UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
Race, Identity, and Culture
by
Ricky Kai Yiu Hon
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY
CALGARY, ALBERTA
SEPTEMBER, 2016
© Ricky Kai Yiu Hon 2016
ii
Abstract
This thesis addresses the racial ontology debate in the philosophy of race. The positions in this
debate can be summarized along realist and antirealist dimensions as shown below:
Realist: racial naturalism, racial constructionism
Antirealist: racial skepticism
I argue for racial constructionism. In particular, I argue for a Du Boisian-inspired cultural theory
of race, whereby races are cultural groups.
There is also a normative dimension to the racial ontology debate. There are three positions in
this normative debate: conservationism, reconstructionism, and eliminativism. Conservationism
holds that our race talk should be conserved, reconstructionism holds that it should be
reconstructed to treat race as something other than what it actually is, and eliminativism holds
that it should be eliminated, either entirely or in certain respects. I argue for the cultural
excellence thesis, a conservationist thesis which holds that we should conserve race talk based on
the cultural value of races.
iii
Acknowledgements
I thank my thesis supervisor, Ann Levey. Ann challenged me to refine my arguments and to
develop them more fully in the service of advancing those goals which I have set for myself in
this thesis. This thesis would be worse off without Ann’s support.
iv
Table of Contents
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………..ii
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………........iii
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………...iv
Chapter One: Introduction……………………………………………………………………….1
Chapter Two: Racial Naturalism………………………………………………………………....6
2.1 Classical racialism……………………………………………………………………6
2.2 Racial naturalism…………………………………………………………………....10
Chapter Three: Racial Skepticism………………………………………………………………14
3.1 Joshua Glasgow……………………………………………………………………..14
3.2 Lawrence Blum……………………………………………………………………...19
3.3 Anthony Appiah……………………………………………………………………..24
Chapter Four: Racial Constructionism…………………………………………………………. 30
4.1. Background…………………………………………………………………………30
4.2 W.E.B. Du Bois……………………………………………………………………...34
4.3 My cultural theory of race…………………………………………………………...40
4.4 The meaning of ‘race’……………………………………………………………….48
v
4.5 One last challenge from Appiah……………………………………………………..52
Chapter Five: The Cultural Excellence Thesis…………………………………………………..58
5.1. Background…………………………………………………………………………58
5.2. The cultural excellence thesis……………………………………………………….60
5.3. Racial cultural excellence…………………………………………………………...64
5.4 Appiah’s eliminativism……………………………………………………………....66
5.5 Race in the post-racist future………………………………………………………...78
5.6 Future research……………………………………………………………………….83
Chapter Six: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………85
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..88
1
Chapter One
Introduction
The reality of race is often taken for granted as an enduring fact. Lucius Outlaw nicely
captures this idea when he notes that “[f]or most of us that there are different races of people is
one of the most obvious features of our social worlds.”1 Outlaw’s observation seems accurate
when we look at the social salience of race. To draw attention to just a few examples: we see the
social salience of race in the large number of countries in which there has been a long and
destructive history of racial tension and injustice. We see the social salience of race in the lives
of everyday people as they grapple with issues of racial identity. And we see the social salience
of race at the level of institutional structures and public policy, where there has been no shortage
of contentious issues. For instance, in recent years, affirmative action has been one of the most
contentious issues in this area because it is influenced by discourses concerning the nature of
colorblindness and fairness, among others.
At first glance, it is not clear why anyone would question the reality of race given its
social salience. And yet the reality of race has been called into question by scientific advances
which demonstrate that there is no biological basis for race.2 In light of such scientific evidence,
there remains a certain tension as many of us continue, at the very least, to talk as if race were
real. While some continue to insist that race is biologically real, others claim that it is a social
construct. Some claim that race is not real because it is socially constructed, while others insist
that what is socially constructed is just as real as the biological.
1
Lucius Outlaw, “Toward a Critical Theory of Race,” in Anatomy of Racism ed. David Theo Goldberg
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 58.
2
For instance, see Paul Hoffman, “The Science of Race,” Discover, November 1994.
2
These concerns have prompted an evaluation of the reality of race in the philosophy of
race where a debate over racial ontology has emerged. This thesis will focus its attention on this
racial ontology debate. That is, it will examine whether race is real or not.
The positions in the racial ontology debate can be summarized along realist and
antirealist dimensions as shown below:
Realist: racial naturalism, racial constructionism
Antirealist: racial skepticism
Racial naturalism holds that race is real as some kind of biological phenomenon. That is,
race is real and its reality lies in certain biological facts. Racial constructionism denies that there
is any biological reality to race and holds instead that race is real as some kind of social
phenomenon. That is, race is real and its reality lies in certain social facts. Racial skepticism
holds that race is not real.3
When we ask whether race is real or not, the question is about whether races exist or not.
That is, we are not interested in whether individuals of a particular race exist, but, rather, whether
races as distinct and discrete groups exist or not. This is a subtle point, but it is an important one,
for it is difficult to see how there are individuals belonging to a particular race if there are no
races to begin with.
The three ontological positions listed above are related to three normative positions one
can take with respect to race. In the normative realm, the focus is on our race talk. Regardless of
whether one is a realist or antirealist about race, one can support one of the following three
3
My naming of these positions comes from Ron Mallon. See his Ron Mallon, “Passing, Traveling and Reality:
Social Constructionism and the Metaphysics of Race,” Nous 38, no.4 (2004): 644-673.
3
normative positions with respect to our race talk: conservationism, reconstructionism, or
eliminativism. Conservationism holds that our race talk should be conserved, reconstructionism
holds that it should be reconstructed to treat race as something other than what it actually is, and
eliminativism holds that it should be eliminated, either entirely or in certain respects.
In addition to racial ontology, this thesis will also focus attention on the normative
dimensions of race as they pertain to our race talk. There is an intimate connection between the
ontological and normative dimensions of race. Insights about the one often inform the other, and
vice versa. And while racial ontology is interesting and worthwhile as a subject of philosophical
analysis in its own right, any analysis of racial ontology is incomplete and impoverished without
a statement as to what we ought to do with respect to our insights concerning the reality of race.
In this thesis, I will argue for racial constructionism. An examination of racial ontology
will serve as a large part of this thesis, but I will also devote a part of this thesis to arguing for
conservationism, the normative position that we ought to conserve our race talk.
Interestingly, there has been an overlooked tension in the racial ontology debate. The
tension lies in the relationship between racial skeptics on the one hand, and racial
constructionists on the other. Both racial skeptics and racial constructionists hold that there is no
principled basis for holding that race is real as some kind of biological phenomenon. Put another
way, both racial skeptics and racial constructionists deny that there is any biological reality to
race. However, while racial skeptics hold that race is simply not real, racial constructionists hold
that although there is no biological basis for the reality of race, race is real as some kind of social
phenomenon. That is, there is a social basis for the reality of race. Going further, for social
constructionists, social facts, not biological facts, are the relevant race-making facts.
4
This tension between racial skeptics and racial constructionists serves as a source of
motivation for the writing of this thesis. More generally, though, the issue of racial ontology is
central for a robust understanding of other issues related to race. To take just one example,
insights into the reality of race have tremendous implications for public policies aimed at
reducing racial injustice. Insights into the reality of race can help clarify whether such policies
are morally tenable, among other things. The importance of the racial ontology debate, then,
should not be in doubt. Not only is it an important subject in its own right, but it is also important
for understanding other issues related to race.
Here, then, is the plan for this thesis. In chapter two, I set the stage for this thesis by
examining classical racialism as the first robust theory of race. I then go on to examine racial
naturalism. In light of the work done in chapter two, I go on to present and critically assess the
case for racial skepticism in chapter three. In light of the analysis of racial naturalism given in
chapter two (spoiler: I show that racial naturalism is unsuccessful), racial skeptics conclude that
race simply is not real. This racial skeptic conclusion will be analyzed in chapter three. In
particular, I will analyze the background assumptions underlying racial skepticism. In doing so, I
will articulate why and how, exactly, racial skepticism poses a challenge to racial
constructionism. Ultimately, I reject racial skepticism.
In chapter four, I present my case for racial constructionism. My racial constructionist
position is inspired by W.E.B. Du Bois’s essay “The Conservation of Races”. In this classic
work, Du Bois argues for a cultural theory of race. As such, I argue for and defend a Du Boisianinspired cultural theory of race. On my view, races are cultural groups of a certain kind and
cultural groups of this kind are real. Therefore, races are real.
5
This analysis of racial skepticism and racial constructionism only touches on the
ontological side of the racial ontology debate. As noted before, there is also an important
normative dimension to the racial ontology debate. The normative dimension will be addressed
in chapter five where I present and argue for my Cultural Excellence Thesis, a conservationist
thesis which argues that we should conserve race talk based on the cultural value of races. I will
also discuss whether race should be conserved even in the post-racist future.
6
Chapter Two
Racial Naturalism
In this chapter, I will establish a foundation for the chapters to come by examining
classical racialism as the first robust theory of race. I then go on to examine racial naturalism. I
close the chapter by providing some initial thoughts on racial skepticism and racial
constructionism.
2.1 Classical racialism
Anthony Appiah defines classical racialism as such:
[Classical racialism is the view] that we [can] divide human beings into a small number
of groups, called “races,” in such a way that the members of these groups [share] certain
fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural characteristics with one
another that they [do] not share with members of any other race. […] These
[c]haracteristics [..] that each normal woman (and man) of a race [is] supposed to share
with every other woman (and man) together [determine] what we can the essence of that
race; [these are] characteristics that [are] necessary and sufficient, taken together, for
someone to be a normal member of the race.4
As Appiah’s definition makes clear, racial group membership is determined by the possession of
certain characteristics, all or most of which speak to the capacities and abilities of different races.
These characteristics, taken together, form the essence of a race. The notion of racial essences is
thus a crucial aspect of classical racialism.
4
K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color Conscious (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 54-55.
7
However, it is important to note that Appiah’s definition does not make reference to any
notion of a hierarchy among the races. Lawrence Blum notes that classical racialism “[involves]
both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. Horizontally, races [are] radically distinct from one
another, and social distance and separation [are] meant to reflect this. Vertically, races [are]
superior and inferior to one another, and the hierarchical social order [is] to reflect this as well.”5
The notion of racial hierarchy is an indispensable aspect of classical racialism. As a theory of
race, classical racialism developed from a legacy of differential treatment between races in
various parts of the world. This legacy is seen most clearly perhaps when we look at the heritage
of black slavery in Europe and the United States, dating back (as far as the latter is concerned) as
far back as the sixteenth century. Indeed, classical racialism developed in tandem with largescale imperialist and colonial projects in the west, of which slavery was just one (albeit a
particularly heinous) aspect. Classical racialism became a way for those who would come to be
raced as white to rationalize and justify their differential treatment of other races based on
notions of racial difference generally and on notions of racial superiority and inferiority in
particular. As a result of this legacy, classical racialism achieved prominence in nineteenth
century Europe and the United States.6
And yet, we know today, based on abundant scientific and other evidence, classical
racialism, as a theory of race, is false. That is, there are no racial-membership-determining
characteristics of the kind Appiah references in his definition of classical racialism. Indeed,
science tells us today that given a random selection of any two individuals on Earth, there will
be, on average, only 0.2% genetic difference. Of this 0.2% of genetic difference, 85% is
5
Lawrence Blum, I’m Not a Racist But…: The Moral Quandary of Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002),
128.
6
Ibid., 109-130.
8
accounted for by differences between neighbors, 9% by differences between ethnic or linguistic
groups, and only 6% by differences between geographically distant groups, who we usually think
of as races. Thus, if there are races, racial difference accounts for only about 0.012% of the
genetic differences we see among humans. And, as Amy Gutmann notes, the “genetic differences
that can be accounted for have little or no scientific, let alone moral, importance.”7 Thus, there
are no racial essences to demarcate and differentiate different groups we might think of as races.
Perhaps most importantly, we know that, to the extent that there are races at all, races are not
ordered in the hierarchical fashion classical racialism supposes. What, then, is the significance of
classical racialism today, as it relates to general thinking about race and as it relates to the racial
ontology debate in particular?
To be sure, there is a great deal of moral difficulty associated with classical racialism.
Classical racialism brings with it, we might say, a great deal of moral baggage. And yet, it is a
robust theory of race. Going further, it is, arguably, the first robust theory of race. For this reason
alone, it is worthy of our consideration, for it serves as an important backdrop against which we
can compare and assess other theories of race.
Indeed, classical racialism can be seen as a forerunner to contemporary racial naturalist
views. Given its emphasis on racial essences determining racial group membership, classical
racialism can plausibly be interpreted as positing that races are natural kinds. Although it was
advanced before post-Mendelian genetics and Charles Darwin’s natural selection theory, given
these developments in biology, the only way to make sense of classical racialism is through a
specifically biological lens. That is, the only way to make sense of classical racialism is to think
of the racial essences it posits as being racial genetic essences. On this view, possession of
7
Gutmann, Color, 115. Gutmann draws from Paul Hoffman (see foonote 2).
9
different racial genetic essences determines racial group membership, as well as accounts for the
diversity we see between racial groups.
Again, science tells us today that classical racialism is false. Nonetheless, when we strip
it of its negative connotations, we can begin to see how, exactly, it is a forerunner to racial
naturalist views. Racial naturalist views do not view races as being natural kinds for the racial
genetic essences that would have to exist in order for such a view to be plausible simply do not
exist. Instead, racial naturalism holds that races are real as breeding populations. Here, the idea is
that various breeding populations have, through time, achieved significant geographical isolation
from each other, resulting in genetic differences as expressed through differences in phenotypic
features. These differences are maintained through high levels of inbreeding within breeding
populations and correspondingly very low levels of interbreeding between breeding populations.
This kind of view, unlike its classical racialist predecessor, has a plausible claim to being
supported by some of the available science. As such, it is worthy of our consideration.
Two racial naturalist views in particular have attracted attention in the racial ontology
debate. Philip Kitcher develops his racial naturalist view by analyzing the notion of breeding
populations generally and he goes on to argue that races are, in fact, real because they are
breeding populations that can be studied as such through a biological lens.8 However, Kitcher’s
view has one glaring problem: Kitcher’s view is characterized by a strong pragmatist
commitment to ontology and truth. This is a problem because, in the racial ontology debate,
although it is never stated explicitly, there is a very strong presumption among the participants in
this debate that there is a more or less determinate answer to the questions: (1) what is race? and
(2) does race exist? And it is, of course, our job to answer these questions by doing philosophy.
8
Philip Kitcher, “Does ‘Race’ Have a Future?,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 35, no.4 (2007): 293-317.
10
Furthermore, Kitcher’s particular brand of pragmatism blends the distinction between the
ontological and normative dimensions of race insofar as he takes races to be breeding
populations only to the extent that it is moral to think of races in this way. That is, if thinking of
races as breeding populations were to have a negative impact on certain individuals, we should
not pursue this kind of racial naturalist project. As such, Kitcher’s pragmatist orientation is, at
best, not conducive to the kind of project we should be interested in pursuing as participants in
the racial ontology debate. At worst, it is simply not compatible with such a project.
Robin Andreasen’s racial naturalist view, on the other hand, argues that races are real
because races are cladistic races, and cladistic races are real.9 Andreasen’s view has two main
advantages over Kitcher’s view. First, it is not infected with the kind of pragmatist orientation I
argued is anathema to the kind of project we should be interested in. Second, it paints a much
clearer picture of how races, understood as breeding populations, could plausibly be real. For
these reasons, I forego any further discussion of Kitcher’s view. Instead, in what follows, I will
focus my attention on Andreason’s view. I turn to examine her view in the next section in this
chapter.
2.2 Racial naturalism
Andreasen’s view is based on what she calls the “cladistic race concept” (CRC).
Andreasen argues that races are real by virtue of being cladistic races. Cladistics is a branch of
biology that deals with the genealogy of living organisms. Here, the idea is that biologists taking
a cladistic approach to taxonomic classification will map out relations between various species
based on genealogy. Drawing on work in human evolution, anthropology, and paleontology,
9
See especially Robin Andreasen, “The Meaning of ‘Race’: Folk Conceptions and the New Biology of Race,” The
Journal of Philosophy 102, no. 2 (2005): 94-106.
