Politicus Journal
JOURNAL
VO LU M E 3 , I S S U E 2
SPRING
2 01 6
Staff
Co-Managing Editors
Alexandra Green & Emma Jones
Management Board
Editorial Board
Kate McNeil
Ryan Anderson
Daniel Cassese
Zoe Share
Nicole Bucik
Catherine Morrison
Julianna Doughty
Chris Caffrey
Kelley Humber
Daniel Adessky
Student Liaison
Jenna Carter
Shivani Gonzalez
Marketing Co-Directors
Eric Nicol
Workshops and Lectures
Coordinator
Copy Editors
Kate Clarke
Spencer Kalan
Crystal Lee
Finance Director
Layout Editor
Kole Renwick
Copyright © 2016 Politicus Journal. All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without the express written consent of
Politicus Journal. Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors
themselves and do not necessarily represent those of the editorial board, faculty
advisors, or Queen’s University.
www.politicusjournal.com
2
Politicus Journal
Table of Contents
Letter from the Editors
4
Friends with Benefits, or More?: How Churchill, imperialism
and identity define the Anglo-American Special Relationship
Caleb Hunter
5
Still laughing all the way to the Bank? : The Impact of the Global
Financial Crisis on the Anglo-American Special Relationship
Charles Pentland Editor’s Choice Award
David Orr
Don't Sleep on al-Qaeda: A Content Analysis of English Language
Jihadist Literature Targeted to the Anglosphere
Sam Koebrich
Nuclear Atlanticism: The US, The UK, & The Nuclear Bomb
Andrew Myers
The German Factor: Euro-American Relations in Post Cold War
Europe
Maddie Pace
3
19
38
57
69
Letter from the Editors
WewouldliketopresentthesecondissueofvolumethreeofPoliticusJournal.Thejournal
isatestamenttothecaliberofworksubmittedbyQueen’sUniversitystudents.Thisissue
providesanin-depthexplorationoftheUK-USspecialrelationship.Further,thisissue
wouldnotbepossiblewithoutthededicatedworkofProfessorHaglundandProfessor
VuceticwhoconstitutedtheReviewPanel.Theirenthusiasmforthisissueandstudent
researchwasinvaluablefordevelopingPoliticusJournal.WehopethatProfessorsand
studentsalikewillcontinuetocontributetotheacademiclegacyofPoliticus.
Furthermore,ourstudentEditorialBoardspentnumeroushourscriticallyanalysingthe
articlestoensurethehighacademicqualityandintegrityofPoliticus.ToRyan,Catherine,
Juliana,Chris,Zoe,Daniel,Kelley,Nicole,andKate,thankyousomuchforyourcritical
dedicationandrespectfulparticipation.
ToourManagementBoard,wecouldnothavepublishedthisissuewithoutyou.Fromthe
supportofourStudentLiaison,Daniel,whoprofessionallycoordinatedauthorsandmade
recommendationsforthebettermentofthejournal.Toourcopyandlayouteditors,
Spencer,Kate,andKole,whoworkedlonghourstoensurethatthejournalwaspolished–
weareeternallythankful.WearealsoindebtedtothemembersofourManagementBoard
notdirectlyinvolvedinthepublicationoftheissues,butwhoallowtheJournaltoinnovate
andstrivetobethebestitcanbe.Ourwonderfulmarketingteam,ShivaniandJenna,have
driveninnovationandkeptupfromcomplacency,whileourfinancialdirector,Crystal,has
reeledusinwhenwewantedtogoslightlytoobig.Thankyoualsotowonderfulworkshop
andlecturescoordinatorandfirstyearintern,Eric,foryourcreativityandpositivity.
Finally,wewouldliketothanktheArtsandScienceUndergraduateSocietyfortheir
dedicationtoourwork,andfortheirlogistical,operational,andfinancialsupport.Special
thanksareduetoKarimHafazalla,AndrewDiCapua,andBrandonJamieson.
Wewouldalsoliketothankeveryoneinvolved,whetherdirectlyornot,fortheopportunity
tooverseeawonderfulprojectsuchasthis.Wehavelearnedmanythingsinourroles,and
lookforwardtoapplyingourlessonsinfutureeditionsforthebettermentofthejournal.
Warmregards,
AlexandraGreen&EmmaJones
4
Politicus Journal
FRIENDS WITH BENEFITS, OR MORE? How Churchill, imperialism, and
identity define the Anglo-American Special Relationship
Caleb Hunter
The existence of an Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) is the source of much
contention and debate. Scholars have been unable to reach any consensus as to whether such a
relationship exists; furthermore, even AASR sympathizers have been unable to reach any
agreement as to what the source of the special relationship is. That said, perhaps the best way to
explain the AASR’s inception and continued existence is through Britain and America’s shared
experiences and identities. This paper will look to demonstrate that an AASR does exist and that
it originated with Winston Churchill, who acted as a role model and inspired America to pursue a
more expansionist foreign policy. While US expansionism clearly greatly differs from British
imperialism, America’s acceptance of expansionism, or an imperialism light, has strengthened
Anglo-American relations, as it has allowed both countries to identify themselves as expansionist
global superpowers during periods of history.
Introduction
The driving force behind the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR), assuming it
exists, has been attributed to various sources. Some have suggested that language has formed the
basis of the AASR, while others consider economics or nuclear sharing to be the ties that bind
together the relationship; however, imperialism seems to be another possible origin of the
AASR. By scrutinizing Anglo-American relations using first and second image analyses, a link
between Churchillian imperialism and America begins to be uncovered.i In fact, imperialism has
acted as such a strong ideological bridge between the US and Britain that, in some ways, it seems
to have been intentional. While it is impossible to read anyone’s mind, let alone a dead man’s, it
seems that Churchill’s insistence on promoting a special Anglo-American relationship may have
been an attempt to mitigate the damage caused by Britain’s shrinking power during the 1940s.
Recognizing that the conditions of the international system were such that perpetuating any
5
semblance of British primacy would be impossible, Churchill opted for the second best option.
Churchill’s “Plan B” was an attempt to maintain British influence by association through a
special relationship with the world’s new most powerful international actor, America. By
reintroducing America to an outward-looking, imperial approach to foreign policy, Churchill
initiated the creation of the AASR, and ensured that Britain would retain a great deal of influence
despite losing its status as the world’s premier power.
For those who believe that an AASR does exist, two years commonly cited as the
relationship’s inception are 1940 and 1946. To some, the fall of France to the Nazis and the
“Destroyers for Bases Deal” in 1940 represents the beginning of the AASR, while others see
Churchill’s 1946 Sinews of Peace Address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri as the
AASR’s proper date of birth.ii Some may argue, correctly, that threat perceptions played a role in
forging the initial alliance between Britain and the US; however, such explanations fail to
address how relations between the two states transcended the level of a traditional alliance to
form a Special Relationship.iii While the US and the UK were both facing threats during the
1940s, it is the treatment of these threats that explains the emergence of the AASR. For the
majority of the war, between May 1940 and July 1945, Winston Churchill was the man tasked
with deciding how the UK should react to the threat posed by the Axis powers. As such, it seems
possible that Churchill acted as the catalyst that led to the establishment of the AASR.
The great man theory of history bestows the lion’s share of credit for historical
developments on a single individual, a practice that has become controversial amongst
academics. Mainstream thought during the 20th and 21st Centuries has tended to characterize the
great man theory of history as meritless and antiquated; however, it seems unreasonable to assert
that societal forces direct the course of history irrespective of the leaders that hold office.iv The
originator of the great person theory, Thomas Carlyle, asserts that many developments in history
can be attributed to the exceptional charisma, political skill, and intelligence of various high
profile leaders, whom he describes as “heroes.”v Although those who subscribe to Carlyle’s
theory are now in the minority, it is not a completely ludicrous view to hold. While societal
forces undoubtedly play a key role in determining the course of history, and even in deciding the
selection of leaders, once in power, leaders still hold a considerable amount of latitude to
respond to situations as they see fit.
6
Politicus Journal
His Gift to America: Churchill, Imperialism, and the AASR
The question remains: why and how did Churchill’s handling of World War II contribute
to the establishment of the AASR? Churchill’s influence on American politics can, at least
partially, be attributed to the era during which he served as the British Prime Minister. As
Britain’s wartime leader, Churchill was not lacking opportunities to make his mark on history.
After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour, one of the worst attacks on American territory in
history, Churchill was particularly well positioned to influence his American allies. This attack
drastically changed America’s perception of World War II.vi Suddenly, the US was forced to
involve itself directly in the conflicts raging around the globe, and in this time of crisis and
uncertainty the US looked across the Atlantic to see Europe in shambles. France had fallen under
Nazi control, war raged on the Eastern front, and Britain had only recently weathered the Blitz.
Despite the chaos and the bleak outlook for the future, America saw the UK, with Churchill at
the helm, as the only remaining opposition to Nazi Germany on the Western Front.vii
Churchill’s strong leadership style and fierce resistance to the Axis powers represented a
viable model on which to base America’s fledgling outward-looking foreign policy. By
staunchly opposing the Axis powers and almost singlehandedly stopping Germany’s push
Westward, Churchill accomplished what few others would have been able to.viii Churchill’s
impressive, albeit brief time as wartime Prime Minister proved that his approach to foreign
policy was better suited to the political climate of the 1940s than other politicians of the time.
Considering Britain’s success in resisting the Germans, it is unsurprising that America turned to
Churchill for inspiration. Through the 1920s and 1930s, the US adopted an isolationist approach
to foreign policy, which was characterized by high tariff barriers and a refusal to become
involved in international institutions, while the 1940s saw them increase their international
involvement .ix
Walter Russell Mead’s Special Providence is an effective tool to help understand the shift
in approach to US foreign policy. By dividing approaches to US foreign policy into four distinct
schools, Wilsonianism, Hamiltonianism, Jeffersonianism, and Jacksonianism, Mead provides an
interesting framework from which to approach the study of American foreign policy.
Jeffersonianism and Hamiltoniamism are quite useful for analyzing Churchill’s influence on the
AASR. Mead considers Jeffersonians to be leaders who focus on developing democracy at home
and rejecting war and alliances, while Hamiltonians consider the further integration of America
7
into the world economy to be crucially important. With Mead’s eponyms in mind, the rapid shift
away from a Jeffersonian approach to foreign policy that rejected entering into any “entangling
alliances” to a more expansionist, Hamiltonian conception of international politics found a
perfect role model in Churchill.x
Although on the surface, Churchill was a seemingly unlikely candidate to capture the
hearts and minds of American politicians and citizens alike, he would later become a defining
figure in American politics. Born to an aristocratic family in 1874, Churchill’s childhood
coincided with the apex of British power and influence in the world. During Churchill’s early
years, Britain was not only the world leader in the realms of finance and trade, but also ruled
over an extensive empire with the extremely powerful Royal Navy.xi Fuelled by the British glory
of his developmental years, Churchill was a proud Englishman who eventually looked to
maintain and extend his country’s power as its Prime Minister.
While Churchill’s faint connections to the British establishment and the nationalist and
imperial biases formed during his youth may not have made him an obvious candidate for
American idolization, it was these same prejudices that allowed him to gain immense popularity
in the US. For example, Churchill’s refusal to negotiate or compromise with the enemy fuelled
his status as an underdog who represented the last remaining beacon of democracy and liberty in
Europe. This representation of Churchill would have appealed strongly to American political
culture.xii Americans are generally wary of political authority and often question and express
discontent with their government; moreover, they find the idea that one person can exert control
over another to be nearly blasphemous.xiii Churchill’s open hatred for Hitler and his fascist,
authoritarian Nazi regime that looked to forcefully impose its values on the rest of Europe and
the world synchronized nicely with America’s love of democracy and individualism.xiv As such,
Churchill’s decision to oppose the distinctly un-American Nazi regime played a large part in
building his popularity in America.
Churchill’s personality also played a large role in building his popularity amongst the
American population. Americans were instantly able to relate to the British Prime Minister. The
Prime Minister’s obvious sincerity and mastery of language were refreshing to an American
public that was almost conditioned to distrust political elites.xv The confidence and national pride
that Churchill epitomized was another important factor in winning the affection of American
population. Churchill was sure to brashly claim Britain as the last gatekeeper of freedom,
8
Politicus Journal
democracy, and justice fighting an existential battle against an evil, tyrannical enemy.xvi While
this rhetoric would have likely inspired anyone who opposed the Axis powers, appealing to the
fundamental American values of liberty and honour would have been particularly effective in
rallying support in the US; furthermore, by associating himself with these central American
values, Churchill was able to help Americans reconcile his imperial tendencies with their
conception of democracy.xvii
Churchill’s popularity and influence in America would have been further bolstered
amongst America’s political elite by the special treatment he afforded the US. The maintenance
of the Anglo-American alliance and the promotion of increased relations between all English
speaking countries were of the utmost importance to Churchill.xviii At the time, both Churchill
and the British population considered the Channel to be wider than the Atlantic, demonstrating
that the British saw themselves as more American than European; however, British selfidentification with America extended beyond mere words.xix Despite his love of the country and
the empire, Churchill acknowledged that the transfer of imperial power from Britain to the US
was likely, if not inevitable. He felt that if Britain was going to survive the German onslaught,
much of the imperial burden would need to be shifted onto America.xx Given this view, it is
unsurprising that Churchill used his popularity stateside to inspire America to pursue an
increasingly expansionist foreign policy.
The wartime relationship formed between Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt also
played an integral part in imbuing American foreign policy with Churchillian, imperial values.xxi
Christopher Hitchens argues that Roosevelt was able to exploit Churchill and the British to make
America the most powerful country in the world at essentially no cost to the US; however, this
interpretation seems to underestimate Churchill’s perception of the British state of affairs.xxii The
Prime Minister knew that the perpetuation of the British Empire would be impossible when faced
with a Nazi controlled Europe, and that any hope of defeating the Nazis involved financial and
military support from the Americans.xxiii Regardless of America’s level of involvement in the
war, it would have been clear, even to the imperialist Churchill that the golden age of the British
Empire had come and gone. With the Empire slowly slipping from Britain’s grasp, Churchill
would have looked to maintain any connection with the Empire and the influence associated with
it. Here, Churchill would have seen the incredible value in attempting to strengthen the link
between the UK and US in an effort to establish a special relationship.
9
To Churchill, establishing a special relationship with the US and promoting imperial
values in America were two elements of the same plan. The circumstances of the time dictated
that America’s eclipse of Britain’s primacy was imminent.xxiv Given that America would become
the world’s new superpower as long as Germany was defeated, the US was in a unique position
to inherit the perks of being the most powerful player in the international system. Therefore,
Churchill conditioned the American population to think of expansionism as being compatible
with their conception of democracy in an attempt to ensure that the US would take the
opportunity to become a new imperial power. Seeing that Britain’s fall from primacy was
inevitable, Churchill saw value in ensuring that the Americans picked up where the British had
left off. By essentially transferring power to the US free of charge while also forging a special
relationship with the Americans, Churchill was able to ensure that Britain maintained a great
deal of imperial influence through one of its strongest allies. As a result, imperialism can be seen
to represent the catalyzing force behind the creation of the AASR.
British Invasion Before The Beatles? Churchill’s Omnipresence Stateside
While Churchill’s obsession with fostering better Anglo-American relations may have
been a desperate attempt to maintain some distant, indirect grasp on the empire, American
imperialism itself has helped strengthen relations between the US and the UK. The American
adoption of neo-imperial values has given the two countries another shared value on which to
base their relationship. With a number of commonalities already existent between the two states,
including the ever-important presence of a shared language, the emergence of American
imperialism further strengthens the shared identity of the US and UK. As Srdjan Vucetic and
Janice Mattern note, shared histories and identities are particularly important in relationship
building.xxv While Edward Ingram claims that the United States was actively trying to destroy
Britain during World War II, it is clear that the US never sought to destroy Britain, and it seems
more likely that Churchill was able to associate Britain’s past with America’s present.xxvi
Churchill accomplished this by establishing a unique historical connection that resulted in him
singlehandedly creating a new element of Anglo-American shared identity and history.
Based on the idea that Churchill inspired shared norms and identities, American
imperialism is a plausible explanation for both the beginning and the perpetuation of the AASR.
Under Churchill’s tutelage, American imperialism re-emerged in the 1940s after a two-decade
10
Politicus Journal
hiatus during the 1920s and 1930s.xxvii Since World War II, American imperialism, broadly
construed as the exertion of sovereignty beyond a state’s traditional boundaries, has been on full
display.xxviii Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman, famously employed a form of imperialism
when practicing Cold War era containment strategies. Largely shaped by George Kennan,
containment was an integral part of the Truman Doctrine. Kennan’s vision involved fostering
political attitudes favourable to America’s conception of the international system in areas of the
globe crucial to American security.xxix In other words, Truman and Kennan hoped to stop the
spread of communism by instilling American democratic and capitalist values in states judged to
be at risk of falling to Soviet control. The Truman doctrine also employed more nefarious
techniques for limiting communism’s spread. For example, Truman authorized the active, covert
exploitation of political and economic rifts between the Chinese and the Soviets by US officials
in an attempt to discourage the growth of communism in China.xxx
American imperialism continued worldwide throughout the 20th Century. The US overtly
engaged itself in countries including the Congo, Colombia, and Vietnam. That said, it is perhaps
the more indirect approaches to imperialism that have had greater, longer lasting effects on neocolonial states. The US has been able to exercise an incredible amount of control over
developing nations through military foreign aid programs and American dominated institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.xxxi These non-traditional
approaches to imperialism have allowed the US to influence developing countries, many of
which have colonial histories, while appearing to be a promoter of democracy and development.
Considering America’s construction of an informal empire throughout the 20th Century, it is
clear that similarities between US expansionism and British imperialism contributed to the
perpetuation of the AASR during this time period.
Initiating the AASR was, however, not Churchill’s only contribution to American
politics. In fact, Churchill has been absorbed into American political culture to such an extent
that his bulldog-like attitude defines a large portion of right wing politics in the US. The
Republican obsession with Churchill can be traced back to his 1946 Sinews of Peace speech at
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. Churchill’s Fulton Address is best remembered for its
popularization of the “iron curtain” metaphor and for its foreshadowing of the Cold War;
however, it also held strategic importance for the Republican Party. During the speech, Churchill
acknowledged that the agreement reached at the Yalta Conference allowing the USSR to annex
11
Poland was a failure because it favoured the Soviet interests too strongly.xxxii Republicans used
this perception of Yalta to paint the Democrats as weak appeasers that had betrayed the
American public.xxxiii
Despite many Republicans’ particularly obvious affinity for Churchill, the AASR and the
imperial policies that make up its foundation cannot be exclusively attributed to particular parties
in either the US or the UK. For instance, the AASR was conceived by a Conservative
government in Britain, while a Democratic President, Roosevelt, sat in the Oval Office. One of
the more recent examples of the AASR in action, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, saw Tony Blair of
the Labour Party join George Bush, a Republican, in a legally questionable encroachment on the
sovereignty of Iraq. It is interesting to note that in both of these cases, the two governing parties
are considered to be ideologically inconsistent. In fact, ideologically consistent governments in
the US and UK have at times resulted in strained Anglo-American relations. For example, during
the Suez Crisis, a Conservative British government was completely humiliated by the
Republican US President Dwight Eisenhower, who refused to support his close allies in the
UK.xxxiv
The AASR’s ability to not only overcomes differences in political ideology but also to
survive bona fide disasters like the Suez Crisis speaks volumes about the quality of AngloAmerican relations. In order for the AASR to persevere through the incredibly rough patches that
it has experienced in the past, at least one of two things must be true. The first, as Lucille Eznack
suggests, is that the relationship is so mutually beneficial that both states value relational repair
over virtually any other interest involved in a dispute between them.xxxv Alternatively, the
persistence of the AASR through crises could be attributed to a complex set of shared values,
norms, and identities that have helped to develop a mutual understanding between Britain and
America. This mutual understanding that even serious disputes between the US and UK can be
resolved peacefully prevents quarrels from creating irreconcilable differences between the two
countries.xxxvi Given that the AASR allows Britain to punch above its weight to a certain extent,
it is perhaps unsurprising that the UK may be willing to easily forgive the US for most of its
transgressions internationally; however, it takes two to tango. Many of the AASR’s benefits,
like nuclear sharing, are a one-way street where Britain benefits considerably more than
America; American capabilities would not be greatly reduced without British cooperation;
therefore, it seems more reasonable to argue that the basis of the AASR is more intangible than
12
Politicus Journal
mutual benefit, and that it is built upon a common set of values and norms that tie the two states
together.
