“WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS”
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT
AND ITS CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION IN AFGHANISTAN
The Cahiers de la Recherche doctrinale (The Doctrine Research Journal) are a
key contribution to the French Army research on the present major operational
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considered neither as official reports nor as staff documents.
“WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS”
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT
AND ITS CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION IN AFGHANISTAN
This study was directed by Lieutenant Bertrand Valeyre (Reserve)
of the Research Branch of the CDEF Research and Lessons Learned Division.
Forces Employment Doctrine Center: 821 753 81 65 – Tel.: (+33) 01 44 42 81 65 – Fax: 01 44 42 44 66
MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE
ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS
Paris, le 15 juin 2010
N° 500480/DEF/CDEF/DREX/BR
“Winning hearts and minds” has become rather a familiar slogan since 2009 when American
forces began rallying behind it in Afghanistan. It is seen as the cornerstone of a new operational
culture aimed at encouraging the Afghan population to favor the coalition’s cause.
This phrase, however, is far from new; it is rooted in classical philosophy and in Christian
doctrine, particularly among Anglo-Saxon Protestants. As time passed, the phrase became
progressively secularized and crossed over into political and military vocabulary.
Defining what lies at the heart of this concept and its profound implications has been the subject
of thorough studies by various military thinkers, from Lyautey to McChrystal, and from Templer
to Galula. In the past half century, British, French and American armed forces have all been
tasked with conducting “pacification” or “counterinsurgency” operations in extremely hostile
environments. How did they actually go about implementing this concept? Has successfully
“winning hearts and minds” indeed been the true cornerstone of successful crisis resolutions?
At the present, particularly in the United States, these questions are wide open for debate.
This doctrinal paper will attempt to answer these questions by comparing recent British, French
and American experiences. The concept of “winning hearts and minds” has achieved successes
and suffered setbacks, but has always survived. The British successfully implemented it in
Malaya in the 1950s and it enjoyed some success with the French in Algeria, though it became
discredited after the American experience in the Vietnam War. It has since regained interest this
past decade with the conflict in Iraq and operations in Afghanistan. Today, the local population
is at the center of the coalition strategy in the Afghan theater of operations. Hope for the rapid
normalization of this ever-hardening conflict hinges on this strategy and its highly comprehensive approach. “Winning hearts and minds” is set to remain the slogan that coalition forces rally
behind in the coming months.
Forces Employment Doctrine Center: 821 753 81 65 – Tel.: (+33) 01 44 42 81 65 – Fax: 01 44 42 44 66
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
ObSERvATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
PART 1 – A CONCEPT DEvELOPED AND CLAIMED bY THE bRITISH . . . . . . . . . 21
ChApTER I – ThE MALAyAN EMERgENCy (1948-1960):
A MODEL OF SuCCESSFuL COuNTERINSuRgENCy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.1 – The Initial Errings of Repression (1848-1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2 – The Experimental Strategy Shift of 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3 – The Positive Results of the Flexible and Population-Centric Approach (1952-1960) . . . . . . . . . . 25
ChApTER II – A REpRODuCIBLE SuCCESS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1 – The Lessons Learned by Robert Thompson (Good Governance and Reasoned Use of Force) . . . 27
2.2 – The Lessons Learned by Major General Sir Frank Kitson (Counterinfluence and Crowd Control) . 29
2.3 – The Major Objections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
ChApTER III – A COMpONENT OF BRITISh LAND FORCES EMpLOyMENT DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1 – The War “Among the People”, According to General Sir Rupert Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 – The Contribution of the Army to Security and Stabilization Operations (JPD 3-40) . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 – The Mitigated Experiment in the Afghan Theater of Operations (Helmand Province: 2006-2009) . . 35
PART 2 – AN APPROACH THAT FINDS COMMON GROUND
WITH FRENCH EXPERIENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
ChApTER I – ThE LEgACy OF MARShALS gALLIENI AND LyAuTEy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.1 – The Idea of “Pacification” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.2 – The Principle of “Gradual Penetration” or “Oil Spot” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.3 – The Concept of “Dissuasive Pressure” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7
ChApTER II – ThE pOpuLATION AS ThE MAIN STAkE IN ThE DOCTRINE OF REVOLuTIONARy WARFARE
(DRW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.1 – Anti-subversive Warfare According to Roger Trinquier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2 – Counterinsurgency According to David Galula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3 – The Experience of the “Sections Administratives Spécialisées” (SAS) in Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
ChApTER III – COuNTERINSuRgENCy IN ThE STABILIzATION phASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1 – The Doctrinal Evolution: from the “War within the Crowd” to “Stabilization” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 – Restoring Security in the Theatre of Operations Among the Population (CREB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 – The Civil-Military Actions of the French Forces in Afghanistan
(Kapisa-Surobi area: 2009-2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
PART 3 – UNITED STATES: ONCE DISCREDITED,
DEbATED AND REDEFINED MODEL, AGAIN PREvAILING . . . . . . . . . 59
ChApTER I – DISCREDIT IN VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.1 – CORDS: A Program Overshadowed by a “Dirty War” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.2 – The Malaya Example Imperfectly Assimilated? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.3 – A Misleading Slogan? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
ChApTER II – REhABILITATION IN IRAq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.1 – David Kilcullen’s New Definition of the Concept and its Use of Sociology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2 – The “Petraeus Doctrine” (from FM 3-24 to the Iraq “Troop Surge”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.3 – Persistent Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
ChApTER III – ThE TRANSFER TO AFghANISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.1 – The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and the Human Terrain System (HTS) . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 – The McChrystal Plan (a New Operational Culture) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3 – The Ongoing Strategic Debate in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
PART 4 – A CHALLENGE FOR THE COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . 79
ChApTER I – ThE INERTIA FACTOR: SOCIAL AND pOLITICAL ASpECTS ThAT MAkE FOREIgN
INTERVENTION DIFFICuLT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1.1 – The Mentality and Expectations of the Afghan People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1.2 – The Mutual Misunderstandings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1.3 – The Failing Go-Betweens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
8
ChApTER II – ThE uNDERLyINg STAkE: ThE LEgITIMIzATION OF FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.1 – The Definition of the Desired End State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.2 – The Problem of Legitimacy and Proportionate Use of Force in the Current Environment . . . . . . 88
2.3 – The Question of Long Term Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
ChApTER III – ThE LACkINg pRINCIpLE OF ACTION: WINNINg “ThE hEARTS AND MINDS”
OF ONE’S OWN pOpuLATION? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.1 – The Influence of the “COIN Lobby” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2 – The Resilience of Public Opinion (the War of Relevance and Media Amplification) . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.3 – The Challenges of Globalization (the Internet Revolution and Global Insurgency) . . . . . . . . . . . 95
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
ANNEXES, SOURCES AND bIbLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
9
ObSERvATIONS
11
Observations
Observation #1:
“Winning hearts and minds” is the operational concept of population-centric counterinsurgency
(COIN). It requires action among the civil population, focused on the population and in support
of the population, particularly during the stabilization phase. The desired end state is the lasting
separation of insurgents from the population, as well as the population’s support of the legitimate
authority. This population-centric or indirect option differs from the enemy-focused conventional approach, which is centered on “search and destroy” operations against the enemy.
Observation #2:
The population-centric option does not exclude the proportional, controlled and restricted use
of a form of coercion. Based on the principle that an action directly targeted at insurgents can
only be effective if it has a positive impact on the population that is greater than the damage it
can cause. This action needs to be planned, assessed and finally conducted on the basis of the
net effect to be achieved among the local population. This results in what is commonly referred
to as “rational use of force”.
Observation #3:
Operations aiming at “winning hearts and minds” are mainly of a political nature, and therefore
part of a struggle for legitimacy. The primacy of the political authority is made clear by the fact
that the civil executive is the ultimate authority in the fight against insurgency. The armed forces
operate in support of the government of the country in which they are deployed. They do not aim
to be liked for their efforts, for what really matters is the attitude of the local population towards
its own government.
Observation #4:
“Winning hearts and minds” means gaining the trust of a population by gaining its respect, not
by imposing values or a biased view, but by bringing them security and, above all, development
capabilities. “Winning minds” means convincing a population that their lives and livelihoods are
being protected, while deterring those who have not made up their minds from joining the
insurgency. “Winning hearts” means meeting the needs of a community of individuals, and doing
so requires their belief that their expectations will be met by the success of the COIN mission.
Observation #5:
While the security aspect of COIN operations aims to protect inhabitants, the development aspect
requires serving the population. Well beyond mere disciplined behavior of the deployed troops
who must learn to respect local customs, the development aspect requires the establishment of
relationships with the local population that can lead to mutual trust. Counterinsurgents thus need
to identify social networks, which, in addition to carrying influence, can establish links that can
bring support to the loyalist cause.
13
Observation #6:
Security and development need to be put into place simultaneously. They can only be successful
if they are carried out in an environment in which a lasting dialog is maintained with the representatives of the population, as well as with NGOs and armed forces. Coordinating all administrative
actions involved in civil-military stabilization activities is a precondition for success.
Observation #7:
Operating among the population makes it possible to gather reliable intelligence that can be used
to eliminate the enemy’s political cells. This intelligence enables COIN forces to locate insurgency
fighters and convince them to change their allegiance to the legitimate loyalist authority. For many
additional reasons, gathering information of an ethnographic or cultural kind helps the deployed
forces have a better command of the human aspects of their operational environment.
Observation #8:
psychological operations (PSYOPS) play a significant role in population-centric COIN. When
carried out in conjunction with information operations (INFO-OpS), psychological actions are
part of a comprehensive plan. Information Operations can be positive when they aim to promote
loyalist force actions and negative when they attempt to discredit the opposing insurgents. They
also take into account the impact of international public opinion.
Observation #9:
population control is another key element of “winning hearts and minds”, aimed at restricting
contact between the population and the insurgency. This control is carried out according to
“quadrillage” or “gridding tactics” principles. The following measures are various forms of
population control: census-taking and the administrative registration of the population, including
new advances in biometrics, surveillance, the imposition of curfews, restrictions of freedom of
movement and requisitions. History recalls populations being gathered into protected enclaves.
These protected enclaves, called “strategic hamlets”, were supposed to be permanent and economically viable social showcases, in addition to being secure locations. Forced displacements of populations, which are likely to increase the resentment among the population, are now proscribed.
Observation #10:
The establishment of security within geographic areas and populations is carried out according to
the “oil spot” principle. This method of “gradual penetration” starts from one secure sector from
which all insurgents have been driven out, and extends “pacification” outwards in concentric
circles. This method is the ideal tactical course of action of a population-centric counterinsurgency.
The use of the word “ideal” is quite relevant, since it is extremely difficult to bring together each
and every condition required for the success of “winning hearts and minds” operations, particularly
if the insurgents are deeply embedded in the population.
14
INTRODUCTION
15
Introduction
“Winning hearts and minds”. This strong and martial slogan has been used many, many times.
This expression, though inextricably connected to the history of asymmetric warfare, has
become so debased so that it has even become a catch phrase in commercial advertising
campaigns. The concept is so ambiguous and all-encompassing that many military experts,
unable to agree on a common definition, would be relieved if the phrase and the wide range of
hotly debated tactics that it covers were simply forgotten 1. However, the primarily American
strategists of the coalition leading operations in Afghanistan, the International Security and
Assistance Force (ISAF) have been implementing it since 2009, both as the basic principle for
a “new operational culture” aimed at winning the trust, confidence and respect of the Afghan
population, and the engine of a “population-centric” rather than “enemy-focused” COIN.
Classical philosophy tells us that the combination of the mind and the heart encompasses
the whole of a man. The heart is the center of his affection, desires and temporal passions. The
mind is the center of his rationale, his calculating intellect and his eternity. “Winning hearts
and minds” actually implies fully subjugating the bodies and souls of a group of individuals.
The modern use of this concept comes from the Christian faith: religion subjugates man to God
and fills “the hearts and minds” of faithful believers. This dedication to God, this enthusiasm
and emotional respect that is recalled in Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians 2 was considered by
Anglo-Saxon protestant thinkers when they tried to find a way to introduce it into the political
environment.
The expression then became secularized and developed a strong attachment to the liberal
democratic order. In a letter to a Baltimore newspaper in 1818, John Adams, a founding father
and the second president of the United States of America, described the French Revolution as
an event that was “in the minds and hearts of the people; a change in their religious sentiments
of their duties and obligations”. Later, when he was engaged in the political battle of the “New
Deal”, the 32nd president of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, used the phrase
“hearts and minds” on several occasions to rally the American nation behind the creation of the
welfare state 3.
Later the struggle for “hearts and minds” moved from inspired speeches to actual battlefields
where it came under fire. The “militarization” of the concept dates back to June 1952, a key
moment in the “Emergency” declared by the British in Malaya. For the first time, the phrase
referred to the methods and objectives of a population-centric counterinsurgency operation.
According to General Sir gerald Templer, High Commissioner and Commander in Chief of
the British forces in Malaya, “the answer [to defeating the insurgents] lies in the minds and
hearts of the population”.
1
2
3
FD: Gagner les cœurs et les esprits, une devise à revoir ? (Winning hearts and minds: a motto to be reconsidered?)
AgoraVox – Le média citoyen, March 19th, 2008.
“And the peace of God, which transcends all understanding, will guard your hearts and your minds in Christ
Jesus.” (Philippians 4:7) It is interesting to note that this is about divine peace, not about war.
In an address in 1934 President Roosevelt said: “In these days it means to me a union not only of the states, but
a union of the hearts and minds of the people in all the states and their many interests and purposes, devoted
with unity to the human welfare of our country”.
17
Introduction
Nevertheless, according to researcher Thomas Mockaitis, the concept may have appeared
earlier in the 1920s and 30s during British ‘imperial policing’ operations, at the initiative of
officers who fought against the Pashtun rebels of the North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP)
of the Indian Empire 4. In that case, the modus operandi promoted by US General Stanley
McChrystal in 2009 in Afghanistan and Pakistan would simply be resuscitating it in the geographical and human environment where it was born. The concept that comes closest to “winning
hearts and minds” on the French side is “pacification” and the principle of the “oil spot”,
implemented in the French colonies by governors-general gallieni and Lyautey.
Mao Zedong.
For the Western servicemembers who fought against armed insurgencies
in the post-WWII decolonization wars, the rhetoric of “winning hearts
and minds” was considered as the equivalent response, at least in terms
of impact and efficiency, to the famous phrase of Mao zedong (18931976), a theorist of the “popular war”, who believed that the communist
guerrilla fighter had to move within the population like “a fish in the
water”. Later, “driving the water out”, “siphoning the bowl”, and
“draining the swamp” became the keywords of COIN. Also, action can
be “taken against the water, meaning that the population could be prevented from being the biotope that hosts the insurgency, and the ‘winning
hearts and minds’ strategy can achieve this goal” 5.
The conquest of “hearts and minds” is thus presented as the major effect in COIN 6. It aims to
compel a population to support its cause (frequently referred to as “loyalist”). Cutting off
guerrilla fighters from the local population is required in order to prevent the rebels from
obtaining supplies and melting into the population. In reality, the proportion of the population
recruited by one faction or the other is often very low. The population chooses which side to
support, depending on the events and policies conducted by each actor. While the support of
the population is critical to defeat the insurgency, its actual neutrality is what is most needed
as a minimum requirement for the achievement of most political objectives 7. Between 75 and
80% of COIN actions are in fact of a political nature8.
Population-centric counterinsurgency has always been tackled as the opposite of the exclusively
“kinetic” (a US-born euphemism indicating the massive use of weapons, violence or force)
or coercive approach, most often characterized by “search and destroy” operations against
4
5
6
7
8
Thomas Mockaitis: British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era (1919-1960), Manchester University
Press, 1995. To support his assumption, Mockaitis recalls the experience of Lieutenant-Colonel C.E. Bruce, from
the Indian Political Department, in NWFP in 1938.
Général Jean-Pierre Gambotti: Contre-Insurrection et Stratégie Oblique, Alliance géostratégique, November 23rd,
2009.
Definition of COIN in the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP 3.4.4): counterinsurgency is the set
of political, economic, social, military, media and psychological activities required to defeat insurgency and
address any core grievances of the population.
Barthélémy Courmont, Darko Ribnikar: Les Guerres Asymétriques – Conflits d’Hier et d’Aujourd’ hui, terrorisme
et nouvelles menaces, Institut de la Recherche Internationale et Stratégique (IRIS), deuxième éd. revue et augmentée,
Dalloz, Coll. Enjeux Stratégiques, 2009.
75% according to British General (and future Marshal) Gerald Templer. 80% according to David Galula, a French
COIN thinker who is well-known in the US is and currently being rediscovered in France.
18
Introduction
the enemy. Counterinsurgency has a complex history. It was nearly forgotten after the decolonization wars in Asia and Africa of the 1950s and 60s, then discredited after the US military
intervention in Vietnam and the use of its most coercive techniques by South American dictatorships in the seventies. It then regained intellectual interest as a result of the Afghanistan (post2001) and Iraq (post-2003) conflicts.
America, at war against Islamist terrorism in Iraq, initially believed it could eradicate evil
with strikes and intimidation (“shock and awe”) prior to acknowledging in the middle of the
decade, under the influence of a group of COIN supporters, that a different strategy taking the
human factor further into account would be more successful in containing a clever enemy
keen to capitalize on the population’s frustrations and make good use of globalization’s many
possibilities.
The need for a similar strategic reorientation became obvious for the United States and its
NATO allies in Afghanistan. 200 soldiers had already been killed by early 2010. At the time,
the coalition was facing its heaviest human losses yet. This clearly demonstrated that the
insurgency continued to grow stronger fully eight years into the conflict, even as coalition
reinforcements continued to arrive.
Before discussing the feasibility of the struggle to “win hearts and minds” in Afghanistan,
it would be useful to recall the military history of the concept, to question its practical effectiveness and to have a look at how it is presented in the doctrine of uk, French and uS forces.
19
PART 1
A CONCEPT DEvELOPED AND CLAIMED
bY THE bRITISH
“Winning hearts and minds” proved successful in the execution of “imperial policing”
operations and is quite typical of British pragmatism. Born in the colonial environment
and considered to be a valid strategy since the 1950s, it is now officially integrated into
the doctrine of the United Kingdom’s armed forces. The primacy of “winning hearts
and minds” over “search and destroy” is a given in all British counterinsurgency theory
and practice.
21
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
C hapter I – t he M alayan e MergenCy (1948-1960):
a M Odel Of S uCCeSSful C OunterInSurgenCy
The counterinsurgency campaign conducted by the British in Malaya between 1948 and 1960
is recognized as a success 9. The attempt by defeated communist leader Chin Peng to resume
hostilities against the Malayan government after 1967 met with no more success than his first
attempt to raise a popular revolt against the British colonial authorities. This is quite remarkable 10 when put into the context of the decolonization wars launched after 1945 by “Third
World” insurgents supported by the Eastern Bloc.
Although the Malayan case got off to a bad start, the loyalists eventually enjoyed a successful
outcome. The consensus among analysts of the Malayan Emergency, particularly among AngloSaxon COIN experts, is an admission that the flexible population-centric approach adopted
by the British command, which, after 1952 was focused on “winning hearts and minds”, had
been the key to success 11.
1.1 – the Initial errings of repression (1848-1950)
After fighting against the Japanese in WWII,
Malayan communists resumed guerrilla warfare,
this time against the British and supported by their
political-military system. The colonial authorities
had been severely weakened by the Japanese
occupation. Malayans of Chinese descent, 38% of
the total population of approximately 5 million
inhabitants, made up 90% of the insurgents
commanded by the Malayan Races Liberation
Army (MRLA) or Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), which was the militant wing
of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
The Malayans of Chinese origin controlled a significant part of the economy and thus attracted
the jealousy of native Malayans. They were not, however, integrated into the culture. They
suffered from restrictions imposed by the colonial authorities on obtaining Malayan nationality
and therefore did not have the right to vote. Some 500,000 Chinese-born Malayan “squatters”,
who had sought refuge in the surrounding jungle during the Japanese occupation, constituted
the base of recruitment for the MRLA/MNLA.
Anthony Leguay: Etat d’Urgence en Malaisie – Un Exemple d’Adaptation à la Contre-Insurrection par les
Forces Britanniques (1948-1960), Cahier de la recherche doctrinale du CDEF, 2010.
10 Only the defeat of the communist Huks in the Philippines at that time can be compared to it.
11 Dr Richard Stubbs: From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya
(1948-60), contribution to Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, joint publication by Daniel Marston and Carter
Malkasian, Osprey Publishing, 2008.
9
23
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
At the start of the campaign in 1948, neither side was fully prepared. The conflict quickly
turned very aggressive since the British command was eager to suppress quickly the troublemakers whom it qualified as “terrorists” or “bandits” and to re-instate order, while the
communists tried to impose their ideological stance. The MRLA/MNLA’s most spectacular
feat was the assassination in an ambush of British High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney, on
October 6 th, 1951.
The British seemed to be overwhelmed by the violent turn of this asymmetric conflict. The
former WWII officers in command in Malaya had trouble understanding the operational environment they now had to cope with. Intelligence shortfalls as well as a complex chain of
command that was totally disconnected from the terrain made most operations uncertain, if
not counterproductive 12.
At the beginning of the conflict, the British were only able to mobilize 13 infantry battalions
(seven of which partially composed of Gurkhas, two belonging to the Royal Malay Regiment
and another from the British Royal Artillery Regiment, used as a reserve force). From the
beginning, the troops were clearly unprepared for jungle warfare. The authorities had to call
for units from the Royal Marines and the King’s African Rifles, as well as reinforcements from
the Commonwealth 13. The Special Air Service (SAS) created during WWII was re-formed in
Malaya in 1950 as a specialized reconnaissance, raid and counterinsurgency unit.
During the first years of the conflict, the various loyalist troops under British command, with
little knowledge of the local environment, and local police, poorly trained and highly corrupt,
conducted numerous brutal actions that merely worsened the security situation and led a large
number of inhabitants, both native Malayans and those of Chinese descent, to side with the
insurgents.
1.2 – the experimental Strategy Shift of 1951
In order to stop the Malayan population from turning further against the British authorities,
Lieutenant General Sir harold Briggs, who was promoted to Commander-in-Chief of
operations in Malaya in 1951, issued a memorandum in May 1950 that was to be become the
basis of a plan aimed at regaining control of the most heavily populated areas and restoring a
sense of safety and security among the local population.
Lieutenant General Briggs’s objectives were threefold:
• Improve intelligence on the MCP and the communist rebels;
• Isolate and separate the MCP and the MRLA/MNLA from the population;
• Force the guerrilla fighters to confront the British forces in open terrain.
12
13
Anthony Leguay: op. cit.
Beside the soldiers of the British Army and the Malayan Federation, contingents coming from Australia, New
Zealand, the Fiji and South Rhodesia fought against the insurgents in Malaya.
24
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
The “Briggs Plan” was radically different from previous applications of military strategy, all of
which had a “military-driven, insurgent-focused, search and destroy approach”14. It was a long
term learning process and experiment, typical of a new approach focused on population control
and security. To that end, the commander-in-chief included in his recommendations some
forced displacements of populations towards resettlement areas 15, but also the initiation of
local authority reforms and support for the coordination of efforts amongst all involved state
players, such as local authorities, the armed forces and police.
Despite the obvious shortcomings of the Briggs Plan, despite
the furor caused by the assassination of Sir Henry Gurney and
despite the limited results of the population relocation policy 16,
this plan was used as the basis for the strategic option that
was developed and further implemented by Brigg’s successor,
Lieutenant General Sir gerald Templer, High Commissioner
in Malaya from 1952 to 1954. The comprehensive British
campaign aimed at “winning hearts and minds” was implemented
during this period.
1.3 – the positive results of the flexible and population-Centric
approach (1952-1960)
Lieutenant General Templer arrived in Malaya in February 1952 with the intention of taking action
in a broad range of domains: military, police, social, political and administrative. He was a man of
strong charisma who believed he could improve the situation by focusing on the overall wellbeing of the local population, to whom he promised to follow a “Malayan way”. This operating
method was in line with the intent expressed by the conservative cabinet of Prime Minister
Sir Winston Churchill set up in 1951, and also by the new colonial administration that was
subsequently organized to initiate the first steps for the accession to independence, with the support
of Muslim Malayan notables. Malaya would eventually gain independence on August 31st, 1957.