11
Andreasen reasons that races are subspecies of homo sapiens. In particular, work on human
evolution shows that from our genesis as humans from Africa, humans have migrated to different
parts of our planet such that distinct breeding populations have branched out or “evolved” from
the original breeding population in Africa. Thus, depending on the model of human evolution we
are looking at, we have breeding populations ranging from Africans to Southeast Asians to
Europeans, among others.
Andreasen’s argument, although initially plausible, is not without its problems. The most
devastating critique against her view is the mismatch objection. Here, the idea is that there is a
mismatch between the breeding populations that result from various models of human evolution
and the actual groups we take to be races at the level of everyday discourse. Thus, to use L. L.
Cavilli-Sforza’s model as example, while we have the recognizable breeding population of
Africans, the group we recognize as the racial group Whites is actually divided into Europeans
and Non-European Caucasoids, and the group we recognize as the racial group Asians is divided
into Pacific Islanders, Southeast Asians, Northeast Asians, and Arctic Northeast Asians. And, to
the extent that we recognize Latinos as a racial group, they are missing altogether from this
model. If we are prepared, then, to accept that Pacific Islanders and Arctic Northeast Asians, for
instance, are distinct and discrete races, then the mismatch objection is not particularly
devastating. But I think the reasonable conclusion to draw from what we see here is that there is
very much a mismatch between the groups we take to be paradigmatic races and the breeding
populations that happen to be substantiated on various models of human evolution. Indeed, the
12
mismatch is so great that the mismatch objection, alone, is enough to sink any racial naturalist
view that relies on any notion of breeding populations.10
Perhaps this is too quick, though. Andreasen does have a response to the mismatch
objection. Indeed, what makes Andreasen’s argument particularly interesting is that she
distinguishes between two different conceptions of race, namely, the commonsense (CS)
conception of race and her CRC conception of race. Andreasen argues that the notion of race at
play in the CS conception can be fairly robust as it is sometimes extended to fit with certain
classical racialist considerations. Race in the CS conception, then, may prove not to be real.11
But that doesn’t mean that race can’t be real according to the CRC conception. Here, the idea is
that biologists are not relying on the CS conception of race when they seek to find out whether
race is real or not. Biologists are working with a biological notion of race. And here, according to
Andreasen, races are real because races are cladistic races, and cladistic races are real. Andreasen
argues that when we distinguish between these two conceptions of race, we also see that these
two conceptions are compatible. Indeed, Andreasen notes that racial constructionism – which
operates, she claims, following the CS conception – and racial naturalism are compatible
positions in the racial ontology debate. That is, they can both be correct without any logical or
conceptual conflict.
In assessing Andreasen’s argument here, it is important to go back to this idea that we, as
participants in the racial ontology debate, need to be concerned with answering the questions (1)
what is race? and (2) does race exist?. If the CRC conception of race is what we really mean
10
The mismatch phenomenon has been observed by many in the racial ontology debate literature. For instance, see
Joshua Glasgow, A Theory of Race (New York: Routledge, 2009), 91-107.
11
Andreasen’s understanding of the CS conception of race draws from Joshua Glasgow, “On the New Biology of
Race,” The Journal of Philosophy 100, no.9 (2003): 456-474. This CS conception’s central focus is on the
morphology of race and so takes races to be groups differentiated on the basis of morphological characteristics.
13
when we talk about race, then Andreasen’s argument is still in the running. But if it is not (if, for
instance, the CS conception of race is what we really mean when we talk about race), then
Andreasen’s argument fails, for the CS and CRC conceptions of race cannot be both correct.
And, for me, some CS conception of race – though not Andreasen’s particular CS conception – is
the conception which best captures what we mean when we talk about race. Thus, Andreasen’s
argument is not successful. Going forward, then, I will set aside any further discussion of racial
naturalism. In the chapters to come, in advancing my racial constructionist position, I will focus
solely on racial skepticism as the opponent to my view.
14
Chapter Three
Racial Skepticism
As we saw in the last chapter, racial naturalism fails in its attempt to ground the reality of
race on certain biological facts. Racial skeptics argue that this failure substantiates the conclusion
that race is not real. This chapter focuses on their arguments. In particular, I look at Joshua
Glasgow, Lawrence Blum, and Anthony Appiah’s racial skeptic views.
3.1 Joshua Glasgow
Joshua Glasgow agrees with the failure of racial naturalism as demonstrated in the last
chapter. As such, he sees racial constructionism as the only remaining obstacle to establishing
racial skepticism. Joshua Glasgow employs a series of different thought experiments to discredit
racial constructionism. Ultimately, these thought experiments are used in the service of
establishing the racial skeptic conclusion that race is not real. For us, looking at what Glasgow
does here is a helpful way to start looking at racial skepticism as it will help get our intuitions
going concerning various ideas. Let us look, then, at Glasgow’s thought experiments:
Utopia. Our society (or even the whole world), with all its racist baggage, finally comes
around. It is no longer true that being white is a point of access for getting much better
car loans, that being Latino means having a much greater than normal chance of dying in
a workplace accident, or that being an indigenous American means being more likely
than most other Americans to live one’s entire life in extreme poverty. In short, there is
no longer any difference between various races with respect to any of the social statistics
probabilistic [racial constructionists] might use to individuate the races. Society is
perfectly racially egalitarian.
15
Disaster. Everyone above the age of ten months is being killed by a virus that itself will
expire as soon as it kills the last person who is more than ten months old. In a furious
effort as they await their doom, the remaining scientists devote themselves to finding a
device that can keep the infants alive until they are old enough to survive on their own.
Temporary Amnesia. We are all simultaneously struck by an agent that causes us to
forget our systems of racial classification. Any time we start to racially classify ourselves,
our cognitive apparatuses short-circuit. One hour later, cognition reverts to its preamnesiac state, and racial classification resumes.12
Again, these thought experiments are used to discredit racial constructionism. Utopia is meant to
discredit probabilistic racial constructionism. Probabilistic racial constructionism “requires that
each race have its own statistical profile, detailing the distinctive rates with which various
socially malleable facts [such as facts having to do with differences in housing, education,
wealth, access to health care, and so on] are true of its members.”13 As such, the idea with Utopia
is that, in a perfectly racially egalitarian society (that is, a society in which there are no
differences between races as it relates to various social statistics) races will be longer exist
because the existence of races, on probabilistic racial constructionism, is simply a function of
differences grounded on various social statistics. That is, once there is a state of egalitarian
harmony between the races, races will cease to exist as the social statistics that undergird the
existence of races will be a thing of the past.
In contrast, Disaster and Temporary Amnesia are meant to target a different kind of racial
constructionism, namely categorical racial constructionism which is premised on the idea that
12
13
Glasgow, Theory, 120-21.
Ibid., 119.
16
race is real because of our racial classification practices. On such a view, races will cease to exist
in the worlds described by Disaster and Temporary Amnesia, as racial classification will cease to
exist in those worlds. Temporary Amnesia goes a step further than Disaster, though. Temporary
Amnesia is also meant to highlight the apparently counterintuitive idea that somehow we can go
from being raced to non-raced, and back to being raced again once racial classification resumes
in the world. And, indeed, on categorical racial constructionism, Glasgow is correct to point out
this is very much a possibility to the extent that racial classification as a social activity can cease
and resume at any time. As such, so the argument goes, any view premised on such a notion of
switching between being raced and non-raced does not capture what we mean when we speak of
races.
In assessing Glasgow’s case for racial skepticism, it is important to point out that his
thought experiments, in targeting only certain varieties of racial constructionism, do not
completely rule out racial constructionism as a viable option in the racial ontology debate. There
may very well be other varieties of racial constructionism which are immune to the problems
generated by his thought experiments. Indeed, as will become clear in the next chapter, my
cultural theory of race is, in fact, immune to (at least two of) Glasgow’s thought experiments.14
Thus, while Glasgow’s argument might successfully eliminate some racial constructionist views,
it does not do what is necessary in establishing racial skepticism – namely, it does establish
across the board that all racial constructionist views fail to establish the reality of race. In order
to do this, Glasgow would not necessarily have to consider all racial constructionist views
individually. If, for instance, he could find some property or properties which all racial
14
As will become clear in the next chapter, my cultural theory of race is certainly immune to Utopia and Temporary
Amnesia. However, one might argue that it is not immune to Disaster. But it seems as though many, if not all, social
categories will cease to exist in the scenario outlined in Disaster. That is, Disaster has implications that extend
beyond race.
17
constructionist views have in common and then adequately discredit the property or properties in
question, he could take down all racial constructionist views at once.
But if we look more carefully at Glasgow’s thought experiments, they seem to gesture
toward such a common property that all racial constructionist views tend to share: the denial that
race is biological. Indeed, this last point leads to Glasgow’s main contention when it comes to
race, which is that race is an essentially biological notion. That is, it is a non-negotiable part of
our understanding of race that race is biological.
Going back to Glasgow’s argument, we can see then how the thought experiments he
employs are meant not only to discredit various forms of racial constructionism, but they are
meant to help establish this idea that race is not a function of social facts by animating our
intuitions and moving them in the direction of this conclusion. That is, they are meant to
establish this idea that social facts are not the relevant race-making facts. Instead, biological facts
are the relevant race-making facts. And, given the failure of racial naturalism, Glasgow
concludes that these biological facts do not, in fact, obtain in the case of race. Thus, Glasgow
concludes that racial skepticism is the right position to take in the racial ontology debate.
While Glasgow’s aims are clear, we still need to consider whether his thought
experiments actually do what he intends for them to do. That is, we need to consider whether his
thought experiments are actually successful in problematizing (at least some) racial
constructionist projects. Indeed, Glasgow’s thought experiments seem to confuse the robustness
of races as social constructions with their permanence. Races can be robust in a racial
constructionist way without being permanent entities. For racial constructionists, if races were to
cease to exist one day, it would be incorrect to thereby conclude that they are not robust. Races
18
are robust insofar as they can exert tremendous causal pressures on the world, and the possibility
that they might cease to exist one day would not prove that fact to be false.
For instance, consider Temporary Amnesia. Glasgow’s treatment of this thought
experiment suggests that socially constructed races grounded on the practice of racial
classification are not robust because racial classification is not robust to the extent that it is
possible to forget our system of racial classification one day. But this position obscures the ways
in which racial classification is a powerful instrument in the social construction of races insofar
as racial classification practices can shape the way we think about who belongs to what race.
Indeed, in Temporary Amnesia, it is plausible to think that instead of race ceasing to exist as a
social construction, we would only cease to remember that race exists for an hour. That is, race
would continue to exist as a social construction despite our forgetting that it does for that hour.
And this point could be extended to any number of other social constructions. For instance, the
law would also not cease to exist in Temporary Amnesia just because we forgot about the law for
an hour.
The conflation of the robustness of an entity with its permanence is not problematic only
for socially constructed entities but it also problematic for scientific entities as well.15 There is
sometimes a sense that socially constructed entities are somehow less robust than their scientific
counterparts. To the extent that this is true, even many scientific entities will not meet the
condition of permanence that Glasgow’s thought experiments seem to require. For instance,
species are robust scientific entities but they are also subject to the vagaries of the natural world
such that particular species or even all species could also cease to exist one day. A meteoroid
15
For my purposes, I take socially constructed entities and scientific entities to differ insofar as the former are
objects of study in the social sciences whereas the latter are objects of study in the natural sciences.
19
could take out all of the species on our planet. However, as with race, this lack of permanence
would not thereby invalidate the fact that species are robust insofar as they can also exert
tremendous pressures on the world. So permanence is an unreasonable condition for ontological
legitimacy for both socially constructed and scientific entities.
However, even if we were to grant that Glasgow’s thought experiments actually do what
he intends for them to do, his argument is still missing a crucial element. While Glasgow’s
thought experiments might problematize some racial constructionist accounts, they are not
sufficient on their own to show that race must be biological in order to be real at all. What is
needed is something that goes beyond thought experiments. Thought experiments are helpful in
engaging our intuitions in various cases, but they should not generally be taken as settling
difficult disputes of the sort we see in the racial ontology debate. Thus, while thought
experiments may provide a helpful starting point to think more clearly and rigorously about an
issue, rarely should they signal the end of a debate. In Glasgow’s case, much more is needed. In
order to successfully rule out racial constructionism as an option in the racial ontology debate,
what is needed is a robust case that clearly demonstrates that race must be biological in order to
be real at all. But Glasgow has not attempted to provide anything resembling such a case. Thus,
Glasgow’s racial skeptic argument is unsuccessful.
3.2 Lawrence Blum
Lawrence Blum’s particular brand of racial skepticism is premised on an analysis of race
that builds on the theory of classical racialism discussed in the previous chapter. He believes that
the contemporary understanding of race is rooted in the classical racialist legacy, such that the
contemporary conception of race contains some aspects of classical racialist thought, while
20
having discarded other aspects of that thought. As Appiah puts it, “current ways of talking about
race are the residue, the detritus, so to speak, of earlier ways of thinking about race; so that it
turns out to be easiest to understand contemporary talk about “race” as the pale reflection of a
more full-blooded race discourse that flourished in the last century.”16
For Blum, our understanding of race has softened in certain respects. For instance, the
notion of hierarchy is not as pronounced as it was during the height of classical racialist thought.
Nonetheless, the contemporary understanding of race is still unmistakably classical racialist in its
general orientation insofar as it is racially inherentist. As Blum notes, racial inherentism is the
idea that “certain traits of mind, character, and temperament are inescapably part of a racial
group’s “nature” and hence define its racial fate.”17 While Blum distinguishes between various
forms of inherentist thinking (biological, cultural, metaphysical, and uncommitted), he
nevertheless concludes that all the different forms of inherentism have their basis in genetics. On
this point, Blum notes that
“[insofar as] racial thought is inherentist[,] […] the only plausible account of how
psychological characteristics could be inherent is that they are genetically based. […] If
the deep, inherent differences [classical] racialism claims do exist, […] they can do so
only if there is a genetic basis for them. This is why the evidence that the substantial
genetic diversity that does exist in the human species as a whole is mostly present within
any geographically located population group, but not between racial groups, is so
striking.18
16
Appiah, Color, 38.
Blum, Racist, 133.
18
Ibid., 140-41.
17
21
Here, Blum mentions psychological characteristics as they are often tied to the visible
phenotypic features taken to mark one’s membership in a particular race.19 He claims that
genetics is the only plausible candidate for grounding these psychological characteristics.
Referencing research on genetic diversity in the human species, Blum notes that the available
science does not justify inherentist thinking in any form, for reasons that echo what was said in
the discussion of classical racialism in the previous chapter. Thus, given its commitment to
classical racialist thought, contemporary racial thinking is untenable in continuing to assert the
reality of race. As such, we should be racial skeptics.
Unlike Glasgow, Blum does not directly engage with racial constructionism in his
journey toward racial skepticism. Instead, Blum talks about racialized groups. For Blum,
racialized groups race are real, socially constructed entities. On this point, Blum notes that:
Blacks, whites, Asians, and Native Americans have been treated as if they were races.
This makes them racialized groups, but not races; for there are no races. This is not
merely a shift in terminology. Racialization does not, but race does, imply inherent
characteristics, a virtually unbridgeable, moral, experiential, and cognitive gulf among
racial groups, and a hierarchy of worth. Racialization is a matter of degree;
Latino/Hispanics are partially racialized, blacks fully so. […] Races are not socially
constructed; they simply do not exist. Racialized groups, however, are socially
constructed, by the historical process of racialization. There did not have to be racialized
19
There are two ways to interpret this connection between psychological characteristics and visible phenotypic
features. One might simply claim that the psychological characteristics merely correlate with the visible phenotypic
features. One could go further, though, and claim that the visible phenotypic features are a sign or marker for these
more significant psychological characteristics. Blum does not explicitly state which interpretation informs his
analysis but the second interpretation would most obviously fit into his analysis of classical racialism and
contemporary racial thinking.