Indicators of America’s romanticized view of Churchill and the AASR are widespread.
Since the Fulton Address, self-identification with Churchill has become commonplace in the US.
For example, American politicians have become fond of invoking Churchill whenever they find
themselves in a troubling position. These references to Churchill often arise when a politician is
attempting to legitimize their tough, brutish behaviour; however, this is only one example of
America’s idolization of Churchill.xxxvii Statues and busts of Churchill are sprinkled almost
haphazardly throughout the US, and one even found its way into the Oval Office during George
W. Bush’s presidency. Even in one of America’s least English cities, New Orleans, a statue of
Churchill overshadows the nearby representation of the French hero Joan of Arc.xxxviii These
monuments are obvious signs of Churchill’s wild popularity in the US, and are demonstrative of
the romanticized perception that the US holds towards the AASR. As a result, it is clear that
America’s obsession with Churchill dubbed the “Churchill Cult” by Hitchens is alive and
well.xxxix
Conclusion
Winston Churchill played an indispensable role in crafting the AASR. Churchill’s
insistence on building strong Anglo-American relations may have represented an active attempt
to maintain a faint connection to the empire or may demonstrate Churchill’s belief that, with its
power fading, Britain would be better off forging a strong relationship with the world’s new
dominant power. Either way, it is clear that Churchill was the catalyzing force behind the
establishment of the AASR. By re-introducing America to imperialism and expansionist
approaches to foreign policy, Churchill made a strong contribution to the shared sense of identity
between the US and the UK. This shared identity has proven to be the backbone of the AASR,
and has provided it with the staying power required to persist through crises and disagreements
for 65 years; furthermore, Churchill’s legacy in America has lived on long after his passing;
whether it be through the various monuments to Churchill sprinkled throughout the US or
through his many invocations by modern American politicians, it is clear that Sir Winston
Churchill’s ghost still makes its presence felt in America.
13
Finally, it should be noted that framing imperialism and American primacy as the glue of
the AASR presents two possible futures for Anglo-American relations. On one hand, Churchill
and the British initiated the Special Relationship in the context of impending American preeminence on the world stage. Given China’s recent rise to prominence, it appears that after 65
years the conditions under which the AASR was formed may be changing. Should Chinese
wealth, power, and influence continue to grow at significantly high rates, America’s ability and
desire to conduct an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy may be diminished in a new bipolar
world. The resulting reduction in American influence would, by extension, damage the UK’s
ability to pursue its interests internationally. Without the assurance that Britain could benefit
from American neo-imperialist tendencies, it seems that the AASR could be headed for rough
waters. In fact, these trends have already begun to play out. With America increasingly directing
more attention to Asia, and Barack Obama practicing a less aggressive foreign policy
characterized by “leading from behind”, Britain has begun to worry that America is neglecting
the AASR.xl
The AASR’s strong foundations in shared identity, however, make it too soon to begin
writing the Special Relationship’s obituary. Firstly, it is highly unlikely that China’s rise will
result in immediate American irrelevancy. Second, even if the international powers of the US
were to undergo a drastic reduction, the AASR would likely still live on. What makes the
relationship between the US and the UK special is its partial transcendence of the interests and
threat perceptions that are the driving force behind most normal relationships and alliances.
While threat perceptions and interests undoubtedly play a part in the AASR, shared experiences
of expansionism play a huge role in drawing the two countries together. As self-identified
promoters of democracy, human rights, and international development, the US and the UK see
themselves as partners in promoting a common worldview. Recognizing this, David Cameron
and Barack Obama penned a joint piece in the Washington Post, reaffirming their commitment to
what they dubbed an “essential relationship.”xli As such, so long as the US and the UK hold
similar, ideologically expansionist identities, it does not seem that the AASR will be going
anywhere
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)
iiii
David Reynolds, “1940: Fulcrum of the 20th Century?,” International Affairs col. 66 no. 2
(Apr. 1990), 348-350.
i
14
Politicus Journal
iii
John Baylis, “The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory,” International
Relations 8(4) (January, 1985): 371.
iv
HerbertSpencer,TheStudyofSociology(NewYork:D.Appleton&Company,1875)
v
ThomasCarlyle,OnHeroes,Hero-Worship,andtheHeroicinHistory(NewHaven:Yale
UniversityPress,2013)
vi
William G. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House,
1967), 34.
vii
Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Empire: The Enduring Angle-American Relationship,
(New York: Nation Books, 2004), 180.
viii
John Lukacs, Churchill: Visionary. Statesman. Historian., (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2002), 2-3.
ix
Carleton, “The Revolution,” 29.
x
John Kaminski, “Thomas Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address 1801,” in Milestone Documents
in American History: Exploring the Primary Sources that Shaped America (Dallas: Schlager
Group Inc, 2008), 372-383.
Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the
World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002)
xi
Stuart Ball, Winston Churchill (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 6-11.
xii
Lukacs, “Churchill,” 95.
xiii
Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 74.
xiv
Ellis, “American Political Cultures,” 74-76.
xv
Ball, “Winston Churchill,” 12 & 92.
xvi
IBID, 95-96.
xvii
Ellis, “American Political Cultures,” 150.
xviii
Lukacs, “Churchill, “ 83.
xix
IBID.
xx
IBID, 95.
xxi
IBID, 58-59.
xxii
Hitchens, "Blood, Class, and Empire,” 202.
xxiii
IBID, 205-207.
Lukacs, “Churchill,” 95.
xxiv
Hitchens, “Blood, Class, and Empire,” 206.
xxv
Srjdan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of Racialized Identity, (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 2011)
Janice Bially Mattern, “The Power Politics of Identity,” European Journal of International
Relations 7 (September 2001), 349-397.
xxvi
EdwardIngram,“TheWonderlandofthePoliticalScientist,”InternationalSecurityvol.22no.
1(Summer,1997)
xxvii
Robert Zevin, “An Interpretation of American Imperialism,” The Journal of Economic
History vol. 32 no. 1 (Mar. 1972), 316-360; (332-333).
xxviii
Zevin, “An Interpretation of,” 319.
xxix
John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National
Security Policy During the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 29.
xxx
Gaddis, “Strategies of Containment,” 67-68.
xxxi
Zevin, “An Interpretation,” 333.
15
xxxii
Brian Bonhomme, “Winston Churchill’s ‘The Sinews of Peace’,” in Milestone Documents in
World History: Exploring the Primary Sources that Shaped the World (Dallas, Schlager Group
Inc., 2010), 1436-1451.
xxxiii
Athan Theoharis, “The Republican Party and Yalta: Partisan Exploitation of the Polish
American Concern over the Conference1945-1960,” Polish American Studies vol. 28 no. 1
(Spring, 1971), 5-6.
xxxiv
Lucille Eznack, “Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’
Relationships,” Security Studies 20 (April 2011), 238-265.
xxxv
Eznack, “Crises as Signals,” 264.
xxxvi
Vucetic, “The Anglosphere,” 6.
xxxvii
Hitchens, “Blood, Class, and Empire,” 182.
xxxviii
IBID
xxxix
IBID, 180.
xl
Simon Chesterman, “’Leading From Behind’: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama
Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya,” Ethics and International Affairs 25(3)
(Fall 2011), 279-285.
xli
Barack Obama and David Cameron, “United States and Britain: an essential relationship,” The
Guardian, March 13, 2012 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/13/barackobama-david-cameron-essential-relationship
16
Politicus Journal
Bibliography
Ball, Stuart. Winston Churchill (New York: New York University Press, 2003).
Baylis, John. “The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory,” International Relations
8(4) (January, 1985).
Bonhomme, Brian. “Winston Churchill’s ‘The Sinews of Peace’,” in Milestone Documents in
World History: Exploring the Primary Sources that Shaped the World (Dallas, Schlager
Group Inc., 2010).
Carleton, William G. The Revolution in American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House,
1967).
Carlyle,Thomas.OnHeroes,Hero-Worship,andtheHeroicinHistory(NewHaven:Yale
UniversityPress,2013).
Chesterman, Simon. “’Leading From Behind’: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama
Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya,” Ethics and International Affairs
25(3) (Fall 2011).
Ellis, Richard J. American Political Cultures, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Eznack, Lucille. “Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’
Relationships,” Security Studies 20 (April 2011).
Gaddis, John L. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security
Policy During the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Hitchens, Christopher. Blood, Class, and Empire: The Enduring Angle-American Relationship,
(New York: Nation Books, 2004).
Ingram,Edward.“TheWonderlandofthePoliticalScientist,”InternationalSecurityvol.22no.1
(Summer,1997)
Kaminski, John. “Thomas Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address 1801,” in Milestone Documents in
American History: Exploring the Primary Sources that Shaped America (Dallas: Schlager
Group Inc, 2008).
Lukacs, John. Churchill: Visionary. Statesman. Historian., (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2002).
Mattern, Janice Bially. “The Power Politics of Identity,” European Journal of International
Relations 7 (September 2001).
Mead, Walter Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the
World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).
Obama, Barack and Cameron, David. “United States and Britain: an essential relationship,” The
Guardian, March 13, 2012
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/13/barack-obama-david-cameronessential-relationship
Reynolds, David. “1940: Fulcrum of the 20th Century?,” International Affairs col. 66 no. 2 (Apr.
1990).
Spencer,Herbert.TheStudyofSociology(NewYork:D.Appleton&Company,1875).
Theoharis, Athan.“The Republican Party and Yalta: Partisan Exploitation of the Polish American
Concern over the Conference1945-1960,” Polish American Studies vol. 28 no. 1 (Spring,
1971).
Vucetic, Srjdan. The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of Racialized Identity, (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 2011).
Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
Zevin, Robert. “An Interpretation of American Imperialism,” The Journal of Economic History
vol. 32 no. 1 (Mar. 1972).
18
Politicus Journal
STILL LAUGHING ALL THE WAY TO THE BANK: THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
David Orr
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 rocked world markets to a degree unseen since the
Great Depression. Nowhere were the effects more palpable than within the heavily integrated
financial hubs of London’s City and on New York’s Wall Street, which saw stock markets tumble
and financial sector employees made redundant. Representing more than the seizing up of interbank lending, the GFC also illustrated the fallibility of the laissez-faire Anglo-American finance
model that had permeated world capital markets since the 1950s. This paper seeks to understand
whether or not the GFC represents a terminal crisis for the Anglo-American Special Relationship.
By drawing on constructivist literature, it finds that, despite the GFC delegitimising the AngloAmerican finance model and allowing the UK to develop a rosier financial relationship with China,
it did not put the Anglo-American Special Relationship is not in jeopardy. Rather, the deep
economic, military, political, and cultural interdependence between the two states means that the GFC
should be regarded as yet another challenge that, although economically debilitating, will inevitably
be overcome by the sustained strength of the Special Relationship.
The costs of this crisis will be with us for a generation.
Mervyn King, former Governor of the Bank of England
Address to the Trades Union Congress, 20101
British Airways flight BA001 enjoys a special place in International Relations. An Airbus
A318 configured in an all-business class layout, the aircraft ferries bankers between the two
Anglo-American financial metropoles: London and New York. It is no coincidence that its flight
number not only coincides with the primacy of the two cities within the international finance
sphere, but also with the financial epicentres of the Anglo-American Special Relationship.
Economic integration represents a fundamental tenet of this relationship, and the UK is currently
the US’ fifth-largest trading partner.2 Yet it is the financial services component of their shared
economic linkages that represents the most salient aspect of their economic relationship;
1
Philip Aldrick, “Bank of England governor Mervyn King warns unions accept cuts or 'fail your children',” The Telegraph,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/ 8004109/Bank-of-England-governor-Mervyn-King-warns-unions-accept-cuts-orfail-your-children.html.
2
United States Department of Trade, “Top U.S. Trade Partners, 2015,” United States Government,
http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ia n_003364.pdf.
finance’s share of the UK and US economies tripled between 1950 and the 2000s.3 Moreover,
between the 1970s and 2008, Britain and the US espoused a culture of complacent noninterventionism in financial markets. Bereft of serious cultural and market rivals, the AngloAmerican model of finance became the global norm, and saw not only booming financial sector
profits, but also the engineering of novel and ever-riskier financial instruments. However, in
March 2008, the markets collapsed, prompting the worst economic crisis for 70 years and
placing the legitimacy of the Anglo-American financial model in jeopardy.4 Thus, although the
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was global in character, its origins were very much AngloAmerican, which gives rise to the question of how the GFC impacted the Anglo-American
Special Relationship. Indeed, the UK’s rather rosy financial courtship with China and its
wavering over its European future, much to the chagrin of the US, has led some scholars to
suggest that the relationship is evolving to reflect a new post-GFC global political economy in
which financial power is more diffuse and is moving towards East Asia.5
This paper tackles this hypothesis by first examining the deep economic integration and
financial primacy of the UK and the US in the years preceding the crisis before assessing the
degree to which the GFC delegitimised the Anglo-American finance model. The following
sections examine China’s rise in the financial sphere, and whether the UK’s closer relationship
with China will sound the death knell for the Anglo-American Special Relationship. Ultimately,
this paper finds that the GFC does not represent a terminal crisis for Anglo-America. Rather, by
drawing on constructivist literature by Janice Bially Mattern and Lucile Eznack, it is found that
the GFC should be regarded similarly to any other crisis endured by the elastic and resilient
character of the Anglo-American Special Relationship. The manner in which actors engage in
crises is thus more important than their material force. Indeed, the close cooperation between the
two powers following the GFC, coupled with the continued pervasiveness of New York and
London’s financial model, illustrates that, despite the GFC’s economic debilitation, AngloAmerica’s deep economic, military, political, and cultural ties mean that the GFC should be
regarded as a crisis that was inevitably overcome by the sustained behavioural strength of the
Anglo-American Special Relationship.
3
Adair Turner, Between debt and the devil: money, credit, and fixing global finance, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2015): 1.
4
Leo Goodstadt, Reluctant regulators: how the West created and how China survived the global financial crisis, (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 2.
5
See Goodstadt’s Reluctant regulators and Jeremy Green’s “Global currency shifts.”
20
Politicus Journal
Before delving into the GFC’s manifestations, it is worth briefly contextualising the
importance of economic integration within the Anglo-American Special Relationship. The
existence, essence, and direction of the Anglo-American special relationship has spawned a
wealth of literature. Its constructivist basis – grounded in the notions of shared norms and
identities – makes it challenging to identify the explicitly tangible effects of the relationship.
Indeed, the elusive and immaterial foundations of values and cultures make it difficult to
determine the precise tangible impact of, for example, British culture on American culture.
However, there is one element of the Anglo-American Special Relationship that terminalist,
realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist scholars agree can be empirically verified (along
with intelligence and nuclear sharing): the entrenched interdependence and primacy of the
Anglo-American model of capitalism. For the renowned essayist and realist Christopher
Hitchens, “the joint-stock aspect of Wall Street and the City of London” illustrates the
institutionalised nature of the Special Relationship.6 Moreover, despite Niall Ferguson
dismissing the Special Relationship as a “Churchillian fiction,” he nevertheless identifies the
deep economic interdependence between the UK and the US.7 For the English School realist
John Baylis, economics represents a fundamental tenet of ideological affinity between the US
and the UK because it provides a “mental prism” through which common interests can be
identified and furthered.8 Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh concur, and argue that economic
integration is a manifestation of the deep philosophical views shared between the two states,
which has led to the cultivation of a Special Relationship.9
Wall Street and the City: The Municipal Anglo-American Special Relationship
By the time Ronald Reagan left office in 1989, Britain and the United States were in the
throes of free market orthodoxy. With firm encouragement from Margaret Thatcher, the UK and
the US had developed into market-oriented economies, joined in an effort to promote trade
liberalisation. This Anglo-American liberal orthodoxy manifested itself in the international
financial system, which underwent rapid change in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, the
6
Christopher Hitchens, Blood, class, and empire: the enduring Anglo-American relationship, (New York: Nation Books, 2004),
361.
7
Niall Ferguson, “Nothing Special,” American Interest 1, (2006): 68.
8
John Baylis, "The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory," International Relations 8, no. 4 (1985): 379.
9
Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?” International History Review 36,
no. 4 (2014): 691.
21
financial revolution was not limited to the commercial sector. The activities of the Bretton
Woods Institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
which were responsible for the smooth operation of the international financial system, further
propagated the free market ideology. In 1971, the US abandoned the Bretton Woods fixed
exchange rate system, giving birth to a laissez-faire economic ideology that became known as
the ‘Washington Consensus’ because of its adoption by the IMF, the World Bank, and the US
government. The UK quickly followed the American example of abolishing fixed exchange
rates, prompting mass global currency volatility.
With currency controls eradicated, the free markets boomed. When the oil shocks of 1973
and 1979 flooded the extractive-based Arabian Gulf economies with cash, these countries did not
have sufficiently developed financial institutions to handle such capital, and lacked adequate
domestic investment opportunities to absorb this new wealth.10 Recognising this, British and
American banks successfully competed for these petrodollars, so “[while] inflation ravaged the
real economy in both countries, the banks were awash in capital.”11 This phenomenon quickly
spread across the European continent. German and French banks sought to emulate AngloAmerica’s success, creating a wave of liberalised European capital markets. Cronin notes that the
most symbolic event of the era was the “Big Bang” of 1986, which saw the liberalisation of the
UK’s financial hub, the City of London.12 Prompted by Thatcher’s neoliberal orthodoxy, the
City’s removal of capital controls offered British firms the ability to compete more effectively
with New York, thereby strengthening transatlantic economic interdependence. Moreover, the
“Big Bang” led Paris and Berlin to end capital flow restrictions in Europe.13 The eradication of
European capital controls would have significant implications not only for Britain’s integration
in Europe, but also for our contemporary understanding of the Anglo-American Special
Relationship.
The newly liberalised and global nature of the finance sector in the late 1980s, partly due
to the adoption of neoliberal ideologies by developed states, and partly to technological
innovation in the industry, led to major shifts in international finance. Its rapid and entrenched
globalisation brought economic benefits. The flush of petrodollars allowed for the expansion of
10
James Cronin, Global Rules: America, Britain and a Disordered World, (London: Yale University Press, 2014), 139.
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Dariusz Wojcik, "The dark side of NY–LON: Financial centres and the global financial crisis," Urban Studies 50, no. 13
(2013): 2741.
11
22
Politicus Journal
lending and borrowing, making foreign direct investment more accessible. Moreover, liberalised
capital markets ensured that market knowledge could be disseminated faster and more
effectively; however, openness also brought limitations. A rapidly appreciating currency in one
country could have devastating effects on the economic health of another, resulting in currency
volatility in the early 1980s, which, coupled with the US’ abandonment of the Bretton Woods
fixed exchange rate system in 1971, caused inflation to rise.
According to Cronin, the key objective of 1980s economic policy in the UK and US was
inflation control, yet the US, savouring the dollar’s primacy, was in no hurry to reintroduce
exchange rate controls and lower interest rates.14 Without the leader of international commerce
on board, reform would be impossible. Although the Europeans established a European
Monetary System in 1979, which provided some stability on the continent, it was only in 1985
that the US brought forward the Plaza Agreement to promote financial stability and coordination
among Europe, Britain, and America.15 Thus, while the financial revolution of the 1980s offered
expanded credit opportunities, it also confirmed the US’ primacy in the financial sphere.16
What should be made of the shared macroeconomic consensus among British and
American policymakers in the years preceding the crisis? In order to answer this question, it is
necessary to focus the examination upon the interdependence between Anglo-America’s
financial hubs: London and New York. Wojcik argues that the connectivity between the two
cities is wholly unique, and calls their relationship the ‘New York-London dyad.”17 Indeed, the
development of the New York-London axis has been underpinned by strong complementarities
and commonalities. Beyond the shared English language, which conveniently is the lingua
franca of international finance, both cities share a “strong tradition of economic and political
liberalism, a fertile ground for belief in the self-regulation of business and finance, as well as
corporate governance and accounting standards geared towards business owners rather than other
stakeholders.”18 The two cities’ degrees of commonality, complementarity, and connectivity
validates their centrality to the globalisation and propagation of the Anglo-American model of
14
Cronin, Global Rules, 139.
