Roman Szul
University of Warsaw,
Centre for European Regional and Local Studies,
Ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 26/28
00-927 Warsaw, Poland
[email protected]
Scottish and Catalan Independence Tendencies in the Broader European
(after 1989) Comparative Perspective
1. Independence/secessions – introductory remarks
Emergence of new states (independence, secession) out of old ones is as old phenomenon
as the political history of the world. Each case of secession differs from others, however, there
can be distinguished some common elements: existence of leaders (actors of secessionist
movements), ideas (driving for separation), declaration of independence, internal acceptance
of independence (by politically decisive active part of the population of the area aiming at
independence), external acceptance (by other states), geopolitical circumstances (which made
that the state from which a new state seceded was not able or not willing to stop the
secession), solving practical problems resulting from the secession (e.g. division of rights and
duties between the old and the new state(s), delimitation and demarcation of borders, crossborder movement, etc). In the process of secession usually third parties are involved –
external forces which encourage or discourage independence movements or settle conditions
for external recognition of new states.
In most cases emergence of new states is a by-product (and catalyst) of larger geopolitical
changes. Without going too far in the history and geography, one may mention some waves of
emergence of new states in the 19th, 20th and 21st century Europe. In the 19th century,
especially in its latter half, weakening of the Ottoman Empire gave rise to several states in
south-eastern Europe: Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania. Independence of
Norway (after dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union) can be attributed to the then
mood in Europe when many small ethnic groups aimed at becoming independent states. The
“geopolitical earthquake” of the first world war and the resulting disappearance of the
Hapsburg (Austro-Hungarian) empire, revolution and civil war in the Russian Empire and
weakness of Germany produced a series of new states (and changes of borders of several
existing ones): Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (in the western fringe of the Russian
Empire), Poland (encompassing territories earlier belonging to Russia, Austria and Germany),
Czechoslovakia (from Austria-Hungary), Hungary and Austria (practically new states after
the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and emergence of other states), Albania (existence of
Albania as independent state before the first world war is rather problematic) and Yugoslavia
(practically a new state after unification of Serbia with territories previously belonging to
Austria-Hungary). Also independence of the Republic of Ireland can be attributed to results of
the first world war when the British Empire lost ability or will to stop independence
movement in Ireland. Besides, Island (in 1918) followed suit of Norway and declared
independence (from Denmark). The second world war, quite surprisingly, did not brought
about many new states in Europe. The only example is the creation of the German Democratic
Republic from the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. (Forced independence of Austria was
restitution of the pre-war situation, and the Federal Republic of Germany can be regarded as
continuation of pre-war Germany). On the contrary, the second word war reduced the number
of states (annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union) and limited
independence of several states (especially in central-eastern Europe). The process of
decolonisation in Europe gave independence to two states on Europe’s Mediterranean fringe:
Malta and Cyprus. The last big wave of emergence of new sates in Europe was related to the
end of the cold war and disintegration of three federative states in central and eastern Europe:
USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Then appeared: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldavia (plus de facto existing Pridniestrovian Republic) and Russia (out of the
USSR),
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia (or FYROM), SerbiaMontenegro, then separate states Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo (without full
international recognition) (out of Yugoslavia) and the Czech Republic and Slovakia (after
dissolution of Czechoslovakia). The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 has been accompanied by three
declarations of independence: of the Republic of Crimea (its only aim was to get free from
Ukraine and to ask Russia for incorporation) and the two “people’s republics” of Donetsk and
Lugansk, not recognised by any state, including Russia.
In Western Europe no new independent state emerged after the second word war. Instead,
there have been centrifugal tendencies in several regions leading to decentralisation of some
states. The most outstanding examples of this tendency are the Scottish (and Welsh)
movements in the UK (leading to the devolution in 1999), Catalonian, Basque and some other
regionalist/nationalist movements in Spain (resulting in transforming Spain into a quasifederative state after the end of Franco’s regime) and the Flemish nationalism (which has
transformed Belgium into a federation in 1993).
