Class in the Household: A Power-Control Theory of Gender and Delinquency
Author(s): John Hagan, John Simpson and A. R. Gillis
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 92, No. 4 (Jan., 1987), pp. 788-816
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Class in the Household: A Power-Control
Theory of Gender and Delinquencyl
JohnHagan
UniversityofTorontoand StatisticsCanada
JohnSimpsonand A. R. Gillis
UniversityofToronto
This paper extendsa power-control
theoryof commondelinquent
behaviordevelopedby Hagan, Gillis,and Simpsonin 1985. It does
so by bringingtheclass analysisofdelinquencyintothehousehold,
usinga new modelof class relationsbased on therelativepositions
of husbands and wives in the workplace.In patriarchalfamilies,
wives have littlepower relativeto husbands,daughtershave little
freedomrelativeto sons, and daughtersare less delinquentthan
sons. These differencesare diminishedin egalitarianfamilies.
Power-control
theoryexplainsthisvariationin termsof (1) gender
divisionsin domesticsocial controland (2) the resultingattitudes
towardrisktaking.Power-control
theorytherebyaccountsforclassspecificdeclinesin gender-delinquency
thatpreviously
relationships
requiredseparatedeprivationand liberationtheoriesofgenderand
delinquency.The new theorycalls formajorchangesin thestudyof
class, gender,and delinquency,as well as fora new appreciationof
in manyother
theimportanceofgenderand structures
ofpatriarchy
social processes.
In truth,
woman,likechildren,
has butonerightand thatis
therightto protection.
The rightto protection
involvesthe
to obey.[GeorgeFitzhugh,
obligation
Sociology
fortheSouth
(1854)]
Economicindependence
forwomennecessarily
involvesa
Perkins
changein thehomeand familyrelation.[Charlotte
Gilman,WomanandEconomics(1898)]
A recentlyformulatedpower-control
theoryof commondelinquentbehavior(Hagan, Gillis, and Simpson 1985) bringstogethera macro-level
1 This studywas made possiblebyfunding
fromtheSocial Sciencesand Humanities
ResearchCouncilof Canada, theMinistry
of the SolicitorGeneralof Canada, and
StatisticsCanada. We assumefullresponsibility
forthe resultsand interpretations
presented
here.Requestsforreprints
shouldbe senttoJohnHagan, FacultyofLaw,
ofToronto,Toronto,OntarioM5S lAl.
University
? 1987 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.
.50
0002-9602/87/9204-0002$01
788
AJS Volume 92 Number 4 (January 1987): 788-816
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Genderand Delinquency
considerationof class in the workplacewith a micro-levelanalysisof
genderdifferences
in the parental controland delinquentbehaviorof
adolescents.This initialformulation
of power-control
theorywas based
on a class analysisof heads of households.However, it is increasingly
evidentthatpowerin the familyderivesfromthepositionsin the workplace held by husbandsand wives (Coser and Coser 1974).
Summarizinga large researchliterature,Coser writesthat
powerdependson resources,
and womenwhodo nothaveoccupational
resources
are in a poorpositionto shareit equallywiththeirhusbands
[CoserandCoser1974].Conversely,
ofpower
thefactthatthedistribution
inthefamily
infavorofthewifewherever
changes
financial
shecontributes
meansto thehousehold
has beenamplydemonstrated.
Bloodand Wolfe
[1960,pp. 40-41] and othershave shownthisto be truefortheUnited
States,and HymanRodman[1967]examinedthisforall countries
for
whichdata are available-Belgium,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Ghana,Greece,Japan,theUnitedStates,and Yugoslavia-and
foundthisto be truethroughout.
[1985,p. 1]
Coser cautionsthatthesepowergainsforwomenmaybe moreevidentin
higherthanin lowerclasses,butthemoregeneralpointpersists:powerin
thefamilyderivesfromthepositionsin theworkplaceofwives as well as
of husbands.
The questionforpower-control
is this:What differtheorytherefore
ences do the relativeclass positionsof husbandsand wives in the workplace make forgendervariationsin parentalcontroland in delinquent
behavior of adolescents?This paper extendspower-control
theoryby
developinga modelof familialclass relationsthatis thenused to answer
thisquestion.In thismodel,power-control
theorysubsumestwo earlier
deprivationand liberationtheoriesof genderand delinquency.
The abilityof power-control
theoryto subsumeearlierformulations
is
importantbecause, as Homans pointsout, a good testof a theoryis its
abilityto deduce a varietyofempiricalfindings
froma limitednumberof
generalpropositions,"with the help of a varietyof given conditions"
(1967, p. 27). Below, we demonstratethatcircumstances
of deprivation
and liberationconstitutescope conditionswithinwhich power-control
theorymakes important,and perhapssurprisingly
similar,predictions.
However, specification
of these scope conditionsrequiresan analysisof
the class dynamicsof the family.The originsof thisclass analysisare in
the deprivationand liberationtheoriesof genderand delinquency.
FROM DEPRIVATION TO LIBERATION
It is well knownthatmen markedlyexceed womenin criminality,
and,
untilrecently,it was believedthatonlyeconomicdeprivationmightap789
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
preciablyalterthisrelationship.For example,earlyin thiscenturyBongerarticulatedtheimportanteffectdeprivationmayhave on genderand
crime,observingthat"the criminality
of men differsmorefromthatof
womenin the well-to-doclasses than in classes less privileged"(1916, p.
477). Bonger'spointis thatdifferences
in the"manneroflife"forthesexes
decrease as we descend the social scale and that thereforeonly in the
underclassesshould the criminality
of women be expectedto approach
thatof men.
A modernversionof this deprivationtheoryof genderand crimeis
offeredby Giordano,Kerbel,and Dudley, who arguethatcontemporary
increasesin thecriminality
ofwomen"reflectthefactthatcertaincategories of women (e.g., young,single,minority)are now in an even more
unfavorablepositionin the labor marketat the same timethattheyare
increasingly
expectedto functionindependently"
(1981, p. 81). The Giordano et al. formulationfocusesparticularattentionon female-headed
households,which are of recurringconcernin contemporary
studiesof
delinquencyand poverty(see McLanahan 1985). These householdsare of
specialinterestforour extensionofpower-control
theoryand ouranalysis
oftheclass dynamicsofthefamily.Because menare notan integralpart
of thesehouseholds,thesefamiliesconstitutea unique comparisongroup
thatis usefulin assessingthe impacton childrenof power relationsbetweenhusbandsand wives in householdswithtwo active parents.
The "expectationsof independence"notedby Giordanoet al. bringus
to theliberationtheoryofgenderand crime.This theoryis mostprovocativelyformulated
byFreda Adler(1975),who assertsthatfemalecriminal
behaviorhas becomewidespreadin recentyearslargelyas a resultofthe
women'smovement.Adler arguesthatwe are observing"a gradualbut
acceleratingsocial revolutionin which women are closingmanyof the
gaps, social and criminal,thathave separatedthemfrommen"(1979,pp.
fromthatfoundin
kindofformulation
93-94). This is clearlya different
the writingsabout deprivationand genderdiscussedpreviously.However,bothdeprivationand liberationare assumedto decreasedifferences
betweenmenand women."The closertheyget,"writesAdler,"themore
aliketheylook and act.... Differences
do exist... butit seemsclearthat
those differences
female
are not of primeimportancein understanding
criminality"
(1979, p. 94).