Ibid.
16
Patrick O’Brien, "The myth of Anglophone succession," New Left Review 24 (2003): 124.
17
Wojcik, "The dark side of NY–LON”, 2738.
18
Ibid., 2741.
15
23
financial capitalism.19 In essence, the relationship between London and New York is the
municipal equivalent of the Anglo-American Special Relationship.
London and New York surpass all other cities in terms of the number of individuals
employed in the financial sector, with 123,000 and 262,000, respectively.20 The next closest city,
Hong Kong, has a mere one financial sector employee for every four employed in New York.
The two cities also enjoy deeply connected physical infrastructure. To take two examples: their
stock exchanges are the most interconnected and advanced in the world, and the Heathrow-JFK
flight route is the world’s busiest intercontinental route, with British Airways and American
Airlines alone operating seventeen flights per day between the two financial hubs.21
The deeply integrated physical infrastructure aided each city’s financial development in
the two decades preceding the GFC. As discussed earlier, foreign currency trading in the 1970s
was centred in London and in New York, and in the 1980s, London shed its tradition of class
privilege and transitioned towards a merit-based financial culture, making it more like New
York. Moreover, the EU’s adoption of the Euro in 2002 consolidated London as a centre of
European wholesale finance and currency trading. The US greatly benefited from London’s
newfound financial character, because it offered the country an opportunity to enter the
complexities of European currency and capital markets. With both cities firmly committed to a
neoliberal self-regulation ideology, a pattern emerged. Financial innovations would be cultivated
in New York and then transported to London, where they would be tailored to European and
international market tastes.22 This also created a lifestyle based on the fusion of London and New
York for each city’s political, cultural, and business elite.23
“Hubris and Complacency”: The Crisis Unfolds
Despite its financial primacy, the New York-London axis was an important component of
the multi-causal mix that underpinned the GFC. Both cities served as platforms for individuals
and firms to engage in an “explosive combination of hubris and complacency,” which fuelled the
crisis.24 Indeed, Anglo-American capitalism’s penchant for deregulation was a significant cause
19
Goodstadt, Reluctant regulators, 6.
Wojcik, "The dark side of NY–LON”, 2747.
21
Daisy Carrington, “Flying London to New York: It's cutthroat for airlines on highly prized route,” CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/16/travel/london-to-new-york-its-cutthroat.
22
Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 20.
23
Wojcik, "The dark side of NY–LON”, 2741.
24
Ibid., 2744.
20
24
Politicus Journal
of the GFC. Financial deregulation fostered the emergence of a largely unregulated banking
sector in the US, with investment banks as the key players. Wall Street behemoths, including JP
Morgan and the Lehman Brothers, engineered an array of complex, unregulated, and jargon-rich
financial instruments predicated on high-risk asset-backed securities, which included credit
default swaps, collateralised debt obligations, and asset-backed commercial papers.25
Simultaneously, London was also establishing itself as a leading centre of mortgage
securitisation in Europe for both UK and foreign mortgages.26 Thus, a mutually dependent
Anglo-American financial life cycle emerged.
As the shadow banking sector and its profits grew, the use of firms’ own internal risk
management models became widely accepted, which was justified by the ethos of self-regulation
propagated by the incumbent UK and US governments.27 Moreover, the banks convinced
regulators that such internal regulation was beneficial. Britain’s Financial Services Authority and
the US’ Securities and Exchange Commission presided over a series of deregulatory reforms that
were excessively favourable to the biggest banks.28 These agencies also participated in the
multilateral Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, illustrating how British and American
officials’ mutual understandings indirectly shaped international regulatory debates through
disproportionate regulatory influence.29
As asset prices rose and bank profits soared, government regulators accepted that banks
should have lower capital requirements because of their ostensibly more complex internal risk
models. For example, Northern Rock, a firm with the unenviable distinction of being the first
British bank to collapse in the GFC, held a mere two per cent of capital against risky portfolios.30
Moreover, Anglo-American political elites faced serious disincentives from increasing
regulation, for enhanced bank profits had become integral to the financing of their respective
welfare systems. Eventually, however, the crisis struck; banks’ internal risk assessment models
bore close resemblance to competitors’, and tended to hit their risk limits at the same time. In
25
Ibid., 2743.
26
Ibid.
Andrew Baker, "Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global financial
governance," International Affairs 86, no. 3 (2010), 649.
28
Ibid., 650.
29
Goodstadt, Reluctant regulators, 24.
30
Baker, "Restraining regulatory capture?”, 650.
27
25
early 2008, asset prices plummeted and financial herding emerged, heralding the advent of the
GFC.
Although the global transmission of “Anglo-Saxon” finance norms meant that the GFC
became a global crisis, its origins were very much Anglo-American. Moreover, it marred the
Anglo-American regulatory culture that was convinced of the innate and superior wisdom of
financial markets. In direct contrast to the prosperity and stability enjoyed by Anglo-America in
the previous thirty years, the GFC of 2008 struck on a scale that surpassed all normal
experiences and expectations. The crisis that emerged, catalysed by the disastrous consequences
of the US letting Lehman Brothers fail, and the UK’s refusal to bail out Northern Rock, is termed
by Leo Goodstadt as “Anglo-American Armageddon.”31 Although Goodstadt’s description is
rather hyperbolic, the UK did experience an unprecedented fiscal deficit of 13 percent of GDP in
2009 and 2010, and the US valued its Troubled Asset Relief Program at $700 billion.32
However, what was most debilitating about the GFC was how it exposed the vulnerability
of the New York-London axis. As the world’s financial leaders, the UK and US economies had
no lender of last resort to bail them out, while member states of the Eurozone could rely on the
European Central Bank to perform this vital duty. Thus, of the seventeen banks with the largest
admitted losses, eight were American and four were British.33 Moreover, the heavily integrated
and globalised character of financial markets meant that New York and London could not
prevent the spread of contagion to world markets; the US accounted for 31 percent of global
financial assets and 62 percent of global reserve currency assets in 2007.34 Consequently, the
crisis swiftly became the financial crisis of global concern, devastating international markets,
with the average sovereign loss equivalent to 33 per cent of GDP.35
Laissez-faire no more: The Anglo-American Financial Model in Jeopardy
The GFC placed the Anglo-American financial culture of complacent noninterventionism in jeopardy. The serious economic slowdowns, massive loss of wealth, and
temporary reversal of world trade following the crisis illustrated the shortcomings of the Angloliberal growth model. Indeed, its aura of invincible economic growth was weakened,
31
Goodstadt, Reluctant regulators, 3.
Ibid.
33
Ibid., 19.
34
Ibid., 5.
35
Ibid., 116.
32
26
Politicus Journal
delegitimising the very structure that bound the British and American economies together.
Revealingly, a testy and public back-and-forth between British regulator Martin Wheatley and
US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner arose, with Wheatley contending that the “US is not the
global standard setter” and instead pointing to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
while Geithner retorted that the UK set a “tragic” regulatory example.36 This spat was highly
unusual; the ‘friendship’ that Berenskoetter believes the UK and the US share meant that such a
scenario would have been highly unlikely prior to the GFC.37 However, by publicly exposing the
divergence of policy between the two states’ leading financial regulators, Wheatley and
Geithner’s quarrel symbolised the threat posed by the GFC to the health of the Anglo-American
Special Relationship.
The loss of legitimacy for Anglo-America’s vision of self-regulating markets was
compounded by how states were forced to respond to the crisis. Having been shunned by the
Anglo-American neoliberal finance model, capital controls regained their legitimacy following
the crisis. Even seven years after the GFC, the imposition of capital controls in Greece in early
2015 illustrates their continued applicability for mitigating financial crises.38 To their credit, the
US and the UK cooperated and developed new measures to reform the financial sector following
the GFC, including the Vickers Commission in the UK, which sought to ‘ring fence’ banks
through tighter regulation, and which created some discomfort in the banking sphere.39
However, the failure of global standards to prevent the crisis reinforced discomfort with
US leadership. Financial rescues and bailouts emerged on an unprecedented scale, involving the
European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the world’s major central banks,
resulting in a loss of confidence in the US’ economic governance. 40 Moreover, the mammoth
size of the bailouts contributed to the need for co-financing, which had a negative impact on the
long-shared belief of Anglo-America’s primacy in world affairs. Co-financing involves a number
36
Robert Cookson, “Wheatley attacks Geithner on Regulation,” Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a56da4491b0-11e0-b4a3-0144feab49a.htm l#axzz3sNM67TsN.
37
Felix Berenskoetter, "Friends, there are no friends? An intimate reframing of the international," Millennium-Journal of
International Studies 35, no. 3 (2007): 670.
38
Kevin Gallagher, “Regaining Control? Capital Controls and the Global Financial Crisis,” in The consequences of the global
financial crisis: The rhetoric of reform and regulation, ed. Wyn Grant and Graham Wilson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), 109.
39
Wyn Grant and Graham Wilson, The consequences of the global financial crisis: The rhetoric of reform and regulation,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6.
40
William Grimes, “Financial Regionalism after the Global Financial Crisis: Regionalist Impulses and National Strategies,” in
The consequences of the global financial crisis: The rhetoric of reform and regulation, ed. Wyn Grant and Graham Wilson,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 88.
27
of financial institutions cooperating to provide capital and decide the conditionalities of a
financing arrangement. With the UK and the US’ attention diverted to bailing out domestic
firms, they were unable to bail out other countries. Consequently, heavily indebted countries
approached non-Anglo-American lenders for capital, thereby increasing the role and relative
influence of regional groupings. East Asian governments and central banks responded so
effectively after the GFC that the region’s emerging markets actually experienced economic
growth for much of the crisis period.41 From an international political economy perspective, the
economic resilience of China and other East Asian economies led Goodstadt to believe that the
centre of the global economy was shifting eastwards and away from the New York-London
axis.42
East Asia’s success following the GFC was complemented by strengthened regional
integration. Member states of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and three
additional states (China, Indonesia, and South Korea) launched a $120 billion regional bailout
fund, termed the Chiang Mai Initiative, which Grimes believes will displace the IMF in future
East Asian crises.43 The rise of the Beijing-led Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank, which
is intended to rival the IMF in the provision of long-term financing to developing states, further
illustrates the challenge East Asia poses to the Anglo-American finance model in the post-GFC
era.
Looking East: China and the Anglo-American Special Relationship in the post-GFC era
The emergence of a successful East Asian response to the GFC, the weakened perception
of American and British power in both relative and absolute terms, and a delegitimised AngloAmerican finance model all hint that new strains may be emerging in the Anglo-American
financial relationship. Since 2008, the UK has actively sought deeper integration with the
Chinese economy, calling into question whether a new geo-economic centre no longer predicated
on the New York-London axis has emerged in the post-GFC era. Although we must recognise
that Sino-US economic relations dominate world trade, the scope of this section is restricted to
Sino-Anglo economic relations because of the UK’s heightened and rapid economic integration
with China following the GFC.
41
Ibid., 89.
Goodstadt, Reluctant regulators, 7.
43
Grimes, “Financial Regionalism,” 89.
42
28
Politicus Journal
Predicting the continued rise of Chinese economic power and the internationalisation of
its Renminbi currency, the UK’s Chancellor, George Osborne, and London’s financial
institutions have increasingly adopted pro-Sino economic policies. China has responded
favourably, and the UK is now the country’s largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
in Europe, with China having invested $17.8 billion in the UK since 2005.44 Several icons of
British industry now have Chinese owners; Chinese investors hold significant stakes in the UK’s
two busiest airports, Heathrow and Manchester, as well as in London’s water supplier, Thames
Water. The revered sports car brand, MG, is also under Chinese ownership, as is the cereal brand
Weetabix. Illustrating the deep penetration of Chinese FDI in the UK’s banking sphere, the
China Development Bank holds a 3.1 percent holding in British banking giant Barclays.45 This
FDI relationship causes some concern for the health of the Anglo-American Special
Relationship. From the US-funded Marshall Plan through 2008, strong FDI flows have
underpinned and strengthened Anglo-America’s deep economic interdependence. China’s rise as
an alternative source of British investment foreshadows the diffusion of geo-economic power in
the post-GFC era, away from the US and towards East Asia’s largest economy.
Further illustrating the courtship between China and the UK, the chair of China’s largest
property company told the BBC in 2015 that he considers the UK to be the “best place in the
world to invest.”46 This is not a one-way flow of FDI: by 2020, the UK will quadruple
investment in China, contributing £26 billion to its economy.47 The UK is also simplifying
Chinese investment in London. In 2014, the Bank of England appointed the state-owned China
Construction Bank as the Renminbi’s London-based clearing bank. A year earlier, a currency
swap agreement was made between the Bank of England and the Chinese central bank, allowing
London-based investors to invest directly in Renminbi-denominated stocks and shares, an
activity impossible for their American counterparts. Consequently, London-based asset managers
are the “only ones within the West able to invest directly in this manner.”48 With London already
accounting for 62 percent of Renminbi payments outside China, the city has secured a ‘first
44
Asa Bennett, “10 British Businesses You Don't Realise Are Backed By China,” The Huffington Post (UK),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/10/21/china-britain- business_n_4135090.html.
45
Ibid.
46
Linda Yueh, “Britain best place to invest, says China’s richest man,” British Broadcasting Corporation,
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31838296.
47
Rebecca Burn-Callander, “UK to 'quadruple' investment in China within five years,” The Telegraph (UK),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/11353826/UK-to- quadruple-investment-in-China-within-five-years.
48
Jeremy Green, “Global currency shifts and the City of London,” The University of Sheffield Political Economy Research
Institute, http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2014/10/21/global-currency-shifts-city-london.
29
mover advantage’ over New York-based financial institutions, which are begrudgingly being
compelled to acknowledge the changing fortunes of the dollar’s primacy in international trade.
Moreover, hinting that the UK’s political and economic elite are seeking alternatives to the US
Dollar in the wake of the GFC, George Osborne has suggested that the “emergence of China's
currency as one of the world's leading currencies will be the next huge change” in the financial
sector.49
Despite the downturn in Chinese stock exchanges in the second and third quarters of
2015, the Sino-Anglo financial courtship suggests that China and East Asia are slowly shifting
the global economy away from its traditional hearts of New York and London. Symbolically, the
UK’s endorsement of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in early 2015, to the
frustration of the US, transports the Sino-Anglo economic relationship from the bilateral to
multilateral spheres. Ostensibly seeking to rival the IMF, the AIIB provides alternative financing
structures to the financial liberalisation conditionalities characteristic of IMF loans. As a coarchitect of the IMF during the Bretton Woods meetings of the 1940s, the UK’s endorsement of
the AIIB illustrates that, although they are not shunning the IMF directly, they are receptive to
new multilateral financial institutions that are neither US-led, nor promote “self-correcting and
self-policing market policies” of the sort that caused the GFC.50
The US has not responded kindly to the positive economic relationship that exists
between the UK and China. Although certainly not as serious to the continuity of the AngloAmerican Special Relationship as the severe disagreement between the US and the UK during
the Suez Crisis of 1956, the spat over the UK’s endorsement of the AIIB was both a rare and
public phenomenon. However, what represents a more realistic threat to the sincerity and
longevity of the two states’ relationship will be the result of the UK’s 2017 referendum on
whether or not the UK should remain a member of the EU.
Prompted by the rise of right-wing Eurosceptic politicians, the Eurozone’s recent
instability following the Greek debt crisis, and fears that EU regulation might harm the interests
of London’s financial institutions, the UK’s wavering over its European future (‘Brexit’) has
become central to Anglo-American relations. As we explored earlier, the EU’s adoption of the
Euro in 2002 consolidated London as a centre of European finance, which greatly benefited the
49
British Broadcasting Corporation, “Bank of England names London Chinese currency clearing hub,” British Broadcasting
Corporation, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27901373.
50
Goodstadt, Reluctant regulators, 7.
30
Politicus Journal
US by offering it a proxy to enter the currency and capital markets of Europe. However, if
Britain votes to leave the EU, the US will be bereft of a vital lubricator that eases its access to
European economies.
The US has been vocal in its concern, highlighting the negative impact that ‘Brexit’ could
have on the Anglo-American Special Relationship. The US Assistant Secretary for European
Affairs stated publicly that the US has “a growing relationship with the EU as an
institution…and we want to see a strong British voice in that EU…that is in America’s
interests.”51 The leaders of Anglosphere states, including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,
have also expressed their preference for the UK to remain in the EU, because they believe that
the EU benefits from Britain’s liberal, pro-free trade views.52 If Britain does indeed leave the
EU, its importance as an economic partner to the US will be diminished, and the nation will risk
damaging its relationship with the US. From a broader perspective, Britain also risks disrupting
the genial interdependent, institutionalised, and integrated Special Relationships it enjoys with
the rest of the Anglosphere.53 In contrast with the US, China does not publicly harbour such
concerns about Brexit, as the stakes are low for Beijing. Indeed, the head of the China
Construction Bank is ambivalent about the UK’s future in the EU, and argues that the
referendum’s result “will not do any harm to trade or economic ties between the UK and
China.”54
A Terminal Crisis for Anglo-America?
To the chagrin of the US, the UK is confidently taking steps eastwards, raising the
question of whether this shift towards China represents a terminal crisis for the Anglo-American
special relationship. Certainly, the GFC delegitimised the Anglo-American financial structure as
the finest growth model in the post-War era. Moreover, the UK’s shift towards China suggests
that the Anglo-American Special Relationship is evolving to reflect a global political economy in
which power is more diffuse and new poles of economic dynamism of an East Asian flavour are
51
Kim Sengupta, “Obama administration warns Britain to stay in the European Union,” The Independent,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/obama-administration-warns-britain-to-stay-in-the-european-union8444789.html.
52
The Economist, “The geopolitical question.” The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21673511-mostbritains-friends-world-would-prefer-it-stay-geopolitical-question.
53
Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A genealogy of a racialized identity in international relations, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2011), 3.
54
Yueh, “Britain best place to invest.”
31
emerging. Should it then be concluded that the GFC represents a terminal crisis for AngloAmerica?
In short, no. There have been other serious economic crises for the Anglo-American
Special Relationship, including the 1949 devaluation of sterling, and the IMF crisis of 1976. In
these cases, the financial problems were, albeit serious, passing, and overcome by cooperation
between the two countries.55 To take the most serious non-economic spat between the two states,
constructivist scholar Janice Bially Mattern contends that the Suez Crisis of 1956 served as a
therapeutic moment to consolidate relations.56 This Anglo-American discord is remembered as a
“family spat” by former president Eisenhower, illustrating the lasting nature of Anglo-American
relations.57 Indeed, Bially Mattern argues that throughout the Suez Crisis, the British continually
referred to the primacy of the Anglo-American special Special Relationship to strengthen and
cement a unified conception of the Anglo-American identity.58 The ultimate goal was to preserve
trust in nonviolence and to “trap adversarial identities into acquiescence.”59 Applying insights
from Bially Mattern’s theory to the GFC, it is unlikely that the GFC will severely damage the
Anglo-American Special Relationship over the long term. Rather, the special relationship will
persist, thanks to the economic and non-economic linkages including shared values, norms, and
histories, which, although less tangible, are a vital source of mutual empowerment. Dobson and
Marsh contend that these identities helped cut across the financial disagreements between the
two countries in 1949 and 1976 by “[preventing] them from connecting strongly with power and
status and identity and values in such a way that they might develop ideological coherence.”60
Despite the economic debilitation of the GFC, the saliency and continued relevance of these
shared values illustrate that the Special Relationship will not be supressed in the near future.