In September 2014 in Scotland referendum on independence is due to be held. In Catalonia
political leaders of this region declare desire to organise a similar referendum, although,
unlike the Scottish referendum, it would be illegal given the lack of consent from central
Spanish authorities. It would be interesting to compare the Scottish and Catalan independence
movements to recent cases of independence movements and emergence of independent states
in Europe. The selected cases are developments after 1989 in Belgium and in the three former
federations in central and eastern Europe: the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
2. Belgium – incomplete independence of Flanders
There are many factors behind Flemish identity and nationalism 1 – a separate language
(different from French, the language of the rest of the state and once the only official language
of the state), a separate culture, feeling of previous political, cultural and economic inferiority
and present economic strength being source of pride mobilising for striving for greater
autonomy or independence. Indeed, many of the present independent states in Europe, even
members of the EU, lack such a strong identity, let alone economic strength. Why, then,
Flanders has not become one of new independent states and the process of “breaking out” of
Flanders from Belgium stopped at transforming Belgium into a federative state? For sure,
there are several reasons, but it seems that two of them are decisive: Brussels and
international circumstances.
Brussels, the capital city of Belgium, is a predominantly French-speaking city surrounded
by Flemish-speaking areas. Despite the fact that it is mostly francophone area and despite the
fact that it is a separate administrative unit in the Belgian federation, it is cultural and
administrative centre of Flanders (central offices of the Region of Flanders and Flemish
Community are located in Brussels) and plays a very important symbolic role for the Flemish
people. As a result possible independent Flanders can not absorb Brussels (it is too big and
too French) and can not abandon it (it is too important, also due to its location). Flanders and
1
There exists an abundant literature on Flemish regionalism/nationalism and on transformation of Belgium from
a unitary state into federation. See e.g. a detailed study by Anna Jassem-Staniecka (Jassem-Staniecka 2012), see
also Swenden 2006, Swennen 1999, Pavy 1999
its counterpart Wallonia look like Siamese twins with common heart and head. (It is not a
problem for Wallonia as it does not aim for separation from Belgium). Another reason why
Flanders can not become independent state are international circumstances, including the role
of Brussels for the European Union and for NATO. These organisations would leave Brussels
in the case of problems resulting from division of Belgium and uncertainty around the status
of Brussels. The threat of losing headquarters of these organisation plus international
persuasion not to divide Belgium is a strong discouragement for Flemish independence.
In such a way Belgium (unlike Czechoslovakia, otherwise closely observed by Belgians in
the early 1990s) can not split into two separate state. What the Flemish independence
movement can do and is doing is a “creeping independence” or “carving out” of Belgium –
getting more and more cultural, economic and political autonomy for Flanders without
declaration of independence and without dramatic changes of the status of Brussels. This
strategy – negotiated still stronger autonomy – has been adopted until recently by Scottish and
Catalan movements. Given that Scotland and the rest of the UK are not connected by such a
Gordian knot like Brussels, and given that external (including all-British) circumstances are
much more favourable for Scottish independence, much more depends on Scots themselves.
In the case of Catalonia in the present international and Spanish conditions the Flemish-like
attitude seems to the most probable.
3. The split of Czechoslovakia against the will of its peoples
The split of Czechoslovakia into two states – Czechia (Czech Republic) and Slovakia is in
the modern world a unique case of division of a state without direct approval of this act by its
citizens in referendum2. The decision to split the state was confirmed by the parliament while
opinion polls showed that a clear majority in the whole state and in each of its two main parts
was against it. This split is also an example of peaceful negotiated separation of two nations
that can serve as a model for others, including for the English (British) and Scots as well for
Spaniards and Catalans.
In order to present circumstances of the split of Czechoslovakia it is necessary to describe
the main characteristics of its history and internal composition. Czechoslovakia was
established after the first world war out of territories belonging to Austria (Czech lands) and
Hungary (Slovakia). It was a unitary state, however with clearly defined border between
Czech lands and Slovakia, and with two varieties of the “Czechoslovak” language as the
official language – the Czech language in the Czech lands and the Slovak language in
Slovakia. The Slovak standard language, established in the 19th century, was strongly
influenced by the Czech language to the extent that there is almost full intelligibility between
the two standard varieties. The capital city was Prague, located in the heart of Czech lands.
