Afghanistan
2017 Country Review
http://www.countrywatch.com
Table of Contents
Chapter 1
1
Country Overview
1
Country Overview
2
Key Data
5
Afghanistan
6
Middle East
7
Chapter 2
9
Political Overview
9
History
10
Political Conditions
16
Political Risk Index
202
Political Stability
217
Freedom Rankings
232
Human Rights
244
Government Functions
246
Government Structure
266
Principal Government Officials
285
Leader Biography
287
Leader Biography
287
Foreign Relations
307
National Security
360
Defense Forces
363
Chapter 3
365
Economic Overview
365
Economic Overview
366
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
369
Nominal GDP and Components
373
Government Spending and Taxation
376
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
379
Trade and the Exchange Rate
381
The Balance of Payments
382
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
384
Nominal GDP and Components
387
Government Spending and Taxation
390
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
393
Trade and the Exchange Rate
395
The Balance of Payments
396
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
398
Nominal GDP and Components
401
Government Spending and Taxation
404
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
407
Trade and the Exchange Rate
409
The Balance of Payments
410
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
412
Nominal GDP and Components
415
Government Spending and Taxation
418
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
421
Trade and the Exchange Rate
423
The Balance of Payments
424
Economic Performance Index
426
Chapter 4
438
Investment Overview
438
Foreign Investment Climate
439
Foreign Investment Index
441
Corruption Perceptions Index
454
Competitiveness Ranking
466
Taxation
475
Stock Market
475
Partner Links
475
Chapter 5
477
Social Overview
477
People
478
Human Development Index
480
Life Satisfaction Index
484
Happy Planet Index
495
Status of Women
504
Global Gender Gap Index
507
Culture and Arts
517
Etiquette
519
Travel Information
523
Diseases/Health Data
533
Chapter 6
539
Environmental Overview
539
Environmental Issues
540
Environmental Policy
541
Greenhouse Gas Ranking
542
Global Environmental Snapshot
553
Global Environmental Concepts
564
International Environmental Agreements and Associations
578
Appendices
Bibliography
603
604
Country OverView
Pending
Chapter 1
Country Overview
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 1 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Country Overview
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan is a landlocked, mountainous country in south Asia. Its strategic position sandwiched
between the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent along the ancient "Silk Route"
means that Afghanistan has long been fought over despite its rugged terrain. It was at the center of
the so-called "Great Game" in the 19th century when Imperial Russia and the British Empire in
India vied for influence. It won independence from British control in 1919. A military coup in 1973
abolished the monarchy, and the country became a republic.
Afghanistan became a key Cold War battleground after the Soviet troops invaded in 1979 to
support a pro-communist regime, touching off a long and destructive war. The Soviet troops
withdrew in 1989, but a series of subsequent civil wars saw Afghanistan finally fall in 1996 to the
Taliban which was in control of about 90 percent of the country until late 2001.
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. and its partners
in the anti-terrorist coalition launched air strikes against Afghanistan in October 2001 after Taliban
refuse to hand over Osama bin Laden who was held responsible for the September 11 attacks. The
Taliban regime was toppled, and Afghan factions opposed to the Taliban met at a United Nationssponsored conference in Bonn, Germany in December 2001 and agreed to restore stability and
governance to Afghanistan--creating an interim government and establishing a process to move
toward a permanent government.
Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan in December 2004;
he won a second term as president controversial elections in late 2009. The second Karzai term
was characterized by fractious relations with the United States, which was leading the charge to
keep Afghanistan safe. Controversial elections followed in 2014 and ended in contested results,
and with the two contenders -- Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah -- at odds. United States
Secretary of State John Kerry was hailed as a hero in Afghanistan for brokering a unity
government agreement, with Ghani as the president and Abdulllah as chief executive, and rescuing
the country from a slide into political chaos.
More than two decades of conflict destroyed much of Afghanistan’s limited infrastructure and
disrupted normal patterns of economic activity. Although the country’s economic outlook has
improved significantly and is showing strong signs of recovery since the fall of the Taliban regime
in 2001, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The economy is highly
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 2 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
dependent on foreign aid and agriculture, which is extremely vulnerable to adverse weather
conditions, especially drought.
Despite gains toward building a stable central government, a resurgent Taliban and continuing
provincial instability - particularly in the south and the east - remain serious challenges for the
Afghan government. United States-led NATO forces have been operating in Afghanistan with a
eye on staving off the threat posed by militant Jihadist extremists from the Taliban and al-Qaida,
who have been responsible for acts of terrorism, including the 2001 attacks in the United States.
Editor's Note
President Barack Obama's blueprint for the exit of United States troops in Afghanistan called for
the withdrawal of the majority of troops at the end of 2014, but left in place 9,800 troops in that
country through 2015, when over the course of that year, the number would be reduced by half to
4,900. The remaining troops would then be withdrawn in 2016.
It should be noted that while liberals in the United States were frustrated that a complete exit from
Afghanistan -- and an end to a war that had been ongoing for more than a decade -- did not come
at the end of 2014, some Republicans in Congress criticized President Obama's exit schedule from
Afghanistan. For conservatives, such as Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Kelly
Ayotte, issuing a date-certain deadline was tantamount to surrender. The three Republicans issued a
statement that read as follows: "The president's decision to set an arbitrary date for the full
withdrawal of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is a monumental mistake and a triumph of politics over
strategy." But President Obama was vociferous in his stance that the engagement of United States
military forces in Afghanistan was coming to an end, and the specific mission in Afghanistan was
on the verge of being completed. According to the United States president, it was time for Afghans
to take responsibility for their country. As noted by President Obama in his drawdown
announcement from the White House's Rose Garden, "We have to recognize that Afghanistan will
not be a perfect place, and it is not America's responsibility to make it one."
President Obama made clear that significant progress had been made in the years since the 2001
terror attacks -- a time when Afghanistan was the locus of the terrorist Islamist group, al-Qaida.
Indeed, United States military forces since that time have carried out a relentless assault on the
terrorist group, eliminating its leadership, and preventing Afghanistan from being used as a safe
haven and a base for attacks against the United States. With the death of Osama bin Laden -- a
perilous operation authorized by President Obama himself in 2011 -- the United States president
could conceivably argue that the time to exit Afghanistan had come. However, the president was
clearly looking towards a phased withdrawal, and one on a somewhat more protracted timeline
than he had indicated in recent years. To this end, he said: "Now we're finishing the job we've
started."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 3 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In October 2014, progress was being made in the effort to "finish the job" as United States and
United Kingdom forces exited their main military bases in Helmand province, turning security over
to Afghan forces. While the complete withdrawal of United States forces would not take place
until 2016, a phased drawdown was certainly taking place. Meanwhile, this particular exit would
mark the withdrawal of the last British combat forces from Afghanistan.
In November 2014, President Obama authorized United States troops to continue their combat
operations against Taliban and other Islamist terrorist militants in Afghanistan, if they threatened
either American forces or the Afghan government. The order also authorized the use of United
States air support for Afghan combat missions. Moreover, the United States made clear that it
would deploy an additional 1,000 troops to Afghanistan to deal with the security threat if needed.
In March 2015, President Obama responded to a request by the newly-elected President Ghani
for continued United States engagement in Afghanistan, under the aegis of a new bilateral security
agreement, and with an adjusted withdrawal schedule. That new adjusted schedule would hold
the current deployment of 9,800 troops in place in Afghanistan through the end of 2015, and
would outline a new phased withdrawal schedule through 2016, with any remaining troops at the
end of 2016 tasked with securing the Kabul embassy. In effect, the structure of the 2016 exit
schedule would be maintained, but the pace of withdrawal was now changed, with most
redeployment occuring in 2016.
The schedule, including the decision to keep in place a select number of combat troops through
2016, was due to the fact that President Obama wanted to see further training for Afghan security
forces along with the ability to launch counterterrorism missions in the interests of maintaining the
progress made in a war that had gone on for more than a dozen years and left more than 2,000
United States troops dead.
Note: To date, more than 2,000 American and approximately 450 British soldiers have died in the
war in Afghanistan that began in late 2001.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 4 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Key Data
Key Data
Region:
Asia
Population:
34124812
Climate:
arid to semiarid; cold winters and hot summers
Languages:
Pashtu (Indo-European language) and Dari (Afghan Persian) are the major
languages; other Indo-European, Indo-Aryan and Indo-Iranian languages,
such as Balochi, Pashayi and Eastern Farsi, are also spoken; Turkic and
Altaic languages, such as Uzbek and Turkmen, are present; Arabic and Tajiki
are also used. Note: There are approximately 45 living languages in total and
a large degree of bilingualism
Currency:
1 afghani (AF) = 100 puls
Holiday:
Independence Day is 19 August, Nowroze (New Years Day) is 21 March,
Labour Day is 1 May
Area Total:
647500
Area Land:
647500
Coast Line:
0
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 5 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Afghanistan
Country Map
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 6 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Middle East
Regional Map
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 7 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Page 8 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Chapter 2
Political Overview
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 9 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
History
Located just northwest of the modern day India, Afghanistan has long served as the northwestern
border and gateway for the Indian civilization. Various Indian emperors have ruled the region over
the last 3,000 years and its close relations with the rest of India have been well-documented by
historians.
The Hindukush Mountains in the west and Himalayas in the north and northeast served as the
borders for India; Afghanistan was an integral part of the Indian kingdoms at various times during
its history.
In the fourth century before the common era (B.C.E.), Taxila and Kandahar formed important
centers of commerce and education for the empire of Ashoka the Great. In fact, Taxila was one of
the first universities to be founded in India. In those days, the entire region of today's Afghanistan
and northern Pakistan was called Gandhar, after which an important stream of Indian art -painting and sculpture -- has been named. The area was also an important center for Buddhism
inits early days and several ancient statues of Buddha and other artifacts of Buddhism are still
found in the region.
The Indian influence continued, though on and off, until modern times when Sikh kings ruled large
chunks of Afghanistan. In fact, the famous PanjsherValley in the northern Afghanistan is derived
from Punjabi and means the Valley of Five Lions.
Afghanistan also served as the gateway for invasions into India, especially the invaders from
central and west Asia. In 328 B.C.E., Alexander the Great entered the territory of present-day
Afghanistan to capture Bactria (present-day Balkh). Invasions by the Scythians, White Huns and
Turks followed in succeeding centuries. In 642 B.C.E., Arabs invaded the entire region and
introduced Islam.
Arab rule quickly gave way to the Persians, who controlled the area until the Turkic Ghaznavids'
conquest in 998 in the common era (C.E.). Specifically, Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030)
consolidated the conquests of his predecessors and turned Ghazni into a great cultural center, as
well as a base for frequent forays into India. Ghazni was also attracted by the tales of Indian riches
and mounted several raids deep into India in the beginning of the 11th century, bringing back tonnes
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 10 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
of gold and precious stones taken from the kings and the temples that lay in his path. One of his
most famous raids was conducted in 1025 on the Somnath temple in Gujarat in western India,
which was one of the richest temples in India at that time. Between 1001 C.E. and until his death
in 1030 C.E., Mahmud launched 17 raids on India. However, he never really made any attempt to
occupy and rule the Indian territory that he overran, with the exception of parts of Punjab which
he controlled through a governor at Lahore. Nevertheless, he paved the way for future conquests.
Over a century later, Muhammed Ghauri, another Afghan king who now occupied the throne at the
Ghazni Kingdom, followed Mahmud's footsteps and tried tocapture India. His first attempt in 1178
failed when he was driven back by the Indian kings. He came back nearly 15 years later in 1192
and faced Prithviraj Chauhan, an Indian king who ruled Delhi. Ghauri was again defeated after a
protracted battle in Punjab. He was also injured in the battle.
Instead of chasing and decimating the invading army, Chauhan let Ghauriescape, only to see him
gather his forces again and launch another raid barely a year later. This time, though, Chauhan
received the help of about 50 smaller Indian kings; Gahadalavas, the king with the largest army in
northern India, who ruled in northeastern India refused to help Chauhan, whom they saw as rivals.
In a surprise raid conducted by Ghauri, Chauhan's army was routed and the king wasalso killed in
the battle. Ghauri then installed Qutb ud din Aibak, one of his generals as rulers in Delhi. The
general, however, turned independent and stayed on to found his own dynasty and became the first
Muslim ruler of Delhi in1206.
Following Mahmud's short-lived dynasty, various princes attempted to rule sections of the region
until the Mongol invasion of 1219. The Mongol invasion, led by Genghis Khan, resulted in the
destruction of many cities, including Herat, Ghazni and Balkh, and the plunder of fertile
agricultural areas.
