofTlatelolcoinMexicoin1968)
or when it occurs duringa democraticuprising(e.g., the "conintheDominicanRepublicof1965).
stitutionalist"
insurrection
fromthe
The militarization
ofthestateis notsimplythetransition
of the state
to thepolitical,but theoverwhelming
purelymilitary
apparatusas a wholebythearmedforces-inessencethe"colonizastructures
ofstateandstate-related
tion"ofthemajority
(attheapex
and thepartialor totalfusionofthe
ofthepyramid)
by themilitary
ofthesystemofpolitiwithotherapparatuses
repressive
apparatuses
cal domination.
This militarization
maybe open and explicitbutmayalso take
" subterranean"
forms
inwhichthearmedforcesdo not
moreindirect,
occupythe frontline in the politicalsense. They do not govern
butexerciserathertightcontrolovertheformalholdersof
directly,
as in theadministrapoweror increasingly
occupystatestructures,
extensionofmilitary
tionofcertain"vital"regions,
the"unlimited"
justice,andso forth.
Suchhas beenthecase in Colombia.
are desigGenerally,
military
regimesand civiliandictatorships
natedby the conceptof "statesof exception."This terminology
seemsveryquestionable
inthesensethatitimplicitly
considersthe
"constitutionalist"
state(formal)
democratic
orparliamentary,
as the
norm,and themilitary
stateas theexception.The history
of Latin
Americafrom
itsindependence
untilthetwentieth
century,
andoverall in thelasttwenty
years(thisis also validforAsia, Africa,and
southern
Europe)tendsto suggestthecontrary
hypothesis:
thatthe
normis thecivilianormilitary
dictatorship,
theexceptiontherepresentative
andconstitutional
regime.Somesocialscientists
recognize
thisdifficulty
andtrytoavoiditthrough
useoftheconceptof" stateof
permanent
exception,"butthisseemsto me a terminological
coniftheexception
tradiction:
ispermanent,
itceasestobe anexception.
Beyondthe terminological
discrepancy,
thereis a deeperproblem here:thatthe exerciseof powerby the dominantclasses in
10
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Latin America(and elsewhere)requirestheconstantand habitual
(not exceptional)utilizationof coercionas the principalformof
domination.
armored
Gramsci(1975:165)definesthestateas a "hegemony
by
as thetotality
ofthestructures
coercion,"understanding
hegemony
andinstitutions
capableofcreating
socialconsensusaroundthedominantclass.
These structures,
the"ideologicalapparatuses"(school,church,
politicalparties,press, radio, etc.), by themselvescould never
class; theyalwaysrequirethe
guarantee
thedomination
oftheruling
ofthesocialorderintheformof
presenceofan "ultimate
guarantee"
apparatuses"(army,
police,
instruments
ofcoercion,the"repressive
paramilitary
forces,etc.). But to the extentthatthe equilibrium
is disturbed
andthefocusofpowershifts
betweenthetwostructures
itis possibleto speakofa
clearlytowardtherepressive
apparatuses,
tothe
termthatI prefer
"predominantly
coercivestate,"aprovisional
equivocalconceptofa stateofexception.
In LatinAmerica,theexplosivecharacter
ofsocialcontradictions
years
has constantly
provokedshifts
ofthistype.In thepasttwenty
thatis characterized
however,
a newhistorical
stagecanbe discerned
bytheextensionofpredominantly
coercivestatesovermostofthe
The
as a consequenceof a profound
crisisofhegemony.
continent
performing
theirfuncideologicalapparatuses,
incapableofskillfully
ofconsensus,havefoundthemselves
displacedby
tionsas generators
orabsorbedwithin
inparticular
therepressive
thearmed
apparatuses,
forces.Schools,universities,
thechurch,and politicalpartieshave
increasing
experienced
anincreasingly
intensecrisisandencountered
inpropagating
theideologyoftheestablished
order.The
difficulties
mostnotableexceptionis Mexico,wherethe overallcomplexof
forpropagating
theofficial
ideologyof the
apparatusesresponsible
Indominated
MexicanRevolution,
by thePartidoRevolucionaria
Revolutionary
Party-PRI), has been
stitutional
(the Institutional
of thepopular
able to guaranteetheadherence(or neutralization)
recourseto themassiveuse ofcoerciveinstruments
classes,making
(as seenin 1968)infrequent.
ofthestatehas
toemphasizethatthemilitarization
It is important
not
notmeanttheexclusiveuse ofcoercionas a formofdomination;
tofulfill
theirrolebut
continued
onlyhavetheideologicalapparatuses
a
an ideologicalrolein transmitting
thearmyhas itselfperformed
economicdenumberof themesthatvarywiththe conjuncture:
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
11
velopment,
nationalunity,
defenseagainstsubversion,
and so on. In
it is necessaryto distinguish
betweenthe conceptsof the
reality,
military
regimeand thepredominantly
coercivestate:theydo not
inwhichcoercion
alwayscoincide.Therehavebeenmilitary
regimes
a rolethanina so-calledconstitutional
playednomoreimportant
state
(Peruunderthegovernment
ofVelascoAlvarado),and,incontrast,
thereare examplesof civilianregimesbased almostexclusivelyon
repression
andterror
(Haiti).
inpower,itis essential
theconductofthemilitary
To comprehend
toemphasizethatthemilitary
as a unitis neither
a classnora " caste"
andthatitspoliticalpracticecannotbe entirely
explainedintermsof
of the
the social originsof its members.Thus the predominance
agrarianoligarchyin the hierarchyof the navy and the pettyin
ofthearmy-togivean exampleprominent
bourgeois
composition
in
differences
Latin America-mayat timeshelpin understanding
conductand even conflicts
branchesof thearmed
amongdifferent
refers
forces.But"theunityofthearmedforces,"beyondthemyth,
to a concretephenomenon:
thefactthatmembersof the military
belongto a singlesocial categoly. A social categoryis a groupdefined
withextra-economic
instancesofthesocialstructure,
byitsrelations
miliideological(intellectuals,
students)or political(bureaucracy,
tary).Therefore,
just as thereis a certainunityin theconductof
studentsindependent
oftheirsocialorigins,thereis in everysocial
determined
categorya certainextra-class
community
by theircomwiththeideologicaland politicalapparatuses.Theremonrelations
as theleadinggroupofthecoerciveapparatusofthe
fore,themilitary,
a relatively
state,constitutes
homogeneoussocial categorywhose
conductis broadlydefined
Fromthis
bythisspecificdetermination.
resultsa relative
autonomy
ofthemilitarized
statewithrespecttothe
itis alwaysinthelastinstancetheguarddominant
classes,although
ian of the orderestablishedby these classes. This autonomyis
inwhichthemilitary
broaderinthestateformcalled"Bonapartist"
itselfinthepoliticalarenaas anarbitrator
presents
amongthevarious
inregimes
inwhich,through
themediation
ofa
classes,andnarrower
military-industrial
complexor by the cooptationof the generals
within
administrative
councils,thereis a truesocialfusionofmilitary
andentrepreneurs
(e.g., Brazil).
Inconsequence,
thepetty-bourgeois
socialorigin
ofthemajority
of
theprofessional
sectorsof LatinAmericanarmies,contrary
to the
usualanalysisofNorthAmerican
is nota decisive
military
sociology,
12
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
apparatusentersintocrisisand the
factorexceptwhenthemilitary
amongsocial
artificial
unityof thebarracksgivesway to conflicts
theinstitution.
classesthatspreadthroughout
FACTORS IN THE MILITARIZATION
OF LATIN AMERICAN REGIMES
oftheLatinAmeritowardthemilitarization
Behindthistendency
ofsocialrelations.On theone
can statelies a profound
modification
achievedin the mostimportant
hand,the capitalistdevelopment
ofcapitalaccumunewforms
inthe1950sand1960srequired
countries
politicalstruglation.On theotherhand,aftertheCubanRevolution
withnewobjectives,new
glesentereda newphaseofconfrontation,
alliances,andnewformsofexpression.
sayingthatthereis inpracticeno strictseparation
It goeswithout
to a new
betweeneconomicand politicalfactors.The transition
was nota purelyeconomicphenomaccumulation
modelofcapitalist
ofexploitation
ofthelaborforcebrought
enon.The newconditions
withthemnewpoliticalfactorsrelatedto itsrealization.New relaButthemodelofaccumulationsamongclasses becamenecessary.
tionthattook shape was the resultof thesenew social relations,
orclass
to thecapacityofeachclass,stratum,
established
according
betweenpoliticaland
The distinction
fraction
toimposeitsinterests.
of
a clearseparation
hereisnotintended
toestablish
economicfactors
to theiressence. In emthetwo levels,as thiswouldbe contrary
mypurposeis to
ofthetwokindsoffactors,
phasizing
thespecificity
conditions
ofeach situation.
theparticular
clarify
The state,in its role as the centerof powerin society,is the
As a reflection
of
socialrelations.
ofestablished
dominant
expression
between
and therelations
stageofcapitalaccumulation
thecurrent
thestateis simultaneously
thedifferent
forcesin theclass struggle,
or
of thedominantsocial classes forconsolidating
the instrument
forcona mode of accumulationand theirinstrument
modifying
theequilibrium
oftheexistingsocialforces.
or modifying
solidating
of
and theaccumulation
For thisreason,the state,class struggle,
penetrateeach otheron all levels. Each of these
capitalmutually
appearswithinthecontextoftheothers,thewholeconphenomena
whatwe call the" socialformation."
stituting
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
13
towardthemilitarization
of
Whatarethecauses ofthistendency
ofthe1960s?
