NOMADS AND BYZANTIUM
PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF MAINTAINING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH THE PECHENEGS
Marek Meško
* This work was supported by the Program of „Employment of Newly Graduated
Doctors of Science for Scientific Excellence“(grant number CZ.1.07/2.3.00/30.0009)
co-financed from European Social Fund and the state budget of the Czech Republic.
Byzantine Empire could particularly thank its active diplomacy for its millennial
duration, as diplomacy was one of the main tools of the Byzantines to maintain and
protect its territory.1 Byzantine art of diplomacy as such represented legacy of ancient
Rome and its implementation was carried out in the spirit of Roman imperial
traditions until the end of the Byzantine Empire. With a few exceptions (Sasanian
Empire, Arab Caliphate) no other contemporary country could boast with a similar
basis to enforce its influence. As in the present time, the diplomacy represented art to
carry out negotiations between two parties2 mediated by authorized representatives
also in the past, and these negotiations were intended to regulate relations between the
parties. In the case of Byzantium, it was essentially about maintaining the premise
that the supreme Christian ruler designated by God was the Byzantine emperor who
should be for this reason the sole ruler of the whole Christian oikumene.3 If the real
situation was too different from this ideal, another important task of the Byzantine
diplomacy was to ensure peace and validity of this premise, at least on the Byzantine
territory that actually was subject to the emperor residing in Constantinople.
Even though the Byzantines did not have any specifically designated and trained
representatives to conduct negotiations as it is today, there were several high-ranking
officials carrying out diplomacy as part of their duties, who belonged to the highly
sophisticated administrative apparatus in the imperial capital. 4 Diplomatic embassies
were regularly sent to countries that were on almost the same level in the spirit of the
Byzantine universalism, as well as to other partners. Regular contact was considered
the basis for successful negotiations, which distinguished Byzantium from most of its
neighbors who sent their own embassies ad hoc. Byzantine envoys travelled in all
directions, especially to areas that were important for the protection of the Byzantine
oikumene. One of these areas was the steppe north of the Black Sea, a place through
which successive waves of nomadic peoples, starting with the Huns, have been
coming to the Byzantine territories in the Balkans (and thus also in the direction of the
capital of Constantinople) since the 4th century.5 For various reasons, it was the task
of the Byzantine diplomacy to master these dangerous neighbors. Problematic aspects
of maintaining diplomatic relations between Byzantium and the nomads are showed
in detail in the case of the Pechenegs, who dominated the aforementioned area from
the end of the 9th century to the first quarter of the 11th century, and due to their
position they played a very important role as the Byzantine allies.
1
Moravcsik (1976:151).
Smythe (1992: 305).
3
ODB (1991:634); Ahrweiler (1998: 12).
4
ODB (1991:635).
5
For the information overview of the migration of nomadic peoples since the arrival of the Pechenegs,
see Golden (1987‒1991: 41‒54); Grousset (1965: 226‒238).
2
1
Geographical distance
One of the factors which greatly complicated the maintaining of regular diplomatic
contacts between the Byzantines and the Pechenegs was the great geographical area
and the distance between their territories which, in addition, were not directly
neighboring. In the 10th century, this area ‒ called quite naturally Patzinakia by the
Byzantines6 ‒ spread from the mouth of the Danube to the Volga (or to the Don) 7 and
covered the steppe belt north of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea several hundred
kilometers wide. It was intersected by the lower reaches of the Siret, Prut, Dniester,
Bug, Dnieper, Donets and the Don rivers (from the west to the east).8 There were no
land communications in the area and no bridges spanned over the reaches of the
aforementioned rivers and their tributaries. In the summer, the Pecheneg steppe
territory turned into an arid, hot and inhospitable area (with the exception of the
territory on the banks of the numerous rivers), which was covered with deep
snowdrifts in winter months.9 Even though the Byzantines had a good overview of the
whole area and its neighboring states, or peoples,10 it still did not alleviate their
difficulty in organizing contacts with these nomads, because in addition to the
mentioned weather changes, it was necessary to cover a relatively long distance, too.
There were two ways for the Byzantine delegations to reach the Pechenegs. The first
one was that the imperial envoy used the Byzantine port of Kherson in the Crimea,11
which due to its location was directly neighboring with the Pecheneg territory, as the
starting point of his journey and, therefore, the whole journey was considerably
shorter.12 The other way of travelling to the Pechenegs used the Byzantine capital
Constantinople as the starting point, where the envoy boarded a warship, which then
took him across the Black Sea to the mouth of one of the rivers flowing through
Patzinakia.13 The ambassador and his entourage disembarked there and sent
delegations to the Pechenegs, who in turn sent guides to meet him. Accompanied by
the guides, he then headed inland to a place where negotiations were to take place. 14 It
is obvious that the latter was rather time consuming. The situation “streamlined” after
1018, when the Byzantines annexed the Bulgarian territory after the wars of the
emperor Basileos II against the Bulgarians, and the northern Byzantine border again
followed the course of the lower Danube.15 Since then the Byzantine Empire and
Patzinakia were direct neighbors, which made the travelling considerably easier.