Perhapsthe mostinteresting
factabout the deprivationand liberation
theoriesis that,althoughtheybothspecifyconditionsunderwhichmen
and women seem to become more alike, both sociallyand in termsof
criminality,
theydo so by pointingto oppositeends oftheclass structure.
to
While deprivationtheorypointsto the lower end, and, increasingly,
female-headedhouseholds,liberationtheorypoints to the upper end,
wherethe liberationof women may be mostlikelyto occur. Empirical
790
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Genderand Delinquency
testsof deprivationand liberationtheoriesof genderand crime have
see Box
producedequivocal results(fora recentreviewof thisliterature,
and Hale 1984). We believe this is because the structuralrelationships
that can resultin genderequalityand that are foundat high and low
positionsin the class hierarchyhave not yet been adequately conceptualizedor operationalized.
POWER-CONTROLTHEORY AND THE CLASS DYNAMICS OF THE
FAMILY
Our extensionof power-controltheorybegins with the observationof
Weber(1947) thatan importantjuncturein the developmentof modern
capitalismwas the separationof the workplacefromthe home. Two
of
distinctspheres,whichWeberregardedas crucialto therationalization
an industrialcapitalisteconomy,resultedfromthisseparation:the first
was populatedby womenand focusedon domesticlabor and consumption,and the second was populatedby men and centeredaroundlabor
power and direct production.The new family,and particularlyits
mothers,was responsibleforsociallyreproducing
(Vogel 1983)thegender
divisionof these separate spheres.This familywas patriarchalin form
and createda "cult of domesticity"
aroundwomen(Welter1966).
Today, thereis a decliningdivisionoftheconsumption
and production
in theincreasedparticipation
ofwomenin the
spheres,whichis reflected
labor force(Coser 1985). The studiesmentionedabove indicatethat,as
women joined the labor force,theygained new power in the family,
in theupperclass. This resultsin a considerablevariationin
particularly
familystructures
in our modelof familyclass relations.These structures
can be thoughtof as varyingbetweentwo extremefamilyclass relations
thatformreal-lifecounterparts
to two ideal-typefamilies.
The firstoftheseideal typesis largelya residuefromtheearlierperiod,
in which the consumptionand productionsphereswere more strictly
dividedby gender.To reflectthislegacy,we will call thisthepatriarchal
family.Of the familyclass relationswe identifybelow, the one that
should mostcloselycorrespondto the ideal-typepatriarchalfamilyconsistsof a husband who is employedin an authoritypositionand a wife
who is notemployedoutsidethehome.It seemsplausiblethatpatriarchal
familieswould tend to sociallyreproducedaughterswho focustheirfuturesaround domesticlabor and consumption,as contrastedwith sons
who are preparedforparticipation
in directproduction.We willsay more
about how thishappens. Here we simplyrepeatthatWeberregardedthis
processofsocial reproduction
as crucialto therationalization
ofindustrial
capitalism.
At the otherextremeis an ideal typewe call theegalitarianfamily,in
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whichtheconsumptionand productionspheresare undividedbygender.
Of thefamilyclass relationswe identify
below, theone thatshouldmost
closelycorrespondto the ideal-typeegalitarianfamilyincludesa mother
and fatherwho both are employedin authoritypositionsoutside the
home. It seems plausible that egalitarianfamilieswill tend to socially
reproducedaughterswho are preparedalong withsons to join the proa partofan overlappingofthe
ductionsphere.Such familiesare therefore
societyno
consumptionand productionspheres,which a postindustrial
longerso clearlykeepsapart;suchfamiliesare a partas well as a product
of changingeconomicrelations.
So thepatriarchalfamilyperpetuatesa genderdivisionin theconsumptionand productionspheres,whereastheegalitarianfamilyfacilitatesan
overlappingof these spheres. How does this happen and what are its
consequences?Power-control
theoryanswersthesequestionsbyjoininga
class analysisof the familywith an analysisof domesticsocial control
labor,thelinkbetweenthembeingbased on parents'social reproduction
of theirown power relationshipsthroughthe controlof theirchildren.
relationship(Hagan,
The key process involves an instrument-object
Simpson,and Gillis 1979)thatis at its extremein thepatriarchalfamily.
ofsocial control)
Here fathersand especiallymothers(i.e., as instruments
are expectedto controltheirdaughtersmorethantheydo theirsons(i.e.,
objectsof social control).In regardto mothers,we shouldnotethatour
pointhereis notthattheyare, in any ultimatecausal sense,moreimportantthanfathersin the controlof daughtersbut ratherthatmothersare
assigneda keyinstrumental
role thatinvolvesthemmorein the day-today controlof theirchildren,especiallytheirdaughters,in patriarchal
is a productofa
relationship
families.This imbalancedinstrument-object
featureof
divisionin domesticsocial controllabor and is a distinguishing
the controlof daughtersin patriarchalfamilies.The instrument-object
relationship
is a keypartoftheway in whichpatriarchalfamiliessocially
reproducea genderdivisionin the spheresof consumptionand production.
it is throughthe diminutionof this relationshipthat
Alternatively,
egalitarianfamiliescan generationally
reproducean overlapof the productionand consumptionspheres.This does not necessarilymean that
fatherswill becomeas involvedas mothersare in theparentalcontrolof
children;indeed, thereis continuingevidence that this is not the case
(e.g., Huber 1976). What it does mean is that parentsin egalitarian
familieswill redistribute
theircontrolefforts
so thatdaughtersare subjected to controlsmore like those imposedon sons. In otherwords,in
egalitarianfamilies,as mothersgain powerrelativeto husbands,daughthe
tersgain freedomrelativeto sons. In termsof social reproduction,
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Genderand Delinquency
presence of the imbalanced instrument-object
relationshiphelps perpetuatepatriarchyand its absence facilitatesequality.
Our nexttheoreticaltask is to linkthisdiscussionofideal-typefamilies
and theinstrument-object
relationshipwithpredictedgenderdifferences
in commondelinquentbehavior.This finalintervening
linkinvolvesattitudestowardrisktaking.At one extreme,thepatriarchalfamilyand its
acute instrument-object
relationshipbetweenparentsand daughtersengendersa lowerpreference
forrisktakingamongdaughters.Risk taking
is the antithesisof the passivitythat distinguishesthe "cult of domesticity."So, in patriarchalfamilies,daughtersare taughtby theirparents
to avoid risk. Alternatively,
in egalitarianfamilies,daughtersand sons
alike are encouragedto be moreopen to risktaking.In part,thisaccommodationof riskis an anticipationof its role in the entrepreneurial
and
otheractivitiesassociatedwiththe productionsphere,forwhichdaughtersand sons are similarlypreparedin egalitarianfamilies.Controltheorieshave oftenregardeddelinquencyas a formof risktaking(Thrasher
1937; Bordua 1961; Hirschi 1969), sometimesseeing it as an unanticipatedconsequenceofa rewardedwillingnessto takerisks(Veblen1934,
p. 237; Sykes and Matza 1961, p. 718). Bearing this in mind, we use
power-control
theoryto predictthatpatriarchalfamilieswill be characterizedby largegenderdifferences
in commondelinquentbehaviorwhile
in
egalitarianfamilieswill be characterizedby smallergenderdifferences
delinquency.In egalitarianfamilies,daughtersbecomemorelike sons in
theirinvolvementin such formsof risktakingas delinquency.
Note thatwe have notyetsaid anythingabouteitherthefemale-headed
householdsemphasizedin deprivationtheoryor the variousotherkinds
ofhouseholdsthatwe willbe considering.We have formulated
thetheory
in termsofhouseholdswithbothparentspresentand in termsofthepolar
ideal typesofpowerrelations(patriarchaland egalitarian)thatcan result.
