European Journal of Public Health, Vol. 24, Supplement 1, 2014, 11–15
ß The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Public Health Association. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1093/eurpub/cku099
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The big crossing: illegal boat migrants in the
Mediterranean
Hassène Kassar1, Paul Dourgnon2
1 Laboratory, History of Mediterranean economies and societies, Faculté of Humanities at Tunis/Center of studies and
prospective research, Tunis, Tunisia
2 Institute for research and information on health economics, Paris, France
Correspondence: Hassène Kassar, Laboratory, History of Mediterranean economies and societies, Faculté of Humanities at
Tunis/Center of studies and prospective research, Tunis, Tunisia, Tel: +21698215685, e-mail: [email protected]
This article explores illegal migration routes and groups across North Africa to Europe. We describe sub-Saharan and
cross-Mediterranean routes, and how they changed during the years. We propose an analytical framework for the main
factors for these migrations, from local to international and regulatory context. We then describe sea-migrants’
nationalities and socio-economic and demographic characteristics, from studies undertook in Tunisia and Morocco.
While boat migration represents only a fraction of illegal migration to Europe, it raises humanitarian as well as ethical
issues for European and North African (NA) countries, as a non-negligible amount of them end up in death tolls of
shipwrecks in the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, existing statistics show that illegal trans-Mediterranean migration is
growing exponentially. Ongoing crises in Africa and the Middle East are likely to prompt even larger outflows of refugees
in the near future. This should induce NA countries to share closer public policy concerns with European countries.
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Introduction
mages of overloaded migrants’ boats, accounts of shipwrecks tragedies
Iand endless lists of death tolls have become a daily matter in the
Mediterranean Sea, shifting its common representation from a civilization crossroad to an invisible fence, and eventually a cemetery for illegal
migrants (cf. Box 1.). While boat migration represents only a fraction
of illegal migration to Europe, it raises humanitarian as well as ethical
issues for European and North African (NA) countries. Boat migration
studies remain biased and poorly documented. Most figures rely on
media accounts or statistics from the Frontex (European Union) EU
agency. These statistics are, by nature, oblivious of those who manage
to pass through the net, of those who renounce, and of the lost at sea.
Clandestine attempts to enter Europe have been common practice
for decades. For a while it mostly applied to NA political opponents or individuals with criminal records, to whom the authorities
had refused a passport, and to some extent those who did not want
to undertake the official procedure. Over the past two decades,
however, clandestine migrations via the Mediterranean routes have
increased exponentially. According to the Italian government, 22 000
migrants had reached Italy by boat from January to May 2014, 10
times more than during the same period of time in 2013. This
migratory flow is fuelled by political, economic, demographic and
social change not only in Africa but also in Europe.
Even if the south Mediterranean coast remains a major gateway in
the migration process, trajectories have become more diversified, no
longer following the traditional migration route, but a new south–south
route before attempting the giant leap into Europe. As a result, NA
countries appear to no longer be sheer emigration countries. They
have shifted to immigration, as well as emigration and transit countries.
In this article, we analyse the determinants and patterns of these
new migration routes through the Mediterranean Sea, and describe
sea-migrants’ nationalities and socio-economic and demographic
characteristics.
A brief history of trans-Saharan migrations
to the Maghreb
The Sahara, a century-old thoroughfare
For centuries, the Sahara was the only available trading route for
camel caravans crossing between sub-Saharan Africa and NA.1 These
trans-Saharan trading activities established trading routes across the
desert, human communities and agglomerations at the origins of a
long and continuous blending of cultures and ethnic groups.