thestateinLatinAmericasincethebeginning
It is evidentthatthe Cuban Revolutionis one of the decisive
thisevolution.The CubanReveventsforunderstanding
historical
by
thetraditional
systemsofdomination
affected
olutionprofoundly
precewithout
a crisisofhegemony
inmotionor intensifying
setting
All of theideologicalapparatuses-schools,
denton thecontinent.
in varyingdegreesacthechurch,politicalparties-wereaffected
andtheperiod.Thecrisistookdiverseforms:
tothecountry
cording
theappearanceof a
of studentmovements,
extremeradicalization
faccurrent
in certainsectorsoftheclergy,
Christian
revolutionary
"populist"parties,suchas
tionalsplitswithinthevarioustraditional
Americana
(American
thePeruvianAlianzaPopularRevolucionaria
Alliance- APRA) andtheVenezuelanAcPopularRevolutionary
(DemocraticAction-AD).
cion Democriatica
andthe
ofeconomicdevelopment
As a resultofthecombination
thereoccurredin LatinAmericaa
impactoftheCubanRevolution
about
thatbrought
ofsocialcontradictions
intensification
significant
social strata(campesinos),
disorganized
theeruptionof previously
the developmentand "politicization"of industrialconflicts,the
appearanceof radicalforcesof oppositionto the statusquo, and
thequestioning
and disciplinewithinthearmedforces
of authority
themselves.
threats
andtorebuildthefailing
Itwas tocope withthesemultiple
coercivestate
andpredominantly
thata military
systemofhegemony
forthe"constitutional"
was substituted
state,withthereplacement
functionaries.
We can
of traditional
politicalpersonnelby military
andspeakofthestateas coercionwrapped
invertGramsci'sformula
cover(theideologicalapparatuses)
inhegemony:
whentheprotective
is stripped
away,thecoercivenucleuscomesto thesurface.
These social, political,and ideologicalfactorscombinewitha
in
fundamental
economicone: thenewmodeofcapitalaccumulation
at the level of the state. It is
Latin Americaand its implications
to outlinethe process of Latin American
necessary,therefore,
fromWorld
in thepreceding
period,roughly
capitalistdevelopment
WarI to theendofthe1940s.The longcrisisoftheworldmarketin
thatperiodcreatedfavorableconditionsforchangein the motive
export
centerof the Latin Americaneconomiesfromtheprimary
industrial
sector.The splitbetweenproduction
sectorto theinternal
ofperipheral
economiesseemedto
andconsumption
so characteristic
14
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
be disappearing
(see Furtado,1973,and MauroMarini,1973).The
reductionin Latin Americanexports,whose consequencewas a
contraction
ofthecapacityoftheseeconomiestoimport,
freedmonetaryresourceson theone hand,and createdconsumersforthedeofan "import-substitution"
velopment
on theother
typeofindustry
(Barrosde Castro,1968;Furtado,1973;Frank,1968;MauroMarini,
1973,1974;PeraltaRamos,1972;Pinto,1959;and Tavares,1972).
Thisprocessofindustrialization
beganinthebranchesofproductionoffinished
consumergoodsthatwereless complextechnologically,thetextileandfoodindustries,
takingadvantageofan abundant
laborforceand theavailability
of local raw materials.The growth
ofthese"wage-goods"branchesofindustry
reflected
theincreased
consumption
demandsofwageearners.Thisis notto say,however,
thattheabove-mentioned
splitbetweenthespheresofproduction
and
consumption
tendedtodisappear.IfLatinAmerican
industrialization
was to proceedwithoutabandoningits primaryexportbase, the
modesofproduction
andcirculation
had to be adaptedto thatbase.
LatinAmericanindustrial
bourgeoisies
developedas appendicesof
primary
exportsystems.Theforeign
currency
earnings
necessaryto
import
machinery
camefromexports.Monopolistic
appropriation
of
landgenerated
an important
reserveoflaborchargedwithproviding
laborpowerat a low price. Demandsof theprimary
exportsector
frequently
forthemostpart,theconsumption
constituted,
market
for
localindustries.
Followingthecrisisof 1929,alteration
of the conditionsof the
world marketproducedsignificant
changes in Latin America's
powersystems.On theone hand,a processofindustrialization
was
initiated.
Ontheother,
absenceofanindustrial
bourgeoisie
politically
independent
oftheruralbase led to a compromise
powersystemin
whichindustrialinterestswere defendedby governments
whose
broadsocialbases permitted
them,starting
froma fundamental
pact
withtheancientoligarchy,
totipthebalancetowardindustry.
Vargas
inBrazilin1930,C'ardenas
inMexicoin1934,theliberalgovernment
in Colombiain 1934,theFrentePopular(PopularFront)in Chilein
1938,and Peronin Argentina
in 1945all redirected
theactionofthe
statewiththeobjectiveofcreating
an internal
market.Theseregimes
fromone anotherowingto diversealliancesandrelations
differed
of
forcesand differences
in stageof development.
But theywereall
promoters
ofan extensiveprocessofindustrialization,
a strengtheningoftheroleofthestate,andtheincorporation
ofnewcontingents
of
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
15
therelationof
laborintotheurbanlabormarket,withoutbreaking
exporteconomythatprovided
createdby theprimary
dependency
earningsnecessaryforimports.This is what
themwiththeforeign
causedRuyMauroMarinito say,
Uprootedfromthe mode of circulationthatcharacterizedthe export
economy,thedependentindustrialeconomyreproduced,in a specific
form,theaccumulationof capital based on theoverexploitationof the
As a consequence, it also reproduced,althoughin a modified
wvorker.
ofcirculationthatcorrespondsto thattypeofaccumulathenmode
wvay,
tion. Now, it is not thedisassociation ofproductionand citculationof
merchandisein termsof the world marketthat is operatinigbut the
separation betweenthehighand thelow spheresof circulationwithin
the economyitself,a separationithat,not being counteractedby the
faictorsthatoperate withinthe classic capitalist economy,acquires a
radical character[1973: 63-64].
mrior-e
mtiuch
afterthebeginning
thatinstalledthemselves
The politicalregimes
processand whose objectivewas the deof the industrialization
velopmentof thatprocesswere sustainedby a broadsocial base
of
favoredbytheextension
composedofnewlevelsoffunctionaries
in the
opportunities
thestate'sroleand thegrowthof employment
ownersfaand smallproperty
sector,liberalprofessionals,
tertiary
voredby the increasein urbanrents.Even withinthe exploited
withintheindusofworkersincorporated
classes,newcontingents
theyhadnotpossessedas rural
privileges
triallaborforce,enjoying
thebasis forpopulist-type
constituted
workersor subproletarians,
process,
relations.The dynamicof thisextensiveindustrialization
wentbeyond
whichhad producedtheconditionsforcompromise,
thoseconditions.Havingbegunwiththebranchesof intermediate
morecomplexbranchesof
it affected
consumergoods production,
and capitalgoods as a consequenceof thepressures
intermediate
exertedon theimportcapacityof thesystem,and thisproduceda
forthosesectors.Duringthe
changein thefocusof accumulation
becameevidentinMexico,
1950s,thedemandsofthistransformation
with
attempted,
The governing
bourgeoisies
Brazil,and Argentina.
greateror lessersuccess,to respondto themintermsofthelogicof
process.
theaccumulation
at which
thereis a moment
In theprocessofimportsubstitution,
toa newstage
necessaryforthetransition
theamountofinvestment
capital
oftheproblemoftheshortageofinternal
callsforresolution
16
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
ofinternational
offoreign
andtheavailability
capital.The solicitation
the most
capital has to be accompaniedby definiteattractions,
important
of whichare favorablelegislation
fortherepatriation
of
ofinfrastructural
profits,
theavailability
resources
atverylowprices,
and,aboveall,a cheapworkforce.Insofaras theworldmarket
again
oftheperipheral
broadened,inthepostwarperiod,thedependency
thiswasevidentinthetechnologindustrialization
processincreased;
ical models that dominatedit and acceleratedthe process of
monopolization
oftheeconomy.
of a technology
too highlydevelopedforthe
The introduction
farin
modelsproducedan expansionofproductivity
LatinAmerican
oftheproductive
excessofthedevelopment
base. Thisis to saythat
didnotcompensate
theamountofnewinvestment
fortheunemployinnovation.
mentproducedby technological
We have here,then,a
crisisofrealization:
the
The bipolariz-ation
of income
tendcls
on)theoniehand, to str-ainl
expanditled
reproductionof calpitalandicl
exacerbate the contracldictions
orientaition1of capitail accumuonithe other handtc,
andtc,
throulghthe niewt,
to hail'e asaS by-product aiiieit' niodification of the
tlitioni,
/listriblution of
c(ate gor --commonlyxcalled themiddi//(le
inicotneto the beniefitof ai third
classes-----and
to the(let/i/lie
ntoftheworkingclass. Thisthirdca tegorv
(lenilaids the reactivationoj the process of accuudaltion when it is
capable of dloinigso, thait is, wh/Jel
the repressionlintegration of the
working class is achieved without too much shock [Salamna, 1974:
58-59].
