The Psychological Record, 2004, 54, 15-25
NAivE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE: THE PREVALENCE,
STRENGTH, AND SOURCES OF MISCONCEPTIONS
ANNETTE KUJAWSKI TAYLOR and PATRICIA KOWALSKI
University of San Diego
Studies show that misconceptions about psychology are
pervasive. This study examined how the strength of prior beliefs
and the sources of misinformation relate to conceptual change
following an introductory psychology course . Ninety introductory
psychology students completed a 36-item "Psychological
Information" questionnaire. Testing during the 1st day of the
semester showed 38.5% accuracy whereas testing during the last
week showed 66.3% accuracy. These results suggest that
misconceptions remain prevalent but can be reduced by taking an
introductory psychology course. Our data also indicate that
strength of belief is an important transitional variable that may
reflect the process of change. Finally, although personal
experience and media are important sources of misinformation,
we found that they do not promote strongly held beliefs.
Currently, many authors define misconceptions as beliefs that are
held contrary to known evidence, and often derived from years of life
experiences and observations (Hynd & Guzzetti ,. 1993). In educational
research, studies of misconceptions often focus on the physical sciences
(Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997), where
misconceptions are prevalent and the corresponding scientific concepts
readily demonstrated. Many authors refer to these science
misconceptions as "na"lve" science (ct., Pine, Messer, & St. John, 2001)
to emphasize that individuals acquire these concepts in a primitive
fashion, through individual trial-and-error.
Since the early 20th century researchers have documented that the
field of psychology presents no exception to this finding of prevalent
misconceptions (e.g. , Garrett & Fisher, 1926; Valentine, 1936). Evidence
This work was supported, in part, by the University of San Diego through Faculty
Research Grants to both authors.
We thank Vincent Stretch, Stephen F. Davis, and Kenneth Keith for their feedback on
earlier drafts of this manuscript.
Correspondence should be addressed to Annette Taylor, Department of Psychology,
University of San Diego, 5998 Alcala Park, San Diego, CA 92110, USA. (E-mail :
[email protected]) .
16
TAYLOR AND KOWALSKI
for widespread belief in misconceptions concerning human behavior
continues to be demonstrated among college students (Brown, 1983;
Lamal , 1979, 1995; Messer & Griggs, 1989; Sternberg & Grigorenko,
1999), as well as among the general public (Science and engineering
indicators, 2002), nonsocial science faculty (Gardner & Hund, 1983), and
cross-culturally (McCutcheon, Furnham, & Davis, 1993). Furthermore,
studies examining the effect of the introductory psychology course on
student misconceptions have suggested that there is only limited change
in students' false beliefs following instruction. For example, studies by
McKeachie (1960) and Vaughn (1977) found only a small decline in
misconceptions, 5.5% and 6.6%, respectively. In addition, Gardner and
Dalsing (1986) and Kowalski and Taylor (2001) found that even after
taking several psychology courses, many students still retain their false
beliefs. The only studies we found which showed decreases in
misconceptions used refutational text, lecture, and discussion (Miller,
Wozniak, Rust, Miller & Slezak, 1996; Taylor & Kowalski, 2002).
The study of misconceptions is important because research shows
that strongly held , but incorrect beliefs, are particularly difficult to change
(Otero , 1998; Vosniadou, 2001). Once misinformation becomes fixed in a
person's knowledge base, new information is frequently distorted or
ignored, resulting in strengthening or retention of the inaccurate belief. If
students are entering the introductory psychology class with strongly held
misconceptions, teaching them the more scientifically accurate findings
will be particularly difficult.
The conceptual change literature provides extensive evidence that
strongly held beliefs are especially difficult to change. Dole and Sinatra
(1998) attribute this difficulty to the cognitive effort required to change
basic schemata. Dole (2000) additionally provides evidence to suggest
that the more strongly held a belief, the more it reduces comprehension
of new material , in conflict with the prior belief.
Much of the psychological literature on misconceptions has focused
on problems in defining and assessing misconceptions as they relate to
human cognition and behavior rather than on the processes underlying
change. Recent researchers have criticized early tests of
misconceptions, particularly for their reliance on the true/false format.
