LOCALISM AND REGIONALISM IN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: IS THERE A HOME
STATE OR REGIONAL ADVANTAGE?
JAMES
C. GARAND
Louisiana State
University
major tenet of folk wisdom in American national politics suggests the importance of geographic considerations in the deter~ ~ mination
of presidential nominations and final election outcomes.
According to the conventional wisdom, presidential and vice-presidential
nominees of the two major political parties must be selected with great
attention paid to potential home state and regional advantages that might
be brought to the party presidential ticket. Such a view places great emphasis on the ability of presidential and vice-presidential candidates to
capture their states for the party ticket, as well as to increase the probability that states within each candidate’s home region will give their elecNE
the ticket in November. Of course, this assumes that
outcomes at the state level are affected positively by
home state and regional considerations
in other words, that having
a presidential or vice-presidential candidate from a given state or region
on the party ticket increases the likelihood that the ticket will carry the
&dquo;advantaged&dquo; states in the presidential election. Further, at the individual
level this view assumes that home state and/or regional attachments enter into the decisional calculus of at least some voters, with the result
being shifts in aggregate behavior away from what would be expected
in the absence of such advantages.
Is the conventional wisdom about geographic advantages supported
empirically? At the very simple level of winning and losing, home state
and regional advantages do not appear to be significant. For instance,
Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) note that, of the 42 cases from 1884 to 1980,
only 23 (about 55 percent) presidential candidates were able to carry a
plurality of the vote in their home states. During the same period, only
29 of 48 (approximately 60 percent) vice-presidential candidates were
able to deliver their states to their presidential party ticket. Rosenstone
(1983) demonstrates that in more recent years (i.e., 1948 to 1972), 111
of 14 of the major party presidential candidates were able to carry their
toral
votes to
aggregate electoral
-
Received: May 1, 1985
First Revision Received: July 8, 1986
Second Revision Received: October 17, 1986
Accepted for Publication: October 29, 1986
a revised version of a paper presented at the 1984 annual meeting of the
Southern Political Science Association, Savannah, Georgia, November 1-3, 1984. I would
like to express my thanks to Dayle Brown for helping to collect the data used in this
paper, as well as to Ron Weber, the editor of this journal, and three anonymous reviewers
for their helpful comments and suggestions on the paper. Any errors that remain are
the sole responsibility of the author.
NOTE: This is
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86
home states, but only 8 of 14 vice-presidential nominees were able to
deliver the electoral votes of their home states. Using victories as a measure of home state electoral success, it would appear that local advantages
are not as clear-cut as the conventional wisdom would suggest. Until recently, there has been little attempt to examine more systematically the
empirical relationship between home state and regional advantages, on
one hand, and final presidential election outcomes, on the other. In developing his predictive model of presidential election outcomes from 1948
to 1972, Rosenstone (1983) observes a modest home state advantage for
presidential candidates, but finds no significant vice-presidential home
state effects. Further, Rosenstone finds a regional effect for presidential
candidates only in the South, and no regional effect for vice-presidential
candidates at all. Based on these results, one does not find strong support for the home state and regional effects hypotheses during the 1948
to 1972 period. On the other hand, one recent study does purport to
find a significant home state advantage for presidential candidates. Using a more inclusive time frame (1872 to 1980) and a measure of home
state electoral success which takes into account national electoral trends
and expected party vote within each home state, Lewis-Beck and Rice
(1983) find that the average home state advantage is approximately four
percentage points. While this margin is not large, it easily achieves statistical significance, and can be seen as large enough to help a presidential
candidate in a close election within his home state.
Each of the recent works by Lewis-Beck and Rice and Rosenstone suffer from unique limitations which constrain the generalizability of inferences drawn from their analyses. First, Lewis-Beck and Rice examine only
home state advantages for presidential candidates. While this is, by itself, a reasonable endeavor, one cannot make any inferences concerning
(1) the effect of regional advantages for presidential candidates on state
electoral outcomes and (2) the impact of home state and regional advantages for vice-presidential candidates on state electoral outcomes. Second, although Rosenstone includes variables in his predictive model of
state election results which reflect home state and regional advantages
for both presidential and vice-presidential components of each national
party ticket, his analysis is limited to the presidential elections from 1948
to 1972. Hence, the generalizability of his findings is limited to a fairly
narrow time span.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis undertaken by
Lewis-Beck and Rice in order to account for the impact of regional proximity of presidential candidates on state electoral outcomes as well as
the local and regional advantages accruing to a ticket based on the selection of vice-presidential nominee. In other words, it is my intention to
evaluate the degree to which home state (local) and regional advantages
exist for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of a party
presidential ticket. I begin this analysis by presenting a research design
which allows for an assessment of the empirical validity of the home state
and regional hypotheses. In the second section will be presented the
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87
results of the empirical analysis. Finally, I will conclude by
the implications of these findings for presidential electoral
addressing
politics.