This demandis not an artificial
a posteriori
creationbut a direct
On theone
productoftheabove-mentioned
modeofaccumulation.
hand,thetechnicalcharacteristics
of modemindustries
requirean
increaseinthenumber
ofunproductive
workers.Undertheprevailingconditions
offormation
ofthelaborforceinthesecountries,
these
workers
achieveremuneration
thanthoseofmanlevelsmuchhigher
ual laborers.On theotherhand,thedifficulties
in therealization
of
ofcapitalfromtheproductive
capitalprovokea diversion
sphereto
in thissphereincreases,procommerceand services.Employment
consumers.
ducingmanymoreprivileged
Undertheseconditions,
theincremental
expansionofthemarket
does notnecessarilyimplyan increasein the remuneration
of the
workforce.On thecontrary,
it impliestheoverexploitation
of this
forceto guaranteean "overaccumulation'
capableofsustaining
the
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
17
intensification
of consumption
of a limitedprivilegedbase. This
necessityto exertpressureso as to diminish
thecostofproduction,
forthelimitsofthemarketby an increaseinthe
andto compensate
prices of products,is incompatiblewith populistregimesand
bourgeois
democracy.
By thisI do not meanthatthe authoritarian
regimesimposed
The
throughout
LatinAmericago alongwithits industrialization.
atitspleasure;
bourgeoisie
doesnotchooseitsregimes
ofdomination
theseare theresultoftherelationsof socialforcespresentin each
Incontrast,
I arguethatthepoliticalconditions
situation.
mostfavorin the
able for the developmentof capitalistindustrialization
in thepresentstageofcapitalistaccumulation
periphery,
guarantee
formsofresistance
oftheelementary
therepression
bytheworking
classes. (Here I am speakingof a stagein an international
sense,
achievedin each
of thelevelof development
because independent
itis international
conditions
ofaccumulation
country
byitsindustry
for
of theprocessof importsubstitution
thatpreventa repetition
seeninthe1930s.)Forthisreason,
relatively
closednationalmarkets
ofthemasseswithin
thatrelyonthepopulistmobilization
theregimes
offormaldemocracyrepresent
theframework
increasingly
unstable
and precariousbalances of forces,not the "normalform"of
bourgeois
domination
seenthroughout
thecontinent.
FORMS OF MILITARIZATION
OF THE STATE
Militarydictatorships
eliminatethe balancedrepresentation
of
different
fractions
of thedominant
classes. In theirplace arisesan
executivethatconcentrates
all ofthefunctions
ofgovernment
andis
directly
dependent
on thearmedforces.
The unique characteristicsof the armed forces-"professionalism,"authoritarian
andan ideology
discipline,
rigidhierarchy,
of defenseof order-naturally
give military
regimesa repressive
aspect.Thisdirectresortto repression
is clearlya symptom
ofthe
crisesoflegitimacy
ofbourgeoisdomination
ofthecontinent.
Butif
welookclosely,
wecandistinguish
betweenmilitary
regimes
basedon
therepressive
function
(Argentina,
Chile,Uruguay,
andothers)and
those thatcombinesemipopulist
characteristics
with repressive
18
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
measures(Peru underVelasco Alvarado,PanamaunderTorrijos,
andso on). Amongthemilitary
regimes
orientedtowardrepression,
we mustfurther
distinguish
traditional
which
military
dictatorships,
comeintobeingtomaintain
frommilitary
theprimary-export
society,
thatarisein responseto thecontradictions
dictatorships
createdby
in
theindustrial
capitalistsociety;it willbe seen thatthesediffer
accordancewiththedifferent
functions
theyperform.
TRADITIONAL
MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS
Traditionalmilitary
dictatorships,
beingproductsof relatively
simplesocieties,haverelatively
simplefunctions:
toensuretheoverofruralworkersandprevent
exploitation
theestablished
orderfrom
beingthreatened
bycompetition
amongrivalsectorsoftheoligarchy.
In a way,theseregimesmediatebetweentheruraloligarchy
ofthe
countryand the foreigncompanies(or company)thatcontrolits
external
commerce.
Theyreceivetheassistanceofthelocaloligarchy
inprotecting
theirinterests
againstforeign
capitalandinguaranteeing
internal
order.Thanksto thissupport,
thetraditional
military
tyranniesareabletoimposeorderfrom
aboveontheinterminable
conflicts
inturnbelongtocliquesand
amongoligarchic
groups.Butthetyrants
utilizepowerto theiradvantage.
In thissense,thesedictatorships
cannotachievetheunification
of
thedominant
class. The stigmaofcorruption
thatseemstoadhereto
themlike theirown shadowsis simplythe absence of legal, intheft.For thisreason,theyare at thesametimeinstitutionalized
oftheforeign
struments
companiesandofthelocaldominant
classin
ofcontrolling
theirfunction
thenationaleconomy.
Suchis theproper
in the DominicanRepublic
description
of the Trujillodictatorship
and the Somoza dictatorship
in Nicaragua,accordingto Halpenn
Donghi:
In thesecountries,
theexpanisioni
belatedlyattainin1g
of exports,the
dictatorship
is the instrument
of economicconquestby the ruling
group. The Truxjillo
familyin Santo Domingoand the Somozas in
to a largepartofthenationalpatrimony.
Nicaraguahelpthemselves
Thesepracticessubordinate
thetraditional
andallowforthe
oligarchy
penetrationi
oftherepresenttatives
ofthedominant
economy:theconoftheDominicanlandbyNorthAmerican
sugarcompacnies
qcuest
andl
is tiedto
Nicaraguaby UnitedFruit.In bothcases, thedictatorship
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
19
previoIIs North Americantimilitaryoccupation; the chiefsof tie Na-
owe their
tional Guards, exceptionallywvellairm-led
antidtiaintaiined,
positionIs
to the occupier and count oni military assistance for their
bases of local pow-ver.
The Nationial
fromthetraditionial
inidependlence
of
Guartdsare loval to thedictatoranidare less subjectto theinfliuences
the oligarchythan1
armnies
[1969: 238].
thatthese
Letus examinethismoreclosely.Whataretheproblems
endeavortoresolve,uponwhatkindsofsocialrelations
dictatorships
do theyengender?
aretheybased,andwhatcontradictions
At thebeginning
of thecentury,
the UnitedStates,Britain,and
France sharedin the economicdominationof Nicaragua. The
to
nationalist
government
of Zelayatriedto utilizethiscompetition
The UnitedFruitComimprove
thecondition
ofthelocaleconomy.
thatoVerthrew
theregime.
panythenorganized
an armedmovement
The directintervention
of the UnitedStates in 1911ensuredthe
whowas a member
oftheConservative
"election"ofa newpresident
butwhentheU.S. forceswithdrew
fromNicaraguain1924,a
party,
civilwar ensued. In 1926,U.S. Marineslandedagainand forced
liberaland conservative
generalsto makepeace. Amongtheliberal
therewere
government,
however,
generalswhoopposedtheresulting
oftheworkers.For these,the
forcesthatexpressedtheaspirations
of exploitation
imposedby
fundamental
problemwas thesituation
worker
agricultural
foreign
power.AugustoCesarSandino,a former
and miner,
theNationalGuardand
headeda smallarmythatfought
theoccupationforcesuntil1930.After
thedefeatoftheseinsurgents,
oftheNationalGuard,led
GeneralAnastasioSomoza,commander
thecoup d'etatthatbeganhislongreign.
The Somoza dictatorship
was imposedthrough
thepowerofthe
NationalGuard;it overcamethe Sandinothreatand ensuredthe
butonethat
existenceofa nationalstatefreefrom
military
occupation
wouldguaranteetheunopposedeconomicdomination
oftheNorth
Americancompany.
The powerof a personor ofa clan (Trujillo,Duvalier,Somoza,
Stroessner)maintained
by a loyal and privilegedNationalGuard
tothenecessities
ofa simplesocietybasedontheexport
corresponds
ofprimary
for
Withaneyetowardmaximizing
theearnings
products.
theterror
ofthestateis obligedto
companiesinthistypeofactivity,
crushtheslightest
manifestation
ofopposition.
Thelocalpopulation,
whosedemandsformorewagescanonlyincreasethecostsofproduc-
20
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
tionand reduceincome,is notallowedto consumethewealthprosectorsoftheeconomy.
ducedbytheimportant
andignorance
misery,
employforce,extreme
Thus,theseregimes
energiesthatdevelop
to repressthepopulation.The revolutionary
by the Mexican Revolutionof
withinthiscontextare illustrated
inEl Salvadorin1932,thelong
1910-1915,
thecampesinoinsurrection
factoralso
ofSandino,andtheCubanRevolution.Another
struggle
Dependingas theydo
ofsuchdictatorships.
diminishes
thestability
clique,
ofthedominant
thecorruption
andprotecting
onpoliceterror
ofautocratic
theurbanmiddleclassnomorethanleftovers
theyoffer
theyin turn
power.As these classes growand become stronger,
democraticand moralizingmovements.These pettystrengthen
oftheoligarchy,
areassistedbycertainfractions
bourgeoisinitiatives
ofthecycleofmilitary
andtheironlyconsequenceis theperpetuation
fromthispointofview
LatinAmerica.In reality,
coupsthroughout
the Cuban Revolution,the 1979NicaraguanRevolution,and the
a turning
in El Salvadorand Guatemalarepresent
struggles
current
FidelCastrobecause
point.Attheoutset,theUnitedStatestolerated
morethana newliberalrebelhismovement
appearedto be nothing
whichin a few yearswould itself
lion againsta corrupttyranny,
itsdemocratic
objectives
Bylinking
tyranny.
becomeanother
corrupt
withthe profoundsocial aspirationsof the workingmasses, the
andclosedthedoortothe
CubanRevolution
signaleda newdynamic
liberalschemesoftheold oligarchies.
cycleoftheBolivian
Boliviais a veryspecialcase. Therestorative
of1952endedin1964withthecoup
armedforcesaftertherevolution
d'etat of Barrientos.The antilaborcharacterof the Barrientos,
ifwe considerthe
andGarciaMeza regimes
is verysignificant
B'anzer,
actual political forces of the Bolivian proletariat.From this
dictatorships
standpoint,
theseregimeslookmorelikenewmilitary
ofthe
struggles
ones. Butjust as therevolutionary
thantraditional
oftheruralsectorand
hadtoovercometheweight
Bolivianproletariat
social
ofthecountry,
thelackofa corresponding
thebackwardness
theBrazilian
from
following
dictatorships
base prevented
themilitary
cannotbe an instrument
model.In Bolivia,themilitary
dictatorships
ofmediaoftheindustrial
sector,itis insteadaninstrument
monopoly
via
andimperialism
tionbetweensectorsofthenationalbourgeoisie
situation
resembles
thestate'scontrolofminerals.Seenthisway,the
is thenationalifeature
whoseparticular
thetraditional
dictatorship,
Butthe
revolution.
a
of
the
1952
zationoftheminingsector, legacy
of the
and
are
the
maturity
experience
principallegaciesof 1952
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
21
proletariat,
whichimpedeanyreactionary
stabilization
ofthecountry.