However,thetheorydoes have importantimplicationsforfemale-headed
households,as well as forotherkindsof families.For example,because
fathersare notan integralpartoffemale-headed
households,thereshould
be no manifestpower imbalance betweenparents,and therefore,
here,
too, daughtersshould gain in freedomrelativeto sons. These femaleheaded householdsprovidea unique kindofcomparisongroup;a special
kind of egalitarianfamilythat allows us to testour theoryfurther.The
expectationis thatfemale-headedhouseholdsshouldparallelotherkinds
ofegalitarianhouseholdsin manyofthecharacteristics
and consequences
so fardiscussed.It is the commonfocuson freedomfrommale domination in these different
kinds of householdsthat allows our extensionof
power-control
theoryto subsumebothdeprivationand liberationtheories
of genderand delinquency.
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This discussionof patriarchal,egalitarian,and female-headedhouseholdsprovidesa setofscope conditionsto be used in testingourextension
of power-control
theory.Each conditioncarrieswithit a predictedset of
consequencesin termsof gendervariationsin parentalcontrol,risktaking, and commonformsof delinquentbehavior.These conditionstake
intoaccounta rangeof circumstances
thatpreviouslygeneratedseparate
deprivationand liberationtheoriesofgenderand delinquency.However,
manyotherkindsof householdsalso exist.We turnnow to a moreinclusive modelof familyclass relationsthatcan be used in a moreextensive
testof our theory.
A DAHRENDORFIAN MODEL OF FAMILY CLASS RELATIONS
The extensionofpower-control
theorytestedhereassertsthatthegenderbased relationshipswe have discussedare conditionedby the combined
class positionsof fathersand mothers(i.e., the class compositionof the
household).Parentsof 463 studentsfroma surveyconductedin 1979 in
the Torontometropolitan
area (see Hagan et al. 1985)were followedup
by telephoneto collectthe information
we now use to constructa new
model of familyclass relations.
Our new model of familyclass relationsis based on Dahrendorfian
conceptionsof powerand authorityand theiruse in thecontrolof collective units. Following Dahrendorf(1959, p. 198), these collectiveunits
includeall "imperatively
coordinatedassociations";thatis, theyinclude
the familyas well as the workplace. Because theyoccupy so centrala
place in mostpeople's lives, authorityrelationsin industrialproduction
oftenovershadowand determineauthorityrelationsin othercollective
units,includingthe family(see Litwak 1968). In fact,thisis our fundamentalpoint-that to understandtheeffects
ofclass positionin theworkplace on crimeand delinquencyit is necessaryto tracetheway thatwork
relationsstructurefamilyrelations,including,forexample, the instrument-objectrelationshipbetweenparentsand daughtersthathas previouslybeen described.The cruciallinkthatwe now add to power-control
theoryis the variable role of womenin the workplaceand its impacton
the social organizationof domesticsocial control.2
2 Others,notablyKohn(1977)and Millerand Swanson(1958),also analyzerelationshipsbetweenfeatures
oftheworkplaceand thestructure
ofthefamily.Our perspectivediffers
fromtheseimportant
efforts.
Kohn is concernedprimarily
withtheinfluenceofworktechnologies
on theformation
ofattitudes
thatinfluence
socialization
processes.Millerand Swansonare concernedmainlywiththeinfluence
of relations
betweenpersonsin theworkplaceon socialization
attitudes.
NeitherKohnnorMiller
and Swansonemphasize,as we do, thecentralimportance
ofthepresenceor absence
ofdominancerelations
on gender-linked
controlprocessesortheimportance
ofconsideringtheclasspositions
ofwivesrelativetothoseofhusbands.In recentpapers,Kohn,
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Genderand Delinquency
Dahrendorfianclasses (see Dahrendorf1959, pp. 166-74) are distinguishedon the basis of theirrelationsto authority.We followLopreato
(1968)and Robinsonand Kelly(1979) in usingtheterms"commandclass"
and "obey class" to distinguishDahrendorfianclass positions.Members
of the commandclass exerciseauthority,regardlessof whethertheyare
subjectto it themselves.In contrast,personsin theobeyclass are subject
to the authorityof othersand exercisenone themselves.Finally,a small
classlessgroupneitherexercisesauthority
noris subjectto it; itsmembers
workon theirown. Robinsonand Kelly (1979, p. 44) demonstratethat
separatingthe latterclasslessgroupfromthe obey class adds nothingto
theexplainedvariancein theiranalysisof incomeand attitudes,so these
classes are therefore
collapsedin our analysis.
We use the above ideas in the followingways: We beginwithhouseholds in whichboth parentsare presentand the fatheris employed(female-headedhouseholdsare broughtinto our analysisbelow). In these
on thebasis of
households,fathersare categorizedas exercisingauthority
affirmative
responsesto questionsaskingwhetherthereare people who
workforhim or are supervisedby him. Wheretheseconditionsare not
met, fathersare categorizedas not exercisingauthority.Mothersare
divided into threecategories,being considered(1) unemployedif they
indicate,in responseto an itemaskingabout full-or part-time
work,that
theywere "not employedduringthe past year,"or, if theyare or were
employedpart-or full-time
duringthatperiod,as (2) exercisingor (3) not
exercisingauthorityon the basis of responsesto questionslike those
posed forfathers.The dichotomized
measureoffather's
workplaceauthority is then cross-classified
with our trichotomized
measureof mother's
workplaceauthority
to generatethesix familyclass relationsindicatedin
table 1.
In threeof the class categoriesindicatedin table 1, both parentsare
locatedin thesame class, and theclass relationtherefore
has an unambiguous meaning in Dahrendorfs scheme. For example, when both the
fatherand motherhave authorityin theworkplace,thefamilyis located
in whatwe call theuppercommandclass,(12.45% ofour sample).This is
theclass relationthatmostcloselycorrespondsto theideal-typeegalitarian familyabove. When neitherthe fathernor motherhas workplace
authority,the familyis located in the obey class. Two obey classes are
in table 1 by whetherthemotheris employed.In theupper
distinguished
Slomczynski,
and Schoenbach(1968)considertheseparateinfluence
ofmothers'
and
fathers'
on childrens'
socialpositions
values,andMirowsky
(1985)examinestheeffects
of maritalpoweron depression.By bringing
womenintotheiranalyses,boththese
ofgenderpaperscomecloserto ourconcerns-although
not,ofcourse,inthecontext
linkedcontrolprocessesand delinquency.
A veryimportant
paperbyCurtis(1986)on
familyand inequalitytheoryappearedas thispaperwentto press.
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TABLE 1
DAHRENDORFIAN
WIFE'S AUTHORITY
IN WORKPLACE
Has authority..............
Has no authority............
Not employed ..............
MODEL
OF FAMILY
CLASS
RELATIONS
HUSBAND'S AUTHORITY IN WORKPLACE
Has Authority
Upper commandclass:
husband and wifein
commandclass
(12.45% [57])a
Husband in command
class and wifein obey
class (20.96% [96])b
Husband in command
class and wifenot employed(16.38% [75])b
class relation not subsumable
NOTE.-Family
(14.85% [68]).
a Balanced class relation.
b Unbalanced class relation.
Has No Authority
Husband in obey class
and wifein command
class (6.77% [31])b
Upper obey class: husband and wifein obey
class (18.12% [83])a
Lower obey class: husband in obey class and
wifenot employed
(10.48% [48])a
under table categories: female-headed household
obeyclass, themotheris employed(18.12%); in thelowerobeyclass, the
motheris not employed(10.48%). Upper-and, to a lesserextent,lowerobey-classfamiliescould also be thoughtof as constituting
egalitarian
families,in thesensethatbothspousesoccupyobey-classpositions.However, giventhe lesserlikelihoodnotedby Coser (1985) of women'swork
beingtranslatedinto power in lower-classfamilies,we probablyshould
families-and
qualifyour egalitarianexpectationsforupper-obey-class
the expectationsforlower-obey-class
familiesare certainlyno higher.In
any case, the egalitarianfamilyis an ideal type,and we can look to the
data to see how closelythesefamiliesapproximatethe relationships
that
power-control
theorywould otherwisepredictforfamiliesapproaching
thisform.In thefirstpartoftheanalysisreportedbelow,we take advantage of the common class locations of husbands and wives in these
familiesto forman aggregatethatis designatedin table 1 as "balanced
class relations."This groupingis subsequentlydisaggregatedinto the
morerefinedclass distinctions
describedabove.