DATA AND METHODS
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable utilized
in this analysis is a derivative of the
deviation measure employed by Lewis-Beck and Rice (1~83).I In this
analysis I have measured the dependent variable as the electoral deviation from the party vote share for state j (denoted Rj and Dj for Republican and Democratic tickets, respectively), measured as the deviation of
the actual party presidential vote proportion of state j (Saj) from the expected party vote share in that state (Sej), adjusted for national party
trends (Na~ - Nej). This can be stated formally for each party:
state
where Rj (Dj) is the electoral deviation of state j from its expected Republican (Democratic) vote proportion; SREPVOTEaj (SDEMVOTEaj) is the
actual Republican (Democratic) proportion of the vote for state j; SREPVOTEej (SDEMVOTEej) is the average Republican (Democratic) vote
proportion in state j over the previous five presidential elections; NREPVOTE~j (NDEMVOTEaj) is the national Republican (Democratic) popular
1
analysis Lewis-Beck and Rice had developed
(H) for a presidential candidate equal to:
In their
the deviation of his actual
vote share in that state
as
in the
following
vote
a measure
of home state
advantage
share in his home state (S
) from his expected
a
for his national popularity (N
a
- N
),
e
), adjusted
a
(S
formula:
where H is the home state advantage (in percentage points of the state popular
a is the presidential candidate’s actual popular vote percentage in his
vote); S
home state; S
e is the average popular vote percentage for the candidate’s party
in his home state over the previous five presidential elections; N
a is the
e is the
presidential candidate’s actual national popular vote percentage; and N
average national popular vote percentage for the candidate’s party over the
previous five presidential elections.
For example, the authors illustrate the use of this formula for the case of George
McGovern in 1972. (I have substituted proportions for percentages in the equation.)
Hence, George McGovern received approximately 14 percent more popular vote in
his home state of South Dakota than would be expected, given previous patterns and
national trends in 1972. This deviation can be attributed
for McGovern in the state of South Dakota.
to a
home
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state
advantage
88
vote
proportion; and NREPVOTEej (NDEMVOTEej) if the
mean
national
Republican (Democratic) vote proportion for the previous five presidential elections.
The measure of local advantages developed in this paper differs from
that employed by Lewis-Beck and Rice in two major respects. First, the
deviation scores employed herein are party-specific
i.e., they are measured in terms of deviations from each party’s expected proportion of the
total vote.2 The measure employed by Lewis-Beck and Rice is, on the other
hand, neutral with regard to the partisanship of the home state presidential ticket, and measures specifically the home state advantage, regardless of party. The use of party-specific deviation measures allows for the
specification of separate models testing the localism and regionalism hypotheses for each party’s state electoral deviation; this is important, since
Republican and Democratic vote proportions are not mirror images of
each other due to third party candidacies. 3 Second, I have measured this
variable for all states from 1884 to 1984, while Lewis-Beck and Rice have
measured their dependent variable only for those states with local or
regional major party presidential candidates on the ticket.4
The state deviation measure was calculated for all states for the years
1884 to 1984, with the presidential election data used in these calculations obtained from Congressional Quarterly’s (1979) Presidential Elections Since 1789; data for 1980 and 1984 were collected from Ranney
(1981) and Sandoz and Crabb (1985), respectively. In line with the anal-
2
In this paper the deviation scores are measured utilizing each party’s proportion of the
total vote instead of each party’s proportion of the two-party vote. Utilizing the latter
measure as a base has the advantage of excluding third-party vote proportions from
the analysis, but would result in measures of the dependent variable that are less readily interpretable. Also, in computing the expected votes, the use of the two-party vote
would (in some cases) distort the expected vote measure by including disproportionately high (or low) values among the five electoral values used n the computation. For
instance, in 1948 several southern states had Democratic vote proportions of 0.00; the
Republican proportion of the two-party vote would hence be 1.00, even though the
Republicans did not obtain a plurality of the total vote. This would result in an overestimation of the expected Republican vote in those states. Hence, each party’s proportion of the total vote is employed in this analysis.
3
It should be noted that the Republican and Democratic deviation scores are not mirror
images of each other. This is due to the fact that the deviation scores are computed
using the Republican and Democratic proportion of the total vote. The use of twoparty vote to compute the deviation measures would result in scores that are mirror
images of one another. However, as computed using each party’s proportion of the
total vote, the correlation between D
j and Rj is substantial (r = -0.6373), but not close
enough to unity to treat these two measures as mirror images.