Moreover, while both countries have incorporated a more Sino-centric flavour into their
respective economic policies, they have not moved away from each other in any drastic
economic fashion. Trade between the US and UK increased by 10.5 percent between 2013 and
2015, suggesting that greater collaboration with China is not mutually exclusive with continued
Anglo-American economic integration.61 Indeed, despite the US and China being each other’s
55
Dobson and Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations”, 688.
Janice Bially Mattern, "The power politics of identity," European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 3 (2001): 371.
57
Peter Mangold, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (Routledge Revivals), (London: Routledge, 2013), 181.
58
Bially Mattern, "The power politics of identity," 351.
59
Ibid.
60
Dobson and Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations”, 688.
61
United States Department of Trade, “Top U.S. Trade Partners.”
56
32
Politicus Journal
largest trade partners in terms of exports, this has not diminished either state’s economic
integration with the UK in the wake of the GFC, illustrating that Sino-Anglo, Sino-American,
and Anglo-American bilateral trade can continue to grow and strengthen without severely
disrupting Anglo-American relations.62 Moreover, there was no serious retreat from international
markets and Anglo-American-style laissez-faire markets following the GFC. Cronin goes
further, and contends that the system for overseeing the international economy when the GFC
broke proved durable, despite having been amended slightly to broaden its regulatory oversight
and becoming more tolerant of diversity in how states respond to crises.63 Thus, the notion that
the Anglo-American model of financial capitalism is entirely delegitimised or that it is
irreparable is somewhat absurd. Rather, it illustrates that the Anglo-American regulatory culture
is not the only formula for economic growth and stable financial markets.
British attachment to the Anglo-American special relationship remains strong, as
evidenced by Gordon Brown and David Cameron cleansing their relationship with Barack
Obama following the public opinion fallout of the Bush-Blair era.64 Such cooperation aligns with
Eznack’s argument that problems can serve as opportunities for allies to work together to prevent
future crises.65 Indeed, the monetary and regulatory authorities of both the UK and the US are
entering a phase of intense coordination and cooperation to prevent the failures of large financial
institutions.66 Coupled with largely similar legal systems and a lingua franca, this corrective and
cooperative dialogue, including the aforementioned Vickers Commission, illustrates the
continued strength of the Anglo-American Special Relationship. Moreover, although Wojcik
argues that the financial triad of Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong enjoys strong
complementarities, the political discontent between China and Hong Kong limits its potential to
challenge the traditionally affable relations between political and financial actors in the New
York-London axis.67 In contrast to the longer menu of financial instruments offered by the
Anglo-American financial metropoles, the East Asian cities focus on offshore transactions,
further limiting their influence. Furthermore, practical considerations render it unlikely that
62
Ibid.
Cronin, Global Rules, 312.
64
Dobson and Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations,” 686. The authors contend that “the Iraq War and its aftermath created strong
anti-American sentiment in Britain” and huge political problems.
65
Lucile Eznack, "Crises as signals of strength: The significance of affect in close allies’ relationships," Security Studies 20, no.
2 (2011): 238.
66
Dobson and Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations,” 688.
67
Wojcik, "The dark side of NY–LON”, 2748.
63
33
London-based financial institutions will relocate en masse should the ‘Brexit’ occur, for only the
“most swingeing regulation would outweigh the City’s agglomeration and time-zone benefits.”68
For an international firm to give up its presence in London is a difficult proposition, and such
threats appear rather contrived.
Indeed, world markets remain grounded upon the Anglo-American flavour of financial
liberalisation, albeit with slightly greater regulatory oversight than before the GFC. The leaders
of both the Bank of England and of the US Federal Reserve also argue that calls for a major
expansion of regulation are misguided, because regulators would be unable to keep up with the
pace and scale of financial innovation.69 Thus, the promise of improved regulatory performance
does not imply the downfall of the Anglo-American Special Relationship. On the contrary, the
model’s free market assumptions have persisted beyond the GFC, and have helped retain the
credibility and influence of the Anglo-American financial structure. As Cronin aptly notes,
although there are still occasional demands for a “de-Americanised” economic order following
the GFC, there have been few serious moves in this direction.70 Ultimately, New York and
London still have no serious challengers in terms of financial assets and transactions controlled.71
Of course, future events could deliver blows to the Anglo-American special relationship.
In the unlikely event that the fiercely left-wing British Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, wins the
next election, he would have drastically divergent defence and economic policies than his
potential American counterpart, Hillary Clinton. Moreover, future financial crises and the
‘Brexit’ would also strain the relationship, as would refugee, natural disaster, and climate change
challenges.
However, challenges to the relationship are not a new phenomenon. Since the ‘great
rapprochement’ during the final five years of the nineteenth century, the Anglo-American
Special Relationship has consistently illustrated its resiliency and elasticity in the way it
responds to disagreements between London and Washington. Despite the tensions that stemmed
from Suez, Vietnam, and Iraq, the cherished Special Relationship has persisted. Certainly, the
GFC shattered some illusions about the invincibility of the Anglo-American financial model and
has seen China come to occupy an increasingly important position in international finance, but
68
Ibid., 2748.
Goodstadt, Reluctant regulators, 33.
70
Cronin, Global Rules, 313.
71
Wojcik, "The dark side of NY–LON”, 2747.
69
34
Politicus Journal
the underlying shared norms and values of the Special Relationship have not been eradicated.
Moreover, China’s recent stock market crashes and the government’s chaotic response illustrate
that the Chinese growth model may not be as watertight as originally believed, calling into
question whether the Anglo-American financial model, with heightened regulation, has more
merits than recently held.
Thus, the Anglo-American Special Relationship will endure. As Eznack compellingly
argues, crises between allies should be seen as signals of strength.72 Indeed, the spat discussed
earlier between Geithner and Wheatley should be viewed in this light. Of course, the GFC hurt
both the British and American economies, and also called into question the legitimacy of the
Anglo-American liberal growth model that was convinced of the innate superiority of an
unpoliced market. Moreover, the UK’s economic courtship with China following the GFC
illustrates that the Anglo-American Special Relationship is evolving to reflect a more diffuse
global economy, where the new poles of economic dynamism are moving away from the New
York-London dyad, and towards China. However, it would be rather absurd to suggest that
greater Anglo-Chinese economic relations are incompatible with the Anglo-American Special
Relationship. In the past, economic crises have been overcome by the elastic nature of the
Anglo-American relationship, and the GFC is no different. Analogous to previous AngloAmerican crises such as Suez in 1956, the GFC has encouraged the UK and the US to seek ways
to avoid future problems. More revealing is that the global financial markets of today have not
strayed far from the pre-GFC Anglo-American liberal growth model. Indeed, no other two
centres enjoy the same degree of commonality, complementarity, connectivity, asset control, and
financial innovation as London and New York; their integration is truly special. Ultimately, the
deep economic, military, political, and cultural interdependence between the two states means
that the GFC should be regarded as yet another challenge that, although economically
debilitating, will inevitably be overcome by the sustained strength of the Special Relationship.
Interestingly, the British Airways business-class-only flight between London and New York is
thriving: a second service was added earlier this year.73
72
Eznack, "Crises as signals of strength,” 238.
Claire Wrathall, “Five years of Club World London City,” The Telegraph (UK),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/luxury/travel/47324/five-years-of-club-world-london-city.html.
73
35
Bibliography
Aldrick, Philip. “Bank of England governor Mervyn King warns unions accept cuts or 'fail your
children'”. The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/
8004109/Bank-of-England-governor-Mervyn-King-warns-unions-accept-cuts-or-failyour-children.html (accessed November 22, 2015).
Baker, Andrew. "Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories
of change in global financial governance." International Affairs 86, no. 3 (2010): 647663.
Baylis, John. "The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory." International Relations
8, no. 4 (1985): 368-379.
Bennett, Asa. “10 British Businesses You Don't Realise Are Backed By China”. The Huffington
Post (UK). http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/10/21/china-britainbusiness_n_4135090.html (accessed November 22, 2015).
Berenskoetter, Felix. "Friends, there are no friends? An intimate reframing of the international."
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 35, no. 3 (2007): 647-676.
Bially Mattern, Janice. "The power politics of identity." European Journal of International
Relations 7, no. 3 (2001): 349-397.
British Broadcasting Corporation. “Bank of England names London Chinese currency clearing
hub”. British Broadcasting Corporation. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27901373
(accessed November 10, 2015).
Burn-Callander, Rebecca. “UK to 'quadruple' investment in China within five years.” The
Telegraph (UK). http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/11353826/UK-toquadruple-investment-in-China-within-five-years.html (accessed November 24, 2015).
Carrington, Daisy. “Flying London to New York: It's cutthroat for airlines on highly prized
route.” CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/16/travel/london-to-new-york-its-cutthroat
(accessed November 20, 2015).
Cookson, Robert. “Wheatley attacks Geithner on Regulation.” Financial Times.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a56da44-91b0-11e0-b4a3-0144feab49a.htm
l#axzz3sNM67TsN (accessed November 15, 2015).
Cronin, James. Global Rules: America, Britain and a Disordered World. London: Yale
University Press, 2014.
Dobson, Alan, and Steve Marsh. “Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?”
International History Review 36, no. 4 (2014): 673-697.
Eznack, Lucile. "Crises as signals of strength: The significance of affect in close allies’
relationships." Security Studies 20, no. 2 (2011): 238-265.
Ferguson, Niall. “Nothing Special.” American Interest 1, (2006): 66-70.
Gallagher, Kevin. “Regaining Control? Capital Controls and the Global Financial Crisis,” in The
consequences of the global financial crisis: The rhetoric of reform and regulation, ed.
Wyn Grant and Graham Wilson 109-198. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Goodstadt, Leo. Reluctant regulators: how the West created and how China survived the global
financial crisis. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011.
Grant, Wyn, and Graham Wilson. The consequences of the global financial crisis: The
rhetoric of reform and regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
36
Politicus Journal
Green, Jeremy. “Global currency shifts and the City of London.” The University of Sheffield
Political Economy Research Institute. http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2014/10/21/globalcurrency-shifts-city-london (accessed November 23, 2015).
Grimes, William. “Financial Regionalism after the Global Financial Crisis: Regionalist Impulses
and National Strategies,” ed. Wyn Grant and Graham Wilson 88-108. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012.
Hitchens, Christopher. Blood, class, and empire: the enduring Anglo-American relationship.
New York: Nation Books, 2004.
Mangold, Peter. Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (Routledge Revivals). London:
Routledge, 2013.
O'Brien, Patrick. "The myth of Anglophone succession." New Left Review 24 (2003): 113-134.
Sengupta, Kim. “Obama administration warns Britain to stay in the European Union.” The
Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/obama-administrationwarns-britain-to-stay-in-the-european-union-8444789.html (accessed November 21,
2015).
Strange, Susan. Casino capitalism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.
The Economist. “The geopolitical question”. The Economist.
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21673511-most-britains-friends-worldwould-prefer-it-stay-geopolitical-question (accessed November 11, 2015).
Turner, Adair. Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
United States Department of Trade. “Top U.S. Trade Partners, 2015.” United States Government.
http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ia
n_003364.pdf (accessed November 8, 2015).
Vucetic, Srdjan. The Anglosphere: A genealogy of a racialized identity in international relations.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.
Wojcik, Dariusz. "The dark side of NY–LON: Financial centres and the global financial crisis."
Urban Studies 50, no. 13 (2013): 2736-2752.
Wrathall, Claire. “Five years of Club World London City.” The Telegraph (UK).
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/luxury/travel/47324/five-years-of-club-world-londoncity.html (accessed November 23, 2015).
Yueh, Linda. “Britain best place to invest, says China’s richest man.” British Broadcasting
Corporation. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31838296 (accessed November 23,
20
37
Don't Sleep on al-Qaeda: A Content Analysis of English Language Jihadist
Literature Targeted to the Anglosphere
Sam Koebrich
Using text mining software and content analysis methodologies, Don't Sleep on al-Qaeda looks at
corpuses of English-language Jihadist literature published by both al-Qaeda and ISIL. The two
groups are then compared and contrasted in their intent, capabilities, and ideologies, with particular
reverence paid to the threat each group poses to Western targets in the immediate future. The
results suggest that ISIL is hampered in he Syrian and Iraqi theaters, and that while its media
popularity is a factor in influencing already radicalized operatives, their focus on launching attacks
on the West is diminutive. These findings are then analyzed in the context of the Anglosphere and
France, highlighting how the actions of the West are often harmful or unproductive in preventing
terrorism. Ultimately, al-Qaeda's duplicitous ideology has long intended to portray Western
powers as occupying forces. The Anglosphere has repeatedly fallen victim to their ploys, and risks
doing so once more in underestimating their current posture.
Another year of horrific conflict in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere in the Middle
East has been punctuated by seeping terrorist attacks in the US, France, Tunisia, Beirut, Bahrain
and elsewhere. The rise of ISIL in 2015 inspired Islamophobia in the West and reignited a global
fear of terrorism hardly seen since the zenith of al-Qaeda. Is this fear justified, and how are the
perennial wagers of the ‘War on Terror’ – namely the US, the UK and France – reacting? This
paper will seek to answer these questions by first briefly theorizing modern strands of Salafist
terrorism, presenting original research findings, and scrutinizing the utility of the Anglosphere as
the chieftain in preventing terrorism.
al-Qaeda’s Gambit
An April 2004 voice message features a droll Usama bin Laden making an unexpected
proposal to European nations: If you withdraw your troops from the wars in the Middle East, alQaeda offers you a truce. The message was formally rejected, but nonetheless represents
archetypal al-Qaeda propaganda: rich in symbolism, anti-Americanism, and intended above all
else to divide and conquer. Just a month prior to the message being released, ten bombs shredded
commuter trains in Madrid, three days before general elections were held. The incumbent
Partido Popular was leading the polls before the attacks, but the Partido Socialista Obrero
Español won on the basis of their promise to withdraw from the Iraq War. al-Qaeda later claimed
38
PoliticusJournal
responsibility for the attacks, which were alluded to in bin Laden’s 2004 truce offer as
representative of al-Qaeda’s capabilities. Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Norway, and Italy all
withdrew from Iraq by 2005, many removed their troops ahead of schedule. Italian Prime
Minister Romano Prodi lambasted the war as a “grave mistake that has complicated rather than
solved the problem of security.”1 In 2009, following the departure of the last significant
supporting nation in Iraq – Australia – the ‘Multi-National Force’ was dissolved, and the US and
the UK were left as isolated allies.
In 2006, bin Laden extended the same truce offer to the Americans and the British, and
promised that if they refused, more 9/11 and 7/7 style attacks would follow. Neither country
accepted the offer, causing al-Qaeda’s divide and conquer gambit to fail. Looking back, this
chronology is almost surreal; considering the omnipresence of the threat of ISIL today, it is
unimaginable that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would extend a truce proposal to Western nations.
While France was not present in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Paris is currently seen as ISIL’s (read
terrorism’s) next front. Meanwhile, the ‘Anglo-American Special Relationship’ (AASR) that
endured through the ‘Long War’ in Iraq (and Afghanistan with the addition of Canada) is now
focusing on a strategy of containment. Bombs, intelligence, and diplomacy are the only tools
available in Iraq and Syria. The Anglosphere's strategy in the Middle East has shifted from
stability and regime change to containment and counterterrorism. The AASR will be discussed
later, but the implications of this paper hint that the rubric of the Anglosphere is becoming dated
– other actors, most notably France, need to be on the same page strategically, as they have an
equal commitment in fighting ISIL and are a valuable tertiary target of al-Qaeda.
So, how do we gauge this threat of terrorism? For decades, the motivation of al-Qaeda
was explained through two muddled arguments: ideology2 or grievances3. Does al-Qaeda attack
because its radical Salafist culture is fundamentally opposed to Western Liberalism and
capitalism à la Huntington4? Or has a century of British colonialism and decades of American
1
Sturcke, James. "Prodi Condemns Iraq War as 'grave Mistake'" The Guardian. 18 May 2006.
A good portion of the ideology argument has roots in the writings of the early Muslim Brotherhood ideologue
Sayid Qutb. This doctrine is explained in: Calvert, John. Sayyid Qutb and the origins of radical Islamism. Oxford
University Press, 2009. and Ryan, Michael. Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America.
Columbia University Press, 2013.
3
The ‘grievances’ or ‘intervention’ argument is best exemplified in Chomsky, Noam. 9-11: Was There an
Alternative?. Seven Stories Press, 2011.
4
Huntington, Samuel P. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Penguin Books India, 1997.
2
39
militancy in the Middle East triggered grievances and a desire for retaliation? Originally, I
envisioned that answering this question would hint at the motivations of the so-called bigger,
badder, threat of ISIL. However, my research found that the threat posed by radical Salafism is
not ingrained in the origination of any qualms, but is instead present in the current determination
and capability of terrorist groups.
One can imagine that, even if a country had accepted bin Laden’s offers of truce, not
much would have changed. While al-Qaeda would no longer have the ‘perpetual intervention’
grievance, the group would find a new complaint, such as cartoons depicting the Prophet
Muhammad protected by freedom of speech, or Western support for Israel, and use these
grievances to justify their continued attacks. However, the ideology argument is not capable of
standing independently – before the Mujahideen attacked America, they were at war with the
USSR in Afghanistan, not because of ideology, but in retaliation for occupation.
al-Qaeda’s propaganda has always exclaimed that they are misconstrued in the media, as
they do not hate freedom, but just want sovereignty over Muslim lands, and that they do not
mind the West, but just oppose the economic burden imposed by capitalist entities like the IMF
and the World Bank upon Arab governments. In fact, al-Qaeda’s literature often cites Western
ideologues like Malcolm X and Guevara as inspiration, and respected academics have suggested
that al-Qaeda’s ideology borrows more from Mao than from Muhammad5. Following the death
of bin Laden, al-Qaeda’s presence in the speeches of Obama or Cameron, or on the pages of the
The Daily Mail or The New York Times, can only be described as marginal. Meanwhile, ISIL is
discussed to such a large extent by the press that the West seems to be anticipating the next
attack without considering ISIL's determination or capabilities. ISIL has continuously been
analyzed under a geopolitical lens of its holdings in Iraq and Syria, but a constructivist content
analysis of how they are actually saying they pose an external threat to the West has never been
undertaken.
Though an information gap does exist, for the first time both al-Qaeda and ISIL are
actively speaking to Western audiences, and much can be gleaned from these communications.
Both groups publish glossy, well-written English language digital magazines. Both al-Qaeda’s
Inspire and ISIL’s Dabiq are available online in PDF format. The groups take media very
5
Ryan, Michael. Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy. p. 70-72. The quotes of Malcolm X appear several times in
Inspire, and Ryan writes in depth about the influence of Mao and Che on al-Qaeda.
40
PoliticusJournal
seriously: Anwar al-Awlaki, the American born and educated al-Qaeda commander was thought
to be Inspire’s Editor-in-Chief before being killed by a drone, and ISIL uses its magazine as a
platform to distribute content related to their infamous execution videos. The readership of these
magazines is fretfully large. The Tsarnaev Brothers followed the instructions for a ‘pressurecooker’ bomb published in Inspire to carry out the Boston Marathon Bombing, and Inspire also
provided strategic and tactical advice to the Charlie Hebdo terrorists. A paper issue of Inspire
was also reportedly found inside a Guantanamo Bay cell. ISIL’s Dabiq has been the group's
primary platform to lure Westerners on Hijrah, or travel to become a ‘foreign fighter’ for the
group. Possession of either magazine has been made illegal under certain pretenses in the UK. alQaeda has been publishing Inspire for five years, and has released 14 issues, while ISIL has been
publishing Dabiq for two, and has released 12 issues.