Following Genghis Khan's death in 1227 C.E., a succession of petty chieftains and princes for
supremacy until late in the 14th century, when one of his descendants, Tamerlane, incorporated
Afghanistan into his vast empire. Babur, a descendant of Tamerlane and the founder of India's
Moghul Dynasty at the beginning of the 16th century, made Kabul the capital of an Afghan
principality, bringing Afghanistan back into the Indian orbit, a state that continued more or less
uninterrupted until the late 19thcentury.
In 1747, after the demise of the Moghul Dynasty, Ahmad Shah Durrani took charge in Delhi. He is
often called the founder of the modern day Afghanistan.Throughout his reign, Durrani consolidated
chieftainships, petty principalities and fragmented provinces into one country. His rule extended
from Mashhad in thewest to Kashmir and Delhi in the east, and from the Amu Darya (Oxus) River
inthe north to the Arabian Sea in the south. All of Afghanistan's rulers, untilthe 1978 Marxist coup
d'etat, were from Durrani's Pashtun tribal confederation,and all were members of that tribe's
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 11 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Mohammadzai clan after 1818.
Conflict between the expanding British and Russian empires significantly influenced Afghanistan
during the 19th century. British concern over Russian advances in Central Asia and growing
influence in Persia culminated in the two Anglo-Afghan Wars.
The first (1839-42) resulted not only in the destruction of a British army, but is remembered today
as an example of the ferocity of Afghan resistance to foreign rule. The second Anglo-Afghan War
(1878-80) was sparked by Amir ShirAli's refusal to accept a British mission in Kabul. This conflict
brought AmirAbdur Rahman to the Afghan throne. During his reign (1880-1901), the British and
Russians officially established the boundaries of what would become modernAfghanistan. The
British retained effective control over Kabul's foreign affairs.
Afghanistan remained neutral during World War I, despite German encouragement of anti-British
sentiment and Afghan rebellion along the bordersof British India. The Afghan king's policy of
neutrality was not universallypopular within the country, however.
In 1919, members of an anti-British movement assassinated Habibullah, AbdurRahman's son and
successor. His third son, Amanullah, regained control ofAfghanistan's foreign policy after launching
the third Anglo-Afghan War with anattack on India in the same year. During the ensuing conflict,
the war-wearyBritish relinquished their control over Afghan foreign affairs by signing theTreaty of
Rawalpindi in August 1919. In commemoration of this event, Afghanscelebrate August 19 as
Independence Day.
King Amanullah (1919-29) moved to end his country's traditional isolationin the years following the
third Anglo-Afghan War. He established diplomaticrelations with most major countries and,
following a 1927 tour of Europe andTurkey (the latter of which had seen modernization and
secularization underAtaturk), introduced several reforms intended to modernize the country.
Some of these reforms, such as the abolition of the traditional Muslim veilfor women and the
opening of a number of co-educational schools, quicklyalienated many tribal and religious leaders.
The weakness of the army underAmanullah further jeopardized his position. He was forced to
abdicate in January1929 after Kabul fell to forces led by Bacha-i-Saqao, a Tajik brigand.
PrinceNadir Khan, a cousin of Amanullah's, in turn defeated Bacha-i-Saqao in Octoberof the same
year. With considerable Pashtun tribal support, Khan was declaredKing Nadir Shah. Four years
later, however, a Kabul student, seeking revenge,assassinated him.
Mohammad Zahir Shah, Nadir Khan's 19-year-old son, succeeded the throne andreined from 1933
to 1973. In 1964, King Zahir Shah promulgated a liberalconstitution providing for a two-chamber
legislature to which the king appointedone-third of the deputies. The people elected another third,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 12 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
and provincialassemblies selected the remainder indirectly. Although Zahir's "experiment
indemocracy" produced few lasting reforms, it permitted the growth of unofficialextremist parties
of both left and right. This group included the communist People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA), which had close ideologicalties to the Soviet Union.
In 1967, the PDPA split into two major rival factions: the Khalq (Masses)faction headed by Nur
Muhammad Taraki and supported by the military, and theParcham (Banner) faction led by Babrak
Karmal. The split reflected deep ethnic,class and ideological divisions within Afghan society.
Zahir's cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud, served as his prime minister from1953 to 1963. During
his tenure as prime minister, Daoud solicited military andeconomic assistance from both
Washington and Moscow and introduced controversialsocial policies. Daoud's alleged support for
the creation of a Pashtun state inthe Pakistan-Afghan border area heightened tensions with
Pakistan and eventuallyresulted in his dismissal in March 1963.
Amid charges of corruption and malfeasance against the royal family andpoor economic conditions
caused by the severe 1971-72 drought, former PrimeMinister Daoud seized power in a military
coup on July 17, 1973. Daoud abolishedthe monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and
declared Afghanistan arepublic with himself as its first president and prime minister. His attempts
tocarry out badly needed economic and social reforms met with little success, andthe new
constitution promulgated in February 1977 failed to quell chronicpolitical instability.
Seeking to exploit the mounting disaffection of the populace, the PDPAreunified with Moscow's
support. On April 27-28, 1978, the PDPA initiated abloody coup that resulted in the overthrow and
death of Daoud and most of hisfamily. Nur Muhammad Taraki, secretary general of the PDPA,
became president ofthe Revolutionary Council and prime minister of the newly established
DemocraticRepublic of Afghanistan.
Opposition to the Marxist government emerged almost immediately. Thisreaction was largely due
to the fact that the PDPA brutally imposed aMarxist-style "reform" program during its first 18
months of rule, which rancounter to deeply rooted Islamic traditions.
Decrees advocating the abolition of usury (lending money and chargingexorbitant interest rates),
changes in marriage customs, and land reform wereparticularly misunderstood and upsetting to
highly conservative villagers. Inaddition, thousands of members of the traditional elite, the
religiousestablishment, and the intelligentsia were imprisoned, tortured or murdered.Conflicts within
the PDPA also surfaced early and resulted in exiles, purges,mass imprisonment and executions.
By the summer of 1978, a major revolt in the Nuristan region of easternAfghanistan spread into a
countrywide insurgency. In September 1979, HafizullahAmin, who had earlier been the prime
minister and minister of defense, seizedpower from Taraki after a palace shootout. Over the next
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 13 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
two months, instabilityplagued Amin's regime as he moved against perceived enemies in the PDPA.
ByDecember, party morale was crumbling, and the insurgency was growing.
The Soviet Union moved quickly to take advantage of the April 1978 coup. InDecember 1978,
Moscow signed a new bilateral treaty of friendship andcooperation with Afghanistan, and the
Soviet military assistance programincreased significantly. The regime's survival was increasingly
dependent uponSoviet military equipment and advisers, and over time, the Afghan army began
tocollapse.
By October 1979, however, relations between Afghanistan and the SovietUnion were tense as
Hafizullah Amin refused to take Soviet advice on how tostabilize and consolidate his government.
Faced with a deteriorating securitysituation on Dec. 24, 1979, large numbers of Soviet airborne
forces, joiningthousands of Soviet troops already on the ground, began to land in Kabul underthe
pretext of a field exercise. Two days later, these invasion forces killedHafizullah Amin and installed
Babrak Karmal, exiled leader of the Parchamfaction, as prime minister. Massive Soviet ground
forces invaded from the northon December 27.
Following the invasion, the Karmal regime, although backed by anexpeditionary force of about
120,000 Soviet troops, was unable to establishauthority outside Kabul. As much as 80 percent of
the countryside, includingparts of Herat and Kandahar eluded effective government control.
An overwhelming majority of Afghans opposed the communist regime, eitheractively or passively.
Afghan "mujahidin" (freedom fighters) made it almostimpossible for the regime to maintain a
system of local government outside majorurban centers. Poorly armed at first, in 1984 the
"mujahidin" began receivingsubstantial assistance in the form of weapons and training from the
UnitedStates and other outside powers.
In May 1985, the seven principal Peshawar-based guerrilla organizationsformed an alliance to
coordinate their political and military operations againstthe Soviet occupation. Late in 1985, the
"mujahidin" were active in and aroundKabul, launching rocket attacks and assassinating high
government officials. Thefailure of the Soviet Union to win over a significant number of
Afghancollaborators, or to rebuild a viable Afghan army, forced it to bear anincreasing
responsibility for fighting the resistance and for civilianadministration.
Soviet and popular displeasure with the Karmal regime led to its demise inMay 1986. Muhammad
Najibullah, former chief of the Afghan secret police (KHAD),replaced Karmal. Najibullah had
established a reputation for brutal efficiencyduring his tenure as KHAD chief. As prime minister,
though, Najibullah wasineffective and highly dependent on Soviet support. Undercut by deepseateddivisions within the PDPA, the regime's efforts to broaden its base of supportproved futile.
By the mid-1980s, the tenacious Afghan resistance movement, aided by theUnited States, Saudi
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 14 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Arabia, Pakistan and others, was exacting a high price fromthe Soviets, both militarily within
Afghanistan, and also by souring theU.S.S.R.'s relations with much of the Western and Islamic
world. Althoughinformal negotiations for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had been
underwaysince 1982, it was not until 1988 that the governments of Pakistan andAfghanistan, with
the United States and Soviet Union serving as guarantors,signed an agreement settling the major
differences between them.
The agreement, known as the Geneva Accords, included five major documents.The accords called
for U.S. and Soviet non-interference in the internal affairsof Pakistan and Afghanistan; the right of
refugees to return to Afghanistanwithout fear of persecution or harassment; and, most importantly,
a timetablethat ensured full Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan by Feb. 15, 1989. About14,500
Soviet and an estimated one million Afghan lives were lost between 1979and the Soviet withdrawal
in 1989.
Significantly, the "mujahidin" were neither party to the negotiations, norto the 1988 agreement, and
consequently, they refused to accept the terms of theaccords. As a result, civil war did not end
with the Soviet withdrawal, whichwas completed as scheduled in February 1989. Instead, it
escalated. Najibullah'sregime, though failing to win popular support, territory or
internationalrecognition, was able to remain in power until 1992.
The Soviet-supported Najibullah regime did not collapse until the defectionof Gen. Abdul Rashid
Dostam and his Uzbek militia in March 1992. As thevictorious "mujahidin" entered Kabul to
assume control over the city and thecentral government, a new round of conflict ensued between
the various militias,which had coexisted only uneasily during the Soviet occupation. With the
demiseof their common enemy, the militias' ethnic, clan, religious and personalitydifferences
surfaced, and the civil war continued.
Seeking to resolve these differences, the leaders of the Peshawar-based"mujahidin" groups agreed
in mid-April 1992 to establish a 51-member interimIslamic Jihad Council to assume power in
Kabul. Moderate leader, ProfessorSibghatullah Mojaddedi, was to chair the council for three
months, after which a10-member leadership council composed of "mujahidin" leaders and presided
overby the head of the Jamiat-i-Islami, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, was to be setup for a
period of four months. During this period, a Loya Jirga, or grandcouncil of Afghan elders, would
convene and designate an interim administrationto hold power for up to a year, pending elections.
In May 1992, however, Rabbani prematurely formed the leadership council,undermining
Mojaddedi's fragile authority. In June, Mojaddedi surrendered powerto the Leadership Council,
which then elected Rabbani president. Heavy fightingbroke out in August 1992 in Kabul between
forces loyal to President Rabbani andrival factions, particularly those who supported Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar'sHezb-i-Islami.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 15 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
After Rabbani convened a highly controversial council to extend his tenurein December 1992,
fighting in the capital flared up in January and February1993. The Islamabad Accord, signed in
March 1993, which appointed Hekmatyarprime minister, failed to have a lasting effect. A follow-up
agreement, theJalalabad Accord, called for the militias to be disarmed but was never
fullyimplemented.
Through 1993, Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami forces, allied with the Shi'aHezb-i-Wahdat militia,
clashed intermittently with Rabbani and Masood's Jamiatforces. Cooperating with Jamiat were
militants of Sayyaf's Ittehad-i-Islami and, periodically, troops loyal to ethnic Uzbek strongman,
Abdul Rashid Dostam. OnJan. 1, 1994, Dostam switched sides, precipitating large-scale fighting in
Kabuland in the northern provinces, causing thousands of civilian casualties in Kabuland elsewhere
and creating a new wave of displaced people andrefugees.
In late 1994, a force called the Taliban, consisting of primarily Pashtunrefugees, came to the fore
in Afghanistan, intending to install an Islamic government. The group systematically eliminated all
other factions and gradually took control of many of Afghanistan's provinces.