The military action was rationalized. Loyalist forces were increased to 35,000 men. The infantry
was organized into small, adaptable, mobile and decentralized units, capable of tracking down the
enemy in its own territory in accordance with the “jungle bashing” doctrine that was approved by
Briggs just a few days before his departure in November 1951. Company commanders and platoon
leaders received extended decision-making autonomy. The SAS carried out raids in the very heart
of the areas held by the guerrilla forces, and hence provided the infantry with the strategic depth
it had previously lacked. The Royal Air Force played a major role in COIN operations: airplanes
and helicopters increased their roles from “close air” support logistics, including deployment of
troops in the depth of the area of engagement, land operations supply and medical evacuations 17.
Dr Richard Stubbs, op. cit.
At the beginning of the 20 th century, forced displacements of populations for antisubversive purposes had been
carried out for the first time by the British against Afrikaner commandos and the families, who had been deported
into “re-concentration camps” that had been opened during the 2 nd Boer War (1899-1902).
16 The camps were poorly protected against rebel attacks and the populations suffered from police acts of violence.
17 Anthony Leguay: op. cit.
14
15
25
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
Templer understood that an insurgency is a war of the people that requires a political solution
be found to subversion, rather than the destruction of the guerrilla fighters 18. After successfully
uniting the various actors in a single front to fight against the insurgency, Templer implemented
the idea voiced under Briggs according to which “the cornerstone of a guerilla’s power is its
relationship with the population” 19. From that moment on, the British counterinsurgency focused
on this relationship. The necessity to “win hearts and minds” became a repeated refrain under
Templer’s leadership 20. The phrase itself was first coined by the High Commissioner in June
1952: “The answer [to defeating the insurgents] lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle,
but rests in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people” 21.
Templer believed it was possible to win hearts “if the people
are treated well and their expectations met”. He improved
their living conditions by launching “Operation Service”, which
was a full overhaul of the authorities, with police put at the
service of the displaced populations. The resettlement areas set
up under Briggs were now called “new villages”. In these “new
villages”, Templer introduced social measures and development
projects that were always coupled with a coercive dimension
for the loyalist cause to become accepted in the minds of the
people.
population control measures were indeed attached to the “hearts and minds” program: a curfew,
movement restrictions, food rationing (which could be extended as far as actual “food denial”
to the recalcitrant), collective fines and preventive custody. However, in certain areas where the
insurgency had been eliminated or was inactive, Templer declared the setting up of “white areas”
that had a more lenient population control system and higher incentives for cooperation with
the authorities.
The population’s active participation in this part of the campaign was encouraged by the
establishment of a “Home Guard”, as well as the active promotion of local elites within the
legitimate authority’s power structure. Additionally, the recruitment of well-trained native
policemen and a practice known as “continuous exhortation” 22 were encouraged. With these
actions, the psychological war conducted to win over the undecided, as well as the counterpropaganda campaign to attract the insurgents themselves, were both successful. COIN
theorists often quote Templer and praise his methods when justifying the implementation of the
“winning hearts and minds” principle.
Sir Gerald Templer: “An insurgent movement is a war of the people, and the government must give priority to
defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas”.
19 This phrase is recalled by Anthony Leguay, op. cit.
20 According to Simon C. Smith: General Templer and Counter-Insurgency in Malaya: Hearts and Minds, Intelligence, and Propaganda, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 16, Nr. 3, 2001.
21 Partially recalled by Elizabeth Dickinson in Foreign Policy: A Bright Shining Slogan. How Hearts and Minds
Came to Be, September-October 2009 issue.
22 Gérard Chaliand, in Les Guerres Irrégulières (20 th-21 st centuries), Gallimard-Folio, 2008, presents the positive
conclusions drawn by Major General Julian Paget in his book Emergency in Malaya, Faber & Faber, 1967.
18
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Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
C hapter II – a r eprOduCIble S uCCeS ?
In English language historical reviews, the Malayan case has become a common point of
reference. According to Major General Sir Julian paget 23, one of the main COIN practitioners
and specialists in the United Kingdom: “the state of emergency in Malaya clearly demonstrates
how important the goal of winning hearts and minds needs to be considered, for short term
and longer term purposes, and how a government can achieve this”. Besides Paget, other
renowned authors who have analyzed the paradigms established in Malaya and thereby helped
foster the population-centric approach and the minimum use of force include General Sir Robert
Thompson and General Sir Frank kitson.
The highly flexible strategy of General (later Field Marshal) Templer did indeed inspire the
campaigns led by British forces against other irregular and asymmetric forces in kenya (19521959), Cyprus (1955-1959), Aden (1963-1967), Oman (1962-1975) and even Northern
Ireland (after 1969). Civil-military cooperation at all levels, interaction between the military
and the police, intelligence integration, involvement of native elites and air force support to
counter-guerrilla actions are all the most obvious examples of the Malayan Emergency’s
influence on these various theatres of operations. In each case, population control was the main
component put into action. While “winning hearts and minds” was often claimed in theory, it
has not always been thoroughly implemented. For example, Kenya’s, Mau Mau insurgency
was poorly organized and lacked modern leadership, and could be crushed by conventional
military means. Retrospectively, some writers became rather dubious about the exportability
of the British strategy in Malaya, despite its clear relevance and –at least– compliance with
the ideal evoked in the phrase “winning hearts and minds”.
2.1 – the lessons learned by robert thompson (good governance
and reasoned use of force)
General Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson (1916-1992) worked with General Sir Gerald
Templer in Malaya. In September 1961 he was appointed chief of the British Advisory Mission
(BRIAM) in Saigon. In this role, he advised the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations
on the conduct of operations in Vietnam. His writings on asymmetric warfare and commando
operations are references in their fields 24. General Sir Robert Thompson gives overall priority
to the establishment of government structures in counter-guerrilla operations.
He adopts Field Marshal Templer’s phrase “war of the people” to assert the following: “an
insurgent movement is a war for the people. The measures taken by the government must
obviously aim at restoring its authority and public order throughout the country, in order to regain
23
24
Paget was involved in all of the UK’s major post-war colonial campaigns (Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, etc.)
Three publications are particularly worth mentioning: Defeating Communist Insurgency. Experiences from
Malaya and Vietnam, Chatto & Windus, 1966, No Exit from Vietnam, Chatto & Windus, 1969, and Revolutionary
War in World Strategy (1945-1969), Chatto & Windus, 1970.
27
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
control of the population and to gain its support” 25. He insists on the need to apply good
governance: “winning the support of the population means in a nutshell to have good government
in all domains” 26.
Thompson acknowledges the political nature of an insurgency instead of attributing its effects
simply to terrorists whose sole aim is to generate unrest. He insists on the relationship between
the civil power, which holds ultimate authority, and the armed forces. He also insists that the use
of force be reasoned and minimal. Gérard Chaliand, in his book Le Nouvel Art de la Guerre,
published in 2008, underlines that Thompson puts great emphasis on legality and respect of
democratic values. “The State must adopt a strategy that coordinates socio-economic and military
factors, while acting in compliance with the law of which it is the guarantor”. An anti-subversive
campaign can only be built on solid foundations and reliable intelligence. Priority must be given
to getting rid of political subversion, which includes the possibility to eliminate the enemy’s
agents. Paget echoes Thompson and excludes “inhuman and disproportionate” retaliations.
On the subject of coercion, Thompson actually favors the physical separation of guerilla
fighters from the local population. Therefore, recalling the lessons learned from the Malayan
Emergency, he recommends the following population control measures:
• The settlement of “strategic hamlets” similar to “new villages” and enjoy viable
economic conditions 27;
• The establishment of self-defense militias;
• The control of the movement of people and goods.
The objectives of these measures are
threefold: to separate guerilla forces from
the population, to protect the people and
to eradicate any clandestine subversive
organizations from the villages. Unlike
Paget, Thompson recommends police
force primacy over the armed forces for
conducting repressive actions. As soon as
the process of restoring authority is initiated and reason returns to the minds of the
population, reforms can be launched in
Crédits : Imperial War Museum
order to “win hearts”. This is accompliVillage perimeter entrance secured by the Home Guard.
shed by changing the population’s habits
in order to deny subversive elements a receptive audience for their propaganda. The population
is still considered to be the central stake of the conflict by both the insurgents and the State.
Quoted by Gérard Chaliand in Les Guerres Irrégulières (XX e-XXI e siècle), Gallimard-Folio, 2008.
Gérard Chaliand, op. cit.
27 Robert Thompson implemented this idea later again in Kenya in the form of “fortified villages” and in Vietnam
in the 1960s.
25
26
28
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
2.2 – the lessons learned by Major general Sir frank Kitson
(Counterinfluence and Crowd Control)
Sir Frank Kitson, born in 1926, is a retired major general and theorist of counterinsurgency warfare
and low intensity conflicts. He served as Commander-in-Chief, Land Command (CINCLAND)
of the British Army from 1982 until 1985. He is best known for inventing the concept of countergangs involved in measures of deception, or “false flag” operations. Kitson recounted his COIN
experience in Malaya and in Kenya in two works now regarded as references in the field 28.
Kitson asserts that this type of warfare is a struggle to gain the trust of the population. Even if
Major General Kitson admits that all cases of insurgency are different, he presents a comprehensive plan to counter them effectively, based on four main pillars:
• Increased coordination at all levels, which is expressed in CIvil-MIlitary Cooperation
(CIMIC);
• Launching information or psychological operations that can create the required political
atmosphere, enabling the government to introduce its measures with the highest chances
of success;
• Setting up an effective intelligence system;
• Full respect of the primacy of law.
As far as the second pillar is concerned, Kitson broke new
ground when he developed his counter-guerrilla system as a
mechanism to condition the public and influence decisionmakers, allowing them to take the best-suited initiatives after
anticipating or testing their effect on the population. According
to Kitson, purely military methods cannot replace the political
and economic aspects of the overall campaign.
When conducting security restoration operations, defensive
actions, which involve the bulk of troops, should focus on
preventing the insurgents from hampering the implementation
of government programs. Offensive actions, carried out by
small decentralized units, must focus on the targeted elimination of insurgents. Both courses of action must always counterbalance each other. Defensive operations generally include:
• Monitoring and protection of people, critical points, isolated villages, crops and markets;
• Crowd and riot control;
• Denying insurgents the opportunity to exert influence on the population.
28
Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping, Faber & Faber, 1971 and A Bunch of Five,
Faber & Faber, 1977.
29
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
Kitson’s theory is clearly population-centric and includes riot control and counterinfluence
measures. As far as counterinfluence is concerned, Kitson favors social programs that make
it possible to win “the hearts and support of the people”, the creation of civil committees that
counterbalance the guerrilla’s clandestine structures, and the setting up of daily patrols that
allow close contact between the military and the population29.
2.3 – the Major Objections
Major General Kitson asserts that the British method was successful in Kenya against the Mau
Mau and in Oman against the Dhofar rebels, having been validated somewhat during the
Malayan Emergency. Kitson systematically extols the virtues of the “winning hearts and minds”
principle and all but proclaims the paradigm’s universal applicability. Kitson, Thompson and
their supporters have nevertheless been criticized by researchers inclined to call this very idea
into question, especially after the use of “winning hearts and minds” to characterize the interventions in Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan that left behind significant damage caused by
inappropriate use of force.
Those who are the least hostile to the population-centric options believe that “winning hearts
and minds” does not fully explain the success of the loyalist forces. Several factors were present
and coincided in a positive way, which some believe explains why Malaya was a special case.
The strongest critics contend that the specific category of counterinsurgency that the Malayan
Emergency typified remains that of a coercion enterprise, regardless of what others may wish
call it. This type of action can never be implemented without causing prejudice toward one
population or another.
Historian Jacques Droz and counterinsurgency expert Gérard Chaliand, who belong to the first
category of critical observers, note that the guerrillas consisted almost exclusively of an ethnic
minority (Malayans of Chinese descent) directed by a Marxist-Leninist movement that was
isolated from the wider population and without any support bases outside Malaya 30. The
counterinsurgency certainly capitalized on the local economic boom created in the wood and
copper sectors by the supply needs of the korean War (1950-1953) that coincided with the
earlier stages of the Malayan Emergency. This windfall effect ensured the economic prosperity
and viability of the “new villages”. The communists saw the population turn their backs on
them because of their heavy use of sabotage that caused unemployment and an ensuing loss of
income. In order to defeat the communist subversion, the British relied on the support of the
Malayan majority. They had committed themselves very early to granting independence to
the Muslim traditional elites. “Such favorable conditions have never come up again since
then” 31.
This aspect is underlined by Fred A. Lewis, in article published in The Canadian Army Journal, The Ability to
Do Old Things in New Ways - Counterinsurgency and Operational Art, Vol. 9.3, winter 2006.
30 The guerrilla could not count on the support of the “great Maoist backup”, as historian Jacques Droz put it.
31 Gérard Chaliand, Le Nouvel Art de la Guerre, L’Archipel, 2008.
29
30
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
Historian Karl Hack 32 believes that the major reason for the defeat of the insurgency was not
the charm offensive initiated by General Templer from 1952 onward, but the population control
and guerrilla fighter isolation policy started under the command of General Briggs between
1950 and 1952. To put it bluntly, it was clearly the use of sheer force together with this strategy
of deportation [of millions of Malayans] that broke the back of the insurgency, not a joyful
and pleasant “winning hearts and minds” campaign 33.
Researcher Paul Dixon 34 went a step further in calling into question the “winning hearts and
minds” concept. He believes that claiming to have implemented a “winning hearts and minds”
offensive in such a deadly and destructive campaign is against core democratic values. Behind
the convenient cover of “winning hearts and minds”, the British supposedly carried out repeated
“violations of the law and human rights abuses”. The principles of respect for legality and the
use of force only as a last resort, central to UK counterinsurgency practices as defined by Kitson
and Thompson, were seemingly ignored in later military commitments. Dixon is referring
particularly to the conflict in Northern Ireland with this observation, though he is also very
critical of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Before expressing any value judgment, and instead of insisting on the dichotomy between the
approaches, it is certainly more relevant to recall, as historian Richard Stubbs 35, does, that the
operations in Malaya were part of a broader continuum. The path resolutely followed by
Templer in order to put an end to the insurgent movement had already been established during
Briggs’s mandate. The High Commissioner in Malaya reintroduced consistency into the civil
and military systems. The British learned from their past mistakes. Their brutal initial reaction
was typical of a colonial power that was destabilized by protests. Coercive COIN was not done
away with when “winning hearts and minds” was brought into the foreground. Coercive aspects
were simply adapted, making them more humane. This is symbolized by the transformation
of the camps into “new villages”, which were the prototypes of the “strategic hamlets” seen in
other future conflicts. Improving living conditions and gaining the support of the population
never lost focus as a goal of the colonial government. The counterinsurgency’s success in the
Malayan Emergency is the result of the combination of policies instituted in the right place at
the right time, whether or not the British continue to claim it as a part of COIN’s founding
mythology.
Karl Hack: The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32#3,
June, 2009.
33 US Army Colonel Gian P. Gentile: Les mythes de la contre-insurrection et leurs dangers : une vision critique
de l’US Army, translated into French by Stéphane Taillat and Georges-Henri Bricet des Vallons for Sécurité
internationale, winter 2009-2010.
34 Paul Dixon: Hearts and Minds? British Counterinsurgency from Malaya to Iraq, Journal of Strategic Studies,
Vol. 32, #3, June, 2009.
35 Richard Stubbs: Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), Oxford University
Press, 1989.
32
31
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
C hapter III – a C OMpOnent
d OCtrIne
Of
b rItISh l and f OrCeS e MplOyMent
British COIN doctrine relies heavily on the theories of General Sir Robert Thompson and Major
General Sir Frank Kitson. It stresses the minimization of the use of force, the restoration of
legitimate political authorities, CIMIC and psychological operations. updated in 2009, the
latest doctrine formalizes the lessons learned by UK forces in colonial conflicts and field
operations that took place during the drawdown of the British Empire. “Winning hearts and
minds” is one of its principal features, almost the trademark of the newly updated doctrine.
In 1970, the military code in use at the time already stated that a high level of popular support
was a pre-requisite for success:
“Unless the trust, confidence and respect of the people are won by the government and the
security forces, the chance of success is greatly reduced. If the people support the government
and the security forces, the insurgents become isolated and cut off from their supply channels,
safe havens and intelligence networks” 36.
This reflection on “winning hearts and minds” was to be further developed by the British. The
population-centric approach does not focus only on the psychological frame of mind of a
villager or a group of villagers as in Malaya. It also aims at shaping the mindset and feelings of
ever-growing communities: the urban crowd, the wider population, and even the world audience.
The deployment of British troops in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) in the framework of
coalitions of nations once again raised the question of the relevance of the application of force
and its proportionality within a civil environment. This question had already been raised in
the international interventions in Somalia (1992) and former Yugoslavia (1995). In his works
published in 2005, General Sir Rupert Smith explained these new dilemmas very clearly. The
spirit of open-mindedness and cultural adaptability cultivated by the British chain of command
contributed in no small way to reopening the debates on security restoration and stabilization
operations 37. The new British Counterinsurgency Army Code, published in 2009, goes into
further detail.
3.1 – the War “among the people”, according to general Sir rupert
Smith
general Sir Rupert Smith (retired) remains one of the most experienced and best-known
modern military commanders, with 40 years of operational command at all levels of seniority.
He commanded the British division in the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991, the UN forces in BosniaHerzegovina in 1995 and the Northern Ireland theater of operations from 1996 to 1999. His last
British Ministry of Defence: Land Operations, Vol. III: Counter-Revolutionary Operations, Part 3, CounterInsurgency Army Code #70516.
37 This was highlighted in a seminar organized by Kingston University together with the Royal United Services
Institute on September 21st, 2007, on the topic Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq.
36
32
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
position was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe before he retired from active duty in
2002. In The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World, published in 2005, he
explains why force remains necessary even though the wars of the industrial era are over and
also how the conditions for the use of force need to be rethought.
Smith believes that current conflicts are totally different from traditional
interstate wars:
Sir Rupert Smith.
“The strategic objective is to gain the support of local populations to the
military’s political mandate, not to win the decisive battle on the battlefield. As a result, the military’s methods need to comply, especially at
tactical level, with this strategic political requirement, or at least to steer
the allegiances, representations and interests of this population into a
direction that is favorable to the military and their mandate” 38.
According to General Sir Rupert Smith, and to General Robert Thompson before him, counterinsurgency is a war of legitimacy in which the population is at stake. Areas with the highest
concentration of people, in other words, cities and urban areas, should be privileged for
psychological operations (PSYOPS) aimed at “winning minds”. Communication strategy
plays a critical role. Psychological operations are “positive” when they aim at promoting the
loyalist forces’ actions, and “negative” when they attempt to discredit the opposing insurgents.
In order to carry out successful operations within the population and win its support, Smith
recommends obtaining greater understanding of this population and its expectations, which he
files under two categories: the freedom to prosper and the freedom to live in a safe environment (freedom from fear, hunger, cold, uncertainty, etc.).
This classification recalls the “four freedoms” that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt presented as fundamental in his State of the Union address on January 6th, 1941; those that every
human being should enjoy everywhere in the world: freedom of speech and expression, freedom
of every person to worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. The two first liberties
are based on those stated in the First Amendment of the US Constitution; the last two (the right
to enjoy economic security and an internationalist view of foreign policy) have become the
pillars of an “American liberal doctrine”.
To justify operations carried out among populations, General Sir Rupert Smith relies on
humanist views stemming from the humanist Anglo-Saxon tradition, the same spirit that
motivated the founding fathers of the United Nations (UN) following WWII 39. This distinguished heritage paves the way for COIN, which becomes a “liberation of hearts and minds”
38
39
Rupert Smith: The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World, 2005.
The “four freedoms” were integrated into the Atlantic Charter, a joint statement by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on August 14 th, 1941. They influenced the United Nations
Charter adopted on June 26 th, 1945, and were included in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights adopted by the UN on December 10 th, 1948.
33
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
instead of a “conquest of hearts and minds” 40. While this approach may seem democratic, it
shows that Anglo-Saxon culture reluctantly views COIN as situated outside the framework of
an individualistic liberal society 41.
3.2 – the Contribution of the army to Security and Stabilization
Operations (JPD 3-40)
Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, is the title of the handbook published in
2009 by the British Ministry of Defence under the reference: Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40
or JDP 3-40. It was designed as a set of guidelines for security restoration and stabilization
operations to be conducted in fragile or failed states facing criminality or insurgency. Its
authors at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) integrated the converging
and complementary observations of both Frank Kitson and Rupert Smith.
This handbook also extensively incorporates methodology borrowed from united States
counterinsurgency doctrine, newly developed since the mid-2000s (see Annex 1 of this study.)
The British handbook defines a “COIN sequence” in four steps: “Shape, Secure, Hold,
Develop”, while the Americans use “Shape, Clear, Hold and Build”. In an asymmetric war,
JDP 3-40 praises the forces’ anticipation, learning and adaptation capabilities claimed by
nearly all COIN supporters from the English-speaking world.
According to JDP 3-40, British COIN is based upon the following principles:
• Priority given to the political-strategic level;
• Minimum use of force;
• Use of intelligence to locate insurgent fighters and make them change sides;
• Relentless offensive pressure on insurgents;
• Tactical patrols by small mobile units to carry out cordon and search operations;
• Population control (security restoration, self-defense) and resource control;
• Setting up of safe areas freed from any insurgent, which extend to the bordering areas
according to the “ink blot” or “oil spot” strategy 42;
• Strong focus on “hearts and minds” and psychological operations in general.
It states that the population should be the focus of the counterinsurgents’ actions, though
JDP 3-40 uses the term “the wider population”. The handbook notes that the expressions
“winning hearts and minds”, “population focus” and “securing the population” are intermingled
and all refer to the same concept, which may cause overinterpretation. Hence the generally
In 2010, French military commanders engaged in Afghanistan also promote this phrasing.
Observation by Stéphane Taillat.
42 The French refer to it as the “oil spot” principle. See Part 2 of this study.
40
41
34
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
accepted idea according to which “winning hearts and minds” strategy is implemented primarily
to the benefit of international counterinsurgency forces is incorrect. In following the British
approach, this advantage is not the main goal 43. What truly matters is the attitude of the “wider
population” towards its government. The counterinsurgency must seek to influence public
opinion in favor of the local government, with the support of its own local “rival elites” who
compete between themselves for power and authority in their own government.
British doctrine notes that the population’s sentiment has a direct impact on the judgment of a
government’s perceived competence, authority and legitimacy. In a country where counterinsurgency forces are deployed, it is critical for a government to provide security to its population.
The “wider population” must be certain that its own government can “sustain adequate security
provision” 44. To that end it must produce a message, a narrative that is credible and wins broad
support among the population.
3.3 – the Mitigated experiment in the afghan theater of Operations
(helmand province: 2006-2009)
In Afghanistan, British forces are taking part in both
halves of the NATO mission: security restoration
and reconstruction assistance, under the mandate of
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
and the fight against terrorism, known as “Operation
Enduring Freedom” (OEF). In helmand province,
under Regional Command South (RC South), their
action did not really “win hearts and minds”, but
rather prompted the fierce resistance of the Taliban
insurgents embedded within the population. British
officials admitted that their armed forces had not faced
such ordeal by fire “since the experience of the
Korean war”. The British contingent’s force protection and offensive reaction requirements account for
the fact that a population-centric COIN strategy
encountered significant delays in; only implemented
fully two years after the first British troops arrived in
Helmand. The UK forces were constantly torn
between two strategic options: appeasing insurgent fighters and winning over tribal groups.
This situation lasted until 2009 when it was replaced by the American comprehensive approach
for Afghanistan, which has yet to prove successful.
Conversely, too strong a hostility of the population towards the international forces will impede the stabilization
effort, without totally preventing it.