Using computational linguistic software, I performed a content analysis of the combined
1599 pages available of Inspire and Dabiq. I coded themes and keywords to assess the relative
volume of discussion each group is having over certain topics, working under the presumption
that dramatic differences in volume in certain topics will highlight hermeneutic differences in the
determination and capabilities of the groups6. Both qualitative and quantitative content analysis
will be presented in the findings, with some attention to discourses that display lesser-known
narratives used by the groups. The research question this paper will principally answer is
whether the supposedly dormant al-Qaeda or the surging ISIL poses a greater threat to the
national security of the Anglosphere in the immediate future. In the following pages the data will
be presented, key findings will be analyzed, and a section will place the findings in the context of
the AASR in the post-9/11 Middle East. A final section will outline prescriptions for the
Anglosphere in moving forward with counterterrorism.
Dabiq Issues 112 (680 Pages)
Inspire Issues 114 (911 Pages)
Difference
States and Communities
United States
862 (1.27)
2904 (3.19)
1.92 Inspire
West in General
215 (0.32)
463 (0.51)
0.19 Inspire
6
The methodology is further explained in an attached appendix
41
Israel
182 (0.27)
319 (0.35)
0.08 Inspire
United Kingdom
66 (0.10)
147 (0.16)
0.06 Inspire
Apostate (Pejorative reference to Arab Countries)
166 (0.24)
35 (0.04)
France
63 (0.09)
127 (0.14)
0.05 Inspire
Russia
123 (0.18)
41 (0.05)
0.13 Dabiq
Europe
61 (0.09)
70 (0.19)
0.1 Inspire
NATO
19 (0.03)
8 (0.00)
0.03 Dabiq
References to Each Other
ISIL
1146 (1.69)
11 (0.01)
1.68 Dabiq
War in Syria
773 (1.14)
70 (0.08)
1.06 Dabiq
al-Qaeda
173 (0.25)
392 (0.43)
0.18 Inspire
War in Yemen
139 (0.20)
311 (0.34)
0.14 Inspire
Justifications
Opposing Crusaders
581 (0.85)
205 (0.23)
0.62 Dabiq
Opposing Kafir / Infidel
472 (0.69)
126 (0.14)
0.55 Dabiq
Opposing Western Media
103 (0.15)
473 (0.52)
0.37 Inspire
Opposing Western Religion
323 (0.48)
217 (0.24)
0.24 Dabiq
Representing Ummah / Muslim Nationalism
134 (0.20)
365 (0.40)
0.2 Inspire
Desire for Caliphate
423 (0.62)
25 (0.03)
0.58 Dabiq
Desire for Shariah Law
272 (0.40)
162 (0.18)
0.22 Dabiq
Citations of Islamic Text
103 (0.15)
162 (0.18)
0.03 Inspire
Opposing Freedom of Speech / Drawing Prophet
9 (0.01)
72 (0.08)
0.07 Inspire
Methods and Capabilities
Jihad
554 (0.81)
1165 (1.28)
0.47 Inspire
Terrorist Attacks (on Western targets)
231 (0.35)
705 (0.77)
0.42 Inspire
Exhaust Western Economies
49 (0.07)
264 (0.29)
0.22 Inspire
Hijrah (Foreign Fighters)
204 (0.30)
18 (0.02)
0.28 Dabiq
Lone Wolf Attacks
5 (0.01)
135 (0.15)
0.14 Inspire
Findings and in the Content Analysis
42
0.2 Dabiq
PoliticusJournal
The total number of references to a given topic sorts the preceding table. Numbers in the
individual cells indicate the sum of all references on a given topic by magazine title, while the
parenthetical numbers represent the average number of references to that topic per-page. For
example, an average page of Inspire references the United States 3.19 times, while one in every
ten pages of Dabiq references the UK. The column on the right is the difference in the average
references per-page, and these cells are shaded proportionally to highlight the subjects with the
most divergence between the two magazines. The subjects and keywords examined were
grouped into four categories: geographic countries or communities, references to other jihadist
groups, justifications for terrorist attacks on the West, and the methods and capabilities of these
attacks. This section of the paper will outline the findings in each category.
States and Communities:
It is not surprising that both ISIL and al-Qaeda refer to the US more often than any other
nation, although al-Qaeda still refers to the US at a much higher rate than ISIL does – frequently
as ‘The Far Enemy’. These mentions range from grievances against the presence of US soldiers
in the Middle East to specific threats against a variety of targets. Israel is the second most
mentioned country in terms of total volume, although both groups routinely couple mentions of
Israel with mentions of the US in phrases such as “Zio-American,” or “without America’s
financial support for Israel, Israel would simply not be in the powerful state that it is in today.”
(Both from Inspire)
al-Qaeda references the UK and France at similar rates, but uses them in different
contexts. Most of the references to France come from a single issue of Inspire, which glorifies
the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks and instructs Western jihadists on how to plan similar
'lone wolf' style attacks. Sporadic grievances against France in Inspire include inciting threats
against French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy for looking to ban the Hijab, and perceived
transgressions against the Muslim community in Mali. ISIL refers to France in Dabiq in the
context of reprisal for France’s support of recent US coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, and
occasionally references the flow of ‘foreign fighters’ back into Europe.
Both groups reference the U.K. in curious ways. In Dabiq, both Mark Sykes and David
Cameron are referred to as “crusaders” for the Monarch. Dabiq also lambasts British newspapers
for their coverage of the Syrian war. Inspire views Britain as haplessly following America into
illegitimate wars in the Middle East. Likewise, the UK is referred to more frequently as a target
43
by al-Qaeda, and is often paired with a mention of the United States. Semantically, al-Qaeda
makes two specific hermeneutic references to the Anglosphere, one which states that “The
current Anglo-Saxon generation has been raised with this kind of arrogance mentality,” and
proceeds to criticize the treatment of blacks in the Anglosphere, comparing all Americans and
Brits with Aryan-supremacists. The close pairing of America and Britain (and occasionally
France), is present in much higher levels in Inspire than in Dabiq, suggesting that al-Qaeda
targets the nations (and the relationships between them) with more purpose, and at a higher rate,
than ISIL does.
A quote in a 2014 Inspire interview with a subject named “The AQ Chef” – rumored to
be Ibrahim al-Asiri, al-Qaeda’s ‘master bomb maker’, responsible for the tactically failed
underwear and printer cartridge bomb plots – outlines al-Qaeda’s selection of target states quite
clearly:
“Q: On whom is lone Jihâd, particularly this bomb, used?
A: Of course the first priority and the main focus should be on America, then the United Kingdom, then
France and so on. Together with this priority, we put capability in consideration. I mean, if I have five men
who can carry out operations in both the US and the UK, I will certainly send all the five to America, as
long as I have the option. But if I have no option but the UK and another country, I will go for the UK. This
goes on with the NATO countries as per the known order.” (From Inspire)
al-Qaeda has the determination to strike the US, but if their capabilities fail there, the UK, France
and other NATO countries will be targeted in that order until al-Qaeda find an unhardened target
they are capable of attacking.
Critics who say that Russia’s sole intention in Syria is to protect Assad should read
Dabiq, as ISIL more or less groups Russia with the Western coalition members in the skies over
Iraq and Syria. In Dabiq, ISIL claims responsibility for the bombing of Russian Metrojet Flight
9268 over the Sinai in October 2015 – but unlike Inspire, which would have used the opportunity
to provide instructions for readers to construct an identical bomb at home, ISIL provides few
tactical details. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda’s references to Russia mainly serve as a cautionary tale to
the West, rehashing the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the economic collapse that
followed. This comparison provides an interesting contrast to other states referred to by ISIL or
by al-Qaeda. While ISIL is willing to target Russia just like any other state with a presence in
Iraq or Syria, al-Qaeda is steadfast in choosing Western targets because of their important
symbolism.
44
PoliticusJournal
Dabiq also makes frequent references to the nation-states of Arab countries, almost
always in a pejorative context. While neither group recognizes Arab states – or any nation-state
for that matter – as legitimate, ISIL still discusses them in an insulting tone, while al-Qaeda
makes few mentions of them. This information becomes relevant when comparing the support
network of each group within the Arab states.
References to Each Other:
An interesting observation in this research is the dichotomous approaches used by ISIL
and al-Qaeda when the two make references to each other. ISIL frequently mentions al-Qaeda in
pejorative contexts – as illegitimate purveyors of the Islamic world. They criticize and attack
both the group’s ideologies and its operations on the ground in Iraq and Syria. ISIL also
strangely refers to al-Qaeda as puppets of “crusader” foreign policy – possibly referencing the
failed US arming of rebels in Syria: weapons that reportedly accidentally ended up in the hands
of Jabat al-Nusra. Other references include outlandish conspiracies designed to self-victimize
ISIL, including those suggesting that al-Qaeda and the US have arranged a separate peace.
Inspire seems to have an institutional policy of ignoring ISIL completely. The self-proclaimed
Islamic State is only mentioned 11 times in the Inspire corpus.
I also searched for references of the ongoing Syrian and Yemeni conflicts in both
magazines as a way to gauge how self-aware the groups are of current events. Interestingly, ISIL
spends many more pages recounting battles and providing updates of the current geopolitical
climate than al-Qaeda, which holistically avoids Syria and hardly mentions Yemen. It can be
inferred from this assessment that ISIL is preoccupied with its multifront war – waged against: at
least two rebel factions, the Syrian government, Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, Shia militias, the Iraqi
Army, the Kurds, al-Qaeda, and coalition airstrikes – in their publication of Dabiq. I use this data
to argue that the attrition of the Syrian war is consuming much of ISIL’s military and financial
resources. The production of a terrorist group is the product of its capabilities and determination,
so as long as ISIL is occupied on its home front, it will be difficult for them to levy the resources
required to launch a massive 9/11 style operation, and the group will be distracted. Meanwhile,
although al-Qaeda is engaged in warfare in Yemen, the findings of this research demonstrate that
they are focused on posing an external threat to the West rather than combat within an Arab
theater.
45
Justifications for Terrorism:
Both groups use Koranic and Islamic rhetoric in their magazines routinely, but ISIL does
so at a higher rate. Specific radical Salafist objectives, like establishing a Caliphate or Shariah
Law, are both emphasized in Dabiq far more than in Inspire. al-Qaeda discusses the Muslim
Ummah – an abstract nation constituted of all Muslims in the world – more than ISIL does. From
this, it can be inferred that al-Qaeda’s scope is still transnational, while ISIL is somewhat
contained within its own land holdings. This is significant when considering the effectiveness of
the Western coalition airstrikes against ISIL, which have been described by Barack Obama as
working under a strategy of containment7.
Another interesting finding are the references to Western media within Inspire. Western
media outlets are frequently discussed as propaganda arms for the Anglosphere and for France.
al-Qaeda also takes great offence at drawings or inappropriate references to the Prophet
Muhammad at a much higher rate than ISIL does, and claims that these provocations are hate
speech which should not be protected by any freedoms or rights.
Calls to Action:
Inspire works very hard to convince Muslims living in the West that they have a duty to
perform jihad, that the most effective and rewarding form of jihad is martyrdom in the West, and
that they should perform these attacks without attempting to contact al-Qaeda or travel to the
Middle East to avoid detection from authorities. al-Qaeda emphasizes that even if operatives fail
at destroying their target, the economic and psychological impact of terrorism is still effective.
Inspire often provides detailed instructions to carry out the types of attacks that al-Qaeda
believes will cause the most success, and lists specific targets. A sampling of the most distressing
instructions include articles on how to make: homemade explosives capable of evading airport
security checkpoints, “pressure-cooker” style bombs, and car bombs. The publication also offers
advice for planning mass shootings and assassinations as well as an assortment of potential
targets in the US, the UK, and France. More outlandish attacks that don’t require martyrdom are
also discussed, some of which include lighting forest fires in locations like Montana to inflict
significant economic costs, or “pour[ing] [cooking] oil before the bend” of highways to cause
7
Mendelsohn, Barak. "Divide and Conquer in Syria and Iraq." Foreign Affairs. 29 November 2015. In tragic irony,
Obama also proclaimed that ISIL was contained in an ABC News interview mere hours before the November 2015
Paris attacks.
46
PoliticusJournal
automobile accidents. These suggestions may appear ridiculous, but must be recognized as part
of the sizeable toolbox al-Qaeda is providing to would-be jihadists in the West.
Dabiq espouses the infamous 'lone wolf' attack far more than Inspire does. Dabiq rarely
encourages readers to perform terrorist operations in the West, and when it does, it provides no
instructions, unlike Inspire. One possible reason for this difference is that ISIL has alternative
distribution methods for this type of propaganda, and another possibility is that ISIL is not
advocating 'lone wolf' attacks to the extent that the media and policy makers have interpreted. It
is far too early to draw conclusions from the recent tragedy in Paris, but it should be noted that
several of the terrorists are believed to have not only traveled to and from Syria, but also to have
received direct operational guidance from ISIL. Dabiq also encourages readers to engage in
Hijrah, or the travel of foreign fighters to ISIL, at a rate more than ten times that of al-Qaeda,
suggesting that ISIL is reliant on ground fighters – especially Western ones they can posturize –
whereas al-Qaeda would prefer Westerners to launch 'lone wolf' style attacks than travel to the
Middle East. It can therefore be deduced that counterterrorism policies in the US and the UK
should be anticipating the threat of al-Qaeda members executing 'lone wolf' style attacks to a
similar if not greater extent than ISIL. A dreadful example of this is the shooting in San
Bernardino on December 2, 2015. While the 'lone wolf' attack was quickly attributed to ISIL,
and at least one of the shooters had made recent statements in support of the group, later
information revealed that the shooters were supportive of al-Qaeda several years prior, and that
they had likely been readers of Inspire.8
A final takeaway is the externalities considered by both groups. ISIL routinely describes
attacks simply in a retaliatory fashion: against nations with a presence in Iraq and Syria. With
this viewpoint, it becomes apparent that acts of terrorism, like the Paris attacks, were strategized
with the objective of maximizing casualties. This is deplorable, but does not reflect the same
strategy advocated in Inspire. A comparison of the corpuses identifies that ISIL does not
fetishize symbolism or externalities to the extent al-Qaeda does. al-Qaeda advocates methodical,
deliberate targeting and timing of attacks to maximize the psychological and economic impact of
terrorism. The ‘body count’ is secondary to the symbolism, and the economic element is a very
significant part of al-Qaeda’s grand strategy. Inspire glorifies the failed 2010 printer-cartridge
8
Coverage in the Los Angeles Times such as “Online loan may have helped couple fund their terror arsenal in San
Bernardino attack” directly links bombs used by the terrorists with instructions in Inspire.
47
mail bomb plot as an operational success despite the fact that it never caused any physical
damage. The group insists that the plot – named “Operation Hemorrhage” – cost them only
$4,200, but “will without a doubt cost America and other Western countries billions of dollars in
new security measures. That is what we call leverage.” Identical reasoning is used to explain
other ‘failed’ plots. al-Qaeda’s grand strategy is to win a war of attrition by combining the
massive economic cost of counterterrorism policies with the ever present psychological fear of
'lone wolf' style attacks. al-Qaeda wants British and American ‘boots on the ground’, they want
Westerners to be annoyed by having to take their shoes off at airports, and they want the West to
expand their defense budgets. In this sense, they anticipate the externalities of attacks in a way
that ISIL so far does not.
Findings Conclusion:
In July 2015, FBI Director James Comey spoke at the Aspen Institute, and lamented that
“What keeps me up at night ... is the ISIL threat in the homeland.”9 Hundreds of media
organizations spun that quote into a headline, and corresponding views are now most likely
present in the minds of most Americans, British, and French citizens. While the threat of ISIL in
the Anglosphere (and beyond) should not be discounted, the threat of al-Qaeda is also very real.
A distinction between the types of threats posed by each group can be deduced from the
preceding section. ISIL is overwhelmed by trying to maintain its territory, and will use terrorism
as an external threat to dissuade governments from further targeting them. While their capability
to launch terrorist attacks on the West is hampered, and their determination distracted, they still
desire retaliation.
al-Qaeda is still very active, and maintains both the capability and the determination to
terrorize the West. They are leveraging sympathy from deranged individuals – some of which are
likely cross-pollinated from ISIL’s online presence – in an attempt to launch low risk/high
reward 'lone wolf' attacks on the West without much effort. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda’s operational
command structure is still plotting larger symbolic attacks – like the ones on Charlie Hebdo or
9/11. Though there is a limit to what can be extrapolated from this content analysis, the project
has provided significant credibility to the argument that al-Qaeda is still an external threat,
perhaps a larger one than ISIL, and that its primary target is the Anglosphere.
9
Grygo, Katherine. "FBI Director: ISIL Is 'Not Your Parent's Al Qaeda'" Interview. The Aspen Institute. “The
Complexity of Today’s Global Threat Environment”, 23 July 2015.
48
PoliticusJournal
Relevance to the Study of the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR)
The study of any specialness in the relationship of two states should be nearly
omnipresent and apparent in isolation. Looking at any slice of the culture, trade, communication,
or military, the two states should be distinguishable from any control subject. This is why
apparitions in the AASR (like Suez) are so remarkable – they are entirely unexpected
considering the sum of all other parts of the relationship. In isolation, the study of the post-9/11
military operations of the US and the UK in MENA is worthy of being labeled ‘special’, but the
Anglosphere’s combined track record in counterterrorism operations is troubling.
Studies of the AASR in the Middle East often look at the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when
Britain followed the US into a possibly illegal war. While some cite Former UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair as “Bush’s poodle”, a caricature that portrays Britain as haplessly following
American foreign policy without much forethought, others, such as Edward Luck, believe that
both Bush and Blair recognized the ‘Special Relationship’, and allowed their “hardline [stances]
on Baghdad” to reinforce one another10. For what it is worth, Wallace and Phillips demonstrate
that Blair was a significant proponent of the AASR invading Afghanistan as well11. A
perspective like this pulls the AASR in post-9/11 MENA out from an isolated appraisal, but
reiterates that the two allies shared both values and abstract interests in the ‘Global War on
Terror’ (GWOT).
Following the invasion, Iraq serves as an excellent example of mission creep. While the
initial goal was to remove Saddam Hussein and secure WMDs, it was later to protect human
rights12, then to establish a government and reorganize a national army, then to fight an
insurgency, and so on. As aforementioned, the UK was the only country that stuck with the US
every time the goalposts shifted. The Labour Party had little at stake, yet sacrificed blood, gold,
and an immeasurable amount of political clout to follow America into Iraq. While realists can
10
Luck, Edward C. "Bush, Iraq, and the UN: Whose idea was this anyway?." Wars on Terrorism and Iraq: Human
Rights, Unilateralism, and US Foreign Policy(2004): 135-154. p. 145.
Luck cites a 2002 British research poll where the question of Blair’s “poodleness” was posed to Brits directly.
Thirty-eight percent agreed.
11
Wallace, William, and Christopher Phillips. "Reassessing the special relationship." International affairs 85.2
(2009): 263-284.
12
Christopher Hitchens surprisingly supported this “neoconservative” argument, and stuck with it too. In a 2008
piece the author states that the war had a positive impact. Hitchens, Christopher. "How Did I get Iraq Wrong?: I
Didn’t.” Slate. March 17, 2008.
49
say that the UK shared the interests of the GWOT with America, especially after the 7/7 attacks,
constructivists can posit that the shared cultural norms between the US and the UK enabled a
pervasive level of trust within the AASR, which caused the war to continue.
A more significant indicator of the AASR in post-9/11 MENA was the 2001 invasion of
Afghanistan. The UK resoundingly echoed the US offer to the Taliban government to extradite
bin Laden pre-Invasion, and once the offer was refused, the Royal Navy participated in the initial
bombing of Afghanistan before the end of September 200113. By October, Operation Enduring
Freedom was launched with the clear mandate to remove the Taliban government and isolate the
Taliban’s ideology from al-Qaeda’s. The Taliban was forced into insurgency status, and by 2008,
had separated from al-Qaeda following peace-talks between the Taliban and the Afghani
government14.