Czechoslovakia was first divided shortly before the second world war by external forces –
Czech lands became German protectorate and Slovakia formally independent state, in practice
strongly dependent on Germany. After the second world war Czechoslovakia was re-unified
and in 1968 transformed into an asymmetric federation: Slovakia obtained autonomous
government and parliament. (In such a way Czechoslovakia resembled the present situation in
the UK).
After the fall of communism in 1989 Czechoslovakia was transformed in 1990 into a
symmetrical federation (and its official name changed into “Czech and Slovak Federal
2
The role of politicians as the main driving force of the split of Czechoslovakia and negative attitude to it by
most citizens is underlined by most observers, see for instance a book by a Polish author Pawel Ukielski
(Ukielski 2007) and an article by a Belgian author Hubert Rossel (Rossel 1997). The latter is both an in-depth
analysis of the split of Czechoslovakia and of disintegration tendencies in Belgium. It is also an evidence that the
processes of disintegration of Czechoslovakia were closely observed in Belgium.
Republic, its short name was Ceskoslovensko in the Czech Republic and Cesko-Slovensko or
“Czechia-Slovakia” in Slovakia). It should be added that the asymmetry was one of source of
dissatisfaction among Czechs with the organisation of the common state: many institutions
apart from their all-national headquarters in Prague had their branches in Bratislava for
Slovakia). Among Slovaks there emerged desire for greater autonomy and greater
international visibility of Slovakia, without dividing the common state. At the same time
there appeared differences in socio-economic preferences of inhabitants of the two parts of the
state: while Czechs preferred free market economic policy, Slovaks preferred socially
oriented economic policy. There was no common party, the main parties were active only in
one part of the state. Besides, there appeared strong and ambitious political leaders – Vaclav
Klaus in the Czech Republic (leader of ODS – Civic Democratic Party) and Vladimir Meciar
in Slovakia (leader of HZDS – Movement for Democratic Slovakia). Given that the two
leaders (having together majority in the Czechoslovak parliament) could not reach agreement
as to the organisation of the state and economic policy, they decided to split the state into two
separate states.
Given that the idea of separation was rejected by majority of Czechs and Slovaks, its
proponents decided not to organise a referendum and to confirm it by the parliament (by a
simple majority voting) where the two parties (ODS and HZDS) had a majority. To soften
social opposition to this idea proponents of the separation promised that would not affect
everyday life of Czech and Slovaks. To do that the split of Czechoslovakia (January 1 st, 1993)
was negotiated and all problems were solved. For instance, liabilities and duties of the
common state were divided in proportion 2 : 1 (in accordance to the proportion of inhabitants:
10 million Czechs and 5 million Slovaks), citizens in each new state would be treated as
domestic citizens in the other country (what regards labour market, insurance, education etc.).
Among other things, languages (Czech and Slovak) were treated as fully comprehensible:
students from one country can be admitted in the other country without presenting evidence of
proficiency in language of this country, and theses can be written in any of the two languages.
Besides, proponents of the split promised that the cross-border movement would be free.
Due to these promises and negotiations, social dissatisfaction with the split did not turn into
open opposition, and on November 25, 1992, Federal Assembly (parliament) voted
dissolution the federation due to December 31, 1992. The split of Czechoslovakia passed
through in the third voting, as in the two first ones some members of the governing parties
voted together with the opposition against the it.
Functioning of the two states after the split, with small exceptions, has been in conformity
with the negotiated terms of separation. The main exception was introduction of the border
control on the common border shortly after the separation to stop smuggling and illegal
immigration from third countries. (On one of the newly established border crossing check
points on November 1993 died in a road accident minister of foreign affairs of Slovakia,
Roman Zelenay, one the most active proponents of the split). This control was lifted a few
years later. Now both countries belong to the main Western organisations – NATO and the
EU (and Schengen area of free cross-border movement). However, they differ in some
respects, for instance Slovakia since 2009 is member of the eurozone while the Czech
Republic isn’t, and together with the UK belong to the strongest eurosceptics in the EU.
The smooth, peaceful (“velvet”) dissolution of Czechoslovakia was possible, among other
things, to the lack of insurmountable obstacles, unlike in Belgium: there is no problem of
capital city, no language problem and no language minorities, no border problem; besides
there is no hostility between Czech and Slovaks.