44 The 1970 British forces Code of Conduct stated that the primary task of the armed forces was to establish a
cohesive civilian government rather than the defeat of the enemy, which implies, particularly, the restoration of
a police and civilian justice system. This is similar to nation building or even state building.
43
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Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
As of June 1st, 2010, 289 British soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan, a tally that weighs
heavily on British public opinion towards the conflict. The total number of casualties exceeds
that of the Falklands War in 1982, where 255 servicemembers were killed. 289 KIA still only
amount to about a third of the military losses during the duration of the conflict in ulster. In
30 years of presence in Northern Ireland, the British 15,000-strong contingent lost 700 soldiers.
They were facing a population of about 800,000 Catholics, a population similar in size to the
Pashtuns in Helmand. This 60,000 km² province is located in the South of Afghanistan. It is the
cradle of the Taliban movement and is also home to 40% of the world’s opium poppy production.
It has been the area of operations of the British contingent since 2006.
From 2006 to 2009, before being reinforced by US Army and US Marine Corps troops, and
also before the start of two US-dominated COIN operations (Khanjar on July 2 nd, 2009, then
Moshtarak on February 14 th, 2010), the Helmand counterinsurgency efforts involved 3,300 UK
soldiers reinforced by 250 Danish and 150 Estonian soldiers. In order to fulfill its missions of
protecting the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 45 based in the province’s main town of
Lashkar Gah and conducting attacks on designated targets in the course of OEF, Task Force
Helmand initially deployed itself in the area to numerous operating bases, also known as
“platoon houses”.
The contingent suffered a higher casualty rate than in Vietnam and the Falklands, a soldier
having a 1-in-36 chance of being killed in action. The death of Captain Philippson on June 11th,
2006, when the Taliban encircled and overran the Musa Qala platoon house was a setback that
compelled the British to call their operational plans into question. The battalion was in fact a
“foreign body” that had been “transplanted” into Helmand. It totally failed to find common
ground with the local elites and had provoked growth of “antibodies” as soon as it attempted to
suppress poppy cultivation. The province significantly became known as “Hell Land” among
British forces.
Since they could not resupply or reinforce Musa Qala platoon house but also refused to surrender, the British were forced to sign an agreement with the local elders that initiated a mutual
truce and settled the simultaneous withdrawal of both parties of belligerents. This policy of
appeasement, intended to lower the intensity of the conflict, in fact caused friction between
the Afghan government and the American ally. Musa Qala was quickly ceded back to the local
elders in January 2007. It soon fell under Taliban control and became a stronghold of their
guerrilla fighters. This district center was taken back much later on December 7 th, 2007, with
the support of an American battalion and a battalion of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The
struggle for control of Musa Qala still causes problems for ISAF in 2010.
In spring 2008, this strategy began to be replaced by a new approach focused on winning over
part of the population according to the “oil spot” principle, with a concentration of all military,
economic and political assets in two locations, Lashkar Gah and Gereshk, in order to radiate
and extend the loyalist influence zone. The defection to the loyalists of a Taliban commander,
along with a third of his men, facilitated counter-guerrilla operations. COIN operations had
45
The PRT operating methods are studied in the Part 3 of this study, which focuses on American COIN.
36
Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
their first major chance to engage in the battle for “winning hearts and minds” with the reconstruction of the Kajaki Dam, which was a source of pride for the troops and the focus of much
media attention. The project’s aim was to rebuild the dam in order to supply 1.8 million inhabitants with electric power. The population-centric approach fostered by the British doctrine
brought along a progressive merging of the civil-military and police activities, the dispatching
of a female team, which proved to be accepted by the population when making ID checks and
house-to-house searches, and the establishment of sociological databases by the PRT in order
to identify power brokers among the population.
According to Colonel Michel Goya 46, the British results in the Afghan conflict between 2006
and 2009 can appear frustrating 47. The “winning hearts and minds” campaign could not have
its full impact since three obstacles were in place that are highlighted by Afghanistan specialist
Gilles Dorronsoro 48: the collective memories of the British Army’s expeditions in the area in
the 19 th century ruined the chances to win over a significant number of Pashtuns of Helmand;
the high level of popular support locally enjoyed by the Taliban; and the lack of structures
effectively representing the Afghan state that helped contribute to the marginalization of the
power brokers connected with President Hamid Karzai. According to Dorronsoro, all these
reasons account for Helmand not being an ideal candidate as a place to trial population-centric
COIN. Furthermore, the Taliban’s tactical skills and resilience had been underestimated. Their
deceptive actions against British troops in the districts of Musa Qala and Sangin prevented the
“oil spot” from spreading from the centers of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk. In 2009 and 2010,
similar difficulties greeted the Americans when they attempted to implement their “Shape,
Clear, Hold and Build” sequence in Helmand.
From a purely tactical point of view, Task Force Helmand was a well-suited tool, but it lacked
critical mass prior to the arrival of American reinforcements, particularly in the purely kinetic
domain. It was also the first time the British had initiated a COIN operation without being
the top command authority, as they were in Malaya. This could be the reason behind notable
differences in perception of the strategy’s effectiveness between the British and American
forces. The Americans needed more time than the Europeans to be convinced of the need to
favor the political approach over the restrictive military option. This political approach is based
on dialogue with different segments of the local population and on reducing the opportunities
for conflict. As General Sir Richard Dannatt, Commander-in-Chief of the British armed forces,
summed it up: “waging war alongside the Americans does not mean making war like them” 49.
Speech by Michel Goya at France’s Ecole Militaire on April 29 th, 2009, during the study day of the Center of
Historical Studies of the French Defense (CEHD) dedicated to Afghanistan. See the related article printed in the
CDEF publication Doctrine #17, July 2009.
47 British journalist and former humanitarian worker Matt Waldman went further and called this experience vain
and futile: “These attempts to win hearts and minds are futile. With over 200 soldiers dead, Britain must realize
that building schools and hospitals won’t win the Afghan people’s trust”, The Guardian, August 16 th, 2009.
48 Gilles Dorronsoro: Fixing a Failed Strategy in Afghanistan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009.
49 Foreword of the book by Charles Reed and David Ryall: The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First
Century, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
46
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Part 1 – A Concept developed and claimed by the british
Conclusion of part 1:
In Malaya, the British laid the foundations of the battle to “win hearts and minds”. The
insurgent enemy could be defeated thanks to a confluence of geopolitical, economic and social
factors that highly favored the loyalists, but this exact situation has never again been seen in
other theaters of operations. In Helmand Province, the British contingent and the American
forces deployed there since 2009 as reinforcements are neither in control of the territory nor of
the local institutions. They cannot stand in for the Afghan state in implementing all its governmental competences, especially in the field of police and justice. Local partners cannot be relied
upon because of the high degree of fragmentation of the society and the failure of society’s
traditional elites. To make matters worse, alternative crops that could be introduced to generate
income cannot compete with highly lucrative poppy cultivation. The coalition troops in Helmand
do not control the population, let alone the border with Pakistan, which is used as a safe haven
and rear base for many Taliban fighters.
38
PART 2
AN APPROACH THAT FINDS COMMON
GROUND WITH FRENCH EXPERIENCES
The French military is not as concerned with the conquest of “hearts and minds” as its
English-speaking counterparts seem to be. Nevertheless, some common ground could be
found in the years following the colonial period thanks to the informal exchange of knowhow in field operations, to the introduction of the common concept of “stabilization” and to
the posthumous rehabilitation of David Galula’s works that have been rediscovered and
studied anew since the mid 2000s. The French doctrine of counterinsurgency (“contrerébellion” or “CREB”) summarizes and encapsulates operating methods inherited from the
colonial period, such as “pacification” and the “oil spot” principle, psychological operations
and population control. They are largely borrowed from anti-subversive warfare theories and
include a population-centric approach.
39
Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
C hapter I – t he l egaCy
Of
M arShalS g allIenI
and
lyautey
At the end of the 19 th century and the first half of the 20 th century, the “pacification” missions
conducted by French colonial troops largely resembled the similar “imperial policing” activities
of their British counterparts. The French “pacification” tradition, well known to Joseph gallieni
(1849-1916) and subsequently prolonged by Louis-hubert Lyautey (1854-1934), rested on
the principle of “gradual penetration” according to the “oil spot” principle and the “dissuasive
pressure” concept, at least through the period of the wars of decolonization. Success in this
environment was obtained by maintaining a clever balance between two options: “search and
sweep” units operating deep into enemy territory, and “quadrillage” or “gridding tactics”.
Generals (both later Marshals) Gallieni and
Lyautey understood that victory could not be
obtained by purely military means when
facing politically motivated native uprisings.
Coercing insurgents to fall in line with
loyalist authority was not the only goal sought
through “pacification” operations. “Winning
hearts and minds” at the time also included
the officer’s “social role”, as Lyautey 50 put
it, which is reminiscent of the “Republic’s
duty to civilize” colonized peoples 51. The
paternalistic ideology of spreading civiliJoseph Gallieni.
Louis Hubert Lyautey.
zation that underpinned the “pacification”
fostered by these marshals of the Third French Republic sharply contrasts with General (later
Field Marshal) Templer’s post-1952 pragmatism and utilitarianism in Malaya.
1.1 – the Idea of “pacification”
Stéphane Taillat is a French expert in “pacification” and counterinsurgency à la française. He
maintains an online journal called “En Vérité”, which is dedicated to these and other similar
topics. He states that “the doctrinal apparatus does exist, but it is often informal and is based on
the writings of notable personalities”. Taillat cites Gallieni and Lyautey as the top contributors.
gallieni was General Governor of French Sudan (1886-1891) where he had to put down a
native uprising violently. In 1892, he was posted to Tonkin, where he commanded the Second
Military Division and fought against Chinese pirates known as the “Black Flags”, before consolidating the French presence in Indochina at the time. He was then appointed Governor General
in Madagascar where he pacified and took control of the Great Island from 1896 to 1905.
Lyautey, who worked with him in Tonkin (1894-1897) and Madagascar (1897-1902), created
the French protectorate in Morocco, where he was posted as Commissioner General (1912-1925).
Le Rôle social de l’officier, an article by Lyautey published anonymously in the Revue des Deux Mondes in 1891.
Reprinted by Editions Bertillat, 2003.
51 On 28th July 1885, Jules Ferry, a fervent proponent of colonial expansion, made a famous speech at the National
Assembly: “Superior races have a duty towards inferior races […] It is their duty to civilize inferior races”.
50
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
Taillat notes that “pacification” is a concept that was never called into question in Indochina
or Algeria:
“it mainly includes maintaining or restoring order in front of insurgent peoples or groups
(the phrase ‘winning over’ is often used), or even piracy in Tonkin. According to Lyautey
and Gallieni, it is based on the principle of ‘organizational penetration’ (sometimes called
‘oil spot’) that must go beyond the mere return to the initial state for the population. Prosperity
and security are indeed fair aims in and of themselves, since they require the establishment of
the rule of Law and Civilization” 52.
In preparation for deployment to Madagascar, Gallieni gave his troops the following instructions:
• pacify and extensively occupy the territory according to the “oil spot” principle;
• Always advance outwards;
• Combine political and military actions in order to take control of the country;
• Immediately establish close contacts with the population, get familiar with their habits
and their mindset, and meet their basic requirements in order to persuade them to accept
the new institutions 53.
The phrase “winning hearts and minds” had yet to have been coined, however, Gallieni’s instructions constituted a French version of the same concept that predated by a half-century the
British counter-guerrilla experiences that were to come in Malaya.
On May 22 nd, 1898, in his general orders, Gallieni gave the following instructions:
“Each time an officer is required to act against a village […] he needs to remember that his first
duty, after securing submission of the local population, is to rebuild the village, reorganize
the local market and establish a school. The process of establishing peace and future organization in a country will come from the combined use of force and politics”.
According to Gallieni, military intervention54 in the colonies had to include assistance to the local
population in such domains as government, the economy and education. It required permanent
contacts with the inhabitants as well as a thorough knowledge of the country and its languages.
Under Gallieni’s command, numerous infrastructures were put in place, such as railways and
the Pasteur Institute. He introduced a new approach to population control and defined and
implemented a “race policy” in Madagascar. On the basis of the racialist anthropological theories
of the time, he carried out a systematic and photographic census of the population and then divided
the country into administrative districts according to the resulting “racial mapping”.
Stéphane Taillat, op. cit.
Quotation by Lieutenant General Bruno Dary, Paris Garrison Commander, in an introduction to Jean-Yves
Alquier’s testimony Nous Avons Pacifié Tazalt – Journal de Marche d’un Officier Parachutiste, published by
the French Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF) in a series of doctrinal papers in 2009.
54 The repression of the Malagasy resistance to French colonisation caused between 100,000 and 700,000 deaths
from a population of 3 million.
52
53
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
Lyautey, also an empire builder with a comprehensive vision for the future, built roads, harbors
and an administrative capital, Rabat in Morocco. He was eager to reconcile the French presence
with the local Cherifian traditions and insisted that priority be given to gaining the population’s
support: “[in Morocco], the peaceful and mostly agrarian local population was the subject of
[the French forces’] first and most efficient cooperation” 55. In one of his Letters from Tonkin
(1928), he explained how cautious one should be before “destroying in the night a rebels’ nest
that might be a market during the day” 56. He advocates for the education mission of the armed
forces, beyond its purely military combat function. In Lyautey’s eyes, each deployed officer
should be ready to play a “social role” among the local population he has to live with, as well
as with his own subordinates.
1.2 – the principle of “gradual penetration” or “Oil Spot”
The “oil spot” principle is a population-centric course of action that was praised by Lyautey in
Du Rôle colonial de l’Armée, his work written about the Army’s colonial role. Mokran
Ouarem 57, in a recent article that discusses the current implementation of Lyautey’s “pacification” idea in Afghanistan, summed up its objective: “Sustained occupation rests on the combination of the use of force and civilizing actions. The method entails a step-by-step approach,
immediately exploiting the gained advantage, reassuring the population, restoring order and
re-establishing social life, reopening the local marketplaces, and in doing so simultaneously
extending the pacification outward in concentric circles”.
The “oil spot” principle, still praised by supporters of American COIN, stems in some way from
the population. It is the static component from which counterinsurgency forces are entrusted
with a threefold mission:
• Drive out the insurgent organization;
• Deny guerrilla or terrorist activities;
• Secure tight control to turn the population toward the loyalist cause.
Armed force relies heavily on two complementary coercive tactics in order to restore peace
and security in a given territory: “search and sweep” by specialized units in an offensive
column layout, which wage war against the opponent, and “quadrillage” by fixed units, which
allows for zone-specific defense. “Quadrillage” facilitates prolonged interaction between the
population and the armed forces so long as offense and defensive actions are properly supported
Speech before his peers at the Académie française on December 5 th, 1926.
Quote by Major General Thierry Ollivier, commander of the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF) when
opening the seminar titled: Weapons and Hearts: Paradoxes in Modern Wars, on November 23 rd, 2009.
57 Mokrane Ouarem: Lyautey au Chevet de l’Afghanistan, Le Monde, April 1st, 2010. Mokrane Ouarem is a Lieutenant Commander in the Maréchal-Lyautey class of the French War College.
58 The coercive method has existed since the Vendée wars (“the Infernal Columns”) but Gallieni and Lyautey
improved their effectiveness and provided them with constructive methods.
55
56
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
by the political, civil and military authorities. “Winning the confidence” of the inhabitants can
be achieved by protecting people and property, keeping lines of communication and trade routes
open, and getting acquainted with the population 59.
Stéphane Taillat notes that “security restoration actions are planned and conducted according
to a division of territory into three parts: the target zone, the security zone and the harassment
zone. In boundary areas, security can be restored by applying “relentless [dissuasive] pressure
on other zones in which insurgents might try to find refuge” 60.
1.3 – the Concept of “dissuasive pressure” 61
The concept of “dissuasive pressure” shows itself to be the best way to achieve “pacification”
effects according to the “oil spot” principle. The latter indeed relies on the establishment of
secured zones and hence creates a patchwork of territories that are distinguished from one
another by their degree of insurgent activity. During “search and sweep” operations, most
notably when exercised in heavily populated areas, the counterinsurgents must occupy the
territory for a certain period of time to “pacify” the zone before resuming their offensive,
especially in adjacent zones.
It is thus necessary to take offensive “harassment”
action in the insurgents’ staging areas and refuge
zones to prevent them from taking advantage of the
temporary weakness of the counterinsurgent forces
in the geographical areas where they are less present
or stretched thin. In the end, these harassment
operations pave the way for the next step of the
“oil spot” by eroding the enemy’s capabilities, by
such actions as the destruction of weapon caches,
dismantling of networks, interdiction of communications channels, etc. To accomplish this mission, the police forces must function alongside the
military, either on the front line if the insurgent forces are not openly visible, or as reinforcement
troops to the military.
This is how the tactical method makes it possible to successfully confine insurgent organizations. Limiting the freedom of maneuver of the enemy between safe havens, staging areas and
areas of operations completes the actions separating the insurgency from the population which
take place simultaneously in regions which are being “pacified”.
Adèle Le Guen: L’Emploi des forces terrestres dans les missions de stabilisation en Algérie, CDEF Doctrinal
Paper, 2006.
60 Stéphane Taillat: Auto-critique, En Vérité, June 27 th, 2009.
61 Section 1.3 of this chapter is a full translation of the article dedicated to this tactical course of action in the article
Counterinsurgency in the French language version of Wikipedia, a free online encyclopedia to which Stéphane
Taillat is a contributor, October 2008.
59
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
C hapter II – t he p OpulatIOn aS the M aIn S taKe
Of r evOlutIOnary Warfare (drW)
In the
d OCtrIne
After 1945, the fight against communist subversion in Indochina and the similarities drawn
from the emerging Algerian rebellion were translated into theoretical principles by a number
of military strategists of the time. A corpus of anti-subversive methods was developed in the
early sixties and became the de facto doctrine for combating “revolutionary war”. The Doctrine
of Revolutionary Warfare (DRW) incorporates some key aspects of “pacification” and
introduces counter-guerrilla concepts taken from the converse of Mao’s famous maxim, where
the aim is to “take the fish out of the water”. Reference to these two combined approaches can
even be found in the titles of two psychological warfare schools, called “training centers for
pacification and counter-guerrilla tactics”. They ware created in French Algeria by General
Raoul Salan and Colonel Charles Lacheroy, in the Jeanne d’Arc hamlets in Philippeville
(Skikda) and in Arzew.
The DRW states that the population
is always the main concern in
an ideological confrontation. The
population is at stake both in the
conflict and in the terrain where it is
taking place. The enemy is characterized as a subversive agent. Faced
with this undermining influence,
counter-guerrilla tactics aim alter nately at controlling and assisting
the populations that are to be protected. It has become common to
oppose these two courses of action,
although they are largely complementary 62. Roger Trinquier (1908-1985) is usually considered
as the theorist behind rather coercive and security building tactical measures: control and
intimidation of the populations, elimination of suspects and torture-based extraction of
information. David galula (1919-1967), who lived at the same time but was not well known
until recently, promoted a more population-centric approach that included strategic actions and
political reforms.
The “Sections administratives spécialisées” (SAS) program that was put into place between
1955 and 1962 was more political than coercive in its approach. Though it was perhaps the most
developed initiative aimed at reconciling “minds and hearts”, it could not change the course of
the Algerian War all by itself.
62
Bertrand Valeyre, Alexandre Guérin: op. cit.
45
Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
2.1 – anti-Subversive Warfare according to roger trinquier
When Colonel Roger Trinquier published in 1961 his work La Guerre moderne 63, he summarized his experiences in two different theaters of operations: Indochina (1946-1954) and Algeria
(1954-1962). He believed that the use against the insurgent enemy of the same weapons of that
same adversary was legitimate, a concept known as “fighting fire with fire”. “Acting differently
would have been absurd”, he wrote. Trinquier starts from a certain strategic environment: that
of a communist-dominated insurgency stirred up from abroad. Since subversion is a weapon
of war used by a foreign country, Trinquier recommends granting army forces extended powers
during troubled periods. Victory is achieved by destroying the insurgents’ political-military
apparatus and in doing so, restoring security.
The establishment of “exceptional legislation” aims to neutralize insurgent psychological
operations and identify the “inner enemy” 64. It thus allows for striking the enemy through
policing and by judicial means, thereby clear the way for other operations. “Quadrillage” and
“search and sweep” operations also aim to restore civil order and peace. Once order is restored,
the “exceptional legislation” rules must be abrogated.
Trinquier proposes the following three principles:
• Separate the insurgents from the population which supports them;
• Render the guerrilla areas indefensible;
• Coordinate these actions over a large geographic area over a long period of time.
He admits that the actual implementation of these three principles
is not easy, since the insurgents will generally move within difficult
terrain of their own selection. They are likely to enjoy the support
of the population and hence have superior intelligence collection
capabilities. The best way to counter that is to increase monitoring
measures to identify and neutralize subversive agents as early as
possible. No comprehensive measures for dividing the insurgent
movement are envisaged by Trinquier. His main strategy hinges on
systematic population control and organization. The organization
of the population as theorized by Trinquier follows a strict hierarchy.
No elected representatives are proposed, only caretaker officials put
in charge of making sure that the population takes its defense in its own hands. Trinquier asserts
that the “precondition of modern warfare is the unconditional support of the population” 65.
Psychological operations must above all create a feeling of security in the people’s mind.
This work, with a foreword by Bernard Fall, was published in the US in 1964 under the title: Modern Warfare,
a French View of Counterinsurgency.
64 Mathieu Rigouste: L’Ennemi intérieur – La Généalogie Coloniale et Militaire de l’Ordre Sécuritaire dans la
France Contemporaine, La Découverte, 2009.
65 Emphasized by Colonel Fred A. Lewis: op. cit.
63
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
The measures listed in La Guerre moderne are mainly of a coercive
kind 66. Once security is restored, there is no need to carry out largescale reforms to “win hearts” since the legitimacy of the ruling power
is never called into question. Social actions aim only at meeting the
basic needs of the civil population. Trinquier’s approach treats
insurgency as a purely external factor. To him, the endogenous
factors (weak institutions, socio-economic gaps, ethnic tensions)
merely facilitate “revolutionary war” that is fomented abroad.
2.2 – Counterinsurgency according to david galula
Lieutenant Colonel David Galula (1919-1967), dubbed “the Clausewitz of Counterinsurgency”
in the United States, is an author whose significant works were recently rediscovered on both
sides of the Atlantic.
His works are well known in the US 67, but they went unnoticed in
France at the time of their publication in the 1960s. They mix
references to “pacification” and lessons learned from British
experiences. Having been sent as the French deputy military attaché
to Beijing after World War II, he had real-life experience of the
Partisan War in China (1945-1948). As an observer with the UN
Special Commission for the Balkans, he witnessed the shockwaves
from the Greek Civil War in 1948. In his next assignment as military
attaché in Hong Kong, he found himself in the midst of three different
communist insurgencies rocking Southeast Asia in the 1950s:
Indochina, Malaya and the philippines.
In February 1956, David Galula returned to France and volunteered to serve in Algeria. He first
authored a lessons learned report concerning “pacification” in Kabylia, published in the US in
1963 under the title: Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, which was used as the underlying matrix
for his masterpiece titled Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, published in 1964
with the support of the RAND Corporation 68. Galula and his works are valued highly by the
Americans and serve as a kind of intellectual link between the pacifying visions of Gallieni and
Lyautey and the British population-centric approach. Like Trinquier, Galula is convinced that
These measures were exported to the American continent in the 1960s and 70s and were met with fierce criticism
voiced by DRW opponents. See the book and TV report by Marie-Dominique Robin: Escadrons de la Mort,
l’Ecole Française, La Découverte, 2004.
67 After being posted in Algeria, Galula was appointed to make a series of conferences for NATO American officers.
At the end of 1959, he was sent to follow the courses of the Armed Forces Staff College in the US.
68 The French version of this work, Contre-insurrection, théorie et pratique, with a foreword by David H. Petraeus
and John A. Nagl, is a translation by Philippe de Montenon, and was not published until 2008 by Economica.