The creation of modern states in Africa and the Maghreb after the
Second World War (WWII) was able to restrict these large-scale
population movements. Regional tribes nevertheless continued
cross-border trading activities using ancestral paths. ‘In short, territorial dynamics do not develop by chance; routes are used because
there are roads, staging areas and trade. With new realities of these
trans-Saharan crossings, the Maghreb is no longer simply an origin
country for migrant smuggling, but also a transit and destination
country’.2
Migration and political change in the Saharan region
Since the 1970s and 1980s, the forced and voluntary settlement of
nomads, recurrent wars in the Sahel (i.e. the zone between the
Sahara desert to the north and the Sudanian Savannas to the
south) and droughts provoked two forms of mobility. First, impoverished nomads and traders, such as the Tuareg, migrated as a means
of survival, finding work at construction sites and the oil fields of
southern Algeria and Libya. Second, recurrent warfare in the Sahel
provoked the exodus of thousands of refugees who then settled in
the towns and cities of Libya, Algeria, Mauritania and Egypt. This
immigration was often welcomed. In Algeria, Libya and Mauritania,
sub-Saharan migrants filled local labour shortages and fitted in with
national policies aimed at revitalizing underpopulated regions.
After the 1973 oil crisis, Libya, and to a certain extent Algeria,
witnessed an increasing number of migrants crossing the border
from neighbouring countries to find work in the oil fields where
local populations often refused to work. Libya rapidly developed as
the Maghreb’s major migration pole. In its attempt to impose itself
as a regional power, Libya opened its labour market to Chadian and
Nigerian workers and then to all African nationals.
However, other more recent factors have been at the origins of
Maghreb’s re-emergence as a zone of transit for labour migrants, as
‘this earlier migration to Libya, and to a limited extent Algeria, set
the stage for more large-scale trans-Saharan migration occurring
after 1990, when many ex-nomads found new livelihoods by
smuggling goods and people using ancient trading routes’.3
Ethnic, religious and political conflicts in Africa from the 90s have
also strongly shaped African immigration. Indeed, statistics from the
12
European Journal of Public Health
Box 1 Three recent tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea
The three most tragic events occurred on 7 September 2012 and
in October 2013. These events were highly mediatized, not only
because of the death toll but also because of the number of
women and children on board.
The 2012 boat tragedy involved 136 clandestine migrants
including 10 women and 6 children. Only 56 people were
saved including 1 woman.
The death toll in October 2013 was even higher. The first boat,
sailing from Libya, carried sub-Saharan African migrants. It
capsized on 2 October south of the Island of Lempadusa with
450–500 migrants on board according to the authorities. Only
around 150 people were saved with a death toll of around 339.
These sub-Saharan migrants were in the majority from the
Horn of Africa.
The second boat sank just a few days later carrying 206 people
on board, in the majority Syrians, causing the death of 34
people and around 10 missing. According to the Maltese
police, there were many women and children on board.
According to the Prime Minister of Malta, Maltese Navy
vessels rescued around 150 immigrants of which 113 men, 20
women and 17 children. Of these, one adult and three children,
including ‘two very young children’, were already dead.
refugee camps that were set up in Tunisia during the 2011–12 Libyan
crisis show that the bulk of the flow originated from the horn of
Africa (Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia).
Economic deterioration in sub-Saharan countries
The current differences in living conditions, demographics and
economic structure between the countries of the Maghreb and
sub-Saharan Africa suggest that migration will continue in the
future. The role played by the Maghreb as a zone of permanent,
but especially transitory, immigration for the populations of the
Sahel will therefore have to be rapidly taken into consideration.
The recent global financial crisis and the structural adjustment
measures implemented in the different sub-Saharan countries,
have intensified migratory flows towards the Maghreb, and occasionally further on into Europe. The south Mediterranean coast,
the traditional departure point for migratory flows towards
Europe, has in parallel become a transit zone for new migration
flows via the Sahel and the Sahara as well as an internal migration
zone.4–6
The impact of economic deterioration in sub-Saharan countries
on the intensification of migratory flows is by no means insignificant, even if this approach to the question remains partial. It is
paradoxical to observe that populations in developing countries
are the least mobile. Migratory dynamics in sub-Saharan African
countries are undoubtedly additional factors in the disruption of
subregional demo-economic systems inherited from the colonial
period.