The "cocaine coup" of GarciaMeza in 1980and thesuccessionof
coupsandcountercoups
thatfollowed
illustrate
thechronic
instability
ofBolivianmilitary
regimes.
The triumph
oftheSandinistaRevolution
ofJuly19,1979demonstratedthe vulnerability
of traditional
military
dictatorships
once
again.It showedthatthepolitical-military
overthrow
ofa traditional
military
dictatorship
was possiblewithin
thecontextofitslossofany
socialbaseanditsconfrontation
bya broad-based
massrevolutionary
movement
capableof initiating
an armedinsurrection.
Nicaragua's
revolutionary
victory
foritspartdeepenedthecrisisofothermilitary
regimesin CentralAmerica,above all in El Salvador-wherethe
militaryhas tried to camouflageits power with "Christian
Democracy"-andin Guatemala,withitsmilitary
chiefspersonally
involvedinprofitable
petroleum
businessesand landspeculationin
the so-calledFranja Transversal
del Norte(NorthernTransverse
Strip),indirectassociationwithmultinational
corporations
(Shenandoah, GettyOil, Texaco,etc.).
NEW MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS
The newmilitary
shareswiththetraditional
one the
dictatorship
function
of copingwithworkers'capacityto reactto overexploitainthatitcorresponds
tion.In addition,
toa different
stageofcapitalist
ithas itsowntasks.In analyzing
theparticular
condidevelopment
tionsinwhichsuchregimes
EmirSaderidentifies
originate,
a crisisofhegemonywithinthepoliticalsystemthatinvariablyaccompanies coalitions of a reformist
or
nature-petty-bourgeoisreformism
Wuorker
reformism-ingovernment,aimed at reorderingthesystemof
dominationthroughthemediationof class conflictand thepositioning
ofconciliatoiymass leaders . . . Thesegovernments
constitutethelast
possible solution vithintheprevailingsystemat the end of the 1930s
and beginningof the 1940s: parliamentarydemocraticgovernmenital
regimnes,ideologically populist and functionallyauthoritarianand
elitist.Insofaras theseintermediatesolutionscainnotbe achieved in a
durable fashion, the political systemn
is condemned to a definiitive
failure[Sader, 1977:19].
The antilabor
is moreapparcharacter
ofthistypeofdictatorship
entthanin thetraditional
a more
because it confronts
dictatorship
22
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
thathas matured
developedlabormovement
duringperiodsofrelativeliberty.
Because thistypeappearsat moreadvancedstagesof
capitalist
concentration,
itorderstheinternal
conflicts
ofthedominantclassesbyaccelerating
themonopolization
ofcapital.Therefore,
itislogicalthatthegovernments
thatreflect
theinterests
ofmonopoly
classconciliation
forthereprecapitalshouldbe thosethatsubstitute
sentation
ofpolitically
excludedsectors.Now,thepoliticalexpressionofsuchinterests
impliesoverallactionmuchmorecomplexthan
thepoliticaldirection
oftheoldprimary
exportsectors.To theplace
previously
occupiedbytheoldtyrant
andhiscliquethenewmilitary
dictatorship
elevatesthe armedforcesto a managerialbody.The
successofthedictatorship
is measuredbyitscapacitytoconvertthe
armedforcesnotonlyintoa centralorganofpowerbutalso intothe
sole partyexpressingthe interestsof the hegemonicfractionof
capital.
The armed forces are the last elemiient
affectedby the system of
dominationand depenidoniits hierarchicalstructure,whichdoes riot
protectthemfromclass strugglebutdoes diminishtheirvulnierability
to
the effectsof the violenitsociail anidpolitical strugglescurrenlt
in the
conjunctureof the society. For these reasons, in its capacity as ani
the militatyrepresentsthe ultimatebase of operationsfor
institution,
the reconstructionof the conditionsfor political domination and
economic exploitation[Emir Sader, 1977: 23].
The bestexampleoftheseregimesis theBraziliandictatorship.
Theconditions
ofcapitalist
accumulation
beginning
inthemid-1950s
preparedthe way. The industrialization
process had developed
a massiveinfluxof foreign
through
capitalthathad injectedgreat
intobasic industries
and theproduction
of durablecondynamism
sumergoodsfora limited
high-income
urbanconsumersector.In the
early1960s,the maintenance
of thisprocessrequirednew investmentsin thesedynamicsectors,butthecapacityto attractforeign
capitaldependedon the capacityof the systemto containlabor
and rationalizethe
demands,guaranteehighratesof exploitation,
unitsofproduction
at thesame
economy,
eliminating
less profitable
timethata newconcentration
ofearnings
wasoperating
infavorofthe
dynamicsectors.The politicalregimethathaddirectedtheprevious
stageoftheindustrialization
processhad shownsignsofbeingincathesenewnecessities.Thepoliticalweight
pableofsatisfying
givento
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
23
all thebourgeoisfractions
in therepresentative
democraticmodel
impededimplementation
ofa coherent
andrationalnationalpolicyof
concentration.
Relationsofa populisttypewiththemasses
capitalist
also impededtheapplication
ofa policyofwagecontrols.
Confronted
withthenew necessitiesof capitalistaccumulation,
thebourgeoisieabandonedpopulismwhenthepopularmovement
beganto rushaheadofthepopulistleaders.Butitspoliticalorganizations,the PartidoSocial Democriatico
(Social DemocraticPartyPSD) and the Partido TrabalhistaBrasileiro(Brazilian Labor
Party-PTB) remainedimbuedwiththispopulismor at leastwere
incapableofovercoming
itwithintheframework
ofa parliamentary
theUnia6 Democrfitica
democracy,
Nacional(NationalDemocratic
Union-UDN). Thus,thearmedforcespresented
themselves
as the
" armedwing"ofa broadcoalition.Thepolicyofpurging
theLeftand
the populistcurrentin orderto avoid concessionsto the masses
progressively
eliminated
bourgeoisleadersfromthepoliticalscene
andemptiedcivilinstitutions
ofall power.In theprocessofcombatting"subversion"and "rationalizing"
the politicaland economic
apparatusofthestate,thearmedforcesemergedas thebackboneof
thestate,progressively
thelegislature,
thejudiciary,
andthe
reducing
partiestoa purelydecorative
and
influence
ofthe
role
controlling
the
and thechurch.
press,theuniversities,
Withoutthe counterweight
of any politicalrepresentation,
the
military
dictatorship
appliedthe policyof monopolistic
capitalto
overcometheeconomiccrisisthathad hungoverthecountry
since
1962.It utilizeda policyof wage controls,repression
of unionlife,
creditrestrictions,
incentives
forforeign
ratesof
capital,increasing
andrestriction
oftheconsumer
it
exploitation,
"wagegoods"market;
acceleratedmonopolistic
concentration
andthedenationalization
of
theeconomy.
It was notuntilDecember1968,withtheliquidation
of thelast
thatthemilitary
was
vestigesofthebourgeoisrepublic,
dictatorship
that
consolidated.Duringthatyear,theaccumulated
contradictions
arosefrom
theeconomiccrisisandthesolutions
appliedtoitandfrom
thepoliticalrepression
reachedtheirlimit.Inresponsetotheextreme
of themilitary
theold bourgeoisinstituunpopularity
government,
of "sendingthemilitary
tionsmanifested
back to
some intentions
theirquarters."But thisbourgeoisopposition,facedwiththefirst
oftheradicalization
ofa popularopposition,
and
symptoms
retreated
was eclipsed.The Leftcontinued
tobe equallyimmature
andfragile.
24
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
was thenable to resumethe initiative,
The military
dictatorship
executing
anothercoup,dismantling
alltradeunionandpoliticallife.
ofthearmedforces,Institutional
ActNo. 5
Morethana newvictory
was a decisiveturning
pointfortheregime.On thepretextof the
dicnecessity"to fight
againstrevolutionary
warfare,"themilitary
and official
tatorship
suppressedtheparliament
parties,destroyed
stillexistedinthejudiciary,
whatlittleautonomy
suspendedpolitical
a politicalalternative,
rightsof bourgeoisleaderswho represented
and gatheredunderits directcontrolall principalideologicalapto thepress.The military-police
paratuses,fromtheuniversity
repressiveapparatusacquiredautonomy
within
thearmedforces,given
itfrom
thewayinwhichtheregime
wasconsolidated.