Several authors (Gardner & Dalsing, 1986; McCutcheon, 1991; Ruble,
1986) contend that information in psychology is more complex than a
single , simple statement can imply. In addition, true/false-testing fails to
discriminate between strongly held misconceptions and answers that
result from guessing. Researchers have addressed this issue by
including a "don't know" option to account for guessing (Gardner &
Dalsing, 1986), or by altering the test format by creating multiple-choice
options (McCutcheon, 1991). Neither of these alternatives, however,
assesses the strength of beliefs.
Viewing psychological misconceptions within the conceptual change
framework underscores the importance of assessing the strength of
students' beliefs. Not only would such an assessment clarify the guessing
NAivE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
17
issue, such an assessment is also likely to provide information on the
processes underlying changing conceptions and beliefs. Both the
cognitive literature and the education literature suggest that the
metacognitive ability to evaluate one's knowledge (Maki , 1998: Kruger &
Dunning, 1999), to notice inconsistencies (Otero , 1998), and to
experience dissatisfaction with that knowledge (Posner, Strike, Hewson,
& Gertzog, 1982) is critical to conceptual change. Moreover, as Dole and
Sinatra (1998) note, the evidence from studying conceptual change in
science knowledge and text comprehension suggests that change is
gradual and evolutionary rather than being sudden and revolutionary.
Changing strength of belief, then, can provide a more sensitive index of
slowly changing conceptions.
In addition to the ambiguity inherent in asking students to assess
simple true/false statements about complex psychological issues,
previous studies on psychological misconceptions have mostly
speculated on the sources of misconceptions and have recommended
that research assess the sources of misconceptions (Barnett, 1986;
Brown, 1984; Griggs & Ransdell, 1987; Higbee & Clay, 1998;
McCutcheon, 1991; Panek, 1982; Ruble, 1986; Vaughn , 1977). Only the
source of prior belief in the 10% myth has been investigated to any great
extent (Higbee & Clay, 1998).
The science education literature suggests that so called "na"ive
science" arises from faulty conclusions based on limited personal
experiences and observations, social interactions, and inaccurate prior
instruction (i.e., Dole, 2000; Qian & Guzzetti, 2000). If scientific
misconceptions are derived from such sources (i.e. , are "na"ive") , then
individuals may also develop misconceptions about psychological
science from similar sources. These sources may contribute to the
persistence of inaccurate beliefs by providing intermittent repeated
exposure to perceived supporting evidence, creating both a confirmation
bias and a learning schedule that is resistant to change.
The present study investigated several aspects of psychological
misconceptions in the context of an introductory psychology course
guided by findings from the literature on conceptual change. Our general
goal was to assess the ongoing prevalence of psychological
misconceptions among students , using an instrument designed to
address several criticisms of previous instruments. Specifically we
assessed misconceptions that were unambiguous, and which were
covered by course content. We also addressed the limitation of the
true/false format by assessing the strength of belief for each response. To
accomplish this latter objective, participants rated their confidence in
each statement. This procedure provided a more sensitive measure of
the strength of students' beliefs in misconceptions and allowed for
assessment of guessing. We expected confidence ratings to provide an
additional measure of conceptual change from pretest to posttest beyond
simple absolute accuracy rates.
We also assessed the sources of students' (mis)information, in order
18
TAYLOR AND KOWALSKI
to correct the lack of this information in the literature. We expected this
information when taking account of strength of belief to allow an
assessment of the confidence participants placed in their knowledge,
based on the source of their knowledge.
Using the conceptual change literature to guide our hypotheses, we
predicted that misconceptions would be prevalent and would decline
following the introductory course. We also expected that strength of
beliefs would provide additional insight into absolute accuracy rates. If
change is gradual and evolutionary, then accuracy rates alone may not
provide as sensitive a measure of changing beliefs as would changing
confidence rates. The effects of guessing, as operationalized in low
confidence ratings, could also be accounted for. Finally, we expected that,
in general , misconceptions would be derived from personal experiences
and mass media sources.
Method
Participants
Ninety introductory psychology students, primarily traditional
(immediately out of high school) incoming freshmen, volunteered to
complete both the pretest and posttest.