Initially, many Afghans welcomed the Taliban as a force to reunite thecountry. Many opinions
were changed over the course of the year, however, as harsh punishment (including executions)
was employed to enforce strict conformity to fundamentalist Islam.
After the attacks in the United States in 2001, which suggested Taliban complicity in the terrorism
carried out by the extremist al-Qaida network, a war was launched against the regime. Opposition
forces in Afghanistan worked with an United States troops to oust the Taliban from power. A new
constitution was established, which set the foundation for new instruments of government.
Supplementary sources used in this section include: The Dawn, The AfghanTimes, IDSA, New
Delhi.
Note on History: In certain entries, open source content from the State Department Background
Notes and Country Guides have been used. A full listing of sources is available in the
Bibliography.
Political Conditions
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 16 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Civil War in Afghanistan
After multiple artillery attacks on Kabul, an Islamic miltant cadre, known as the Taliban, seized the
capital on Sept. 27, 1996, and displaced the ruling members of the Afghan government. President
Rabbani fled and continued to rule the northern third of the country with the remainder of his
cabinet. From there, anti-Taliban forces fought to regain control of the country. Nevertheless, by
early 1997, the Taliban had gained control of approximately 90 percent of the state. The name of
the country was officially changed to the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and the flag was also
changed. The Taliban steadily consolidated control over Afghanistan throughout 1998 and early
1999. In March 1999, Taliban forces captured the Dara-e-Soof area in the northern province of
Samangon from opposition forces led by Ahmad Shah Masoud.
February 1999 negotiations between the Taliban and opposition forces were unsuccessful. From
March 11-14, 1999, Maulvi Wakil Ahmed Mutawakkil of the Taliban and Muhammad Younus
Qanooni of the northern opposition met in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan. There, they
reached an agreement to exchange prisoners of war and to continue cease-fire negotiations in April.
Most importantly, they also agreed to establish a coalition government representing all sides. In
early April 1999, however, the Taliban announced they would not continue the peace talks.
Although the Taliban maintained control over approximately 90 percent of Afghani territory, on
April 21, 1999, the Taliban suffered a setback. After intense fighting, it was forced to abandon the
city of Bamiyan to Unification Party forces, members of the Northern Alliance loyal to President
Rabbani. In mid-May, the Taliban retook Bamiyan. The former Afghan Islamic Government (AIG)
accused the Taliban of the massacre of hundreds of civilians and the burning of more than 200
houses belonging to Shiite Muslims. The Taliban denied the allegations. In late May, the Taliban
seized thousands of weapons from residents of Bamiyan. Fighting continued throughout May in the
Samangan and Balkh provinces.
Meanwhile, neighboring countries and international organizations were appealing to both sides of
the conflict to reconcile their differences non-violently. The Six plus Two Group, consisting of
neighboring countries Pakistan, Tajikistan, Iran, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and the United
States and Russia, convened in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in late July to have a meeting with Taliban
leaders and the former government of Afghanistan in an effort to reach a settlement. The Tashkent
Declaration stated there was no military solution to the conflict and called for an immediate
ceasefire and negotiations. In addition, all roads were to be opened, prisoners exchanged, and
humanitarian aid disbursed. All members of the Six plus Two Group, excluding Turkmenistan,
signed the Tashkent Declaration.
Despite the agreements made at Tashkent, the Taliban immediately thereafter launched the biggest
offensive of the year. Taliban forces moved north from Kabul in a three-pronged attack into
Tagab, Bagram and Koh-e-suf. The forces were able to seize the capital of Parwan province and
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 17 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
move into the Panjsher Valley. The opposition lost a key air base in Bagram. Heavy fighting
continued into August and resulted in a civilian exodus from Afghanistan into Tajikistan a n d
Pakistan. In early August, the opposition was able to make a recovery by taking back Charikar
only a few days after it was lost, and then moved within 50 km of Kabul. Refugees from the
region bolstered the opposition's forces, and were believed to be a significant contributing factor to
these advances. In August, it was revealed that "madrasas" (Islamic seminaries) had been closed in
the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan in order to allow the students to fight along with
Taliban forces. Meanwhile, the Taliban began sweeping through the capital and arresting dissidents.
The Taliban pushed further in September securing the Shomali plain and moving toward Taloqan
in an effort to cut supply links to Tajikistan.
Afghanistan Under the Taliban
As 2000 began, the civil war in Afghanistan continued unabated and without a real solution in sight.
The Taliban reportedly controlled the majority of the country's territory, but due to the significant
interests of some of Afghanistan's neighbors in limiting the spread of fundamentalist Islam in
Central Asia, the opposition continued to receive considerable military, economic and political
support.
The year 2000 turned out to be a year of mixed fortunes for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Politically, the regime made rapid progress in gaining tacit approval from governments across the
world. Representatives of the Taliban were received by major governments all over the world; the
Taliban also managed to open liaison offices in key capitals across the world. Key Taliban officials,
notably the foreign minister Wakil Mutawakil, made a series of visits to Europe in an attempt to
convince governments of the need to lift the sanctions imposed by the United Nations in 1999.
Confrontation, between United States and the Taliban on the one hand and between Russia and the
Taliban on the other, took more serious colors as the world's two biggest powers blamed Taliban
for supporting acts of terrorism and harboring terrorists and pushed the United Nations to impose
additional sanctions against the regime.
The United States has asked the Taliban to hand over Saudi Arabian businessman Osama bin
Laden, who was blamed by the U.S. for the deadly bombings carried out in Kenya and Tanzania in
the August 1998, claiming over 300 lives. Bin Laden had been living in Afghanistan for five years
under the shelter and protection of the Taliban, who had refused to turn him over to the U.S.
saying that there was insufficient evidence linking him the bombings. The dispute between the U.S.
and the Taliban on this issue had already seen several heated moments, especially in 1998 when
U.S. aircraft bombed positions in Afghanistan where bin Laden was supposed to be hiding.
Russia, on the other hand, alleged that the Taliban was supporting the Islamic rebels in its troubled
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 18 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
republic of Chechnya where the Russian army has been fighting a battle with separatists for three
years. Russia said that several of the Chechen fighters were trained and armed in Afghanistan and
that a number of mercenaries, from various Islamic countries all over the world, were also trained
in Afghanistan and later dispatched to fight the Russian soldiers in Chechnya. Russia says that the
Taliban government had been complicit in these training activities and failed to take adequate
measures to curb these activities. Once again, the Taliban denied that it was involved in the
Chechen affair in any way.
As such, the two largest powers in the world finally turned to the United Nations to "punish" the
Taliban. They introduced a resolution in the U.N. Security Council calling for further sanctions
against the Taliban regime. The resolution called for an arms embargo against the Taliban, closure
of Taliban offices outside Afghanistan, freezing of Taliban assets outside the country and ban on
Taliban officials' travels abroad, besides tightening the ban on international flights to Afghanistan.
The resolution was heatedly discussed in the U.N. Security Council where some countries, notably
France, were hesitant to agree to fresh sanctions on the Taliban. France maintained that sanctions
would only hurt the common people of Afghanistan.
In this regard, the French were accused of defending their commercial interests by opposing
sanctions. It was alleged that France wanted to tap the massive oil resources of the Central Asian
region and would use Afghanistan's territory for building a pipeline to bring the oil and gas from the
region to the huge, energy-deficient markets in the South Asian region. Despite these allegations,
France also voted in favor of imposing fresh sanctions, which included a ban on arms sale to the
Taliban. Pakistan, the strongest supporter of the Taliban, also objected to the sanctions. The
Pakistani army was also believed to be involved in training and arming the Taliban. Pakistan said
that further sanctions could scuttle any peace efforts and further isolate the Taliban. China, a
permanent member of the Security Council and a strong ally of Pakistan, abstained from the vote,
along with Malaysia.
Outside the United Nations, countries neighboring Afghanistan, especially the newly independent
states in Central Asia, were closely watching the conflict between the Taliban and the opposition.
The Newly Independent States of the region had expressed fears of destabilization because of
Taliban support for extremists elements in their own countries. As the Taliban made gains in the
northern part of Afghanistan, Afghanistan's neighbors expressed fears that the battle could spill
over into Tajikistan, the small state bordering Afghanistan in the north. The region was hit hard in
the summer of 2000 when an Islamic group, trained, armed and based in Afghanistan, attacked
government forces in Kyrgyzstan a n d Uzbekistan. The attacks, apparently launched from
Tajikistan, were aimed at creating an independent Islamic state in the Ferghana Valley that passes
through the three countries. Kazakhstan, the biggest of the countries in the region, accused the
Taliban of funding terrorism and drug trafficking in order to spread Islamic extremism throughout
the region.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 19 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Meanwhile, Russia and India formed a joint working group on the Taliban. Both countries face
serious problems due to Islamic militants. Quite like Russia, India was faced with mercenaries from
Afghanistan infiltrating the troubled region of Jammu and Kashmir and launching a "jihad" against
the government. The working group was charged with developing ideas to contain the Taliban and
its influence on the militants. The group was formed during the visit of the Russian President
Vladimir Putin to India in October 2000.
Russia said that it would like to see India associated more closely with the efforts to contain the
Taliban. Russia was already working closely with the Central Asian Republics like Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Russia placed nearly 20,000 of its troops on the northern borders of
Afghanistan in order to prevent infiltration by Islamic militants from Afghanistan into the Central
Asian countries. On the western front, Iran placed nearly 50,000 troops on its border with
Afghanistan as a gesture of support for the Afghan opposition and also for putting military pressure
on the Taliban. China, too, took an active interest in the situation due to the trouble in its own
Muslim-dominated Xinxiang-Ughuir autonomous region bordering Afghanistan in the east. China
was also keen to ensure that the Taliban-inspired and aided militants operating in its territory were
contained.
Strategic Developments in 2000
On the battlefront, the Taliban began the summer of 2000 on a strong note. Summer also marked
the beginning of the fighting season as the snows start to melt in the high reaches of the mountains.
The summer of 2000 saw one of the fiercest battles in recent years and the international
community watched nervously as the Taliban managed to stage rapid gains on the battlefield in the
first few weeks.
The Taliban managed to win control over the strategic Takhar gorge in northeastern Afghanistan
and followed this crucial victory with the conquest of Taloqan town, the biggest and most serious
defeat for the Northern Alliance, the umbrella grouping of anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan, since
the fall of Kabul to the Taliban several years ago. The Taliban attempted to continue their
momentum by attacking the critical Panjsher Valley, literally the last stronghold of the opposition
forces. However, the opposition, led by Ahmed Shah Masoud, was able to beat off the Taliban
attack and hold on to their strongest position in the country.
The opposition was worried about the reverses it had suffered on the battlefield. Masoud blamed
the fall of Taloqan and Takhar gorge on betrayal by the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar faction of the
alliance and also due to the role played by Pakistan in the latest Taliban offensive. Pakistan was
known to be the strongest supporter of the Taliban and allegedly supplied them not only with
political support, but also military leadership and supplies. The United States Department of State
officials often accused the Pakistani army of being involved in the Taliban operations, with its
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 20 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
officials fighting alongside the Taliban.
The defeats seemed to bring the opposition together and led to extensive consultations on their
future strategy to counter the gains of Taliban. Masoud held meetings with the Uzbek warlord and
another opponent of the Taliban, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Ismail Khan and Maulvi Atta
Muhammad in the Iranian city of Mashad in October 2000 to discuss the situation in the parts of
Afghanistan controlled by Taliban.
The consolidation of the opposition forces enabled them to launch attacks on the Taliban, opening
new fronts against them and managing to wrest control of key towns from the Taliban. In addition
to the northeastern parts of the country, the opposition forces launched attacks on the Taliban in
central Afghanistan as well. In intense fighting in the Bamiyan province in central Afghanistan, the
opposition was able to capture the strategic town of Yakawlang in late December 2000. The
opposition followed its victory with yet another crucial, morale-boosting win in the neighboring
Ghor district, capturing another key town, Ghalmin, about 350 km northwest of Kabul by Dec. 31,
2000. Opposition leaders said they had opened a new front in the battle against Taliban and that
more fighting could be seen in the region. The victories were significant since the Taliban had
captured the Bamiyan and Ghor provinces a few years before. Since then, the region had been
totally under their control. As such, a return to opposition control was viewed as a pivotal
development.