The Sahel is frequently confronted with recurrent food crises,
terrorist and security threats, trafficking in arms, drugs and
human beings. This political and social destabilization has
deteriorated considerably following the Libyan and Malian crises
that have threatened peace and security in the subregion if not the
continent as a whole. The illicit trafficking of illegal immigrants,
goods and anything that can be sold continues uninterrupted and
without any consideration for the territorial sovereignty of the
countries located in the region. In this respect, the geographical
space occupied by the Sahara constitutes its centre and, despite its
harshness, continues to be a space of considerable human mobility.
Changes in the legal and political context
The countries of the Maghreb find themselves in an increasingly
embarrassing situation. They are expected to respect agreements
with African countries on the free circulation of persons, and at
the same time, security agreements with Europe.
International rules and policies were implemented during the past
40 years are the following:
– The 1974 immigration laws that halted legal immigration to
Europe.
– The introduction of French entry visas for all African
nationals in 1986.
– The 11 September 2011 terrorist attack leading to an international campaign against terrorism and the tightening of
political and security policies.
– The signing of security agreements, and the hardening of
sanctions against those transporting illegal immigrants and
the migrants themselves.
In addition, in the interests of externalizing border surveillance,
Europe has been able to impose several agreements with the
Maghreb in the aim of reducing the number of candidates for unauthorized emigration, not only among their own nationals but also
other foreign nationals. Among the most well-known agreements,
we can cite as an example, the bilateral agreements for the repatriation and readmission of clandestine migrants between Tunisia and
Italy in 1998 and 2011.
In Tunisia, the 3 February 2004 Act constituted a milestone in
policies tacking clandestine migration, as it targeted migrant
smuggling networks. It was also the year in which EU created the
Frontex organization to ensure the security of its external borders in
cooperation with non-member states.
Furthermore, post-WWII sub-Saharan population movements
had always flowed into Europe without passing through the
Maghreb. Over the past 20 years, however, transit migrations or
migrations towards the Maghreb have increased considerably, and
a ‘flourishing’ network of contacts between the south and the north
Mediterranean has developed.
The countries of the Maghreb almost contemporaneously adopted
repressive laws against migrant smuggling between 2003 and 2008.
The laws not only target migrants but also those who organize the
shipments of illegal immigrants, provide lodgings, supplies and any
person involved in facilitating operations. The migration issue has
succeeded in uniting NA governments in a common cause, which
throughout history has rarely been the case concerning more
standard issues. In addition, the Supreme Council of Arab
Ministers for Internal Affairs is the most dynamic and best
organized structure in the matter.
It was with this regional political aim that ‘within this framework,
association agreements were concluded with Tunisia, Morocco and
Algeria (respectively entering into force in 1998, 2000 and 2005)
entailing the commitment of NA states in the fight against the unauthorized emigration of their nationals to Europe in exchange for
more openness to regular immigration to Europe requirements’.7
Through their respective laws of 2003 and 2004, Morocco and
Tunisia implemented repressive policies equivalent of the laws
against terrorism applied after the events of 11 September. The
Moroccan Law n 02-03 of 11 November 2003 not only ‘provides
for the entry and residence of foreigners in Morocco, but also illegal
emigration and immigration’. The Tunisian Law n 2004-06 of 3
February 2004, reforming Law n 1975-040 of 14 March 1975, limits
itself to adding a chapter relative to ‘repressing illegal entry and
emigration on the national territory’ (chapter IV, articles 38 and
following). The same applies to Algeria’s, which 2008 legislation
on immigrants aims at tackling organized trans-national crime
and terrorism.
In Tunisia, illegal immigrants risk up to seven years of imprisonment, and migrant smugglers up to 20 years of imprisonment. The
The big crossing
13
Figure 1 Migrants routes from Africa to Europe. Source: UN-Frontex European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 2007.
same law encourages denunciation by condemning any person susceptible of being aware of attempts to smuggle illegal immigrants
failing to report to the authorities.