22
groups, just as there did not have to be nations; but there are, they are fully “real,” and
there is a good deal of agreement as to how we determine someone’s racialized group.20
Blum could not be any clearer on his position here: races are not real. Racialized groups,
however, are real, as they derive their reality from a historical process of racialization. As a
result of this process, different racialized groups come into being. An important part of this
process includes a legacy of certain groups being treated as if they races. Indeed, there is often a
certain predictive reliability concerning racialized groups, as we are often able to slot individuals
into their “correct” or “appropriate” race, as Blum notes. Racialized groups, then, are real, even
though they are socially constructed, historically contingent entities.
Offering this distinction between races and racialized groups is a way for Blum to address
racial constructionism as a challenge to racial skepticism, albeit indirectly. In what follows, I
offer a reconstruction of what Blum was probably attempting to convey in his discussion of
racialized groups. Although my reconstruction may miss some things, it is very much in the
spirit of what I think he was trying to convey.
Many racial constructionists take historical facts to be causally (as opposed to
constitutively) tied to the social construction of races.21 For these racial constructionists,
historical facts (as a particular kind of social fact) account for the reality of race. Blum, however,
argues that these historical facts do not ground the reality of race, but, rather, racialized groups.
For Blum, racial constructionists are simply mistaken, as historical facts – while they can ground
the reality of racialized groups – cannot ground the reality of race. For Blum, this is the case
because only biological facts can ground the reality of race. If successful, then, this argument –
20
Blum, Racist, 162-63.
For an account of the difference between causal and constitutive forms of social construction, see Ron Mallon,
“Naturalistic Approaches to Social Construction,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online).
21
23
call it the “racialized group argument” – seems to effectively discredit racial constructionism. In
contrast to Glasgow, for Blum, the property that different racial constructionist views have in
common is a reliance on historical facts. In arguing that historical facts are the wrong kind of fact
to ground the reality of race, Blum seems to effectively eliminate racial constructionism as a
challenge to racial skepticism.
The question, then, is whether the racialized group argument is successful. For my part, it
is not. While some varieties of racial constructionism take historical facts to be foundational to
the social construction of race, this is not true of all varieties of racial constructionism. There are
non-historically-centered varieties of racial constructionism that are untouched by Blum’s
argument, as they do not take historical facts to be foundational to the social construction of race.
Indeed, I argue in this thesis for such a non-historically-centered racial constructionist view. On
my cultural theory of race, races are, first and foremost, cultural groups. Much more will be said
about this in the next chapter, but given that there are varieties of racial constructionism that the
racialized group argument does not touch, Blum’s case against racial constructionism is
ineffective at best.
However, as we saw with Glasgow, there is a larger issue for Blum. Blum and Glasgow’s
views both share the same core commitment: race is essentially biological. And for both of them,
since races, understood biologically, do not exist, races do not exist. However, as was the case
with Glasgow, Blum fails to provide a robust case that clearly demonstrates that race must be
biologically real in order to be real at all. Thus, Blum’s racial skeptic argument is also
unsuccessful.
24
3.3 Anthony Appiah
Anthony Appiah presents, to my mind, the most sustained and effective case for racial
skepticism.22 Appiah’s approach is based on looking at the two main theories of reference: the
ideational theory and the referential theory. This approach is based on finding referential
candidates for race in the world and seeing if we can successfully refer to any of them based on
at least one of the theories of reference.
Appiah’s general strategy involves seeing whether there is anything in the world that
meets a certain standard, such that we can say that race is real. Appiah never really specifies
what the standard is, although he implicitly relies on two different tests: (1) does the candidate
for race look like what we might reasonably call race? and (2) is the candidate for race
substantiated by science? For Appiah, a candidate for race must pass both tests. For instance, the
Amish in the United States might be scientifically substantiated as a breeding population, but the
Amish do not look like to us as though they are a race. However, if a candidate for race passes
both tests, this would provide some plausibility to the candidate for race, such that this would
lend some plausibility to think that race is real.
With this general strategy in mind, Appiah goes on to consider various candidates for
race. The candidates he comes up with are (Thomas) Jeffersonian biologically-grounded races,
(Matthew) Arnoldian biologically-grounded races, breeding population races, and races defined
merely by similarities in racial visible features. Appiah finds that none of these candidates for
race work in substantiating the reality of race. Jeffersonian and Arnoldian races look like the
races we reasonably take to be races, but they are not substantiated by science given their
22
Appiah, Color, 30-74.
25
classical racialist nature. And neither breeding population races nor races defined merely by
similarities in racial visible features look like the races we reasonably take to be races, nor are
they substantiated by science. So Appiah finds that there is no plausible candidate for race in our
world. He concludes that “[t]he truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that
can do all we ask race to do for us.”23
However, if we look carefully, we see that Appiah only considers biologically-grounded
races as potential candidates for race. He does not consider any racial constructionist candidates
for race. Thus, Appiah’s argument here – call it the “theory of reference argument” – only
eliminates racial naturalism. For Appiah, though, this is a crucial part of the racial skeptic
project for he believes, with both Glasgow and Blum, that race is essentially biological. To the
extent that race is real at all, then, it must be real as a biological entity. Nonetheless, Appiah still
has to contend with racial constructionism.
Indeed, the problem for both Glasgow and Blum is that they were unable to successfully
rule out racial constructionism as an option in the racial ontology debate. As racial skeptics and
racial constructionists both agree on the failure of racial naturalism, the challenge for racial
skeptics is to rule out racial constructionism in order to establish racial skepticism. Ruling out
racial constructionism is a necessary step in order for racial skeptics to establish racial
skepticism.
This is where Appiah has an advantage over Glasgow and Blum. While Glasgow, Blum,
and Appiah all agree that race is essentially biological, Glasgow and Blum leave open the
possibility that racial constructionist races might be real. Indeed, neither Glasgow nor Blum
23
Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 45.
26
provide any argument or evidence to demonstrate that race must be biological in order to be real
at all. However, this is what is needed in order to complete the argument for racial skepticism.
Unlike Glasgow and Blum, Appiah recognizes this, and attempts to build his case for racial
skepticism accordingly.
In attempting to show that race must be biologically real in order to be real at all, Appiah
draws from an analysis of the history of the concept of race to establish the idea that race is
essentially biological. On this point, he turns to Thomas Jefferson. He notes that Jefferson
believed, regarding blacks, that
[w]hether the black of the negro resides in the reticular membrane between the skin and
scarf-skin, or in the scarf-skin itself, whether it proceeds from the colour of the blood, the
colour of the bile, or from that of some other secretion, the difference is fixed in nature,
and is as real as if its seat and cause were better known to us. [Jefferson goes on to ask:]
And is this difference of no importance? Is it not the foundation of a greater or less share
of beauty in the two races [of whites and blacks]?24
Here, Jefferson takes one biologically-grounded morphological trait – that of skin color – to be
central in understanding blacks and whites, as it is the foundation for at least one important
social quality: beauty. Going further, Jefferson provides an analysis of the differences in mental
capacities between blacks and whites as he notes that
[c]omparing [blacks] by their faculties of memory, reason, and imagination, it appears to
me, that in memory they are equal to the whites; in reason much inferior, as I think one
24
Appiah, Color, 44.
27
could scarcely be found capable of tracing and comprehending the investigations of
Euclid; and that in imagination they are dull, tasteless, and anomalous[.]25
It is not clear from this passage whether Jefferson fully subscribed to the tenets of classical
racialism, as he does go on to note that “[i]n music[,] [blacks] are more generally gifted than the
whites with accurate ears for tune and time”.26 Nonetheless it is clear that, at the very least,
Jefferson believed in differential racial gifts between blacks and whites: Generally, blacks are
more musically gifted but lack imagination, while whites have superior reason.
Appiah also looks at the ideas of the nineteenth century poet and critic, Matthew Arnold.
Arnold held that
[s]cience has […] made visible to everybody the great and pregnant elements of
difference which lie in race, and in how signal a manner they make the genius and history
of an –Indo-European people vary from those a Semitic people. Hellenism is of IndoEuropean growth, Hebraism of Semitic growth; and we English, a nation of IndoEuropean stock, seem to belong naturally to the movement of Hellenism.27
Perhaps, for many of us, talk of an Indo-European race or Semitic race might sound a bit odd,
but the important point here is the point about how it is science that elucidates the points of
difference among the races of the world. These differences, in turn, are crucial in understanding
the differences in genius and history between races. Like Jefferson, Arnold, too, holds that race
is essentially biological. On this last point, Appiah believes we should take Jefferson and Arnold
very seriously as they are both historically representative, canonical experts on race.
25
Ibid., 45.
Ibid.
27
Ibid., 58.
26
28
What we need to consider now is whether Appiah’s historical analysis successfully
eliminates racial constructionism as an option in the racial ontology debate. There are two main
ways of responding to Appiah’s historical analysis. One way is to cite other historical experts
who provide resistance to this idea that race is essentially biological. Here, the idea is that we
could cite historical experts who claim that race is actually socially constructed. However, this is
not a promising approach. At best, it leaves us in a sort of stalemate, as racial skeptics and racial
constructionists could each argue that their own historical experts are the ones who ought to be
privileged in understanding race. At worst, this approach just adds confusion to the discussion.28
The other approach is to focus on making the best sense out of our collective practice in
using the term ‘race’ in order to determine its meaning. We can look to marriage as an analogy
here. It was once held to be non-negotiable that marriage was only to be between a man and a
woman. LGBT persons, however, had a different idea of marriage in mind. For them, same-sex
marriage was consistent with the general idea of marriage. For my part, I agree with this LGBT
analysis. Thus, not only was there a lack of principled reasons for denying LGBT persons access
to the institution of marriage, but it was morally reprehensible to continue to deny LGBT persons
the right to marriage.
This second approach, unlike the first approach, is very promising, and as such, I will use
such an approach as a part of my case in arguing for racial constructionism. Indeed, I will argue
that the best understanding of race is that races are cultural groups. We find the genesis of this
28
This approach has been suggested by Paul C. Taylor. See Paul C. Taylor, “Appiah’s Uncompleted Argument:
W.E.B. Du Bois and the Reality of Race,” Social Theory and Practice 26, no. 1 (2000): 122-128. Taylor suggests
that we should consider figures such as W.E.B. Du Bois as resisting a biological understanding of race in favor of a
socially constructed understanding of race. I believe this approach ultimately ends up in a stalemate because the
arguments for privileging certain historical figures in our understanding of race will be historical ones, as opposed to
philosophical ones. That is, the question of which historical figures have had the greatest impact on the way the race
concept has developed through history is one for historians to figure out. I believe that we should instead focus on
what various individuals have said. That is, to the extent that we should look to historical figures to understand race,
we should focus on the content of their arguments, rather than debating the historical impact of their arguments.
29
idea that races are cultural groups in Du Bois’s essay, “The Conservation of Races”. Du Bois can
be understood as putting forth a cultural theory of race in his essay, and based on my reading of
Du Bois, I will argue for a DuBoisian-inspired cultural theory of race. All of this will have to
wait, however, until the next chapter.
At this point, then, we are not yet done with Appiah’s racial skepticism. Indeed, Appiah
also addressed Du Bois and his cultural theory of race. His critique of Du Bois’s view, and my
response to his critique, will also have to wait, however, until the next chapter. Let us move on,
then, to that chapter.
30
Chapter Four
Racial Constructionism
In the previous chapter, I presented the case for racial skepticism. There, we saw that
while we can dismiss Blum and Glasgow, this is not the case for Appiah. Indeed, Appiah’s racial
skepticism will continue to serve as a source of tension in this chapter. So while this chapter is
devoted, in part, to responding to Appiah’s racial skepticism, the bulk of this chapter will be
devoted to presenting racial constructionism as a viable position in its own right.
4.1 Background
Before we go into the detailed analyses of this chapter, it will serve us well to think a bit
about where we currently stand in this thesis’s exploration and analysis of the racial ontology
debate. In light of racial naturalism’s failure, the challenge for racial constructionists is to
provide reasons for why we ought to think that race is nonetheless real. Indeed, as we saw in the
previous chapter, in light of racial naturalism’s failure, the impulse for some is to conclude that
race is not real.
The natural question that arises at this point, then, is why we should be racial
constructionists at all. Indeed, we could keep things quite neat and tidy, ontologically speaking,
by simply accepting racial skepticism. This question gets at the motivation for racial
constructionism. The reality is that there are many motivations for racial constructionism. In no
particular order, let us begin with a practical demand: namely, we need a way of continuing to
think and speak about race. Even given racial naturalism’s failure, there is still a pressing need to
address the reality of race in a way that honors the ways in which race continues to remain
relevant in the lives of virtually everyone. That is, even though we have determined that race is
31
biologically insignificant, it does not follow that race will cease to have any significance. Indeed,
as mentioned, the opposite is true. Charles Mills nicely captures this particular motivation for
racial constructionism when he notes that “the task of those working on race is to put race in
quotes, ‘race’, while insisting nevertheless, it exists (and moves people)[.] […We need to] make
a plausible social ontology neither essentialist, innate, nor transhistorical, but real enough for all
that”.29
Mills’s call for the need for a racial social ontology can be understood in different ways.
One way of understanding Mills here is to interpret the need for a racial social ontology as being
necessary in the fight against racism. This is a decidedly political motivation. However, as we
will see, those who are motivated in this way also take the content of races to be political. As
such, I use the term “political racial constructionism” to name varieties of racial constructionism
which are inspired by a political motivation and which take the content of races to be political.
Political racial constructionism is the most common kind of racial constructionism in the racial
ontology debate. It has been given voice to by many in this debate, but Sally Haslanger, to my
mind, has provided the most vigorous and sustained case for political racial constructionism.
Haslanger’s political racial constructionism is based on this idea that we should
understand races fundamentally in terms of their political relations. As such, she defines races in
the following way:
A group G is racialized relative to context C iff members of G are (all and only) those:
i)
who are observed or imagined to have certain bodily features presumed in C to be
evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region (or regions);
29
Charles Mills, Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), xiv.
32
ii)
whose having (or being imagined to have) these features marks them within the
context of the background ideology in C as appropriately occupying certain kinds
of social position that are either subordinate or privileged (and so motivates and
justifies their occupying such a position); and
iii)
whose satisfying (i) and (ii) plays (or would play) a role in their systematic
subordination or privilege in C, i.e., who are along some dimension systematically
subordinated or privileged when in C, and satisfying (i) and (ii) plays (or would
play) a role in that dimension of privilege or subordination.30
There are several things to note about Haslanger’s definition of race. She references the bodily
features that we normally associate with race, but these features are relevant only insofar as they
are used to motivate and justify racial privilege and subordination. Here, the mention of
background ideology is important. The relation between those who are privileged and
subordinated is not accidental. In the selection of certain bodily features and in tethering the
possession (or perceived possession) of these bodily features to the conditions of different races,
there is a great deal of deliberate, conscious privileging and subordinating. That is, the features
are recruited for reference and use in a racial system. As such, races are, as a definitional matter,
political entities.
We should also note that Haslanger’s political racial constructionist view is – as is the
case for many varieties of racial constructionism – largely context-sensitive. That is, on
Haslanger’s view, what counts as a race in one particular context may not count as such in a
30
Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?,” Nous 34, no. 1
(2000): 44.
33
different context. This all depends on a number of factors in the contexts in question (e.g. the
bodily features taken to be relevant, the background ideologies, particular power dynamics, etc.).
Political racial constructionism, as exemplified by Haslanger’s view, is seemingly de
rigeur among racial constructionists. Indeed, this view captures the idea that, for many people of
color, the need for social ontology is motivated by a desire to make sense of one’s reality in a
way that allows one to fight effectively against racism. In this regard, Haslanger’s view offers
certain resources for people of color. It offers a way of identifying how power structures work to
organize individuals into races. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which racial
subordination is normalized and justified helps to create room for resistance in a long-term
program of political resistance and transformation. When viewed in this way, it is hardly a
surprise why many have found political racial constructionism to be such an appealing position.