4
The rationale for utilizing a more comprehensive dependent variable is quite simple. Primarily, there are many reasons why the electoral outcome in state j may deviate from recent historical patterns and current national trends. One reason may be home state
presidential advantages, but one can observe other states with positive deviations that
do not have such an advantage in place. By measuring the dependent variable for the
entire population of state-election cases, one is able to examine other relevant factors
(e.g., home state advantage for vice-presidential candidates, and regional advantages
for both presidential and vice-presidential candidates) that may be of theoretical interest in determining electoral deviations.
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89
ysis by Lewis-Beck and Rice, I do
not
consider elections
prior to the Civil
War years because of the well-known realignments occurring during that
era. Furthermore, I utilize the previous five elections in computing the
expected vote variables
for 1884 and 1888 were
respectively, due to the
fore 1872.
Independent
(i.e., Sej and Nej); the expected vote proportions
computed utilizing only three and four elections,
difficulty in interpreting electoral data from be-
Variables
primary independent variables used in this analysis are measured
dummy variables which reflect the home state and regional attributes
The
as
of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Eight dummy variables for home state and regional characteristics were measured, with each
variable indicating whether or not state j has during election year t a
Republican (Democratic) presidential (vice-presidential) candidate either
from within its boundaries or from the geographic region with which
the state is most closely identified. If local and regional electoral advantages exist, it is expected that (1) state Republican electoral deviations
(Rj) will be positively related to Republican geographic advantages, and
negatively related to Democratic geographic advantages; and (2) state
Democratic electoral deviations (Dj) will be negatively related to Republican geographic advantages, and positively related to Democratic geo-
graphic advantages.
These variables
are
defined
explicitly
in Table 1.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED TO TEST HYPOTHESES
HOME STATE AND REGIONAL ADVANTAGE
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OF
90
Table 1
Intervening
(continued)
Variables
Several additional factors may help explain the existence of home state
and regional advantages in presidential elections. First, home state and
regional loyalty should accentuate local advantages. Not all states and
regions are characterized by uniform levels of local loyalty, so variation
in this factor should interact with geographic proximity to create variation in home state or regional advantages. For instance, voters from the
Southern or Western states are often characterized as having higher levels
of state or regional loyalty arising out of common identification grounded
in historical experience. Hence, one might expect citizens from these two
regions to be more likely than citizens of other regions to support
presidential tickets with local geographic attributes. In order to provide
a (very) rough surrogate measure of this concept, two separate dummy
variables
denoted SOUTH and WEST - were created, taking on a value
of 1 if a state falls within the South or West, respectively, and 0
otherwise. 5
-
5
In order to
SOUTH:
the following state and region codes were employed:
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West
classify states into regions,
Virginia.
WEST: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
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91
Second, Stokes (1975) has argued that the United
States is experienctrend toward &dquo;nationalization of politics.&dquo; Such a view suggests
that variation in American electoral behavior across electoral units has
declined in recent years, and that the impact of local factors on electoral
outcomes has deteriorated. According to Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale
(1984) - who are critical of Stokes’s findings this trend toward greater
nationalization of American electoral politics is attributed to, among other
things, &dquo;the growth of the national media, which present a similar image of the candidates in many different localities....&dquo; Given this view,
one might argue that home state and regional advantages have declined
over time as other (national) factors have grown in salience within voters’
decision calculi. Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983) tested this assertion for home
state advantages and found no supporting evidence, but their analysis does
not examine presidential regional advantages and vice-presidential home
state and regional advantages. In order to assess the hypothesis of declining local and regional advantages over time, a counter variable
(COUNTER) was created, ranging from 1 (in 1884) to 26 (in 1984).
Finally, Lewis-Beck and Rice suggest, three additional factors that
should be related to home state and/or regional advantages in presidential elections. In each case, these authors found moderately strong empirical evidence that all three of these variables have an impact on home
state advantages in the expected direction. For one thing, state population should be inversely related to home state advantages. Incentives for
voters to support a home state candidate are likely to be maximized in
small states, where voters are more likely to have (direct or indirect) contact with the home-grown candidate. In order to assess the empirical validity of this hypothesis, state population (POPULATION) For each state
j was measured by the population of each state as a proportion of the
total population in the nation. Second, Lewis-Beck and Rice posit that
political party of the presidential tickets should be relevant for home state
(and, I would suggest, regional) advantages. Since Democrats have demonstrated lower rates of turnout historically, the selection of a home state
or home region candidate on the Democratic presidential ticket should,
with all else being equal, bring out more marginal voters and increase
turnout at a faster rate than would the selection of a local candidate on
the Republican ticket. Hence, a political party dummy variable (denoted
PARTY) was created, coded 1 if a state had a home state or home region
candidate on the Republican presidential ticket, and 0 if a state had a home
state or home region candidate on the Democratic presidential ticket, and
ing
a
-
are obtained by combining ICPSR state and region codes. For the South
region variable, states in the Southern and Border state classifications were included.
For the West region variable, Western and Pacific state classifications were included.