The opposition victories were also significant since the opposition forces were believed to have
received a significant amount of tactical and military help from Russia and other countries in the
region. The re-arming of the opposition took place at a feverish pace following the serious defeats
handed to the opposition by the Taliban earlier in the summer of 2000. The opposition said it also
saw an opportunity in those victories since people in southern, western and Southwestern
provinces of Afghanistan were reportedly getting restless with the Taliban regime.
As usual, the civilian population bore the brunt of the battle. Afghanistan faced severe droughts due
to lack of rains for several years. The conditions became especially severe in the summer of 2000
as local production fell 44 percent to 1.82 million tons, leaving the country dependent on foreign
aid for the balance of 1.5 million tons. The United Nations issued warnings that thousands of lives
were at risk unless the international community acted quickly to send in relief supplies. The U.N.
estimated that aid worth over $60 million was needed urgently to prevent famine in the country.
The World Food Programme, along with several international non-governmental organizations, set
up camps in various parts of the country to ensure that food was distributed even in the remote
mountainous parts.
The renewed fighting also added to the misery of the local population as thousands fled the area
affected by the battle and sought shelter elsewhere. Nearly 10,000 people had escaped from the
northern province of Baghlan itself, while over 50,000 fled from Takhar and Badakshan provinces
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 21 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
earlier in the summer when fighting was intense in those parts of the country.
Developments in late 2000 and early 2001
The course for Afghanistan was not entirely negative. The United Nations also managed to achieve
a breakthrough in getting the Taliban and the combined opposition to agree to peace negotiations.
In November 2000, the United Nations special envoy for Afghanistan, Francesco Vendrell, sent
feelers to all the parties about holding indirect peace talks. As both the Taliban and the opposition
showed readiness to talk, the first round of peace talks was held in the Turkmen capital Ashgabat
on December 11, the first peace moves in the troubled country for the last couple of years. The
talks, which eventually turned out to be direct, face-to-face talks between the warring factions,
lasted three hours and focused on the need to establish a coalition government. They also
discussed possibilities of a long-term ceasefire before establishing the preconditions for forming an
administrative arrangement in the country. The two sides agreed to meet again. The Taliban also
warned that if the United Nations imposed additional sanctions, then it would not participate in any
peace initiative by the United Nations.
In February 2001, the Taliban leader Mohammed Omar ordered the destruction of all statues that
exist in the country, saying that since the statues were religious, they were anti-Islamic. The
Taliban identified two gigantic statues of Buddha in the central Afghan town of Bamiyan as its first
targets. The statues, measuring 55 m and 38 m in height, dated from the Mauryan period in India
in third century C.E. Despite appeals by the international community, including the United Nations
and the UNESCO, the Taliban soldiers bombarded the statues with anti-tank fire for almost a
week, reducing this rich piece of the country's cultural heritage to rubble.
The Northern Alliance
The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas turned out to be the last such wanton act of destruction
of Afghan heritage by the Taliban. In early September 2001, the Taliban scored a major victory
when Ahmad Shah Masoud, the military chief of the Northern Alliance, was seriously injured in an
assassination attempt. Two Arabs posing as journalists carried out the attack on Masood. They
detonated the bomb hidden in their television camera that led to several deaths and critically
wounded Masood, who was immediately removed to a hospital in the neighboring Tajikistan.
However, he did not survive his injuries and died a few days later. Masoud was accorded a state
funeral, held in his own hometown in the Panjsher valley, that was attended by thousands of his
followers and the leaders of the Northern Alliance.
The Northern Alliance immediately blamed the Taliban for the assassination and said that the plot
had been to blow up the entire leadership of the Alliance. The two assassins had actually requested
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 22 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the entire leadership council of the Alliance to gather together for a picture so that they could dispel
rumors of disunity among the leadership. However, this was rejected since the Alliance leaders had
long feared assassination attempts and had decided never to gather together at one place.
Yet, the death of Masoud was by far the most serious setback for the Northern Alliance from the
beginning of the Afghan conflict. It was Masoud, almost single-handedly, who had been
masterminding the Alliance's military operations against the Taliban. His death could have resulted
in a complete military rout of the Northern Alliance. Not only would the Alliance military have
been without an incisive and experienced general, but Masoud's death could also have set off
disputes among the Alliance leadership over the succession to Masoud. Thus, the assassins, looked
set to achieve their target. However, it was not to be. The September 11 terror attacks in the
United States and the events unfolding after these attacks changed Afghanistan as much as, if not
more than, it changed the United States. They were also to dramatically alter the balance of power
in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan After September 11, 2001
Almost as soon as the deadly attacks took place in New York and Washington D.C., accusing
fingers turned towards Afghanistan's Taliban regime, which has been housing and protecting
Osama bin Laden, the most wanted man in the United States. Within days, the United States
investigators zeroed on to bin Laden as their man. The U.S. accused bin Laden and his Al-Qaida
terror network of planning and masterminding the deadly attacks that claimed thousands of lives.
The U.S. urged the Taliban regime to hand over bin Laden so he could be tried in the United
States for the terror acts. However, the Taliban rejected the demand. It first said that bin Laden
had neither the means nor the technology to conduct the highly successful terror attacks. The
Taliban also said that as bin Laden was a guest, he could not be forced to leave the country. The
Taliban repeatedly asked the U.S. to furnish evidence that bin laden had indeed been involved in
the September 11 attacks. The Taliban also resisted mounting pressure from its few allies in the
world - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - to cooperate with the United States
authorities.
Toward the end of September, the Taliban said it would hold a meeting of the religious leaders to
decide the fate of bin Laden. The meeting finally decided to leave it up to bin Laden on whether he
wanted to leave Afghanistan or not. The resulting stalemate with the Taliban led the U.S. and its
allies to pursue the military option. The U.S. and Britain began sending their forces to the region.
Thousand of soldiers - on board their ships or ferried by aircraft -- were brought in from bases as
far as Bahrain, South Korea and Southeast Asia. The forces found ready bases all around
Afghanistan, including Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The U.S. also used bases as far as
Turkey to prepare for the eventual attacks.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 23 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
As the U.S.-led coalition was preparing for the attacks, so too were the anti-Taliban forces which
finally saw a real chance of toppling the Taliban. The main player of these forces, the Northern
Alliance, said it would cooperate with the U.S. The alliance offered intelligence resources for the
U.S. military and called for a coordinated war effort against the Taliban. The Northern Alliance
and other anti-Taliban forces also offered thousands of soldiers to actually take on the Taliban in
ground battles, something that neither the U.S. nor its allies were ready for in the beginning.
The War on Terrorism
On Oct. 7, 2001, nearly a month after the U.S. terror attacks, the United States and Britain
launched the attacks on the Taliban and Al-Qaida network. The first attacks were launched from
U.S. and British ships that had been moved to the Arabian Sea, just south of Pakistan's coastline.
The first of these sea-launched cruise missiles hit areas near the Kabul airport and also in the
southern cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad. The missiles had struck the defense ministry complex in
the heart of Kabul.
In a clear indication that strikes were imminent, the US Air Force launched the KH-11 satellite,
known popularly as the Keyhole. The satellite is capable of doing detailed imaging over every
square inch of designated territory, from over 200 miles up in the sky, and it is capable of
monitoring movement and telecommunications in the target area. The satellite was launched in
order to help direct the attacks.
The initial attacks focused on the major cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif,
which were strong holds of the Taliban. The bombings, the heaviest ever in the history of man,
were highly successful in decimating the Taliban air power and air defenses, besides smashing the
military logistics of the Taliban. While the bombing campaign proceeded, the anti-Taliban forces
were initially content to sit back and watch; the Northern Alliance said it would move once the
Taliban had been really 'browbeaten.' The Alliance said it expected a large-scale defection from the
Taliban as its forces became demoralized following the U.S. bombings.
Something close to that happened within a couple of weeks of the bombing campaign. The
Northern Alliance mounted its operations. The Alliance began from the areas it controlled in
northeast Afghanistan. The swiftness with which the Alliance forces gained victories in the initial
phases left even the most optimistic Alliance leaders astounded. The Taliban was just simply
disappearing, without offering a real fight. Within a couple of weeks, the anti-Taliban forces had
captured over 50 percent of the country, while they controlled just 10 percent at the beginning of
the war.
The first major battle occurred near the key northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif, which controls access
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 24 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
to the central and western Afghanistan. However, here, too, aided by precision bombing by the
U.S. forces, the Northern Alliance was able to claim victory in a matter of days. Over the next few
days, other cities like Heart and Bamiyan had fallen to the anti-Taliban forces. Another major
target was Bagram, just north of Kabul. Bagram was home to a very strategic airfield that could
grant the anti-Taliban forces a decisive edge over Kabul. Once Bagram fell to the Northern Alliance
forces in early November, the fall of Kabul was imminent.
The rapid gains made by the Northern Alliance on the ground in Afghanistan and the capitulation
by thousands of Taliban soldiers within weeks and without much resistance was hardly the sort of
news that Pakistan wanted to hear. The relations between the Northern Alliance and Pakistan had
always been chilly or outright hostile due to the role played by Pakistan in arming and training the
Taliban. Seeing the military gains of the Northern Alliance, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf
began expressing fears about the stability of Afghanistan and that Pakistan would like to have a
friendly government in power at Kabul. In order to calm Pakistani fears, the United States urged
the Northern Alliance not to enter Kabul until an interim government had been formed in order to
replace the Taliban. However, the military machine of the Northern Alliance continued its march
and on November 13, Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance, making Pakistan's worst fears come
true.
After The Collapse of Kabul
The fall of Kabul precipitated international efforts to find an interim regime that would be
acceptable to all and bring stability to war-torn Afghanistan until the country could hold democratic
elections. Thus, when the United Nations invited various Afghan factions to begin negotiations on
the structure and composition of an interim administration in Afghanistan, it was clear that the
Northern Alliance would have a significant say in how things went, prompting Pakistan once again
to emphasize the need to have a 'well represented' interim administration which reflected the true
composition of the Afghan society. Pakistan was hoping it would be able to get pro-Pakistan
Pashtun leaders onto the interim administration.
The negotiations for a post-Taliban government in Afghanistan began in the German city of Bonn
in last week of November. The four main Afghan factions opposed to the Taliban attended the
talks. The negotiations got off to a rocky start since the positions and the interests of the four
factions were often conflicting. Each of the groups wanted to have the maximum power in the
interim government and of course several leaders were jockeying for the coveted position of the
head of the interim government. Besides, bigger groups like the Northern Alliance wanted to have
as many of the important cabinet seats as possible.
Yet, the international community ensured that the leaders of the various factions actually went into
a closed-doors discussion. The discussions, which blew hot and cold for over a week, finally
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 25 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
resulted in an agreement on December 4, after over a week of negotiating, on a framework for a
post-Taliban administration, just hours after the United States pressured the Northern Alliance to
drop obstacles threatening to derail talks on Afghanistan's political future. In a night of hectic
diplomacy, U.S. appeals persuaded Northern Alliance leader Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul to
release a long-delayed list of candidates for an interim administration, the missing link after seven
days of talks frustrated by conflicting signals from Kabul. With the list finally on the table,
delegations representing the northern alliance, exiles loyal to former King Mohammad Zahir Shah
and two smaller exile groups quickly finalized the text of an agreement establishing a 29-member
interim governing council.
Under the agreement, the interim executive council would govern for six months, until former King
Mohammad Zahir Shah convened a traditional tribal gathering, or the emergency Loya Jirga, (a
traditional grand council) which would establish a transitional administration to govern for 18
months, paving the way for a democratic constitution and eventual elections. The accord provided
for an interim government for a period of six months, which took power in Kabul on December
22.
The Transitional Government
The factions agreed that the new head of Afghanistan's interim administration be a 44-year-old
tribesman from the Taliban heartland of Kandahar, who speaks fluent English, studied abroad and
has led troops in his homeland against the Islamic militia. Hamid Karzai, initially supported the
creation of the Taliban in 1994 as an alternative to the lawlessness of the warlords who ruled his
native Kandahar. In 1995 the Taliban asked Karzai to be their permanent representative at the
United Nations. By that time, the religious movement disillusioned him because he said it had been
hijacked by neighboring Pakistan.
Karzai, meanwhile, cut deals with Pashtuns in Uruzgan to abandon the Taliban and then began
moving southward toward Kandahar with an armed force of several thousand tribesmen. In
published reports, Karzai said he wanted the Taliban's defeat in Kandahar to be a negotiated one
that did not include bloodshed. Karzai often accused the religious militia of being manipulated by
neighboring Pakistan, with whom he had a complicated relationship. While Pakistan allowed Karzai
to maintain his headquarters in its southwestern Baluchistan province, the two sparred regularly. A
fierce nationalist, Karzai often accused his fellow tribesmen of being pawns in a greater game being
played out by Afghanistan's neighbors, specifically Pakistan.