However, political racial constructionism is not without its problems. Indeed, Haslanger’s
view about race is similar to her positions with gender, in that she also defines being a man and a
woman in terms of one’s position in a system of gendered privilege and subordination. Jennifer
Saul provides a critique of Haslanger’s view when she argues that, on Haslanger’s view, there is
no such thing as an unsubordinated woman.31 Indeed, for Haslanger, to be a woman at all is to be
subordinated along some dimension or other in a system of gendered privilege and
subordination. Saul notes that this result is especially problematic as it relates to political efforts
to combat gender inequality as it rules out the possibility of gender equality. That is, once
women are unsubordinated, they cease to be women at all. Of course, Haslanger does not deny
that there will still be the persons whom we take to be males and females in the post-gender-
31
Sally Haslanger and Jennifer Saul, “Philosophical Analysis and Social Kinds,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 80 (2006): 119-143.
34
inequality world. That is, sexual anatomical difference will not go away in the post-genderinequality world. We will just no longer use these differences to justify gendered privilege and
subordination in such a world. However, even with this in mind, Saul’s critique is still effective
in problematizing Haslanger’s account. When we look at what Saul’s critique means for race,
this critique highlights the fact that what was supposed to be the raison d’etre of political racial
constructionism is the source of its own downfall. That is, political racial constructionism is
appealing precisely because it offers a way of thinking about racial social ontology in a way that
offers resources for those engaged in political efforts to fight racism. And yet, if races are, by
definition, political entities, this leaves no room for races in the post-racist world.
Political racial constructionists could respond by questioning why there would even be a
desire to have races in the post-racist world anyways. That is, given the terrible destruction that
the race concept has brought to the world, why would one continue to have a positive attachment
to the idea of races? I will say that while Saul’s critique against Haslanger is effective, I will
ultimately go beyond this kind of critique in arguing that races have a place in the racist present
and the post-racist future. This is an argument that is predicated on racial cultural excellence.
However, I will not develop this argument now. Instead, I will address the issues raised here in
chapter five. Nonetheless, some of the issues raised here are ones which Du Bois addressed in his
essay “The Conservation of Races”, and so I turn to Du Bois in the next section.
4.2 W.E.B. Du Bois
W.E.B. Du Bois (1868 – 1963) was a black American intellectual who wrote about issues
such as the state of blacks in America, racism, and the nature of races. These three themes
predominate in much of Du Bois’s intellectual work, including in his essay, “The Conservation
35
of Races”.32 Du Bois originally delivered “Conservation” as a speech before the American Negro
Academy and it was published by the organization in 1897.
In Du Bois’s time, “Conservation” and much of his other work served as an important
point of reference in a vibrant black American intellectual tradition. Many of the issues with
which we are engaged in the contemporary racial ontology debate find their genesis in an earlier
debate involving Du Bois and some of his black American contemporaries. Indeed, we might see
our contemporary racial ontology debate as an extension of this earlier debate, such that our
debate and the debate in this earlier period are all a part of an on-going tradition, in which the
participants are attempting to get an intellectual grasp on the reality of race. The disagreement
between Du Bois and many of his black American contemporaries reflect some of our present
difficulties with race. For instance, we find between Du Bois and Booker T. Washington a
disagreement as to the best way to deal with racism. Du Bois takes on a seemingly more racecentered approach, whereas Washington’s approach emphasizes entrepreneurship as a way to
achieve black progress. We also find in Du Bois and Frederick Douglass a disagreement over the
future of race. Du Bois, as we will see, champions the conservation of races, and Douglass
argues that the elimination of racial difference is part of the project of eliminating racism. Du
Bois’s relevance for our contemporary racial ontology debate must be situated in the context of
his engagement with his black American contemporaries. This provides for a greater
understanding of Du Bois’s project, and it also helps us to see the breadth and depth of Du Bois’s
intellectual contribution to the issues with which we are engaged.
32
W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races” in The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), 179-88.
36
So it is no surprise that “Conservation” has become a touchstone in debates in the
philosophy of race generally, and as it relates to the racial ontology debate in particular. In his
essay, Du Bois considers two main theories of race: the biological and cultural theories of race.
For Du Bois, the biological theory of race asserts, roughly, that races are defined by physical
differences – that is, by qualities such as color, hair, cranial measurements, and language.33 Du
Bois rejects this biological theory of race, noting that “[a]ll these physical characteristics are
patent enough, and if they agreed with each other it would be very easy to classify mankind.
Unfortunately for scientists, however, these criteria of race are most exasperatingly
intermingled.”34
There is a more important point for Du Bois, though, which is that
[a]lthough the wonderful developments of human history teach that the grosser physical
differences of color, hair and bone go but a short way toward explaining the different
roles which groups of men have played in Human Progress, yet there are differences –
subtle, delicate and elusive, though they may be – which have silently but definitely
separated men into groups. While these subtle forces have generally followed the natural
cleavage of common blood, descent and physical peculiarities, they have at other times
swept across and ignored these. At all times, however, they have divided human beings
into races, which, while they perhaps transcend scientific definition, nevertheless, are
clearly defined to the eye of the Historian and Sociologist.35
For Du Bois, if we are to understand what races really are, we must go beyond the superficial
physical differences that some take to be of paramount importance. The superficiality of these
33
Ibid., 179-80.
Ibid., 180.
35
Ibid.
34
37
physical differences is put into sharp focus when we turn our attention to the subtle forces which
Du Bois takes to be the real factors in race differentiation. Indeed, the relation between these
subtle forces and the gross physical racial markers is contingent.
What is striking though about the quoted passage is Du Bois’s insistence that race is real,
even though it is not, fundamentally, a biological reality. This point is taken for granted
oftentimes by racial constructionists in the racial ontology debate, but when we look outside the
discipline of philosophy to what other disciplines have written about race, we find, often, claims
made to the extent that race is not real because it is socially constructed. That is, race’s social
construction is taken to be evidence of race’s status as an illusory and fictitious entity. That Du
Bois had the foresight to see beyond this misleading and false claim speaks to the strength of his
analysis in “Conservation”. Based on what I have seen, this point has not been appreciated or
even mentioned in the scholarship on Du Bois.
Du Bois’s insistence that race is real, even though it is not, fundamentally, a biological
reality, also marks a proposed shift in reliance on a different set of experts. It is taken for granted
by many philosophers of race and, indeed, many in the general public, that the real experts on
race are scientists. And yet, Du Bois notes that those who probably have the most expertise on
race – given that they have the best resources for gaining insight into the subtle forces which are
really responsible for differentiating races – are historians and sociologists. This is another virtue
of Du Bois’s approach: he does not debate racial ontology on the antirealists’ terms. That is, he
does not debate racial ontology based on the opinions of biologists. Instead, he turns to a
different set of experts altogether.
38
Du Bois goes on to provide his definition of race: “It is a vast family of human beings,
generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses,
who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain
more or less vividly conceived ideals of life.”36 In Du Bois’s definition of race, we see a clear
articulation of the kind of subtle forces he referred to in the previous quoted passage. The subtle
forces in question are the common history, traditions, and impulses of races. Again, these subtle
forces – in contrast to the gross physical racial markers – are the real factors in race
differentiation. Put another way, this is simply the idea that “while race differences have
followed mainly physical race lines, yet no mere physical distinctions would really define or
explain the deeper differences – the cohesiveness and continuity of [races]. The deeper
differences are spiritual, psychical, differences – undoubtedly based on the physical, yet
infinitely transcending them.”37 For Du Bois, the physical differences are relevant insofar as they
enable us to track, in a very general way, the actual races that exist in the world, but it is still
important to emphasize their superficiality.
For the most part, I agree with Du Bois’s definition of race. However, I do not agree with
certain aspects of his view of race. Du Bois believed that races have a particular mission to fulfill
in the form of delivering a unique message to the world. However, this notion of racial destiny is
problematic for understanding race in our contemporary setting. Since Du Bois’s time, the world
has generally moved in the direction of greater complexity as it relates to individuals’ possession
of different identities. For instance, we see nationalism as a powerful force in shaping
individuals’ identities. Indeed, since “Conservation” was published, Du Bois could see all of this
for himself having lived through the first and second world wars. In more recent decades,
36
37
Ibid., 181.
Ibid., 182.
39
discourses around multiculturalism have generated greater interest in individual identities, with
ethnic identity, LGBT identity, and political identity, among others, existing alongside race as
different identities that shape the way individuals view themselves. In contrast, Du Bois thought
that “the history of the world is the history, not of individuals, but of groups, not of nations, but
of races, and he who ignores or seeks to override the race idea in human history ignores and
overrides the central thought of all history.”38 Given this, one might interpret Du Bois as
privileging race as a component of identity. However, to the extent that this interpretation is
correct, the increase in the complexity of identity formation problematizes this privileging of
race.
This can be seen in its most extreme form in the fact that some people in our
contemporary world actively run away from their race, and choose not to see it as a component
of their identity at all.39 For these individuals, their racial anxiety shapes the way they engage
with race. Even in the absence of such racial anxiety, race may not be all that important for some
people. Some people might acknowledge race as a component of their identity, but other
identities they have might override the importance of the race component of their identity. For
instance, a black man might identify more with being a libertarian than he does with being black.
In response, some might say that this black man is not “black enough”, implying that his black
identity ought to be more central. All of this is just to say that identity is a difficult subject
because of its personal nature. And it has become more difficult since Du Bois’s time.
Returning to the issue of nationalism, we see that nationalism affects the way we
understand race in other ways. For instance, I am less sanguine about Du Bois’s impulse to see
38
Ibid., 180-81.
To be clear, such individuals will still have a race, but they choose not to acknowledge it as a component of their
identity.
39
40
the interaction of races at a global level, for nationalism has supplanted much of the possibility
for pan-racial movements, such as pan-Africanism. Nationalism also affects the way we think
about the racial constructionist project. To the extent that Du Bois is correct that races are
cultural groups, it is not clear how, in our contemporary setting, a race can be said to share a
common cultural tradition. Given the nationalist emphasis on strict policing of national borders,
it is more precise to say that a race of people share a common cultural tradition but that such a
tradition is given different localized expressions. That is, I think Du Bois’s insights on race and
culture are worth preserving, but we must recognize that there, in fact, these different localized
expressions. Different racial diasporic groups will still share central aspects of a common racial
cultural tradition, but this common racial cultural tradition will go through a certain degree of
transformation in the form of different localized expressions.
For all my disagreements with Du Bois, and there are not all that many, I seek to preserve
Du Bois’s insight that races are cultural groups. Indeed, in what follows, I argue for a Du
Boisian-inspired cultural theory of race. I say “Du Boisian-inspired” as opposed to “Du Boisian”
because I extend Du Bois’s cultural theory of race in ways that I do not think he had in mind
given some of our disagreements. Nonetheless, Du Bois provides a strong foundation for myself,
and, indeed, for anyone who desires to advance a cultural theory of race.
4.3 My cultural theory of race
My cultural theory of race takes as its starting-point Du Bois’s characterization of races
as cultural groups, as offered in his definition of race. This is a helpful starting-point, but what is
missing, in large part, from the racial ontology debate is an explication of what, exactly, it means
41
to have a cultural theory of race. In this section, I present and argue for my cultural theory of
race. I also examine two objections that arise in advancing my cultural theory of race.
While Du Bois’s definition of race may seem a bit bizarre at first, I contend that there is
nothing in Du Bois’s definition that departs from our commonsense understanding of race.
Indeed, the biological theory of race which Du Bois refers to has been effective in obscuring
certain aspects of race and this explains why some might see Du Bois’s definition as a bit bizarre
at first. In emphasizing the physical differences between members of different races, the
biological theory of race obscures aspects of race which feature tangibly in most of our lives as
they relate to race membership.40 That is, upon minimal reflection, many of us are able to very
quickly identify the positive aspects of race membership that make race membership a valuable
part of our lives. The sense of community that exists between members of the same race is
perhaps best exemplified among people of color. For Asians, blacks, indigenous peoples, and
other racial groups, the sense of community we share with members of our own race have, for
some of us, been amplified through a common struggle against racism. But we must go beyond
this political focus in examining this sense of community.
Indeed, reducing the sense of community that exists between members of the same race
to a common struggle against racism obscures the fact that we often, as people of color, find joy
and contentment in the associations we have with members of our own race independently from
any sense that we are joined together politically. For many of us, the relationships we have with
members of our own race are forged on a foundation of shared values, traditions, and ways of
40
However, this is not to say that physical differences have no part to play in my cultural theory of race. Indeed, I
will discuss the relevance of racial visible features and ancestry to my view later on in this section.
42
seeing the world. In this sense, being a member of a race means having a metaphorical place to
call home. Within our own race, we experience a sense of belonging.
At this point, we see that there is a sharp distinction between political racial
constructionism and cultural racial constructionism. Indeed, racial constructionism is often taken
to mean just political racial constructionism. Chike Jeffers gives voice to this need to
disaggregate these two different kinds of racial constructionism when he notes that
what a social constructionist chooses to emphasize about race makes a difference. […]
The main role of race in social life, from [the] perspective [of political racial
constructionism], is our division along lines of dominance and subordination, superiority
and inferiority. It is, in short, the evil we call racism. If [political racial constructionism]
is right that this is what lies at the heart of race, then the ultimate defeat of racism, toward
which we should all be constantly striving, necessarily means the defeat and total
abolition of race itself. […] But what if, under the influence of “Conservation,” we come
to see the sense in which racial distinctions can imply cultural differences as of equal or
even more importance? This makes it possible to imagine racism going away without
race going away.41
The insight which Jeffers offers here concerning this idea that we need to pay attention to what
different racial constructionist accounts emphasize is crucial. It is crucial as it relates to the
normative dimension of the racial ontology debate because political racial constructionism can,
and often does, end up endorsing eliminativism in the long term, as opposed to cultural racial
constructionism which can, and often does, end up endorsing conservationism in the long term.
41
Chike Jeffers, The Cultural Theory of Race: Yet Another Look at Du Bois’s “The Conservation of Races”,”
Ethics 123, no. 3 (2013): 421.
43
Given all of this, I agree with Jeffers about the clear need to draw a sharp distinction between
political racial constructionism and cultural racial constructionism.
For many of us, belonging to a race is also valuable because we see ourselves as a part of
an on-going project of rich, vibrant, and dynamic cultural expression. In this respect, races are
cultural groups insofar as the kind of positive racial expression we engage in when we think of
ourselves as members of a race communicating a particular message to others is a decidedly
cultural kind of expression. This racial cultural expression, in turn, is situated within a racial
cultural tradition. This shared racial cultural tradition provides a basis for a shared racial identity.
Any analysis of racial identity is incomplete without an analysis of the forms of racial
cultural bonding that help to facilitate and maintain racial identities. Individuals’ racial identities
will inevitably be shaped by the way they see themselves as participants in a distinct racial
cultural tradition. This explains why individuals are often protective of the racial cultural
tradition of which they are a part. This protectiveness is grounded in an individual’s investment
in his or her racial cultural tradition. For instance, an indigenous person may be very protective
of the way indigenous stories are preserved from one generation to the next.
One of the virtues of my cultural theory of race is that it highlights the fact that racial
identity is not just a function of shared political goals. This is important because political racial
constructionism has a problem with explaining how and why it is that racial identities are stable
in ways that extend beyond the sharing of common political goals. That is, we often enjoy
spending time with the members of our own race and for reasons that have virtually nothing to
do with our politics. Indeed, members of the same race can engage in distinctly racial cultural
forms of bonding even though there may be divergent views as to the best way to fight racism.
44
Political racial constructionism’s explanatory deficit is a reason to reject political racial
constructionism, and it is also a reason to affirm my cultural theory of race.
The analysis of races as cultural groups thus far also highlights the importance of
community to our understanding of races as cultural groups. On my cultural theory of race, races
are important sites for community-building. Such community-building is fostered by a shared
racial cultural tradition and shared racial identity. The racial community-building I am referring
to here can be facilitated in a number of ways, including the development of various professional
networks. The existence of such professional networks helps to create trust between members of
a racial community and also allows for opportunities to connect outside of professional contexts.