Thisprevented
institutional
forthediversesectorsof
creating
channelsofexpression
thedominant
becamedependent
class,anditsideologicallegitimacy
onitseconomicsuccess.Inthisregard,
thedictatorship
couldalready
countontheeffects
oftheeconomicrecovery
thatbeganin1967.The
continual
increaseinnationalproduction,
realizedthrough
increased
oftheworking
exploitation
masses,offered
extraordinary
prospects
forprofit
tolargeinvestors
andbrought
abouta significant
riseinthe
incomeof the privilegedstrataof the urbanmiddleclasses. This
impededanyattempt
at bourgeoisopposition
duringthisperiod.
The formin whichthe military
ensuredcapitalist
dictatorship
recoveryprotectedthe "monopolistic
path" of capitalistdevelopment.The overexploitation
ofworkersfacilitated
but
accumulation
without
theinternal
developing
marketfor"wage goods," a sphere
thatlackedinterest
formonopolistic
capitalinBrazil.Acceleration
of
thecapitalist
transformation
inagriculture
also tookplace through
a
processofincreasing
ofcampesinos,andcontribproletarianization
utedto a reduction
inthecostofindustrial
The solicitaproduction.
tionofforeign
capitalandthecreditpoliciesoftheregimeintensified
imperialist
for
domination
oftheeconomy.
Establishment
ofa system
theconsumption
ofdurablegoodsbroadened
for
financing
conditions
realization
ofprivileged
productive
sectorsbyimperialist
capital.
Thestability
oftheBrazilianmilitary
regime
thusresulted
from
the
factthatitdidnotrestsolelyon repression.
It legitimated
itselfinthe
eyes of the entirecapitalistclass by offering
conditionsof high
for
and
profitability investments, even considerablenumbersof
salariedworkersbenefited
fromeconomicimprovement.
Theywere
wonovernotbytheexplicitideologyoftheregime,itsconservative
but by its appeal to individualism
and political
authoritarianism,
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
25
indifference
and the"realization"of consumerism.
Withthese,the
atomization
ofcivilsocietywas reinforced.
in1974,however,
the
Withtheworldeconomicrecessionbeginning
economy,
thatassuredthelegitimacy
oftheregime,
andso dependent
inthe
on theoutsideworld,reacheditslimits.The mostlucidfigures
government
realized that theymust look for other sources of
legitimation.
GeneralErnesto Geisel assumedthe presidencyin
1974 with a projectof "aberturapolitica" and the reappraisal
of civil institutions:liberalizationof censorship,of electoral
couldbring
and so on. Although
this"decompression"
propaganda,
to thesurfaceall sortsof underground
opposition,thegovernment
soughtto keep themundercontrolwithitseconomicreorientation
andsocialdepoliticization.
was unableto containthewave of
Nevertheless,
thegovernment
to "launcha new cycleof accumulation"
opposition.Its intention
oftheeconomiccrisis,whichendedby
collidedwiththemagnitude
the
theold solidarity
ofthedominant
classesandweakening
breaking
"military
party."At the same time,thedynamicof social protest
ofmeninpower.The
considerably
surpassedhaughty
expectations
ofmassivelaborstrikes
in1978revealedtheexisteruption
beginning
ence of a social movement
whosetendenciestowardpoliticaland
tradeunionautonomy
madetheprojectof "transition
fromabove"
Thisis notbyanymeansto say thatthemilitary
difficult.
teamlost
butto maintain
ofconcescontrol,
it,ithad to broadenitsprogram
sions and liberalizationsconsiderably.With President Joao
in1979theprojectchangedfrom
oneofsimple"liberalizaFigueiredo
tionof themilitary
democdictatorship"
to one of "authoritarian
racy."To accomplishthis,themilitary
teamrequiredcertaincondiwithrestrictions:(1) controlofthemechanisms
of representation,
tionson theorganization
ofparties,limitations
on legislative
action,
theresults,and(2)
thatdistorted
and,aboveall, an electoralreform
in legislathemaintenance
ofmechanisms
"of exception,"whether
tion(thenationalsecuritylaw,forexample)or withregardto the
forthesepractices(hencethedirectrejection
of
mustered
personnel
anyinvestigation
thatthreatened
theexistenceofthe"paramilitary"
to reconcile
groups).But at everystep it became moredifficult
liberalization
withthemaintenance
oftheseconditions,
andtheelectionsof1982showedthelimitsoftheBrazilianmilitary
project.
The increasing
weightof the state'seconomicapparatushad a
tendency
to strengthen
thepowerofthegovernmental
bureaucracy
26
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
withrespecttoprivatecapitalists;
butintheveryprocessofapplying
a policyfavorableto largecapital,theofficer
corpsof the armed
wereno
forceswas absorbedbyit.Thegeneralsandtheirtechnocrats
separate
longerthedefenders
ofthecapitalist
systemwhileremaining
fromthecapitalist
class; nowtheybelongedtothatclassandentered
corpsthat
intothemanagement
ofthemajorcompanies.The officer
directedthecentersofpoliticalpowerwas nowtheprivileged
representative
oflargecapital.In thissense,itwas possibleto speakofa
interests.
"military
party"as theprincipal
expression
ofcapitalist
dictatorship
Thesamecrisisofhegemony
producedtheBarrientos
in Bolivia(1964),theOnganiadictatorship
in Argentina
(1966),the
in
inBolivia(1971),andthePinochet
B'anzerdictatorship
dictatorship
ofthebourgeoisie
to forgea socialforce
Chile(1973).The inability
capable of defeating
the leftwithinthe contextof representative
oftheleftto overcomethebourgeois
democracyand theincapacity
reactionopenedthewayfora military
solution.Thelevelofviolence
oftheSeptember11Chileancoup can be explainedin termsof the
of theenemiesthathad to be broughtdown. The
characteristics
democracyhad
strength
and flexibility
of Chileanparliamentary
servedto institutionalize
redistribution
by the stateof theincome
inthemining
sector.Thepolitical
generated
bytheforeign
monopoly
to regulaterelations
groups
systemfunctioned
amongthedominant
and betweenall ofthesegroupsand theforeign
enclave,to winthe
in variouswaysintothe
supportofthe"middlesectors"integrated
withinthe
bureaucratic
apparatus,and to keepthelabormovement
law via recognition
of the rightsof unionsand of minorpolzticos
tothemostorganized
sectors.Whenthissystem
provedno
belonging
in containing
theautonomousdynamicof theprolongereffective
in seekingto eliminate
thebourgeoisie,
by
letariat,
it,was hampered
of theprothecountry'slegal traditions
and thepoliticalmaturity
letariat.Thesetwofactorshadalso impededthecoupd'etatthatwas
intended
fromtakingofficein 1970afterhiselecto preventAHlende
tion.
beThe gradualriseoftheChileanlaborandpopularmovement
came apparentin thelate 1950s.In 1958Allendecame onlyabout
theelection.Thecontinued
advanceof
30,000votesshortofwinning
toabandonitsownconservative
theleftcoalitionledthebourgeoisie
inliberty"
candidatein1964anduniteinsteadaroundthe"revolution
tothe
a Kennedy-inspired
reaction
ofEduardoFrei,whorepresented
Cuban Revolution.Afterthreeyearsof apparentsuccess,the Frei
thetimidreforms
promoted
regimeprovedincapableofmaintaining
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
27
by his Partido Democratico-Cristiano
(Christian Democratic
Party-PDC). The campesinosocialbase, initially
wonoverbythe
beginning
oftheagrarian
reform,
didnotmakeup forthesplitofthe
bourgeois
blocprovokedbythereactionoftheruraloligarchy
orfor
theincreaseincampesinorevolutionary
energies,
whichoutpacedthe
cooptivepossibilities
oftheregime.The urbansocialbase gainedby
theFreigovernment's
populistpolicieson housingandcollectivism
also failedtocompensate
forthepopulargroundswell
initiated
bythe
revolutionary
Left.
In 1970the risingLeft confronted
a dividedbourgeoisie.The
platformof Allende's Unidad Popular (Popular Unity-UP)
coalition-toconverttheeconomyto one of popularconsumption
the
anddemocratize
thestate-replacedtheDC projectoforganizing
internal
marketand integrating
thepopularbases intoa bourgeois
state.Sucha projectcarriedthecontradictions
oftheChileansituationto theirlimits.
of traThe existenceof a government
consisting
fundamentally
in such a junctureof
ditionalpartiesof the Chileanproletariat,
createda prerevolutioneconomiccrisisandmassrisingnecessarily
whichdidnotcontrolgovernmental
arysituation.The bourgeoisie,
thattheprocesscouldtake,could
powerandfearedtheorientation
itreactedby
noteffectively
confront
theeconomiccrisis.Therefore,
in speculation,
thusaggravating
andengaging
checkinginvestments
thecapitalistcrisis(Mauro Mariniand Seputlveda,
1974;and Eder
Sader,1974).
