BACKGROUND: Between midnight and 8:00 am on June 3, 1961, a burglary occurred at the Bay Harbor
Pool Room in Panama City, Florida. Someone broke a window, smashed the cigarette machine and jukebox,
and stole money from both. Later that day, a witness reported that he had seen Clarence Earl Gideon in the
poolroom at around 5:30 that morning. When Gideon was found nearby with a pint of wine and some change in
his pockets, the police arrested him and charged him with breaking and entering.
Gideon was a semi-literate drifter who could not afford a lawyer, so at the trial, he asked the judge to appoint
one for him. Gideon argued that the Court should do so because the Sixth Amendment says that everyone is
entitled to a lawyer. The judge denied his request, ruling that the state did not have to pay a poor person's legal
defense unless he was charged with a capital crime or "special circumstances" existed. Gideon was left to represent himself.
As might be expected, Gideon did a poor job of defending himself. He had done no preparation work before his
trial; his choice of witnesses was unusual—for instance, he called police officers who arrested him to testify on
his behalf, not having any reason to believe they would help his case. He had no experience in cross-examining
a witness in order to impeach that person's credibility, so his line of questioning was not as productive as a lawyer's would have been.
Gideon was found guilty of breaking and entering and petty larceny, which was a felony. He was sentenced to
five years in a Florida state prison, partly because of his prior criminal record. While in prison, he began studying law in the prison library, believing that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated when he was denied
a defense lawyer paid for by the State. His study of the law led him to file a petition for habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court of Florida, which asked that he be freed because he had been imprisoned illegally. After the Supreme Court of Florida rejected his petition, he handwrote a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States, asking that it hear his case. The Court allowed him to file it in forma pauperis,
which meant that the Court would waive the fees generally associated with such a petition. Generally, the Court
dismisses most of these petitions; Gideon's was among those that it did not dismiss.
In state criminal trials, are indigent defendants entitled to a lawyer, even in noncapital cases? That was the
question the Court agreed to decide when they accepted Gideon's petition. It was not merely a question of
whether Gideon had been treated fairly; the Court's ruling would affect many other people who faced similar
circumstances. In a previous decision, Betts v. Brady (1942), the Court had held that in state criminal trials, an
indigent defendant must be supplied with an attorney only in special circumstances, which included complex
charges and incompetence or illiteracy on the part of the defendant. Since Gideon had not claimed special circumstances, the Court would have to overturn Betts in order to rule in Gideon's favor. (Florida's state law provided indigent defendants with lawyers only in capital cases; many other states had laws providing lawyers to
most or all indigent defendants.)
Questions:
1. What was unusual about the petition Gideon filed with the Supreme Court of the United States?
2. Why did the Supreme Court of the United States agree to hear
Gideon's case?
3. What is the language in the Bill of Rights that is relevant to this
case? Would you interpret those words to mean a defendant cannot
be denied an attorney if he can afford one, or that a defendant must
be provided an attorney even if he cannot afford one? Why?
4. Do you think the states should be required to provide defendants
like Gideon with a lawyer? Why or why not?
Key Excerpts from the Majority Opinion
The decision was unanimous.
Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady . . . was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant's federal constitutional
right to counsel has been a continuing [sic] source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give
this problem another review here, we granted certiorari . . . Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, we appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments the following:
"Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady be reconsidered?
....
The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." We have construed this to mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for
defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived. Betts argued that this
right is extended to indigent defendants in state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment. In response, the Court stated that,
while the Sixth Amendment laid down "no rule for the conduct of the States, the question recurs whether the constraint
laid by the Amendment upon the national courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to
due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." . . . In order to decide
whether the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is of this fundamental nature, the Court in Betts set out and considered "[r]elevant data on the subject.
...
On the basis of this historical data the Court concluded that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial."
. . ..
Explicitly recognized to be of this "fundamental nature" and therefore made immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth . . . are the First Amendment's freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for redress
of grievances . . . the Fifth Amendment's command that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Eighth's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
....
We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights, which
is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think
the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of
these fundamental rights. Ten years before Betts v. Brady, this Court . . . had . . . declared that "the right to the aid of
counsel is of this fundamental character." Powell v. Alabama, . . . (1932). While the Court at the close of its Powell
opinion did . . . limit its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of that case, its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel are unmistakable.
. . . Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal . . . spend vast
sums of money to . . . try defendants accused of crime . . . Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few
indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning,
our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble
ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. A
defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v.
Alabama:
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial with
out a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or other
wise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he
has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. With
out it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence." . . .
The Court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the Court's holding in Powell v. Alabama rested. Florida, supported by two other States, has asked that Betts v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-two states, as friends of
the Court, argue that Betts was "an anachronism when handed down" and that it should now be overruled. We agree.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further action not inconsistent
with this opinion.
Questions:
5. Prior to this case, which rights were considered to be "fundamental and essential to a fair
trial" and thus "made obligatory on the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment"? Why do you
think the right to a lawyer was not included in
this list?
6. When Justice Black says, "Governments,
both state and federal . . . spend vast sums of
money to . . . try defendants accused of crime. .
. . Similarly, there are few defendants charged
with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best
lawyers they can get to prepare and present
their defenses", what point is he trying to make?
Provide an example of a recent case in which
"vast sums of money" were spent. Do you think
it made a difference in the outcome of the case?
Explain.
7. Many of the decisions the Supreme Court of
the United States makes are based on the principle of stare decisis, or let the previous decision
stand. In the case of Gideon v. Wainwright, the
Court clearly broke with a precedent it had established. Was it justified in doing so?
Key Excerpts from the Concurring Opinions
Justice Clark wrote a concurring opinion
That the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in "all criminal prosecutions" is clear, both from the language of the
Amendment and from this Court's interpretation. . . . It is equally clear from the above cases, all decided after Betts v. Brady, . . .
(1942), that the Fourteenth Amendment requires such appointment in all prosecutions for capital crimes. The Court's decision today,
then, does no more than erase a distinction, which has no basis in logic and an increasingly eroded basis in authority.
I must conclude here . . . that the Constitution makes no distinction between capital and noncapital cases. The Fourteenth Amendment
requires due process of law for the deprival of "liberty" just as for deprival of "life," and there cannot constitutionally be a difference
in the quality of the process based merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction involved. How can the Fourteenth Amendment
tolerate a procedure which it condemns in capital cases on the ground that deprival of liberty may be less onerous than deprival of
life—a value judgment not universally accepted or that only the latter deprival is irrevocable? I can find no acceptable rationalization
for such a result, and I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.
Questions:
9. Justice Clark agrees with the other justices that Betts v. Brady should be overturned. However, he cites a different
reason. What reason does he give?
10. Do you agree or disagree with Justice Clark's reasoning? Explain.
Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion
. . In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, . . . a capital case, this Court declared that under the particular facts there presented—"the ignorance
and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility . . . and above all that they stood in deadly peril of
their lives"—the state court had a duty to assign counsel for the trial as a necessary requisite of due process of law.
Thus when this Court, a decade later, decided Betts v. Brady, it did no more than to admit of the possible existence of special circumstances in noncapital as well as capital trials, while at the same time insisting that such circumstances be shown in order to establish a
denial of due process.
The Court has come to recognize, in other words, that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial.
The special circumstances rule has been formally abandoned in capital cases, and the time has now come when it should be similarly
abandoned in noncapital cases, at least as to offenses, which, as the one involved here, carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence.
In agreeing with the Court that the right to counsel in a case such as this should now be expressly recognized as a fundamental right
embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment, I wish to make a further observation. When we hold a right or immunity, valid against the
Federal Government, to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus valid against the States, I do not read our past decisions to suggest that by so holding, we automatically carry over an entire body of federal law and apply it in full sweep to the States.
Any such concept would disregard the frequently wide disparity between the legitimate interests of the States and of the Federal Government, the divergent problems that they face, and the significantly different consequences of their actions.
On these premises I join in the judgment of the Court.
Questions:
8. What are Justice Harlan's beliefs regarding "special circumstances?"
9. Some people believe that the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment meant that all of the rights in the Bill of Rights
applied to the states, and not just the federal government. Why is Justice Harlan hesitant to make this generalization?