Of course, none of this is to suggest that racial community-building is easy. As with any
large group, factionalism is often a reality and one that poses a real threat to the kind of
community-building I am focusing on. But this is to be expected. On my cultural theory of race,
we would not expect there to be perfect harmony between the members of a race, for such an
expectation would be unrealistic. Racial community-building is difficult. And it is often
sustained only through hard work. In this respect, racial community-building is like virtually
every other kind of community-building.
At this point, there are two objections that need to be addressed. The first objection is
simply that it is not clear why we should treat the kind of cultural groups I call races as races.
Why not treat these cultural groups as ethnic groups? The second objection is that it is not clear
why we should think that the cultural groups I am focusing on are races.
In responding to the first objection, it is important to note that there is a presupposition at
the heart of this objection, which is that there is no need to posit race as a distinct category of
45
social life because, with ethnicity or ethnic groups, we have a category that does all the work we
want race to do vis-à-vis cultural groups. However, this objection fails to take into account the
fact that many of the cultural achievements we take to be paradigmatic in thinking and talking
about cultural excellence are in fact the cultural achievements of races, not ethnic groups. For
instance, the notion of Asian-fusion cuisine has been the product of an effort on the part of
Asians of different ethnic backgrounds working together to produce a culinary form that honors
the creativity, imagination, and dynamism of Asian chefs. The emergence of Asian-fusion
cuisine is a distinctly Asian achievement. Similarly, the notion of black contributions to music
must be understood as a black racial achievement, and not the sole achievement of any particular
ethnic group. Just as the emergence of pan-Asian cuisine is not the product solely of Chinese
Canadians, Japanese Americans, or British Koreans, black contributions to music cannot be
understood as solely as being made by Haitian Canadians, Jamaican Americans, or British
Africans. The cultural theory of race I advance shows why we need race in order to understand
certain cultural achievements. The category of ethnicity or ethnic group is not enough.
And yet, this objection points to a broader objection that it is not clear how why we
should think that the cultural groups I am focusing on are races. That is, what, exactly, makes the
cultural groups I am focusing on races? While it is plausible to think that ethnicity or ethnic
group, as a category, is not sufficient in explaining certain kinds of cultural phenomena, this
current objection differs from the last objection in that it asks: What is it about these cultural
groups in particular that justifies our calling them races?
There is a good amount of evidence to support the view that the cultural groups I am
calling races actually are races. For instance, the cultural groups I think of as paradigmatic races
(Asians, blacks, whites) match up with commonsense racial classifications. These cultural groups
46
look like what we take to be races. That is, the cultural groups I focus on have the visible
features we associate with members of the Asian race, black race, and white race.
However, one might argue that I am sliding back into a biological understanding of race
in focusing on visible features. In order to respond adequately to this argument, I need to
explicate my cultural theory of race a bit more. In doing so, it will be clear that this argument is
mistaken. Visible features will be relevant to any theory of race, because they are central to race.
The focus on visible features is what makes race, as a category, different from, say, the category
of high school teachers, insofar as the latter category is not shaped by the need for visible
differentiation by way of physical features. That is, in the case of race, we need a way of readily
identifying members of a race so that we can accurately and reliably slot individuals into their
correct race. And it is important to note that the visible features in question are racial in
character. That is, differences in height and weight count as differences in visible features, but
we they are not ones that are relevant for racial classification. So in what follows, I use the term
“racial visible features” in referring to the visible features that are relevant for race. So in looking
at these racial visible features, it is clear that because visible features will be relevant to any
theory of race, it follows that they will be relevant even for my cultural theory of race which sees
races as cultural groups.42
However, the argument under consideration here is supposed to be problematic for my
view because racial visible features are phenotypic features which in turn are given expression as
a result of genetic differences in individuals. This seems to point toward a biological
understanding of race. Of course, I do not disagree with this picture of how genetic differences
42
The importance of emphasizing that the visible features we are interested in when thinking about race should be
racial in character is made by Michael Hardimon. See his Michael O. Hardimon, “The Ordinary Concept of Race,”
The Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 9 (2003): 442-443.
47
give rise to differences in phenotypic features. However, I disagree that my focus on racial
visible features thereby turns my theory of race into a biological theory of race. Indeed, if
focusing on racial visible features turns my theory of race into a biological theory of race, it
would follow that all theories of race – given that racial visible features are central to the race
concept – would be biological theories of race. So this objection falsely implies that only
biological theories of race count as actual theories of race.
It is important to note that this argument conflates two separate things: (1) a focus on
racial visible features and (2) the racial naturalist understanding of racial visible features as an
element of biological racial difference. All theories of race will be committed to (1), but not all
will be committed to (2). Not only does this distinction capture what is really going on here with
this objection, but it is also necessary for creating argumentative space for racial constructionist
theories of race generally and cultural theories of race in particular. That is, on my cultural
theory of race, there is a focus on racial visible features but this focus should be not understood
in a racial naturalist way. My focus on racial visible features does not thereby make my cultural
theory of race into a biological theory of race. Similarly, my focus on racial visible features does
not make the cultural groups I call races into biological groups.
On my cultural theory of race, racial visible features are still relevant insofar as they are
recruited into my cultural racial constructionist project. The recruitment of physical features in
social constructionist projects is not limited to race. For instance, physical features are also used
as a point of differentiation in the categorization of dog breeds. As is the case with race, the
focus on physical features in dog breed categorization does not thereby make dog breeds
fundamentally biological entities. With dog breeds, differentiation by physical features is used in
the service of different social constructionist aims. For instance, the physical features in question
48
are often used as a basis for determining exemplars of a dog breed, for the purpose of awarding
prizes at dog shows.
In addition to racial visible features, ancestry is also relevant for understanding my view
of races as cultural groups. However, again, my focus on ancestry should be understood in a
racial constructionist way, not a racial naturalist way. That is, lines of descent are necessary for
determining racial group membership on my view, but they are not important from the
standpoint of, say, biological inheritance. As with racial visible features, the reliance on ancestry
is used in the service of my particular cultural racial constructionist project.43 Thus, the two
objections considered in this section are unsuccessful.
4.4 The meaning of ‘race’
At this point, it is helpful to explore what kind of ontological foundation can be provided
for my view of races as cultural groups. Recall that, in the previous chapter, I raised the question
of whether Appiah’s historical analysis of race – which paints a picture of race as being
essentially biological – successfully rules out racial constructionism as an option in the racial
ontology debate. Indeed, Appiah’s historical analysis poses a challenge – call this the historical
analysis challenge – to racial constructionism, and it must be adequately dealt with before
Appiah’s racial skepticism can be dismissed.
I suggested there were two main ways of responding to the challenge posed by Appiah’s
historical analysis. One way is to cite other historical experts who provide resistance to the idea
that race is essentially biological. I concluded that this approach was not promising. The second
approach, which I do find promising, is to focus on making the best sense out of our collective
43
The focus on racial visible features and ancestry is important for my view because in large part these two features
are what distinguish the cultural groups I am calling races from other non-racial cultural groups.
49
practice in using the term ‘race’ in order to determine its meaning. I left this second approach
undeveloped in the previous chapter, and so I will develop it now.
This second approach is inspired by the work of Sally Haslanger. Haslanger argues that,
in contrast to traditional descriptivism and neo-descriptivism, pure reference externalism
provides a new way of looking at how we can determine the meaning of ‘race’. In particular,
Haslanger argues that Bigelow and Shroeter and Shroeter and Shroeter’s work on pure reference
externalism is helpful in this regard, and in keeping with the insights provided by their work,
Haslanger argues for a jazz account of meaning in determining the meaning of ‘race’. Haslanger
notes that “[t]here are two sets of questions to consider [here]: (a) how does a term such as
[‘race’] get the meaning it has and how do we know its meaning (and so use it correctly); (b)
how do we communicate using the term [‘race’]? By virtue of what do we co-refer, not by
accident, but de jure.”44 Regarding (a), Haslanger quotes Shroeter and Shroeter:
[…] a subject gets closer to the truth about what [race is] via holistic rationalizing
interpretation of her own use of the term [‘race’]. The subject is looking for a theoretical
interpretation of her term [‘race’] which vindicates the most important aspects of her total
practice with that term, including her changing substantive understanding of its reference,
her implicit criteria for identifying instances, her proto-theoretical hunches about why
certain principles are important, and so on. In this exercise of rational interpretation, the
subject is trying to make sense of her whole practice with the term, by requiring each of
her substantive assumptions to earn its keep in light of holistic reflective theorizing.45
44
Sally Haslanger, “Language, Politics and the “Folk”: Looking for the Meaning of ‘Race’,” The Monist 93, no. 2
(2010): 178.
45
Francois Shroeter and Laura Shroeter, “A Third Way in Metaethics,” Nous 43, no. 1 (2009): 14, quoted in Ibid.,
178.
50
For Haslanger, what is stated in this quoted passage is important from the standpoint of honoring
the idea that there should not be any fixed ideas about meaning that are “held true come what
may”.46 That is, the practice of rational interpretation, as described in the quoted passage, is ongoing, and, as such, we are not beginning with any fixed ideas about the meaning of ‘race’. We
can find ourselves grappling with new knowledge concerning ‘race’, and such new knowledge
can, in turn, impact the way we understand what race is. Contrast this with traditional
descriptivism and neo-descriptivism where we start out with a folk theory of ‘race’. With
traditional descriptivism and neo-descriptivism, this folk theory of ‘race’ helps guide us in
different situations as we attempt to use the term to refer to instances of the phenomenon. As
such, traditional descriptivism and neo-descriptivism lacks the kind of flexibility that is required
in terms of incorporating new knowledge concerning race into our practices in using the term
‘race’. I will explain later why the incorporation of new knowledge as it relates to race is
important for my purposes, but for now, let us move to the second set of questions Haslanger
raises. Regarding (b), Haslanger asks us to:
[c]onsider a musical analogy. The members of a classical string quartet achieve a
coordinated musical performance by settling in advance on a common score. This
common score then serves as a fixed template, which guides each individual player’s
performance on the crucial night. The classical performance is coordinated and kept on
track by each player following the template they’ve agreed upon. The members of a jazz
quartet have a very different way of achieving musical coordination: instead of settling
on a specific template for their performance, jazz musicians can rely on their
improvisational skills. Each member is committed to building on whatever musical
46
W. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1953), 42-43, quoted in Ibid., 173.
51
themes other members of the group try out, seeking a continuation that makes best
musical sense out of the whole performance so far. Each player in the group trusts that
the others will try to take everyone’s contributions on board and incorporate them into a
coherent musical structure. The jazz musicians’ coordinating intentions, together with a
rough congruence in musical sensibility, are what keep the joint musical performance on
track, developing interesting themes rather than degenerating into a cacophony of
divergent voices.47
In looking at this quoted passage, what we need to emphasize is that coordinating intentions are
crucial here. That is, in order to communicate successfully there must be a shared sense that we
are trying to engage in the same communicative enterprise. As it relates to our purposes in the
racial ontology debate, we must note in particular that the “effort to coordinate involves “looking
for the property that all of us have been talking about all along”.48
With the jazz account of meaning explicated, we must move on to consider how, exactly,
it helps in answering the historical analysis challenge. In light of the historical analysis Appiah
provides, one could argue that my Du Boisian-inspired cultural theory of race is revisionist. That
is, one could argue that because the meaning of ‘race’ is that races are biological groups, the idea
that races are cultural groups revises our understanding of ‘race’. On this view, this revision
obscures rather than clarifies what race is. In light of all of this, the jazz account of meaning
helps to us to see that I am not revising the term ‘race’ so that it means what I want it to mean.
That is, if we accept that we are all, as participants in the racial ontology debate, attempting to
engage in the same communicative enterprise in attempting to understand what race is, and if we
47
48
Shroeter and Shroeter, “Metaethics,” 16, quoted in Haslanger, “Language,” 179.
Ibid., 17.
52
accept, further, that in order to understand race we must engage in holistic, reflective theorizing
that attempts to make the best sense of our total practice in using the term ‘race’, then it is clear
that my project is not revisionist. Instead, inspired by Du Bois, my project is an attempt to track
the phenomenon we have been talking about all along.
Indeed, at the heart of the historical analysis challenge is a sense that the meaning of
‘race’ is fixed by a body of historical reference. This only makes sense, however, if we are
beholden to traditional descriptivism or neo-descriptivism. But, as we have seen, there are good
reasons, at least in the case of race, to reject these two views in favor of the jazz account of
meaning.
And when we broaden the relevant community of people engaged in the same
communicative enterprise from participants in the racial ontology debate to include everyday
people, we see even more clearly that not only is my cultural theory of race not revisionist, it
honors the way most people approach race. That is, it is a point of common knowledge for most
people that there are no biological underpinnings to race, and yet most people do not endorse
racial skepticism. Instead, they consider race to be a real and important feature of their lives.
Thus, the historical analysis challenge is unsuccessful in ruling out racial constructionism as a
viable option in the racial ontology debate.
4.5 One last challenge from Appiah
We cannot dismiss Appiah’s racial skepticism yet. There remains one last challenge from
Appiah. The challenge from Appiah concerns Du Bois, and since my cultural theory of race is
based on the foundation Du Bois sets out in “Conservation”, I must address it because if the
53
challenge is sufficient to discredit Du Bois’s view, it is enough to discredit my own cultural
theory of race.
In particular, Appiah’s challenge against Du Bois concerns Du Bois’s definition of race.
Recall what the definition is as follows: “It is a vast family of human beings, generally of
common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both
voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less
vividly conceived ideals of life.”49 One by one, Appiah dissects and analyzes each part of Du
Bois’s definition, and concludes that Du Bois’s definition is unsuccessful in advancing a theory
of race that can be distinguished from the biological theory of race Du Bois rejects. Ultimately,
for Appiah, Du Bois was unable to transcend the biological conception of race.
Appiah’s critique of Du Bois’s definition is particularly salient for my purposes with
respect to one part of that definition: common history. Regarding the common history part of Du
Bois’s definition, Appiah notes the following:
[In order] to recognize two events at different times as part of the history of a single
individual, we have to have a criterion of identity for the individual at each of those
times, independent of his or her participation in the two events, so, when we recognize
two events as belonging to the history of one race, we have to have a criterion of
membership of the race at those two times, independently of the participation of the
members in the two events. To put it more simply: sharing a common group history
cannot be a criterion for being members of the same group, for we would have to be able
to identify the group in order to identify its history. Someone in the fourteenth century
49
Du Bois, “Conservation” in Folk, 181.
54
could share a common history with me through our membership in a historically
extended race only if something accounts for their membership in the race in the
fourteenth century and mine in the twentieth. That something cannot, on pain of
circularity, be the history of the race.50
Appiah’s argument against the common history part of Du Bois’s definition – call this the
circularity argument – derives from the same kind of critique that philosophers since John Locke
have levelled against Locke’s account of personal identity based on the memories of an
individual. On this Lockean account, there is continuity in one’s personal identity insofar as one
remembers events from the past in one’s own life. The critique levelled against this account
centers on the idea that we need a way of determining whether the rememberer and the earlier
person featured in the memory of the rememberer are, in fact, the same person. It is circular
reasoning, then, to suggest that memory can serve to individuate the rememberer from the earlier
person.51
Paul Taylor responds to the circularity argument, claiming that
[t]he difficulty with this circularity argument is that it goes through only if the history to
be shared can be identified only as the history of black people [or any other race]
simpliciter – if, in short, there is nothing to be said about this history except that it is The
History of The Race. But there is more to be said, as Du Bois knew. Appiah assumes that
Du Bois’s historical criterion points to a global feature of the group, a feature that the
group has as a whole, that depends on the group’s prior existence, and that members of
the group possess on account of their membership in the group. But it’s much more likely
50
51
Appiah, Africa, 32.
Ibid.
55
Du Bois is arguing that certain persons comprise the group we know as the black race [or
any other race] because, and to the extent that, they have parallel individual histories –
that is, relevantly similar individual experiences of dealing with certain social and
historical conditions. It’s much more likely, in short, that Du Bois is not interested in
some sort of abstract group history but in the biographies of concrete individuals,
biographies which, when relevantly similar enough, justify putting those who’ve lived
them into the same category.52
In responding to the circularity argument, Taylor provides a different interpretation of what Du
Bois meant by the common history of a race. On Taylor’s interpretation, Du Bois is not claiming
that races have abstract group histories. Instead, Du Bois is interested in the parallel individual
histories (the biographies) of individuals. These parallel individual histories, in turn, provide the
basis for seeing individuals as members of the same race.