The massmovement,
bythe
propelled
bythecrisisandstimulated
presence of a popular government,expanded and became
radicalized.As theinstitutionalized
channels,privileged
bythepolof thestate,"revealedtheirlimits,the
icyof "thedemocratization
ofdualpowerappeared.Thus,thepolicyoftheMovimiento
embryos
de Izquierda Revolucionario(Movementof the Revolutionary
oftheseembryos,
ceased to
Left-MIR), basedon thedevelopment
ofthe
itbecameattachedto thedynamics
be simplya proclamation;
numerically
moreimportant
fractions
of theworkingclass and of
withitsownstrategy,
sectorsoftheUP itself.ButtheUP,consistent
as an appealagainstincreasedintervention
soughttouse itsstability
bythearmedforces.
thebourgeoisie,
ingeneralwerealso
Within
thePDC andtheright
forcedto lookto a military
solution.The PDC's objectivewas obvithatmight
ouslynota military
dictatorship
depriveitofdirectpolitical
Its strategy
authority.
was the"destabilization"
ofthegovernment:
28
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
all disconand exacerbating
all demandsto theirmaximum
forcing
tothe"stateoflaws"in
theUP prisoner
tent,atthesametimeholding
orderto preventit fromresolvingin its favorthe contradictions
The
created.But so riskya policycannotbe followedindefinitely.
social forcesthatwereset in motionhad theirown dynamic,and
the
oftheRightsucceededindestabilizing
themobilization
although
it. On thecontrary,
itdidnotsucceedinoverthrowing
government,
therewas a popularcounteroffensive
offensive
foreveryreactionary
assaultson the bourgeois
to further
thatincitedthe government
gave way to a new in"destabilization"
regime.The institutional
of"popularpower."
stitutionalization
to
thebattlefield
shifted
thissituation,
perceiving
Thebourgeoisie,
to thearmedforces.The almost
thebourgeoisstateandparticularly
armedforces,withtheir
of the traditional
completepreservation
the
allowedthemto perform
ideologyoforderand blinddiscipline,
Withthis,thearmed
agentof the"restoration."
roleof privileged
ofAllendeandpopularresistforceswentwellbeyondtheliquidation
orderdesiredbythe
ofthedemocratic
ance andthereestablishment
inBrazilbetween
ChristianDemocrats.The processthattranspired
coexistedwiththe
dictatorship
1964and 1968,whenthe military
did
vestigesofa "civilpower,"didnotoccurinChile.Theparliament
notsurvive,andbourgeoispoliticalpartiesdisappeared.The univerandthemeansofmasscomintervention,
sityfellvictimto military
control.Thejudicial
underdirectmilitary
werebrought
munication
ofthearmedforces.The
apparatuslikewisefellunderthedirection
inaccordancewithitsown
thegovernment
beganmanaging
military
afterthe
itsownhierarchy,
whileconserving
character,
institutional
bloody"purges"ofSeptember.
The statewas practicallyreducedto the armedforces,which
andsoughtto
andjudicialfunctions
executive,legislative,
performed
thelast
To
achieve
class.
becometheonlytruepartyofthedominant
of
objective,theystressedtheevilsofthesystem politicalparties,to
ofsocial
andthethreat
divisionofthecountry
whichtheyattributed
its
ideology
proposed
In placeofall this,thedictatorship
revolution.
of the
thedepoliticization
of nationalunity,to be formedthrough
its
It
demonstrated
rule.
represto
anditssubjection military
country
and
offorce,itsnationalcentralization,
siveefficacy
byitsmonopoly
adequate
as
an
to
itself
Its
impose
ability
discipline.
itsmonolithic
dependedonitssuccessinsuppressofthebourgeoisie
representative
theeconomy.
in
and
reestablishing
ingresistance
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
29
of thewholelegalapparatusdid notmeanthatthe
Destruction
military
dictatorship
controlled
allnationallife.Even ifone does not
takeintoaccounttheclandestine
reorganization
oftheLeftand the
workers'movement,
notall of theold channelsof thebourgeoisie
weredefinitively
liquidated.Although
itistruethattodaythereareno
bourgeoisparties,in the truemeaningof the term,one does find
pressuregroupsthatact withinand through
thearmedforces.The
PDC itselfwas transformed
(temporarily?)
intoa pressure
groupthat
used itspotentialsocialbase to exerta certaininfluence
on various
sectorsofthearmedforces.Together
withthePDC, otherorganizationsperformed
thesamefunction:
thechurch,leadingdailies,the
law school,and so forth.The armedforces,fortheirpart,having
overcomethepoliticaldivisionsthatexistedin Chileansociety,allowedthesedivisionsto penetrate
theirownranks.The survivalof
themilitary
dictatorship
was subjectto itsabilityto return
orderto
In thisperiod,in additionto
in thecountry.
capitalistaccumulation
the sacrificesof the workingmasses, expressedby massiveunthe
and bywagesthatcausedmalnutrition
and misery,
employment
movedagainstthesmallandmedium-sized
military
capitalist
sectors,
of thesesectorsfromthe
as is demonstrated
by thedisappearance
to thelatent
nation'seconomiclife.The regimehadto demonstrate
inthesesectorsitscapacityto stemtherevolution
opposition
and,at
thesametime,ensurehigherratesofexploitation
ofthelaborforce.
The argument
was convincing
onlyto thosewhosaw thatthesalvationofcapitalism
as capitalists.
hadtocomebeforetheirownsurvival
ingeneralwas muchstronger
than
Thepressure
exertedoncapitalists
itwas inBrazil,eitherbecauseofthegravity
oftheChileancrisisor
becauseofthepeculiarities
oftheeconomicpoliciesoftheChilean
towardeconomicliberalism,
junta,which,beingoriented
openedthe
it
tothedomination
oflargecompanies
without
country
counteracting
it is truethat,fromthepoliticalpointof
by stateaction.Although
than
hada muchstronger
view,Chileancapitalists
politicaltradition
theirBraziliancounterparts,
theyweremuchmoreconstrained
bythe
didnotrisk
threat
oftheproletariat.
Therefore,
bourgeois
opposition
and utilizedits discontent
to influence
certain
open confrontation
sectorsofthearmedforceswiththeobjectiveofmakingtheregime
moreflexible.
But how can a regimebecomemoreflexiblewhenits stability
ofitscommandcenters?If
derivespreciselyfromtheomnipotence
theChileanmilitary
regimehas beenthehardestofthenewmilitary
30
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
it is because Chileansocietywas themostcontamidictatorships,
natedby thesubversivetendenciesof theexploitedclasses. Its repressiveefficacyis achievedat directcost to its legitimacy.
If it
succeedsinestablishing
newperspectives
forcapitalist
development,
itwillrecoveritslegitimacy
amongthesectorsthatderivebenefits
fromthatdevelopment.
But if,beforeachievingthis,thecontradica crisiswithinthesystemof
tionscreatedby theregimeprecipitate
due to itsrigidity,
domination
theentirestatewillbe affected.
POPULIST
MILITARY COALITIONS
In someinstances,civiliangovernments
withpopulisttendencies
in representative
originating
democraticsystemsfallunderdirect
controlofthearmedforces.Thishappensin situations
inwhichthe
fora military
conditions
coupareas yetlackingbutthedevelopment
ofclass conflict
callsforincreasedintervention
ofthearmedforces.
in thiscontexthas becomemorethanthe "ultimate
The military
reserveoforder"thatintervenes
only"in thelastinstance,"butitis
notyetthedirectholderofpoliticalpower.Itscontinual
intervention
inanddirectcontrol
overpoliticalactionsgiveevidenceofthegravity
ofthecrisisandtheimpossiblity
ofimmediate
resolution.
In thiscase we are notdealingwithmilitary
governments
with
populistprojects,as in Peru,or even military
regimeswithcivilian
facades,as was thecase withBordaberry
in Uruguay.In thesetwo
cases, a military
couphadalreadydestroyed
therepresentative
democraticsystem
andestablished
anewpoliticalequilibrium.
Inthecase
ofa populistmilitary
arisesfrom
thefact
coalition,
politicalinstability
thattherepresentative
democracyis no longercapable of guaranteeingthestability
ofbourgeoisdomination
without
at thesametime
producing
thefactorsnecessaryfortheestablishment
of a military
dictatorship.
Such a situationis necessarily
ifitis prolonged,
as in
transitory;
it worsensall thesystem'scontradictions.
This typeof
Argentina,
coalitionlackstheefficacy
ofmilitary
repression
orpopulistmobilization.In contrast,
populistmilitary
coalitionstendtoneutralize
themselvesandto stimulate
thedevelopment
ofsocialconflict.
In Argentina,
thefirst
solution(1966-1973)
military
hadno success,
butneither
didthePeronist
government
succeedinachieving
political
stabilization
forthecountry.
The military
dictatorship
was imposed
by thecoup of JuanCarlos Onganiain 1966.After1955,withthe
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
31
thatfounditselfunderthedirection
defeatoftheworkers'movement
had
of the populistbourgeoisie(Peron),the Frondizigovernment
tothisworkers'
togoverninopposition
provedthatitwas impossible
removement(even if Peronismand the Leftwere energetically
conditions.The military
democratic
pressed)underrepresentative
a periodof
inaugurating
thatgovernment,
coup of 1962overthrew
ofthearmedforces,charged
underdirectcontrol
civiliangovernment
withperforming
thenecessarypoliticalpurges.
formof regime,whoseciviltaskswere
The failureofthishybrid
revealed
of diverseradicaltendencies,
assumedby representatives
to
counter
government
a representative
ofsustaining
theimpossibility
Peronism.The middleclasses, the social base of radicalismpar
opposition.The Ongania
bythePeronist
excellence,wereattracted
managedto liquidateparliamentary
dictatorshipsimultaneously
Fromthepositionof
anddividetheworkers'movement.
democracy
on him,Onganiasoughttonegotiate
thatthecoupconferred
strength
withthePeronistlaborbureaucracy.
in
of theworkers'movement
eruption
The semi-insurrectionary
dynamicwithre1969,an expressionofan autonomousproletarian
thebases ofthe
destroyed
spectto theorthodoxlaborbureaucracy,
thatOnganiaplanned.In 1970,a new coup d'etatde"'stability"
stroyed the Ongania regime and broughtRoberto Marcelo
thereafter
hewouldbe deposedshortly
tothepresidency;
Levingston
dicofthemilitary
by AlejandroLanusse. None ofthevicissitudes
class capacityforstrugtheworking
succeededinbreaking
tatorship
the
ofitsrevolutionary
fractions,
gle. Faced withthecombativeness
class through
hadno recoursebuttodividetheworking
government
dicconcessionsto thecorruptunionleaders.Thus,theArgentine
capitalwitha laborforceas
couldneverprovideimperialist
tatorship
cheap and "disciplined"as the Brazilianone, and was therefore
unableto establishthebases fora capitalistexpansionofthesame
type.
theirdefeat,decidedto effectThe armedforces,recognizing
a maneuverof Lanusse-an organizedretreat.Lanusse's
through
call forelectionswas presentedas partof an "organizedretreat"
by the rising
of the "military
party"designedto avoid overthrow
and maintainitscontrolover thecivilian
movement
revolutionary
dependedonthe
necessarily
Thesuccessofthisformula
government.
dominanttendenciesin Peronism,whichhad unifiedthe rapidly
The calculationsturnedout to be cordevelopingmassmovement.