Even greater geographical “rapproachment” occurred after the massive Pecheneg
migration in the winter of 1046/47 to the south of the Danube. As a result of this
migration, part of the Pechenegs settled down right in the territory of the Byzantine
6
De adm. imp. (1967: 166).
Grousset (1965: 238).
8
Толочко (2003: 46).
9
Sinor (1990: 34‒36). See also Плетнева (1958: 187).
10
De adm. imp. (1967: 166, 185‒187).
11
Besides the fact that Kherson was an important port and trade center, it also represented an
invaluable center for the Byzantines for collecting information from neighboring areas of the north
Black Sea area; Shepard (1992: 45); Malamut (1995: 112‒113). There were several other such
locations, e.g. Sugdaia (later Sudak) or Tmutorokan, but Kherson was by far the most important.
12
De adm. imp. (1967: 54).
13
De adm. imp. (1967: 54‒56).
14
De adm. imp. (1967: 57).
15
Stephenson (1999: 89).
7
2
province of Paradounavon (Paristrion). These Pechenegs were later granted a status of
allies (symmachoi).16
Decentralized state organization
Another factor preventing effective implementation of the Byzantine diplomacy with
the Pechenegs was the free, or decentralized political system of the Pecheneg society.
The fundamental social and economic unit of any nomadic group is a nuclear family
and its home and property in the form of a herd, which provides it with livelihood and
all the basic needs.17 In terms of territory, it is an area where the family leads a
nomadic way of life. All other higher units of a nomadic society (families, clans,
tribes, etc.) simply represent only a sum of individual families, which usually connect
largely due to joint political, economic, and military interests on the basis of blood
kinship unions, whether real or imaginary established often ex post, to legitimize the
existing political reality.18 The emergence of a charismatic leader/family/clan, who
could ensure the survival and prosperity to all his followers and subjects thanks to the
divine favor, or luck (qut) sent from heaven,19 was a very important, but not the only
impetus for the establishment of higher social units in nomadic peoples (tribal unions
and nomadic empires).20
The appearance of similar charismatic leaders led to the emergence of vast nomadic
empires in the steppe in a relatively short time span. Since the empire of the Hsiungnu (Asian Huns), these states were led by a ruler called kagan, whose importance is
similar to the title emperor.21 States created this way were not very politically stable.
As soon as the favorable conditions supporting the growth and existence of a nomadic
empire ceased to exist (e.g. inflow of the spoils of war from the conquest campaigns,
supply of the tribute, extinction of a charismatic clan, or inability of the descendants
of the founder of the empire), centrifugal political forces started to dominate in such a
state organization and the nomadic empire disintegrated as quickly as it emerged.22
The Pechenegs represented one of the branches of the West Turkish kaghanate which
existed between 552 and 659, when it disintegrated.23 The imperial tradition then
passed over to the Karluk tribal union, from which Bulgars and Khazars later
separated. Both these nations then established their own steppe empires in the
northern Black Sea area during the 7th century and acquired and used the title kagan
for their paramount ruler, as well as the lower titles (yabgu, šad, čur/čor, tudun,
tarqan, gyula, etc.).24 In the following century, also other nomadic ethnicities
emerged, including the Pechenegs, who won hegemony at the end of the 9th century
in the aforementioned area and thus replaced the Khazars. However, from a political
point of view, they did not acquire the whole structure of the previous empires. Their
grouping can be rather characterized as a tribal union.25 According to the testimony of
16
Meško (2012: 54); Malamut (1995: 127‒128).
Sinor (1977: 174); Golden (1987‒1991: 69).
18
See Lindner (1982: 696‒697, 699).
19
Golden (1982: 45‒46).
20
Lindner (1982: 700). In other words, it is the so-called sacred kingdom in the nomadic context.
21
Golden (1987‒1991: 46).
22
Lindner (1982: 700‒701); Golden (1982: 51‒52). According to the typology of E. Sagan, nomadic
societies corresponded to his definitions of primitive and complex society, see: Sagan (1985: xvi‒xxi);
Golden (1987‒1991: 43‒44).
23
Grousset (1965: 124‒142); Golden (1982: 57).