As we move to assess Taylor’s response, we see that there are problems with it. On an
interpretive level, Taylor’s response does not vindicate what Du Bois was actually trying to say
in “Conservation”. In “Conservation”, Du Bois claims that “the history of the world is the
history, not of individuals, but of groups, not of nations, but of races, and he who ignores or
seeks to override the race idea in human history ignores and overrides the central thought of all
history.” (W.E.B. Du Bois, The Conservation of Races, 180-181). Given this claim, there is good
reason to believe that Du Bois was not interested in the biographies of individuals generally, or
the biographies of individuals in individuating races in particular. At the very least, there is no
textual support for Taylor’s interpretive claim.
52
Taylor, Reality, 108.
56
Furthermore, we should be reminded of Jeffer’s earlier insistence that it matters what one
chooses to emphasize in a social constructionist account of race. Indeed, it is important to note
that, in responding to Appiah’s critique of Du Bois, Taylor is motivated by the desire to support
a political racial constructionist project. Those who are similarly motivated may find Taylor’s
response more persuasive than those who are not so similarly motivated. On its own, none of
this, of course, discredits Taylor’s response. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind Taylor’s
motivation.
Indeed, we see that another problem with Taylor’s response is that it does not provide
argumentative space for a cultural theory of race. In focusing on individuals’ biographies, Taylor
is concerned with the political content of these biographies. For instance, he notes concerning the
black race in particular that “[o]n Du Bois’s view, as [he has] reconstructed it, the common
history that defines the black race is a matter of parallel individual experiences under the
conditions of racist culture.”53 In light of this, one could argue that Taylor’s notion of
individuals’ biographies could be adapted to fit with a cultural theory of race, but this is not
plausible. In developing a cultural theory of race, the focus will not be on individuals’
biographies. Instead, the focus will be on individuals’ participation in a common racial cultural
tradition. So to the extent that Taylor’s response is successful, it is not one that is available to me
because it is not consistent with my view that races are cultural groups. Taylor’s response is only
available for someone who supports political racial constructionism.
Furthermore, I think that Appiah’s interpretation of Du Bois’s notion of common history
is correct. That is, in talking about the common history of a race, we really are talking about the
history of an entire race, as opposed to the parallel histories of individual members of a race.
53
Ibid., 123.
57
Indeed, in advancing a theory that posits that races are cultural groups, this is the only
understanding of common history that makes sense. As such, the circularity argument still poses
a challenge to my cultural theory of race. So I turn now to the task of attempting to respond to
the circularity argument in a way that actually honors my cultural theory of race.
The problem with the circularity argument is that Appiah’s interpretation of Du Bois’s
notion of common history, while correct in the way noted in the previous paragraph, is incorrect
insofar as it treats common history as a criterion for race individuation. There is nothing in Du
Bois’s definition of race that suggests this is what Du Bois meant when he included common
history in that definition. Instead, I take it Du Bois simply meant that insofar as races are cultural
groups, they have a common history. Understood in this way, there is no problem for Du Bois’s
definition. It is a simple fact of the matter that if races are cultural groups, then they will
certainly have a common history. Thus, the circularity argument is unsuccessful in discrediting
Du Bois. And given that my cultural theory of race is based on the foundation Du Bois sets out in
“Conservation”, the circularity argument is also unsuccessful in discrediting my cultural theory
of race. And given that the circularity argument is Appiah’s last challenge to racial
constructionism, Appiah’s racial skepticism cannot complete the necessary step of ruling out
racial constructionism as a viable option in the racial ontology debate. Ultimately, then, Appiah’s
racial skepticism is unsuccessful. In what follows, I take it as a given that I have successfully
made the case for my cultural theory of race. I will now move to examine the normative
dimension of the racial ontology debate in the next chapter.
58
Chapter Five
The Cultural Excellence Thesis
This chapter focuses on the normative dimension of the racial ontology debate. In what
follows, I call this the “normative debate”. In this chapter, I offer background information that is
necessary for understanding the shape of the normative debate. I will then present my cultural
excellence thesis and provide my arguments for this thesis. I go on to provide a picture of how
this thesis operates in the real world, focusing on blacks and Asians, in particular. I then present
and respond to Appiah’s eliminativist challenge. I finish this chapter by examining whether we
ought to conserve race even in the post-racist future.
5.1 Background
The normative debate is a debate over what we should do with our race talk, especially in
light of the ontological conclusions reached in the racial ontology debate. There are three
positions in the normative debate: conservationism, reconstructionism, and eliminativism.
Conservationism holds that our race talk should be conserved, reconstructionism holds that it
should be reconstructed to treat race as something other than what it actually is, and
eliminativism holds that our race talk should be eliminated, either entirely or in certain respects.
Conservationism and eliminativism are relatively straightforward positions.
Reconstructionism is trickier. In the literature, we find two main reconstructionist positions.
Lawrence Blum offers a reconstructionist position whereby we replace our talk of race with talk
of racialized groups. Recall that for Blum, races are essentially biological whereas racialized
groups are essentially socially constructions. Joshua Glasgow offers a reconstructionist position
59
whereby we transition from talking about races as biological groups to talking about races as
social groups.54 Neither Blum nor Glasgow’s reconstructionist positions work.
To see why, note that there is an epistemic connection between the normative and
ontological dimensions of race. In what follows, I refer to this as the “epistemic connection”.
Here, the idea is that if race is not real, there is an epistemic reason to eliminate race talk. So the
idea is that we should not treat unreal entities as though they were real. Conversely, if race is
real, we have an epistemic reason to conserve race talk. So the idea is that if race is real, we
should honor its reality accordingly in conserving race talk. The force of the epistemic reason to
either eliminate or conserve race talk does not necessarily override other, usually normative,
reasons to eliminative or conserve race talk. Nonetheless, it remains an important factor to
consider in the normative debate.
Turning back to Blum and Glasgow’s reconstructionist positions, we see, then, that their
positions fail to honor the epistemic connection. Of course, this, on its own, is not a decisive
reason to dismiss their positions. Indeed, Blum and Glasgow seem to see a need to conserve
something approximating race talk in order to achieve certain political goals as it relates to race.
But this is a problem. In order to achieve certain political goals as it relates to race, it seems as
though we need to be tracking, in our race talk, race itself, and not something merely
approximating race. And yet, the call to conserve something approximating race talk seems to be
their only viable position in the normative debate, for unless they have compelling reasons to
override consideration of the epistemic connection, it would be wildly counterintuitive for them
to suggest conserving race talk despite arguing that race is not real. To be clear, I am not
54
Blum does not develop his reconstructionist position. Glasgow tries to explicate both Blum’s reconstructionist
position and his own. See Glasgow, Theory, 147-154.
60
suggesting that this counterintuitiveness is an unsurmountable obstacle, but, again, one needs to
present compelling reasons to override consideration of the epistemic connection. Thus, given
that we cannot make sense of Blum and Glasgow’s reconstructionist positions, we must dismiss
them. Going forward, I forego any further discussion of reconstructionism and focus exclusively
on conservationism and eliminativism.
5.2 The cultural excellence thesis
The cultural excellence thesis is a conservationist thesis. It states that we ought to
conserve race talk based on the cultural value of races. Going further, this thesis states that while
there are good political reasons to conserve race talk, cultural reasons are sufficient on their own
to make the case for conserving race talk. Still, it is worthwhile to examine how seeing races as
cultural groups can be valuable from the standpoint of the political struggle against racism.
Indeed, given that races are cultural groups, this opens up space for exploring how this affects
our understanding of the political struggle against racism. Here, I argue that my cultural theory
which sees races as cultural groups opens up greater resources for fighting racism than any
political theory which sees races as merely political entities.
On the point of greater resources for fighting racism, the idea I offer here is this idea of
cultural excellence as anti-racist practice. In exemplifying cultural excellence, races are engaged,
at least some of the time, in an anti-racist practice. That is, cultural excellence helps to shield
oppressed races from the problems that inevitably come from living in a racist society. For
instance, consider the case of Chinese persons in Canada and the United States. Initially,
Chinatowns developed as places of racial and ethnic solidarity for Chinese persons – and, indeed,
for other Asian persons and other racially oppressed non-Asian persons. Although Chinatowns
61
initially developed as safe places where Chinese persons could go, they evolved into cultural
hubs exemplifying the best that Chinese culture has to offer. As such, they evolved into cultural
hubs that also began to offer economic, legal, and political protection for Chinese persons. As
Chinese persons rose socio-economically, there were greater resources for fighting racism.55
Although this is a story of a specific Asian ethnic group, similar stories can be told for other
Asian ethnic groups and other non-Asian racially oppressed ethnic groups.
This notion of cultural excellence as anti-racist practice is also important from the
standpoint of resisting cultural hegemony (that is, proliferation of a dominant culture) and one of
its consequences, namely cultural appropriation. Indeed, in countries such as Canada and the
United States, there is a recognition among many race scholars that white supremacy is not just a
racist system operating along economic, legal, and political lines, but it is one that also structures
the cultural life of a society. In this regard, it is important for oppressed races to carve out their
own distinctive forms of cultural expression. Du Bois nicely captures this point in the case of
blacks in America when he notes that they must strive so that “their destiny is not a servile
imitation of Anglo-Saxon culture, but a stalwart originality which shall unswervingly follow
Negro ideals.”56
However, it is not enough simply for oppressed races to carve out their own distinctive
forms of cultural expression, for cultural appropriation is always a danger in a society structured
by white supremacy, or, indeed, any system of race-based domination. As it relates to racial
cultural appropriation, there is an abundance of examples to draw from. I will focus, then, on a
particularly common form of racial cultural appropriation. For those who have devoted their
55
In the Canadian context, the notion of Chinese-Canadian restaurants as an important anti-racist institution is
particularly salient here. See Joshua Wingrove, “The Chinese restaurant as a Prairie icon,” The Globe and Mail,
April 30, 2013, www.theglobeandmail.com.
56
Du Bois, “Conservation” in Folk, 183.
62
lives to the study of race, it should come as no surprise here when I mention the cultural
appropriation of the iconography of different oppressed races. We see this kind of cultural
appropriation as it relates, for instance, to the symbols of various Native American tribes being
used by the white dominant culture to further aims that are devoid of any connection to the
significance of the symbols in their original culture. This kind of cultural appropriation viciously
seeks to exploit the use of Native American tribal symbols in a way that ignores the history of
conquest and dispossession of Native Americans.
While the consequences of cultural appropriation are dangerous to the racial pride of
different oppressed races, the idea of cultural excellence as anti-racist practice provides certain
resources for fighting cultural appropriation. As we saw in the case of Chinatowns, the
exemplification of cultural excellence can eventually bring with it greater resources for fighting
different forms of racism – for instance, resources in the form of economic, legal, and political
protection. As different groups gain more influence in the society, there is greater leverage to
advance their aims in resisting cultural appropriation. There is also a certain level of
consciousness-raising that can take place when a race continues to strive for cultural excellence
in the face of cultural appropriation by the dominant culture. This was the case as it relates to
Native American symbols being used in particular by sports teams, with pressure coming from
Native Americans and their allies for these teams to change their practices of cultural
appropriation.
Of course, none of this is to suggest that cultural excellence is all we need for fighting
racism. The point being made here is simply that the idea of cultural excellence as anti-racist
practice opens up different ways of looking at how we can fight racism. Indeed, the general
tendency for those working on race in the academy, in terms of my own observations, is to focus
63
overwhelmingly on the economic, legal, and political dimensions of racism. However, this
orientation obfuscates an important dimension through which racism operates, namely in terms
of cultural hegemony. The idea of cultural excellence as anti-racist practice is an idea that I hope
will create a space for resistance against this kind of obfuscation in race analysis and theorizing.
Moving on from this political focus, then, I turn now to a consideration of the cultural
value that races bring to the society and the world. Here, cultural diversity will be the central
feature of the discussion. Indeed, cultural diversity is often valorized in multicultural societies
such as Canada or the United States. But in considering the value of cultural diversity, there are a
number of issues we must address. To start, we must recognize that there is a presupposition
underlying the positive valence which we associate with cultural diversity. That is, cultural
diversity is a positive aspect of a society only insofar as the cultures in question bring a breadth
and depth of dynamic cultural energy to the society. However, this is not always the case. At the
very least, we can imagine multicultural societies which are culturally impoverished.57 It is quite
clear, then, that cultural diversity as such is not something that we should value in an uncritical
way. Again, we should celebrate cultural diversity only if it is buttressed by a breadth and depth
of dynamic cultural energy.
As it relates to cultural diversity, we also need to disassociate cultural diversity with an
idea that often underlies support for multiculturalism. This is the idea that all cultures are equal
with respect to the cultural excellence they exemplify in terms of cultural products, cultural
imagination, cultural forms of expression, and so on. Not only is this idea false, but it overlooks
an important aspect to life in a multicultural society, which is that cultures are often engaged in
57
By culturally impoverished, I am talking about a society in which there is neither a breadth nor depth of cultural
excellence that is exemplified for any significant length of time. Cultural problems may be manifest in such societies
but there can be a political and economic dimension as well. For instance, consider Yugoslavia, a country in which
there were many ethnic conflicts during the nineteenth to early twentieth.
64
competition as it relates to different forms of cultural excellence. This kind of competition –
provided that it is conducted in accordance with certain norms – is healthy and beneficial to the
society insofar as it generates new forms of communication between cultures and generates
motivation for different cultures to present better cultural gifts to the society, among other things.
Provided that we keep these caveats about the value of cultural diversity in mind, there is
no doubt that cultural diversity is, in fact, a great thing for virtually any society. For those of us
who are lucky enough to live in multicultural societies, cultural diversity brings with it
opportunities to enrich our understanding of other cultures. At this point, what would be helpful
in illuminating the kind of cultural value that races, in particular, bring to the society and the
world, are some actual, concrete cases in the real world. I turn to presenting such cases in the
next section.
5.3 Racial cultural excellence
In this section, I focus on two specific cases that will help to paint a picture of what racial
cultural excellence actually looks like in the real world. In doing so, in addition to the arguments
I am making for the cultural excellence thesis, I hope that this will provide additional support in
the form of intuitively compelling evidence.
The first case I look at concerns blacks, in the United States in particular, and their
contributions to popular music. The history of popular music, as we know it in its contemporary
form, derives, arguably, from its roots in the early practice of singing hymns and spirituals in
black gospel music. This eventually led to the development of different forms of regionallybased blues music. From blues music, different popular music genres such as country, rock, soul,
and RnB (rhythm and blues) are derived. The best example, arguably, of how popular music
65
today derives from the black gospel tradition is Aretha Franklin. Franklin’s influence is seen not
only in terms of her influence on the particular sounds and nuances of different popular musical
genres, but it is also seen in the influence of her singing techniques which have inspired many
singers in popular music today. Indeed, it is not possible to listen to much of today’s popular
music without hearing the distinctive influence she has had.58
I move now to looking at my other case of racial cultural excellence, which concerns
Asians, in the United States in particular, and their contributions to the development of an Asianfusion cuisine. Here, we must recognize that there is no Asian cuisine as such, just as there is, for
instance, no black cuisine as such. But there are different Asian ethnic cuisines, different black
ethnic cuisines, and so on. So the achievement of a distinctive Asian-fusion cuisine is a product
of the creativity, imagination, and dynamism of Asian chefs.
While different Asian ethnic cuisines share commonalities in terms of the use of similar
ingredients, similar dishes, and so on, there are also pronounced differences in terms of, say,
emphasis on different taste and flavor profiles. So the challenge in fusing different Asian ethnic
cuisines into a distinctive Asian-fusion cuisine is tremendous. But it has been done. And Asians
should be proud of this cultural achievement, for other races have yet to replicate this kind of
culinary achievement. That is, we have yet to see the development of a successful and thriving
black-fusion cuisine, white-European-fusion cuisine, and so on.59
These two cases of racial cultural excellence lend considerable support, then, to
acceptance of the cultural excellence thesis. Although these two cases demonstrate that there can
58
For instance, see Rolling Stone staff, “100 Greatest Singers of All Time,” Rolling Stone, December 2, 2010,
www.rollingstone.com. Franklin is listed as the greatest singer of all time on the Rolling Stone’s list.