The case of Czechoslovakia reveals striking similarities to the case of the UK. The
asymmetric Czechoslovak federation resembles the present organisation of the UK after
devolution, the role of the Czech lands (richer, bigger, without its own institutions) in
Czechoslovakia is similar to the role of England in the UK, and that of Slovakia (poorer,
smaller, with its own autonomous institutions) is similar to that of Scotland; the role of Prague
is similar to the role of London, and that of Bratislava resembles the role of Edinburgh, even
the language situation is roughly similar, Scotland, like Slovakia in the early 1990s, wants to
be more visible internationally. The main difference is the attitude of the main political forces
in Scotland and the UK towards the referendum on Scottish independence.
As regards comparison between Czechoslovakia and Spain (Catalonia) there are more
differences than similarities: Catalonia is neither “Slovakia” (the poorer part of the common
state) nor “Czechia” (the bigger and dominant part of the common state); despite the fact that
intralingusitic differences between Catalan and Castilian (Spanish) are not much bigger than
those between Slovak and Czech, socio-political and psychological language situation in
Spain and Czechoslovakia differ considerably (for instance in Slovakia there was never a
problem of elimination of Czech and promotion of Slovak in the public life). The main
difference is, however, attitude central authorities of Spain and Czechoslovakia to the idea of
secession of a part of the state. International circumstances also differ: Czechoslovakia in
1992 was not member of the EU and was less dependent on EU’s opinion, successor states did
not need to renegotiate their EU memberships, while Catalonia would have to negotiate its EU
membership, including with Spain.
4. Disintegration of Yugoslavia:
negotiations and wars
declarations
of
independence,
referenda,
Disintegration of Yugoslavia took place in a long period between 1991 (declaration of
independence by Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia) and 2008 (declaration of independence by
Kosovo) 3 . As a result seven new states emerged: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, BosniaHerzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia. All these countries, except Kosovo, used to be
“republics” or members of the Yugoslav federation, while Kosovo was autonomous region
within Serbia. Each case of secession was different from others, but there were some common
elements: declaration of independence by republican parliaments (the first two declarations by
Slovenia and Croatia from June 26, 1991, were suspended for three months for negotiations
with other republics and Yugoslav authorities), referenda on independence (in some cases,
like in Slovenia and Croatia, referenda preceded declaration of independence, in Slovenia it
took place on December 23, 1990, in Croatia on May 19, 1991), negotiations with other
Yugoslav partners sometimes accompanied by wars – internal (within the newly established
states between proponents and opponents of independence usually coincident with various
ethnic groups) and external (between local military forces and the Yugoslav/Serbian army).
Intensity of military conflicts differed considerably – the worst wars accompanied declaration
of independence by Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and preceded independence of Kosovo.
Slovenia and Macedonia avoided large-scale conflicts (in Macedonia the conflict was between
Macedonian army or police and Albanian separatists), independence of Montenegro from the
Federation of Serbia-Montenegro in 2006 was peaceful and negotiated.
As regards referenda, it should be stressed that the first ones – in Slovenia and Croatia were not very clear. The wording of them did not exclude existence of Yugoslavia as a loose
confederation in which republican laws would prevail over laws of the confederation. (As a
matter of fact since the death of president Broz Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia was practically a
confederation). Therefore successes of referenda on independence can be to some extent
attributed to their wording acceptable for both proponents of full separation from Yugoslavia
and for a new Yugoslavia. Interesting was the referendum on independence of Montenegro
3
The break-up of Yugoslavia is subject of many detailed analysis, see e.g.: Mesić 2004, Jović 2009, Radan 2002
held under auspices of the European Union. The EU declared that it would recognize
independence of Montenegro if more than 55% (not 50%) would vote for independence. The
result was 56,3%. This referendum was also the only one whose proclamation was negotiated
by parties concerned: the Republic of Montenegro, Federation of Serbia-Montenegro (in
practice Serbia) and the EU. Other referenda were held without previous consent by higher
authorities (of Yugoslavia or respective republic in the case of the many local referenda on
independence or secession from the given republic). Serbia became a separate state “by
default”, after abandoning of Yugoslavia by other republics.
