Science and Pseudoscience
Imre Lakatos
Overview
Imre Lakatos gave a radio address in 1973 on the
question of science versus pseudoscience. The
selected article was the basis for that address. In the
address he responds to the demarcation proposals of
both Sir Karl Popper (see Science: Conjectures and
Refutations) and Thomas Kuhn (see Logic of Discovery
or Psychology of Research?).
The first half of his address discusses earlier
attempts, including those by Popper and Kuhn, to
distinguish between science and pseudoscience.
Lakatos explores the relationship between theory
and fact (or between law and fact) and he explores
(and rejects) various attempts to use that
relationship as a guide to proper science. He
considers probabilism as a way to make the
distinction between science and pseudoscience, and
unsurprisingly, he rejects this as well. Popper and
Kuhn fare no better. Lakatos finds faults with each of
their proposed solutions to the demarcation problem.
Having done away with these earlier attempts,
Lakatos moves on to provide his own solution to the
demarcation problem. He first describes to us what
he means by a research program. A research program
consists of a core set of ideas, the "hard core" of the
program, as well as a large collection of auxiliary
hypotheses and a set of problem-solving tools.
(Lakatos calls this set of tools a machinery or a
heuristic for solving problems.)
Now, having described the basic idea of a research
program, Lakatos goes on to distinguish between
progressive research programs and degenerating
ones. He makes use of a variety of historical examples
to illustrate the difference, with novel, unexpected
predictions being a highlight of progressive programs
and the lack of such predictions being a serious
deficiency of degenerating programs. It is the
progressive research programs that Lakatos will
identify with science.
You will have to decide for yourself how successful
Lakatos's attempt to solve the demarcation problem
really is, but before ending it is worth taking note of
his final paragraph. Lakatos attempts to make a
strong case for the importance of this question of
distinguishing between science and pseudoscience.
To him, the problem is not merely an academic one
but one of vital importance to society. Do you agree?
Key Terms
heuristic – a process or method relating to the
solving of a particular set of problems
hypothesis – a suggested explanation for some
observed phenomenon; a tentative proposal for
the solution to a problem
probabilism – an approach to central questions of
knowledge that makes use of probability rather
than certainty, and in particular that our degrees
of belief in propositions ought to satisfy the
axioms of probability
refutation – the act of showing something to be false,
wrong, or erroneous
In addition to the terms above, an understanding of
the basic terms from Popper's article would be
helpful.
Reading Questions
The following questions are meant to guide and assist
you in reading Popper’s article. They will draw your
attention to key passages and challenge you to think
about what Popper is really trying to say. Although
no page numbers are given, the questions come
roughly in the order that you will find their answers
in the text.
1. Why, according to Lakatos, is the demarcation
problem so important? It is worth noting that he
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starts and ends with justification for the value of
this particular question.
Why is the “degree of commitment to belief” an
inadequate way to distinguish science from
pseudoscience?
What does Lakatos mean when he says that the
cognitive value of a theory has nothing to do with
the psychological influence it has on people's
minds?
What was the commonly held view (including by
Isaac Newton!) of the relationship between
theories and facts?
Why does Lakatos believe that this view persists
even today? (Hint: The answer involves theology.)
How did the downfall of Newtonian theory (at the
hands of relativity and quantum mechanics)
affect this commonly held view?
How did the so-called “inductive logicians”
attempt to separate science from pseudoscience?
How did Popper respond to this attempt? Does
Lakatos seem to think Popper's response was
adequate?
What does Lakatos think Newtonian scientists
and Marxist historians have in common? How is
this relevant to the demarcation problem?
Why does Lakatos think Popper has failed to
distinguish successfully between science and
pseudoscience?
Why does Lakatos think Kuhn has failed to
distinguish successfully between science and
pseudoscience?
What does Lakatos mean by “a methodology of
scientific research programmes”? What exactly is
a research program?
What is the distinction between the hard core of a
research program and the “protective belt” of
auxiliary hypotheses?
What is a heuristic? How does it fit into research
programs?
There is an important footnote on page 24 that
discusses the use of “refutation” by Lakatos. How
is his use of the word different from a more
rigorous use of the word?
What characteristic is common to all of the
research programs that Lakatos admires? What
examples does he give?
16. What is the difference between a progressive
research program and a degenerating research
program?
17. Marxism also made serious predictions, just as in
the cases of Halley's Comet and Einstein's
theories of relativity. What was the important
difference? (Don't overthink this. What turned
out to be different about the predictions made by
Marxists?)
18. What is the relationship between research
programs and scientific revolutions, according to
Lakatos?
19. Lakatos returns to the issue at the beginning of
the article about the importance of the problem
of demarcation. Why does he feel that this is an
extremely important issue?
Challenge Questions
1. Do you think that Lakatos's description of
Popper's demarcation criterion is accurate?
Would Popper approve of the way Lakatos has
worded it?
2. Do you think that Lakatos's description of Kuhn's
demarcation criterion is accurate? Would Kuhn
approve of the way Lakatos has represented his
ideas?
3. On page 24, Lakatos refers vaguely to the
invention "of a hitherto unknown planet" and
various calculations. To which episode in the
history of astronomy do you think Lakatos may
be referring?
4. Can you identify any important similarities
between Lakatos's approach and that of either
Popper or Kuhn? How about important
differences?
5. Can you think of any endeavors that you believe
are scientific but that Lakatos's solution would
reject?
6. Can you think of any endeavors that you believe
are not scientific but that Lakatos's solution
would accept?
7. Which of the three philosophers (Popper, Kuhn,
and Lakatos) do you think has done the best job
of separating science from pseudoscience? Why?