24
Golden (1982: 57‒60); Golden (1987‒1991: 50).
25
Golden (1990: 273); Golden (2001: 40).
17
3
the text De administrando imperio by Constantine VII Porfyrogennetos from the mid10th century, it was headed by the supreme ruler who did not use the title kagan.26
The whole of Patzinakia was divided into eight provinces (themata) led by
chieftains/rulers/princes (archontai); each province consisted of five districts (meroi)
led by lower chieftains (elattonai archontai).27 All chieftains28 were independent and
conducted their own policies. The first four provinces west of the Dnieper River
formed the right wing and the other four east of this river the left one.29 In addition to
this relatively loose political structure, there probably also was an assembly of all free
warriors (komenton).30
It is not clear from the mentioned description of the Byzantine emperor, who uses
contemporary Byzantine terms of the state administration to talk about a structure he
is not very familiar with, whether the mentioned provinces were the seats of
individual Pecheneg tribes and districts of lower social units, i.e. clans, or families.
Yet, it is highly probable. It also seems that the report about the three most important
provinces as the center of the political power in Patzinakia corresponds to the reality,
as concentration of the Pecheneg settlements was confirmed by archeological finds in
the basin of the Ros river (right tributary of the Dnieper) south of Kiev. 31 In the first
third of the 11th century, the Pechenegs lost their territory east of the Dnieper thanks
to the pressure of the Uzes and the number of districts, or clans was reduced from 40
to 13,32 but they kept their supreme ruler (archegos) Tyrach and the individual
chieftains retained their freedom in decision-making.33 The same principle also
applies to the Pechenegs inhabiting the Byzantine area in the Balkans in the second
half of the 11th century.
It is apparent that the loose structure of the Pecheneg tribal union had to be rather
confusing for the Byzantines. There was no absolute ruler with whom they could
negotiate and with whom they would be able to conclude agreements binding upon all
the Pechenegs. On the contrary, agreements concluded with one of the Pecheneg
chieftains were typically valid only for his immediate subjects, but were not binding
upon other clans, or tribes because of their independence. The Byzantines then
repeatedly found themselves in a situation when they virtually had to negotiate with
each and every chieftain to reach desired agreement.34 Similar negotiations had
practical limitations, whether in term of time or the number of available material
resources.
Cultural differences
Besides these practical aspects, which made the activity of the Byzantine ambassadors
among the Pechenegs more difficult, there were also significant cultural differences
between the Byzantines and the nomads. Byzantine civilization was based on three
26
The title kagan is documented only in the later Arabic sources from the 13th century. Pritsak (1981a:
15); Golden (1990: 273).
27
De adm. imp. (1967: 166); Spinei (2003: 105).
28
They could also hold lower titles čur/gyula adopted from the aforementioned Turkish kaganate,
occassionaly documented in historical sources. Golden (1987‒1991: 53).
29
De adm. imp. (1967: 166‒168); Golden (1990: 272‒273); Spinei (2003: 105).
30
Scyl. (1979: 460); Baсильевскій (1872: 128); Pritsak (1981a: 16).
31
Pritsak (1981a: 16, 28).
32
Spinei (2003: 106).
33
Scyl. (1979: 455); Spinei (2003: 106).
34
For example, Emperor Issac I Komnenos managed to conclude peace in 1059 with almost all the
Pecheneg leaders of the Paristrion, except for a chieftain named Selte. Scyl. con. (1968: 107).