The threeremainingfamilyclass relationsin table 1 are each characterized by an unbalancedauthority-subject
in thatone member
relationship,
ofthehouseholdhas authority
in theworkplacewhiletheotherdoes not.
In two of these conditions,the fatheroccupies a positionof authority
whilethemotheris eitherunemployed(16.38%) or employedin a position
withoutauthority
(20.96%). These are thefamilyclass relationsthatcome
closestto matchingthe conditionsof the ideal-typepatriarchalfamily
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describedabove, withthe firstrelationprovidingthe clearestempirical
match. The finaland mostunusual familyclass relation(6.77%) shows
the fatheremployedin a positionwithoutauthorityand the motheremployedin one withauthority.Because thiskindoffamilyis so atypical,in
size as well as meaning,we do not considerit in subsequentanalyses.3
The powerdifferential
in theabove familiesis indicatedin table 1 bytheir
aggregatedesignationas "unbalanced class relations."Aggregatedand
disaggregatedanalysesof theseclass relationsare presentedbelow.
Table 1 is not intendedas an exhaustivecategorization
of familyclass
relations.For example, we have not consideredfamiliesin whichboth
parentsare presentand thefatheris unemployed.Because thereare few
such familiesin our sample,we can onlydiscussthembriefly
below (see
n. 5). However, thereare a substantialnumberof female-headedhouseholds(14.85%; N = 68), and, forreasonsindicatedabove, we includethis
categoryas a comparisongroupthatis predictedto producemanyof the
same consequenceswe would expect in more conventionalegalitarian
families.4
Finally, a Marxian dimensioncan be added to the above model by
includingconsiderationof business ownershipas a means of distinguishing,within the Dahrendorfianupper command class, between
spousesin the"capitalist"or "employerclass" and spousesin the"managerial class." This furtherdistinctionallows us to isolate a class that
3 It is not thatwe regardthisclass categoryas unimportantbut ratherthatwe have too
few data and too few cases to undertakea properanalysis here. We are disproportionately sampling this class relation in a study currentlyunder way. Meanwhile, our
decision to exclude this class fromthe currentanalysis is similarto the decision made
by Wrightand Perrone (1977, p. 43) and othersto exclude the petitebourgeoisiefrom
class analyses of survey data.
4 Our operational definition
of a female-headedhousehold is one in which the mother
is not marriedand has affirmatively
answered a question asking whethershe is the sole
or major source of familyincome. This operationalizationexcludes 11 cases in which
the spouses are no longer marriedbut the spouse is still the major source of income.
These cases illustratea more general point-that when fathersleave, theynonetheless
oftenmaintain some kind of presence in the family.That is why we include a paternal
control variable in our analysis of female-headed families. Finally, an anonymous
reviewer notes that female-headed households may be heterogeneousin termsof the
class positionsof the women thathead them. Althoughthisis certainlypossible, few of
the women heading the households in our sample are in the command class and
removingthem does not substantiallyalter our results. The same revieweralso notes
thatthereare more girlsthan boys (see table 2) in the female-headedhouseholdsin our
sample and suggests that this may resultfroma selectionout of the more delinquent
(older) boys through nonresponse, selection out of school (and thereforefrom the
sampling frame), and/or differentliving arrangements(possibly with fathersor on
their own). Each of these possibilities should be reflectedin a mean age difference
between sons and daughtersin female-headedhouseholds. However, these means are
nearly identical, being 15.032 and 15.157, respectively.Nonetheless, the selection
issue is interestingand deserves furtherresearch.
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comeseven closerto thesocial relationsthatshouldformthebasis ofthe
ideal-typeegalitarianfamily(i.e., familiesin whichthespousesare both
managers)and a class thatreintroduces
thepotentialforpatriarchy
(i.e.,
a familyclass structurein which the husband is an employerwhile the
wife is only a manager). However, this modification
of our model involves the creationof verysmall class categories,and we will therefore
defertheirconsideration.
Again, our basic premiseis that authorityin the workplaceis translatedintopowerin thehousehold,withconsequenteffects
on therelationship between gender and delinquency.More specifically,our refined
power-control
theorypredictsthat the relationshipbetweengenderand
delinquencyshould be reducedin thosefamilyclass structures
in which
the potentialforthe existenceof morebalanced, egalitarianfamilyrelationsis greatest-thatis, in thelowerlevelsoftheclass structure
(e.g., in
the upper obey class and in female-headedhouseholds)and also in the
higherlevels of the class structure(e.g., in the upper commandclass).
Alternatively,
therelationship
betweengenderand delinquencyshouldbe
most intensein the unbalanced familyclass relationsthat most closely
approximatean ideal-typepatriarchalfamily,thatis, in thosesituations
in which the fatherhas authorityin the workplaceand the motheris
eitherunemployedor employedin an obey-classposition.
is that,in theclass
The intervening
theoreticallinkin thesepredictions
relationsthat characterizelife in female-headed,upper-obey-class
and
upper-command-class
families,mothersand fathersare less likelyto reproduce, throughthe controlof theirdaughters,the aversion to risk
in delinquency.In these
takingthat produceslarge genderdifferences
more balanced, egalitarianfamilies,daughtersand sons alike are preit is preciselythis
pared forlifein the productivesphere.Alternatively,
instrument-object
relationshipthatour theorypredictswill characterize
the unbalanced class relationsidentifiedabove, especially,forexample,
thefamilyclass relationthatformsthemostlikelybase fortheideal-type
patriarchalfamilyin our data-that is, thatfamilyclass relationin which
the husbandoccupiesa command-classpositionand the spouse is either
notemployedor employedin a positionwithoutauthority.It is herethat
we expecttheinstrument-object
betweenparentsand daughrelationship
in riskpreferences
tersand the genderdifferences
to be particularly
apparent-and the gender-delinquency
relationshipto be consequently
quite strong.These relationships,power-control
theoryargues,are part
and parcel of patriarchy.They are the basis of the "cult of domesticity"
and an accompanyinggenderdivisionbetweentheconsumption
and productionspheres.Beforewe testthesepredictions,however,some additionalissues of measurementmustbe addressed.
798
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Genderand Delinquency
MEASUREMENT OF INTERVENING AND DEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Parental controlsare the key interveningvariables in our proposed
power-controltheory. Our additively scaled measures of maternal
(ot = .66) and paternal(ot = .78) controlask, "Does your(father/mother)
know(whereyou are/whoyou are with)whenyou are away fromhome?"
We use theseitemsto exploretheinstrument-object
relationship
emphasized betweenparentsand daughters.
"Taste for risk" is a socially acquired attitudeexpectedto mediate
further
thelinkbetweengenderand delinquency.Taste forrisk((x = .67)
"I like
is measuredby adding Likert-scaledresponsesto two statements:
to take risks"and "The thingsI like to do best are dangerous."Powercontroltheorypredictsthattasteforriskis sexuallystratified
and thatthis
attitudein turnstratifies
perceivedrisksof gettingcaughtin delinquent
link. Three "riskof gettingcaught"items
behavior,our last intervening
fromthe workof Jensen,Erickson,and Gibbs (1978) forman additive
scale (ox = .76). They involve the followingestimations:"Could you
(break into a spot/stealfroma store/write
and not get caught?"
graffiti)
We use an adapted versionof Hirschi's(1969) self-report
delinquency
scale as our dependentvariable. The six-itemadditivescale asked how
oftenin the last year the respondentshad takenlittlethings(worthless
than$2/between$2 and $50/morethan$50) thatdid notbelongto them;
takena care fora ridewithouttheowner'spermission;purposelybanged
up somethingthat did not belong to them; and, not countingfights
witha brotheror sister,purposelybeaten up on anyoneor hurtanyone
(t = .78).