Migrations and migrants through North
Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea
Transit and boat migration in Tunisia
It is almost impossible to estimate precisely the number of persons
who transit from sub-Saharan Africa to the Maghreb. These journeys,
generally carried out clandestinely, do not supply quantifiable information unless they result in tragedy or interventions by national and
international organizations, and available data are therefore scattered
and incomplete. In Tunisia, the political implications were such that
the numbers involved remained taboo for a long time, whereas in
Algeria, the subject was considered of minor importance. In Libya,
it was only after the major political reforms that the question was
broached without supplying reliable data.
Sub-Saharan migrants transiting through the Maghreb countries
are by definition an extremely varied population. They often no
longer possess identity documents that have either been lost or
stolen on route. Others abandon their documents, enabling them
to declare they come from a war zone to qualify for a refugee status.
The majority of studies have been conducted on cases involving
countries of the Maghreb, but virtually nothing has been written
on the sub-Saharan countries. As a result, we obviously lack an
overall view of these migratory flows.
networks of traders or ‘smugglers’ never interrupted their activities
even after colonization. The same tribes or fractions of tribes settled
on either side of the border and helped each other build up their
trade. Smuggling people out of Libya into Tunisia or vice versa was
relatively easy for experienced networks.
It was only after the upheavals in Tunisia and Libya during the
course of 2011, bringing waves of African migrants fleeing the war in
Libya, or the waves of Tunisian migrants who took advantage of the
situation to leave the country, that the question was periodically
dealt with by the media and the government. It has been argued
that Tunisian governments, since 14 January 2011, have attempted
to take advantage of the situation by multiplying their requests for
European aid in return for their increased efforts in ensuring the
safety of European borders. However, despite the effort to create
refugee camps in southern Tunisia, thousands of Tunisians and
other nationalities illegally attempted to reach the coasts of Europe
on often unseaworthy vessels. Some succeeded but the fate of others
is known only to the Mediterranean Sea.
From January 2011 to July 2012, an estimated 386 immigrants
drowned at sea but only 95 bodies were recovered. Victims included
Tunisians and people of other nationalities, essentially from subSaharan Africa. As of September 2012, the migrant death toll was
estimated at 17 856 persons over the past 20 years.8 It should be
noted that during the same period there were a number of other
attempts to reach the European coast and several other sea rescue
operations. The majority of vessels had sailed from southern Tunisia,
although others had sailed from Libya.
Clandestine migration networks in Tunisia
Migration routes from Tunisia
The management of migratory flows in and out Tunisia has always
been dealt with from a security angle, and given that relations with
Libya have not always been ‘friendly’, Libyan border controls have
always been strict. Despite these controls, the Libyan border was
totally porous outside official border control points. Historical
During the course of our first inquiry into clandestine migration
conducted in 2005, and preceding surveys9–12 ex-smugglers or
migrants confirmed that at the beginning, migrants were smuggled
onto commercial vessels sailing for Marseille, notably vessels transporting livestock. It was easier to hide among livestock, and controls
14
European Journal of Public Health
Figure 2 A now common encounter in the Mediterranean. Source: Photo archive of the Tunisian maritime marine, http://www.
huffpostmaghreb.com
were less rigorous. It was even confirmed that certain passengers
were carried on into Belgium, diving overboard as the vessels
approached the ports. Fishing boats were also used to reach Sicily.
The increased controls resulted in the diversification of routes,
methods and departure points. Practically all Tunisian beaches
were used by migrant smugglers as departure points at a time
when controls were slacker. Among these locations, the small port
of Haouaria, located at the extreme north-western point of Tunis
facing Sicily, was chosen for its proximity to Italy despite the navigational risks on the approach to the straits of Sicily.
The departure point was often chosen according to area of
residence, contact networks and also opportunity. The change of
destination towards Lampedusa, the diversification of departure
points for Libya and the choice of ports located in the centre of
Tunisia resulted from increased controls by the Tunisian authorities
and Italian and European coastguards. This is why, over the past few
years, and more particularly, the past three years, the vast majority of
boats sailed from the centre or southern regions of Tunisia or Libya
to the Island of Lampedusa.