Clearly, such a classification scheme provides, at best, only a rough surrogate for regional
loyalty. In this analysis I have chosen to rely on these revised ICPSR codes, though
future research should explore the impact of regional loyalties utilizing a range of regional
classification schemes. Furthermore, future research should address the theoretical meaning of regional loyalty as it pertains to geographic determinants of electoral behavior.
These codes
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92
the authors suggest that incumbency should
home state and regional advantages; this is
due to the fact that incumbent tickets tend to enjoy larger election margins overall, and it &dquo;becomes more difficult for home state [or regional]
gains to keep ahead of national gains&dquo; (1983: 554). Therefore, an incumbency variable (INCUMBENCY) was measured, taking on a value of 1 if
a state had a home state or home region candidate who was an incumbent, 0 if a state had a non-incumbent home state or home region candidate, and missing otherwise.
All variables utilized in this analysis are described fully in Table 1.
missing
have
a
otherwise.
Finally,
negative impact on
The Models
The major hypotheses underlying this paper suggest that presidential
tickets will do better (i.e., Rj or Dj will be positive) in those states in
which the presidential and/or vice-presidential nominees are either
(1) from that state or (2) from a state within the same region as the state
in question. The degree to which these expectations are met can be assessed using a multiple regression model which includes the relevant
dummy variables for state and regional attributes of the presidential and
vice-presidential candidates. Coefficients associated with these variables
should indicate the degree to which various types of home state and
regional advantages can be discerned empirically.6
The primary localism model suggests that state deviations are a simple
function of home state and regional attributes of individual candidates:
.
6
major point deserves attention. Thoughtout this analysis I will be reporting regression coefficients, their standard errors, and the results of significance tests of the regression parameters. However, it is my view that the usefulness of significance tests is
restricted substantially when one is employing population data. In such an instance,
the need to test the significance of regression coefficients in nonexistent, for the coefficients represent actual population parameters, and not estimates of population
parameters. In this analysis, the data constitute the population of presidential election
cases in the American states for the years 1884 and 1984. Hence, regression coefficients associated with the various models under test represent actual characteristics
of relationships within the population, and therefore do not need to be subjected to
traditional tests of significance. I recognize that other social scientists find that significance testing is appropriate, or at least helpful, in evaluating relationships within
populations. In deference to this position, and primarily for illustrative purposes, significance tests are presented in the tables reporting the parameters of these models.
However, the reader should take great care in interpreting their use, and should be
aware that I do not feel compelled to base my inferences on these results.
One
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93
where a is the intercept term; b1, bz, ..., b8 are regression coefficients
for the home state and home region variables; e is an error term; and
the variables are as described in Table 1. The intercept term (ao) reflects
the mean deviation score for those states without any home state or
regional advantages. Each bi represents the mean increment (or decreadded to ao that is associated with states holding the relevant
and regional attributes. For instance, when added to ao, bi
indicates the mean deviation score for those states represented by a
presidential candidate on the Republican national ticket. This model has
the advantage of being able to discern the differential impacts of having
a Republican versus a Democratic local advantage.7 For the Republican
model, it is expected that ao, b3, b4, b7, and b8 will be negative (i.e., indicating a pro-Democrat, anti-Republican shift), and that bi, b2, b5, and
b6 will be positive (indicating a pro-Republican shift). Coefficients of the
opposite direction are expected for the Democratic deviation model.
In order to assess the impact of the various intervening variables on
home state and regional advantages, it is necessary to remove from the
analysis all (state-election) cases that have no home state or regional advantages associated with them. In essence, this allows one to simulate
the Lewis-Beck and Rice analysis, with the advantage being that one can
examine regional and vice-presidential effects as well. Hence, the examination of the impact of intervening variables requires the estimation of
eight sets of models of state electoral deviations one for each party’s
(1) presidential home state advantages; (2) presidential home region advantages ; (3) vice-presidential home state advantages; and (4) vicepresidential home region advantages. Each set of models is estimated
separately using electoral deviation scores Rj and Dj as the dependent
variables.
ment)
home
state
-
7
An alternative set of models can be specified which are similar to those suggested by Rosenstone (1983). Such models allow for the estimation of local and regional impacts that
are
undifferentiated by party:
In this case, each
sum of the variables within parentheses is equal to 1 when there is
pro-Republican geographic advantage, — 1 when there is a pro-Democratic geographic
advantage, and 0 when there are two candidates from the same region or state. Since
the independent variables are scored as positive when there is a Republican advantage,
one would expect; (1) for the Democratic equation, all b
s to be negative, with a
i
0 negative, and (2) for the Democratic equation, all b
s to be negative, and a
i
0 positive. Furthermore, each b
i indicates the mean shift in magnitude of deviation scores resulting
from a home state or home region advantage, with the direction of the shift depending
a
which party holds the relevant local characteristics. Because of space limitations,
the parameter values for these models are not presented, though they are substantively
consistent with the results presented in this paper. Interested readers may obtain a copy
of these results from the author.
on
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94
First, one can assess the degree to which home state and regional advantages have shifted over time through the use of the following model
estimated for each of the four sets of
possible geographic advantages.