THE ANALYSIS
Our extensionof power-control
theoryexplicitlypredictsthat the relationshipbetweengenderand delinquencyis conditionedby familyclass
composition.Our analysistherefore
proceedswithinthe aggregatedand
disaggregatedfamily class relations and female-headedhouseholds
in table 1. This analysisincludesa seriesofwithin-class
identified
correlationspresentedin table 3 and the resultsof estimatinga seriesof regression equationsare shownin tables4, 5, 6. Between-classcomparisonsof
genderregression
coefficients
are presentedin table 7, and a refinement
of
our class analysis,anticipatedin table 3 and above, is presentedin table
8. Descriptivestatisticsforour variablesare presentedin table 2.
Our firstinterestis in determining
whethertheinstrument-object
relationshippostulatedby our theoryvaries as predictedwithfamilyclass
relations.Correlationsrelevantto this issue are presentedin table 3.
(Discussionof the "refined"findingsreportedtowardthe bottomof this
799
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Genderand Delinquency
TABLE 3
CORRELATIONS
GENDER
WITHIN
AGGREGATED
WITH MATERNAL
AND DISAGGREGATED
AND PATERNAL
PERCEIVED
CLASS
TASTE
CATEGORIES
FOR RISK,
OF
AND
RISK
1
2
3
4
Maternal
Control
Paternal
Control
Taste for
Risk
Perceived
Risk
- .341****
- .257****
.267****
-.272****
- .398****
- .264***
.263***
- .294***
- .297***
- .256***
.275***
- .256***
Class Categories
Unbalanced class relations: .....
CONTROLS,
Husband commands/
wife not employed
........
Husband commands/
wife obeys ...............
Balanced class relations: .......
Lower obey class ...........
Upper obey class ............
Upper command class: .......
-
.275**** - .081
.120**
- .194***
- .275**
- .369****
- .156
- .156
- .167*
.104
.084
.229**
- .006
- .049
- .242**
- .276**
- .446**
- .498**
.164
- .470**
Husband employer/
wife manager ...........
Husband and wife
managers ..............
Female-headedhouseholds
- .024
.....
.025
.347***
.078
- .060
.119
- .185
- .114
* P < .10.
** P < .05.
*** P < .01.
**** P < .001.
table is reserveduntillater, when these categoriesare described.)The
firstcolumnin this table presentscorrelationsbetweengenderand the
maternalcontrolscale withinthe aggregatedand disaggregatedfamily
class categories.As expected,these correlationsare generallynegative,
indicatingthat motherscontroltheirdaughtersmorethan theydo their
sons. Note furtherthat the correlationsbetweengenderand maternal
betweengenderand
controlsare generallystrongerthanthe correlations
paternalcontrols,shownin thesecondcolumn.In table 2 we can also see
higherthan paternal
thatmean levels of maternalcontrolare uniformly
levels of control.Across classes, then,mothersare moreinvolvedthan
of parentalcontrols,and the objectsof theseconfathersas instruments
trolsare moreoftendaughtersthan sons.
relationA further
premiseofour theoryis thattheseinstrument-object
and
wives.
husbands
in
relations
between
family
class
shipscan originate
If thispremiseis accurate,thecorrelations
reportedin table3 shouldvary
acrossfamilyclass relationsin predictableways. Using thispremise,we
predictedthat the more egalitarian(i.e., balanced) class relationsthat
characterizethe obey and upper commandclasses-and, by default,ferelationmale-headedhouseholds-will moderatethe instrument-object
801
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
ship between parents and daughters.Alternatively,our extensionof
power-control
theoryleads us to predictthattheseinstrument-object
relationshipswill be morecharacteristic
ofunbalancedclass relations,including, forexample,the mostunbalancedfamilyclass relation,whichmost
resemblesthe ideal-typepatriarchalfamily-that is, the familywith a
command-classhusband and an unemployedwife.In thisclass relation,
we shouldfindfathers,and especiallymothers,to be particularly
controlling of theirdaughters.
Table 3 generallyconfirmsthe above predictions.It is in the femaleheaded householdsand the upper commandclass thatthe maternalinstrument-object
relationshipsare weakest (.025 and -.156), and it is
whenthehead commandsand thespouseis notemployedthatthisinstrument-objectrelationshipis mostacute (-.398). However, thisrelationship remainsratherstrongin thelower(-.275) and upperobey(-.369)
classes, as well as in the class in whichthe husbandcommandsand the
wifeobeys(- .297). The latterfindingis consistentwiththeexpectations
of our theory,while the formerfindingsare consistentwithCoser's suggestionthat women in the lower classes are least likelyto benefitfrom
changesin familypower relations,even when theyjoin the workforce.
Overall, the maternalinstrument-object
relationshipis strongerin unbalanced than in balanced class relationsand weakestin female-headed
households.
The within-classgender-paternalcontrolcorrelationsparallel those
notedabove, but at lower levels. Thus, the correlationbetweengender
and paternalcontrolis strongerin unbalanced class relationsand most
acute in thosefamiliesthatare mostpatriarchal.In balanced class relations,includingthe moreegalitarianupper commandclass and femaleheaded households,thecorrelationis weaker.The remainingfamilyclass
relationsare, as expected,somewherebetweentheseextremes.
The factthatmean levels of maternalcontrolare essentiallyconstant
across the familyclass categories(table 2) shows that the instrumentobject relationshipsdo not varyacross theseclass categoriessimplyas a
resultofthetimethatmothersspendin or away fromhome;overalllevels
of maternal control remain approximatelythe same, regardlessof
whethermotherswork.Variationsin theinstrument-object
relationships
musttherefore
ofmaternalcontrols
occuras a resultof theredistribution
vis-a-vissons and daughtersin thesehomes.
in table 3 concerntasteforand perceived
The finalsetsof correlations
risk.In all class categoriesin whichthe correlationof tasteforriskwith
the relationshipis in the expecteddirectionof sons
genderis significant,
preferring
risktakingmorethan daughtersdo; the correlationof gender
withperceivedriskis negative,indicatingthatdaughtersperceivegreater
risksthan do sons. However, of greaterinterestis the findingthat the
802
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Genderand Delinquency
correlationsbetweengenderand the risk variables are strongerin the
unbalancedthan in the balanced class relations.For example,the correlationbetweengenderand tasteforriskis strongest
in thosepatriarchal
classes in which the husband commandsand the wifeis eithernot employed(.263) or employedin a positionwithoutauthority(.275) and is
weakest in the more egalitariansettingsof the upper command class
(-.006), the lower obey class (.084), and in female-headedhouseholds
(.119). The correlation
ofgenderwithtasteforriskin theupperobeyclass
is perhapssomewhatstrongerthan expected(.229), but otherwisethese
findingsare quite consistentwith the intervening
role assignedto risk
takingin thisextensionof the power-control
theoryof genderand delinquency. Patriarchalfamiliesdo seem to discouragerisk takingamong
daughtersas comparedwithsons, while egalitarianfamiliesseem more
likelyto encouragea taste forrisk among daughtersas well as among
sons. Overall, the implicationsare similarforthe measureof perceived
risk.
We move now to the estimationof regressionequationsin tables4, 5,
and 6. The purpose of these equations is to test the theory'srefined
specification
of the gender-delinquency
relationshipacross class categoriesand its identification
of intervening
linksbetweengenderand delinquencywithintheseclass categories.