66
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
the battle for the population is an essential feature of the “revolutionary war” where the population
is the objective in and of itself. Operations focused on gaining the population’s support (for the
insurgent), or at a minimum maintaining it in a state of submission (for the loyalist), remain
primarily political in nature.
Loyalists cannot achieve many of their goals if the population does not feel protected against
the insurgent forces right from the very beginning. Control of the population is established in
order to eliminate or at least significantly reduce contact between the population and the guerrilla
movement. This is achieved through surveillance, curfew, requisitions, food control, or even
population resettlements. The three objectives of population control are the following:
• Restore the loyalists’ authority;
• Isolate the guerrilla by physical means;
• Collect intelligence that can be used to eliminate the opponent’s political cells.
Galula endorses population control measures, but departs from Trinquier’s theories in that he
considers that the armed forces are a tool among many other options in the hands of the political
power. It is essential, he states, for the latter to remain in the hands of the counterinsurgency
struggle. The prerogative to exercise political power requires only the tacit or explicit agreement
of the population. Attempting to achieve submission is a minimum obligation; the loyalist
government must gain not only the approval of the population, but also its active participation
in the fight against the insurgency. Hence Galula worked out his four laws for counterinsurgency:
• Law #1: The population is essential. Supporting the population is the very first duty of
the counterinsurgency campaign; it is impossible to defeat the insurgents and stop their
recruiting actions without the population’s support;
• Law #2: This popular support is gained via the support of an active minority, which
accepts to support the counterinsurgency actively and must be supported in return for
the effort to win the neutral majority over and neutralize the hostile minority.
• Law #3: The population’s support remains conditioned by the way it is used; this
support can be lost if the actions taken are unfavorable to the population;
• Law #4: The struggle against the insurgency requires a high concentration of efforts,
resources and personnel; progress is made from district to district according to the wellknown “oil spot” principle.
According to Galula, the loyalist force will not be victorious if it merely destroys the insurgent
forces and their political apparatus in a given region, which is the sole objective according to
Trinquier’s theory: “If the insurgent forces are destroyed in a region, they will be rebuilt in
another one; if both elements are destroyed, they will be rebuilt by actions taken by insurgents
from abroad. Victory is not only this, but also the final break-up of the bonds between the
insurgents and the population, not at the population’s expense, but with its support” 69. This
wording is in line with the “winning hearts and minds” principle. For example, Galula suggests
revitalizing local democracy by recruiting new leaders, installing them in positions of power,
and then gathering them in a political party that meets the population’s expectations.
69
David Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, new edition RAND Corporation, 2005.
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2.3 – the experience of the “Sections Administratives Spécialisées”
(SaS) in algeria
The Algerian War was a turning point in France’s approach to anti-subversive warfare, where
the military took over the management of the population matters. The French Army set up the
first “Sections administratives spécialisées” (SAS) at the initiative of General Georges
Parlange 70 in 1955. Their creation was made official by a decree dated September 26 th, 1955,
signed by Jacques Soustelle. They officially rolled out on December 3 rd, 1957, while the
“Sections administratives urbaines” (SAU), which were their urban equivalent, went live a few
months later on February 4 th, 1958.
The SAS resulted from the need to re-establish contact with a population and territories that
were acknowledged at the time as being clearly under-managed. In the “Guide de l’Officier des
Affaires Algériennes” of 1957, the following observation was made:
“The rebellion would have probably not broken out or would have been quickly crushed if it
had not found a suitable breeding ground that had been created by our own shortfalls:
• Lack of infrastructure in many rural areas (roads, water supply, schools, housing, etc.);
• Poor administration in those same areas;
• Loss of contact;
• Poor knowledge of Islamic culture and mindset”.
These State military auxiliaries are exactly that in nature. They exercise the powers of the civil
authority if the latter is not present or has failed, and they are not intended to be in charge over
the long-term. In their short operational lifespan, the SAS were committed in administrative,
civic, social, medical, educational and youth mentoring actions, with
one guiding principle: “convince rather than compel”. The SAS
were not humanitarian organizations by design. They were supposed
to be a starting point for the “conquest of hearts and war of ideas” 71.
Each SAS was composed as follows:
• One officer, serving as SAS commander;
• One NCO or a civilian contractor acting as his deputy;
• Three Algerian Affairs Service attachés (actually civilian
contractors: one secretary/accountant, one secretary/interpreter
and one radio operator);
General Parlange also invented of the “assembly camps” in Algeria, which were the French version of the British
and American “strategic hamlets”.
71 1st Lieutenant Lasconjarias and 2 nd Lieutenant Jouan: Les Sections administratives spécialisées et leur action en
Algérie: un outil pour la stabilisation, Cahier de la recherche doctrinale CDEF, 2005.
70
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• One “Maghzen”, which is a security detachment recruited by the SAS commander,
generally composed of 30 to 50 men of both Muslim and European origin;
• Whenever possible, one or more female assistants from the Algerian Affairs Service,
who were in charge of social programs that benefitted Muslim families.
An SAS generally had between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants in its area of responsibility. The
main functions devoted to the SAS were to strengthen the influence of France among the
Algerian population, to separate it from the influence of the National Liberation Front (NLF)
insurgency and to take part in intelligence and security restoration operations. The latter was
most often done with the assistance of its Maghzen and its connections with the combat units.
The SAS took part in the economic reconstruction of their area of responsibility. To that end,
SAS personnel were required to be “civilians among soldiers, and soldiers among civilians”.
Evaluating the overall effectiveness of the 700 SAS remains open for debate. An SAS was often
an efficient tool that was tailored to its environment, though it was very much dependent on
the personality of its commander and the quality of its personnel, most of whom were trained
on the job. This unit reported to two chains of command: one civil, the other military; a fact
which sometimes caused conflicts of interest. The shortfalls in coordination observed in the
“quadrillage” units on the ground, as well as the lack of any coherent broader policy at regional
level, both decreased the impact of actions undertaken by Sections administratives spécialisées
to “win hearts and minds”.
Their incompatibility with “hard” military practices, like the contradiction between their vision
of the integration of Muslims, of Europe-dominated French Algeria and of independence, was
patent.
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
C hapter III – C OunterInSurgenCy
In the
S tabIlIzatIOn p haSe
In the 21st century, “stabilization” has become the new name for “pacification”. The doctrine
of the French Army today refers to “contre-rébellion” (“CREB”) rather than “counterinsurgency”, as the Americans and the British do. Of course, the word “insurrection” exists in both
languages 72. The French term rébellion is rather the equivalent of “insurgency” 73. In France,
CREB was developed over time with successive contributions, relying heavily on the legacy of
Gallieni and Lyautey and their famous “oil spot”, as well as the general principles concerning
actions among the population as established by Trinquier and Galula. There has also been some
cross-pollination with the new COIN doctrines jointly developed in the uS and the uk.
In 2009, France’s CDEF, the Forces Employment Doctrine Center, published a CREB
doctrine 74 in order to fill the void in adapted tactical processes between the conventional coercive
methods and population control methods in the security restoration phase. The introduction
of this handbook notes that “insurgencies do not have military objectives; instead, they have
political goals. Consequently, they create asymmetrical conditions at the tactical level which
rely upon the population as both the principal actor and prize of the conflict. War conducted
in the midst of the population, otherwise known as guerilla warfare, has an essential place in
today’s conflicts as an alternative means of action. The French Armed Forces are rediscovering
this type of action which had fallen into disuse but has been revived by our engagement in
Afghanistan”.
3.1 – the doctrinal evolution: from the “War within the Crowd” to
“Stabilisation”
Fifty years before the population-centric approach of General Sir Rupert Smith, in the Revue
de la défense nationale published in June 1956, French Colonel Jean Némo, a theorist of counterinsurgency à la française, used the expression “war within the crowd” to describe the situation
of the troops engaged at the time in Indochina and Algeria. He meant that modern wars now
took place “among the population” and required a new way of strategic thinking.
This theory of three phases 75 of engagement was formalized by Major general de Saqui de
Sannes, then commander of France’s Military Doctrine and Post-Graduate Teaching Command
(“CDES”), and picked up by the latest French doctrinal papers of the time 76. In the first phase,
identified as the “initial intervention on the crisis theater of operations”, the expeditionary
Large-scale popular upheaval. This mass violence is not within the scope of French contre-rébellion (CREB).
Armed violence expressed under the form of terrorism and/or guerrilla. In this restricted meaning, COIN and
CREB are synonymous.
74 English title: Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level.
75 They are fully in line with the American and British doctrines of the three-block war: coercion, stabilization and
assistance.
76 CDEF: Doctrine for the Employment of Land Forces in Stabilization Operations, November 2006, Winning the
Battle – Building Peace, Land Forces in Present and Future Conflicts, January 2007 and Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, January 2009.
72
73
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corps deploys and neutralizes enemy forces. The second phase, “stabilization”, aims at stabilizing the area in order to restore the social situation that had previously been disrupted. The third
phase, “normalization”, restores the political balance.
Stabilization is defined as one the crisis management processes that aims to restore the normal
conditions of viability of a state or a region, by putting an end to violence as a means of protest
and establishing the conditions for a return to normal daily life by initiating a civil reconstruction process77.
As quoted from another CDEF publication titled Winning the Battle – Building Peace (FT 01),
published in 2007:
“There is not one single conflict where the civilian population does not find itself at the heart
of the military concerns of all parties involved. Thus, changing from a world where the civilian
population constituted “the rear” – as opposed to the front, in essence a military zone –
nowadays, the armed forces operate among and in reference to it. Military forces have entered
an age of conducting war operations among populations.
Since the stake is human society, its governance, its social contract, its institutions, rather than
such and such a province, river or border, there no longer exists a line or terrain to conquer or
protect. The front is multidimensional and encompasses the whole theatre of operations. To be
effective, the use of force cannot be dissociated from what the people, plunged into disarray,
chaos and arbitrariness, expect of it”.
FT 01 also borrows several principles from Gallieni and Lyautey: “it is in the village that has
been secured by force that one will need to re-establish normal living conditions, recreate
markets and send children to school. The fickle crowd that welcomes or opposes has the capacity
to change sides as the result of a sign, image or order. On the spot diplomacy and military action
are closely interrelated and form two aspects of the soldier in operations”. As far as on site
diplomacy is concerned, is this not just another reference to “winning hearts and minds”?
A 2007 staff paper went a long way towards encapsulating this concept. It very explicitly mentioned the “conquest of hearts and minds” as one of the basic requirements for meeting its military
commitments 78. It describes the six prerequisites for the engagement of a coalition against an
asymmetric opponent:
• The legitimacy of the commitment according to the public opinion;
• The adaptability of the structures and courses of action;
• The controlled use of force;
This definition is adopted by the French Concept of Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilization
(PIA 00-151).
78 Working document of the Joint Forces Center for Concept Development, Doctrine and Experimentation (CICDE)
with the following title: Réflexions doctrinales – Options militaires pour vaincre un ennemi irrégulier, July 2007.
77
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
• The battle for relevance and perception;
• The systematic consideration of the population;
• The population must remain the focus of the main effort 79.
From the outset, the local population must immediately be convinced of the merits of the actions
conducted by the armed forces. These actions rely on a sustained political project. The aim is
not to initiate administrative reforms or social and economic measures, but to undertake the
ambitious project of “shaping” of the local population. “Winning hearts and minds” here takes
on a particularly volontarist aspect:
• Win over the population to our side and to offer incentives to provide information;
• In doing so, take their expectations into consideration;
• Influence the “minds” of the asymmetric opponent, in order to trigger reactions that
are favorable to our side;
• Reassure the “minds” of the neutral and non-committed segments of the population;
• Destroy the opponent’s image as victim.
Neither the expression “winning hearts and minds” nor the bold idea of “shaping” were
employed in the final version of the document, called Concept des opérations contre un
adversaire irrégulier (PIA 00-180) 80, which was published on May 22 nd, 2008. The similarly
inspired Concept de contribution des forces armées à la stabilisation (PIA 00-151) 81, published
on February 2 nd, 2010, announced a national joint counterinsurgency doctrine. PIA 00-151
clearly defines the concept of “gaining the support of the local authorities and population”:
“In a given theater of operations, the armed
forces” actions are not restricted merely to
preserving the legitimacy of the intervention.
They also contribute to transferring the
recovery process into the hands of the local
authorities and population. The force must seek
to preserve or win over the support of the large
majority of the population to the international
community’s action, and in particular to the
intervention force’s action”.
This fundamental requirement for military action is one of the five adopted by the French
doctrine of “stabilization”. The other four tenets are: the preservation of the action’s legitimacy,
the preservation of credibility, a common understanding regarding the rules of engagement
and the aim of unity of effort.
Items 1 to 3 are in line with the British counterinsurgency doctrine. Item 4 is directly taken over from the ideas of
retired General Loup Francart on the “war of relevance” and the “action in psychological fields”. Items 5 and 6
are clearly population-centric and in line with French tradition.
80 Concept of Operations against an Asymmetric Opponent.
81 Concept of Contribution of Armed Forces to Stabilization.
79
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
These basic requirements result from NATO concepts and are based on the following eight
principles of action:
• “Learn and adapt”: understand the environment and adapt to it;
• Anticipate the stabilization phase from planning of the very first response;
• Seek synergy of effort with other actors while preserving the specificity of the military role;
• Operate in close contact with the population;
• Influence perceptions;
• Act quickly and ensure sustainability of effort;
• Find the balance between acting as a deterring force to insurgents and deferring to local
forces when possible;
• Favor the concentration of effects.
Two of these principles are clearly population-centric: operating in close contact with the
population and influencing perceptions. Both are further developed in Annex 2 of this study.
3.2 – restoring Security in the theater of Operations among the population (CREB) 82
The CREB manual published in January 2009 by France’s Forces Employment Doctrine Center
(CDEF) also refrains from claiming any “shaping” of “hearts and minds”. The conduct of
CREB must first produce a political effect, primarily the restoration of security in the theater
of operations through actions taken among (and not on) the population 83. The additional effect
to be achieved is operational in nature: the neutralization of insurgents through kinetic warfare.
The principal stake in this struggle remains, first and foremost, the population. This is the
reason why the first pillar in the struggle against an insurgency is based upon actions among
the population. The desired objective is to deprive the enemy forces of any argument against
the loyalist government by re-establishing normalcy to the running of the country. Therefore,
when the insurgents taking advantage of the “deterioration” of the situation are neutralized, the
resulting security favors reestablishment of the norm 84.
The nature of operations to be conducted requires mastering interaction with the population,
showing great flexibility of maneuver and also a capacity to adapt to any type of threat.
Moreover, ground forces participate in the control of the level of violence by showing their
presence and by maintaining public order, so as to isolate the insurgents and ensure security 85.
These actions have multiple repercussions, especially in urban areas. It is important to predict
and measure them in order to control their consequences. They must therefore be accompanied
by complementary military actions designed to explain and justify them. They are usually
The paragraphs in Section 3.2 of this chapter are taken from Part 2 of the Doctrine de Contre-Rébellion (CREB)
(English title: Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level).
83 According to the author, “action on” means is more like to the aforementioned “modeling” of the population.
84 This was Roger Trinquier’s vision.
85 Adaptability and controlled use of force are put forward, as the British do.
82
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
conducted by Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) detachments 86. They are often conducted in
concert with social efforts designed to provide the population with the material and moral
assistance they need to return to normal life 87.
The actions of ground forces should have the general effect of keeping the armed insurgency
away from controlled areas and disrupting the organization of the insurgency’s structure. The
prevention and protection missions of general public security typically fall under the jurisdiction of police forces, provided they have sufficient means available. If not, the armed forces
must complement them or assume their role.
The two types of coercive actions envisaged by the French CREB are establishing the security
of geographic spaces and populations, to be carried out according to the “oil spot” principle,
and the dismantling of the insurgents’ organization through the traditional measures of population control and the establishment of an intelligence collection network. The struggle against
propaganda calling for armed insurgency must be actively carried out by government authorities
and by the force itself as part of a comprehensive information plan.
3.3 – the Civil-Military actions of the french forces in afghanistan
(Kapisa-Surobi area: 2009-2010)
The NATO International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) was formed in 2002 by its coalition
partners in Afghanistan. It has defined three different lines of operations: security, governance and
development. The French contingent is currently composed of some 3,000 soldiers 88 and has been
operating since November 1st, 2009, as “Task Force Lafayette”, under the supervision of Regional
Command East (RC East) in the provinces of kapisa and Surobi 89, some 60 kilometers east of
Kabul. It is mainly involved in security matters. This is due to the assumption that no progress
is possible in the fields of governance and reconstruction in this very hostile and dangerous zone.
Accordingly, the following missions were given to
the French CIMIC forces:
• Contribute to restoring security in the
Kapisa-Surobi area, especially by improving
the acceptance among the population of the
contingent’s presence;
• Reinforce the power of the local authorities
by involving them in the planning, realization and monitoring of projects;
Légende
Site militaire
Route principale
Route secondaire
Piste
Kapisa-Surobi
Commandements régionaux
Province
District
Their information operations aim at influencing the perceptions of the population in order to support the action
of the land forces.
87 This phrasing recalls David Galula and the Sections administratives spécialisées (SAS) in Algeria.
88 The total personnel strength of the PAMIR mission amounts to 3,764 soldiers.
89 The Surobi district, in which a French battalion was deployed, was put under the command of RC East on
November 1st, 2009. Like the Kapisa district, it is a historical stronghold of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami,
the Islamist mujahideen political party. The Taliban have also established solid strongholds, often to the detriment
of the Hezbi.
86
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
• participate in the improvement of the Afghan standard of living;
• Establish liaisons between the force and the community in order to boost awareness
and support of the contingent’s mission.
The French political action initially aims at establishing contact with official players in order
to discuss with them the types of military and/or development actions that are best suited for
the local environment. This action is also particularly careful in co-opting influential personalities who are both identified as interlocutors with the population, and as potential interfaces
with the insurgents. This political commitment is extended to the population through CIMIC
actions, through contacts established by detachments on patrol or via radio broadcasts. The
aim is to increase the support of the loyalist government through the population and gain
support gradually in insurgency-controlled areas.
Military action is subordinated to political action. It aims to deter rather than to induce combat.
In combat situations, rather than seeking the attrition of enemy forces, it must foil the enemy’s
plans in plain view of the population 90. Its own self-imposed rules are to avoid civilian casualties,
to work in close collaboration with the Afghan National Army (ANA), to hold captured terrain
and never to disengage under fire 91.
In Kapisa, the relationship with the population has clearly improved in the Tagab Valley during
2010. This attracted the attention of both the insurgents and the coalition since the heavily
trafficked Main Supply Road (MSR) Vermont passes through it. This road is an alternative route
to the Northern provinces avoiding Kabul. Civil-military action, which focuses on development
microprojects 92, initially focused on aiding the marginalized population of Alakozai Pashtun ethnic
origin in the southern part of the valley, which has traditionally been neutral or friendly in many
instances, prior to expanding to the North, according to the “oil spot” principle, into Safi Pashtun
dominated areas. Many attempts were made to collaborate with the non-Pashtun Pachaie tribe
that inhabits the nearby mountains. To compensate for the small number of judges and policemen
in the district of Tagab, the CIMIC action included a reinforcement of the traditional judicial
system that included the establishment of militias to protect MSR Vermont as part of the Road
Maintenance Initiative. Their members are recruited from local tribes 93.
While insurgent pressure has been loosened in the Tagab Valley, it remains strong in the
neighboring valleys of Alasay, Shpe and Bedrao. The Taliban have retreated here in a defensive
posture. In the Afghanya Valley, the insurgency has intensified. In the Surobi district of Kabul
province, the situation remains closely dependent on infiltrations from the neighboring district
of Mihtarlam, in Laghman province, where certain locations are used as insurgent assembly
areas.
Lessons learned by Colonel Benoît Durieux in the Surobi province.
Lieutenant Colonel Meunier, 2 nd Régiment étranger parachutiste, quoted by Le Figaro on April 26 th, 2010.
92 School refurbishment, well-drilling, agricultural irrigation, construction of footbridges and food storage buildings,
etc.
93 Often former Hezbi Pashtuns who used to support Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami, a secondary insurgency
element, often compared to the Taliban.
90
91
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
In Kapisa-Surobi, the French decided to
maintain their enabling and mentoring role
to the benefit of all local actors 94: soldiers,
police, public servants, elders, and the
population itself. The aim is not to “shape”
them, but rather to “let the Afghan soul
express itself ” 95. The expression “winning
hearts and minds” is not used in this environment: Brigadier General Maurice Druart,
who commanded Task Force Lafayette from
November 1st, 2009 to April 30 th, 2010,
denounced this phrase as having an “oppressive marketing approach to the Afghan
population”. Like Colonel Benoît Durieux,
who commanded the French battalion in
Surobi from July 2008 until January 2009, he
prefers to use the expression “setting hearts
and minds free”.
Since the objective is not to defeat the
insurgency but to enable the Afghan authorities to regain the control of their territory and
population, the French military try not to induce a permanent state of belligerence. The French
command in Kapisa-Surobi, instead of carrying out counterinsurgency measures, prefers to
implement “a more conventional model, that of a limited conflict in which military actions and
political negotiations alternate. The objectives remain limited and focused on territorial control,
and the population is more an arbitrator than the stake itself ”.
This posture, focused more on mentoring than transforming the human environment, is justified
as long as the actors remain in clearly confined geographic areas and the stakes consequently
limited. Nevertheless, should the Taliban insurgency decide to transform the Surobi province
into a testing ground for its capability to expand into Kabul’s outlying areas and to take root
in the densely populated area of Kapisa, or should external elements such as Pakistani or
global jihads, whose presence has already been detected in the area, mingle with the insurgents
and tribesmen in Kapisa-Surobi, this soft version of French CREB will no longer be sufficient.
In this case, a whole new set of counter-guerrilla and counterterrorism actions will be
required.
Reference to violence control, which was very fashionable at the end of the 90s prior to the resurfacing of counterinsurgency ideas: General (ret.) Loup Francart restricted the employment of forces to “soft missions”, in which
the aim was to decrease tensions and assist international peacekeeping.
95 Interview of General Maurice Druart by the author.
94
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Part 2 – An approach that finds common ground with French experiences
Conclusion of part 2:
In Algeria, French actions took a heavy toll on the insurgency. They won the “Battle of Algiers”
in 1957 and cornered the FLN from a military point of view. DRW, then a mainly coercive
process, apart from for the population-centric SAS experiment, drew upon lessons learned from
the Indochina War while capitalizing on the legacy of “pacification” developed by Gallieni and
Lyautey. The turn of events in France, followed by the referendum that granted independence
to Algeria – in very different conditions from those experienced by the British in Malaya –
overshadowed this military success, though it highlights a basic prerequisite elucidated by
Galula: the indomitable primacy of politics.
In the course of the intervention in Afghanistan, the French military is rediscovering counterinsurgency among rural Muslim populations during “stabilization” missions. Doctrine is
continually adapting to the new environment while drawing on lessons from the past. The French
contingent is as strong in terms of manpower as the British contingent in Pashtun Helmand.
They operate in Kapisa-Surobi, a multiethnic area where tribal structures are still robust and
the population is dense, though administrative structures remain insufficient. Therefore it is not
in France’s best interest to revive the SAS program to “win hearts and minds” – an expression
that still raises reservations among the French military – but rather to assist the Afghan state
in imposing its own legitimacy.
58
PART 3
uniTed sTATes:
once discRediTed, debATed And
Redefined model, AGAin PRevAilinG
Counterinsurgency tactics, heavily influenced by British and French theories, first appeared
in the US Army Field Manual (FM 100-5, Operations) in 1962. The American version of
“winning hearts and minds” was quickly put to the test in Vietnam soon thereafter. US strategy
relegated it to a backup role, while the administration in Washington discredited the method,
considering it to be a mere public relations ploy. In the US, the concept would not see the
light of day again until the mid 1990s. A decade later, the population-centric approach made
its way to center stage, be it as a matter of principle or as a “last chance” solution. It has been
updated and defended by a new generation of officers following General David H. Petraeus
in the wake of the protracted armed interventions in Afghanistan and in Iraq, both campaigns
having been launched by President George W. Bush.