During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Karzai was in Pakistan. When Islamic
insurgents took power from the pro-Moscow regime in 1992, Karzai became Afghanistan's deputy
foreign minister. The rebel government, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, the current de facto ruler of
Afghanistan, fought bitterly among themselves, destroying large sections of the city and killing
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 26 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
50,000 civilians. Karzai left Rabbani's government in the first years, disillusioned by the bickering
between the groups. In the early years of the rebel government, Karzai asked Rabbani and his
regime, which was largely run by minority Tajiks, to incorporate more ethnic Pashtuns,
Afghanistan's largest ethnic group.
The factions also agreed to ask the United Nations Security Council to consider deploying an
international security force although it was also decided that the interim administration would not
be delayed for such a force to be assembled. The agreement also foresees that Afghan fighters
eventually will be integrated into a regular Afghan army. The breakthrough came after intense
diplomacy by White House official Zalmay Khalilzad and German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer, both of whom pressured Rabbani for a breakthrough. United States envoy James F.
Dobbins, who was prodding the four factions meeting in Germany to reach a workable accord that
would be respected on the ground, unleashed his diplomat after he concluded that the alliance was
stalling on the list of names to prevent an agreement.
Zahir Shah, the ex-king of Afghanistan, and leader one of the factions, expressed his satisfaction
with the United Nations-brokered accord and is expected to return to Kabul in early 2002. The
accord stipulates that Zahir Shah should open a Loya Jirga, or traditional grand council, in six
months time to chart the country's future. The former king will have no official position, but the
convener role underlines his grandfather-of-the-nation status. Zahir Shah, who hails from
Afghanistan's main Pashtun ethnic group, was ousted from power in a bloodless coup in 1973 and
has lived in exile in Italy ever since.
International Peacekeepers
Meanwhile, after weeks of debates and discussions, the Northern Alliance and the other major
Afghan factions agreed to let an international peacekeeping force enter Afghanistan in order to
ensure peace and also to provide security to the new interim administration. The Afghan leaders
had held up the entry of the multinational force saying they did not want any foreign military
presence on Afghani soil and that the Afghan military forces would be enough to ensure peace.
However, the international community, especially the United States and Britain were not buying the
argument. Finally, it was agreed to let a peacekeeping force of 5000 in Afghanistan but with a
limited charter of keeping peace and helping the Afghan administration in maintaining law and
order in the country. The peacekeeping forces assembled for the purpose were led by Britain and
include members of the armed forces of several other countries including France and Germany.
The United States forces, too, took control of key installations across the country and set up its
main base at the Bagram air base, just outside Kabul, positioning thousands of soldiers in the area.
The United States Secretary of State Colin Powell said at NATO headquarters that the new interim
post-Taliban government, formed on December 22, had requested the peacekeepers. "There will
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 27 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
be no shortage of troops," Powell said, referring to pledges from many countries, including 11 of
NATO's 19 members - to contribute forces and military hardware. "Getting the right mix and
determining the leadership of this force has yet to be sorted out." He said that for the "foreseeable
future," the United States would maintain a military presence and keep "going after Al-Qaida, the
Taliban and Osama bin Laden." "We are now talking to the United Nations about what the
mandate of this force should be, what mission should it be ready to perform," Powell said. He said
the turnover of Kandahar helps "get rid of the Taliban regime and prepare the country for the
return of legitimate government in the form of the interim administration that was created earlier
this week."
The United Nations' senior peacekeeping official said on December 7 that the first elements of a
multinational force would be in Kabul in two weeks, in time for the launch of Afghanistan's postTaliban interim leadership. Jean-Marie Guehenno, United Nations undersecretary general for
peacekeeping operations, said the force should secure the capital, currently under the control of
anti-Taliban Northern Alliance troops, before expanding to other cities. "It would indeed be very
good that some element of the force be in place by then," Guehenno said. "After the political
momentum created by the talks I think there is a need for a quick deployment of that multinational
force," he said at United Nations offices in London.
Gender Issues
Women leaders from Afghanistan and around the world, meeting in Brussels on December 4,
pledged to work together to achieve a greater say for women in how the country is run after years
of repression by the Taliban. The summit, coinciding with talks in Germany on Afghanistan's
future, opened with statements of support for Afghan women from women prominent in the
United Nations and the European Union. "We are here to show solidarity," said Mary Robinson,
United Nations high commissioner for human rights. "Whatever government emerges from the
talks in Bonn, we must ensure full participation" of women, Robinson said. European and U.S.based women's groups organized the three-day gathering. Robinson said she expected it to
culminate in a formal demand for the inclusion of women in an interim government in Afghanistan.
"One woman would be only a token," she said. "Women must be in there, that is the measure of
success."
Anna Diamantopoulou, the European Union commissioner for social affairs, said the international
coalition built by the United States to fight terrorism should also combat inequalities.
Diamantopoulou said the European Union would revise its foreign policies by next year to ensure
that nations seeking trade deals with the 15-nation bloc respected equal rights for women. She
added it was "vital" for women to participate in any new government in Afghanistan. While many
of the women at the summit live in Afghanistan, several were exiles who had been active in
publicizing the plight of women back home.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 28 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The world's wealthiest nations were urged on December 5 to be generous with aid to Afghanistan's
new interim administration and help the country lift itself out of the chaos that made it a haven for
terrorists. But government officials and international aid organizations gathered in Berlin stressed
that Afghans themselves must decide how to rebuild their country after more than two decades of
war. Opening the meeting of the Afghanistan Support Group, which coordinates aid for the
impoverished country, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer underlined the need for a longterm effort. "So this conference must send a clear signal: We won't abandon the people in
Afghanistan to their hunger and need," he said.
The women's meeting was scheduled before talks on Afghanistan's political future were arranged in
Koenigswinter, Germany. The Berlin meeting brought together 15 countries including the United
States, Russia, Japan and France. In their final declaration, the more than 40 Afghan women
leaders who came to the three-day summit demanded "equal rights for women, including the right
to vote, equal pay and equal access to education, health care and employment." "We have to make
sure these groups implement what they have signed," said Sima Wali, who shuttled between the
women's summit in Brussels and talks in Bonn, Germany. Wali was a member of the former
Afghan King Mohammed Zahir Shah's delegation at the talks. "It is not as complete as it should be,
but it is a first positive step," Wali said.
Financial Support
United Nations special envoy for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi told the donor countries that the
underpinning of the political accord by improving living conditions for Afghans was a daunting
challenge. But he underlined how the September 11 attacks highlighted the risks of repeating
mistakes, when the international community did little to halt the civil war and the rise of the
Taliban regime that shielded terror suspect Osama bin Laden. "It took that tragedy for us all to
realize that that even a destitute, faraway country cannot be left to its own devices without peril to
all of us," he said.
The German Foreign Ministry said the support group and other donors have pledged some $1.3
billion in humanitarian aid. The German government, which currently chairs the group, estimates
that $6 billion will be needed over the next five years to rebuild Afghanistan. Though no new
pledges were expected at the Berlin meeting, a major donor conference was to be held in January
2002 in Japan, when the United Nations Development Program planned to present its estimates of
the cost of reconstruction.
The Search for Bin Laden
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 29 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The spiritual capital of the Taliban, Kandahar, the militant regime's last bastion, ultimately fell after
an armed siege by anti-Taliban forces and American air bombardment. With the expulsion of the
Taliban from their last outpost, the anti-Taliban forces and the United States military focused their
attention on the mountainous Tora Bora region, about 60 km southeast of Jalalabad where
intelligence reports said Osama bin Laden was holed up with the remnants of his terrorist army.
High-flying B-52s pounded the Tora Bora cave complex in the White mountains near the city of
Jalalabad. Though the target area was growing smaller as the hunt for Osama bin Laden continued,
United States fighter jets were dropping almost as many bombs on Afghanistan in mid-December
as they were at the start of the campaign. Aided by the American bombing campaign, Afghan antiTaliban forces on the ground were able to wrest control of most of the country from the Taliban,
now clinging to their last stronghold in the southern city of Kandahar.
Anti-Taliban forces advanced unopposed on these suspected mountain lairs of Osama bin Laden in
east Afghanistan and Pashtun tribesmen said they were nearing the gates of the Taliban stronghold
of Kandahar. Indeed, with the Taliban ousted from all other cities of Afghanistan, the United States
air strikes focused on the Kandahar and Jalalabad regions of Afghanistan.
The Fall of the Taliban
Uzbeki Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum captured Mazar-e-Sharif from Taliban troops on November 9,
2001, the first in a series of Northern Alliance victories that led to a rout of the Taliban from most
of the country. The apparent outbreak of fighting between various Northern Alliance factions in
Mazar-e-Sharif was a sign that long-held tensions within the grouping of warlords were beginning
to show.
Then, Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammed Omar agreed on December 6, to surrender his
last major bastion Kandahar to tribal forces and put himself under the protection of tribal leaders,
Afghanistan's interim leader and a Taliban official said. Hamid Karzai, head of the interim
government, said an agreement had been worked out for surrender of the southern city and that
government forces would enter the following day. "Taliban have agreed to surrender Kandahar and
to hand over power to me," Karzai said. He said the agreement calls for anti-Taliban commanders
Mullah Naqib Ullah and Sher Agha to collect weapons from the Taliban. "I will not be going for a
few days," he said.
The agreement was confirmed by Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban's former ambassador to
Pakistan, who said the Taliban were finished as a political movement. "I think we should go
home," he said in Islamabad. Karzai said Taliban fighters would be allowed to disband and return
to their homes. He earlier told the international media that Omar would also be afforded protection
if he promised to "renounce terrorism" and that Osama bin Laden's foreign fighters would have to
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 30 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
leave the country. "They are criminals," he said.
Following the agreement, Taliban forces abandoned Kandahar on December 7, and witnesses said
joyous residents poured into the streets and tore down the Taliban white flag. Afghanistan's interim
prime minister said Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammed Omar was missing and would be
arrested if found. Elsewhere, fleeing Taliban fighters backed out of a deal to hand in weapons to
another opposition tribal leader, Karzai said from a desert base outside the southern city. "The
Taliban ran away with their weapons," he said. "The leaders and the soldiers, they have all run
away from the city."
The Search for Bin Laden Continues
Meanwhile, anti-Taliban forces captured the main base of Osama bin Laden in the Tora Bora
mountains of eastern Afghanistan, but failed to find the terrorist leader, a military spokesman said
on December 7, 2001. Arab family members, including women, had been captured, along with
weapons and vehicles, but there was no sign of bin Laden.
The head of the interim government Karzai said on December 7, 2001 that the Taliban's chief
Mullah Mohammad Omar, despite surrendering Kandahar, had shown no remorse and must face
trial. As Taliban fighters began to hand over weapons in their last stronghold of Kandahar, Karzai
said he would turn over Taliban leaders and their foreign allies to "international justice." He said he
had given an amnesty to rank and file Taliban, but there would be no escape for the militia's
leaders and foreign allies, including the Al-Qaida network. "We began this fight against terrorism to
free my country from the brutality that terrorists commit against the Afghan people and the Afghan
soil," Karzai declared. "We are absolutely committed to make them stand trial and face justice.
They must pay for their crimes."
Karzai's pledge came as rumors swirled among some United States and tribal officials that Omar
might still be in the surrendered city of Kandahar. Karzai said the whereabouts of Omar were
unknown and that neither he nor bin Laden were in the custody of anti-Taliban forces. Reports
that Omar had been captured, he said, were "all lies." Karzai, who promised to set up a tribal
commission to run Kandahar, said the situation in the city was quiet a day after the Taliban's
chaotic departure from their last bastion, when frightened residents reported looting and violence.
Pakistani border guards refused to allow journalists to cross into southern Afghanistan, saying the
situation was too volatile.
During this period, bin Laden's key associates sustained personal losses in the course of the United
States-war against terrorism. The family of Ayman al-Zawahri, the top aide to bin Laden, published
a death notice saying al-Zawahri's wife and children had been killed in Afghanistan. "The family of
Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri declares to the Muslim nation the death of Azza Anwar Nuwaira and her
children," said the notice published December 7, 2001 in the obituary columns of the leading
Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram. Earlier reports said they were killed in a United States airstrike,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 31 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
and the notice said they died as martyrs. Also a Muslim activist in London, Hani el-Saba'ei, told
The Associated Press that al-Zawahri's wife and three daughters had been killed by United States
bombs in Kandahar, the last major Taliban stronghold, on December 2, 2001. He said several other
relatives of Arab members of bin Laden's Al-Qaida network were also killed. In Washington,
a United States official who spoke on condition of anonymity said the United States had credible
reports that members of al-Zawahri's immediate family were killed in a United States airstrike.