While the AASR is apparent in the GWOT, it has not been particularly good at
counterterrorism. The actions it did take, which included target hardening, mass surveillance,
drone operations, and detentions, played into radical Salfist grievances and incurred enormous
economic and psychological costs. Adam Svendsen performed an exhaustive analysis of the UK
and US counterterrorism strategies in Afghanistan, and concluded that shared operational values
deem the two allies as ‘special’, but that NATO or Western presence in Afghanistan was
ultimately counter-productive at preventing terrorism. Svendsen argues that the “battle of hearts
and minds” was lost in Afghanistan, and “[A]t worst, the counter-terrorism strategies were not
sufficiently effective.”15 The largest consequence of the GWOT was the creation of a
dichotomous “Self-Other” relationship between the Anglosphere and the Middle East. The
objectives of counterterrorism and counterjihad have been obfuscated by a misperception of
jihadist strategy and doctrine16. By demarcating the culture, ethnicity, and religion of jihadists,
Westerners have failed to see why and for what they attack. It is prudent to consider aspects like
grievances and ideology in the present – factors like Guantanamo, drones, extraordinary
rendition, and rentier capitalism are often debated in this vein – to understand how the current
13
Svendsen, Adam DM. Intelligence cooperation and the war on terror: Anglo-American security relations after
9/11. Routledge, 2009. p. 83
14
Robertson, Nic. "Sources: Taliban Split with Al Qaeda, Seek Peace." CNN. 26 Oct. 2008.
15
Svendsen, Adam. Intelligence Cooperation. p. 92.
16
Vucetic, Srdjan. The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations Stanford
University Press. (Kindle Locations 3121-3124).
50
PoliticusJournal
actions of the AASR and its allies are contributing justifications for additional terrorism.
However, historic grievances cannot be answered for, and these alone seem adequate enough to
fuel some level of an external threat.
So why is the external threat of terrorism so dangerous to the Anglo-American Special
Relationship? Principally, because of the political psychology it leverages, which explains how
reactions to terrorist attacks (with relatively few fatalities) inflict drastic systemic changes17.
Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison cite "the inherently emotional nature of global terrorism”
as pervasive within the foreign policy of the AASR18. While the scale of an external threat from
Russia or China is far greater than that of one from al-Qaeda or ISIL, the emotional leverage of
terrorism demands respect. Brent Sasley extends this argument to say “Radical Islamists and
American foreign and domestic policy (in the context of the war on terrorism) then interact with
and continually humiliate each other in a mutually constitutive process.”19 Furthermore, the
preceding content analysis demonstrates that al-Qaeda has preferential targets on the US, the
UK, and France (in that order). The upshot is clear: the threat of radical Salafist terrorism has
become institutionalized within the foreign policies of those threatened.
Prescriptions and Conclusion
With the UK having just decided to extend airstrikes into Syria against ISIL, it appears
that the AASR is united in deployment once more. But perhaps the issue of counterterrorism is
large enough to look beyond the rubric of the Anglosphere. It seems that France, with its recent
military deployments in Afghanistan, Libya, and now in Iraq and Syria, has equal stakes in this
engagement. The Anglosphere – strategically at least – seems to be outdated in its membership
count. The future of the AASR intuitively represents the leadership of NATO, and while alQaeda will continue to principally target the US, the threat of ISIL is relevant to the UK and
France as well. Neither must be overlooked. Considering the findings of this content analysis,
several conclusions can be made: a lighter footprint imposes less collateral damage, defense
17
Gilpin, Robert. War and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Bleiker, Roland, and Emma Hutchison. "Fear no more: emotions and world politics." Review of international
studies 34.S1 (2008): 115-135.
19
Sasley, Brent E. "Theorizing States’ Emotions."International Studies Review 13.3 (2011): 452-476.
18
51
spending is not always the answer, and counterterrorism needs to extend beyond Iraq and Syria
and work to delegitimize the doctrines of radical Salafism.
The intervention narrative – that grievances from collateral damage of Western
interventions instill revenge in Muslim populations – is not the only motivation of radical
Salafist groups, but it is a commonly cited justification by both al-Qaeda and ISIL. Considering
this, the West ought to avoid playing into it as much as possible. The containment of ISIL can
only succeed insofar as it creates less damage than it prevents. Additionally, the war cannot be
won with airstrikes alone. Jihadist narratives will augment themselves to justify attacks against
any enemy. The only way to defeat radical Salafism is to completely delegitimize their
justifications as to prevent radicalization. Actions like aiding refugees, targeting the likely
audiences of propaganda such as Inspire and Dabiq with counter-propaganda, and creating a
dialogue with Muslim populations (at home and abroad) will lessen the impact of radical Salafist
messaging.
Moreover, it needs to be understood that spending more on preventing attacks from ISIL
or al-Qaeda in the Anglosphere is not guaranteeing security. In the case of al-Qaeda, spending
great sums of money for marginal improvements in security is exactly what they want the
Anglosphere to do. It is incomparably cheaper for al-Qaeda to exploit holes than it is for the
West to cover them up, and this is exactly what al-Qaeda will continue to do. This is not to say
that sacrifices in security should be rationalized as cutting costs, but to show that it is important
to understand the grand strategy of these enemies and how they are measuring success.
Finally, it must be understood that the self-proclaimed Islamic State is not the be-all and
end-all of terrorism in the world today. In fact, as this paper has argued, al-Qaeda’s threat to
launch both 'lone wolf' style attacks and larger symbolic operations is most likely greater than
that of ISIL’s, in both capability and in determination. The Syrian and Iraqi theaters are just one
area of sanctuary for terrorism in the Middle East. The Anglosphere should take care to
accurately gauge the threat in locations like Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which all serve
as refuges for al-Qaeda. Furthermore, counterterrorism is not just a foreign policy either. Policies
at home, such as deradicalization programs that have been successfully implemented in the UK
52
PoliticusJournal
are an effective tool against 'lone wolf' style attacks20. Delegitimizing the justifications provided
in al-Qaeda’s Inspire and ISIL’s Dabiq needs to occur within the Anglosphere as well.
The bottom line is this: the AASR has been apparent in the Middle East post-9/11
through attempts to engage in counterterrorism, however these attempts have largely failed and
the threat is still very real. Despite the appeal of knee-jerk arguments to refocus Western foreign
policy on combating or containing ISIL, the threat of al-Qaeda is still potentially larger and must
be considered as such.
Appendix: Methodology of the Content Analysis Project
I originally intended this project to be entirely focused as a discourse rather than as a
content analysis project. I started by reading the five most recent issues of both Inspire and
Dabiq, and interpreting the text by tallying instances of themes such as colonialism, objections to
past Western interventions, objections to Western culture, media, and religion, citations of
Islamic text or al-Qaeda doctrine, and references to specific countries. However, after reading
several issues of each magazine, the results were muddled. After coding a few hundred pages of
fairly depressing content, it was becoming difficult to differentiate between various themes, and I
was worried that the data collection was becoming un-empirical. I set about a different course by
instead performing a content analysis, refined with the selection of key quotes to bring in shades
of discourses.
I converted the PDFs of all issues21 of both magazines into two separate corpuses, and
then imported these corpuses into AntConc22. Then, I generated a world list of all words used in
both corpuses and compared this word list against the Brown English Reference Corpus,23 which
produced a list of keywords found in Inspire or Dabiq that were not frequently found in standard
English. I identified themes to test for through preliminary readings of what was, or was not,
being discussed, and sorted frequently used keywords under each of these themes. I then
performed a search of the keyword lists for each respective theme. Using the concordance
20
Griffith-Dickson, Gwen, Andrew Dickson, and Ivermee Robert. "Counter-extremism and De-radicalisation in the
UK: a Contemporary Overview."Journal for Deradicalization (2014): 26-37.
21
All issues are available in safe PDF format on Jihadology.net an academic project of Aaron Zelin, a PhD
candidate focusing on jihad studies. Zelin also hosts a great podcast on the topic of Jihad Studies, the title of this
paper is inspired by an episode.
22
AntConc is a free text analysis software used in linguistics fields.
23
Francis, W. Nelson, and Henry Kucera. "Brown corpus manual." Brown University (1979).
53
functionality of AntConc, I studied the search results to ensure that mentions of the keywords
were in an appropriate context for the given theme. For reference, the keyword lists for each
theme are listed below.
America: america*, far enemy, obama, clinton, bush, Clinton, Kerry, Rice, Powell, US,
US, New York, Washington, Boston, Los Angeles,
West in General: West*
Israel: Israel, Netanyahu, Zio*, Jew*
United Kingdom: UK, U.K., United Kingdom, Brit*, England, Cameron, Blair, Churchill,
London
Apostate (Pejorative reference to Arab Countries): apostate
France: France, French, Sarkozy, Paris
Russia: Russia*, Putin, Soviet, USSR, USS.R., Moscow, Kremlin
Europe: Europe*, EU, European Union
NATO: NATO
ISIL: Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL
War in Syria: Assad, Raqqa*, Mosul, PKK, Syria*, Sinjar, FSA, Tabqa, Koban*, YPG,
Homs
al-Qaeda: AL-QĀ’IDAH, al-Qaeda, al qaeda
War in Yemen: Yemen, Hadi, Saleh, Houthi*, Sana’a, Aden, Adan
Opposing Crusaders: Crusade*, War Against Islam, War on Islam,
Opposing Kafir / Infidel: Kaf*, Kufr, kuffār
Opposing Western Media: Media
Opposing Western Religion: Christian*, Secular*, Jew*
Representing Ummah / Muslim Nationalism: ummah
Desire for Caliphate: Khilāfah, Caliphate
Citations of Islamic Text: }, ﴿ (stylized parentheses used in every instance of a
Koranic citation)
Desire for Shariah Law: Sharī, Shari*
Opposing Freedom of Speech / Drawing Prophet: insult, drawing, cartoon, freedom of
speech
Jihad: jihād, jihad, jihâd
Terrorist Attacks (on Western targets): terror*, bomb, assassinate, threat,
explosive*, belt*, package*
Exhaust Western Economies: econ*, spend*
Hijrah (Foreign Fighters): Hijrah
Lone Wolf Attacks: lone, homegrown, home-grown
The advantage of this methodology is that it allowed for a much larger sample size and
for a positive level of precision in counting the usage of themes. A drawback is that certain
themes could have been referred to without using searchable keywords. I spent an exhaustive
amount of time looking at the complete word list to ensure that no often-used keywords were
being missed, but likely missed some references. However, this can only mean that the recorded
data is under-reporting the total number of references, making the findings even more troubling.
54
PoliticusJournal
The original intention of a true discourse analysis was inspired by the constructivist
works of Srdjan Vucetic in The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in
International Relations and other projects where Vucetic credits the methodology of Ted Hopf.24
Works Cited
Bleiker, Roland, and Emma Hutchison. "Fear no more: emotions and world politics." Review of
international studies 34.S1 (2008)
Calvert, John. Sayyid Qutb and the origins of radical Islamism. Oxford University Press, 2009.
Chomsky, Noam. 9-11: Was There an Alternative?. Seven Stories Press, 2011.
Gilpin, Robert. War and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Francis, W. Nelson, and Henry Kucera. "Brown corpus manual." Brown University (1979).
Griffith-Dickson, Gwen, Andrew Dickson, and Ivermee Robert. "Counter-extremism and Deradicalisation in the UK: a Contemporary Overview."Journal for Deradicalization (2014): 2637.
Grygo, Katherine. "FBI Director: ISIL Is 'Not Your Parent's Al Qaeda'" Interview. The Aspen
Institute. “The Complexity of Today’s Global Threat Environment”, 23 July 2015.
Hitchens, Christopher. "How Did I get Iraq Wrong?: I Didn’t.” Slate. March 17, 2008.
Hopf, Ted. The Social Construction and International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies,
Moscow 1955 and 1999. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
Huntington, Samuel P. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Penguin
Books India, 1997.
Luck, Edward C. "Bush, Iraq, and the UN: Whose idea was this anyway?." Wars on Terrorism
and Iraq: Human Rights, Unilateralism, and US Foreign Policy(2004): 135-154.
Mendelsohn, Barak. "Divide and Conquer in Syria and Iraq." Foreign Affairs. 29 November
2015.
Robertson, Nic. "Sources: Taliban Split with Al Qaeda, Seek Peace." CNN. 26 Oct. 2008.
24
Hopf, Ted. The Social Construction and International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 and
1999. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
55
Ryan, Michael. Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. Columbia
University Press, 2013.
Sasley, Brent E. "Theorizing States’ Emotions."International Studies Review 13.3 (2011): 452476.
Sturcke, James. "Prodi Condemns Iraq War as 'grave Mistake'" The Guardian. 18 May 2006.
Svendsen, Adam DM. Intelligence cooperation and the war on terror: Anglo-American security
relations after 9/11. Routledge, 2009.
Vucetic, Srdjan. The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International
Relations Stanford University Press.
Wallace, William, and Christopher Phillips. "Reassessing the special relationship." International
affairs 85.2 (2009): 263-284
56
PoliticusJournal
Nuclear Atlanticism: The US, The UK, & The Nuclear Bomb
Andrew Myers
The United States and the United Kingdom have a longstanding history that dates back to the
original thirteen colonies. As time has progressed, these two countries have grown so close that
some have argued that they share a relationship that goes beyond that of traditional interstate
relations. This paper argues for the existence of an Anglo-American Special Relationship, in virtue
of the unprecedented level of nuclear information shared between the two countries.
Although the defining characteristic of the international system is its anarchical nature,
due to inequalities in power and influence amongst states, some states are viewed to be more
powerful than others. Atop this perceived hierarchy are the ‘superpowers’: countries with a vast
degree of clout in the international sphere. The world has seen a number of so-called
superpowers in recent memory; the UK, the Soviet Union, and the US have all been given the
name at one time. The twentieth century saw a marked shift at the top of this international
hierarchy. In 1901, the United Kingdom was the world’s superpower, but by the year 2000, the
United States had taken over. What was unique about this power transition was that it occurred
in a peaceful manner. Throughout history, power transitions like these have precipitated war1.
Academics have attempted to explain the peacefulness of this transition with many different
theories and frameworks from all of the major schools of thought. Feng Yongping summarizes
many of these previous attempts in an article, and concludes that the causes for this smooth
transition are best explained by constructivist theories2. Yongping argues that the relatively calm
transition can be attributed to the strong sense of collective identity, high level of mutual
See Henk Houweling and Jan G. Siccama’s “Power Transitions as a Cause of War” The
Journal on Conflict Resolution 32, no.1 (1988)
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/32/1/87.full.pdf+html (Accessed Nov. 28 2015)
2
Feng Yongping, “The Peaceful Transitions of Power From the UK to the US” Chinese Journal
of International Politics 18, no.4 (2015):84101http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/83.full.pdf+html (Accessed Nov. 28 2015)
1
57
international support, and increasing levels of consolidation and interaction during this time
period3.
While each argument regarding the quiet transition has both merits and faults, it is clear
that, regardless of the cause, these two countries enjoy a relationship that is abnormal for two
powerful states within the anarchical international system. This belief has led to the great debate
surrounding the existence of what is referred to as the ‘Anglo-American Special Relationship’
(AASR). While academics like Niall Ferguson and Alex Danchev question the existence of such
a relationship, others, such as Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, argue that it does exist4. It is the
purpose of this paper to argue that there is in fact an Anglo-American Special Relationship, and
to show that one must look no further than the unprecedented level of nuclear proliferation
between the two countries to find evidence of the ‘specialness’ of this relationship. This paper
will begin by examining the nuclear history that exists between these countries in order to argue
for the existence of the AASR, followed by a comparison of the AASR to the nuclear
relationship between the United States and France, before turning its attention back to the AASR
with a focus on the current development of the F-35 fighter jet, a project in which both the US
and the UK are heavily involved.
The first person to popularize the term ‘special’ in reference to the Anglo-American
relationship was Winston Churchill in 1946. In a speech delivered at Westminster College in
Fulton, Missouri, Churchill used two terms that would go on to become extremely well-known:
the Soviet “Iron Curtain”, and the “Special Relationship” that existed between the United States
and the United Kingdom5. In this speech, Churchill framed the way the Western world would
view the Soviet Communists, as he was staunch in his belief that the Anglo-American
relationship was going to be the key to combatting the spread of Communism across the globe.
Although this was one of the first recorded instances of the relationship being referred to as
‘special’, it is not necessarily when the relationship took on this quality.
Ibid, 101.
4
See Niall Ferguson “Nothing Special” American Interest 1 (2006):66-70, Alex Danchev “On
Specialness” International Affairs 72 (1996):737-750, Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, “AngloAmerican Relations: End of a Special Relationship?” International History Review 36, no.4
(2014):673-697
5
Author Unknown. “A Point of View: Churchill and the Birth of the Special Relationship” BBC
News. 11 March 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17272610. (Accessed Nov. 29 2015)
3
58
PoliticusJournal
As Dobson and Marsh argue, a ‘special’ relationship is one in which “special bilateral
relations transcend the norms and conventions of the international system of independent nationstates”6; the ‘special’ quality of the Anglo-American Special Relationship stems from the
unparalleled sharing of nuclear information and weapons systems between the United States and
the United Kingdom. This nuclear information partnership began in 1943, and still continues to
this day, although it experienced a hiatus from 1946 to 1958.
In 1941 and 1942, there was a growing concern in both the United States and in the
United Kingdom that there was the possibility of either party building a nuclear weapon before
the War was over7. Both the British and the Americans had an interest in using nuclear
technology, and were at first skeptical about sharing any sort of information. However, the US
and the UK understood the importance of being the first to develop this weapon, and so, on
August 19, 1943, at a conference in Quebec, both agreed, “to share the atomic bomb”8. In
practice, this meant that all of the parties involved would work together and share all relevant
information to develop it. Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill understood the
importance of the bomb not only as a wartime technology, but as a beneficial device in the postwar world as well. Although no one initially had a complete appreciation for the destructive
power of the atomic bomb, it was clear to both countries how significant this technological
advancement was going to be.
After the signing of the Quebec Agreement in 1943, scientists from Britain and from
Canada were asked to join the Manhattan Project, which was the code name given to the
American nuclear bomb project that was currently underway in the US9. By July of 1945, the
scientists involved with the project had succeeded in detonating the world’s first Atomic bomb10.
One month after the first successful test, the Americans used this new technology for the first
and only time in history against an enemy when two Atomic bombs were dropped on the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The success of the Manhattan Project ushered in the
6
Dobson and Marsh, 681.
7
Martin J. Sherwin, “The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: US Atomic Energy
Policy and Diplomacy 1941-1945” The American Historical Review 78, no.4 (October
1973):945-968 http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1858347.pdf?acceptTC=true (Accessed Nov.29
2015)
8
Ibid, 952
9
Encyclopedia Britannica, Online. s.v.“Manhattan Project”, Author Unknown.
10
Ibid.
59
nuclear age, and effectively ended the Second World War. Nuclear weapons had officially been
introduced to the world, and their power was unmatched. However, despite the joint success of
the Manhattan project, the immediate post-war years saw a rift grow between the US and the
UK.
Immediately following the end of World War Two, the American government had a
decision to make in regards to its new nuclear capabilities: should they keep the information a
closely guarded secret, or share it with its allies? Faced with this issue, the United States decided
to pass the McMahon Act in 1946, “prohibiting the passing of atomic energy information to all
foreign countries, including Britain, on pain of life imprisonment or even death”11. This move
greatly upset the British, as the countries had previously agreed in the Quebec Agreement to
share the bomb and the relevant information once it was developed. The British felt as though
they had significantly contributed to the Manhattan Project, and were now being prevented from
enjoying the fruits of their labor. In response to the McMahon Act, the British government relaunched their independent nuclear weapons program in 1947, as the government felt as though
“atomic weapons were essential to maintain national security”12. The signing of the McMahon
Act, and the British response, marks the beginning of the hiatus in nuclear information sharing
between the US and the UK, which would last over a decade.
July of 1953 saw the successful test of a Soviet nuclear device, which caused recently
inaugurated President Eisenhower to declare the McMahon Act obsolete, as the American
monopoly on nuclear weapons was now over. Eisenhower was concerned that the McMahon Act
had alienated the US from its NATO allies, which weakened the alliance while simultaneously
improving the Soviets’ capabilities. The United States government passed the 1954 Atomic
Energy Act in an attempt to improve cooperation among its allies, but the bill was largely
ineffective due to congressional opposition and disputes within competing government
agencies13. In 1957, due to the growing Soviet threat, Eisenhower invited British Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan to a conference in Bermuda in order to attempt to restore the bilateral
relations between the US and the UK14. While the meeting in Bermuda was a success in regards
John Bayliss, “Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations for the Anglo-American
Nuclear Relationship” Diplomatic History 25, no.1 (Winter 2001):33-61, quote on 35.