Negotiations seldom concerned technicalities like those accompanying the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia. They often regarded issues of peace and war, suspension or reactivation of
declaration of independence, etc. They were irregular and carried out in tense political
atmosphere, often via intermediaries (like the unsuccessful negotiations between Serbia and
Kosovo). Declarations of independence never depended on successful negotiations even
though international community required agreement between the two parties as prerequisite
for recognition of a new state, as it was the case with Kosovo. Kosovo declared independence
without previous agreement with Serbia, despite this many countries recognised independence
of Kosovo.
Disintegration of Yugoslavia strongly depended on international circumstances. The fall
socialism (communism) in Central-Eastern Europe, starting from Poland, in 1989 encouraged
opponents of the political system in Yugoslavia (including from among the governing League
of Communists of Yugoslavia) to change the political system. The then anti-systemic forces
entailed democrats and nationalists (demanding more rights for their respective republics
and/or ethnic groups). In 1990 in all Yugoslav republics democratic elections were held which
in most republics gave power to forces aiming at dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the new, postcold war geopolitical situation, strong united Yugoslavia was no longer a prerequisite for
political stability in Europe. Some European countries started to look for friends and partners
in Yugoslav republics. This situation encouraged, first Slovenia and Croatia, traditionally
being in the zone of cultural and political influences of Austria and Germany, to declare
independence. The external (international) factor became again very important in the latter
phase of disintegration of Yugoslavia when international military forces (e.g. bombardments
of Serbia by NATO in 1999) and diplomats tried to stop hostilities and put an order to the
process of emerging new states.
When comparing independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia with those in former
Yugoslav republics, the only common thing is referendum. In all cases referendum is (was)
regarded as indispensable confirmation of the will of the respective people for independence.
What is different, however, between the Scottish referendum and most Yugoslav referenda
(except the Montenegrin one) is that holding the Scottish referendum received consent by the
higher (British) authorities. If Catalonia organises its independence referendum without
consent of Spanish authorities, it would be similar to referenda in Slovenia and Croatia in
1990 and 1991. Different are international circumstances: external involvement was
conducive for secession of the first republics from the Yugoslav federation and then was
engaged to stop wars and settle disputes resulting from secessions of consecutive territories
while in the case of Scotland and Catalonia one can hardly expect any encouragement and
direct intervention.
5. Disintegration of the Soviet Union – declarations, referenda and ambiguity
The word which best characterises the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union in
1990-1991 is “ambiguity” – ambiguity over legal and political meaning of such terms like
“sovereignty”, “independence”, “Soviet Union”, “Community of Independent States”, etc.
In the moment of its disintegration the Soviet Union was a federation 4. After the Bolshevik
revolution in Russia (1917-1920) and the loss of its western fringes, the Russian Empire was
transformed into a communist and federative state called Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics. Members of the federation were “Soviet republics”, besides there were
“autonomous republics”, ethnic districts and “oblasts” (ordinary territorial units without
autonomy) as parts of respective Soviet republics. Status and territory of individual
“republics” theoretically depended on existence of respective ethnic nations, but in practice
they highly depended on political calculations and manipulations of Soviet authorities and
were changing. During the second world war territory of the USSR was enlarged – some of
the new territories became “republics” (others were only “oblasts”): Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Karelia (former territory of Finland) became “Soviet republics (later on Karelia lost its
status and was downgraded to the status of “autonomous republic” of the Russian Federation),
Tuva (between the USSR and Mongolia) and Moldavia (former territory of Romania) became
“autonomous republics” (later on Moldavia, originally a part of the Ukrainian republic, was
advanced to the status of “Soviet republic”). Theoretically, Soviet republics were
independent states voluntarily integrated with others into the USSR and had the right for
secession. In practice, for the lack of defined legal procedure of quitting the USSR and given
the centralist nature of the communist USSR, federative nature of the USSR was only
nominal. It should be stressed that the USSR was in a sense a asymmetric federation – the
biggest republic – the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (also called “Russian
Federation”) was lacking some elements of power existing in other republics – first of all a
republican branch of the Communist Party, republican branch of the Academy of Sciences,
etc., and an own capital city (Russian Federation was “sharing’ Moscow the USRR)
In the second half of the 1980s, during the famous reformist movement known as
perestroika and glasnost, centrifugal tendencies in non-Russian republics as well as
dissatisfaction in Russia proper started to dominate the political life of the USSR. They
accelerated in 1990, encouraged by reforms and collapse of communist/socialist regimes in
Central-Eastern Europe without any involvement of the USSR (in 1953 and 1968 the USSR
militarily intervened to defend socialism in Hungary and Czechoslovakia). Republican
institutions (branches of the Communist Party, parliaments, etc) in several republics started to
be more interested in getting more autonomy from the USSR than in saving it. There also
emerged grass-root organisations demanding first more cultural and linguistic autonomy, then
political independence for their republics or ethnic groups. Centrifugal tendencies occurred
also at regional level, even among “oblasts”. Many territorial units, republics and oblasts,
declared “sovereignty”. This period is called in Russian parad suverenitetov or “parade of
sovereignties”. It was not clear whether “sovereignty” meant full independence and
abandoning the USSR or simply a step towards a grater autonomy within the USSR. To stop
the process of disintegration of the USSR and to reform it, in December 1990 the Soviet
parliament decided to organise referendum on “safeguarding and reforming of the USSR”. It
was held on March 19, 1991. The wording of the referendum added to the general ambiguity.