We begin with the aggregatedbalanced and unbalancedfamilyclass
categoriesanalyzed in table 4. Recall that Bonger(1916) predictedthat
the relationshipbetween genderand delinquencywould increasewith
upward movementthroughthe class structure.However, the refined
power-control
theorymodifiesthispredictionby takingintoaccountthe
combinedclass positionsof spouses; it predictsthat,when bothparents
occupy positionsof authorityor when neitherhas such a position,a
roughbalance will be establishedand a moreegalitarianpatternis to be
expected-and, therefore,
thatthe relationshipbetweengenderand delinquencywill decline. That we observe weaker correlationsbetween
genderand maternal-as well as paternal-controlsand betweengender
and the risk variables when we compare the balanced with the unbalanced classes encouragesthis prediction.The resultsof estimating
equation (1) in table 4 (presentedin the firsttwo columns)now directly
confirmthis prediction:the zero-ordergender coefficient
in the unbalanced class relation (b = 2.996) is much larger than the gender
in the balanced class (b = 1.833). These resultsare disagcoefficient
gregatedin table 5 and comparedwith those in female-headedhouseholds. Here we findthatthe largestgendercoefficients
are, as expected,
in the mostunbalancedand patriarchalof families-that is, in thosein
which the fathercommands and the motheris eithernot employed
(b = 3.420) or is employedin a positionwithoutauthority(b = 2.668).
803
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06
a.
Genderand Delinquency
TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF CLASS-CATEGORY GENDER COEFFICIENTS
Comparison
Balanced class relation with unbalanced class relation ....
Command-class father/mother
not employed with:
Upper command class ......
Upper obey class ...........
Female-headed
households ..............
**
Equation (1)
Difference
in Genderb's
t-Valueof
Difference
Equation (5)
Difference
in Genderb's
t-Valueof
Difference
1.163
2.369**
.533
.661
1.880
1.393
2.186**
2.010**
1.143
.944
1.473
1.439
1.750
2.103**
1.010
1.158
P < .05.
Meanwhile,the smallestgendercoefficient
in thistable (b = 1.540) is in
the balanced upper command class, and the coefficient
for genderin
female-headedhouseholdsis onlyslightlylarger(b = 1.670).5
Gendercoefficients
fromtheseequationsare comparedacross classes
accordingto size and statisticalsignificance
in table 7. Our firstinterest
is
in determiningwhetherthe gender coefficient
in the aggregatedunbalancedclass relationis significantly
largerthanthegendercoefficient
in
theaggregatedbalanced class relation.It is (t = 2.369). In turningnextto
thedisaggregatedresults,our interestis in whetherthegendercoefficient
in the most unbalanced and patriarchalfamilywe have consideredthatin whichthe fathercommandsand the motheris not employed-is
significantly
largerthan the gendercoefficient
in the more egalitarian
familieswe have considered-that is, those in which both parents(1)
command(theuppercommandclass) or (2) obey(theupperobeyclass) or
(3) the householdis femaleheaded. The t-valuesreportedin the lowerleft-handpartof thistable reveal that,as power-control
theorypredicts,
all threeof these comparisonsare statisticallysignificant.That is, the
gender-delinquency
relationshipis significantly
strongerin the patriarchal class relationthan in any of the more egalitarianclass relations
(t = 2.186, 2.010, 2.103).
Now we mustdemonstratethatthe intervening
linksproposedin our
theoryreallyhelp explainour gender-delinquency
relationships.
We turn
firstto theintervening
roleoftheinstrument-object
relationship
between
mothersand daughters.We have alreadyseenin table 2 thatmothersare
I An anonymous
revieweraskstheinteresting
question-whether
theeffect
ofgender
in thefemale-headed
households
is similarto thatin households
wherethehusbandis
present
butunemployed.
itmustbe notedthatthereareonly14suchfamilies
Although
in oursample,theansweris yes(b = 1.711, P > .10).
807
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
moreinvolvedthanfathersin thecontroloftheirchildrenand, in table3,
thatmothers,morethanfathers,controltheirdaughtersmorethantheir
sons, particularlyin unbalanced,patriarchalfamilies.In explainingthe
gender-delinquency
relationship,equations (2), (3), and (4) in table 4
further
explorethe rolesof maternaland paternalcontrolsby separately
and then jointly adding these scales to equation (1) in table 4. Both
proceduresyieldsimilarconclusions;we will summarizeonlythe latter.
The resultsof enteringthe parentalcontrolvariablesjointlyin table 4
indicatethatmaternalcontrols(b = -.526) have a slightlylargerdirect
effectthan paternal controls(b = -.461) on delinquencyin the aggregated unbalanced class relation and a much larger direct effect
(b = -.864 and .028, respectively)in the aggregatedbalanced class
relation.The implicationin causal termsis thatin unbalanced,patriarchal families(withgenderheld constant),mothersand fathersplay importantroles in controllingthe delinquencyof theirchildren.However,
we have alreadynotedthat,in relativeterms,mothersare moreinvolved
as the instruments
of thiscontrol,especiallywithdaughtersas theirobjects, and thecompoundpath thatestimatestheindirecteffectof gender
on delinquencyin these familiesthroughmaternalcontrol(-.992 x
-.526 = .522) is again greaterthanthe comparablepath thatestimates
theeffectof genderthroughpaternalcontrol(-.887 X -.461 = .409).
Of course,power-control
theoryemphasizesthatfathersplaya keyrolein
that it is theywho assign an instrumental
role to mothersin domestic
social controlin patriarchalfamilies.So itwouldbe inappropriate
to infer
fromthis analysis that mothersare in any ultimatecausal sense more
importantthan fathers.Our data simplydemonstratethe instrumental
influenceof maternalcontrolsin patriarchalfamilies.Meanwhile,in the
balanced families,the strongdirecteffectof maternalcontrolsand the
diminisheddirecteffectof paternalcontrolsis of furtherinterest.The
latterfindingimpliesthatit is the decreasein paternalpowermorethan
theincreasein maternalpowerthatmayaccountforthemoreegalitarian
outcomesin thesefamilies.This possibilitydeservesfurther
research.
When maternaland paternalcontrolsare enteredseparatelyin equations(2) and (3) forthedisaggregatedclass relationsin table 5, theeffects
ofmaternalcontrolsare again largerthanthoseofpaternalcontrols.The
joint effectsof these controlscan be seen in the reducedgendereffects
betweenthe estimationsof equations(1) and (4) in tables 5 and 6.6 For
6 Becausematernal
and paternalcontrols
are strongly
correlated
(r between.5 and .6)
andbecausethenumberofcasesineachofthedisaggregated
family
classesis reduced,
theestimates
ofthematernaland paternalcoefficients
inequation(4) oftable6 become
slightly
lessstable.However,ifa .10 ratherthana .05 levelofsignificance
is applied,
thesubstantive
patterns
ofresultsis essentially
thesame.We haveconserved
spaceby
808
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Genderand Delinquency
example,in familiesin whichthehusbandcommandsand thewifeis not
employed,thereductionis from3.420 to 2.615; and, in familiesin which
thehusbandcommandsand thewifeobeys,thereductionis from2.668 to
1.738. Maternaland paternalcontrolsofdaughtersrelativeto controlsof
sons are importantin explainingthegender-delinquency
relationships
in
thesepatriarchalfamilies.