12
ibid
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid, 40.
11
60
PoliticusJournal
to the renewal of relations, as the President and the Prime Minister came to an agreement
respecting defense and military cooperation, no formal treaty was signed15.
Deliberation between the two countries on the topic of nuclear information sharing
continued throughout 1957 and into 1958, with delegates from both countries meeting frequently
to discuss to how much information each nation was willing to divulge. While the British were
keen to be let in on the abundance of nuclear information possessed by the Americans, there
were some in Washington who remained hesitant, believing that doing so would lead to an arms
race. Eventually, however, these concerns were laid to rest by a provision that, in the event of an
agreement being reached with any of America’s allies, the nation would only divulge atomic
weapons secrets to countries that had “made substantial progress in the nuclear field”16. Finally,
on July 2, 1958, the United States and the United Kingdom signed an agreement for
“Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes”, often referred to as
the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA), ending the twelve year hiatus on nuclear
cooperation between the two countries.17. The agreement stated that the United States and the
United Kingdom promised to share information regarding defence plans, personnel training, the
development of atomic weapons systems, and all other relevant information18. Although much of
the Agreement is still classified, “it is known, however, that the agreement provides for extensive
co-operation on…nuclear weapons to improve design, development, and fabrication capability”,
as well as the transfer of Nuclear warhead material19.
The first substantial implementation of the MDA was with the Polaris Sales Agreement
of 1963. The Polaris Agreement allowed the United Kingdom to “acquire, support, and operate”
the US designed and manufactured Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
system20. In return for the nuclear arsenal, the UK agreed to utilize its new weapon system for
the defence of all of NATO, while maintaining the ability to also defend itself under extreme
circumstances. The Polaris weapons system remained the UK’s nuclear deterrent for almost
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid, 48.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
UK Parliament.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114we12.htm
(Accessed Dec. 1 2015)
20
Ibid
61
twenty years before the Polaris Sales Agreement was amended in 1982 to allow the UK to
upgrade its nuclear arsenal to the US designed Trident missile system, which it still uses today21.
The Trident system, like the Polaris system it replaced, is also a submarine-based nuclear
weapons system. It consists of four nuclear powered submarines, fifty Trident II ballistic
missiles, and one hundred and sixty nuclear warheads22. Although the UK operates the Trident
system, they remain dependent on the United States for its maintenance.
The signing of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement was the watershed moment for the
Anglo-American Special Relationship, as their relationship immediately transcended that which
would normally be expected between two states. The MDA, which led to the acquisition of an
American nuclear weapons system by the British, is the result of the specialness of this marriage.
It is important to note the unprecedented nature of this relationship. In 1968, the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT)23 was created, banning five states who had nuclear
weapons (The US, the UK, China, France, and Russia), from participating in the proliferation of
any nuclear weapons technology. Any other state with aspirations of acquiring its own nuclear
arsenal could not receive assistance from any of these recognized nuclear states, and would have
to be self-reliant in terms of the development and procurement of nuclear weapons. As one can
begin to see, the nuclear information sharing that occurred between the US and the UK is clearly
significant, as no other nuclear states share this type of relationship
In international relations, realism is one of the major traditional schools of thought. Most
realists would argue that a nation is, at its core, motivated by the desire to maximize power while
continuing to act according to its own self-interests. As Dobson and Marsh argue, the nuclear
aspect of the Anglo-American Special Relationship is significant because it goes directly against
the canon of realist thought24. The United States had already acquired the knowledge necessary
to develop and deliver nuclear weapons prior to signing the MDA. To willingly pass this
information on to another country that did not have equal capabilities goes against the core of
realism, which argues that nations, in order to do whatever they can to ensure their own security,
21
Ibid
22
Ibid
23
United Nations. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (Accessed Dec. 2
2015)
24
Dobson and Marsh, 681.
62
PoliticusJournal
must understand that “today’s ally could be tomorrow’s foe”25. However, the United States, in
delivering a nuclear weapons system to the United Kingdom, did exactly the opposite, and
displayed a level of cooperation between two nations that has not been seen before or since.
There are those who would argue that the United States established a similar relationship
with France in regards to the development of nuclear weapons, a fact which would potentially
detract from the ‘specialness’ of the AASR. In 1970, American President Richard Nixon and
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger agreed to covertly assist the French with their ballistic missile
program26. “Under the arrangement, Washington furnished information to France on how to
design and build nuclear weapons and how to deliver them by missiles and aircraft”27. In order to
avoid breaking the law on illegally proliferating nuclear information, the United States used a
technique referred to as ‘negative guidance’ in order to assist the French. In practice, this
technique was similar to a game of ‘twenty questions’, whereby scientists in the United States
would listen to the French describe the techniques they were attempting and then instruct their
French counterparts on what they were doing wrong. This allowed the United States to “steer
[France] away from research paths that the more mature United States nuclear weapons program
had already found flawed”28. The decision to help the French was made for two reasons by the
Americans. Firstly, it reintegrated France into the NATO alliance, and secondly, it “[increased]
uncertainty in the Soviet Union about a calamitous response to military aggression”29. Although
there is no debating the existence of the French-American agreement, the relationship does not
approach the levels of cooperation seen in the Anglo-American Special Relationship.
A major difference in the US-France relationship and the AASR is the covert nature of
the US-France arrangement. The decision to help the French was made in secret, and was
referred to as “perhaps the best-kept secret in recent Washington history”, unlike the agreements
25
Ibid.
26
National Security Archive, George Washington University.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb346/ (Accessed Dec. 2 2015)
27
Charles Mohr. “US Secretly Helped France Develop Nuclear Weapons, an Expert Writes” The
New York Times 28 May 1989. http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/28/world/us-secretly-helpedfrance-develop-nuclear-weapons-an-expert-writes.html?pagewanted=all Web. (Accessed Dec. 3
2015)
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
63
between the United States and the United Kingdom, which were considered public knowledge30.
The clandestine nature of the US-France arrangement shows the lack of a close diplomatic
relationship between the two countries, as secret agreements between states are better indicators
of a lack of a ‘special’ relationship than the presence of one. If the United States and France had
a relationship that rivaled the AASR, there would be no need to keep this arrangement behind
closed doors, as the news that the US was assisting the French in their development of nuclear
weapons would come as little surprise to most. Instead, because these two states lack the type of
‘special’ relationship that existed between the US and the UK, both the Americans and the
French decided to keep the deal a secret. Another difference between the US-France agreement
and the AASR is that the French still developed and designed their own weapons, while the
British purchased a weapons system that was developed and designed by the Americans. While
the French nuclear deterrent was developed with assistance from the Americans, that assistance
is in no way comparable to the level of cooperation between the US and the UK. As Bruno
Tertrais argued, “Washington never provided a warhead design or anything of the sort that
France would not have been able to develop on its own”31. Furthermore, the United Kingdom
remains dependent on the United States for both the missiles and the upkeep of its nuclear
arsenal, while the French system is independent of the United States. Another significant
difference is the fact that France was already a recognized nuclear power by the NPT when the
Americans agreed to provide assistance to them. Lastly, the United States and France do not
have an agreement in place like the MDA that exists between the US and the UK. The MDA is
far more comprehensive than any other nuclear agreement that the United States has entered into
with any other country, and will remain in effect until 2024, when it will likely be renewed
again, barring a significant change in the international system. Clearly, the US-France nuclear
relationship does not rival the AASR, which reinforces how ‘special’ the Anglo-American
relationship is. Although there are some scholars, such as Janice Bially Mattern, who argue that
the United States treated the UK with more leniency than they showed France throughout the
30
Ibid
31
Bruno Tertrais, “US-French Nuclear Cooperation: Stretching the Limits on National Strategic
Paradigms” James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) 26 July 2011
http://wmdjunction.com/110726_us_french_cooperation.htm Web. (Accessed Dec. 3 2015)
64
PoliticusJournal
20th century, this further departure from the traditional norms of interstate relations is further
evidence of a ‘Special Relationship’ existing between the US and UK32.
The significant level of military cooperation between the United States and the United
Kingdom goes beyond just their nuclear agreement as well, which is further evidence of the
Anglo-American Special Relationship. One such example of notable cooperation is the role of
the UK in the current F-35 fifth generation fighter jet procurement project. Referred to as the
“Joint Strike Fighter program”, it is a project being undertaken by the United States and eight of
its allies to develop the next generation of fighter jets33. Within the program, the eight countries
assisting the United States with the development of these aircraft are divided into different levels
based on the size of their contribution. The United Kingdom is the largest contributor to the
program, being the only level one partner and considered “a collaborative partner in the
definition of requirements and aircraft design”34. The United Kingdom is also going to be the
largest purchaser of the F-35 jet outside of the United States once they are available, giving the
UK an interoperability advantage with the United States in future joint-military expeditions. This
commitment on the part of the United Kingdom to further integrate its military with the United
States’ is further evidence of the existence and entrenchment of the AASR in both countries.
In conclusion, due to the unparalleled level of nuclear proliferation and cooperation
between the United States and the United Kingdom, it is obvious that the Anglo-American
Special Relationship exists. The relationship began in 1943 at the Quebec Conference,
experienced a twelve-year hiatus beginning in 1946 with the signing of the McMahon Act, and
was finally entrenched in the signing of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement between the US
and the UK. Although some might argue that France and the US enjoyed a similar relationship,
this paper has found that claim to be untrue. France and the US never had the same level of
cooperation or dependency that exists in the nuclear relationship between the US and the UK,
and the partnership of the two nations therefore never rivaled the Anglo-American Special
Relationship. The AASR has been a fairly steady presence in the international system since
See Janice Bially Mattern’s “Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and
Representational Force” New York: Routledge, 2005.
33
Joint Strike Fighter Program. http://www.jsf.mil/program/prog_intl.htm Web. (Accessed Dec.
3 2015)
34
Jeremiah Gertler, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program” (report prepared for the members
of Congress,CongressionalResearchService,29April2014)23.
32
65
1958, and lies at the heart of the NATO alliance. As insecurity around the globe shows no signs
of slowing down, the Anglo-American Special Relationship can play an effective role in
mitigating security crises both at home and internationally through diplomacy and intervention.
The AASR has the international clout as well as the capabilities to contribute to, and foster, a
safer and more hospitable international community. As both the US and the UK look to the
future of their relationship, one can only hope that it endures.
Works Cited
AuthorUnknown.JointStrikeFighterProgram.http://www.jsf.mil/program/prog_intl.htm
Web.(AccessedDec.32015)
AuthorUnknown.NationalSecurityArchive,GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb346/(AccessedDec.22015)
AuthorUnknown.UnitedNations.http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml
(AccessedDec.22015)
AuthorUnknown.“APointofView:ChurchillandtheBirthoftheSpecialRelationship”BBC
News.11March2012.http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17272610.(AccessedNov.
292015)
Bayliss,John.“ExchangingNuclearSecrets:LayingtheFoundationsfortheAnglo-American
NuclearRelationship”DiplomaticHistory25,no.1(Winter2001):33-61,quoteon35.
Danchev,Alex.“OnSpecialness”InternationalAffairs72(1996):737-750.
Dobson,AlanP.andSteveMarsh,“Anglo-AmericanRelations:EndofaSpecialRelationship?”
InternationalHistoryReview36,no.4(2014):673-697.
EncyclopediaBritannica,Online.s.v.“ManhattanProject”,AuthorUnknown.
Fenwick,Toby.“RetiringTrident:AnAlternativeProposalforUKNuclearDeterrence”(Report
forCentreForum,February2015)
Ferguson,Niall.“NothingSpecial”AmericanInterest1(2006):66-70.
66
PoliticusJournal
Gertler,Jeremiah.“F-35JointStrikeFighter(JSF)Program”(reportpreparedforthemembersof
Congress,CongressionalResearchService,29April2014)23.
Houweling,HenkandJanG.Siccama.“PowerTransitionsasaCauseofWar”TheJournalon
ConflictResolution32,no.1(1988)http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/32/1/87.full.pdf+html
(AccessedNov.282015)
Mattern,JaniceBially.“OrderingInternationalPolitics:Identity,Crisis,andRepresentational
Force”NewYork:Routledge,2005.
Mohr,Charles.“USSecretlyHelpedFranceDevelopNuclearWeapons,anExpertWrites”The
NewYorkTimes28May1989.http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/28/world/us-secretlyhelped-france-develop-nuclear-weapons-an-expert-writes.html?pagewanted=allWeb.
(AccessedDec.32015)
Sherwin,MartinJ.“TheAtomicBombandtheOriginsoftheColdWar:USAtomicEnergyPolicy
andDiplomacy1941-1945”TheAmericanHistoricalReview78,no.4(October1973):945968http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1858347.pdf?acceptTC=true(AccessedNov.29
2015)
Tertrais,Bruno.“US-FrenchNuclearCooperation:StretchingtheLimitsonNationalStrategic
Paradigms”JamesMartinCentreforNonproliferationStudies(CNS)26July2011
http://wmdjunction.com/110726_us_french_cooperation.htmWeb.(AccessedDec.3
2015)
UKParliament.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114we12.ht
m(AccessedDec.12015)
Yongping,Feng.“ThePeacefulTransitionsofPowerFromtheUKtotheUS”ChineseJournalof
InternationalPolitics18,no.4(2015):84101http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/83.full.pdf+html(AccessedNov.282015)
67
THE GERMAN FACTOR: EURO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN
POST COLD-WAR EUROPE
Maddie Pace
Within both the academic and political communities, the US-UK relationship is considered to be
special. However, the degree to which it exists as the most special and what makes it so special is
highly contested. Some refer to nuclear information sharing, others to mutual strategic interests or
common enemies, and still others to explanations ranging from the emotional to the material.
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the erosion of political power of the USSR, and the declining
threat of communism, the question of what held the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR)
together was at the forefront of political minds. Germany emerged from its reunification,
threatening to eclipse the tenuous Anglo-American Special Relationship, which had lost its firm
footing in the loss of a common enemy. This paper will consider the dynamics of relationships
between European countries and the US in post-Cold War Europe, utilizing the Gulf War as a case
study of the British intent to resituate themselves at the core of US transatlantic security policy.
The US-UK relationship is considered in academic and political circles as being
noteworthy, or special. However, the definition of special and degree to which the relationship
exists as the most special is highly contested. This paper is concerned with the era following the
fall of the Berlin Wall, the erosion of political power of the USSR, and the declining threat of
communism – commonly referred to as the post-Cold War period. During this period, as the
Cold War tensions relaxed and a tentative détente was reached, a pervasive discourse of
terminalism emerged. This discourse claimed that, without a common enemy such as the Axis
Powers or the Soviet Union, the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) could not
endure.
While these terminalist views were being propagated, Germany was emerging from
reunification in a position of relative strength. Once a “dire enemy” of the West, the nation was
now a “staunch Western ally”. The transformation of Germany’s status can be explained as a
“discursive resource for delegitimizing policy options opposed to Germany’s incorporation into
68
PoliticusJournal
American-led military and economic institutions.”1 In other words, a reunified Germany could
serve to be a valuable American ally, both militarily and economically. In the pro-AASR camp,
there was great concern that with its growing economy and freedom from the hold of
communism, Germany would grow to eclipse the UK’s own tenuous position as the most special
of relationships with the United States.
This fear of Germany’s ascension can certainly be attributed at least in part to comments
made by American President George H.W. Bush. As Coker wrote, "even before German
unification was dreamed of, in April 1989, Bush on his first visit to Europe as President talked of
a 'partnership' between America and Germany, a phrase that went down badly in London - as
well it might.”2 Bush’s statement in 1989 at Mainz and again in 1990 in an address to Germany,
both of which declared the US and Germany to be “partners in leadership,”3 were signals to
many that Germany posed a serious threat to the ‘specialness’ of the marriage between the UK
and the US. However, this concern failed to culminate in the UK’s displacement, as the vision
that Germany and the US should become “partners in leadership” never developed past the
rhetorical stage.
This paper will consider the dynamics of relationships between Germany, the UK and the
US in post-Cold War Europe, and seek to understand why it was that Germany never ascended to
the position that Bush declared it would. It will examine why Germany evolved from being such
a threat to the UK to being relatively inoffensive, and how the UK reasserted themselves in the
face of this threat. What it aims to establish is that there were a series of challenges that were
preventing Germany from becoming a useful partner to the US, which the UK capitalized on in
order to maintain its status. These restraints included economic and military factors, which were
influenced by historical and legal elements that restricted Germany’s ability to perform and
ascend to a position of primacy in terms of specialness. It will also argue that the Gulf War
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of
the West (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2009), viii.
2
Christopher Coker, “Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s,”
International Affairs 68 (July 1992): 407-421, 411.
3
George H. Bush, “Address to the German People on the Reunification of Germany,” (address
by President George Bush, October 2, 1990). Retrieved from http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6901002.htm
1
69
served as the newest lynchpin in the Anglo-American relationship, which had always been based
around common enemies and mutual interests.
Specialness is a subject of concern for scholars of the Anglo-American relationship.
Scholars debate whether or not this Special Relationship exists, and if it does, what makes it so
special. Generally, scholars fall into three camps on the AASR. Some argue it exists and appears
to exist, others claim it exists but does not appear to, and finally, some argue that it does not exist
though it may appear to. Alex Danchev proposes a classification system that divides scholarship
on the AASR into three types – evangelical, functional, and terminal. Those who approach the
AASR with an evangelical standpoint hold that the relationship is an emotional and idealistic
framework that leads to justice and peace. Functionalists believe the AASR is an interest-based
relationship that is negotiated and has a functional purpose. The final category of AASR scholars
are called terminalists – those who believed that it existed at one point (usually during WW2) but
decayed in the post-Cold War era. 4 This is the category to which both Danchev and Coker
belong. This paper’s view of the relationship is a functionalist one, which stands in direct
objection to both the terminalist standpoint and to Coker’s viewpoint that the British “will have
no place at all” in the New World Order.5 The Anglo-American Special Relationship does exist,
and appears to, however, it exists on the basis of the usefulness and functionality of both nations
in a partnership. As a State Department policy paper set out in April 1950 states:
The British and with them the rest of the Commonwealth, particularly
the older dominions, are our most reliable and useful allies, with whom
a special relationship should exist. This relationship is not an end in
itself but must be used as an instrument of achieving common
objectives. We cannot afford to permit a deterioration in our
relationship with the British.6
In any relationship, there is a calculation of the benefits that can be reaped for both
parties. Coker underestimates the Gulf War’s ability to give the British a chance to resituate
themselves at the core of transatlantic security policy. This will be a consideration of immense
importance in the examinations of the quality of American relationships with their European
counterparts, Britain and Germany.
4
Alex Danchev, “On Specialness,” International Affairs 72 (October 1996): 737-50, 738-740.
5
Coker, “Britain and the New World Order,” 411.
6
Kathleen Burk, “How did the Anglo-American Relationship become essential?” (Lecture
presented at King’s College London, July 6, 2011), 4.
70
PoliticusJournal
To begin, this paper will consider the military factors at play in the German-American
relationship by using the Gulf War as a case study. However, one must first consider the
historical and legal elements that restricted Germany’s ability to prove itself to be the military
“partner in leadership” for which the US had hoped. Germany’s security culture was unique
following the end of the Cold War. Germany’s constitution, or Basic Law, proved to be a
powerful restraint on the country. In Article 26 of German Basic Law, Germany renounced all
forms of aggression, and “declared any intentions to disturb the peaceful relations between
nations as unconstitutional and a punishable offence.”7
What the German Basic Law does or does not allow the German government to do has
become a hotly contested political issue following the First Gulf War. It contains a ban against
any war of aggression in Article 26. “Article 24, however, allows the entry into a system of
collective security for the maintenance of peace; that was the constitutional basis for the
country's entry into NATO in the 1950s.”8
The controversial aspect, and the major concern during the Gulf War crisis, was the
differing views on the extent to which Basic Law confined Germany militarism. Some view
Basic Law as allowing German forces outside of Germany so long as it is part of a collective
action designed to maintain peace. This understanding would allow their participation in the Gulf
collective; however, the German government at the time chose to interpret it as limiting
Germany to self-defense.9
This legal limitation obviously arose from historical grievances, namely WW2. “In light
of the disastrous consequences of German militarism during the Nazi period, a stable antimilitarist political culture has evolved in Germany,”10 and was reinforced by the concern from
surrounding countries that there would be an abuse of power coming from the German camp
again in the future.