59
For instance, see Sara Dickerman, “Fusion Reaction: How America fell in love, and then out of love, and then in
love all over again, with Asian-influenced cuisine,” Slate, April 12, 2012, www.slate.com.
66
be a tremendous degree of racial pride in the cultural achievements of one’s race, it is also
important to note that there is a sense in which everyone can benefit from these cultural
achievements in a multicultural society. That is, black-influenced popular music is not just for
blacks, just as Asian-fusion cuisine is not just for Asians. Indeed, one of the promises of
multiculturalism is the fusion of different cultures into a synergistic whole that is more than
simply the sum of its parts.
And when we speak of a multicultural society, we must emphasize that we are not
speaking simply of ethnic cultural diversity here, for the cases I focus on in this section
demonstrate that there is a dimension of cultural excellence that is distinctively racial in
character. Of course, ethnic cultural excellence is important, but we lose out on a great deal by
not recognizing and affirming racial cultural excellence. So given all of the reasons provided,
then, we must accept the cultural excellence thesis.
5.4 Appiah’s eliminativism
In this section, I look at Appiah’s position as it relates to the normative debate. In
presenting his position, I look at some of the issues that arise for my cultural excellence thesis.
With respect to the normative debate, Appiah is an eliminativist. That is, he argues for the
elimination of race talk in the long term. In the short term, however, Appiah is in favor of racial
identities as a transitional step toward eliminativism, as it conserves some aspects of race talk
that individuals might find worth conserving. Even here, though, Appiah thinks there is danger in
retaining racial identities as a way for individuals to make sense of their relation to their
communities and the world at large. In particular, Appiah believes that racial identities promote
the use of racial scripts in organizing and structuring our behavior in ways that limit and
67
constrain our free expression. It is in this sense that Appiah believes that racial identities can “go
imperial” on the individuals who have an attachment to them.60
Appiah provides the most comprehensive and persuasive case for eliminativism. As such,
I take it to pose the greatest challenge to the cultural excellence thesis. So, in what follows, I
focus exclusively on his particular brand of eliminativism.
I am sympathetic to Appiah’s eliminativism. Central to Appiah’s eliminativism is a
general suspicion of forms of self-identification which function to constrict the free expression of
individuals. While individuals should have the freedom to navigate their worlds and engage in
various sorts of creative and productive endeavors, it is undeniable that some of our in-group
associations may prevent us from the kind of cross-cultural engagement that is central to living a
vibrant and rich life, at least for those of us living in societies which are diverse with respect to
many dimensions of social life.
The moral dangers of racial identities are particularly worrisome given the history of
involuntary, forced racial ascriptions, used in the service of promoting and maintaining different
forms of racial oppression, including slavery. There is a worry that, even in their contemporary
form, racial identities still carry with them aspects of this legacy. One might question whether it
is even possible to entirely shear from racial identities the moral and psychological weight of
race-based terror. When we really understand the history of race-based terror, it is no wonder
why Appiah’s brand of eliminativism is such an attractive position.
And yet, I disagree with much of what Appiah says. Members of oppressed races have
always contested and resisted the morally problematic aspects of their racial identities. As an
60
For Appiah’s case for eliminativism, see Appiah, Color, 74-105.
68
Asian person, I do not accept the race-based limitations imposed on me which dictate that I must
be quiet and agreeable all the time. That is, I do not accept the infantilization of Asians. I do not
accept any of the racist characterizations of Asians that operate to stifle, mask, and diminish
Asian excellence. Indeed, it is important to note that Asian resistance against the kind of racial
scripts Appiah is concerned about has challenged and problematized those scripts.61 This shows
that racial identities are not fixed. Instead, racial identities can transform and shift in positive
ways. So racial scripts do not have the kind of limiting power Appiah thinks they do.
At this point, one might object that my response does not get to the heart of Appiah’s
main concern: autonomy. More precisely, it seems as though what Appiah cares about is the
availability of identity options. He claims, on a personal level: “If I had to choose between Uncle
Tom or Black Power, I would, of course, choose the latter. But I would like not to have to
choose. I would like other options.”62 This desire for options arises from a recognition of the
freedom-restricting tendencies of racial scripts.
I will refine my response, then, by suggesting that we should not respond to the
imperializing tendencies of racial identities by eliminating racial identities altogether. In the face
of racism, we should, as racially oppressed persons, engage in a process of reinventing our racial
identities, to fashion them in ways that honor our dignity and in ways that honor our differences
as members of different races. In doing so, we exercise and honor our autonomy, as opposed to
diminishing it. Indeed, how are we honoring a concern for the availability of options when we
choose to remove an option that provides for a distinctly racial form of self-identification? Racial
eliminativists need to think hard about this question, for we all know that racial identity is not the
61
For instance, Bruce Lee is an important figure in changing the perception (by some) of Asians as infantilized
individuals.
62
Ibid., 99.
69
only problematic social identity in our contemporary life. Gay identity, for instance, is also
morally problematic. Are gay men’s freedom constrained by the scripts that prescribe limits as to
how gay men should behave? Perhaps, but it is also undeniable that there is, for many gay men,
pride in being gay. And this pride cannot, and should not, be discounted simply because there is
anti-gay hostility. Similarly, there is racial pride in being Asian (black, indigenous, and so on),
and this racial pride cannot, and should not, be discounted simply because there is anti-Asian
racism (anti-black racism, anti-indigenous racism, and so on). My racial pride will never be
diminished by the fact that there is anti-Asian racism.
One might argue that in talking about racial pride, I am making an untenable claim. That
is, it is not clear that there actually is racial pride for members of racial groups, particularly for
those that have experienced racism in ways that have had a significant impact on their lives. So
to be clear, in talking about racial pride, I am not claiming that the experiences of all members of
all racial groups are best characterized by racial pride. But I do believe that racial pride is a
feature of many experiences of racial membership. Just as there are those who choose to eschew
their racial identity, there are also some individuals for whom having a racial identity is
important insofar as it links one to a larger racial community, characterized in part by
participation in different racial cultural forms of engagement.
And by racial pride, I am talking about a positive endorsement of one’s race in a way that
opens up possibilities for one to participate fully and enthusiastically in one’s racial cultural
tradition. For instance, there are race-specific awards shows and ceremonies that are dedicated to
celebrating the best in different areas of accomplishment. Two examples come to mind: The
BET (Black Entertainment Television) awards celebrate black American achievement (and for
that matter, the achievements of other American racial minority groups as well), and the Asian
70
Film Awards celebrate excellence in Asian Cinema. These celebrations of racial cultural
excellence show that racial pride is not only a feature of many individuals’ experiences of racial
membership, but that such racial pride is often central in understanding celebrations of racial
cultural excellence.
This racial pride also opens up possibilities for recognizing the accomplishments of other
members of one’s race in a way that can even lead to elation when a member of one’s race
succeeds. For instance, consider Jeremy Lin’s success in the NBA. While Lin’s success was
widely celebrated in the larger society across racial lines, it was also an important racial cultural
moment for Asians in particular. And to the extent that Lin is a role model for many Asian youth,
it is not hard to see how his success might have an impact on the self-esteem of many of these
youth. Indeed, the connection between pride and self-esteem is an intimate one. Research shows
that for black American adolescents, positive racial socialization messages (focusing on cultural
pride) from parents are positively correlated with the peer self-esteem of these adolescents, while
higher cultural endorsement of white mainstream racial socialization messages are negatively
associated with the school self-esteem of these adolescents.63
So we should not eliminate options relating to social identification simply because there
may be morally problematic aspects for any given option. Instead, we should pay attention to the
ways in which individuals have resisted the morally problematic aspects of their racial identities.
We should also pay attention to the ways in which individuals positively affirm their racial
identities. When we do this, it is clear that Appiah’s concerns about the availability of identity
options do not justify the elimination of racial identities. Indeed, a love of freedom requires that
63
Madonna G. Constantine and Sha’Kema M. Blackmon, “Black Adolescents Racial Socialization Experiences:
Their Relations to Home, School, and Peer Self-Esteem,” Journal of Black Studies 32, no. 3 (2002): 322-335.
71
we conserve such options, so that individuals have the choice to shape these options in ways that
honor their own conception of who they are. Ultimately, considerations of freedom should lead
one toward conservationism, not eliminativism.
Part of the appeal of eliminativism is that it offers a way out to frustrated racially
oppressed persons. It suggests that we do not have to deal with the racial aspect of who we are.
Instead, I think it is important to focus on the efforts of individuals who have done the hard work
of challenging racial scripts, for their resistance to such scripts demonstrates that we do not have
to be bound by them.
There is another aspect of Appiah’s eliminativism that concerns us. Appiah is adamant
that we should not think of our racial identities as being predicated, in any way, on the idea that
races are cultural groups. Appiah makes the following point:
I have insisted that African-Americans do not have a single culture, in the sense of shared
language, values, practices, and meanings. But many people who think of races as groups
defined by shared cultures, conceive that sharing in a different way. They understand
black people as sharing black culture by definition: jazz or hip-hop belongs to an AfricanAmerican, whether she likes it or knows anything about it, because it is culturally marked
as black. Jazz belongs to a black person who knows nothing about it more fully or
naturally than it does to a white jazzman.64
Appiah sees this view as an instance of cultural geneticism.65 This is the view that the cultural
products of a race are yours simply in virtue of your being a member of that race. Appiah insists
64
Appiah, Color, 90.
The term “cultural geneticism” comes from Henry Louis Gates Jr., and for more on this, see Appiah’s footnote in
Ibid.
65
72
that we should instead understand culture in terms of one’s earning one’s way into a particular
culture by way of thoughtful reflection and engagement. Call this the “self-cultivation view” of
culture. For Appiah, “[i]f you have this [self-cultivation] view of culture, you will think of
cultural geneticism as the doctrine of the ignorant or the lazy, or at least of those who pander to
them. And it is a view of culture whose adoption would diminish any society that seriously
adopted it.”66
One might argue that cultural geneticism naturally follows from my view of races as
cultural groups. However, I argue that this is not the case. There is nothing in what I have written
that suggests anything like this. Appiah is right that cultural geneticism is a ridiculous doctrine.
The value of culture lies, in part, in the voluntary striving (as mentioned in Du Bois’s definition
of race) that is rooted in the kind of thoughtful reflection and engagement Appiah emphasizes.
One does not get to claim the cultural products of the one’s race for oneself unless, and until, one
understands the history of one’s race in a way that allows for one to fully appreciate the cultural
achievements of one’s race. All of this is just to say that I agree with Appiah about what culture
entails. However, again, I do not agree that cultural geneticism flows from my view of races as
cultural groups.
Nonetheless, one might object that my cultural theory of race still needs to provide an
account of cultural inheritance that answers that some of the concerns Appiah has concerning
cultural geneticism. There is something to this objection. However, it seems as though Appiah
conflates these two things – that is, he conflates cultural inheritance and cultural geneticism.
Cultural geneticism, as described by Appiah, is only one understanding of cultural inheritance,
and it is one that is too narrow to honor what cultural inheritance is really about. Indeed, the
66
Ibid., 91.
73
cultural geneticist focus on the ownership of certain aspects of a racial-cultural tradition by
individuals is misleading and just wrong. Instead, I would say that jazz, for instance, belongs to
the black cultural tradition, and that blacks, as natural participants in this tradition, can be
understood as being the closest to such a tradition, because how that tradition grows and
develops will have the greatest impact on blacks, given that jazz is a uniquely black cultural
product that uniquely speaks to black cultural achievement. When we understand cultural
inheritance in this way, there is no problem.
There is one final objection concerning cultural geneticism that deserves our attention. I
said, in the previous paragraph, that jazz belongs to the black cultural tradition. This might be a
cause for concern for some, because even though I have tried to distance my cultural theory of
race from cultural geneticism, it seems as though I am still beholden to a certain cultural
geneticist understanding of cultural inheritance. More precisely, one might wonder why we need
to even talk about cultural ownership at all. Indeed, talk about cultural ownership seems to create
barriers between individuals and between groups, when such barriers are not necessary. Thus,
there should be no barriers, for instance, to whites participating in the jazz tradition.
To be clear, when I say that jazz belongs to the black cultural tradition, I am not, in any
way, suggesting that whites cannot participate in the jazz tradition. I would say, however, that all
non-blacks have a special obligation to be cognizant of their participation in the black cultural
tradition, given that this tradition is not their own racial cultural tradition. Whites, in particular,
need to be even more cognizant given that they are members of the dominant racial cultural
group, at least in countries such as Canada and the United States. The general point applies, as
well. That is, whenever one is participating in a racial cultural tradition different from one’s own,
one must be a responsible participant such that one does not engage, for instance, in cultural
74
appropriation. The emphasis here is on responsible participation. I believe in cross-cultural
engagement, not cultural barriers. However, cross-cultural engagement must be predicated on
responsible participation.
We should also embrace cultural ownership (again, understood as a cultural item
belonging to a particular cultural tradition) for it is important to recognize the diverse sources of
achievement. It is also a matter of recognizing facts, for it is a fact that jazz is a black cultural
tradition. Recognition of cultural ownership is also important because it serves as a form of
resistance to cultural appropriation. Cultural appropriation is a form of exploitation. In a white
supremacist society, cultural appropriation operates by taking the cultural products of non-whites
and using in ways that serve white supremacist ends. This often manifests as a form of financial
exploitation, whereby the cultural products of non-whites are used by whites for their own
financial gain. Meanwhile, the original significance of these non-white cultural products are
ignored or erased altogether. Whether we are talking about, say, the exploitation of black music
or the exploitation of Asian stories, the consequences of such exploitation are dangerous for the
spirit of the racial communities directly impacted. And calls to end such exploitation are not
adequately addressed by simply telling those directly affected to “quit being so sensitive”, for
such exploitation breeds racial resentment. To the extent that racial harmony is a worthy goal,
racial resentment is anathema to such a goal.
There is one final aspect of Appiah’s eliminativism that concerns us. It is not one that
Appiah mentions in his case for eliminativism, but it is one that can help to further the case for
eliminativism, and it is one that is relevant to my cultural excellence thesis. Up until this point, I
have not directly addressed the white race. There are many difficulties here. To start, there is
ambiguity concerning what counts as white racial cultural excellence. One reason for this is that
75
instead of counting as a distinct race, whites have largely had an impact culturally through
whiteness counting as the unspoken and often unacknowledged standard against which other,
non-white races are to be compared and judged. Thus, we have, for instance, questions as to
whether, say, Asian literature is on the same level, in terms of literary excellence, as white
literature. And this example raises another ambiguity in the case of white literature. Is white
literature really a white cultural phenomenon, when so many non-whites have contributed to,
say, English literature? Or perhaps English literature is a white cultural achievement because the
canonical authors and works in this literary tradition are virtually all white. More precisely, we
would have to say that the canonical authors and works in this literary tradition are judged to be
virtually all white. The example of English literature also highlights the fact that non-whites have
often participated in cultural traditions taken to be white because such cultural traditions have
been elevated by societies that valorize whiteness. It is in this way that English literature is often
taken by some to be synonymous with being just good literature, with the implication being that
non-English literature must meet a higher standard to be judged to be good, or with the
implication being that such non-English literature is ignored altogether. All of this is just to say
that the notion of white literature, like many white cultural achievements, is fraught with
difficulty.