All the interveningvariables in our theoreticaldiscussionare finally
enteredintoequation (5), and the resultsof estimatingthisequationare
presentedin tables4 and 6. In additionto maternaland paternalcontrols,
thisequation includesour scales fortasteforriskand perceivedriskof
capture.Both thesescales exercisesignificant
effectson delinquency;the
effects
oftasteforriskare particularly
pronounced.A centralpremiseofa
power-control
theoryof genderand delinquencyis thatthe instrumentobject relationshipestablishedwith daughtersparticularlydiscourages
risktakingamongthelatter.Fromthisperspective,itshouldbe expected
thatthe gender-delinquency
relationshipsin equation(5) shouldbe substantiallyreducedfromthosein equation(1)-and theyare. The rolethat
gender-linked
thoughtsabout risk takingplays in mediatingthe effect
of genderon delinquencycan be measured by comparingthe gender
in equation (5) withthosein equation(4), in whichboththe
coefficients
maternaland paternal controlscales are included but the risk-taking
variablesare not;forexample,whenthe riskvariablesare introducedin
thosepatriarchalfamiliesin whichthehusbandcommandsand thewife
is not employedoutside the home, the gendercoefficient
declinesfrom
2.615 to 2.051. Differencesin attitudesabout risktakingtherefore
play
theexpectedrolein mediatingtheeffects
ofgenderon delinquencywithin
thisand otherfamilyclass categories.Furtherevidenceoftheintervening
roleoftheriskvariablescan be observedin thereductionsoftheeffects
of
the maternaland paternalcontrolvariables in the estimationsof equations(4) and (5) in table 4. Finally,turningto the last two columnsof
table 7, we see that controllingfor our interveningvariables has the
theoretically
predictedresultof removingall significant
differences
betweenthe gender-delinquency
relationshipsin the unbalancedand most
patriarchalas comparedwiththemorebalanced and egalitarianfamilies.
In otherwords, delinquencyis more stronglyrelatedto genderin the
unbalanced and patriarchalclass relationsbecause of the instrumentobject relationshipand differences
in risktakingemphasizedin powercontroltheory.
Looking back over the analysis,it is clear that the upper command
class is, as predicted,the class that varies mostfromBonger'soriginal
notpresenting
thematernalandpaternalcoefficients
fromequation(4) intable6. They
are availableon request.
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expectationthattherelationshipbetweengenderand delinquencyshould
increasewith upward movementthroughthe class structure.We will
now make two finalpointsabout how this relationshipdeclinesin the
upper command class and about how, on the basis of our theory,its
reappearancecan also be predicted.Whenequation(1) is estimatedin the
uppercommandclass in table 5, theconstant(8.806) attainsa value that
is exceededonlyby thatforfemale-headedhouseholds(9.239). Because
genderis the only variable in equation (1) and is treatedas a dummy
variablewithfemalescoded zero,therowofconstantsforthisequationin
table 4 reflectsthe mean score of femaleswithineach class on the selfreporteddelinquencyscale. The averagemale scorescan be calculatedby
to theconstantwithineach
addingtheunstandardizedgendercoefficient
class. Doing so shows that the relationshipbetweengenderand delinquencydecreasesin the upper commandclass, not because the average
male scoredeclinesbut because thefemalescoreincreases.The same can
be said of female-basedhouseholds.Our data show that girlsare most
households.
delinquentin theuppercommandclass and in female-headed
Power-control
theoryexplainstheseincreasesin femaledelinquencyby
focusingon conditionsof genderequalitythatcharacterizebothkindsof
households.We will considerseveralfeaturesoftheuppercommandclass
commenton thefemale-headedhouseholds.Priorresearch
beforefurther
husbandsand wives tend to transindicatesthat upper-command-class
in theworkplaceintoparityposilate theirparallelpositionsof authority
tionsof powerin thehousehold.In theuppercommandclass thisresults
in a diminishedinstrument-object
relationshipbetweenparents,especiallymothers,and theirdaughters,or, in otherwords,in an increasein
the freedomof daughtersrelativeto thatof sons. Yet we shouldnot too
easilyassumethat,because husbandsand wivesfromthisclass bothhave
authoritypositionsin the workplace,theyare entirelyequal in power.
Marxian conceptionsof power would superimposeon the Dahrendorfianschemethatwe have used a considerationof businessownership
that goes beyondsimple authorityin the workplace.We have resisted
includingthisMarxiandimensionbecause it resultsin smallclass categories and because the Dahrendorfianlink betweenauthorityrelationsin
the workplaceand the home is so clear. However, in table 8 we extend
our analysis in this directionby drawinga distinctionbetweenuppercommand-classhusbandswho are in theemployerratherthanthemanagerial class (see Wrightand Perrone 1977; Robinson and Kelly 1979;
Hagan and Albonetti1982; Hagan and Parker1985).
Employer-classhusbands own businessesand have one or moreemployees,while managerialclass husbandsdo not own businessesbut do
have subordinates.When the uppercommandclass, withits commandclass spouses,is subdividedin thisway, theclass becomespolarized,with
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Genderand Delinquency
TABLE 8
MARXIAN REFINEMENT OF UPPER COMMAND CLASS
Equation (1) Values
Gender ..................
Beta ....................
Standard error
...........
Constant ................
Husband Employer/Wife
Manager
(N = 14)
Both Spouses Managers
(N = 43)
6.833*
.198
.489
.047
3.129
.651
9.250
8.652
Difference in gender b's = 6.635
t-Value of difference = 4.160****
* p < .10.
**** P < .001.
one set of class relationsmovingin thedirectionof greaterbalance (i.e.,
becomingmore egalitarianin form)and the otherset movingtoward
greaterimbalance(i.e., towardpatriarchy).Power-control
theorythereforepredicts(1) that,when thehusbandis in theemployerclass and the
wife is in the managerialclass, the instrument-object
relationshipbetween mothersand daughtersshould reappear,along with the genderdelinquencyrelationship,and (2) that, when both spouses are in the
decline.
managerialclass, bothof theserelationshipsshouldfurther
The refinedresultspresentedin tables 3 and 8 confirmtheabove prein
dictions.Recall firstthattheoverallupper-command-class
relationship
table 3 betweengenderand maternalcontrolswas - . 156 (withmothers
controllingtheirdaughtersmore than they did theirsons). However,
whenan imbalanceis reintroduced
intothisclass by separatingout situations in which the fatheris an employerand the wife a manager,the
above relationship
jumps to -.446. Alternatively,
whenbothspousesare
managers,therelationship
is reducedto -.024. The predictedchangesin
the gender-delinquency
relationshipresultingfromour refinement
of
theseclass categoriesand the expectedchangesin the gender-maternal
controlrelationship
are shownin table8. Althoughthereare only14 cases
in the former(imbalanced class) relation,the unstandardizedgender
coefficient
is significant
and increasesto 6.833 (P < .05). Meanwhile,in
the latter (balanced class) relation, this coefficientdeclines to .198
(P > .10). This coefficient
is notonlystatistically
insignificant;
it is almost
nonexistent.Furthermore,the differencebetween these two gender
coefficients
is, as predicted,significant
at the .001 level.
Finally,it is of interestto note pointsof similarity
thatexistbetween
the new joint-managerial-class
relationshipswe have identified
and the
female-headedhouseholdswe discussedearlier.In bothkindsof householdstheinstrument-object
relationships
betweenmothersand daughters
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
and the relationshipsbetweengenderand riskpreference
as well as between genderand delinquencyare weak, while the average levels of
femaleparticipationin delinquencyare relativelyhigh.The implicationis
thatdaughtersare freestto be delinquentin familiesin whichmothers
eithershare power equally with fathersor do not share power with
fathersat all.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The goals of thispaper includea revivalof two traditionstowardwhich
currentdelinquencyresearchis skeptical.The firstof these traditions
involves studiesof class positionand delinquentbehavior;the second
traditionconsistsof researchon familyrelationshipsand delinquency.
Both traditionsare stalled,thefirstby uncertainresults(Tittle,Villemez,
and Smith1978)and thesecondby a declinein interest(Wilkinson1974).