59
Part 3 – United States: once discredited, debated and redefined model, again prevailing
C hapter I – d ISCredIt
In
v IetnaM
The second Vietnam War (1964-1975) no doubt constitutes a turning point in the history of the
United States, comparable in many ways to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, or the
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11th, 2001. Not truly “defeated”, but
unable to win against the will of a small Third World nation, the US found itself trapped in a
“dirty war”. At that time, the war’s influence reached far beyond any combat zone. It was of
interest not just to Southeast Asian nations, but also to the major powers of China, the USSR and
the US, who considered the stakes of the conflict to be of particular importance. It was also viewed
as a testing ground that revealed internal tensions in the US. Within Western society, the link
between the Vietnam War and the major civilization crisis from 1964 to 1970 cannot be ignored.
In the US, the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam and its hardships heralded the “end of
innocence” in both domestic and foreign politics. To the chagrin of the few military men who
believed that a COIN strategy should be based on “winning hearts and minds”, the fact that
intervention doctrines at the time were wholly inadequate and that the Army and Marine Corps
doctrine tended towards “search and destroy”, the entire effort was bound to fail. A complex
bureaucracy and a disdain for the political aspects of the conflict deprived the genuinely population-centric Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program
of any visibility. To make matters worse, the American public felt there was a tremendous
divergence between the violent reality of the war and the “hearts and minds” mantra that was
repeated in the administration’s domestic communications. This had a sustained negative effect
on the entire concept’s credibility and helped foster a pacifist protest movement.
1.1 – COrdS: a program Overshadowed by a “dirty War”
After the French withdrawal from Vietnam, the 1954
Geneva Accords planned general elections that would have
allowed a reunification of North and South Vietnam.
The Washington-supported Saigon government, led by the
ultra-conservative Ngo Dinh Diem, refused to hold these
elections. His policy triggered growing opposition among
the working class and also within the Buddhist clergy. The
National Liberation Front (NLF or “Viet Cong”) then
published its manifesto, which was principally inspired by communism. The NLF, which was
supported by North Vietnam, increased the tempo of its guerilla operations. Concerned about
the situation that was developing, US President John F. kennedy sent thousands of “military
advisors” 96 to Vietnam and also encouraged the 1963 coup d’état that overthrew Diem, whom
he regarded as being too dictatorial. President Lyndon B. Johnson would further escalate
American involvement.
96
Kennedy moved from the limited commitment with the 685 advisors laid out in the Geneva Accords to an unlimited
commitment. On May 11th, 1961, he authorized the deployment of US Special Forces, the first anti-guerilla forces
trained by the CIA.
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Part 3 – United States: once discredited, debated and redefined model, again prevailing
In order to support the military dictatorship of generals Minh, ky and Thieu, who were Diem’s
successors in Saigon, Washington steadily increased the number of American troops in Vietnam,
peaking at 500,000 in 1968. During this period, clashes between the American forces, the NLF
and the North Vietnamese intensified. The uS Air Force’s B-52s heavily bombed North
Vietnam, which was struck by more bombs than Germany was throughout all of WWII. None
of these facts diminished the determination of the Viet Cong guerrilla movement, who were
well equipped with Chinese and Soviet armament. The fact that “search and destroy”
methodology was so heavily relied upon and that the war become ever more protracted and
intense led to an increasing level of violence: whole populations were deported and corralled
into “strategic hamlets”, carpet bombing was commonly used, entire towns were burned down
with napalm, vegetation was destroyed with defoliants and other chemicals and a significant
number of NLF leaders were killed during the anti-subversive Phoenix operation.
When Hanoi launched the Tet offensive on January 31st, 1968, the US realized that victory was
just as unlikely as defeat. This offensive proved difficult and costly for the Americans to counter,
and served to highlight the fact that that a US victory in Vietnam would require a “total war”
that was certain to be very costly in terms of casualties, money and prestige. In the US, public
opinion grew more and more hostile towards the war. In March 1968, President Johnson
announced simultaneously that he would stop bombing targets in North Vietnam if a peace
conference were opened in Paris, and that he would not run for a second term in the White
House. Getting the US out of the mire of Vietnam was left to his successor, President Richard
Nixon. Seven years later, Saigon fell to the communist North on April 30 th, 1975, signifying
their victory.
The intensity of “kinetic” operations during “The Big War” and the outcome of vietnamization
overshadowed the results of the Americans” only counterinsurgency program that was really
and truly focused on the population. Owing to the efforts of Bob “Blowtorch” korner, this
innovative but belated program called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support (CORDS) was officially launched on May 1st, 1967. Jointly managed by the South
Vietnamese government and the American Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV)
CORDS brought all CIMIC programs together under one roof. US Ambassador William Colby,
who took charge of the program in 1968, used CORDS to extend and broaden the base of the
anti-subversive Phoenix plan.
CORDS linked the implementation of socio-economic projects to human intelligence collection (HUMINT) activities, with the objective of meeting the population’s material needs in
order to better separate it from the hidden Viet Cong infrastructure 97. Sadly, CORDS started
too late and ended too soon; but, everywhere it was implemented, this program appears to have
triggered the decline of the NLF’s influence. Ambassador Colby indeed blamed the ultimate
failure in Vietnam on the gap between the “American way of waging war” and the necessities
required by the transformation of the rural society. He regarded these necessities as the
“conditions for peace and stability” that were indeed the core of the CORDS program 98.
97
98
Richard A. Hurt: Pacification – The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds, Westview Press, 1998.
William Colby, with James McCargar: Lost Victory: A First-Hand Account of America’s Sixteen Year War in
Vietnam, Contemporary Books, 1989.
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1.2 – the Malaya example Imperfectly assimilated?
“Draining the swamp” primarily by coercive means, deporting the population by force or simply
terrorizing it, could not fail to provoke overall resentment, erode the people’s trust, and boost
the communist guerillas’ recruiting. Indochina expert Bernard Fall 99, also a former WWII
resistance fighter, war correspondent, doctor of political science and professor of international
relations, concluded as early as 1964 that the US methods being applied in Vietnam would lead
to failure, just like the French in Algeria before them:
“Those who are interested in the current operations in South
Vietnam will be surprised as they discover that their so-called
new counterinsurgency techniques – be it the installation of
strategic hamlets or large-scale pacification operations – are
nothing but old-hat tactics. All that helicopters, insecticides,
and heavy machine guns can do is increase the scale of the
bloodshed, but they definitely do not change the nature of
the struggle. Since the same causes create the same effects,
the results cannot be any different if the political errors that
France committed were to be copied by any other country
at war”100.
In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife – Counterinsurgency
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, retired Lieutenant
Colonel John A. Nagl 101 compares the Vietnam experience
from 1964 to 1975 with that of the British in Malaya from
1948 to 1960 102. He is convinced that “in order to put down an insurgency, one must know who
the insurgents are. And to learn this one must win and keep the population’s support”. Nagl
especially wonders about the ability of the armed forces to adapt to changes during conflicts
for which they are not prepared. He feels the “organizational culture” is the key to its adaptability. This ability, which he believes to be part of their history and culture, could explain why
the British so easily adopted the population-centric approach after 1951 during the Malayan
Emergency.
On the other hand, it is clear to him that the American military was unable to conduct the
paradigm shift required to win in Vietnam. He quotes the then Army Chief of Staff and later
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, who stated in a speech at the
Bernard Fall was killed in Vietnam during a sortie with a US Marines detachment in 1967.
Excerpt from Bernard Fall’s introduction to Roger Trinquier’s masterpiece, English version: Modern Warfare.
A French View of Counterinsurgency, Praeger, 1964.
101 Cavalry officer John A. Nagl taught strategy at the US Military Academy at West Point and was Military
Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The title of his 2002 book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,
reprinted in 2005 after Nagl’s participation in the operations in the region of Khalidiyya during the intervention
in Iraq (2003-2004), is derived from an aphorism by Colonel T.E. Lawrence, also known as “Lawrence of
Arabia”.
102 Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife – Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Praeger, 2002 /
reprinted Chicago University Press, 2005.
99
100
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Fordham University on November 7 th, 1962: that “It is fashionable in certain sectors to say
that the difficulties in Southeast Asia are political and economic in the first place, rather that
military. I don’t share that point of view. The essence of the Vietnam problem is of military
nature” 103.
The “organizational culture” under General William
Westmoreland, who led the MACV from 1964 to 1968, was
centered on the battlefield and not the population. According
to Nagl, the replacement of General Westmoreland by
General Creighton Abrams, on July 1st, 1968, could have
changed the Americans’ strategic focus, since, unlike his
predecessor, Abrams did not focus purely on the “body
104
count” . Abrams intended conversely to “bring security to the people”. To do so, US military
operations should have endeavored to “neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure and to separate
the enemy from the people”. These provisions, however, were thwarted by the inaction of the
military bureaucracy.
1.3 – a Misleading Slogan?
One of the paradoxes of the Vietnam War is that never
before had official speeches so often mentioned the
objective of “winning hearts and minds”. In the midst
of this demoralizing conflict that was so costly in
human casualties, never before had “hearts and minds”
seemed so distant from reality in the view of the public.
President Lyndon B. Johnson used the “winning hearts
and minds” phrase no less than 28 times between
January 16 th, 1964 and August 19 th, 1968, including
in front of heads of state and members of Congress.
He also changed the order of the words to “minds and
hearts” ten times.
His use of the term was so frequent and widespread that
by 1965, some commentators at the time ignored the
British precedent in Malaya and considered Johnson
to be the inventor of the counterinsurgency concept. On
May 4th, 1965, during a speech made before managers
of the Texas Electric Cooperatives Inc., the President
John A. Nagl: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam, contribution to Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, collective
work under the direction of Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, Osprey Publishing, 2008.
104 The expression stigmatizes the method that consists in deducing the success of a campaign from the number of
casualties inflicted to the opponent without taking other facts into consideration, such as social, and economic
factors.
103
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stated that even if the US were ready to fight in Vietnam, “the ultimate victory will depend on
the hearts and the minds of the people who actually live out there” and that the fight “for the
cause of freedom throughout the world” would be won by bringing them hope and by bringing
them electricity 105.
This slogan was repeated like a mantra, and was often accompanied by a series of positive
references to the American nation’s history. One such commentary that Johnson relied upon
came from founding father and second president John Adams, who was certain that revolutionary sentiment was present “in the hearts and minds of the American people”, even before
the Revolutionary War. The president also recalled how helpful the slogan had been to Franklin
Delano Roosevelt in the 1930s to unite the nation and to make it accept the economic reforms
of the “New Deal”.
Lyndon B. Johnson transferred this slogan into foreign policy just as John F. kennedy had
done before him when speaking to the US Congress on April 2 nd, 1963, hoping that his country’s
Latin America policy would be able to rest on the will to bring about change of the Latin
American peoples themselves: “Perhaps most significant of all is a change in the hearts and
minds of the people – a growing will to develop their countries. We can only help Latin
Americans to save themselves”.
Finally, it cannot be excluded that Johnson, desperately in need of legitimacy after having
succeeded Kennedy under the sudden and dramatic circumstances of his assassination in Dallas
on November 22 nd, 1963, wanted to imitate the manner in which the 26 th US President
Theodore Roosevelt had cemented his extraordinary popularity largely using good publicity.
Asked in 1906 by future General Douglas MacArthur, at the time a lieutenant and his aide-decamp, what had been the secret of his success with respect to the American public, Roosevelt
answered that he had the ability to “to put into words what is in their hearts and minds, but not
in their mouth”.
Despite Johnson’s frequent use and abuse of the “winning hearts and minds” concept, the public
became aware through radio and TV broadcasts that the military considered the solution to be:
“more bombs, more shells, more napalm... till the other side cracks and gives up” 106. “Winning
hearts and minds” became considered to be a euphemism that hid the truly brutal character of
a coercive war, a character that was vulgarly summed up by an anonymous, though insightful
American colonel: “If you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow”!
After 1968, the term “winning hearts and minds” became so discredited that British Marshal
Templer, who had previously defended this strategy in Malaya, began to distance himself from
“this despicable phrase he thought he had invented” as he was quoted by Singapore newspaper
The Straits Times on March 27 th, 1968.
Lyndon B. Johnson: “So we must be ready to fight in Vietnam, but the ultimate victory will depend on the hearts
and the minds of the people who actually live out there. By helping to bring them hope and electricity you are
also striking a very important blow for the cause of freedom throughout the world”.
106 Major General William E. DePuy, 1st US Infantry Division, in 1966: “The solution in Vietnam is more bombs,
more shells, more napalm... till the other side cracks and gives up”, cited by John A. Nagl.
105
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A feature-length documentary, produced in 1974 and
titled “Hearts and Minds”, locked in place all the
negative connotations now linked to the concept. The
film, made by Peter Davis, was awarded the Academy
Award for Best Feature Documentary in 1975. It laid
bare any and all contradictions and misrepresentations
made by American civil and military authorities
concerning Vietnam policy 107. At the Oscar award
ceremony in April 1975, co-producer and the anti-war
activist Bert Schneider launched a nationwide debate
by reading aloud a message of “Greetings of Friendship to all American People” issued by the Vietcong
delegation to the Paris Peace Accords that sought to
end the conflict. The movie was allowed to be distributed and shown 108 despite lawsuits filed by some of
the persons interviewed, including former Assistant for
National Security Affairs Walt Rostow, who felt that
the movie was deceptive and that many statements
made within had been taken out of context.
One of the most shocking statements is the following: “We had to destroy the village to save it”, attributed to
an American serviceman after the destruction of Ben Tre on February 7 th, 1968.
108 The provocative filmmaker Michael Moore cites Hearts and Minds among his movie inspirations.
107
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C hapter II – r ehabIlItatIOn
In I raK
David H. Petraeus never served in Vietnam, having
been commissioned out of West Point only in
1974. But just like other officers of his generation
who have pursued advanced degrees in parallel
to their military careers, Petraeus has learned
the lessons that the US military drew from the
Vietnam conflict 109. Back from a first tour of duty
in Iraq (2003-2004), he initiated a full overhaul of
America’s counterinsurgency doctrine together
with retired Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl and
Australian Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen,
110
both meticulous readers of David galula’s works, during the time when General Petraeus
commanded the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth from 2005 through 2007. This
led to the publication of a joint Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
(FM 3-24). Heading the Multinational Force in Iraq (2007-2008) and then as the chief of the
US Central Command (CENTCOM) 111 from October 31st, 2008, Petraeus put his theories into
practice and reintroduced the “winning hearts and minds” concept.
The “operational art” of the counterinsurgents, though it tries to take into account the geopolitical and social reality of the country, has yet to bring about a definite resolution to the
conflict. It has, however won back a part of the Iraqi people’s trust and reassured the
American public and its leadership of the legitimacy of the “troop surge” that was undertaken
in Iraq in 2007. To attain certain COIN objectives, it was necessary to mobilize additional
funds and to deploy significant troop reinforcements in a “troop surge”. The “COIN
lobby”, having taken into account the lessons learned from America’s failure in Vietnam, won
over both the Special Forces and all-technology lobbies. They convinced the Pentagon and
the State Department of the necessity to adapt their structures and coordinate their efforts
in order to focus on the population with a view to providing security and to reconstructing,
which is the essence of the old “winning hearts and minds” slogan. This is, at least, the
positive “narrative” that the media, echoing the words of the military experts in the “COIN
lobby”, have molded into the prevailing politically correct opinion, giving little room to its
“structural opponents”.
This was the topic of the doctoral thesis he defended at the Princeton University in 1987.
Bertrand Valeyre, Alexandre Guérin: op. cit.
111 Command that covers the countries of “arch of the Islamic crisis”, reaching from the Middle East to Central
Asia.
109
110
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2.1 – david Kilcullen’s new definition of the Concept and its use of
Sociology
Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, attached
to the US Government, served as counterinsurgency advisor to General Petraeus in Iraq
in 2007 112. Now retired from service, he owes
his current renown in the COIN domain to his
original reflections that redefined and rehabilitated the population-centric approach. To
Kilcullen, an irregular war is always a competition between two belligerents who both want to
mobilize the people and want to win the fight
for legitimacy. The use of force in this context
must always remain the last recourse. “The people remain the prize”, just as much as the terrain on
which the prize is at stake. While demographic and ethnographic factors are essential, the problems
underlying any conflict tend to be global in nature.
In 2006, Kilcullen provided junior officers deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq with a handbook
that presented his ideas summarized in 28 articles 113 titled: Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals
of Company-Level Counterinsurgency. Among the articles, the 13th, “Build Trusted Networks”,
calls for investment in social capital.
According to French sociologist pierre Bourdieu, who passed away in 2002, social capital is one
of the four types of power in a society; the others being coercion, economic domination, and
authority. An individual holds social capital if he or she is able to reach its objectives by tapping into
social networks. Identifying and associating with the individual or group of individuals with the
ability to mobilize such power is exactly the task of the counterinsurgent in stabilization operations.
Insurgencies thrive on the social networks that existed well before a given conflict (village, tribe,
family, party, religious community, etc.) According to Kilcullen, COIN’s objective is to isolate
insurgents from these networks and to replace their influence among the people by one’s own.
Isolating insurgents from the people actually means manipulating social networks and exploiting
cultural knowledge.
Article 13 also offers a modern definition of the “winning hearts and minds” concept. “Winning
hearts” means that you have to “persuade the people that the counterinsurgents success is in its
own best interest, while ‘winning minds’ means that you have to persuade the people that the loyalist
forces are able to protect them and that there is no point in resistance”. The counterinsurgents’ main
effort is to mobilize the people with this framework as its starting point. The rest is secondary (from
Self Interest, not Emotion, is What Counts. See Annex 1).
Named US State Department Chief Strategist for Counter-Terrorism upon recommendation, he wrote the section
on irregular conflicts of the July 2005 issue of the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review. Since his return
from Iraq, he has collaborated with various think tanks, including the Center for a New American Security
(CNAS). Today, he has his own auditing and consulting group, CAERUS Associates.
113 These 28 fundamentals of counterinsurgency are a tribute to the T.E. Lawrence’s 27 Articles of Desert Guerilla
Warfare of 1917.
112
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Using sociological vocabulary, Kilcullen states that the principle of COIN is to “bring
about human security 114 to the people, not to destroy the insurgent enemy” 115. Rather than
speaking about control of the population, he prefers to invoke “population-centric security”,
based on:
• Continuous presence in population centers;
• partnership with community leaders;
• The establishment of local self-defense militias;
• The operation of small units keeping the enemy at a distance in liaison with the security
forces.
2.2 – the “petraeus doctrine” (from fM 3-24 to the Iraq troop Surge)
The uS Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24), published in
December 2006 and co-authorized by Army General David H.
Petraeus and Marine Corps General James F. Amos 116 relies heavily
on the ideas of Kilcullen. The 28 fundamentals it identifies, along
with Article 13, which defines the “hearts and minds” concept, have
been encapsulated as Annex A (A Guide for Action). Annex A
encourages soldiers to network with the various members of the
community, such as local allies, security forces, notable elites, NGOs,
non-governmental actors, the media, etc. They are encouraged to
conduct inquiries in the villages to identify how to satisfy the basic
needs of the people, and in doing so establish a relationship of trust.
Any inappropriate action 117 that weakens this trust or destroys these
networks is prohibited since it will only help the insurgent enemy.
Defining a threefold “Clear, Hold, Build” method of operation to follow the “Shape” phase 118,
FM 3-24 applies the principles previously identified by Frenchman David Galula and the British
school of counterinsurgency 119. According to the “Petraeus Doctrine”, the three objectives of
the COIN are as follows:
According to Stéphane Taillat, and Mary Kaldor, professor of political science at the London School of
Economics (LSE), there is some debate that “human security” and “restoring security” are synonyms. See Mary
Kaldor: Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention, Polity Press, 2007.
115 David Kilcullen: The Accidental Guerrilla – Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of the Big One, Oxford University
Press, 2009.
116 For whom the manual is registered as MCWP 3-33.5. The collaboration of General James N. Mattis of the US
Marine Corps was decisive until he was succeeded by General James F. Amos.
117 In Article 13, Kilcullen refutes the systematic elimination of “high value targets”. Article A-26 of the annex to
FM 3-24 reflects this provision, does not pick up this formulation but instead makes reference quite unemotionally
to “measures that will generate a short-term military advantage”.
118 See Part 1, Chapter III, 3.2, that deals with the British counterinsurgency.
119 Traditionally, the “Clear” and “Hold” phases are attributed to Frank Kitson, whereas the “Build” concept is often
credited to Galula. In the introduction, the authors of the FM 3-24 praise the works of both Thompson and Galula.
114
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• Creating a secure physical and psychological environment;
• Establishing firm government control of the population and the terrain;
• Gaining the support of the population.
The major tasks of the counterinsurgents consist primarily of bringing about permanent security,
ending the insurgent presence, reinforcing “political primacy”, restoring order by enforcement
of the law, and reconstructing the institutions of the host nation, also known as “nation building”.
The counterinsurgent must take advantage of all opportunities to satisfy the expectations and
the basic needs of the population and ensure that their efforts are widely noticed, following the
basic maxim that “actions speak louder than words”. Just like France’s now-defunct Doctrine of
Revolutionary War (DRW), US counterinsurgency doctrine allows for population control
measures and information operations meant to support the intelligence collection.
The “petraeus Doctrine” was first implemented in Iraq in 2007. General Petraeus had come
to believe that the war in this country, the dynamics of which the Pentagon had previously
never had a hold on 120, was more like a contest “to win over the people” than a key piece of the
Bush administration’s “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). Studies financed by the RAND
Corporation, perhaps the think tank most favorable to COIN since the 1960s, have confirmed
his postulate 121. Together with David Kilcullen and an entourage of highly talented senior
officers selected by Petraeus himself, the general proposed the following six essential axes to
“win hearts and minds” in Iraq:
• Set up an integrated and consistent political strategy in cooperation with all state
actors involved;
• Restore within the people a tangible feeling that their security is assured;
• Build alliances at the local level in order to reinforce the fabric of civil society;
• Set up community militias in the Sunni community capable of defending themselves,
in order to marginalize extremists;
• Establish liaison with insurgents who are prepared to reconcile (whilst eliminating
the irreconcilable);
• Persuade the people, the government and international public opinion that the measures
being taken are justified 122.
In order to conduct projects that are essential to community development, aimed at gaining the
support of the population, the military commanders on the ground receive funds from the
Commander’s Emergency Response program (CERp), for which John A. Nagl, among
others, is full of praise. According to him, CERP makes it possible to “win hearts twice, first by
The Sunnite population, in particular, felt prejudiced by the “debaathification” of “proconsul” Paul Bremer and
a number of Sunnis joined the insurgency that General Casey was struggling to contain.
121 The RAND Corporation: Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations – Lessons from Iraq (2003-2006).
122 This enumeration was given by David Kilcullen, in a presentation regarding the “Petraeus Doctrine” in Iraq
during an international colloquium at the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr on May 12 th and 13 th, 2009,
titled Winning the hearts and Minds of Iraqi people? Speech transcript by Michel Goya.
120
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fixing the essential parts of the infrastructure, then by employing the local who would otherwise
have become easy prey to insurgents”123. Improving living conditions and assisting in intelligence collection are the priorities of this program, which somewhat resembles a decentralized
version of the Vietnam-era CORDS program.
Dominant opinion in the US, both among experts in counterinsurgency and more widely, has
been shaped by positive media coverage. It is considered that the “population-centric” strategy,
through a series of judicious actions, both military (kinetic) and civilian (non-kinetic), alongside
the role of major local and regional players, has made it possible to reduce to a certain extent the
number of security incidents. They also helped separate islamonationalist combatants from the
hard core of the insurgency, pushing jihadist Al-Qaeda supporters to the sidelines of Sunni society.
2.3 – persistent Opposition
Those who challenge the validity of FM 3-24 or doubt that the “Petraeus Doctrine” in Iraq is
indeed a success story are less visible than those who praise this population-centric approach.