4
main pillars ‒ the first one consisted in the Christian religion, the second one in the
Roman law and the third one in Greek classical knowledge and culture. The
Byzantines also inherited Roman imperial ideology, which then lasted enshrouded in
the Christian veil for the whole duration of the Byzantine Empire. Within this
worldview, only the so-called just war (dikaios polemos) to protect the Roman
(Byzantine) oikoumene and the Christian citizens living there was recognized as
justifiable and also the Byzantine foreign policy conformed to it.35 The war was
perceived as a necessary evil.36
Nomadic peoples, including the Pechenegs, who were based on totally differing
cultural traditions, perceived war as a natural part of life and did not see any
significant difference between achieving various goals by means of peace or war.37
Although the Pechenegs knew and practiced the conclusion of peace agreements, their
frequent breach did not bother them too much if there was possibility to obtain
benefits, and therefore, the Pechenegs got the reputation among the Byzantines as
dangerous and unpredictable oath-breakers.38 The surprise and indignation of
Byzantine elites was often all the greater that the nomads let the Byzantines give them
gifts for the conclusion of peace (they required the so-called tribute). Thus, besides
their reputation of oath-breakers, the Pechenegs also gained the reputation of greedy
people longing for material wealth.39
Different Pecheneg and Byzantine goals
Different cultural approaches of the Byzantines and the nomads also resulted in their
different political or power objectives. As any similar state, the Byzantine Empire
sought to ensure the protection of its territory and vested interests. In the case of the
Pechenegs, the Byzantines tried to ensure stability in the northern Black Sea area,
which thus became a kind of a buffer zone between the Byzantine territories on the
lower Danube and the strip of steppes east of the Volga. The control of this zone
through befriended nomads was significant for several reasons. Peace with the
Pechenegs concluded at the end of the 9th century ensured primarily direct security of
the Byzantine border on the lower Danube. Another benefit of the alliance with these
nomads was the fact that this pact had a deterrent effect on the neighboring countries
and nations (Hungary, Bulgaria, Kievan Rus), for whom the attack on the Byzantine
territories in the Balkans became a dangerous and risky act.40 In addition, the trade
routes passing through this area became safer, which helped the Byzantine trade with
the neighboring nations and states to thrive. And, last but not least, the strong
hegemon represented by the Pechenegs on the western end of the Euro-Asian steppe
created a barrier for other nomadic peoples settled further to the east when moving in
the western direction.
It is very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to formulate the Pecheneg goals, since, as
mentioned above, their fragmented and decentralized state organization more or less
excluded any joint pursuit of a uniform policy. Nevertheless, it is evident that it was
in the interest of the nomads to have control over the long-distance trade routes which
passed through their area as well as over the trade centers which were located thereon.
35
Stouraitis (2009: 267ff.).
Stouraitis (2009: 207).
37
Golden (1987‒1991: 71).
38
Gautier (1962: 113); Golden (1987‒1991: 54); Ahrweiler (1998: 13).
39
De adm. imp. (1967: 54); Malamut (1995: 114).
40
It is clearly documented in relevant passages of De administrando imperio. See: De adm. imp. (1967:
48‒52, 57); Malamut (1995: 113).
36
5
The Pechenegs did not represent an exception.41 Peace relations in the steppe enabled
them to benefit from the long-distance trade in the form of collected charges and
duties,42 and they also gained access to goods which would not be accessible in the
steppe under different circumstances (corn, precious metals, and various other types
of luxury goods).43
However, if there was a situation when it was easier for the Pechenegs to satisfy their
need for unusual or inaccessible types of goods by war means, their support of peace
would immediately end. All previous agreements ceased to apply and the Pechenegs
attacked either by themselves or in connection with other attackers. This was the main
reasons why the objectives of the Byzantines and the Pechenegs in the 10th and the
11th centuries ceased to coincide in some cases, leading to abrupt military clashes
between the allies.44 Combined with threat of Byzantine weapons, Byzantine
diplomacy always could prevent the worst to some extent, although during the 11th
century the effectiveness of the Byzantine countermeasures gradually decreased.
However, it was a result of the altered situation in the Euro-Asian steppe where mass
movements of steppe peoples in the western direction started at the beginning of the
11th century.45 As a result, the Pechenegs were pushed to the Byzantine Balkans in
1046/47 and the Byzantines were forced to look for a new ally in this area. They
found this ally at the end of the 11th century in the Cuman tribal union.46
Byzantine countermeasures – strategy in dealing with the nomads
Byzantine diplomacy tried to address the above-mentioned troubles by a set of
strategies and practices examined over centuries. The first measure was a regular
(annual) sending of diplomatic delegations to the Pechenegs. 47 Within these
delegations, the Byzantine ambassadors could repeatedly gain information about the
current situation in the northern Black Sea area; they also had opportunity to reward
the “loyalty” of their clients among the nomads by luxurious material gifts.48 Another
traditional measure included the organization of pompous receptions for nomadic
chieftains connected with giving expensive gifts.49 Similar receptions also provided
good opportunity for secret negotiations with particular Pecheneg chieftain(s).50
Considering the decentralized character of the Pecheneg society, the Byzantines
mostly managed to crown their attempts with success.51 Upon completion of
negotiations, the Byzantines secured themselves by taking hostages from circles
41
Golden (1987‒1991: 57); Spinei (2003: 115).
Muslim sources from the 10th century (Gardízí) mention great personal wealth of the Pecheneg
chieftains, which was apperantly from the mentioned levying of charges. Golden (1987‒1991: 54).
43
De adm. imp. (1967: 52); Golden (1987‒1991: 71).