Part of this difficulty lies in the fact that whiteness is not neutral. In many cases,
whiteness is tethered to the advancement of white supremacy. However, in terms of the cultural
excellence thesis, it is important to recognize that the relationship between whiteness and white
supremacy is a contingent one. We can readily imagine a world in which whiteness developed
within a decidedly non-white supremacist tradition. That, of course, is not the world we live in,
but it is possible to imagine such a world. So what we really need in talking about the white race
76
is an approach that uncouples white supremacist whiteness from what it means to be white. And
I think this is possible. There is a case to be made that English literature really is a white cultural
achievement because the English literary tradition, foundationally, is a tradition that developed
from an examination of those who are, in fact, white. This is a factual matter. Either Shakespeare
really was writing (mostly) about whites, or he was not. There is a good case to be made that he
was, in fact, actually writing (mostly) about whites. None of this is to suggest that it is an easy
project to decouple the white race from the notion of white supremacist whiteness (call this the
“decoupling project”). I am simply arguing that it is possible to do this in a way that can provide
validity to the idea of a white race. And in a project like this, it is crucial that anti-racism remain
at the center of one’s judgements.
However, turning back to Appiah’s eliminativism, there is a case to be made that this
decoupling project is not feasible. One might argue that white supremacy infects every aspect of
whiteness such that no notion of the white race can be rescued from the legacy of white
supremacy. And yet, even in this objection, we must recognize that white supremacy is an
ideology that supports the unjust elevation of the white race. Just as we can make sense of an
unjustly elevated white race, we can make sense of a white race that is not unjustly elevated
through the advancement of a pernicious ideology. We can imagine a white race that is simply
one race among many, striving to exemplify cultural excellence, but not doing so in a way that
harms other races. This would be a good thing for whites, and it would be a good thing for race
relations.
In attempting to engage with Appiah’s eliminativist concerns, I have often talked about
the positive aspects of racial identity. However, there is more to be said about why racial
identities are important. Racial identities are important because they function as a way of
77
anchoring one’s experience in the world. That is, racial identities help individuals to have an
appreciation of who they are. Furthermore, racial identities help individuals to navigate their
social worlds by providing a sense of rootedness in terms of a foundation of self-knowledge.
This is why the erasure of racial identities is extremely problematic. For instance, consider the
case of the Canadian Indian residential school system. This system systematically removed any
concrete sense of racial identity from indigenous youth. This was accomplished by alienating
these youth from their traditions, language, families, and communities. In light of this legacy, it
is not difficult to see why there is a demand among some indigenous persons for truth and
reconciliation.
Understanding this legacy is important because there is sometimes confusion and even
resistance concerning the calls for truth and reconciliation. Perhaps some of this confusion and
resistance can be attributed to the fact that erasure of racial identity is not as salient for some
people. However, for some indigenous persons, the personal experience of erasure of racial
identity is a concrete reality. For those of us who are fortunate enough to have a stable and robust
racial identity, we need to be careful about not taking our racial identities for granted. Even for
those who choose to eschew their racial identity, having a racial identity in the first place is not
something to be overlooked. Indeed, the discussion in this section concerning the contesting of
racial identities is one that presupposes the possession by individuals of a racial identity in the
first place. And yet there are some for whom having a racial identity is not a given. So Appiah’s
eliminativism is problematic because it does not take into the account the importance of having
racial identities insofar as racial identities help give us a sense of who we are as individuals.
Ultimately, Appiah’s case for eliminativism is unsuccessful. However, we can still learn
a lot from Appiah’s eliminativism. Most importantly, Appiah’s eliminativism reminds us that we
78
must always be vigilant about the moral dangers of race. This is a lesson that we must always
keep at the forefront of our discussions of race. With this in mind, it is time to move forward. We
are not yet done with the cultural excellence thesis, for there are some issues that we still need to
look at before the conclusion of this thesis.
5.5 Race in the post-racist future
Up to this point, in presenting and arguing for my cultural excellence thesis, I have been
implicitly concerned with only the racist present we find ourselves in, as opposed to the postracist future we are working toward. In looking at the issues with which this thesis has been
concerned, our analysis is incomplete without an examination of the post-racist future. This
section is devoted to such an examination. This is not merely an exercise in thinking about the
interesting things that may await us in such a future, but in thinking about what such a future
may look like, we may end up with a better grasp on race.
In talking about the post-racist future, I am not talking about a kind of utopia. That is, I
am not talking about a world that is perfect with respect to all dimensions of morality and
politics. In talking about the post-racist future, I am talking about a world where racial justice
obtains. This is a world in which one’s racial membership is not a barrier to one’s living a free
and meaningful life. Du Bois, himself, seems to gesture at the possibility of such a world: “[I]it is
our duty to conserve our physical powers, our intellectual endowments, our spiritual ideals; as a
race we must strive by race organization, by race solidarity, by race unity to the realization of
that broader humanity which freely recognizes differences in men, but sternly deprecates
inequality in their opportunities of development.”67 I believe such a world is actually possible in
67
Du Bois, “Conservation” in Folk, 185.
79
the sense of it being reasonably within our reach. I believe it is possible to design and structure
our social institutions in ways that allow for free access to the opportunities of development Du
Bois mentions. However, this is not a world in which racial harmony obtains. By racial harmony,
I mean a world in which there is a perfect state of harmony between the different races such that
there are never any racial disagreements or racial (non-violent) conflicts. Such a world might
sound nice at first, but I do not think it is desirable. I have mentioned the importance of
competition between different cultures in this thesis before68, but it is relevant here as well. In a
racially harmonious world, there would not be sufficient levels of (non-violent) conflict between
races to generate the kind of productive competition that I think is an essential form of racial
cross-cultural engagement. The kind of racial cultural competition I am talking about here is a
competition in which the central focus is on races trying to improve themselves, as opposed to
trying to diminish other races. There needs to be a certain level of racial disharmony – enough to
make things interesting. A racially harmonious world would be boring.
In describing the post-racist future, I am assuming that race will still be around in such a
future. Indeed, I hope that race will still around in such a future, and I argue that it would be a
good thing if race were still around in such a future. As such, the cultural excellence thesis
applies not only to the racist present, but also to the post-racist future.
However, in thinking about race in the post-racist future, Jeffers foregrounds two
difficulties that confront us.69To start, there is an issue concerning the desirability of whiteness in
the post-racist future. In speaking about whiteness in the racist present70, I was hopeful about the
possibility of carving out a space for the white race so that the white race is just one race among
68
See page 63-64 of this thesis.
Chike Jeffers foregrounds and discusses these two difficulties in Jeffers, “Cultural,” 423-26. I owe a lot to his
discussion and analysis.
70
See pages 74-76 of this thesis.
69
80
many. However, it might be thought that the possibility of a post-racist future necessarily means
the dissolving of the white race.
I do not see this to be the case. For those of us non-white persons living in white
supremacist societies, what should concern us is not the dissolving of the white race but, rather,
the overcoming of white supremacy. White supremacy is the obstacle that prevents non-white
persons from having access to the full range of opportunities of development Du Bois mentions,
not the white race as such. With this in mind, there is no problem to the notion of the white race
being around in the post-racist future. White culture will not cease to be simply because white
supremacy is no longer a reality.71
Jeffers foregrounds another important issue: “we should either imagine that races in a
future post-racist world will be connected to races in our world by lines of descent, and thus most
likely by distinctive appearances similar to those we possess now, or that they will not.”72 In his
own analysis, Jeffers focuses exclusively on the lines of descent, but I think the worry here really
concerns racially distinctive appearances. This is an important issue that we must grapple with,
especially as it is one that, up until now, I have not discussed in presenting my cultural theory of
race and my cultural excellence thesis.
On my cultural theory of race, racial visible features are relevant insofar as they serve as
racial markers that serve as a generally reliable, though imperfect, tool for distinguishing
individuals of different races. In this sense, they are also relevant in terms of providing a sense of
71
The dissolving of the white race in the post-racist future would mean that whites would be closed off from
participation in a common racial cultural tradition which would be an unwelcome implication. And it would also
mean that whites would be unraced, while non-whites would be raced. This is perhaps too reminiscent of the
Colonial motivation to move forward the project of racially classifying “others” but not those doing the racial
classification. This, too, would be an unwelcome implication.
72
Jeffers, “Cultural,” 425.
81
racial community. Racial visible features help us in a process of racial community-building by
enabling us to readily identify those with whom we share a common racial cultural tradition.
These racial visible features are maintained by sufficient levels of inbreeding within races.
However, the fact that racial visible features must be maintained is an important one, for it is
possible that racial visible features will cease to exist in the post-racist future. And if this is the
case, it seems as though races, even if we understand them to be cultural groups, will cease to
exist in the post-racist future. That is, visible racial differentiation is a central part of what race
is. And yet, due to such factors as the increasing levels of interracial marriage and racial
interbreeding, it seems as though visible racial differentiation will cease to be in the post-racist
future (or even before then).
We could focus on ancestral lines of descent to replace racial visible features as a tool for
distinguishing individuals of different races, but the role of racial visible features extends beyond
its use as a tool for recognizing racial differentiation. Racial visible features are taken to be a
paradigmatic element in what race is. It is true that ancestral lines of descent are also a
paradigmatic element in what race is, but we are looking at two distinct elements here. Thus, we
cannot simply substitute ancestral lines of descent to replace the role that racial visible features
play in race.
To be clear, the forms of cultural difference that exist between races can still exist
without the existence of visible racial features, but the issue, in the absence of such visible racial
features, is whether we should still call the resulting culturally differentiated groups races. An
alternative might be to think of these groups as ethnic groups. Jeffers, himself, considers such an
alternative. But there is a real issue as to whether this alternative is even available to us, given
that there is a relationship between racial visible features, races, and ethnic groups. That is, races
82
are often taken to be composed of subgroups in the form of ethnic groups. For instance, the
Chinese, Japanese, and Korean ethnic groups are often taken to be a part of the larger family
known as the Asian race. But in the absence of visible racial features, it would not make sense to
talk about even ethnic groups. If Italians looked exactly like Koreans, it seems as though ethnic
groups, in addition to races, would also cease to exist. Indeed, racial visible features are not only
relevant for race, but they are also relevant for ethnicity.
What this analysis of racial visible features shows is that these features are important
even for a cultural racial constructionist position, even though they are not taken to be important
in a racial naturalist way. Racial visible features are important for cultural racial constructionism
because racial visible features are central to race. So this is an issue that concerns all racial
realists.
My response to this analysis of racial visible features is to agree with it. If racial visible
features cease to exist, races would cease to exist. However, the issue over what to call the
remaining once-racial groups, at this point, might still be important. Furthermore, deciding
whether to conserve these once-racial groups might still be important. It is possible that
individuals in the post-racist future might want to conserve these once-racial groups by focusing
on ancestral lines of descent, although, once again, it must be emphasized that focusing on
ancestral lines of descent alone would not thereby make these once-racial groups into racial
groups. The conservation of these once-racial groups might be important because they still might
embody meaningful forms of cultural expression. They might be important also because they
would serve as a reminder of race and racism.
83
To be clear, just because I agree with the analysis of racial visible features, does not mean
that I am happy with the potential disappearance of race in the post-racist future. The reality is
that with the loss of race, I would be sad. This should be clear given everything I have said in
this thesis. With the loss of race, we would be losing a source of joy and contentment. But I
believe that we, as humans, are capable of finding different and interesting forms of cultural
expression that provide for us different sources of joy and contentment. We should do this not so
that we may find something to replace race if race ceases to exist, for nothing can really replace
race. We should do this because if the history of racial cultural excellence has taught us anything,
it is that it is in our natures to strive for excellence.
5.6 Future research
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide a rigorous examination of the cultural
dimensions of races and racism. This general project of connecting cultural considerations with
race is difficult for the racial ontology debate has largely gone on without an explicit
acknowledgement of culture. In this respect, the work to be done perhaps falls most naturally
onto those who advance cultural theories of race, but I believe it is incumbent on all the
participants in the racial ontology debate to do this work. One does not have to hold a cultural
view of race in order to see that the cultural dimensions of races and racism are worth paying
attention to.
One might object that some of what I say in this chapter is too quick, but it is important to
emphasize that no thesis chapter could possibly do full justice to the full range of considerations
that would have to receive rigorous treatment in an analysis of the cultural dimensions of races
and racism. What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to provide a general framework for
84
thinking about the cultural dimensions of races and racism, specifically in the context of my
cultural theory of race. So for instance, I have taken care not to be too firm in my descriptions of
what cultural appropriation amounts to because context matters, and my treatment of cultural
appropriation is provided in the context of my cultural theory of race. Nonetheless, any cultural
theory of race must address culture. That is, in order to honor the idea that races are cultural
groups, we must engage with different cultural concepts. It is my hope that the framework I have
provided in this chapter helps to clarify the positions I am taking in this thesis. At the same time,
I am aware that there is more work to be done on the issues I have raised in this chapter, but they
are not ones that I can do full justice to in this thesis.
I also hope that the framework that I have developed in this chapter helps us to think
more carefully about some of the issues that arise in thinking jointly about race and culture. I
think I have been successful in demonstrating that our ideas on race can inform the way we think
about culture. For instance, we must resist the impulse to think, as many do, that
multiculturalism only concerns ethnic cultural diversity, when the reality is that it also concerns
racial cultural diversity. I think I have also been successful in demonstrating that our ideas on
culture can inform the way we think about racism. Indeed, in looking at the cultural dimensions
of racism, we must consider the role that cultural hegemony plays in the proliferation of racist
ideas and in the promotion and maintenance of racial exploitation. So the connections between
race and culture provide many opportunities for future research.
85
Chapter Six
Conclusion
This thesis has set out to examine the reality of race by looking at the racial ontology
debate within the philosophy of race. In chapter two, I presented and argued against racial
naturalism. I showed that racial naturalism is not a viable option. In chapter three, I presented
and argued against racial skepticism. I showed that while Blum and Glasgow’s racial skeptic
arguments are unsuccessful, Appiah’s racial skeptic argument might be plausible. In chapter
four, I completed the case against Appiah by showing his racial skeptic argument to be
unsuccessful. I also presented and argued for my racial constructionist position. I presented and
argued for my Du Boisian-inspired cultural theory of race, whereby races are cultural groups.
In chapter five, I went on to discuss the normative debate concerning race talk. I argued
for my cultural excellence thesis which is a conservationist thesis that states that we ought to
conserve race talk based on the value of having races. In particular, given that races are cultural
groups, we need to recognize the tremendous cultural value that races offer to our society and the
world. Going further, this thesis states that while there are good political reasons to conserve race
talk, cultural reasons are sufficient on their own to make the case for conserving race talk.
This thesis has contributed to the racial ontology debate by foregrounding and
highlighting the connections that exist between race and culture. In particular, this thesis gives us
greater insight into Du Bois’s legacy by clarifying and highlighting his achievements in
developing and advancing a cultural theory of race. This thesis has also expanded on Du Bois’s
contribution by further explicating what it means to say that races are cultural groups. It has also
86
contributed to explicating the nature of racial identity, and it has shown why racial identity is
important.
In arguing that races are cultural groups, I hope to create space for a further examination
of the cultural dimensions of races. In addition to furthering our understanding of races, I believe
this will also contribute to greater appreciation for racial cultural excellence. Our discourse on
culture is impoverished without an appreciation of the distinctive racial dimensions of cultural
excellence. I also hope that my idea of cultural excellence as anti-racist practice will inspire
others to write more about the nature of racial cultural solidarity. And while I hope that much of
this future research takes place in the discipline of philosophy, I also believe that there are
opportunities for other disciplines to contribute as well. So I look forward to seeing the ideas that
I discuss in this thesis being developed more fully by others in the future.
For me, as much as the writing of this thesis has been an intellectual exercise, it is also
bound up in my own journey of personal understanding and development. It is not an
exaggeration to say that in reading W.E.B. Du Bois’s “The Conservation of Races”, I found a
text which spoke to, and also relieved, my racial anxieties. As someone who used to run away
from my racial identity as an Asian person, I found in Du Bois a justification and a call for
celebration of this aspect of who I am. For this, I am deeply grateful to Du Bois for writing a text
that spoke to me personally and that speaks to the concerns of those of us living over a hundred
years after it was first published.
In many ways, race is an intractable topic, in part because it is not always clear what we
are talking about when we talk about race. In focusing specifically on racial ontology and the
value of race talk, I hope that this thesis serves to clarify the some of the difficulties that arise in
87
thinking about these issues. At the same time, it is undeniable that we still have a lot of work to
do, both in understanding race and in bringing about that post-racist future we are all working
toward.
88
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