Mehdi Mabrouk13 divides the departure points into three zones:
The first zone groups together the North-eastern region including
the Cap Bon. Migrants have a preference for this region because
Kelibia in Tunisia is only 60 km away from the Island of
Pantelleria. However, the whole of the north coast, including
beaches as well as ports, was used for departure points. As an
example, of the 3561 migrants, 1260 left from this coastline in 2006.
The second zone, known as the greater Sahel region, is an urban
tourist area recognized as being a historical migration hub. Several
ports and beaches are used as departure points for clandestine
migrants. These include the forests of Ben Hmid, Moknine and
Sayada and the ports and beaches of Chebba, Skhira and Sidi Mansour.
The third zone is in the south and extends from the Gulf of Gabes
to the Libyan border, a region of traders and fishermen historically
renowned as a transit zone for internal and international migrations,
which has become since 2011 one of the major departure points
for migrant smuggling. It includes the Island of Djerba and the
Zarziz-Ben Guerddene region.
Libya as a whole can be added as a migration zone connected to
Tunisia, as Tunisian networks, especially those based in the south,
are closely connected to Libyan networks. In addition, the ‘Rais’ or
smugglers are in the majority Tunisian, even if the boats are Libyan.
These departure points that form part of the migratory space vary
according to the strategies developed by the smugglers and also the
migrants themselves.
Illegal and boat migrants in Morocco
It is estimated that several tens of thousands of sub-Saharan
migrants annually transit via Morocco to reach Spain. Since the
mid-1990s, Morocco has progressively become a country of transit
for these migrants that form a mixed group of asylum seekers,
refugees and an increasing number of labour migrants. In general,
they enter Morocco from Algeria from the border at the east of
Oujda after having crossed the Sahara by road, generally via Nigeria.
On their arrival in Morocco, a great many migrants attempt to
enter the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla by climbing the
fences that separate them from Morocco.
According to the International Organization for Migrations, the
number of sub-Saharan migrants, varying in number from 10 000 to
20 000 migrants, has become noticeable in Morocco. A survey
conducted by Association Marocaine d’Etudes et de Recherches
sur les Migrations (Moroccan Association for Studies and
Research on Migration) (AMERM) in 2007 estimates that,
‘Nigerian nationals remain the most numerous (15.7%) followed
by Malians (13.1%). Other nationals are represented as follows:
Senegalese (12.8%), Congolese (10.4%), Ivoirians (9.2%),
Guineans (7.3%) and Cameroonians (7%), followed in smaller
numbers by Gambians (4.6%), Ghanaians (4.5%), Liberians
(3.8%) and Sierra Leoneans (3.1%)’. The survey also revealed the
presence of migrants from 13 additional nationalities but in minor
proportions. It is estimated that illegal migratory flows in Morocco
concern almost 40 different nationalities. Recently, migrants from
Asian countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have
transited via Morocco by the Saharan route.
Even if the majority of migrants consider Morocco as a country of
transit, a growing number of migrants who fail in their attempts to
reach Europe prefer staying in Morocco rather than returning to an
unstable and considerably poorer country of origin. It is likely that
several tens of thousands of migrants have settled quasi-permanently
in towns such as Tangiers, Casablanca and Rabat where they occasionally find work in the informal services sector, small trade outlets
or the building trade.
Studying is also a means of acquiring a status in Morocco and a
way of preparing a migration project. A number of sub-Saharan
Africans have thus registered as students in Moroccan universities.
However, because of the lack of legal status, they are more prone to
social and economic marginalization.
Characteristics of clandestine migrants
Essentially male migrants
Migration is essentially male despite a relative increase in the
number of female migrants. The testimony provided by ‘P’
indicated that in 2003,14 entire storage sheds in Malta for migrants
waiting to leave for Sicily included women from several countries,
notably from the Maghreb. Some women would travel on their own,
The big crossing
whereas others came accompanied by men that could either be
husbands or friends, and occasionally with children.