Klaus-Dieter Mensel, “The United States and the United Germany: Partners in Leadership,” in
Can America Remain Committed: U.S. Security Horizons in the 1990s, ed. David Haglund
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 97.
8
Ronald Asmus, “Germany After the Gulf War,” (paper prepared for the United States Air force
by RAND Co., Santa Monica, California, 1992), 4.
9
Asmus, “Germany After the Gulf War,” 5.
10
Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, “Germany and the use of military force: ‘total war,’
the ‘culture of restraint’ and the quest for normality,” German Politics 10 (2001): 61-82, 62.
7
71
With regards to how these legal limitations impacted the German threat to the AASR,
"the Gulf War suggested that there was a definite need to clarify the substance of such notions as
‘partners in leadership’ in operational terms."11 This conflict proved to be an intense trial for
German policy makers, as they faced a tough situation: restraint was required, considering the
implications of their history as well as the latent fear of German militarization from European
countries. However, this need for restraint contrasted with a conflicting allegation in the
international sphere that Germany was attempting to use its past to evade obligations. This
perceived evasion of obligations resonated as anti-American with nations around the world, and
most importantly, with the Americans themselves.12
This perception of German anti-Americanism was not necessarily justified. A telling and
yet concerning aspect of the German debate at the onset of the crisis “was the almost total lack of
any discussion about German strategic interests in the Gulf and how they should guide policy.
Instead, the terms were set by such issues, as whether Germans ‘owed’ the United States political
support in the Gulf in return for American support during the unification process...”13
Furthermore, Germany had other focuses at the time – particularly their reunification process that required vast amounts of resources and political motivation to address.
The result of these conflicting issues was a ‘pay, not play’ tactic, where Germany
contributed funds rather than sending troops. This aimed to demonstrate German support for the
Americans without alienating or threatening those who perceived Germany as militarily
untrustworthy. Even a considerable financial contribution of eleven billion dollars, and the
delivery of military equipment and supplies14 was not enough to quell American displeasure at
the perceived lack of solidarity.
Part of the American disappointment can surely be attributed to their opinion that they
must present a united front against Iraq’s President and dictator, Saddam Hussein. In an August
1990 meeting of the National Security Council, General Powell said that “the real solution must
Asmus, “Germany After the Gulf War,” viii.
12
Mensel, “The United States and the United Germany,” 90. 13
Asmus, “Germany After the Gulf War,” vi.
14
Diana Jean Schemo, “Germany's lukewarm support of gulf war leaves its allies cold,”
Baltimore Sun, March 13, 1991, accessed November 30, 2015,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-03-13/news/1991072044_1_gulf-war-persian-gulfgermany.
11
72
PoliticusJournal
be long term. It is an international and regional problem, so the whole world must realize this has
got to be dealt with internationally.”15 It is of little doubt that a strong and durable alliance
demands the ability of all members to contribute, particularly in displays of military support. The
disappointment on the part of the Americans is thus based upon a perceived weak and inadequate
assistance from a state that they had claimed just months earlier was their “partner in leadership”.
As Ron Asmus of California-based research institute RAND Corp. stated, “it's not so much that
people are upset at Germany's non-participation in the Gulf War. It's more so the longer-term
prospect of a Germany that is deeply divided and can no longer play the leadership role that we
had hoped for it that is seriously troubling Washington.”16
With that being said, “the goals of banning war and maintaining freedom, peace, and
justice were the legal-political rationales”17 of Germany's military policy. This perception of
military power left little room for the campaigns that took place in the Gulf. Following the Gulf
War, there was great debate in Germany focused on the issue of amending German Basic Law to
allow German forces participation (by NATO or UN guidelines). However, it is not clear
whether Germany would have acted any differently during the crisis, based on their history and
resulting culture of anti-militarism. It is only clear that the Gulf War demonstrated Germany’s
inability at the time to assume military responsibilities that threatened to cast a negative or
unflattering light upon them so soon after reunification and with trepidation still present in the
international community. Based on American disappointment and frustration, this was
undoubtedly a major restraint on the Germany-American partnership in leadership that had
threatened to replace the AASR as the most special of American relationships.
With regards to economic factors, at the time of Bush’s proclamation that the US and
Germany would be “partners in leadership,” Germany was growing both in prosperity and in
political status. However, following the initial enthusiasm about German unification, and the
reintegration of Germany into the European and global markets following the end of the Cold
War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany’s economy tanked in the early 1990s. Germany’s
ability to contribute such a vast sum to the Gulf War collective was due to its surprisingly strong
15
National Security Council, “NSC Meeting on the Persian Gulf,” (Minutes from the Meeting of
the NSC Meeting, Washington, D.C., August 3, 1990), 9.
16
Schemo, “Germany's lukewarm support of gulf war leaves its allies cold.”
17
Mensel, “The United States and the United Germany,” 89.
73
economy prior to and immediately following unification, despite having to cope with the
pressures of supporting East Germany and reconstructing the state as a whole. However, this
initial success “deteriorated by 1992 and remained dismal for the remainder of the 1990s.”18
Germany became known as the “sick man of Europe” during this period.19
It appeared that the much-praised Modell Deutschland and the favourable conditions that
allowed Germany’s economy to excel in the 1970s and into the 1980s vanished or held little
sway in the 90s.20 As Kitschelt and Streeck wrote in the early 2000s, “dramatically declining
economic performance has raised the question whether Germany can cope with the economic,
demographic and cultural challenges of a new century.” Unemployment doubled, GDP growth
was meager, social security programs were cut or degraded, and, from 1990 until 2003, Germany
experienced the weakest overall growth in all exports as well as in its strong manufacturing
sector out of the G5 countries (UK, US, France and Japan).21 This indicated to economists that
Germany’s lack of diversification could prove to be hugely impactful on its manufacturing base
that had long been its primary economic focus. “The overall picture is one of a German political
economy that produces only slow innovation and adjustment. Growth trailed most other major
economies in the 1990s”22 with the gap increasingly widening.
Obviously a huge part of the vulnerability of the German economy can be attributed to
the effects of re-unification, which placed great demand on the economy. Sharp tax increases to
finance the economy of the East and to pay for the “large deficits in the social security systems
of the New Länder”23 placed significant burdens on the population of Germany. Economists have
18
Jorg Bibow, “The economic consequences of German unification: The impact of misguided
macroeconomic policies,” Public Policy Brief, Jerome Levy Economic Institute of Bard College
67 (2001): 1-37, 2.
19
Christian Dustmann et al., “From Sick Man of Europe to Economic Superstar,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 28 (Winter 2014): 167-188, 167.
20
Herbert Kitschelt and Wolfgang Streeck, “From Stability to Stagnation: Germany at the
Beginning of the Twenty-First Century,” West European Politics 26 (2003): 1-34, 10.
21
Bibow, “The economic consequences of German unification,” 2; Kitschelt and Streeck, “From
Stability to Stagnation,” 14.
22
Kitschelt and Streeck, “From Stability to Stagnation,” 18.
23
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, “Germany’s growth performance in
the 1990s,” (An economic paper presented to the Economic Commission, May 2002): 1-106,
Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication1878_en.pdf.
74
PoliticusJournal
argued that it was this same taxation which led to negative growth and had such a major impact
on the development of Germany’s economy in the second half of the 90s.
As stated previously, it is important that all members of an alliance contribute in
meaningful ways to ensure its strength and durability. It is also crucial that all members make a
significant economic contribution. As Germany became less able to do this, the Americans
seemed to lose faith in what they had once hoped to be a successful partnership, particularly
because Germany’s economic weakness was compounded by their inability to offer support in
the form of military assistance.
This study of the evolution of the German-American relationship is not useful simply for
explaining the competition for primacy between the UK and Germany, but also serves as a
powerful point of comparison to the trials and tribulations of the AASR. Many of the issues that
Germany faced which weakened their partnership with the US were similar in nature to the
problems that had affected the Anglo-American relationship in the past. Economic and military
factors proved to be weaknesses throughout the history of the relationship, presumably as the US
felt that they had little to gain from a special relationship with the UK, which was contributing
little.
In terms of military factors, similarly to how the Gulf War was a source of frustration and
friction for the relationship between Germany and the US, Vietnam and Suez were sources of
tension for the partnership between the British and the US. The US had tried and failed to get the
British to fight in Vietnam alongside them. The story goes that President Johnson:
reacted with some bitterness to this refusal, asking why the
British could not send even a token force? ‘A platoon of bagpipes
would be sufficient; it was the British flag that they wanted.’ The
Americans became increasingly blunt about their disappointment,
with the Secretary of State telling a British journalist that: ‘All we
needed was one regiment. The Black Watch would have done.
Just one regiment, but you wouldn’t. Well, don’t expect us to
save you again. They can invade Sussex, and we wouldn’t do a
damned thing about it.’24
Again, the actions and reactions of both countries were based on functional reasoning and
self-interested motivations. The US was disappointed, since American foreign policy in the 70s
Burk, “How did the Anglo-American Relationship become essential?,” 18.
24
75
was largely focused on the Vietnam War, whereas the British were facing political and economic
troubles at home.
From the American viewpoint, whether or not the British believed in the American
initiative in Vietnam was besides the point – what mattered was that the British showed
themselves to be an unreliable ally in a time when the US sought their support. “Complaints at
the UN, for example, as well as at the State Department, that the British frequently fail to support
the policies of the American government, can be expressed with some bitterness.”25 This issue of
unreliability has been a harbinger of tension on the part of the Americans in both the AASR and
in the German-American relationship. As Britain’s military forces declined precipitously, it
became of less use as an ally. This was a large part of the reason that the US sought allies
elsewhere – particularly in Germany.
Furthermore, in terms of economic factors, the concern over a partner’s falling economy
has led the US to look for other partnerships in the past as well. As the UK’s economy fell in the
70s and the economic crisis forced huge cuts in British forces, it rendered their value problematic
to the AASR.26 Britain reached a crisis point with the 1976 International Monetary Fund (IMF)
crisis. Rising inflation, an international economic crisis, and a lack of fixed exchanged rates
spelled out trouble in the UK.27 “The recovery of western Europe, with first Germany, and then
France overtaking Britain in economic performance, made Britain a less privileged partner in
economic and financial diplomacy.”28 Beyond simple economic performance, “Germany
replaced England as NATO’s greatest monetary contributor. The decline of Britain’s economic
power to roughly half of Japan’s Gross National Product also seemed to prompt the United
States to cultivate other relationships that might prove to be ‘special.’”29 The decline in status for
NATO contributions suggests not only an economic decline, but a military one as well, in terms
of the value that Germans brought to the table as American allies.
Looking even further back,
Ibid, 21.
26
Ibid, 18.
27
Kathleen Burk, “1976 IMF Crisis,” Contemporary Record 3 (1989): 39-45, 39.
28
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, “Reassessing the Special Relationship,”
International Affairs 85 (March 2009): 263-84, 265.
29
Rebekah Brown, “A History of the Anglo-American Special Relationship,” (PhD diss., John
M. Ashbrook College, 2012), 26.
25
76
PoliticusJournal
the post-war context of financial upheaval and lack of world
economic leadership placed Anglo-American relations in the
position of navigating their duty towards the international
economic framework in a logical and concerted manner. An
immediate challenge that would meet the Anglo-American
partnership was the economic disaster left in the wake of two
all-encompassing World Wars.30
The struggles of rebuilding from the ravages of two World Wars meant that the economy
took a heavy hit in Europe, though America was quite prosperous during this period. This same
economic struggle coincided with the withdrawal from Suez; a crisis that had enraged the US
and represented perhaps one of the most tenuous periods of Anglo-American relations. For
context, “in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, the United Kingdom had borrowed over
US$500 million from the IMF, and through the late 1950s and 1960s, Britain went to the fund on
a repeated basis to obtain sizeable IMF stand-bys that ranged from US$500 million to US$1.4
billion.”31 All this is said to emphasize the point that, at the most tenuous points of the AASR,
Britain has been struggling with either economic or military declines, or both. The result of this
struggle was that the Americans found the relationship to be unsatisfactory, unrewarding, and
unequal. These feelings prompted them to look for ‘special’ relationships elsewhere.
However, it seems that Britain has been able to learn from its past and from the
weaknesses in the German-US relationship. They fought beside the US in the First Gulf War,
and have done so in every conflict since. Thatcher supposedly said, “I felt I could not always rely
as before on American cooperation,”32 in light of Bush’s ascension to the Oval Office in place of
Thatcher’s close collaborator, Ronald Reagan. However, this did not prove to be a major
deterrent in the strengthening of the AASR. Christopher Hitchens argued that Thatcher
strategically saw the opportunity and advantage that the Gulf War seemed to provide for the UK
in the face of the German threat:
Did Germany have any traditional friends among the emirs and
sheikhs of the Gulf? Any useful bases and intelligence
connections? Any experience of fighting in the region? No. But
Britain did, and could make itself highly serviceable to any
30
Brown, “A History of the Anglo-American Special Relationship,” 16.
31
Mark D. Harmon, “The 1976 UK-IMF crisis: The markets, the Americans, and the IMF,”
Contemporary British History 11 (1997): 1-17, 2.
32
Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American Relationship
(New York: Nation Books, 2004), xvii.
77
American effort. The first “coalition of the willing” was forged
that day…33
While they were disappointed in the Germans for their lack of solidarity, the Americans
did find an old friend who was ready to prove itself to be valuable once more. The Gulf conflict
involved the commitment of a huge number of British military personnel (the numbers range
from 30,000-45,000).34 The contributions of the British extended past simply the operational –
they were a major player in the logistical planning of the coalition once they arrived in the Gulf,
were key participants in some of the more dangerous operations, and contributed to the largest
extent they were capable of, as opposed to the French, who the Americans felt contributed well
below their ability.35 The Gulf War proved to be a powerful victory both for the coalition of the
willing and also for the British, who had redeemed themselves in the eyes of the Americans, due
to their assistance in defeating Saddam Hussein. With regards to economics, when Thatcher left
office in 1990, she left an economy that had “partially closed the gap in income per capita with
France and Germany.”36 While the economy did slip again in the later 1990s, Britain continued
to meet at least some of the American expectations in the form of military support in the
Balkans. This allowed the relationship to continue to prosper.
As the Cold War progressed, and Germany developed the largest economy and military
in Western Europe, it was also enhancing its status as an ideal ally for the United States.37
However, with the decline of both its military and economic abilities, it had lost its status in the
eyes of the US. This provided the UK with the opportunity to reassert itself and gain back what
standing it had lost throughout the years. Some have said that the AASR “has a Lazarus-like
quality; it has successfully been revived twice since Dean Acheson declared it dead, first in the
1980s and again in the late 1990s. The second revival was the more remarkable, since the shared
33
Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Empire, xvii.
34
John Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17(October 2004): 437-450, 440.; Marc R. Devore,
“Armed Forces, States, and Threats: Institutions and the British and French Responses to the
1991 Gulf War,” Comparative Strategy 31 (January 2012): 56-83, 56.
35
Devore, “Armed Forces, States, and Threats,” 56.
36
Brown, “A History of the Anglo-American Special Relationship,” 52.
37
David Haglund, “Has France Finally Said auf Wiedersehen to Its German ‘Problem’?,” Orbis
48 (Summer 2004): 381-395, 391.
78
PoliticusJournal
framework of strategic interests represented by the Cold War had gone.”38 This paper’s
examination of the Anglo-American Special Relationship helps to illuminate this revival. It
demonstrates that the shared framework of strategic interests did not disappear with the Cold
War, but merely evolved to a new framework, one that focused on peace in the Middle East,
starting with the Gulf War and with Saddam Hussein.
The conclusion reached through this research is that every alliance is based on mutual
need – for the United States, if their ‘Special Relationships’ or “partners in leadership” don’t
meet basic military or economic criteria, they are not opposed to looking elsewhere for partners
that will. It is clear that the AASR persisted despite the threat of Germany because the US found
a more useful partner in Britain, both militarily and economically. With Germany on the rise
again, particularly economically,39 and the prospect of a more militarily engaged state always
possible, time can only tell whether America would ever reconsider Germany as a “partner in
leadership.”
Works Cited
Asmus, Ronald. “Germany After the Gulf War.” Paper prepared for the United States Air force
by RAND Co., Santa Monica, California, 1992.
Baumann, Rainer, and Gunther Hellmann. “Germany and the use of military force: ‘total war,’
the ‘culture of restraint’ and the quest for normality.” German Politics 10 (2001): 61-82.
Bibow, Jorg. “The economic consequences of German unification: The impact of misguided
macroeconomic policies.” Public Policy Brief, Jerome Levy Economic Institute of Bard College
67 (2001): 1-37.
Brown, Rebekah. “A History of the Anglo-American Special Relationship.” PhD diss., John M.
Ashbrook College, 2012.
Burk, Kathleen. “1976 IMF Crisis.” Contemporary Record 3 (1989): 39-45.
Burk, Kathleen. “How did the Anglo-American Relationship become essential?” Lecture
presented at King’s College London, July 6, 2011.
38
Wallace and Phillips, “Reassessing the Special Relationship,” 280.
39
Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, “From Sick Man of Europe to
Economic Superstar,” 167.
79
Bush, George H.W. “Address to the German People on the Reunification of Germany.” Address
by President George Bush, October 2, 1990. Retrieved from http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6901002.htm
Coker, Christopher. “Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s.”
International Affairs 68 (July 1992): 407-421.
Danchev, Alex. “On Specialness.” International Affairs 72 (October 1996): 737-50.
Devore, Marc R. “Armed Forces, States, and Threats: Institutions and the British and French
Responses to the 1991 Gulf War.” Comparative Strategy 31 (January 2012): 56-83.
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. “Germany’s growth performance in the
1990s.” An economic paper presented to the Economic Commission, May 2002. Retrieved from
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication1878_en.pdf.
Dumbrell, John. “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed.”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17(October 2004): 437-450.
Dustmann, Christian, Bernd Fitzenberger, Uta Schönberg, and Alexandra Spitz-Oener. “From
Sick Man of Europe to Economic Superstar.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (Winter
2014): 167-188.
Haglund, David. “Has France Finally Said auf Wiedersehen to Its German ‘Problem’?” Orbis 48
(Summer 2004): 381-395.
Harmon, Mark D. “The 1976 UK-IMF crisis: The markets, the Americans, and the IMF.”
Contemporary British History 11 (1997): 1-17.
Hitchens, Christopher. Blood, Class, and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American Relationship.
New York: Nation Books, 2004.
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of
the West. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2009.
Kitschelt, Herbert, and Wolfgang Streeck. “From Stability to Stagnation: Germany at the
Beginning of the Twenty-First Century.” West European Politics 26 (2003): 1-34.
Mensel, Klaus-Dieter. “The United States and the United Germany: Partners in Leadership.” In
Can America Remain Committed: U.S. Security Horizons in the 1990s, edited by David Haglund.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.
National Security Council. “NSC Meeting on the Persian Gulf.” Minutes from the Meeting of the
NSC Meeting, Washington, D.C., August 3, 1990.
80
PoliticusJournal
Schemo, Diana Jean. “Germany's lukewarm support of gulf war leaves its allies cold.” Baltimore
Sun, March 13, 1991. Accessed November 30, 2015. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-0313/news/1991072044_1_gulf-war-persian-gulf-germany.
Wallace, William, and Christopher Phillips. “Reassessing the Special Relationship.”
International Affairs 85 (March 2009): 263-84.
81