Opposition does exist, though, and criticism should be taken seriously. First of all, there are
those for whom “winning hearts and minds” is inevitably linked to government misinformation,
to a “dirty war”, and to the skirting of the values of democracy. This anti-military and pacifist
criticism of the new COIN is expressed in a rather constructive manner by Sarah Sewall of the
Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. In an address at Harvard University in which she
commented on the publishing of the FM 3-24 by the University of Chicago Press in 2007, she
shared her doubts: “Either the manual would be ignored by the American troops in the first
place, or it would be used to hide deeds that are opposed to military honor and ethics”124.
There are also conservatives who consider war to be a necessarily coercive activity. COIN can
therefore constitute nothing but a diversion, an empty approach, or a “military malpractice”,
as Edward N. Luttwak put it in February 2007 125. Luttwak, an American intellectual wellknown in the 1980s, believes that “brutality and terror can only be brought down by brutality
and terror”. He doubts that Afghans and Iraqis, both of whom he views as “backward Muslims”,
are ready for participatory democracy. He declares himself a supporter of the “hard way” 126.
This type of conservative or neo-conservative opposition surfaced in particular while FM 3-24
was still being drafted, well before the Iraq troop surge.
The last category of criticism also surfaced at the time that the troop surge was taking place
and came from within the US military institution itself. For several years, Colonel gian p.
gentile, Director of the History Department at the US Military Academy at West Point, has
been positioning himself as the chief critic of COIN, which he contends to be nothing but a
John A. Nagl: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife – Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
Praeger, reprinted in 2005.
124 Sarah Sewall has written a new introduction to the public version of the FM 3-24 titled A Radical Field Manual.
125 Edward N. Luttwak: Dead End: Counterinsurgency as a Military Malpractice, Harper’s Magazine, February 2007.
126 David Kilcullen has opposed these arguments on April 15 th, 2007, on the Small Wars Journal’s blog.
123
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vast myth-making operation 127. To him, the effectiveness of the
“winning hearts and minds” concept has never been proven.
He considers it instead to be a “strategy of tactics”. Gentile
particularly challenges Nagl’s belief that a force must first “learn
and adapt”, even before the fighting actually starts. He asserts
than the Vietnam War was not lost because of the US military’s
intrinsic inability to correct its tactics and its operations, but
simply because it applied the wrong strategy, and because the
Viet Cong, proved to be more determined than America.
Gentile calls into question the myth that “winning hearts and minds” as a strategy represents a
major break with the past’s classical way of waging wars. The proof he offers to support his
point is a collection of recent historical studies that conclude that in the France’s Second
Moroccan War, or “Rif War” in 1925, when Lyautey was in command 128, or during Britain’s
Malayan Emergency 129, the population-centric approach had been a more gradual or peaceful
approach, rather than a conventional coercive one. According to Gentile, counterinsurgency
strategists, such as Templer in Malaya, Abrams in Vietnam or Petraeus in Iraq, had artificially
declared the need for a break with the past and minimized the elements of continuity with their
predecessors: Briggs, Westmoreland, and Casey respectively. In short, there is no such thing as
a classical “bad war” or a counterinsurgency “good war”. He contends that counterinsurgency
supporters (i.e. the “COIN lobby”) are creating a public narrative that is baseless and presents
their recycled methods as innovative, thereby purposefully manipulating and misleading the
public.
According to Colonel Gentile, the US Army needs to return to its fundamentals. It must rid
itself of the current myth about COIN that has reduced past counterinsurgency campaigns into
an oversimplified either/or model representing complete success or total defeat. It must, of
course, learn and adapt; but, first and foremost, it must be able to conduct combined arms
combat 130.
Gian P. Gentile: A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army, 2007.
Case critically studied by Douglas Porch, op. cit.
129 Precedent personally interpreted by Karl Hack.
130 Gian P. Gentile, op. cit.
127
128
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C hapter III – t he t ranSfer
tO
a fghanIStan
Afghanistan is the next theater in which COIN was reformulated and implemented, even
though the military intervention in Afghanistan had actually begun two years prior to the
invasion of Iraq. It was not until 2005-2006 that the coalition stopped defining their action
in Afghanistan a fight against terrorism and admitted that they were, in fact, facing an
insurgency131. Typically, three intensity levels can be identified in a conflict: combat, battle,
and campaign. The case studies of Helmand Province and Kapisa-Surobi earlier in this report
showed that certain aspects of classical warfare have completely been turned upside down. In
Afghanistan, the level of battle has all but disappeared: the insurgents simply avoid direct
contact. The campaign level, in return, had never really been considered prior to the strategy
shift initiated in 2009 by General Stanley McChrystal, from the Special Forces, commanding
the multinational coalition in Afghanistan. In order to avoid mission failure, the NATO coalition
completely revised its approach. Like in Iraq, the efforts were refocused on an increase in troop
levels 132, and the reorientation clearly became “population-centric”. The new primacy of the
“winning hearts and minds” principle over the “search and destroy” method, at least in the South
of the country, was a direct consequence of this strategy shift.
The insurgents continue to adapt, redeploy and merge with tribal populations whose dynamics
the coalition still struggles to understand, despite all of the tools and methods they have developed to aid in reconstruction efforts or understand the social science aspects of the “human
terrain”. The counterinsurgents are engaged in a multitude of simultaneous micro-combats, or
small-scale military actions that are most often initiated by the rebels. These skirmishes bog
down coalition soldiers in their attempts at cooperation and building trust with the people,
adding to the psychological pressure on the population and contributing to the disorganization
of operational efforts. In the US, it stokes the debate about the effectiveness of COIN strategy.
3.1 – the provincial reconstruction teams (prt) and the human
terrain System (htS)
The coalition supports the recovery of Afghanistan using its provincial Reconstruction Teams
(pRT). The PRT are new features of the “winning hearts and minds” approach that can be traced
back to the British Army 133. They were created rather hastily in late 2001 and early 2002 to
overcome difficulties the coalition forces encountered during initial deployments. Starting in
2004, PRT fanned out all over the country, combining military operational capabilities with
tangible and visible development efforts. Soon thereafter, this organizational structure that so
typifies CIMIC philosophy was exported to Iraq. PRT can vary significantly in composition
from region to region and depending on their contributor nations.
Bertrand Valeyre, Alexandre Guérin, op. cit.
By the summer 2010, the number of foreign soldiers (not including contractors) is supposed to be increased
from some 130,000 to approximately 150,000, more than two thirds of whom will be Americans.
133 The idea seems to have been initiated by the British Major General Nicholas Patrick “Nick” Carter. Carter
served in Bosnia (1998), and then in Kosovo (1999) where the Liaison and Observation Teams (LOT) and the
Liaison and Monitoring Teams (LMT), both of which resemble PRTs, were fielded.
131
132
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ISAF has 26 PRT, 16 of which are under American command, including Civil Affairs officers
and representatives of other agencies, such as the US State Department, Department of Justice,
Department of Agriculture, and USAID. These have already implemented counterinsurgency
in their own way. These added factors do not change the fact that the aim is still to “win over
the population” while holding terrain as part of a “quadrillage” strategy 134. The PRT have much
in common with the French Sections administratives spécialisées (SAS) system of the Algerian
War half a century ago. In the North, the PRT are more deeply involved in the physical reconstruction efforts. In the South, they are more heavily exposed to Pashtun insurgent strikes, which
limits the operating freedom of their CIMIC teams, which are forced to stay in their ultra-secure
compounds that they seldom are able to leave.
With respect to stabilization and reconstruction, the PRT can be proud of their positive results
in the establishment and opening of schools and improving access to health care. Nevertheless,
the increasing attacks by insurgents and general state of insecurity show that the PRT are not a
magic bullet. They are led by nations that contribute to the coalition, often under very different
mandates and frequently operating with different caveats 135. The provincial teams often suffer
from a shocking lack of coordination. The PRT do not pass on the intelligence they may gather
to ISAF, but to their respective countries who then decide whether to share all or a part of it.
The US military has had Civil Affairs units 136 for a long time now, which are responsible for its
CIMIC actions. These actions must not be confused with the human Terrain System (hTS),
which first appeared in the Afghan Theater in 2006-2007. With a $130 million budget, the HTS
was established in 2005 to be a “CORDS program for the 21st century” 137, in order to obtain
ethnographical and cultural intelligence on the Afghan and Iraqi societies. The scientific
counselor to the HTS is Montgomery McFate, an enthusiastic advocate of General Petraeus’s
COIN. Since its debut, this program has been strongly supported by David Kilcullen, who
qualifies it as “armed social work”.
The Human Terrain Teams (HTT) are made up of five people: one leader and four additional
specialists who typically have qualifications in foreign languages, geography, anthropology, or
ethnography, and are embedded in the fighting units. These “academic embeds”, as they are
called by the military, are supposed to transfer knowledge that can be helpful in fostering the
understanding of the customs and habits of the local population. The Pentagon expects this
to be beneficial with respect to “winning hearts and minds” through village protection, police
recruitment, building trust among different tribes, the eradication of poverty and the improvement of local governance, etc.
The experimental fielding of HTT in Afghanistan and the broader implementation of the HTS
have triggered strong opposition in US led by the American Anthropological Association
(AAA). Since 2007, the AAA has asserted that researchers are being exposed to danger by this
Jean-Charles Jauffret: Afghanistan (2001-2010) – Chronique d’une Non-Victoire Annoncée, Autrement, 2010.
Legal restrictions on certain activities issued by the force-contributing governments.
136 In 2007, one of these, operating within the Jalalabad PRT in Eastern Afghanistan, posted on the Internet a series
of short news reports entitled Winning Hearts and Minds, the New Series.
137 Dr. Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, Captain Don Smith: The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the
21st Century, The US Army Professional Writing Collection, Vol. 4, The Military Review, September/October 2006.
134
135
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kind of “anthropological mercenary service”, that it disapproves of. Two HTT scholars have
indeed lost their lives: Michael V. Bhatia, killed at Khost in May 2008, and Paula Loyd, who
was set on fire at Chel Ghazi on November 4 th, 2008, and passed away two months later. Citing
ethical reasons, the AAA refuses that terrain research in social sciences be assimilated into acts
of espionage and that the “academic embeds” become complicit in the “occupation of hearts
and minds”138. Recruiting within the academic community for military assignments is a difficult
task, and thus the military is forced to recruit mostly Ph.D. candidates. As of today, the overall
results of HTT work remain to be seen.
3.2 – the McChrystal plan (a new Operational Culture)
In summer 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, who at the time enjoyed a close professional
relationship with General Petraeus, then US CENTCOM Commander, filed a situation report
on Afghanistan that stressed that American forces and their NATO allies had not yet been able
to implement their strategic principles “within the population”. To him, ISAF had been wrong
to focus on “searching and destroy” operations against the Taliban rather than on “winning the
hearts and minds” of the Afghan people. In August 2009, the general reiterated that: “The
conflict will be won by persuading the people, not by destroying the enemy”.
General McChrystal’s plan, submitted to Defense Secretary Robert Gates on August 30 th, 2009,
identified the insurgency’s motives and suggested a set of measures designed to disrupt its activities. Most notable was the “troop surge” of 30,000 additional servicemembers authorized by
President Obama, and a population-centric COIN strategy focused on isolating the insurgents
from the Pashto population in the South and East of Afghanistan and on rebuilding the social
fabric of communities down to the district level. This strategy also sought to fight corruption
and graft at various levels of the administration, and to prevent intimidation and violence by
the warlords who undermine the government in Kabul and destabilize certain areas, making
them ideal for the Taliban to flourish. It reasserted the priority of better military and police
training for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), to prepare them to assume greater
operational responsibility in the field.
Upon approval by coalition partners, this plan became the new official NATO strategy for
Afghanistan. President Obama made the plan public at a speech given at the US Military Academy
at West Point on December 1st, 2009. General McChrystal proposed the strategy shift as a
“new operational culture”, and instituted the following changes at ISAF, intended to force it to:
• Improve its understanding of Afghanistan and its people with the objective of being
perceived as a welcome presence, rather than a force of occupation. To do this, McChrystal
extended the length of servicemembers’ tours of duty in country, allowing troops more
time to develop fruitful ties with the population and more time to develop respect for local
customs and habits;
138
Dahr Jamail: Occupying Hearts and Minds, Truthout, May 1st, 2009.
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• Build interpersonal relationships in order to obtain reliable intelligence. To do this, he
encouraged coalition members to spend more time outside their vehicles and to show
more interest in both the needs and grievances of the people;
• Spread a feeling of confidence by “projecting confidence” and spending more time
“dismounted”, and not hiding inside the protection of an armored vehicle;
• Decentralize the management of projects, a move designed to eliminate layers of
bureaucracy and boost the spirit of initiative at the local level;
• Reintegrate war veterans and offer reconciliation to all political figures, acting in the
role of host nation enabler (ISAF should be in a position to provide employment,
protection and resources to anybody who wants to rally);
• Economically support the counterinsurgency, by financing local development projects,
in particular “quick impact projects” that generate perceivable benefits in the short term.
While reasserting the priority given to the fight against Al Qaeda, McChrystal emphasized the
development of civil-military actions. The Pentagon employed all means available, either military
(PSYOPS) or civil (civil engineering works, justice, the economy, or agricultural development),
in liaison with the State Department and the other agencies (chiefly USAID) to increase the CIMIC
impact. An “information strategy” was reviewed and adapted to win the “public relations war”.
The two-fold objective was to minimize collateral damage during “kinetic” operations, while
showcasing the positive impact of the coalition’s efforts in Afghanistan.
3.3 – the Ongoing Strategic debate in the united States
President Barack Obama approved and endorsed the McChrystal Plan in December 2009. At the
same time, other options and points of view were proposed and publicly discussed in Washington.
US Vice President Joe Biden, along with Defense Department civil personnel considered that
COIN strategy, though implemented with a certain degree of success in Iraq, was not easily
adapted to Afghanistan. Implementing COIN required an increase in troop numbers and thus
carried political cost that could not be reconciled with public opinion, which at the time was
growing more and more hostile towards the military campaign in Afghanistan. One popular
alternative strategy proposal, known as “CT plus”, refocused military effort directly on counterterrorism with the principal objective of countering Al Qaeda’s influence rather than the rebellion.
Other projects were presented in reaction to the
criticism that “CT Plus” triggered, especially in light
of the risk of increased radicalization of the Afghan
population as a result of the intensification of the
conflict, most notably in the South. Also taken into
account was the risk of provoking integration of
home-grown Afghan terrorism with international
terrorist networks. The first proposal, promoted by the
Democratic Senator Carl Levin, the Chairman of the
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Senate Armed Forces Committee, focused on boosting training of the ANSF and thereby accelerating the process of “Afghanization” of the war effort. The second proposal came from COIN
experts who, inspired by the theories of David kilcullen, proposed to combine all practices
(COIN, CT Plus and Afghanization) within a restricted number of “strategic hamlets” without
increasing troop numbers. This, they argued, would protect as many Afghans as possible from
the Taliban’s influence and permit an optimization of the implementation of various development
projects.
After the 2009-2010 winter, the debate over COIN and its implementation changed focus to
center around the “organizational culture” of the uS intelligence community. The Center for
a New American Security (CNAS) 139 called attention to multiple intelligence needs of ISAF
that were not being met. According to Major General Michael T. Flynn, General McChrystal’s
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (CJ2), the decision-makers in Washington and at NATO
did not possess the necessary information to define or put into place their political-military
strategy properly. The objectives of the intelligence agencies were still far too focused on
the insurgent groups themselves and not sufficiently focused on the people. He claimed that
US intelligence agencies had an unclear vision of the political, economical, and cultural
environment and therefore lacked the “situational awareness” required to operate. Diplomats
attached to PRT, he claimed, also had insufficient training and preparation for the Afghan
theater.
Major General Flynn thus called for:
• Local assessments to promote better understanding of the reality on the ground in the
different provinces and districts;
• Building information networks with a “bottom-up approach”;
• Understanding the local mechanisms of power, without trying to make them fit into any
particular ethnographical model;
• Tearing down the barriers between military intelligence and open-source intelligence,
which can be collected by the population, NGOs, civil authorities, or UN agencies.
The “rationalization” of intelligence collection promoted by Major General Flynn was a means
of compensating for the glaring lack of assets in the field. It was also a means to exert pressure
on the government in Kabul to force it improve its own efficiency and transparency in
governance. From a civilian point of view, Major General Flynn’s suggestions also bolstered the
“winning hearts and minds” concept, but forced the question: are we aiming to “militarize anthropology” 140 or to “civilize military action” 141?
Think tank to which David Kilcullen, who promoted the enclaves theory as an alternative to COIN, contributes.
Characterization by David Kilcullen.
141 Characterization by Secretary Robert Gates.
139
140
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Conclusion of part 3:
US opinion remains clearly in favor of avoiding the repetition of the errors committed during
the Vietnam War and the trauma and stigmatization that the nation endured as a result. The
lessons learned from Vietnam, however, have various interpretations. Pacifists, who are by nature
opposed to all military interventions, have concluded that there is no pertinence whatsoever
to the “hearts and minds” concept. During the 1990s, they were joined in opposition to “hearts
and minds”, quite ironically, by conservative militarists who support a hard line against
terrorism. The “military-industrial lobby” seemed to have convinced both the general public
and decision makers in Washington that the possibility of a “clean war” exists (as in Iraq in
1991) and allowed the “zero casualty myth” to perpetuate. Over the past decade, this modern
myth began to fade away. The “new operational culture” praised and promoted by the “COIN
lobby” provided it with the opportunity to revive and to reinvigorate the “population-centric”
approach, using elements from the social sciences.
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IN AFGHANISTAN
In theory, NATO’s new strategy adopts a comprehensive approach that systematically coordinates all security, economic development, political governance and diplomacy issues. It attempts
to control the use of force to prevent as many civilian casualties as possible. It focuses on the
struggle against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and on ‘Afghanization,’ the transfer
of responsibilities to the Afghan government. In practice, winning the trust, confidence and
respect of the population is far from having been achieved. The inertia of the host nation’s
social and political structures, the lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the current international commitment, and above all, the decreasing support of world public opinion are a
reminder remind that the approach is difficult to implement, remains uncertain and can be
reversed by the enemy at any time.
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C hapter I – t he I nertIa faCtOr : S OCIal and p OlItICal a SpeCtS
that M aKe f OreIgn I nterventIOn d IffICult
NATO has lost hope of winning the campaign in Afghanistan by purely military means,
though it still holds out hope that winning the trust and confidence of the population is
achievable. As with any COIN strategy, the aim is to first gain understanding, then win
over the passive or neutral inhabitants by proving that the host government is capable of
meeting their needs and improving their living conditions, and then to set up networks of
human intelligence sources in order to identify and destroy any residual insurgent elements.
Having initiated the “Clear, Hold, Build” sequence in the Helmand Province, and preparing
to launch an offensive in Kandahar province (operation Omid, or hope) General Stanley
McChrystal hoped to have broken the dynamic up to then favorable to the insurgents and
changed the expectations of the civilian population.
The NATO command was convinced that the Taliban were gradually losing their grip on the
population. General McChrystal was not yet talking about a return to confidence, but he had
detected “a new hope mixed with anxiety”142 among Pashtuns in the South. Most
Afghanistan specialists consider that this observation made by the ISAF Commander was
mere wishful thinking. The Afghan people are not just a population in the generic sense
used in COIN terminology, but a people with numerous languages and ethnic groups, a history,
a rich culture, a soul, and roots in a certain territory. This people, exhausted by 30 years of
war, is frustrated in its expectations. After 30 years of intervention, it has many reservations
regarding foreigners, and its confidence in its government has yet to be restored.
1.1 – the Mentality and expectations of the afghan people
Afghanistan is home to a society pregnant with conflict. National unity is weakened by the
widespread belief that the country is, historically, the creation of the Pashtuns for the Pashtuns 143.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly asserted since 2002 that Afghanistan should be
the country of all Afghans, without any distinction between ethnic groups, languages or religions,
but this has yet to take root. Pashtuns, being too numerous for the country’s scarce natural
resources to provide for, resort to corruption just to scrape by 144. The Afghans are undeniably
nationalistic and suffer from a complex of “majority inferiority” vis-à-vis other ethnic groups
like the Persian – or Turkic – speaking minorities. To make matters worse, traditional Pashtun
tribal structures have been collapsing for three decades in the South of the country.
An expression he used during his stay in Paris from April 14 th to 16 th, 2010.
Historically speaking, “Afghan” and “Pashto” are synonyms.
144 Message conveyed by French Ambassador Pierre Lafrance at a study group on Crises in Afghanistan Since the
19 th Century that took place at France’s Ecole militaire on April 29 th, 2009.
142
143
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Pashtuns identify themselves according to an ancestral lineage, a common language called
“Pashto” and also their adherence to a system of values known as pashtunwali. These values,
such as hospitality, vengeance, discretion, magnanimity, modesty, courage and bravery, originate
from Islam as well as traditions and customs (“riwaj”). Anthropological studies concerning
Pashtuns on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, known as the “Durand Line”, assist in
better understanding this ethnic group by taking several different approaches. Particular attention
was focused on the Pakistani Swat valley in the 1970s. Fredrik Barth took a classical approach
based on the relationships between the dominating class or “mashar” and the dominated class
or “kashar”. Charles Lindholm focused on the friction between generosity and jealousy.
Akbar Ahmed focuses on the divide he identified in 1976 between the honor-driven or “nang”
Pashtuns who live communally in the mountains and the more settled urban Pashtuns or
“qalang”. It is a shame that David kilcullen, in a chapter dedicated to Pashtun ethos in his
2009 book The Accidental Guerrilla, refers only to the “nang” versus “qalang” divide, which
might very well be the least pertinent of the three approaches and which is the most questionable
of the three approaches.
Pashtuns, reinforced by co-religionists educated in Pakistani madrassas, make up the majority
of the insurgent fighting units in Afghanistan’s South and Southeast. The “outcasts”, or
“majbur” 145 and the “outsiders”, or “naraz” 146 Pashtun communities have largely been
neglected by the government in Kabul. Being pushed aside not only stoked religious fervor
among them, but forced them seek other ways to gain prestige. Both factors drive them to towards
the Taliban. In order to communicate to the population the nature of their priorities in governance,
the Taliban has thus far chosen to no longer deploy religious police to meddle in the Pashtuns’
private lives, but rather to focus on sponsoring development projects in the areas that are under
government control in the South. At the same time, in order to reinforce at national level their
moral authority, the Taleban published a “behavioral code”, or “layeha”, a summary of which
can be found in Annex 3.
At least in the short term, the preferred solution
in this development-oriented approach lies
in charting an achievable path for economic
development that would improve living standards
and in turn, drive down predation and aggression.
An emergency economy could be implemented
in conjunction with CIMIC actions – albeit to the
chagrin of most French NGOs – aimed at
preventing the poorest segment of the population
from turning towards the insurgency. However, there is a lack of consensus around what the
basic needs of the Afghan people are.
145
146
This word characterizes the “constrained” Pashtuns who were expelled from the living areas after 2001.
This word characterizes the “unsatisfied” Pashtuns who are deprived from a job and social status.
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quantitative data about the Afghan people’s expectations of their government are quite lacking
and interpretation of surveys conducted in Afghanistan is difficult. Opinion polls 147 generally
agree that security and justice are the population’s greatest concerns, followed by education
and access to water and electricity. Afghans have suffered under the rule of both warlords and
corrupt officials after the victory of the mujahidin over the communists (from 1992 to 1996).
They remain outraged by the massive corruption pervading every level of government. The
state’s judicial system, widely corrupt and considered ineffective, has not proved capable of
settling the numerous disputes that have arisen between clans and tribes since the beginning of
the civil war. Given these circumstances, development remains dependent on access to water
and electricity. Population-centric COIN is hence oriented towards meeting the two fundamental needs of security/justice and water/electricity in order to “win hearts and minds”. Delays
in the provision of these services deprive the counterinsurgency of one of its main means of
intervention and as a result costs it legitimacy in propping up the Afghan central government in
fighting corruption and enforcing the rule of law. The result is often a recourse to the traditional
dispute settlement method, via tribal assemblies known as “jirga”.