Another interview conducted within the same project framework
with a Tunisian women who had illegally migrated to Paris, shed
some light on independent female migrants. ‘K’ was from south
Tunisia, a qualified engineer aged 34 years at the time of the
interview, with a personal project she considered viable, so she
decided to emigrate. She made several attempts before succeeding,
including one with a group of friends all from southern Tunisia. This
attempt led them to Istanbul and on to the Greek border, but they
were caught attempting to cross the mountains. Her motivations for
migration were not exclusively material, but for reasons relative to
her family environment. Several other women were thus also able to
migrate following different routes and strategies. They attest that
their aim was personal and unrelated to husband or male relatives.
Conflicts of interest: None declared.
Key points
Boat migration to EU in the Mediterranean is not a new
phenomenon, but has been growing steadily recently, and
is not expected to decline in a near future;
Tunisia, Morocco and, from 2011, Libya stand as the main
NA transit countries to Europe;
Boat migrants mostly consist of men aged 20–40 years and
poorly educated individuals, but this population tends to
become more heterogeneous, with more women and more
educated
individuals
considering
crossing
the
Mediterranean;
Most migrants consider NA as transit area, but a growing
number of migrants who fail in their attempts to reach EU
settle there.
Age structure
In Tunisia, the age of migrants generally ranges from 20 to 40 years.
Independently of age, it takes a great deal of courage and good health
to attempt such a perilous crossing. Testimonies, however, reveal the
presence of infants with one of their parents and teenagers occasionally travelling on their own. Over the past few years the Italian social
services have taken an increasing number of these young clandestine
migrants under their care. However, there is a trend towards a greater
diversification, as the crisis affects all age groups. Political crises,
company bankruptcies and the crisis in the tourist sector have led
more and more people of all ages to opt for migration. The age of
sub-Saharan migrants transiting via Morocco varies between 15 and
47 years, with 27.7 years on average and 95.4% aged <36 years.
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Education and socio-economic status
While there exists no statistics on migrants’ education and profession
in Tunisia, a study of Moroccan migrants showed rather high levels of
education: 48.5% reached upper primary level, 32.4% secondary level
and 16.1% higher education level. Those without diploma represent
less than a third of migrants (31.7%).
According to the same study, migrants who would not assess any
profession represent 24% of migrants in Morocco, the remaining
76% regroups employees (20%), traders and commercial and
financial intermediaries (16%), non-agricultural labourers, cargo
handlers and odd-jobbers (10%), farmers, fishermen and loggers
(10%), skilled agricultural and fishery workers (9%), craftsmen
and skilled workers in the artisanal crafts sector (7%).15
Conclusion
NA countries have ceased to be emigration-only countries, and are
now becoming immigration as well as transit countries for illegal
migrants to Europe. A non-negligible amount of them end up in
death tolls of shipwrecks in the Mediterranean Sea. While most
boat-migrants are men in their 20s or 30s, the illegal migrants’
population appears to become increasingly heterogeneous, with
more women and also more educated individuals considering
crossing the Mediterranean. Although illegal migration is by nature
poorly documented, existing statistics show that the phenomenon is
growing exponentially and is not likely to decline in the near future,
considering the factors driving this phenomenon. Indeed, the
ongoing crises in Africa and the Middle East are prompting
outflows of refugees. Changes in migration flows and nature induce
NA countries to share some common public policy concerns with
European countries.
Funding
The present work was funded by EUNAM (EU and NA Migrants:
Health and Health Systems, EU FP7/2007–2013 grant 260715).
15
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11 Kassar H. Les régions côtières en Tunisie, les têtes de ponts de la migration clandestines, Migration clandestine africaine en Europe: un espoir pour les uns, un
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12 Kassar H.Genre et disparité régionale en Tunisie. Middle East and North
Africa Sustainable Development Group (MNSSD), Washington: World Bank report,
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13 Mabrouk M. Voiles et sel, culture, foyers et organisation de la migration clandestine
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14 Interviews conducted for a research project in collaboration with INED UR 12,
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15 Khachani M. Migration as a factor of development: a study on North and West
Africa Migration, labour market and development 2010; Research report, Rabat,
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