44
For example, in 917 and 934 they joined the Bulgars against the Byzantines, or in 944 and 970‒972
they cooperated with the Russians. Malamut (1995: 112‒113, 116‒117); Spinei (2003: 117‒118,
122‒123). During the 11th century, the mutual Byzantine-Pecheneg relations further escalated and
since 1027 the Pechenegs almost annually invaded the Byzantine territories in the Balkans. Malamut
(1995: 117‒118); Spinei (2003: 131); Meško (2012: 50‒51).
45
Pritsak (1981b: 162‒163).
46
Spinei (2003: 132‒145); Meško (2012: 50‒56, 184, 212).
47
De adm. imp. (1967: 49).
48
De adm. imp. (1967: 54); Alexias (2001: 243); Chon. (1975: 14); Malamut (1995: 112).
49
Chon. (1975: 14).
50
Before the decisive battle against the Pechenegs during the winter of 1121/1122, John II Komnenos
held a series of receptions for the Pecheneg leaders where he secretly tried to win some over. Cin.
(1836: 7); Chon. (1975: 14). Several chieftains actually accepted his offers. Chon. (1975: 14).
51
An example of the failure may be secret messages to the Pecheneg chieftains in the summer of 1087,
which did not reach this goal despite the intense efforts of Alexius I Komnenos. Alexias (2001: 205).
42
6
related to the Pecheneg elites, who were to guarantee the just concluded peace
agreement.52 In some cases, also the Byzantines had to provide their own hostages.53
When the arsenal of these above-mentioned “purely” diplomatic measures did not
provide any guarantee of successful achievement of their goal, the Byzantines liked to
apply military intimidation of Pecheneg ambassadors by a thoroughly directed
exhibition of military force.54 Negotiations with nomads were conducted along with
the knowledge of the opponent’s weak points, which were gained by the Byzantine
informers and spies. Only scarce direct evidence of their employment has survived,
but it is clear that the Byzantines excelled in this technique.55 And finally, healthy
skepticism and caution of Byzantine ambassadors and negotiators worked as a
preventer at the negotiations with the Pechenegs, constantly requesting convincing
assurance and evidence from the nomads of their amicable intentions in order to
minimize the risk of breaching agreements on their part as much as possible.56
Abbreviations
AEMAe
Archivum Eurasiæ Medii Aevi
Alexias
Annæ Comnenæ Alexias. Ed. D. Reinsch – A. Kambylis (2001),
CFHB. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Byz. Zeitschr.
Byzantinische Zeitschrift
CFHB
Corpus Fontium Historiæ Byzantinæ
Chon.
Nicetæ Choniatæ Historia. Ed. I. A. van Dieten (1975), CFHB.
Berlin: de Gruyter.
Cin.
Ioannis Cinnami Epitome. Ed. A. Meineke (1836), CSHB.
Bonn: Weber.
CSFB
Corpus Scriptorum Historiæ Byzantinæ
De adm. imp.
Constantine Porphyrogenitus: De administrando imperio. Ed.
Gy. Moravcsik, transl. R. J. H. Jenkins (1967). Washington:
Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies.
ODB
The Oxford Dictionnary of Byzantium
REB
Révue des Etudes Byzantines
52
De adm. imp. (1967: 54).
In 1087, the Byzantine envoy Synesios, who led peace negotiations with the Pechenegs, became their
hostage. After concluding a contract, he had to stay in Paristrion and live with the nomads. Alexias
(2001: 218‒219).
54
In the summer of 1087, Emperor Alexios I Komnenos started to gather his troops in the city of
Lardea where they camped, and provided them with additional training, while he demonstratively sent
a Byzantine fleet squadron to the lower Danube to intimidate the Pechenegs in Paristrion. Alexias
(2001: 205‒206).
55
This fact is evidenced in a written report (apparently from spies) about the upcoming alliance of the
Pechenegs and Bulgarian Krakras, which was received by a Byzantine strategos of Dristra Tzotzikos.
On the basis of this report, he could act and prevent the alliance before it was formed. Scyl. (1979:
355‒356).
56
Alexios Komnenos was cautious before the battle of Lebounion when he negotiated the alliance with
the Cumans led by their supreme khans Togortag and Boniak. Alexias (2001: 243‒244); Baсильевскій
(1872: 280); Meško (2012: 212‒214, 216).
53
7
Scyl.
Ioannis Scylitzæ Synopsis historiarum. Ed. I. Thurn (1973),
CFHB. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Scyl. con.
He synecheia tes chronographias tou Ioannou Skylitse. Ed. E.
Th. Tsolakes (1968). Thessaloniké: Hetaireia Makedonikon
Spoudon.
МИА СССР
Материали и исследования по археологии СССР
ЖМНП
Журналь Министерства народного просвђщенія
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