1.2 – the Mutual Misunderstandings
When Afghanistan began to open its borders to merchants, archaeologists and foreign agents in
the second half of the 19 th century and again in the 20 th century during cooperation with the West,
competing with soon-to-be-Soviet Russia, its inhabitants felt, often rightly, that the presence of
foreigners marked the start of an imperialist enterprise, whether it regarded territorial occupation, appropriation of natural resources or the imposition of an imported ideology. Although
peacefully represented over the years in the person of the German advisor, the American engineer
or the French doctor, foreigners were mostly perceived in the second half of the second half of
the 20 th century as enemies, or “doshman”, and infidels, or “kafir”, who must be pushed back
in the name of the defense of the homeland, or “watan” and religion, “din” 148.
At the present, the “international community” usually refers to the West and “the West” often
refers to the united States. In Afghanistan, the US is systematically accused of disrupting the
world’s progress as a whole 149. There is a strong anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, where Osama Bin Laden’s slogans against the Jews and the “crusaders”
have found a receptive audience among radicalized youth. Anti-Americanism remains one of
the key driving forces of the Afghan insurgency. While the Taliban is not supported by all ethnic
groups, the vast majority of the population remains hostile to NATO forces.
It is impossible to extrapolate precise indications on population perceptions from most of these surveys. Scant
data and security problems make conducting opinion surveys a dangerous enterprise. The individuals surveyed
are reticent about expressing their opinions. It is sometimes necessary to provide a financial incentive. The
methodology is therefore often questionable.
148 Interview by the author of Swiss ethnologists Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont. For a long
time, the only non-Muslim foreigners in Afghanistan were mainly British. Other foreigners have often been
defined in comparison to them, whether positively or negatively.
149 French Ambassador Pierre Lafrance, op. cit.
147
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Among the most hostile of Afghans, the coalition is perceived as an occupying force no different from the Soviets. Hence, even those who dread the return of the Taliban are not necessarily
enthusiastic about the presence of the ISAF. The collateral damage caused by NATO strikes
has further polarized perceptions 150. As in Iraq, the use of disproportionate force that causes
large scale damage, often among the civil population, proves to be counterproductive, and does
not support the aim of separating the guerrilla from the population 151. Finally, the other problem
is of a cultural nature, since the NATO troops have disrupted both local customs and local
economies152.
Afghans maintain an ambivalent attitude to international aid: they want it to be immediately
visible and to change their daily life. In Afghanistan, nothing can cause more damage to “hearts
and minds” than a promise not kept. Over the years, Afghans have developed their own
interpretations about the underlying intent of aid. Even the construction of a clinic or a school
can arouse suspicions. Afghans frequently fantasize that any given NGO is in fact a front for
America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for subversive strategic or religious motives.
At the same time, in areas where the insurgency holds sway, expectations are high among
projects focused on the range of issues from justice to education and from health to access to
water, all of which require long-term investment in human resources. Development projects,
as well as “cash for work” and “cash for food” programs, are usually appreciated for the windfall
effect they bring along by boosting the local economy 153. This does not compensate, however,
for the population’s perception of the coalition as an occupying force, and one that inflicts
casualties and creates insecurity at that.
Westerners in Afghanistan are not always
aware of the lack of understanding and the
rejection sometimes caused by their actions
and their attitudes. Entering an Afghan home
by force is always seen as a slight to the head
of the household, all the more so if the area
given over to women is disturbed. An Afghan
woman is perceived to have had her decency
assaulted, a crime known as “namous” when
she is simply approached or looked at. A man’s
decency is perceived to be challenged when he
is confronted with another man’s nudity or
compelled to be stripped of his clothes. Hence Afghan males’ reluctance to take their clothes
off for body searches or be seen bare-chested while laboring outside, for example. Westerners
The insurgents’ propaganda was reinforced by the indiscriminate bombings and alleged profanations of the
Koran in order to harm the West’s reputation in Afghanistan.
151 Conversely, in Kapisa-Surobi, the population knows and appreciates that the French try to avoid collateral
damage in the course of their military actions. They observe that the damage caused by the forces is reported
by the military police and sometimes the financial compensation is higher than the actual value.
152 Barthélémy Courmont, Darko Ribnikar, op. cit.
153 Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont, op. cit.
150
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perceive humanitarian assistance differently from Afghans. In some instances, Afghans have
burned clothes and blankets they had been given in the course of CIMIC actions because they
believe them to represent a form of humiliation.
ISAF commanders remind troops regularly of the strict standards of behavior necessary, but
progress still needs to be made. For example, ISAF units need to be seen obeying local traffic
rules, instead of driving around traffic in oncoming lanes as is quite common. They need to take
the time to stop, dismount from their armored vehicles, take off their sunglasses and combat gloves
and go to the bazaar and engage in a friendly conversation with Afghans. These clearly defined
principles are listed in General McChrystal’s “COIN guidance” published on August 26 th, 2009:
• We must stop intimidating the population in situations where we think that we are
deterring the insurgents from attacking us. This defensive and mainly provocative
attitude might seem reassuring, but it has no impact on the insurgency and is counterproductive from the population’s point of view;
• New attitudes towards the population must be developed: they need to be sensitive
without showing affection or too much compassion. This is simply about showing
respecting for each other in order to better understand the human environment while
remaining ready to use force as needed;
• We should not hesitate to express our true perceptions of the overall situation, without
applying our own Western criteria. Dialogue based on these principles prevents two
major mistakes: lack of appreciation of the Afghan people in the eyes of the coalition
and the inhabitants’ disdain of the naïve and idealistic Westerners 154.
1.3 – the failing go-betweens
Westerners lack local go-betweens in conducting COIN, which imposes an enormous handicap
in the “Hold” and “Build” phases and postpones “Afghanization”. According to American
officials, Hamid Karzai is quite reluctant to take charge of a COIN operation, the Kabul
government’s political will and involvement are however necessary to “win hearts and minds”.
The Afghan people will only permanently break away from the insurgents if they believe that
the Karzai administration will be the eventual winner. Unfortunately, the poor performance
of the regime in the fields of good governance and curbing corruption is unlikely to convince
the population of that anytime soon. In the Marja district of Helmand, where the Americans
launched an initiative to expel the Taliban 155, the inhabitants insisted on not having the corrupt
Items of the ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance recalled by an officer known as “GROTIUS” in:
Gagner les Cœurs et les Esprits de la Population en Afghanistan... Quelles Actions Civilo-militaires?, Grotius.fr,
2009.
155 The sweep of this district is still ongoing. The Taliban is still planting IEDs and killing those who collaborate
with the Americans.
154
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policemen return to their posts 156. For the previous eight years, the insurgency had been fueled
by a feeling of abandonment by the Kabul regime. Pashtuns widely believe that the central
government is biased towards the former fighters of the Northern Alliance (Tajiks, Uzbeks and
Hazaras). Numerous ancestral conflicts and disputes, known as “doshmani”, are pitting
communities against one other. This fragmentation of Afghan society considerably hampers
the implementation of the “oil spot” principle.
The counterinsurgency has been looking for regional power brokers and alternative sources of
influence as pillars of its strategy to regain the support of the population, even if this might bypass
the kabul government. In October 2001, the Americans had already been relying on the warlords
of both northern and southern Afghanistan as agents to expel the Taliban from Kabul and
Kandahar, without having to engage their own troops on the ground. The fall of the Islamic
Emirate’s government further favored the warlords. The central government could not successfully
fill the political gap in all the provinces and had to secure pacts with each warlord in order to
preserve a veneer of order and stability. The warlords were thus “appointed” by the coalition and
like private contractors, play a highly ambiguous role in COIN. They can be considered effective
partners in the fight against insurgents, but their own violence and corruption increase the
country’s suffering.
The Americans are often inclined to replicate the traditional “divide and rule” method that was
practiced by the British at the Indian border, co-opting Pashtun elders, notables known as
“khan” or “malek” who wield strong influence within their own communities. In the greater
South, the elders have been replaced over the past two decades by a new generation of players.
The Taliban, both “apprentice mullahs” and “religious businessmen” 157, have replaced those
who disappeared during the war, fled to Pakistan or lost credibility in the eyes of the population.
The elders have been replaced in such functions as the representation of Pashtun interests in
Kabul, regulation and the administration of justice and redistribution of funding from the
central government. This situation is unfavorable to the indirect strategy of COIN, which aims
at setting up local social networks based on these warlords and elders. The coalition is thus
forced to look elsewhere to find influential power brokers to deal with 158.
According to a survey carried out by the International Security Council on Security and Development (ICOS),
a human rights NGO working in Helmand, 61% of Afghans interviewed in Marja have developed a “more
negative” opinion of the NATO forces since this offensive began.
157 The Taliban have hoarded “social capital” and rebuilt the Pashtun identity in their own way. The reference to
honor “nang” is still used, but it has become more religious: what is considered as honorable is now more and
more what is assessed as pure “halal” in the eyes of the sharia. Afghan public opinion is very much divided,
but its main criterion is purity; the Taliban thus enjoy great moral superiority. To them, the human being is not
corrupted, but times are, and therefore the context is impure.
158 The projects carried out by targeted CIMIC actions provide many opportunities that can be easily used to
establish contacts with certain individuals in a village, a district or a province.
156
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C hapter II – t he u nderlyIng S taKe :
the
l egItIMIzatIOn
Of
f OrCe
The “pacification” or “imperial policing” campaigns of the colonial era had one clear objective:
to preserve mainland control over colonized peoples. This subjugation is both legally and practically unthinkable in the current Afghan case. The tenants of conventional COIN are, however,
questionable in the post-colonial international order. So, what is the actual aim of COIN strategy
in the 21st century? Experts review the data and ask themselves questions regarding needs to be
met in order to “win hearts” and the effectiveness of the information and counter-propaganda
actions required to “win minds”. What if the underlying stake of the war in Afghanistan were
actually the legitimacy of the force’s presence itself?
Too many political objectives blurred the original message post-September 11th. The need to
cope with the security threat posed by an Afghan insurgency influenced by jihadist salafism has
since been counterbalanced by the effort to put Afghanistan on the path towards democratic
government. Both the existence of the threat and the mission to install democracy in Afghanistan
are called into question more and more frequently. Does either truly require military intervention?
The reorientation endorsed in December 2009 by President Obama 159 called for a rephrasing of
the wording of the commitment. The juxtaposition of two arguments. The contradiction between
the struggle against Al Qaeda being harbored in Afghanistan on the one hand and struggle against
the Taliban’s barbarity and oppression on the other has become more and more problematic, as
the prospect of national reconciliation, including insurgency leaders, is being envisaged.
2.1 – the definition of the desired end State
In the wake of September 11th, the Americans and their allies sought to capture Al Qaeda’s leadership and dismantle the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate in order to punish them for their assistance
to international terrorists. In Afghanistan, the West believed it was carrying out the first international policing operation of the 21st century. Four years later, they found themselves stuck
in a military stalemate 160 and facing an insurgency conflict that appeared to be straight out of
the 19th century, albeit with the added complications that globalization added to the situation.
In the meantime, the security objective of destroying
Al Qaeda’s safe havens, which extended into neighboring Pakistan, had been overshadowed by the mission
of nation building and promotion of democratic
institutions in Afghanistan. This piling up of objectives
or “mission creep” further complicated the strategy
and impeded communication. It exposed differences of
opinion between Americans, focused more on security,
Benoist Bihan: L’Axe du Moindre Mal – Le plan Obama-McChrystal pour l’Afghanistan, Institut de Recherche
Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), Cahier #2, March, 2010.
160 Gilles Dorronsoro: Afghanistan – En Quête d’un Accord Politique, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2010
159
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and Europeans, who insisted more on values. This division was particularly salient when
questions arose about whether Afghanistan’s democratization meant rejecting Islamist
fundamentalism and jihadism, or whether the counterinsurgency and counterterrorist
struggle should have priority over the struggle against narcotics and corruption.
This dilemma is clearly mirrored in the
role given to Afghan police forces. If the
aim is to consolidate democracy, the
coalition trains police in maintaining law
and order and conducting criminal investigations. If the aim is to fight against
insurgents and terrorists, then police are
militarized to take part in “search and
sweep” operations alongside ANA soldiers.
As long as this debate continued, the
conquest of “hearts and minds” could go
in either of two directions: ensuring the population’s security from terrorists and aiding an
at-risk population to usher in a democratic form of government. In the strategic reorientation
of December 1st, 2009, the Americans reconcentrated their efforts on the security requirement
and set aside the promotion of human and women’s rights 161. Within the context of global
security, Obama’s decision to focus mainly on security was not incompatible with the notion of
“just war” (in the hope of building a safer world).
2.2 – the problem of the law and proportionate use of force
in the Current environment
The problem of legitimization and proportionality of the use of force can be viewed in different
ways: “Are we in an environment where we want to restore a universal right for security and
foster development, or are we in a context where we want to impose the Western order, based
on our values we believe to be universal” 162? According to Yves Cadiou 163, “talking about war
within populations raises nowadays a fundamental question: under what law”? Citing the uN
resolution that gave NATO the mandate to intervene in Afghanistan does not hold much sway
in the minds of critics and analysts.
Barack Obama: “As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, and our interests
[…] our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended, because the nation that I’m most interested
in building is our own”. December 1st, 2009.
162 Stéphane Taillat: Un Peu d’Histoire, la Contre-insurrection Française, En Vérité, March 23 rd, 2009.
163 According to Yves Cadiou, who publishes analyses on the site Théâtre des opérations, launching a counterinsurgency campaign means having the population at one’s disposal and therefore denies them the right to selfdetermination.
161
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According to Christian Olsson 164, stabilization and counterinsurgency operations cannot be
presented as a question of home security missions, as was the case in the colonial context.
Both ideas remain anti-liberal in his view. The doctrinal traditions referred to in Afghanistan
prescribe a combination of control, “quadrillage”, coercion, protection, enticement, deterrence
and charm offensives as psychological and civic actions used as remedies to political violence.
This describes a situation of “total war”. The catchphrase of “winning hearts and minds”
becomes a façade for a comprehensive total war strategy (including non-compliance with
standards).
Analyzing the current situation in Afghanistan and the present strategy instituted by McChrystal’s Plan in 2009 tends to contradict this somewhat paradoxical assessment. In Galula’s time,
the desired end state of COIN was the military defeat of the insurgency, the destruction of
their political organization and a sustained marginalization of the insurgency within the population. At the strategic level, the aim was to defeat a rebel enemy without using excessive force,
to consolidate a government and, above all, to impose order. In Afghanistan, where NATO
does not intend to stay forever, the aim is rather to restore order in an instable and chaotic
environment. According to David Kilcullen, insurgency is an ecosystem where numerous
entities endeavor to increase their capability to survive in an attempt to gather support and get
votes.
At the operational level, counterinsurgents must reduce the transformational extent of the
“winning hearts and minds” concept. French-speaking military forces on the ground believe
that the phrase is outdated and they suggest redefining it. The military does not want to impose
a model that suggests external domination. They do not demand to be “liked” either, which is
a blurry concept that hardly corresponds to the rigor of stabilization operations. They only ask
for the respect and trust that go along with such operations 165. To Brigadier General JeanMichel Destribats, instead of “winning hearts and minds”, it would be better to have populations
subscribe to a political objective that is set for them. To achieve such an objective, the force
would need to have reliable intelligence and access to a credible local elite 166. The previous
chapter demonstrated how much this elite is presently lacking in Afghanistan.
Christian Olsson: Guerre Totale et/ou Force Minimale? Histoire et Paradoxes des Cœurs et des Esprits, Cultures
& Conflits, #67, fall 2007. The author refers to Michel Foucauld’s theories on social control. As any strategy
aiming at eliminating war makers to eliminate war itself, a counterinsurgency strategy bears in itself a logic of
escalation to the extremes, which aims to put an end to the insurgency by eliminating the insurgents and their
motivations, by recommending action in the whole social domain, by attempting to control each individual,
which is a breach of the phrase “winning hearts and minds”. Olsson is a professor at Lille II University. He
gave lectures on this subject at IEP Sciences Po, Paris, King’s College London and the French Military Academy
at Saint-Cyr.
165 FD: op.cit.
166 Jean-Michel Destribats: “Ratber than focusing on hearts and minds, I believe it is important to win confidence,
to get across the the positive character of the Force’s action which will only be viewed favorably if it brings
individual and collective benefits which are quick and indisputable. Only this confidence, founded on deep
respect, will allow us to conduct our mission with the necessary freedom of action and to be successful in the
long term.
164
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2.3 – the Question of long term Commitment
The factor of time plays a different role for the insurgents than it does for the counterinsurgents.
The passage of time consolidates the insurgents’ existence and devalues the counterinsurgent
action or inaction. An insurgency, fluid, mobile and elusive, is judged by its promises167, while
counterinsurgents, who often work from within a rigidly bureaucratic apparatus, are judged on
their actual deeds. According to Gérard Chaliand, it is now too late to “win the hearts and
minds”; it would have been better to “feed stomachs,” that is to say to support the Karzai
administration in quickly meeting the Afghan people’s basic needs with respect to the improvement of living conditions 168. At the present moment, the best end state to be hoped for is a decent
“non-victory”.
It is quite tempting for the Force to try to tackle security challenges prior to dealing with the
development issues. However, due to the persistently high threat level, if this rule is applied
then development works will never start. Experience indeed shows that some development
projects yield positive effects on security, such as road construction, (often highlighted by
Kilcullen in Kounar province) or the implementation of agricultural policies to promote substitutes for poppy cultivation. A minimum level of security must be ensured, however, in order
for most work to start.
For Christian Olsson 169, the continuation of the military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, often
encompassed by the term “long wars” in American strategic discourse, raises many dilemmas.
The most obvious is that Western presence can be one of the causes of the intensification of
the conflict 170. The Force tries to compensate for the lack of legitimity in doing so, takes the
place of that very legitimity. In this context, “winning hearts and minds” comes across as a
correction mechanism for the negative effects of an extended presence, but it nevertheless
constitutes one of many root causes of the problem itself.
While the objective is the legitimization
of the use of force, these measures can,
at worst, account for the perception of
the coalition as an occupying force.
In practice, many of the multinational
armed forces in Afghanistan only have
a capacity for temporary or partial
presence. They should therefore
abandon the idea of controlling the
whole country by military means. In
fact, the mandate of the ISAF only
permits the coalition to provide support
and assistance to the ANSF.
In Afghanistan, being a “mujahid”, or a jihad fighter, is such a just cause.
Interview with the author.
169 Christian Olsson: op. cit.
170 This argument is shared by Gilles Dorronsoro.
167
168
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When President Obama announced on December 1st, 2009, that a COIN reassessment was to
be conducted in July 2011, in order to establish a timeline for the gradual withdrawal of troops,
he ordered ISAF and the Afghan government to produce results within a very short time span.
The success indicators of population-centric COIN, such as demonstrably winning over the
opponent, the handover to the ANSF, taking effective control of each district, and overall
confidence levels, are not expected to show significant results before the 2011 deadline.
Christian Olsson’s 2007 reflection that “COIN strategy appears as a substitute for a strategy of
political withdrawal from the conflict” is no longer completely accurate. Both processes
mentioned have since been initiated, and they are effectively competing against each other. All
players have accepted that military victory is impractical and that a political solution has become
a necessity. The London Conference of January 28 th, 2010, determined the twofold need for
reintegration and national reconciliation 171. The 2011 deadline, together with the reinitiation
of inter-Afghan dialogue, has compelled the parties involved ins the conflict to define their
positions. The Pakistani government, for example, cannot imagine being left out of a settlement
involving Afghan Hezbi and the Taliban.
A new debate has started between the civil and military authorities within NATO countries:
should the inter-Afghan dialogue process wait for the COIN to achieve tactical results, in
order to bring the Kabul regime in a reinforced position to the negotiation table, or should it
immediately start negotiating with “reconcilable” insurgents 172 ?
“Reintegration” consists of disarming and reinserting the insurgency’s foot-soldiers into society. “National
reconciliation” entails finding a political agreement with the insurgents’ chain of command.
172 To Lyautey, “any political action must involve finding out and taking advantage of the local elements that can
be used, and neutralizing and destroying those who cannot”, from Rôle Colonial de l’Armée, Armand Colin,
1900.
171
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C hapter III – t he l aCKIng p rInCIple Of a CtIOn : W InnIng the
h eartS and M IndS Of O ne ’ S O Wn p OpulatIOn ?
In Afghanistan, COIN supporters want a repeat of the successful precedent of the Malayan
Emergency fifty years ago. American leaders want to avoid another “Vietnam”. As with
any war, the COIN war in Afghanistan has not only a human cost, but a political and
economic cost as well. European public opinion has more and more trouble accepting
casualties, and to many of them “winning hearts and minds” is an empty catchphrase.
Sensibilities and security perceptions have changed since the two world wars and the
wars of decolonization. On August 18th, 2008, the French armed forces lost 10 men in an
ambush in the Uzbin valley, and this was enough to remind France of the reality of war
and cause an uproar in public opinion 173. Since summer 2009, NATO has lost an average
of between one and two soldiers per day in Afghanistan.
In the West, the justification of the war is losing ground. “Is ‘winning the hearts and
minds of our own populations’ not the missing principle of action of this campaign” 174?
Without the resolute support and resilience of public opinion, how much is the will
displayed by civil and military leaders worth? On their side, the Taliban insurgents and
their Al Qaeda allies have shown that they understand how to take advantage of the
resources offered by globalization, in particular new communication and information
technologies, in order to mobilize the “hearts and minds” of their co-religionists and
supporters and attack from the rear of the psychological battlefield.
3.1 – the Influence of the COIn lobby
Andrew krepinevich’s thesis, The Army and Vietnam, published in 1986, suggests that COIN
campaigns that focus on winning hearts and minds can and will be successful if the “rear front”
of political decision makers and public opinion can display enough will, patience and
confidence in the success of military experts and generals and provided that they receive the
extra resources they always seem to need 175.
As leader of the coalition, US President and recent Nobel Peace Prize winner Barack Obama
has no doubt about the utility of the force on the ground. He is convinced that the true fight
against Al qaeda is taking place in the Afghanistan-pakistan region, not in Iraq.
10 French KIAs is comparable to the daily number of losses during the Algerian War.
This expression is borrowed from Olivier Hubac and Matthieu Anquez: op. cit.
175 For a critical reading of Krepinevich, read Gian P. Gentile: op. cit.
173
174
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COIN supporters are a highly networked and influential international group. They have established close ties in some sectors of the American press and use them in order to disseminate their
theories and influence the decision-making process of the civil and military authorities 176. They
merely put into practice what Frank kitson used to recommend: a policy of influence.
On June 23 rd, 2010, General McChrystal was removed from his command for his disparaging
words against the Executive in Washington, though the population-centric COIN strategy was
never called into question. In fact, President Obama immediately appointed General Petraeus,
the father of the doctrine as we know it today, as his successor. General McChrystal’s highly
publicized indiscreet commentary about the Executive in Washington undermined the principle
of civil control of the armed forces (in compliance with the doctrine of Galula). He was, however,
reminded of his obligations, the Constitution giving preeminence to the civilian authorities.
3.2 – the resilience of public Opinion (the War of relevance and
Media amplification)
While the principal center of gravity of the war is the Afghan
population, the second center is undoubtedly public opinion
among the populations of ISAF contributor countries 177. The
support of European public opinion towards the war in
Afghanistan is clearly shrinking. Americans, still deeply
affected by September 11th, remain in favor of military and
civil intervention in the country. Public sentiment is changing,
however, and some observers suggest that American public
opinion is only three years behind the Europeans.
Starting in 2004 in Afghanistan, the Taliban has been specifically targeting the contingents from
nations such as Canada, the Netherlands and Italy, where public opinion has been most likely
to turn against the war.
The insurgents exert psychological pressure on Western (mainly European) nations by taking
their citizens hostage and targeting them in attacks against NATO convoys. The Taliban’s
determination to continue to attack forces which possess obvious technological superiority,
but whose will can be worn away with the passage of time, is typical of asymmetric conflicts 179.
This became obvious after 2006 when David Petraeus, “the last-chance general in Iraq”, became the object of
much praise. See the comments on this subject by Stéphane Taillat, Christian Olsson et Gian P. Gentile: op. cit.