For the Republican models, if the hypothesis of a declining home state
and regional advantage is to be validated empirically, the coefficient (bl)
associated with the varible COUNTER should be negative for the four
Republican sets of local/regional advantages and positive for the four
democratic sets. For the Democratic models, it is expected that the coefficient bl should be positive for the four Republican advantages, and negative for the four sets of Democratic advantages,8
Second, the impact of other variables on the home state and regional
advantage can be estimated with the following model, again estimated
separately by party for four sets of possible geographic advantages:
For the Republican electoral deviation models, it is expected that, for
Republican presidential tickets, the coefficients b and b2 will be posi-
tive, and the other regression coefficients will be negative; for Democratic
presidential tickets, coefficients in the opposite direction should be observed. For the Democratic electoral deviation models, the coefficients
b1 and b2 will be negative and the other coefficients positive for Republican presidential tickets; for Democratic presidential tickets, the coefficients in the
opposite direction should be observed.
FINDINGS
In Table 2 are presented the parameter values for the two primary
models specified in equations 2a and 2b which estimate the impact of
home state and home region advantages on deviations from expected
Republican (Rj) and Democratic (Dj) vote proportions. These models al8
The
confusing array of expected coefficient valences is due to the nature of two primary
dependent variables. For the Republican local advantages, positive COUNTER coefficients in the Republican deviation (R
) models indicates a trend toward greater localj
ism (and hence less nationalization) in electoral results; negative coefficients suggest
a trend toward greater nationalization. This is because positive values
of R associated
j
with a local Republican advantage indicate a localism effect; should this pattern decline over time, one can infer that the localism effect is also declining. Of course, for
the data set of Democratic local advantages, positive COUNTER coefficients in the Republican deviation models indicate just the opposite: that there is a trend toward greater
nationalization (and less localism). Furthermore, when one switches over to the
Democratic deviation (D
) models, the expectations switch again in the opposite
j
direction.
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95
low for the estimation of local and regional effects separately for Republican and Democratic presidential tickets. It may be recalled that, for the
Republican deviation model, the coefficients for the Republican local advantage variables are expected to be in the positive direction, while those
for the Democratic local advantage variables are expected to be in the
negative direction; coefficients in the opposite direction are expected for
the Democratic deviation model.
TABLE 2
PARAMETER ESTIMATION FOR FIRST MODEI. OF
HOME STATE AND HOME REGION ADVANTAGES, 1884-1984
An examination of Table 2 indicates that the localism advantage hyOn one hand, for both the Republican and Democratic models, the coefficients for the presidential and
vice-presidential home state advantage variables are clearly in the expected direction. The existence of a Republican presidential or vicepresidential candidate from a particular state improves the vote proportion (beyond that expected) for the GOP presidential ticket within that
state by 0.0185 and 0.0231, respectively. For Democratic presidential
and vice-presidential candidates, a home state advantage means a Republican vote proportion decrease from the expected vote of - 0.0588 and
- 0.0311, respectively. For the Democratic model, Republican presidential and vice-presidential home state candidates result in Democratic vote
proportions that are - 0.129 and - 0.285 below expectations, though
similar Democratic home state candidate attributes increase Democratic
deviation scores by 0.0459 and 0.0329. While the overall magnitudes of
the coefficients associated with home state variables are not very great,
they do suggest at least some level of home state advantage that may be
significant in a close election within particular states.
These results are, in many ways, consistent with the expectations derived from the theoretical orientation described in an earlier section. First,
the coefficients are in the proper direction, indicating that (1) Republican
home states candidates increase, and Democratic home state candidates
decrease, the home state vote for that Republican ticket, and
potheses meet with only mixed success.
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96
home state candidates decrease, and Democratic home
candidates increase, the home state vote for the Democratic ticket.
Second, and consistent with the hypothesis suggested by Lewis-Beck and
Rice (1983), for both the presidential and vice-presidential home state
advantages the magnitude of the coefficients for Democratic presidential tickets exceeds that of the Republican presidential tickets by a fair
margin. Home state advantages for the Democratic presidential tickets
are greater than those enjoyed by Republicans; in all four cases, the home
state coefficients are greater for Democratic candidates than Republican
candidates. Third, for Democratic presidential tickets, home state
presidential candidates have a greater impact on party fortunes within
a state than do home state vice-presidential candidates. This is certainly
expected, given the greater emphasis placed at the top of the ticket. However, such a pattern is not observed for Republican presidential tickets;
in the case of both Republican and Democratic models, Republican vicepresidential advantages have a greater impact on deviation scores than
Republican presidential advantages. All in all, though, there appears to
be substantial support for the home state hypothesis.