By the end of December 2001, there was still no sign of bin Laden, even after extensive searches
in the caves of Tora Bora, both by the United States and Afghan forces. The United States
bombing campaign had visibly reduced since Christmas and by the end of the year, the United
States was carrying out reconnaissance sorties rather than bombing runs. However, the mystery
over bin Laden's whereabouts continued. The Afghan forces said they had completed a cave-bycave search of the Tora Bora region and they did not find bin Laden. They said it was very likely
that he had escaped over the White mountains into neighboring Pakistan. The Pakistan government
vehemently denied any reports that bin Laden had indeed slipped into its territory. The border
areas of Pakistan, populated by the Pashtun tribes, were believed to be a new safe haven for bin
Laden and others.
It was later alleged that Osama bin Laden had been allowed to escape from Tora Bora -- a scenario
blamed on the Bush adminstration by its opponents.
The American Taliban
A 20-year-old man, John Walker, who originally came from an American Catholic family in
California, was taken into the custody by United States special forces after being discovered among
captured Taliban troops and Al-Qaida fighters after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif. Army Lt. Col. Jim
Cassella, a Pentagon spokesman, said in Washington that the man was injured and being given
medical assistance by United States forces. The man was among a group of around 80 Taliban
fighters holed up for six days in a basement of the Qalai Janghi fort, hiding from Northern Alliance
soldiers who had put down a riot by Taliban prisoners in the fortress. The revolt, which began
November 25, 2001, was put down after three days of bloody fighting; the men straggled out of
the basement after Northern Alliance fighters filled it with water to force them out.
"I was a student in Pakistan, studying Islam and came into contact with many people connected
with Taliban," John Walker said in an interview shown on the network, CNN, on December 3,
2001. "I lived in the region, the North West Frontier Province (of Pakistan)," he said. "The people
in general have a great love for the Taliban so I started to read some of the literature of the
scholars, the history of Kabul ... my heart became attached to that."
With his capture at Mazar-e-Sharif, United States forces hope that Walker could explain the details
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 32 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
of the death of CIA officer Mike Spann, who was apparently beaten to death by Taliban and AlQaida terrorists. "The only thing that I can say about this individual is that this is somebody who
claims to be an American citizen," Stufflebeem told a Pentagon briefing. "He is in control of United
States military forces. It appears that he is injured or has sustained some injuries and is receiving
medical attention," he said. Stufflebeem also said it had "not yet been defined" whether the man
was considered under arrest or a prisoner of war.
The Red Cross requested access to see Walker, a spokesman said on December 4, 2001. Michael
Kleiner, a spokesman in Kabul for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), said the
ICRC should be given the same access to Walker as to other detainees in order to register and
interview him. "Our line is not to differentiate him from the others. Regardless of who is detaining
him, the ICRC wants to have access to this person, just as it wants to have access to all the
detainees," Kleiner said. It was not clear whether the ICRC had conveyed the request to U.S.
forces holding Walker, since the ICRC team in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif had not been in contact
with the organization's office in Kabul for some time.
Walker, who was known in Afghanistan as Abdul Hamid, converted from Catholicism to Islam at
the age of 16 and traveled to the country via Yemen and Pakistan. He told CNN he had received
combat training in northern Afghanistan from forces supporting Osama bin Laden, the Afghanbased millionaire militant who has been prime suspect in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States. Walker's father Frank Lindh begged the United States military to show his son
mercy following reports that Walker said he supported the September 11, 2001, airliner attacks in
which some 3,000 people were killed.
Walker had begun providing information to United States Marines at a desert base south of
Kandahar, a top United States military official said on December 9, 2001, some six days after his
capture. Walker was being held at the Marine base at an airstrip about 55 miles southwest of
Kandahar. A statement issued at the Camp Rhino base said Walker was "a battlefield detainee" and
was being held "pending disposition instructions from higher headquarters."
Power Struggles
Toward mid-December 2001, as the collapse of the Taliban and the Al-Qaida network gathered
pace, Pakistan strengthened the security at its highly porous border with Afghanistan, in an attempt
to block any terrorists from entering Pakistan. The Pakistani government repeatedly denied reports
that bin Laden had actually fled to Pakistan and was hiding in the country.
Meanwhile, as the Karzai administration took office in a simple ceremony in Kabul on December
22, 2001, enormous challenges awaited the new Afghan government. The first two tasks outlined
by Karzai himself appear monumental - maintain unity in the government and the country, and
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 33 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
maintain peace throughout the war-torn and fractured country --where bitterness rooted in the
period of Taliban rule was far from over. Maintaining the government unity would require a very
tough balancing act by Karzai, as the government was composed of a collection of several groups
and tribes whose interests could not possibly always coincide and, at times, would likely be at
loggerheads. Karzai had already witnessed the pressures of working in such a climate when he
served briefly in the Burhanuddin Rabbani government in the early 1990s. Already, even before
the government actually took charge, the tensions between various groups became evident on
several counts.
Two leading actors did little to hide their unease and dissatisfaction with the Bonn agreement. One
was President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who, while in exile, headed the Afghan government, which
was the sole legitimate government recognized by the United Nations and almost all the countries.
Rabbani had expected to continue as the executive head of the interim administration and indeed to
be restored to the throne in Kabul once the situation had stabilized. However, when he found it
was going to be Karzai who would head the interim administration, he openly aired his
dissatisfaction. Though Rabbani did not command a significant military force to be able to cause
significant trouble for the Karzai administration, he certainly had enough friends in the Northern
Alliance. The differences over Rabbani's role had the potential effect of creating fractures within
the new unity government.
The other leader unhappy with the situation was General Dostum, a one-time Communist militia
who helped the Soviet forces in the 1970s, but later turned against the foreign presence and formed
one of the leading Mujahideen groups fighting the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, Dostum allied with
the anti-Taliban forces to combat the growing might of the Pakistan-assisted Taliban. Dostum, who
besides Masood Shah, was one of the most respected Afghan generals, had expected a suitable
place in the interim cabinet. However, at Bonn, when he felt that he was being effectively
sidelined, he threatened to walk out. Ultimately, Dostum did exactly that.
The dramatic exit of a leader like Dostum could have easily unraveled the entire peace process.
But the international community and fellow Afghan leaders mounted pressure on Dostum to do
nothing to hamper the peace process and assured him of a significant role in the new setup. Finally,
Dostum accepted the interim administration and he was sworn in as the deputy defense minister.
Yet another disagreement came from Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, a prominent figure in the Zahir Shah
group and chief of National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. Gilani expressed his reservations over the
Bonn accord saying that although Karzai was a popular Pashtun leader, no one person could
resolve the problems alone and the whole team needed to play a collective role in ensuring peace in
Afghanistan. Gilani said that as a result of the Bonn agreement almost all old faces had re-emerged.
He alleged that the selection of ministers was unjustified, as all the ministerial slots were assigned
to those who were ministers in the Rabbani regime. He also brought up the issue of the Afghan
leadership not honoring past agreements. He urged the United Nations to keep a vigilant eye on
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 34 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
any violation of the agreed formula.
Though Karzai may have smoothed over these differences apparently without too much trouble,
the challenges ahead would be bigger. As the interim cabinet started to bring peace to the country
and revive the Afghan economy, the real jostling for power within the new government was
expected begin. As the government started to draw up economic rehabilitation and development
programs, each tribe and each grouping would insist that the maximum benefits should first go their
region. Moreover, for restoration of peace, a large scale disarming of the Afghan population needed
to take place. There were more guns and weapons in Afghanistan than people. The gun culture
was centuries old in the country and most Afghans regarded it as a point of prestige to carry
weapons in public. Moreover, the different factions were not keen to disarm before the others, thus
placing Karzai in a difficult position.
There were other very powerful lobbies that had to be controlled by Karzai. The most important of
these was the narcotics (drug) lobby. In recent times, Afghanistan had become one of the largest
producers of heroin and the Taliban often used the drug money to both finance their arms
purchases, and to bribe the opposition commanders. Now, as Karzai tried to remove the
production of poppy from Afghanistan, he was forced to contend with very powerful drug militias.
This promised to be another area where the Afghan government would ultimately require
international assistance.
Upon taking over, Karzai reaffirmed his administration's resolve to fight terrorism and rebuild the
battered country. He said that United States forces would be welcome to stay in Afghanistan until
all terrorist elements were wiped out. "We will see to it that terrorism is completely finished in
Afghanistan in all its forms," he said. Karzai added he would be willing to hand the Saudi-born
militant over to the United States, or, to an international tribunal if he was captured on Afghan soil.
Threats of violence continued to rock Afghanistan even after the collapse of the Taliban regime.
Nearly 300 Chechen, Pakistanis and Arabs -- belonging to the Al-Qaida terror group -- were killed
after United States airstrikes were used to control an insurrection by the militiamen, who had
surrendered and were jailed in the Qalai Janghi fortress, near Mazar-e-Sharif. As the situation
threatened to get out of hand, the United States began bombing the complex. It took the United
States forces nearly two days of continuous bombing, which demolished the entire complex and
left hundreds of prisoners dead. There were practically no survivors from the bombing campaign.
This was by far the biggest such violent incident in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Sporadic violence
continued as the Taliban or Al-Qaida militants blew themselves up or tried to kill the Northern
Alliance commanders during various surrenders.
The extent of Pakistani involvement in the Taliban regime became evident during the bombing of
Afghanistan by the United States-led coalition against terror. The advancing armies of the Northern
Alliance in the northern city of Kunduz trapped hundreds of Pakistanis, including senior officials of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 35 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the army and the intelligence service, the ISI, while they were fighting alongside the Al-Qaida. As
the situation turned desperate, Pakistan wanted to send in its own forces to rescue the trapped
officials. The United States then reportedly allowed Pakistan to quietly send half a dozen flights
into an American-controlled airfield in Afghanistan and evacuate some of the Pakistani military
personnel and jehadis (holy war warriors) holed up in Kunduz. Besides the rescue effort, the fall
of the Taliban was believed to have become inevitable as Pakistan's intelligence agency pulled the
plug on the Taliban just 48 hours before the regime collapsed and its forces fled Kabul.
According to newspaper reports, the move came after President Pervez Musharraf, apparently
embarrassed by the publication of terrorist suspect Osama bin Laden's interview in the Dawn
newspaper, reportedly ordered every ISI member to leave Afghanistan at once. The president was
especially chagrined by the fact that the ISI continued to support the Taliban in complete defiance
of his orders. Reports also said that a fire that broke out in the Pakistan Army's General
Headquarters in Rawalpindi on October 10 was an attempt to destroy the paper trail leading to
ISI's involvement with the Taliban.
Political Developments in 2002
In June 2002, Hamid Karzai was elected by the Loya Jirga as the new interim head of the country.
His primary mission has involved the acquisition of monies from all those international donors who
pledged financial assistance to help rebuild Afghanistan. Rebuilding the infrastructure of the
country and maintaining political stability will be his most significant responsibilities.
In early July 2002, Haji Abdul Qadir, one of the country's three vice presidents, was shot and
killed while being driven from a government ministry building in the capital city of Kabul. Qadir
was the governor of the Nangarhar province before the Taliban came to power, and he had also
fought against the Taliban as a Northen Alliance commander in the eastern part of Afghanistan.
Since the collapse of the Taliban and the installation of an interim government, Qadir became the
public works minister in Afghanistan's transitional government. He was buried next to his brother,
rebel leader Abdul Haq, who was also assassinated last October while attempting to build resistance
against the fundamentalist Taliban regime.
Qadir was the second Afghan Cabinet minister to be killed that year. In February 2002, Abdul
Brahman, the minister of civil aviation and tourism, was assassinated at the Kabul airport. The two
assassinations gave rise to questions about the possibilities for maintaining law and order in this
country with a legacy of violence.