177 Olivier Hubac, Matthieu Anquez: L’Enjeu Afghan – La Défaite Interdite, André Versaille éditeur, 2009.
178 Olivier Roy, in an interview with the author in 2009, expressed that American public opinion, the patriotic
feelings of which rose after September 11th, 2001, is still ready to accept losses. What they do not accept is the
lack of displayed policy and consideration for the wounded and veterans back from overseas theaters of
operations.
179 “The military asymmetry used by our opponents, which consists in bypassing our power, is also a political
asymmetry that derides our wonderful values in order for the population to feel disgusted by them”, says FD:
op. cit.
176
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The lack of a will to make sacrifices in “Old Europe” 180 adds up to a lack of resilience in public
opinion. In France, this level of resilience is generally reserved for reaction to terrorist attacks
on French soil 181. It is neither the result of a comprehensive defense policy, nor of commitments
overseas and their accompanying risks 182. To tolerate the risk of violence, public opinion would
have to agree with the purpose of the war being waged in Afghanistan. In reality, the exact goals
of the war remain unclear to many, causing public opinion, as expressed via the media, to find
the war somewhat irrelevant 183.
Everybody agrees that the media plays an amplifying role. As Christian Olsson184 writes in the
special edition of the journal Cultures et Conflits dedicated to the conquest of “hearts and minds”
in overseas commitments:
“The opposing guerrilla fighter moves and fights within the population, while, thanks to the
media, the audience of these conflicts has become the world population. This world audience
has come to influence the decisions made by its political leaders who send more troops than
are sometimes needed on the ground. Those who wage war within the population have also
come to use the media in order to weigh on decisions and above all on the wishes of the population they try to lead or co-opt. We are not talking about the world village anymore but rather
of the world theater of operations with the participation of the public”.
According to Gérard Chaliand, the success of the Al Qaeda terrorist movement in the media
domain largely exceeds the results that they have actually achieved on the ground, in terms of
human targets or destroyed infrastructure, since the spectacular bombings in New York and
Washington (2001), Madrid (2004) or London (2005). The jihadists took advantage of the poor
reputations of the national, generally state-controlled TV channels in the Arab and Muslim world
and also of independent satellite networks such as Al Jazeera and other global media outlets.
This gave them access to a global audience, and took away the necessity to indoctrinate and
recruit the masses village by village, as guerrilla fighters and insurgents of past decades had to
do. Information about the global jihad is hence broadcast far and wide to the “hearts and minds”
of friend and foe alike (the specific role of the Internet is laid out in section 3.3 of this chapter).
The death of professional soldiers in Afghanistan is a scandal in the public’s mind, not so much because they
lost their lives in the course of a mission conducted on behalf of the nation, but because their state has allegedly
exposed them to too much danger. British public opinion was appalled when they heard that the troops sent to
“Hell Land” were fighting without enough helicopters or protection gear.
181 The 2008 French White Paper on Defense defines resilience as the “will and capacity of a country, its society
and public authorities to resist the consequences of serious events, then to quickly restore their normal operation,
at least within socially acceptable conditions”. The case of the Uzbin ambush on August 18 th, 2008, demonstrated
how much public opinion could be traumatized by the death of young soldiers in the course of their duty.
182 Olivier Hubac, Matthieu Anquez: op. cit.
183 The question of the war of relevance was already tackled in the course of doctrinal studies. The confrontation
is as much psychological as physical: hatred, courage, stubbornness, but also terror, deception and mind assault
are its driving forces. The art of winning over, misinforming or deceiving them has become more important
than the art of maneuvering troops. Loup Francart: La Guerre du Sens – Pourquoi et Comment Agir dans les
Champs Psychologiques, Economica, 2000.
184 Christian Olsson: op. cit.
180
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David Kilcullen reminds us that Al Qaeda, a highly secretive and elitist organization, owes its
global infamy to media amplification of the declarations of Osama Bin Laden. The terrorist
network often issues divisive statements directly to Western audiences designed to drive a wedge
between public opinion and government action, turning the concept of “hearts and minds” in
on itself. The British COIN handbook (JPD 3-40) mentions the intense focus that Al Qaeda
places on public opinion summed up in a rant by their chief ideologist, Dr Ayman Al zawahiri,
hiding in the Afghan-Pakistani border region:
“Al Qaeda”s short-term objectives require the support of the masses. The coalition forces try to
break us away from the masses. Let us foil the plan of the deceptive media; let us not lose hearts
and minds among the general public that is essentially sympathetic to us, and not to them. I am
telling you, I am telling you: we are in a war, and over half of the battles are being fought in the
media; we are engaged in a race to win the hearts and minds of our own umma”186.
3.3 – the Challenges of globalization (the Internet revolution and
global Insurgency)
In a comparative article entitled “Counterinsurgency Redux”, published in 2006 in the magazine
Survival, David Kilcullen admitted that today’s media-oriented insurgencies have significant
differences from those of the post-WWII period. In the classical doctrine, the insurgents were
the ones who had the initiative against an established order. The objective of these insurgents
was the conquest of power: their organization existed solely for this purpose. Their action was
limited to a geographic area, and they had revolutionary goals. In the current situations in the
Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies, the rebel groups’ actions are in reaction to American intervention, which increased the influx of foreign jihadist fighters in both countries.
These globalized Islamist insurgents compete against each other, they are decentralized and
transnational. They often possess more resources than the populations among which, and in
the name of which, they operate. They do not aim to govern like a “state” as we know it. They
stay relevant through their mass communication and the continuation of the chaotic conditions
that serve their agenda. They do not attempt to take control of existing political bodies. They
prefer to stay in the shadows in lawless areas. Even if there are but a few hundreds of them,
their interloping with local guerrillas makes them all the more formidable an enemy in a COIN
situation.
For counterinsurgents who traditionally focus on restoring security in certain areas, controlling
territories, and separating populations from an identified subversive organization, these new
global Islamist players constitute new challenges 187. The jihadists and their transnational
objectives are connected to their ultimate goal of a united Islamic umma, and are not dependent
With these words, Zawahiri ordered “Al Qaeda in Iraq” members not to videotape the beheadings of hostages
so as not to turn public opinion against them.
186 The umma is the community of Muslim believers.
187 Olivier Roy: La Sainte ignorance – Le Temps de la religion sans culture, Seuil, 2008.
185
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on a given culture or territory, such as the Pashtunwali culture in Afghan territory. In order to
be efficient, borderless Islam insurgents coordinate and interact with supporters and issue calls
to arms all around the world, a practice typical of the global Al qaeda movement.
David kilcullen’s central thesis, which he spells out in The Accidental Guerrilla 188, is that
Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist network spreads and sustains itself by “grafting” into local crises 189.
The “accidental guerrilla” situation arises when Al Qaeda members settle down in a conflict
area or a lawless area, identified as the “infection phase”. It starts spreading when Al Qaeda
uses its sanctuary to disseminate its ideology and carry out attacks around borders in the
“contamination phase”. These attacks trigger the action of the international community’s forces
in order to neutralize the threat posed by the terrorist cell in the “intervention phase”. The
foreign presence is perceived negatively by the local population, who then ally with Al Qaeda
in the “rejection phase”, reinforcing the jihadist movement’s hold on the now “infected” area.
This cyclic schema describes how the insurgency sustains itself in Afghanistan and how foreign
jihadists proliferate in this environment. David Kilcullen believes that in Iraq, where Al Qaeda
was not present before 2003, the transition to the “accidental guerrilla” syndrome was caused,
and not intensified, by the American intervention. The author concludes that the West needs to
better assess the relevance of its “international policing” expeditions, which can be a destabilizing factor for local societies and are likely to send recruits straight into terrorist hands.
According to Kilcullen, this form of commitment can only be justified if it is part of a broader
strategy of global counterinsurgency.
At the dawn of the 21st century, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency look like “network
wars”, two aspects of which are: intelligence networks, activated in order to get familiar with
and track an increasingly opportunistic and decentralized enemy, and social networks, which
are mobilized in order to deprive the mujahid of his popular base and transnational support.
There exists a third type of globalized network: the information network, which was born of
the digital revolution that fiber optics and the Internet have made possible. This potentially
alters the conventional concept of asymmetric warfare. In their respective works, Rupert Smith
and David Kilcullen, as well as David Petraeus, who constantly monitored the media in Iraq,
realized the extent of the challenges posed by these.
The Taliban of 2010 demonstrate an understanding of the usefulness of modern media to convey
their propaganda, to embellish their military feats, to discredit the coalition’s action, to arouse
sympathy for their cause outside Afghanistan and to entice pious financial contributors to
provide funds 190. Their action goes against those of the pre-2001 Taliban, who went so far as
to reject any picture of a living creature within their Islamic Emirate. They have adapted. The
informational environment is not external to the insurgency, as the water was for the fish in
the Maoist phrase “a fish in the water”, it is embedded in it, more like a “jellyfish in the water”.
David Kilcullen: The Accidental Guerrilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, Oxford University
Press, 2009.
189 In the conclusion of the CDEF doctrinal paper dedicated to the French legacy in the American COIN approach
(De Galula à Petraeus, op. cit.), this evolution was defined by the new word “glocalism”, meaning the intermingling of global and local elements.
190 Antonio Giustozzi: Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop – The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, Hurst &
Company, 2007.
188
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Beyond Afghanistan, the global jihad has moved into social networks on the internet and
has set up virtual safe havens 191. Comparisons have already been made between warfare
and software, between guerrillas and computer crime, and between improvised explosive
devices (IED) and logic bombs, all of which are issues that require further understanding by
counterinsurgents 192. Jihad online is a new reality for those who portray and amplify the
Afghan and Pakistani Taliban’s struggle on the web. Since the beginning of 2010, Al Qaeda’s
media propaganda has made extensive use of the videotaped last words of humam al Balawi
(Abu Dujana al Khorassani), the Jordanian double agent and suicide bomber who killed
seven CIA officers and a Jordanian intelligence officer on December 30 th, 2009, at the
American military base in Khost, in Southeast Afghanistan. In an online rant that was posted
posthumously on the internet on April 30th, 2010, al Balawi sought to compel still-undecided
Muslims to join the jihadist cause with the following words:
“We will target you with our media productions, laying for you emboldening ambushes and
laying motivational mines, in the hope that they will explode within you as admonishments and
reminders which will fill your souls with thoughts and inflame your hearts with a desire to join
the caravan of champions”.
There have been several cases of Islamist internet users becoming indoctrinated into terrorism
online, resulting from obsessive consultation of sites which provide technical details on the
making of explosive devices and promote the concepts of martyrdom and holy war. As of today,
nobody has been able to measure the effects on the “hearts and minds” of counter-radicalization campaigns that would be technically feasible on the internet, and represent a new challenge
in the “war of relevance”.
Conclusion of part 4 :
The center of gravity of COIN in Afghanistan was inserted into the space between the
insurgents and the population, which explains why the coalition’s intent in theater is to take
action on the population as a top priority. In the South, where the insurgency is fully merged
into the population and state institutions are rejected or nonexistent, NATO’s “hearts and
minds” concept has found its limits. More important than the calling into question of the force’s
legitimacy; time is the main factor that restricts the concept effectiveness. By systematically
targeting Western public opinion, which has increasing doubts about the purpose of the
commitment in Afghanistan, the global jihadist movement endeavors to extend the field of the
struggle for “hearts and minds” using new communication means and technologies.
191
192
Bertrand Valeyre, Alexandre Guérin: op.cit.
Thomas Rid, a researcher who works for the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) at John Hopkins
University and the RAND Corporation, and who wrote War and Media Operations, the US Military and the
Press from Vietnam to Iraq, 2007, is one of those who started the debate.
97
CONCLUSION
99
Conclusion
The “hearts and minds” concept has a truly mythical quality. Backed up by a single notable
success – the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s – the now institutionalized doctrine proves
difficult to institute in the 21st century despite its clear and acknowledged advantages. The
concept was born from the necessity to legitimize the use of force among populations, when
the destruction of the enemy does not appear as a required and sufficient reason for armed
intervention. The objective is to win over the population in gaining recognition of the host
government’s authority on a given territory. It is instituted at various levels, from the forced
acceptance of submission to the passive acceptance of tolerance. Counterinsurgency forces
intimidate and deter the enemy, but they will rally support to their government if they can
successfully inspire the respect of the population.
In today’s “globalized” wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, the stake is more about mobilizing
the masses and controlling social networks,
than a competition to impose territorial legitimacy. This mobilization and this control can
be achieved, according to today’s COIN
theories, by a proportioned mix of incentive
and coercion. Taking an objective approach,
the population is considered both as the
purpose and the means of the COIN activity.
The widely acknowledged baseline aim is to
protect and serve the population whose
support is sought in the stabilization phase in a given country in crisis. In a more ambitious
approach, the project becomes the control and shaping of the “social terrain”, which prompts
protests and rejection in the West in the name of tradition, law and moral values 193.
While some institutional opponents still consider the conquest of “hearts and minds” as an
idealistic or deceptive approach that obscures the true military mission of security restoration,
non-governmental critics are much fiercer and believe that civil-military actions and psychological actions are substitutes or even alibis for coercive actions, tainted with a whiff of
neocolonialism.
In the field of security restoration and stabilization, the US, French and UK doctrines, which
all make reference to traditional COIN principles, have been converging since the mid 2000s
on the population-centric approach and the promotion of CIMIC coordination. Slight differences
exist, of course, as was learned in Afghanistan: to understand and “win hearts and minds”, the
Americans now deploy teams of anthropologists in khaki, trying to build social capital, having
found the limits of the effectiveness of the use of force, whereas the British and the French,
with more limited assets, have been fostering dialogue with tribes and the decrease of opportunities for conflict.
193
One aspect that is not covered in this study on “hearts and minds”, raised by fierce opponents to COIN is the
blurring between external defense and internal security that would result from the repressive assumptions of
anti-subversion without any restrictions. On that topic, read Mathieu Rigouste: L’Ennemi Intérieur – La Généalogie Coloniale et Militaire de l’Ordre Sécuritaire dans la France Contemporaine, La Découverte, 2009.
101
Conclusion
Since insurgents are embedded in the local population, the sole purpose of “winning hearts
and minds” cannot be an objective on its own. The phrase must be translated into a determined
action against “irreconcilable” opponents, while keeping a door open to win over and “reintegrate”
the less hostile insurgents. It should be implemented by building support for the host government
and its interaction with its own population.
Counterinsurgency came late in the
game. The social fragmentation caused
by the shake up of tribal structures and
political fragmentation resulting from
the disappearance of institutions add up
to economic stagnation and criminality
and reduce the hopes for an “Afghanization” of the situation. Few analysts
think it can be successfully completed by
the required deadline. The Kabul regime
and its coalition partners, who integrate
political interests and public opinion into their strategic calculations in their own way, often
have their own separate agendas. National reconciliation, which is no longer perceived as
a disruptive way to harm the insurgents, but as a responsible solution to the crisis, blurs
the line between belligerents and non-belligerents and calls into question the binary nature of
the entire insurgency conflict.
Counterinsurgency requires a narrative. The submission of “natives” to the “civilized”
Europeans was the desired end state of “pacification” campaigns in colonial times. In the
21st century, America and its allies are deployed in Afghanistan under a UN mandate and a
NATO flag, and endeavor to impose their view of international order in the fight against
terrorism and the promotion of human rights and democracy. Their strategic communication,
which encompasses many issues, refuses to use a narrative that could be perceived as imperialistic and constantly puts forward the partnership with the Afghan nation. With a difficult
security situation, and no purely military solution in sight, the Afghan population finds itself
the center of gravity and the stake in the fight between insurgents and loyalists. The perceptions
of the Afghan population, the cooperation of which is essential to end the conflict, need to be
taken into account along with public opinions at home in ISAF contributor countries, also
reluctant to continue their presence in Afghanistan.
The trend of “winning hearts and minds” has won recognition in NATO’s decision-making
circles, just as the “Revolution in Military Affairs” concept found favor in the 1990s. COIN as
a strategy will be quickly brushed aside, however, if the operations in Afghanistan do not quickly
demonstrate the effectiveness of population-centric counterinsurgency. The validity of the strategic concept of “hearts and minds” is thus at stake “within the population”, in the field as well
as in the battle for public opinion. As such, NATO’s political and military credibility is also at
stake, and the Afghan theater serves as a test for the alliance’s expeditionary capability. Public
opinion, in this context, puts to the test the capability and will of each nation to shoulder its
responsibility in the struggle against terrorism.
102
ANNEXES, SOURCES
AND bIbLIOGRAPHY
103
Annexes
anneX 1
the 2006 defInItIOn Of “WInnIng heartS and MIndS”
In the englISh-SpeaKIng WOrld
“Winning hearts” means that you have to “persuade the people that the counterinsurgents’
success is in its own best interest, while ‘winning minds’ means that you have to persuade the
people that the loyalist forces are able to protect them and that there is no point in resistance”.
I – In davId KIlCullen’S 28 ARTICLES
ARTICLE 13: Build Trusted Networks
• Once you have settled into your sector, your key task is to build trusted networks. This
is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds”, which comprises two separate
components. “Winning hearts” means persuading people that their best interests
are served by your success; “Winning minds” means convincing them that you
can protect them and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to
do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.
Over time, if you successfully build networks of trust, these will grow like roots in the
population, displacing the enemy’s networks, bringing him out in the open to fight you,
and seizing the initiative.
• These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces, NGOs
and other friendly or neutral non-state actors in your area, and the media.
• Conduct village and neighborhood surveys to identify needs in the community – then
follow through to meet them, build common interests and mobilize popular support.
This is your true main effort: everything else is secondary. Actions that help build trusted
networks serve your cause. Actions – even killing high-profile targets – that undermine
trust or disrupt your networks help the enemy.
II – In ANNEX A (A GUIDE FOR ACTION) Of the uS
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL FM 3-24
Build Trusted Networks
A-26. Once the unit settles into the Area of Operations (AO), its next task is to build trusted
networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds”, which comprises
two separate components. “Winning hearts” means persuading people that their best
interests are served by COIN success. “Winning minds” means convincing them
105
Annexes
that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless. Note that neither
concerns whether people like Soldiers and Marines. Calculated self-interest, nor emotion,
is what counts. Over time, successful trusted networks grow like roots in the populace.
They displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces
seize the initiative and destroy the insurgents.
A-27. Trusted networks are diverse. They include local allies, community leaders, and local
security forces. Networks should also include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
other friendly or neutral nonstate actors in the AO, and the media.
A-28. Building trusted networks begins with conducting village and neighborhood surveys to
identify community needs. Then follow through to meet them, build common interests, and
mobilize popular support. This is the true main effort; everything else is secondary. Actions
that help build trusted networks support the COIN effort. Actions that undermine trust
or disrupt these networks – even those that provide a short-term military advantage –
help the enemy.
106
Annexes
anneX 2
an alternatIve tO “WInnIng heartS and MIndS”
In frenCh StabIlIzatIOn dOCtrIne
Two population-centric principles taken from chapter 3 (Basic principles of the military
action in the stabilization phase) of the French concept of contribution of the armed forces
to stabilization (PIA 00-151), a document of the Centre interarmées de concepts et doctrines
et experimentations (CICDE) 194 – February 2 nd, 2010.
3.2.4 – act and Close Contact with the population
Since the native population is the major stake in the success of stabilization, the armed forces
conducting an intervention must:
• Establish and preserve close relationships with the local authorities and others identified as key leaders;
• prioritize direct contact with the population in the selection of postures and courses
of action, particularly in the initial phase of the stabilization period, and always show
enough troop presence to the population to ensure that a significant presence is felt;
• protect the population and ensure public security if no other organization is in a
position to do so during the “state of grace” period of stabilization;
• Endeavor to win over the factions of the population that are not fully committed to the
insurgency, but display an firm resolve to the other “hard core” insurgent factions;
• Meet the population’s basic needs, meaning providing emergency humanitarian
assistance if no other organization on the ground is capable;
• Endeavor to respect local culture and customs, and avoid courses of action or
behaviors that may hurt the pride of the local population;
• Reduce the risk of collateral damage by controlling the effects of weapons, in parti cular by using high-accuracy weapons and low-lethality weapons in crowd control
actions.
194
France’s Joint Center for Concepts, Doctrine and Experimentation.
107
Annexes
3.2.5 – Influence perceptions
Since public opinion is critically important in these kinds of commitments, the forces must
develop their capacities to influence perceptions:
• By implementing an information strategy aimed at winning the “information battle”
in the local and international media, as well as on the Internet;
• Through information operations in theater, fighting against disinformation and rumors,
and displaying to local authorities and population the force’s resolve, putting emphasis
on the positive results obtained since the force’s intervention;
• By carrying out CIMIC actions that are in line with the force’s overall strategy and
executed by a decentralized administration;
• By taking into consideration local cultural and social aspects in the force’s actions and
communications.
108
Annexes
anneX 3
“heartS and MIndS”
aCCOrdIng tO the talIban InSurgentS
Excerpts from the last page of the Layeha, the Taliban’s code of conduct, updated and
republished regularly since 2006:
Statement by the “Commander of the Faithful”, Mullah Mohammad Omar.
“My dear mujahid brothers!
All that you are undertaking must be carried out in compliance with the sharia;
Be a rock before the enemy, do not retreat or give ground;
Maintain good relationships with your civilian friends and never let the enemy come
between you and them;
Be careful when engaged in an operation and do not let you personal problems bring about
difficulties;
Protect the people and its belongings, this shall be your mission;
Do not let capricious people take possession of the civilians’ belongings or cause damage
to them”.
109
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Photo credits
photo Credits
Madagascar war, 1896.
http://upload.wikimedia.org
http://www.madagascar-ision.com
Mao Zedong.
http://t3.gstatic.com
Joseph Gallieni.
http://1.bp.blogspot.com
http://www.psywar.org
Louis Hubert Lyautey.
http://www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr
http://www.psywar.org
[email protected]
Sir Gerald Templer.
http://www.generals.dk
[email protected]
http://wikipedia.org
Colonel Roger Trinquier.
http://idata.over-blog.com
Village perimeter entrance secured by
the Home Guard.
Imperial War Museum
[email protected]
Sir Frank Kitson.
http://kenyatembo.giving.officelive.com
Lieutenant colonel David Galula.
http://t0.gstatic.com
Sir Rupert Smith.
http://www.nato.int
[email protected]
Helmand Province.
http://fonzibrain.files.wordpress.com
[email protected]
118
Photo credits
Colonel Gian P. Gentile.
http://warhistorian.org
[email protected]
President Barack Obama and General
Stanley McChrystal.
http://quierosaber.files.wordpress.com
[email protected]
http://militaryengineers.files.wordpress.com
[email protected]
CORDS program.
http://johnfenzel.typepad.com
Afghanistan.
[email protected]
Bernard Fall.
http://blog.villines.com
Afghanistan.
[email protected]
General Creighton Abrams.
http://images.google.com
Afghanistan.
http://farm2.static.flickr.com
Lyndon Baines Johnson.
http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca
[email protected]
Hearts and minds.
http://www.loftcinema.com
[email protected]
General David Howell Petraeus.
http://electricityandlust.files.wordpress.com
[email protected]
Lieutenant colonel David Kilcullen.
http://www.army.mil
[email protected]
American manual FM 3-24.
http://ecx.images-amazon.com
119
Translation:
CNE (R) Alain BOY;
M. William SETTERS, étudiant stagiaire à la section traduction du CDEF
Revision (English version):
Capt (usnc) Timothy GALLAGHER; LCL (R) Donatien LEBASTARD;
M. James GALLOWAY; CDT Aleksandar STEFANOVIC
Graphic Designer:
Mme Sonia RIVIÈRE Sonia, CDEF/DAD/Section Publications
Printing:
BIALEC – 95, boulevard d’Austrasie – BP 10423 – 54001 Nancy Cedex
Distribution:
EDIACAT – 76, rue de la Talaudière – BP 508 – 42007 Saint-Étienne Cedex 1
CDEF
Centre de Doctrine
d’Emploi des Forces
Par les forces, pour les forces
Cahier de la Recherche
November 2011