Materials
We developed a 36-item true/false pretest questionnaire assessing
misconceptions through previously reported pilot studies (Kowalski &
Taylor, 2001; Kowalski, Taylor, Freund, & Houldsworth, 2002; Taylor &
Kowalski, 2002; Taylor, Kowalski, & Laggren, 2000; Taylor, Kowalski,
Negin, & Heise, 2001). A major goal was to include popular
misconceptions of relatively recent origin. Some items were from
previous questionnaires (Vaughn, 1977), some were from readings about
psychological myths (Della Salla, 1998; Elkind, 1987; Segal, 1989), some
were directly from course content, and some were directly from various
texts and instructors' manuals. All of the items were misconceptions and
therefore needed to be answered "false" to be correct. We adopted this
format, in which all correct responses are "false," from the most-often
cited and replicated previous studies (e.g., Vaughn, 1977) to allow a more
direct comparison with the extant data. To address the criticism that
simple statements may be ambiguous (e.g., Brown, 1983), we used pilot
testing , peer critique, and published critiques of some items to eliminate
items that seemed ambiguous or had insufficient evidence for clear
classification as misconceptions.
We also developed a 48-item true/false posttest, including all of the
pretest items. There were 12 additional items, phrased to be "true" and
randomly intermixed with the pretest items. Only the 36 original items
were analyzed.
Participants noted whether they thought each item was true or false;
they then also rated the ir confidence in each answer on a 1-10 scale from
NAIvE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
19
not at a/l confident (guessing) to vel}' confident. The participants noted,
as specifically as possible, where they learned the information by
classifying the sources of knowledge into categories, including "media,
personal experience, read about it, learned it in a class, don't remember
how I learned it, and other-add your own source for this knowledge."
Procedure
Participants provided consent prior to completing the pretest in class
during the first class meeting of the fall semester. They completed the
posttest in class during the last week of the semester, approximately 15
weeks later. Participants required about 20 minutes to complete each of
the questionnaires.
Results
Results are based on analysis of the 36 items that were common to
both the pretest and posttest.
Accuracy: What is the Prevalence of Misconceptions?
Mean accuracy at pretest was 38.5% and at posttest 66.3%, with a
mean of 11.7 more items answered correctly at posttest. This pretest to
posttest accuracy difference was significant, F(1 , 71) = 234.32 , P < .001,
eta 2 = .767.
How Does Guessing Affect Performance on the Misconceptions Test?
To determine whether guessing affected overall accuracy rates we
collapsed the items with a confidence rating of 1, 2, 3, or 4 to reflect
guessing, accounting for 28.0% of all responses. We assumed that items
rated 5, 6, or 7 reflected a moderate level of belief, and those items rated
8, 9, or 10 we assumed to reflect a strong belief. We then recalculated
accuracy rates, dropping responses that reflected guessing. This
recalculation showed a mean accuracy rate of 35.6% at pretest and
67.6% at posttest. This difference remained significant, F(1, 71) = 211.3,
P < .001, eta2 = .749.
The comparison of overall accuracy to accuracy recalculated to
eliminate guessing showed a significant difference at pretest, F(1 , 71) =
9.8, P = .003, eta 2 = .121. There was no signiflicant difference for the
posttest comparison.
Strength of Beliefs: How Does Confidence Reconcile with Accuracy?
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA on mean confidence ratings
with time (pretest/posttest) and accuracy (correct/incorrect) showed a
significant main effect of test time, with significantly higher confidence
levels at posttest, F(1, 68) = 32.5, P < .001 , eta2 = .324. Average
confidence was 5.89 at pretest and 6.92 at posttest. There was no
significant effect of confidence , based on accuracy. Mean confidence was
6.51 for incorrect responses, and 6.30 for correct responses. However,
20
TAYLOR AND KOWALSKI
the interaction was significant, F(1 , 68) = 65.6, P < .001, eta2 = .491, and
showed a greater increase in posttest confidence for correct responses ,
relative to incorrect responses, whereas at pretest confidence in the
incorrect responses was greater than for the correct responses.
What Are the Sources of Misconceptions?
The effect of source of knowledge was analyzed separately for
frequency, accuracy, and confidence, for pretest only, because our
interest was in the sources of students' misconceptions coming into the
introductory course.