By mid-2002, questions arose about the overall viability of the current government in Afghanistan
and its ability to control this country emerging from decades of lawlessness. Similar questions have
been evoked about the United States' true commitment to requisite nation-building in Afghanistan,
as well as augmenting Karzai's authority in a country where warlordism has been a fact of life.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 36 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
At a summit in Germany in December 2002, Karzai delineated his plans for a national army, made
up of about 70,000, that would be loyal to the government. With increasing security concerns in
the region, and especially, with warlordism running rampant once again in Afghanistan, Karzai
believed that the need for control all across his country was a paramount concern. In addition to
the national army, Karzai also called for a plan to disarm the mujahideen, or Afghan fighters; the
disbanding of all other armies and military groups; and the establishment of army commands
outside of Kabul. A year after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Karzai also noted that
international assistance was necessary in achieving these ends and ultimately creating stability in
Afghanistan. In addition to the security issues, Karzai explained that Afghanistan was also in need
of a financial economic and judicial infrastructure; a constitutional framework within which the
2004 elections could proceed; a program for dealing with illicit drugs; a system to investigate
human rights abuses; and a resolution to the increasing refugee problem.
Casualties of War
The death of Qadir (noted above) came on the heels of a couple of unfortunate episodes where
United States forces mistook friendly situations on the ground and retaliated with force. In one
such episode, Canadian allied forces were conducting exercises; they were mistakenly identified as
hostile forces by a United States fighter pilot who then dropped a bomb on them. More recently,
celebratory gunfire at a wedding was mistaken for hostile fire, and again, the United States
returned fire, resulting in the deaths of several civilians. No conclusive number of casualties was
offered in regard to this later incident.
In late July 2002, the transitional government of Afghanistan agreed to sign the treaty banning land
mines. The munitions killed and maimed approximately 300 people each month and, indeed, the
country was regarded as the most heavily landmined country in the world today. In a positive step,
however, the Karzai government has committed itself to not using landmines in the future, while
ensuring the destruction of existing stockpiles.
An Ominous Relapse
In early 2003, officials from Afghanistan expressed the need for more help from the United States
for the formation of an army to fight increasing violence and warlordism. Afghan leader Hamid
Karzai told United States President George W. Bush that United Nations troops could not
effectively deal with the upsurge in violence and lawlessness. Indeed, aid programs in Afghanistan
were suspended because of fighting between warlords, while reports emerged stating that Talibanstyle restrictions on women were being re-established.
Meanwhile, the United States government forgot to provide for nation building assistance to
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 37 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Afghanistan in its budget. As well, the Bush administration excluded United States troops from
peacekeeping responsibilities in Kabul, where the Afghan government faced increasing security
challenges.
By April 2003, as violence and warlordism increased in Afghanistan, a number of government
officials associated with the country's government were assassinated. One casualty, Haji Gilani,
was an ally of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The investigation of the killing, which took place in
the central Uruzgan province, did not garner any immediate arrests. A Red Cross aid worker in the
same province was also killed in a separate incident.
The Associated Press reported that the government had suspected for some time that such killings
might be the work of the former Taliban regime. There was a growing concern that Taliban forces
may have regrouped and were destabilizing the country. Indeed, there were reports of a call for a
jihad (holy war) by the Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, against pro-Western forces in
Afghanistan. Both government officials in Afghanistan and political analysts across the world
suggested that increased Taliban activity may be associated with the war in Iraq. Still, the
fundamentalist Islamic beliefs of the Taliban were at odds with the secularist Ba'ath regime of Iraq.
By June 2003, a report sponsored by the United States-based Council on Foreign Relations and the
Asia Society was released. The report charged that Afghanistan was at risk of reverting into
warlordism and anarchy -- the very conditions that led to the emergence of the Taliban in the first
place. The report warned that the situation did not only augur negatively for Afghanistan itself, but
also for the global war against terror. The report also urged the United States to provide
peacekeeping forces to help deal with the security crisis brewing in Kabul, support for the
International Security Assistance Force, and $1 billion in aid each year for the next five years, to
help with Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts. The disarmament of local militias and an increase in
size of the Afghan National Army were also strongly recommended.
In its first venue of operations outside Europe, NATO assumed control of peacekeeping in
Afghanistan and began its mission in the capital city of Kabul in August 2003. NATO's involvement
outside of Europe was unprecedented, but it was illustrative of a shift in orientation from defense
to dealing with the threat of international terrorism. NATO was to lead the peacekeeping efforts of
the International Security Assistance Force indefinitely. The activities of the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan, functioning under a United Nations mandate, was limited to the
capital city and was under the control of Germany and the Netherlands. Other parts of the
country, however, were plagued with violence by Taliban insurgents, thus resulting in the
suspension of road travel in the southern parts of Afghanistan. The government of Afghan
President Hamid Karzai asked for an expansion of peacekeeping activities in other parts of the
country, however, no change was expected in the near future.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 38 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Movement Toward Constitutionality
With the opening of the "Loya Jirga" or Grand Assembly on Dec. 14, 2003, 500 delegates from
across Afghanistan began a discussion about the country's new constitution. The meeting was
convened by the country's former king, Zahir Shah, and was expected to carry on for several
weeks. Delegates included a host of Afghan political players, such as former communists,
mujahideen fighters, tribal leaders as well as exiles. After only a short period of talks, schisms were
emerging. Notably, there was a division over the issue of whether Afghanistan's presidency should
be maintained as the principle source of political power, or, if presidential power should be
balanced by that of a parliament. By the first week of 2004, however, Afghanistan's Loya Jirga
finalized the country's new constitution, which provided for a strong presidency and consolidated
the ethnically diverse nation state.
The meeting was the second of its kind since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Despite optimistic
hopes for a stable Afghanistan, the country remained plagued by the tide of violence (as noted
above). The United Nations said that its humanitarian mission was becoming impossible to carry
out due to the violence. Indeed, in 2004, a British report by the House of Commons concluded
that Afghanistan could devolve into civil war without the assistance of more foreign troops. The
members of the foreign relations committee backed a call by Hamid Karzai for more resources for
NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in that country.
On the Road to Elections
In July 2004, on the registration deadline for potential candidates, Afghan interim President Hamid
Karzai announced he would be standing as a candidate in presidential elections scheduled for
October. The election date had been pushed back twice as a result of rising violence. Karzai
hoped to win the election, thus democratically legitimizing his rule in a post-Taliban Afghanistan.
He had a mandate to rule as interim leader until year's end. Interim Vice President Abdul Karim
Khalili and Ahmad Zia Masood -- the brother of assassinated mujahideen leader Ahmed Shah
Masood -- functioned as his running mates and represented varied ethnic and political interest
groups. Although Karzai was favored to win the election, twenty other competitors running against
him presented the complication of a split vote. His most well-known rival for the presidency was
northern faction leader General Abdul Rashid Dostum.
In October 2004, Afghanistan finally held its first presidential election. The lead-up to the elections
saw an upsurge of violence as Taliban remnants tried to derail the process. Rockets were fired in
the capital city of Kabul and the eastern city of Jalalabad and 12 election workers were killed over
the course of several months. In addition, Karzai’s running mate escaped a bombing, while a
tanker loaded with explosives was seized on the eve of the election. For months, civilians and aid
agencies were under attack as Taliban leaders attempted to manipulate some kind of rejection of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 39 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the United States-backed elections.
There were other major difficulties as well. As a country with a high level of illiteracy, the voters
of Afghanistan had to be taught about procedures via cartoons and posters. Getting ballots to large
refugee populations in Iran and Pakistan had to be managed, and there were attacks aimed at
frightening female voters away from the polls. However, as the polling progressed, the violence
expected to sabotage the elections never materialized.
Instead the major issue involved the calls of fraud by candidates who opposed Karzai. They
claimed the ink put on voters’ hands to show they had already voted could be washed off, opening
the door to ballot box stuffing. Initially many candidates withdrew their demands for a new poll,
deferring to generally positive reports by international observers. However, the United Nations
called for a probe into possible irregularities.
Late in October 2004, it was made clear that Hamid Karzai had captured the presidency in
Afghanistan's first democratic elections with over 55 percent of the votes cast in his favor. Rivals
conceded defeat.
Developments in 2005
In April 2005, during discussions with United States Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld,
Afghan President Hamid Karzai said his country was hoping for a long-term security relationship
with the United States. While there was no word as to whether or not such an agreement would be
forged, or whether the establishment of military bases might be involved, the United States
government was said to be assessing the future role of American troops on the ground in
Afghanistan.
In May 2005, a suicide bombing at an Internet cafe in the Afghan capital of Kabul left several
people dead, including a United Nations worker of Burmese citizenship. The attack occurred at a
time when security concerns were on the rise. Because the Park Resident Internet Cafe had
been frequented by foreigners, questions emerged as to whether members of the international
community were the targets of the attack. In early 2005, a number of attacks on foreigners took
place, including a few attempted kidnappings.
Also in May 2005, Afghan President Hamid Karzai expressed shock about revelations of alleged
abuse of Afghan prisoners at the hands of United States forces in Bagram. The alleged abuse also
included the deaths of two inmates. He demanded that those responsible be punished for their
crimes.
The details of the apparent abuse at the main United States airbase in Afghanistan were exposed by
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 40 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the New York Times newspaper. That account contained citations from a leaked document
pertaining to the United States army's investigation of the matter. Details of the abuses at the
Bagram airbase appeared to include the torture of Afghan prisoners there. Seven United States
servicemen had already been charged in regard to the deaths of two prisoners there in 2002. But
the information revealed in the leaked investigative report suggested new allegations relating to the
level or degree of prisoner abuse. In one case, a prisoner by the name of Dilawar was allegedly
chained to a ceiling by his wrists for four days and beaten more than 100 times within a 24-hour
period. According to the army investigation, the prisoner was believed to have been innocent.
In response, the United Nations called on the United States to open up the Bagram air base to
human rights investigators. The United Nations' special representative in Afghanistan, Jean Arnault,
said such abuses were "utterly unacceptable." In his sharp criticism, Arnault echoed President
Karzai’s call by demanding punishment for those responsible. He said, "The gravity of these
abuses calls for the punishment of all those involved in such inexcusable crimes, as demanded by
President Karzai."
Meanwhile, President Karzai, who was scheduled to meet with United States President George W.
Bush on May 23, 2005, said two days prior to the meeting that he would call for the handover of
control of United States military operations in Afghanistan. He also said he would request the
handover of all Afghan detainees currently in the United States custody. His tough stance had been
spurred by a combination of the recent abuse allegations, in conjunction with a sharp rise in antiAmerican sentiment in Afghanistan.
Indeed, only a week prior, violent anti-American protest rallies took place in that country following
a now-retracted report by Newsweek about the desecration of the Holy Koran by United States
forces in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Even though that report was retracted, Muslims in
Afghanistan and in other parts of the Middle East learned of similar allegations of abuse and
desecration issued by human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch. Thus, even with
a retraction in the case of Newsweek, experts suggested that damage had already been done.
As these developments transpired, the United States government criticized the Afghan authorities
for failing to control the illicit production of opium. Opium production had been one means by
which terrorists, during the former Taliban era, had bankrolled their activities.
Also in May 2005, the Taliban rejected the notion of an amnesty, which had been suggested by the
head of Afghanistan's reconciliatory body.
In early July 2005, six Afghan policemen were reported to have been beheaded after an ambush by
apparent Taliban guerrillas. The beheaded bodies were found along the roadside. In another
development, four other policemen died when a convoy became engaged in a lengthy gun battle in
the province of Helmund in the south of the country. Both incidences involving policemen appear
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 41 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
to be related to the increase in attacks by Taliban guerillas ahead of elections, which were
scheduled for September 2005. Afghan police and security forces tended to be the targets of
attacks, rather than American troops, because they were not as well armed by comparison.
Afghan Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali said the aforementioned ambush took place only 200
meters from the Pakistan border; he also suggested that the killers fled across the border into
Pakistani territory. The Pakistani authorities, for their part, said they were doing an adequate job of
dealing with cross-border incursions. Regardless, violence has run rampant in the southern and
eastern parts of Afghanistan.
In October 2005, two pro-government clerics were killed in what appeared to be separate
attacks. Mohammad Gul, a member of the clerics' council Shura-e Ulema, was shot and killed as
he walked home from a mosque in Lashkargah, Helmand. Noor Ahmed Jan, the head of the
clerics' council in Kunar who had been highly critical of the ousted-Taliban, was killed when
militants attacked his home in Ghaziabad. It was speculated that remnant elements of the ousted
Taliban regime may have been responsible. A public outcry over the killings ensued with 5,000
demonstrators in Khost calling on the government to protect religious scholars.