On the other hand, the coefficients for the home region hypotheses
are dismally inconsistent with expectations. First, for the Republican
model, all four home region coefficients are in the incorrect direction,
while for the Democratic model the coefficients are incorrectly signed
in three of four cases. For example, these results indicate that Republican presidential and vice-presidential home region advantages result in
shifts from the expected Republican vote of - 0.0087 and - 0.0133; while
the magnitudes of these coefficients are not large, they are still in the
negative direction a finding quite incompatible with what one would
expect, given the local advantage hypothesis. For Democratic presidential tickets the results are even more inconsistent with expectations;
presidential and vice-presidential home region advantages result in Republican vote proportions higher than the expected GOP vote by a margin
of 0.0239 and 0.0366, respectively. These results lend strong support to
the rejection of the home region advantage hypothesis.
The models estimated thus far lend strong support for the hypothesis
pertaining to home state advantages for presidential tickets, but provide
evidence which suggests that regional advantages actually work against
presidential tickets. How is one to explain the anomalous findings with
regard to the home region hypothesis? For presidential candidates, such
a finding is difficult to explain, but there may be a possible explanation
for vice-presidential candidates. In general, presidential candidates are
not selected because of their regional attributes. It is not likely that a political party will consciously and systematically select presidential candidates as a strategy designed to shore up support within specific,
weak-support regions. However, the same cannot be said with regard to
vice-presidential candidates. There is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that vice-presidential nominees are selected largely to overcome perin other
ceived geographic weaknesses in the party presidential ticket
words, to &dquo;balance&dquo; the ticket and bring into the electoral coalition an
(2) Republican
state
-
-
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97
important region characterized by low levels of electoral support. Hence,
the negative coefficients for the vice-presidential home region variables
may be explained in terms of the response by strategic presidential candidates to a perceived short-term weakness in a particular region. Vicepresidential candidates may do poorly (as compared to expectations) because they tend to be selected from those regions within which the party
ticket is in trouble.~9
Intervening Variables
As indicated earlier, several factors have been offered as (at least) par-
explanations of variation in local advantages. In order to explore the
explanatory value of these factors, all cases not including either a home
state or home region candidate on one of the presidential tickets are excluded. The remaining data set includes deviation scores only for those
state-year cases that should benefit from a local advantage.
One factor viewed as a possible determinant of home state and
regional advantages is the nationalization of American politics over time.
Because of space limitations, the parameter values for equations 3a and
3b are not presented here, though the results can be summarized briefly.10 In general, the coefficients for the COUNTER variables are almost
uniformly inconsistent with the nationalization hypothesis. For the home
state advantage models, the COUNTER coefficients are generally of small
magnitude and, in six of eight cases, in the incorrect direction; for the
two cases in which the coefficients are in the expected direction, they
are so small as to be substantively nonsignificant. In general, the magnitudes of these coefficients are so small as to suggest that virtually no substantive trend exists over time. For the home region models, the results
are much the same in terms of the coefficient magnitudes, and again the
valence of the coefficients is in the expected direction in only two of
eight cases. One can reasonably conclude that there is no systematic and
substantive trend in home state and home region advantages over time
tial
a finding that is inconsistent with the hypothesized nationalization of
the American electoral process.
In addition to the nationalization factor, several additional factors
should help explain variation in the home state and home region advantages : (1) party of home state or home region candidate; (2) incumbency
-
9
For instance, in 1984 Walter Mondale might have selected a Southerner in order to help
the Democratic presidential ticket in a region perceived as being a trouble spot. While
the selection of a Southern vice-presidential candidate may have helped the Democratic
ticket slightly in that candidate’s home state, it may be the case that the Democrats
still would have performed worse in the South than previous election margins would
indicate, primarily because the selection of a Southern vice-presidential candidate can
be viewed as a sign of expected electoral weakness in the region. Hence, it might be
incorrect to suggest that vice-presidential home region candidates "cause" the ticket
to do less well in a particular region; instead, the negative coefficient may be the result
of strategic selection processes in combination with perceived short-term electoral weaknesses within a particular region.
10
The results of this
analysis
can
be obtained from the author.
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98
(3) regional loyalty; and (4) state population share of the national
population. It has already been noted that, as expected, Democratic
presidential and vice-presidential candidates seem to enjoy greater home
state and regional advantages than Republican candidates. Hence, one
status;
this variable from the following analysis.
In Table 3 are presented the models estimating the effects of incumbency, regional loyalty, and state population share on home state and
home region advantages from 1884 to 1984. For the sake of brevity, I
will focus on the results for the Republican models, and will discuss results
from the Democratic models only where the substantive conclusions are
different.