Our point is that, when reconceivedand combined throughpowercontroltheory,thesetwo traditionscan contributeto a new understandingoftherelationship
betweenclass and delinquency.However,a keyto
thisnew understanding
is a fullappreciationof the roleof genderin the
class dynamicsof the familyand in delinquency.
The social organizationof work and familyrelationsinfluencesthe
social distributionof delinquencythroughthe genderstratification
of
domesticsocial control.To recognizethis point fullyit is necessaryto
incorporateboth husbandsand wives into modelsof familyclass structure.Traditionaltheoriesof crimeand delinquency,as well as theoriginal statementof power-control
theory,do notfullyincorporatethe positionofthespouse intotheirclass analyses;theextensionofpower-control
theorypresentedhere does do so, by makingthe relativepositionsof
husbandsand wives a basis fora new modelof familyclass relations.
Centralto our extensionof power-control
theoryis a conceptualization
of class and familythatfocuseson powerrelationsin theworkplaceand
thehome.A keypremiseofour extendedtheoryis thatpositionsofpower
in theworkplaceare translatedintopowerrelationsin thehouseholdand
thatthelatter,in turn,influencethegender-determined
controlofadolesof genderand
forrisktaking,and thepatterning
cents,theirpreferences
delinquency.
We have argued that a predominantly
male patternof delinquency
resultsfromtheclass structure
ofmodernpatriarchalfamilies.This patriarchalfamilystructure
is historically
rootedin a separationoffamilyfrom
workthatWeber saw as crucialto the rationalizationof modernindustrialcapitalism.In thesefamilies,an instrument-object
takes
relationship
the formof fathers'and, especially,mothers'controlling
theirdaughters
more than theirsons. This relationshipplays a key role in the social
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Genderand Delinquency
reproductionof a genderdivision betweenfamilyand work-that is,
between a sphere focused on domesticlabor and consumptionand a
sphereconcernedwithlabor powerand directproduction.Our argument
is that the instrument-object
relationshipthat characterizesthe parentdaughterrelationshipin patriarchalfamiliestendsto preparedaughters
fora "cult of domesticity"
thatmakes theirinvolvementin delinquency
comparativelyunlikely.
First, using a Dahrendorfianmodel of familyclass relations,our
power-control
theorypredictsthattheinstrument-object
relationship
betweenparentsand daughterswill be mostacute-and disparitiesin risk
preferences
and delinquencyby gendermostapparent-in unbalanced,
patriarchalfamilies,forexample,thosein whichhusbandsare employed
in positionsof authorityand theirspouses are eithernot employedor
employedin positionswithoutauthority.Alternatively,
our theorypredicts that this instrument-object
relationshipwill be least acute--and
disparitiesin riskpreferences
least
and delinquencyby gendertherefore
apparent-in morebalanced, egalitariankindsoffamilies,in whichhusbands and wives occupy more balanced class positions,for example,
familiesin which neitheror both are in positionsof authorityin the
workplaceor in whichfathersare mostlyabsent(i.e., in female-headed
households).In theseegalitariankindsof families,daughtersgain a kind
of freedomthatis reflectedin a reducedcontrolby fathersand mothers
and an increasedopenness to risk takingthat, among adolescents,includes some commonformsof delinquentbehavior.
Our data are generallyconsistentwiththisextensionof power-control
theory.For example,in our mostpatriarchalfamilies,in whichfathers
have authorityin the workplaceand mothersare not employedoutside
thehome,theinstrument-object
relationshipis mostacute; daughtersare
discouragedfromtakingrisks,and sons are moredelinquentthandaughters.In moreegalitariankindsof families-forexample,thosein which
mothersand fathersboth have authorityin the workplace-the instrument-objectrelationshipbetweenparentsand daughtersis reduced,risk
preferences
of daughtersare morelike thoseof sons, and genderdifferences in delinquencydecline,withaverage levels of delinquencyamong
daughtersincreasing.Interestingly,
these latterpatternsalso prevail in
familiesfromwhichfathersare largelyabsent(i.e., female-headed
households). So, apparently,circumstances
of bothliberationand deprivation
can producethe resultswe have described.Power-control
theoryasserts
thatwhatboththesekindsofcircumstances
have in commonis a freedom
frommale domination;that is, our analyses demonstratethat gender
differences
resultfromunbalanced and patriarchalas comparedwith
more balanced and egalitariankinds of familyclass structuresand, in
thatthesedifferences
turn,confirm
can be removedwhenvariablesasso813
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
ciated with unbalanced, patriarchalclass relationsare taken into account.When daughtersare freedfrompatriarchalfamilyrelations,they
too becomedelinquent.
A Marxianconsiderationofbusinessownershipprovidesan interesting
kind of additionalevidenceforour theory.This refinement
of our class
analysisfurtherspecifiedpower relationsthat increasedand decreased
gender-control
and gender-delinquency
relationships.More specifically,
withinthe upper commandclass, we were able to show thatextremely
large gender differentials
in maternalcontroland delinquencyoccur
whenthefatheris in theemployerclass and themotheris in themanager
class and that these differentials
are almost entirelyabsent when both
spouses occupy managerialpositions.The latteris the mostegalitarian
kind of familystructurewe were able to establishin our data, withthe
possibleexceptionof female-headedhouseholds(fromwhichfathersare
largelyabsent).These are the two kindsof familiesin our data in which
daughtersare freestto be delinquent.
We shouldagain emphasizethat,by givingparticularattentionhereto
the instrument-object
relationshipbetweenmothersand daughters,we
have not meantto implythatmothersare, in any ultimatecausal sense,
moreresponsiblethan fathersforthe controlof daughters.Our pointis
that,in patriarchalsettings,mothersin particularare assignedan instrumentalrolein imposingthisselectivecontrol.Our theoryactuallyimplies
thatfathersand/ora patriarchalsocial structureare the sourcesof this
roleassignment.Exactlyhow, why,and withwhatconsequencesthisrole
research.One purpose
assignmentoccursare importantissuesforfurther
of power-control
theoryis to call attentionto such issues.
By fullyincorporating
power relationsbetweenspouses intoour class
analysis,usinga commonsetofconcepts,and focusingon powerrelations
at low and high ends of the class structure,we can use power-control
theoryto account fordeclinesin gender-delinquency
relationshipsthat
previouslyeitherwentunexplainedor requiredfortheirexplanationseparate theoriesof deprivationand liberation.We have herereducedthose
two theoriesto one power-control
theory.
Power-control
theoryencouragesa new approachto thestudyof class
and delinquency.What is most significantis that it encouragesclass
analystsof delinquencyto become attentiveto familypower relations.
Our approach focusesfirston the relationalpositionsof spouses in the
workplaceand, second,on how thesedeterminespouses'relationsto one
anotherin thehome.The theorythenfocuseson gender-specific
authority
relationsbetweenparentsand adolescentsand on how theseinfluence
the
attitudesand behaviorsof adolescents.The combinationof theseinterlockingrelationshipssuggestsa gender-basedlinkbetweenclass and debetween
linquency.The implicationis that,in explainingtherelationship
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Genderand Delinquency
social structureand commondelinquentbehavior,it may no longerbe
sufficient
to consideronly the fathers'yearsof education,dollarsof income, unitsof occupationalprestige,or even relationalpositionsin the
workplace. Our theoryand data indicatethat importantrelationships
among class, gender,and delinquencyare only discoveredby taking
accountoftherelativepositionsofhusbandsand wivesin theworkplace.
These relativepositionsare changingas more egalitarianfamilyclass
structures
replacemorepatriarchalformsoffamilylife.In thissense,the
changingclass dynamicsof genderand delinquencyare part of a larger
processof social change thatinvolvesthe declinein genderdivisionbetweenconsumptionand productionspheresin postindustrial
society.
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