How often are the varied sources cited? Participants indicated that they
most often did not remember how they learned the information (36.7%),
regardless of accuracy. All other sources were indicated about equally often,
with 18.9% indicating personal experience, 16.2% media sources, 14.3% in
a previous class, and 13.1 % having read about it. We then examined source
in terms of the overall percentage of incorrect responses per source, at
pretest, as a measure of source of misconceptions. Participants attributed
the largest proportion of their incorrect responses (30%) to the "don't know"
category, 20% to "media," 19% to "personal experience," 16% to "reading,"
and 15% to "classroom learning."
We collapsed all pretest responses across sources, based on
accuracy rates. Participants who attributed pretest responses to media
sources had a 23% accuracy rate , 38% accuracy when the source was
personal experience, 25% when having read about it, 35% when having
learned the information in a previous class, and 50% indicated that they
couldn 't recall where they learned the information.
How is the source related to accuracy? A repeated measures ANOVA
showed a main effect of source, F(4, 140) = 7.3, P < .001, eta2 = .173.
Planned comparisons using Simes' (1986) correction showed that
accuracy based on media sources (24.6%) was significantly lower than
for personal experience (40.6%), classroom learning (37.3%), and don't
know (49.1%).
How is the source related to confidence? An ANOVA on mean
confidence ratings for all five sources of information showed a main effect
of source, F(4, 164) = 36.1, P < .001 , eta2 = .468. Planned comparisons
using Simes' (1986) correction showed that mean confidence in media
sources was significantly lower (5.92), compared to personal experience
(7.35), reading (7.09) , and classroom learning (7.20), and Significantly
greater than for don't know (4.32) . The only other significant differences
were between confidence for the 'don't know' response , which was
significantly lower than all other sou rces.
Discussion
This study examined the prevalence of misconceptions regarding
information in psychology, as well as the effects of strength of beliefs and
source ofinformation on this prevalence. The pretest accuracy of 38.97%
NAIvE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
21
was somewhat lower than previous findings (e.g., Gardner & Dalsing,
1986; Griggs & Ransdell, 1987; Lamal, 1979; McKeachie, 1960; Vaughn,
1977) that ranged from 41 % to 77% accuracy, using various versions of
Vaughn's (1977) Tests of Misconceptions. Our accuracy rate, however,
was consistent with other findings (e.g., Gutman, 1979; McCutcheon,
1991; McCutcheon et aI., 1993) of 26% to 35%. These latter studies
emphasized misconceptions of relatively recent origin, as did our
previous studies examining misconceptions (Kowalski & Taylor, 2001;
Kowalski et aI., 2002; Taylor & Kowalski, 2002; Taylor et aI., 2000, 2001).
When we eliminated guessing from the present data, the accuracy
rate fell by 2.9%, to 35.6% at pretest. This decline was statistically
significant but of low effect size. This result suggests that participants
were guessing correctly; however, the overall effect is not very
meaningful. Our results are in contrast to Gardner and Dalsing's (1986)
findings which indicated a small (7.98%) increase in accuracy of beliefs
when guessing was eliminated. PartiCipants in their study selected a
"don't know" option for only 12.2% of items. Griggs and Ransdell (1987),
similarly, found a 12% "don't know" response rate. We conclude that
guessing has only a modest effect on accuracy, a conclusion consistent
with Gardner and Dalsing's, and that overall accuracy rates either with or
without an option for guessing provide a relativElly accurate assessment
of misconceptions.
The posttest accuracy of 65.97% (67.60% when guessing is
eliminated-a nonsignificant difference with low effect size) represents a
larger improvement relative to other studies. As reported elsewhere (Taylor
& Kowalski, 2002), we attributed this result to targeting specific items in a
refutational format during instruction and partly to refining the items in pilot
testing. These data suggest that taking an introductory psychology class can
meaningfully reduce the number of misconceptions.
The confidence data help to interpret our accuracy data. Previous
studies (ct., Lamal, 1995; Vaughn, 1977) suggested that course
instruction had a minimal effect on improving students' thinking about
scientific psychological information. Our data, however, suggest that with
instruction, students not only increased their overall accuracy of beliefs,
but also became more confident in the correct beliefs, and less confident
when retaining their belief in the misconception. This finding suggests an
early change in beliefs when the misconception is not completely given
up, because it is no longer held as strongly. Thus, the use of confidence
ratings provides evidence that beliefs may be in the process of changing,
even when the absolute response suggests no change.