In section A of Table 3 are specified the regression coefficients for
these three independent variables as they have an impact on Republican
can remove
TABLE 3
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR MODELS OF THE IMPACT OF INTERVENING VARIABLES
HOME STATE AND HOME REGION ADVANTAGES
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ON
99
TABLE 3
(Continued)
and Democratic home state advantages. In general, the directions of the
coefficients are consistent with expectations, though the strength of impact varies greatly. First, for Republican presidential and vice-presidential
candidates there is, as expected, a negative relationship between both
state population share and incumbency, on one hand, and home state
advantage, on the other. Incumbent Republican presidential candidates,
for instance, lose almost 4 percent (b
0.0377) from their home state
advantage over what is obtained by non-incumbents, though incumbent
vice-presidential candidates lose far less (slightly more than one-half of
1 percent). In addition, home state advantages decline for GOP presidential and vice-presidential candidates .34 percent and .09 percent, respectively, for each 1 percent increase in a state’s share of the national
population. On the other hand, regional loyalty (i.e., home region candidate from the South or West) increases GOP support by 1.77 percent
(for presidential candidates from the West), 1.95 percent (for vicepresidential candidates from the South), and 1.87 percent (for vice=
-
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100
candidates from the West). All in all, these results seem to
lend support for the model of home state advantages.&dquo;1
For the Democratic presidential tickets, the results are also generally
consistent with expectations though, again, this does vary. For
Democratic presidential home state candidates, population shares and incumbency contribute substantial effects on Republican home state advan0.4975 and b = 0.0581, respectively), although coefficients
tages (b
in a direction similarly consistent with expectations are found only for
the population share variable in the Democratic vice-presidential home
state equation. However, the anomalous coefficient for incumbency in
the latter equation is of a sufficiently low magnitude to be considered
virtually zero. For the regional variables, having a Democratic home state
candidate from the South has little impact on the Republican vote deviations in that region. However, the expected regional effect on home state
advantages does emerge in the Democratic model of electoral deviations;
a Southern regional advantage for the state’s Democratic ticket does increase Democratic deviations (and hence home state advantages) by
0.0326. For Democratic vice-presidential advantages, the coefficients observed are in the correct direction for population and incumbency variables, but are incorrect for the Southern regional variable. Having a
Southern Democratic vice-presidential candidate on the ticket actually
increases the average Republican home state advantage by 0.0223 and
decreases the average Democratic advantage by 0.0132. In sum, one can
conclude that there is moderate support for the hypothesized impacts
of population, regional loyalty, and incumbency on home state advantages, though there are, of course, wide variation in such impacts and
presidential
=
striking exceptions.
Section B of Table 3 also specifies the parameter values for the home
It should be noted that the population share variable has
been excluded from each of these models on theoretical grounds.’z The
results shown here are mixed but generally unsupportive of the hypothesized relationships. First, the coefficients for the regional variables are
very inconsistent with expectations. For the Republican presidential and
vice-presidential advantages, five of six regional coefficients (across both
Republican and Democratic deviations models) are in the expected direc-
region models.
11
Here again, the reader is reminded about the use of significance tests in this analysis.
In many cases the coefficients presented in Table 3 do not achieve conventional levels
of significance. However, in my view many of these coefficients achieve substantive
signifiance because the entire population of presidential election state-year cases is
employed. In many instances the coefficients are not as stable as one might like, but
they do represent actual population shifts that must be treated independently of conventional significance testing.
12
The
importance of population share for individual states in determining home region
advantages is not clear. Theoretically, it seems reasonable that relatively high state population shares should have a negative impact on home state advantages, primarily for
reasons outlined by Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983). However, I can think of no reason
that relatively small states should be more sensitive to home region forces than relatively large states. Hence, I have excluded this variable from the home region equations.
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101
tion, though the magnitudes vary considerably. On the other hand, only
of the four regional variables for the Democratic regional advantages
have coefficients in the expected direction. In essence, region appears
to have a mixed impact on the strength of home regional advantages.