32
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
rect:theconfidence
of themassesin Peronplayeda compensating
rolewithrespecttotheforcesliberated
bythe"politicalopening."In
thecriticalinitialperiod,thisconfidence
servedtoisolaterevolutionarytendencies.Whenthebourgeoisprojectof Peronism
pushedthe
leftwingof thismovement
intoopposition,
thearmedforceswere
moreor less preparedforit. Peronismhad serveditspurpose,and
preciselybecauseithad doneso wellitdivided,and tendedtoward
In thisstage,availingitselfofthemilitary
dissipation.
apparatusthat
hadbeenkeptintact,the"military
party"revealeditselfas thetrue
bourgeois
party.Undertheseconditions,
itcontrolled
theadvanceof
Peronism,
to whichit had passedtheresponsibility
of dividing
and
disciplining
theworking
class. Giventhatthelatteralreadypossessed
an autonomous
classdynamic,
thePeronist
government
ceasedtobe
forthebourgeoisie
efficient
and no longerrepresented
anything
for
the proletariat.
The military
coup of March1976was the logical
consequenceofthisimpasse.
MILITARY SEMIPOPULISM
inwhich
is military
Another
typeofmilitary
regime
semipopulism,
thaninthe
coercionis notprimary
oris considerably
lesspronounced
mentioned
to
now.
In
this
the
forms
up
typeofregime, armytriesandtoa certain
theroleofan ideological
extentsucceeds-toperform
for
of
apparatus themasses certainpopulistpartiesand achievesa
andnationalist
modicum
ofconsensusthrough
a setofsocialreforms
measures(or policies presentedas such). One cannot speak of
populisminthestrictsenseoftheterm,becausethereis little,ifany,
inlabororpoliticalmassorganizations
suchas
popularmobilization
theArgentine
Confederaci6n
Generaldel Trabajo(GeneralConfederationof Workers-CGT), the VenezuelanAD, and so on. The
oftheseregimes
toappropriate
civilianpopularinstruments,
attempt
andgivennewlifebymilitary
results
dulystaffed
personnel,
generally
insemifailure,
theclassicexamplebeingthePeruvianSINAMOS.
These regimesare usuallycharacterized
by "Bonapartism,"a
classes
withregard
tothedominant
relatively
highlevelofautonomy
andan apparent
socialforces.In
roleofarbitrator
amongantagonistic
the armygoverns,eliminating
military
Bonapartism,
politicalpersonnelandtraditional
institutions
(parties,parliaments,
magistrates,
etc.) of thedominant
classes,and developsa policythatobtainsa
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
33
certainpopularsupportand simultaneously
safeguardsthe established social and economic order. This is generallyled by a
individual(the "Bonaparte")who exercisesthe
charismatic-type
ofarbitrator
withinthemilitary
functions
apparatus.
In the1940sand1950s,LatinAmericaexperienced
variousexamples of militaryBonapartismtransformed
into populistcivilian
Bonapartism.This was the case with Per6n,withthe Bolivian
MovimientoNacional Revolucionaria(National Revolutionary
on
Movement-MNR).In thecase ofexistingsemipopulist
regimes
thecontinent,
thistransition
hasnotoccurred,
andthestatemaintains
itsmilitarized
character.
Threeexamplesof thistypeof regimeare those of Peru, Panama,
andEcuador.The Peruviancase is byfarthemostimportant,
owing
to thescopeofreforms
undertaken
and to itspoliticalimpacton the
continent
and beyond.The Panamanianand Ecuadorianregimes
appearto limittheirsemipopulism
to variouseconomicand diplomaticmeasuresinopposition
to certainNorthAmericaninterests.
In hisanalysisofthePeruvianregime,
thesociologist
JulioCotler
defined
thetwoaxesofthepopulistmilitary
modelas "themodernizationofthecapitalist
systemandtheneutralization
ofpopularmobilization"(Cotler,1969:11).Modernization
meansontheone hand,the
elimination
oftraditional
oligarchic
structures
and,ontheotherhand,
reformulation
ofthesystem
ofdependency;
neutralization
impliesthe
demobilization
ofanypopularmovement
thatoverstepsthebounds
or rhythms
oftheprocessofmodernization
establishedby themilitaryregime.
ThecausesoftheOctober1968coupthatoverthrew
the"constitutional"government
of PresidentFernandoBelaunde Terrywere
locatedon different
levelsofthesocialreality:
The incapacityof thetraditionalpoliticalsystemto modernizesocial
relations above all in the countryside and to realize the reforms
necessaryfor maintenanceof the social order in particular,the
impotenceof the governmentand the parliamentto overcomethe
landed oligarchy'sresistanceto the agrarianreformurgentlyneeded
aftermassivepeasantmobilizationsof the 1960sand guerrillamovementsamongdiscontented
ruralpopulations.
The crisis of hegemonydue to the weakening,corruption,and
demoralizationboth of the governmentand of the parliamentary
opposition(theAPRA) and a successionofpoliticalscandals,thelast
34
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
of which was the capitulationistagreementwiththe International
PetroleumCompany(Villaneuva,1969).
thespecific
nationalismthatconstituted
The authoritarian/modernist
ideologyof the Peruvianmilitaryas a social category,allowingan
of
ofitsreactionto thissituationand theestablishment
understanding
junta presidedoverbyVelasco Alvarado.
the"semipopulist"
of
Thislatterbegantotakeshapeafter1958withtheestablishment
(CenterofAdvancedMilitary
theCentrode AltosEstudiosMilitares
included,alongsidethe traStudies-CAEM), whose instructors
economistsclose to ECLA (the
ditionalmilitary,
developmentalist
forLatin America).This
UnitedNations'EconomicCommission
sui generis of the
was the genesisof an ideologicalcombination
and socioproblematicof counterinsurgency
political-military
andreformist
economicconcernsofa modernizing
type.The practiand
wasthateconomicdevelopment
ofthisinstruction
cal conclusion
againstsubversion.As the
werethebestguarantees
socialprogress
ideolLiisa North(1966:53) observed,"thenewmilitary
sociologist
so
ofsocialandeconomicconditions
ogyproposestheimprovement
groupscan
thatthegrievanceson thebasis of whichrevolutionary
obtainsupportwillbe eliminated."
The1968coupwasonlythelastofa seriesofpoliticalinterventions
milestonesin its ideological
by the army,whichalso constituted
evolutiontowarda "reformist"
conception.In 1962thearmytook
VictorRaul Haya de la
powerin orderto preventpresident-elect
Torrefromassumingoffice.(Since 1932,the yearof the APRA's
Haya
inthecityofTrujillo,
thearmedforceshadconsidered
uprising
de la Torre'spartythe"historical
enemy.")Duringtheshortduration
ofthemilitary
itwas confronted
withthelargest
regime(1962-1963)
intheVallede
history,
masscampesinomovement
inrecentPeruvian
ofthepoliceandthemilitary
la Convenci6n.Combinedintervention
anddestroying
campesinounionsand
succeededin crushing
finally
militiasdirectedby the MarxistHugo Blanco. Aftertheelectoral
thecandidatesupportedby the
victoryin 1963of BelauindeTerry,
fromthepoliticalscene,onlyto
military,
thearmedforcesretired
in 1965to confront
order:the
return
a newdangerto theestablished
ruralguerrillas
of the Movimiento
de la IzquierdaRevolucionaria
oftheRevolutionary
Left-MIR), a Marxistbreakaway
(Movement
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
35
from
theAPRA ledbyLuis de la PuenteUceda, andtheEjercitode
Liberaci6nNacional(ArmyofNationalLiberation-ELN), a dissidentcommunist
grouplead by HectorBejar.Thejointchiefsofstaff
to suspendtheconstitution
ofthearmedforcesforcedthepresident
andgrantbroadpowerstothearmyunderthecommandof Generals
JuanVelascoAlvaradoandJorgeFernandezMaldonado(twofuture
operationsucleadersof the 1968junta). This counterinsurgency
ceeded in physicallycrushingthe guerrillasand theircampesino
sympathizers.
significantly
contributed
In militaiy
circles,thesetwoexperiences
theconclusionsdrawnfromtheCAEM seminars:
to strengthening
socialreforms,
and themodernization
onlyeconomicdevelopment,
ofproduction
couldprevent
threats
totheestablished
oftherelations
socialpeace
ofrevolutionary
fociandguarantee
orderandresurgence
General
minister
In thewordsoftheforeign
and"nationalsecurity."