The question was: do you want to retain the Soviet Union as a renewed federation of having
equal rights, sovereign republics…”. The referendum was officially not organised in several
republics decided to quit the USSR (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Armenia and
Georgia). In other republics overwhelming majority voted for safeguarding of the USSR. A
few months later this referendum was meaningless. Following suit of other republics, also
4
This issue has been analysed by many observers. One of the best is Ukrainian-Polish-American scholar Roman
Szporluk who dedicated many of his works to the history of the Russian Empire and disintegration of the USSR
(Szporluk 2000). A concise (ten pages) but very well informed analysis of causes and process of disintegration
of the USSR and establishment of the “Commonwealth of Impossible States” (as he calls the Commonwealth or
Community of Independent States) is presented by Manuel Castells (Castells 2004, 35-45)
Russian Federation established institution of President of the Republic. After democratic
elections this position was occupied by a popular and ambitious politician Boris Yeltsin.
Competition between him and the president of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev turn out to be
lethal for the USSR. On December 6, 1991 three men – president of Russia Boris Yeltsin,
president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk and president of Belarus (in fact chairmen of the
parliament) Stanislav Shushkevich in a meeting in a forest (Byalovyezha forest in Belarus,
near Polish border) declared dissolution of the Soviet Union. (A few days later Gorbachev
resign as president of the USSR, and the USSR officially ceased existing on December 31,
1991). At the same time they declared establishment of the “Community of Independent
States” (CIS). Later on all but the three Baltic republics joint the Russia-centred CIS. For
some people “sovereignty” of their republics and the “Byalovyezha declaration” meant full
independence of their republics and end of the USSR, for others “sovereignty” meant more
autonomy and CIS the that renewed USSR promised by the March 1991 referendum.
Relatively least ambiguity was in the three Baltic states: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In
1988 Estonian parliament declared “sovereignty” thus triggering out the “parade of
sovereignties”, in March 1991 a strong majority confirms independence in a referendum, on
August 20, 1991, Estonia declares independence. On June 28, 1990 Latvian parliament
declared “sovereignty”, on May 4, 1990 it declared restitution of independence which was
confirmed by a overwhelming majority in referendum on March 17, 1991, to complete the
process on August 21, 1991 Latvia declared its withdrawal from the USSR. The first to
declare independence, without previous declaration of sovereignty, and without confirmation
of it by a referendum, was Lithuania (March 11, 1990). These three states rejected the
proposal to join the CIS, and started reforms leading to their integration with the EU and
NATO. Here, however, ambiguity also exited. Many of those who supported independence of
Estonia or Latvia in referenda did not suspect that they (as non-speakers of Estonian or
Latvian) would be denied citizenship of those states. Independence process of those countries
was unilateral in the sense that neither declarations of sovereignty or independence nor
referenda were previously negotiated with the USSR or other Soviet republics. The first
reaction of the USSR to declaration of independence by these republics was hostile –
economic blockade of Lithuania and military intervention in Vilnius in January 1991 (14
peoples on the Lithuania side were killed). Finally the USSR recognized their independence
on September 6, 1991, shortly before its dissolution.