Second, and with a few exceptions, incumbency seems to have the expected impact on home region advantages. Across Republican and
Democratic models, seven of eight incumbency variables have the proper
sign, indicating some support for the hypothesis that incumbency
decreases home region advantages.
one
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The notion that presidential and vice-presidential candidates improve
the electoral chances of their party ticket within their home states and
home regions has achieved the status of conventional wisdom among political analysts. Anecdotal evidence abounds which suggests that political elites (such as party leaders, members of the news media, and the
candidates themselves) believe that such home state and home region advantages exist, and that such elites base their behavior (at least in part)
on such a perception. Furthermore, some empirical evidence of geographic electoral advantages has been presented elsewhere (Rosenstone
1983; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983; Rice and Macht 1985). But is the conventional wisdom correct? In this paper I have attempted to test empirically and systematically this conventional wisdom that presidential and
vice-presidential candidates bring to their tickets an exploitable electoral
advantage within their home states and home regions. The estimation
of a model of geographic electoral advantages suggests that the conventional wisdom may be partly correct, but only under specific circumstances. First, these findings suggest that modest home state advantages
do exist for Democratic and Republican presidential and vice-presidential
candidates. On average, these home state advantages amount to almost
3-4 percent for presidential candidates and approximately 3 percent for
vice-presidential candidates. There is variation in these advantages, however, with (1) Democratic advantages exceeding those for Republican candidates and (2) for Democratic deviation models, presidential advantages
being greater than those brought to the ticket by the vice-presidential
nominees. All in all, it would seem rational for political parties (especially
the Democrats) to select their nominees strategically, keeping in mind
the home state advantages brought to the ticket. Second, there is little
systematic home region advantage for candidates on the national tickets.
Presidential tickets tend to do less well than expected in their home
regions. Democratic home region candidates lose more in this process,
with their losses exceeding 2 percent and 3 percent for presidential and
vice-presidential candidates, respectively, while Republicans lose approximately 1 percent from the expected vote in states within their home
regions. For vice-presidential candidates, this phenomenon may be attributable to strategic decisions made by presidential nominees in their
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102
selection of a running mate; the explanation of this phenomenon for the
presidential candidate of each ticket awaits future development.
What can one conclude about the explanatory value of various intervening variables as they influence home state and home region advantages ? First, it would appear from this analysis that there is little evidence
to support the hypothesis that a nationalizing electorate has resulted in
a decline in home state and home region advantages. In almost all cases,
the magnitudes of the time trend coefficients are sufficiently small so as
to warrant a rejection of this hypothesis. Second, these results seem to
suggest that the intervening variables of incumbency, regional loyalty,
and population share have impacts more consistent with expectations
for the home state models as opposed to the home region models. For
the home state models, the coefficients for the intervening variables are
consistently in the proper direction, though there is wide variation in
the appropriate magnitudes of the coefficients. Population and incumbency do seem to have a negative impact on home state advantages for
both Democratic and Republican candidates, and regional loyalty seems
to play a significant role in accentuating the home state advantages that
may already be in place. On the other hand, the home region models perform less well, with very view of the regional loyalty coefficients estimated in the proper direction, but most of the incumbency coefficients
performing as expected.
Where do we go from here? I certainly do not argue that this paper
constitutes the final word on the dynamics and empirical nature of home
state and home region advantages. Instead, the uncompleted research
agenda on the role of geographic advantages in determining electoral outcomes is a lengthy one. First, this paper has examined the phenomenon
of geographic advantages utilizing aggregate electoral data. However, such
an analysis tells us little about the effect of geographic attributes of
presidential and vice-presidential candidates on individual-level dynamics
of vote choice. Are individual voters aware of the home state and home
region characteristics of candidates on the competing presidential party
tickets? Is the salience of a presidential ticket higher among those voters
with the same home state or home region attributes? Does individual variation in state and regional loyalty accentuate the relationship between
geographic advantages and vote choice? Under what circumstances, if
any, are individual voters likely to deviate from established patterns of
vote choice (based on partisanship, issue positions, ideology, etc.) to support a home state or home region candidate? And finally, are individual
voters more likely to turn out to vote if there is a home state or home
region candidate on one of the presidential tickets? These are questions
that are raised by the aggregate analysis of this paper, but can only be
answered directly through the use of survey data.
Second, the primary focus of this paper has been on presidential elections. One might argue that the focus of research on geographic advantages should extend into a more comparative setting such as that found
in the American states or in cross-national studies. For instance, research
about &dquo;friends-and-neighbors&dquo; voting has been limited to specific states
and time periods. Our knowledge of the importance of geographic ad-
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103
can only be expanded by examining the role of such advantages
settings. For instance, Rice and Macht (1985) examine the degree to which voting in gubernatorial and senatorial elections is affected
by the geographic proximity of competing candidates to the voter. Their
findings suggest a significant home county effect. Future research should
be directed at examining geographic advantages in a more inclusive set
vantages
in other
of
political systems,
as
Rice and Macht have done.
Finally, it is important that future research concentrate on non-mass
explanations of home state and home region advantages. For instance,
do relevant political elitees shift their behavior in response to the geographic attributes of competing presidential tickets? Are party leaders able
to generate more enthusiastic support for a party ticket if there is a home
state or home region candidate included on the ticket? Are members of
the news media more likely to exhibit supportive behavior of presidential tickets that include a home grown candidate? These are all questions
that must be answered before a full understanding of geographic electoral advantages can be realized.
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