These findings using confidence ratings, as an indicator of strength of
belief, concur with findings in the conceptual change literature. Dole and
Sinatra (1998) and Limon (2001) suggest that such change tends to be
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. By this they mean that change occurs
slowly, with knowledge transformed from one state to another, in stages;
massive revisions in prior beliefs are unlikely to occur. Our data support this
notion: While many misconceptions seemingly remained unchanged, the
decline in overall confidence supports this type of gradual process.
22
TAYLOR AND KOWALSKI
The interpretation of the source of misinformation is a bit more
complicated. In support of the frequent finding of source confusion in selfreports , the "don't know where I learned the information" response was
most common. Because the plurality of responses supported this finding,
we felt confident that the detail and precision of personal experiences and
media sources reflected accurate memory for those sources. Wright,
Gaskell, and O'Muircheartaigh (1997) provide evidence for the reliability
of source information , particularly when it is accompanied by detail and
precision in the memory source. Thus, although we can never truly know
whether participants were accurate about their remembered sources, we
believe that the detail and precision with which they recalled a particular
source supported the accuracy of their memory for the source. At best
these would then be accurate sources, at worst they could have
conceivably reinforced a misconception .
Thus, when considering confidence in information as a function of
source, when the source could not be remembered, participants most
often noted low confidence , suggesting they were guessing when the
source could not be remembered. The highest confidence was in terms
of the next two most frequently cited sources of information, "personal
experience" and "media."
The planned comparisons suggested that when media was the
source of knowledge, the responses were significantly less accurate than
for personal experience, class, or don't know. Participants provided the
specific media sources of information, whenever possible . This
information showed that news reports were listed most often as a specific
source of misinformation, followed by prime time news shows (e.g., 60
Minutes, 20/20), prime time fiction, and newspapers, in order. Thus, it
appears that individuals acquire incorrect prior knowledge from media
sou rces. These individuals may lack critical thinking skills, or may have
insufficient prior knowledge, to sift through the misinformation.
The planned comparisons of confidence ratings relative to source of
information showed that confidence was significantly lower when information
came from media sources. This finding suggests that participants were fairly
insightful in doubting the accuracy of knowledge acquired directly from media
sources. This use of the confidence ratings is important because it tells us
that although the participants may acquire much information from the media,
they appear to be cautious about its accuracy.
In summary, we found that misconceptions continue to be prevalent,
perhaps even increaSing over the past 10 to 20 years. Nevertheless,
taking an introductory psychology course can significantly reduce these
misconceptions.
The use of confidence ratings provided an additional understanding
of misconceptions. The confidence ratings suggest that at pretest,
participants were more confident in their incorrect responses than in their
correct responses. At posttest both accuracy and confidence increased.
Confidence decreased for items answered incorrectly at both pretest and
posttest. Thus, when misconceptions remained, confidence in their
accuracy decreased, suggesting a change in belief systems.
NAIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
23
In terms of source of information and as could be expected , most
participants did not remember exactly where they learned the information .
When individuals remembered where they learned their misconceptions ,
it was primarily from varied media sources. The confidence ratings
provided additional insight into the accuracy data because participants
were least confident when they learned information from media sources
or when they did not remember where they learned the information.
Our findings indicate that teachers of the introductory course, often
the only psychology course taken by many students on college campuses
across the country, need to be particularly mindful of the na'lve beliefs
students bring to class. As Bransford , Brown, and Cocking (2000) note,
"If initial ideas are ignored by teachers, students may not develop the
understanding teachers intended" (p. 11).
Our goals for future research include looking at the various classroom
pedagogies that may be most effective in changing misconceptions. Early
analyses based on the developmental metacognitive literature suggest the
refutational format is very effective for changing misconceptions. This
approach focuses on the use of both refutational text and refutational
lectures, directly targeting both the misconception and the evidence that
contradicts that misconception. We are optimistic that even a single
introductory course in psychology can teach students to think critically about
alternatives and to dispel many na'ive and incorrect beliefs about psychology.
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