More ambiguous in practice was the independence process in Ukraine. Ukraine (its
parliament) declared independence on August 24 1991 which was confirmed by referendum
on December 1, 1991. In all regions of Ukraine, including Crimea and city of Sevastopol,
majority of participants supported declaration of independence (the least support was in
Crimea – 54%, in 19 out of 26 regions the support exceeded 90%). The ambiguity concerns
understanding of words “Ukraine”, “independence” and “Community of Independent States”.
For some inhabitants of Ukraine, especially from its western, Ukrainian-speaking regions,
Ukraine was a separate country, for some others, especially from Russian-speaking eastern
regions, Ukraine was a kind Russian region (etymologically the word “Ukraina” in old Polish
and Russian meant “periphery” or “border area”). For some Ukrainians CIS was a
meaningless organisation, for some others it was continuation of the Soviet Union. This
ambiguity allowed most Ukrainians accept Ukraine as their own country.
The situation dramatically changed by the end of 2013 when some Ukrainians rejected
integration of their country with Russia-led Eurasian Community, and others rejected its
integration with the European Community and decided that Ukraine was no longer their own
state. The legally existing parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, encouraged by
Russia and with presence of Russian troops (or, if you like local self-defence formations in
Russian uniforms), on March 6, 2014 declared independence from Ukraine and accession to
Russia, this act was confirmed in a referendum held ten days later, and on March 21 Russian
parliament and president approved incorporation of Crimea. According to the Ukrainian
interpretation, the referendum and declaration of independence of Crimea, and then its
incorporation by Russia, are illegal. Ukraine also does not recognise legality of declarations of
independence and independence referenda in its two eastern regions Donetsk and Luhansk.
The present crisis in Ukraine can be regarded as a follow-up of disintegration of the Soviet
Union and washing out of ambiguities related to it. As regards the road for independence of
individual Soviet republics, it can be said that some of them broke away from the USSR (by
declaration of independence, preceded or not by declaration of sovereignty and confirmed or
not by referendum, all of them without previous negotiations and consent by the USSR),
others became independent “by default” after the disappearance of the USSR.
As regards similarities between independence/secession processes in Scotland and
Catalonia on the one hand, and in post-Soviet republics, conclusions will be similar to those
drawn from comparison of Scotland and Catalonia with post-Yugoslav republics: similar is
the role of referendum considered in Scotland, Catalonia and in some post-soviet republics
(but not in all of them) as indispensable stage in the getting independence. Common to
Catalonia (if it organises referendum without consent by central Spanish authorities) and
those ex-Soviet republics which did organised referendum, would be lack of previous
agreement between breaking-away republics/regions and central state authorities.
6. Conclusions
Above four cases of independence/separatism have been analysed as reference points for
comparison with Scotland and Catalonia. The case of Belgium is unique in that sense that the
centrifugal tendencies stopped at the stage of federation, without the split of the state.
Impossibility to solve the problem of capital city when dividing the common state and the
international environment were among reasons of preservation of Belgium. As regards the
problem of capital city, no such problem exists in the UK and Spain – Scotland and Catalonia
have well defined capital cities. More problematic is the international environment, especially
attitude of the EU for Scottish and especially Catalan independence. The case of
Czechoslovakia point out to two facts: the role of ambitious politicians that can divide the
state without consent of a majority of its citizens, and possibility of peaceful and smooth
division of the state without causing negative emotions provided that the process of separation
is negotiated and all details related to everyday life of inhabitants are taken into account. It
seems that Scotland (division of the UK) is nearer than Catalonia (division of Spain) to the
experience of Czechoslovakia, the difference is still the role of independence referendum
absent during the division of Czechoslovakia. The road to independence of some former
Soviet and Yugoslav republics reveal important similarities to Catalonia. The strongest
separatist tendencies in both states were among the best developed, culturally most
“Europeanised” and politically peripheral parts – in Yugoslavia these were Slovenia and
Croatia, and in the USSR Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Catalonia (together with the Basque
Country) occupies the same position in Spain. Another similarity is that independence
referenda in the above republics (except Lithuania where no referendum as held) and
Catalonia were (or will be) organised without previous consent of central authorities.
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