in a speechbeforetheUnitedNationsin
EdgardoMercadoJarrin,
1969:
September
The concepts of well-being,development,and securityarefirmlyand
directlyrelated,giventhatthemiseryand exploitationthatexistat the
base of underdevelopednationsfan an explosivesituationwhose conto dramatizeherewvithexcessive words[cited
sequences I do not wvant
in Cotler,1969:12].
thescandalof the Act of Talara (the
Underthecircumstances,
andthe
Terrygovernment
reachedbetweentheBelautnde
agreement
incredible
Petroleum
International
Company(IPC), whichcontained
company)was simplythe imconcessionsto the U.S. petroleum
takeover
in1968.Ofcourse,nationalism
mediatecauseofthemilitary
was fromthe outset one of the centralpolitical axes of the
oftheIPC
junta,whichmovedfromtheexpropriation
semipopulist
(therefinery
of Talara,etc.) to a seriesof protectionist
properties
of a 200-milelimitforterritorial
measures(suchas thedeclaration
nationalizations
(suchas Cerrode Pasco).
waters)andfurther
ofthesenationalist
measures
thecombinedeffects
Nevertheless,
it
inquestionbutonlyreformulated
didnotplace Peru'sdependency
in termsmorefavorableto the Peruvianbourgeoisie.Thus, in a
and
oftheIPC, petroleum
agreements
parallelto thenationalization
concessionswere signedwitha seriesof otherNorthAmerican
British
Corporation,
transnational
companies:OccidentalPetroleum
36
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Petroleum,
Belco Petroleum,
GettyOil,StandardOilofIndiana,and
others.In an articleentitled"Oil: Boom intheAndes,"Newssweek
pointedoutthat
"although Peru's m1ilitary
regime expropriatedIniternationalPetrcoleumn. . General JuantVelasco . . is opening up the countryto
foreigndrills. . . For the moment,at least, all threecouintries
[Peru,
Ecuado,; and Colombial seem inclinedto give thepriorityto oil productionratherthannsationtalist
fervor"[ Newsweek, October18,1971].
Foranother
in1969thePeruvianmilitary
government
signed
thing,
a contractwithSouthernPeru Copperforthe exploitation
of the
Cuajonedeposits,amongtherichestintheworld.Copper,itshould
be noted,is one of Peru's principalexports($234 millionin 1969
comparedwith$10.9millionforpetroleum).
byVelascoAlvarado,president
Diverseandrepeateddeclarations
ofthejunta,clearlydemonstrated
thelimitsofPeruviannationalism
Ina speech
ofdependency.
anditsfearofdisrupting
theglobalsystem
on July28, 1968,thegeneralsaid,
ica requiresforeign1
capital. But thiscapiDevelopmlenit
in1LatiniAm1er
tal does notcomnehereforphilantthropic
reasons. It comesfor itsown
witha muttual
interestthatshould
initerests.
Weare dealing, therefore,
be m1acnaged
in a manntier
that is clear and just for the benefitof both
parties.
oftheUnited
Thismoderation
explains,inturn,whytheauthorities
of military
the development
Statescontemplated
regimeslike the
to President
Nixonin1970,NelsonRockefelPeruvian.In hisreport
lerwrote,
A newvtype of rnilita,-y
is arising which often becomes a poweiful factor
of social evolutioniin the American republics. This new military,
motivated bv tl growing impatienice with corruption, inefficiency,anid
thestagnationiofthepoliticalorde,;proposes toadapt itsauthoritarian
to the enidsof social an1deconomnic
traditioni
progress.
undertaken
by thejunta,unAmongthe social transformations
themostimportant
was theagrarianreform.
By limiting
doubtedly
ruralholdingsto 200 hectareson thecoast and 165hectaresin the
eliminated
the socioeconomic
government
highlands,the military
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
37
at thesametime,through
the
of theold ruraloligarchy;
foundation
(agrariandebtbondshad to be investedin
systemofcompensation
hacendadosto becomeindusitobligedtheexpropriated
industry),
trialcapitalists(Quijano, 1970:15). The preambleto the law em"social
asidefrom
reform,
phasizedthattheobjectivesoftheagrarian
ina decisivewaytothe
justiceintheruralworld,"weretocontribute
marketand to generatethe capital
of a broad intermal
formation
One can add
ofthecountry.
necessaryfortherapidindustrialization
expressed
to thesesocioeconomicobjectivesa politicaldimension,
andminister
by GeneralErnestoMontagneSanchez,primeminister
law is an obstacleto
ofwar,on July19,1969:"theagrarianreform
It is stilltoo earlyto tellifthePerutheadvanceof communism."
as the mostradicalof
whichis represented
vian agrarianreform,
thoseimposed"fromabove" (as opposedto thoseimposed"from
below" by thecampesinos,as in Mexicoand Bolivia),willachieve
itsobjectives.
toa certainextentas a newtype
functioned
The Peruvianmilitary
its"centralcommitwithitsuniformed
"militants,"
ofpoliticalparty,
assemblyof the threeservices),its various
tee" (the hierarchical
and so on. However,itcouldnot
ideologicalwingsand tendencies,
performall the tasks of a political apparatus: mobilization/
ofthepopularmasses,and so forth.
neutralization
and containment
the
capableofreplacing
Thus,ithad to acquirecivilianinstruments
or of competing
labororganizations
politicalpartiesor traditional
del
de TrabajadoresRevolucionarios
withthem:theConfederacion
ofPeru-CTR P).
Workers
Peru(theConfederation
ofRevolutionary
Labo-r
the MovimientoLaboristaRevolucionario(Revolutionary
among
Movement-MLR, activein the1968Peruvianrevolution),
was the Sistema
of theseinstitutions
others.The mostimportant
Nacionalde Apoyoa la MovilizacionSocial (NationalSystemof
SupportforSocial Mobilization-SINAMOS), createdin 1971and
regions.
to the military
dividedintoeightregionscorresponding
was also chiefofS IN AMOS.
commander
withinwhichthemilitary
ofthe
was to ensurethecontainment
The purposeof thisstructure
populationon a local basis (farms,shantytowns,barrios)and to
theunions,peasantleagues,andotherpopularassociations
integrate
intothestateapparatus.
But in realitythe Velasco Alvaradoregimedid not succeed in
a realpopularmobilizagaininga broadsocialbase or inpromoting
coup in 1975.The newmilitary
bya military
tion,beingoverthrown
38
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
junta,underGeneralFrancisoMoralesBermuidez,
putan endtothe
in Peruand adopteda proimperialist
semipopulist
experiment
oriwithpopulardiscontent,it opted to proentation.Confronted
reestablish
civiliangovernment
gressively
withtheconvocation
ofa
electionin 1980.The
constituent
assemblyin1977anda presidential
in thepresidential
contestof BelauindeTerry(thesameexvictory
whohadbeenoverthrown
president
by Velascoin1968)signaledthe
to
of
the
return government
traditional
bourgeoispoliticalforcesthat
ofthearmedforces
hadbeendisplayedbythemilitary
andthereturn
their
"constitutional"
role
of
of
the
order.It
to
established
guarantors
is interesting
that,in contrastto the situationin Argentina
and
Bolivia,Peruvianmilitary
semipopulism
didnotmakea deepimpressionon thepopularandlabormovement.
CONCLUSION
The experienceofNicaraguain 1978-1979,
following
thatofCuba
duringthe1950s,appearsto suggestthat,at leastin thecase ofthe
moretraditional
military
dictatorships,
veryfew military
cadres,
ina situation
finding
themselves
ofrevolutionary
crisis,crossoverto
thepopularcamp:themilitary
apparatuscontinuesto function
right
uptoitsowndestruction
as analmostmonolithic
repressive
machine.
Thisdoes notmeanthatthearmedforcesand theirofficer
corps
immune
totheideological
alwaysremain
crisisthatbesetsestablished
ideological
apparatuses
(thechurch,
theuniversities,
etc.)orpolitical
apparatuses(mass parties,etc). It is probable,however,thatsuch
crisestakeradicalformsonlyinlimitedand marginal
sectorsofthe
military
hierarchy.
Themajority
ofcareerofficers
willcontinue,
inthe
foreseeablefuture,
to choose amongmilitary
semipopulism,
partial
from
retreat
thepoliticalscene,andtheinstitution
ofa predominantly
coercivestate(orsomecombination
ofthesethreemodels,as seenin
Argentina
in 1974-1976).
It is difficult
to determine
whetherthisreduction
of therangeof
politicalchoicesfortheLatinAmericanarmedforcesand theirpredilection
forthemoreauthoritarian
aretheresultofsocial
alternatives
factors(theclass originsoftheofficer
corps),economic-corporative
factors("caste privileges"),or ideologicalfactors(systematic
authoritarian
andanticommunist
conservatism
intheformation
ofmili-
Lowy,Sader / MILITARIZATION OF THE STATE
39
tarypersonnel).
Surelyitis a fusionofthesevariousfactors.Itseems
probablethatthearmedforceswillcontinueto serveas guardians
of
theestablished
order,modernizers,
reformers,
and,aboveall,agents
of repression.The presentpolicyof U.S. imperialism,
underthe
Reagan administration,
openlyfavorsthe mostauthoritarian
and
antipopular
varietiesofmilitary
statesinLatinAmerica,whether
of
traditional
(CentralAmerica)or modem form(SouthernCone),
themwiththebroadestpossibleeconomic,diplomatic,
providing
and
assistance.
military
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