Parliamentary Elections
On the eve of elections, Afghan and American officials warned that resurgent Taliban elements
might attempt to sabotage the polling process set for Sept. 18, 2005. In anticipation of election
violence, the United States Department of State warned Americans against traveling to
Afghanistan, expressing concern for foreigners, particularly Americans. The warning came at a
time when the security situation in Afghanistan was being severely compromised. As such, the
presence of troops on the ground was boosted to 100,000, including 22,000 United States-led
troops and 10,000 NATO-led peacekeepers.
The legislative election itself was expected to involve up to 5,800 candidates and followed on the
heels of the presidential election held in October 2004. In that poll, President Hamid Karzai
claimed victory. Karzai, who has not been a factor in the legislative elections, commended the
democratic process and in an interview with the French Le Monde magazine said, "Believe me,
what is happening in Afghanistan now would have been unimaginable two years ago."
On election day, despite violence on the ground ahead of voting which left 15 people dead,
Afghans went to the polls to choose a legislature. Two days prior, over 20 people were killed in
election violence promised by factions of the ousted Taliban regime. The legislative elections were
viewed as the last official step in the process of democratization that began with the United Statesled offensive in Afghanistan, which drove the fundamentalist Taliban regime from power. President
Hamid Karzai said, "We are making history. It's the day of self-determination for the Afghan
people. After 30 years of wars, interventions, occupations and misery, today Afghanistan is moving
forward, making an economy, making political institutions."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 42 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In December 2005, Afghanistan's held its inaugural session in the capital, Kabul, for the first time
in more than 30 years. The presence of female parliamentarians was the source of consternation
among conservatives, while others were not pleased about the presence of former warlords within
the legislative body. No doubt the diversity of representatives would present challenges in the
future. Nevertheless, at the landmark session, President Hamid Karzai told the parliamentarians
that the event constituted a "step toward democracy." The inaugural session commenced with a
reading from the Koran and also a short speech by the former King Zahir Shah, who was ousted in
a coup d'etat in 1973. The brief opening session was attended by United States Vice President
Dick Cheney as well as a number of other foreign dignitaries.
2006: Five Years After the Fall of the Taliban
Five years after the ousting of the Taliban regime in the fall of 2006, Afghanistan remained
unstable. Indeed, violence attributed to remnants of the Taliban intensified in 2006 as compared
with the previous few years, suggesting that the Islamic extremist faction that had once ruled
Afghanistan was making a comeback.
On Jan. 8, 2006, President Karzai said he would welcome peace talks with the Mullah Mohammad
Omar, the head of the ousted Taliban movement. Karzai acknowledged that it was unlikely that
Mullah Omar would emerge from hiding; however, he also noted that the Taliban leader would
have to eventually account for his actions during the time of the brutal Islamic regime.
Mohammed Hanif, a self-appointed spokesperson for the Taliban, rejected the offer, saying that
such overtures were intended to weaken morale. Another Taliban figure, the former Defense
Minister Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, similarly dismissed Karzai's offer and also characterized the
Afghan president as "an American puppet." Earlier, as noted above, the Taliban had rejected the
notion of an amnesty. Such measures have been intended to bridge the divide in a country that has
continued to be plagued by factional violence years after the ousting of the Taliban regime, and
despite the establishment of a democratic government.
In mid-January 2006, a suicide bombing in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar killed Glyn
Berry, a senior Canadian diplomat in charge of reconstruction efforts. Three Canadian soldiers
participating in the peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan as well as several bystanders were injured
in the attack. Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin characterized the attack as "tragic." In the
area of Spin Boldak, another suicide bombing left around 25 people dead and scores more
injured. A man claiming to speak for the ousted Taliban regime said the group had carried out the
attacks. A self-described spokesperson for the ousted Taliban regime, Qari Mohammad Yousuf,
told the Associated Press that such attacks would continue for some time. He said, "We have
many more suicide attackers ready to go." Meanwhile, NATO looked to expand its 19,000-strong
deployment from peacekeeping duties in the capital Kabul to the area around the south of the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 43 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
country, which has been plagued by increasing violence in recent months. Much of that violence
has been attributed to remnants of the ousted Taliban regime, members of al-Qaida, and other
insurgent cohorts.
In March 2006, the issue of religious freedom came to the fore of Afghan politics when Abdul
Rahman, a convert to Christianity, was jailed and set to face trial for rejecting Islam. Under
Islamic Shari'ah law, which is recognized in the Afghan Constitution, he could be executed. Critics
of this extreme measure, however, have argued that the Afghan Constitution also recognizes
freedom of religion and enshrines human rights.
The issue evoked an international outcry. Several Western countries condemned the possibility that
Rahman might be executed for his beliefs. They responded by threatening to withdraw their troops
operating in Afghanistan if the situation was not resolved in a manner that respected Rahman's
human rights. Indeed, even the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Benedict XVI, entered
into the fray to request that Afghan President Hamid Karzai show clemency towards Rahman.
For his part, President Karzai was faced with an almost-impossible situation. He had to balance the
call for adherence to democratic principles by the West with the hardline and unrelenting stance of
his own religious constituents. Perhaps seeking to sidestep the debate entirely, prosecutors in
Afghanistan were expected to re-examine the case, possibly leading to its dismissal on the grounds
that Rahman was too mentally unstable to face trial. Another possible argument centered on the
questionable nature of Rahman's citizenship. Since he had spent many years living in Germany,
where he apparently converted from Islam to Christianity, some argued that he may not be an
Afghan citizen subject to that country's law.
The dismissal of the case on the basis of a technicality would most certainly have prevented
Rahman's execution, however, it would hardly resolve the philosophical question of how to resolve
the dilemma of democracy and human rights within a conservative Islamic country. To this end,
constitutional scholars have pointed to the inherent contradictions within Afghanistan's law and
have demanded some kind of reconciliation between democratic rights and Islamic mandates.
These concerns notwithstanding, Rahman was eventually deemed mentally unable to stand trial for
the charge of apostasy. Soon after this finding was rendered, news emerged that he was missing.
Some time later, it was revealed that he had arrived in Italy where he was apparently granted
asylum. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi confirmed that Rahman was safely on Italian soil,
having been granted asylum by his cabinet -- a measure taken for the purpose of accelerating the
asylum application process, which would normally have taken months to carry out. Afghan
parliamentarians meanwhile responded to the news with anger since they had demanded that he
remain in the country.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan continued to be wracked by violence. In mid-May 2006, fighting between
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 44 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
international troops and militant Islamists intensified, leaving approximately 100 people dead as a
result. The violence was not limited to fighting between these two sides, however, as a spate of
suicide bombings were reported, including one at an army base.
Then on May 22, 2006, it was reported that air strikes by United States-led coalition forces in
southern Afghanistan h a d k i l l e d s c o r e s o f T a l i b a n i n P a n j w a y i i n t h e p r o v i n c e o f
Kandahar. Several civilians were also killed in the strikes.
On May 29, 2006, a collision involving a United States military convoy during rush-hour traffic in
the Afghan capital city of Kabul led to the deaths and injuries of several people. In the ensuing riot
that occurred, protestors threw rocks in the direction of the military vehicles and chanted "Death to
America." The protestors later came under gunfire; however, no information was revealed about
who was responsible.
In July 2006, a statement from the military in the Afghan state of Helmand asserted that British
troops were enduring sustained attacks from Taliban militants. The statement explained that the
British troops were coming under attack while defending a government compound in Nawzad.
The attacks were supposedly originating from within a hospital. British forces were reportedly
exercising restraint but warned that they could be forced to return fire. As such, they were trying
to determine if there were patients in the hospital.
The area had been rife with violence. A week earlier, massive bombs were dropped on a market in
Nawzad, resulting in the deaths of a significant number of people. Elsewhere in Afghanistan, a
suicide bombing at a checkpoint outside a government building left several people dead or injured
in Gardez, the capital of the southern province of Paktia. Clashes between coalition forces and
Taliban were ongoing in Helmand, Paktia and Uruzgan.
By the last week of July 2006, violence in Afghanistan left scores of people dead. One particular
hot spot was the aforementioned southern Helmand province where around 20 Taliban fighters and
three security forces were killed in clashes between resurgent Taliban and a mix of British and
Afghan forces. The clashes were part of an offensive by British and government forces to reclaim
dominance of the area, which has come under increasing Taliban influence. In Ghanzi province,
Taliban fighters killed three policemen in an attack on the police post. In Kadahar -- a Taliban
stronghold -- double suicide attacks left six civilians and two Canadian soldiers dead. In one case,
the Canadians were killed when an explosives-laden car charged into their military convoy. In the
other case, a suicide bombing exacted maximum damage on six Afghan civilians. A Taliban
spokesperson said that his group claimed responsibility for the two suicide attacks and promised
more would be forthcoming.
At the close of July 2006, NATO troops took over from coalition forces in Afghanistan. Their
primary immediate objective was to push back resurgent Taliban elements, in the interest of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 45 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
keeping the peace and preventing the fall into lawlessness. Another objective involved preventing
the production of certain substances for the purpose of narco-trafficking.
Fighting in Afghanistan in August 2006 left dozens of Taliban fighters dead following clashes with
NATO troops and Afghan forces. The scenario ensued in a region southwest of Kandahar in an
operation by coalition forces oriented toward securing the Kabul-Kandahar highway. While Afghan
officials said up to 70 Taliban had been killed, a self-described Taliban spokesperson said only 12
of his group had died.
Afghanistan had been plagued by violence for much of 2006, and most particularly in the summer
of that year. On Aug. 20, 2006, a British soldier was killed just north of the restive Helmand
province. A day earlier on Aug. 19, 2006, five soldiers -- one local and four from the United
States -- were killed in clashes in the south and east of the country.
A suicide bombing in the first part of September 2006 left the governor of eastern Afghanistan's
Paktia province dead. The governor, Abdul Hakim Taniwal, was was in a car leaving his office in
the provincial capital Gardez when the suicide bomber detonated the explosives wired to his body.
A bodyguard and a driver were also killed in the attack. The Taliban was said to have been
responsible. Taniwal, a Sociology professor with Australian citizenship, was the highest-ranking
official to be killed since the emergence of the Taliban insurgency. He was viewed as an
intellectual who aspired to end Afghanistan's "Kalashnikov" (gun) culture.
In response to news of Taniwal's assassination, Afghan President Hamid Karzai expressed deep
sadness saying, "Mr Taniwal was a patriot, a man of both action and academic achievements. He
was also a personal friend of mine, who returned from abroad to serve his nation." Thomas
Gregg, the head of the United Nations assistance operation in Gardez, said that the loss of Taniwal
represented a setback for the country. To this end, he said, "In many ways, it was Governor
Taniwal's positive attributes that made him a target. It's a very sad day for both Afghanistan and
the international community. He was a fine leader."
Even Taniwal's funeral in his ancestral home of Khost was not spared from continuing violence. A
suicide bombing at the funeral on September 11, 2001 left several Afghan policemen dead and
scores of attendees wounded.
As these events in Gardez were unfolding, NATO and Afghan forces were carrying out a major
offensive led by Canadian troops in the southern province of Kandahar. Operation Medusa, which
began at the start of September 2006, was tasked with driving out insurgents from the area, which
has been regarded as a Taliban stronghold. It was regarded as the most significant operation since
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took control of southern Afghanistan from a United
States-led coalition in mid-2006. Since the start of the operation, hundreds of Taliban were
reported to have been killed. By mid-September 2006, the fighting was centered in Panjwayi and
the district of Zhari.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 46 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
While the violence in Afghanistan in 2006 was primarily blamed on the Taliban, it was believed
that the insurgency might well be composed of more complex dynamics. Major Toby Jackson, a
spokesperson for NATO, explained the complicated mix of actors saying, "There are elements
involved from internal – other -- groups within Afghanistan, who are resisting the central
government's extension. There are also a mixture of criminality and factional fighters as part of
what we describe as insurgents."
On the fifth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks, ceremonies marking the tragic events
were taking place in the United States. Meanwhile, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the deputy leader of the
al-Qaida network who was responsible for the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, called on
Muslims in the world to continue to resist American power. In the videotaped address, he also
warned that al-Qaida intended to target Israel and the leadership of Arab countries in the near
future.
On September 18, 2006, a suicide bombing in Kandahar left at least four Canadians dead along
with several civilian casualties. The attack took place when a bomber on a bicycle wired with
explosives detonated the explosive devie while amidst a crowd composed of both troops and
civilians. Children were also in the crowd. In a separate attack in Herat, another apparent suicide
bombing killed around a dozen people.
September 2006 was also marked by a suicide bombing just outside the compound of the United
States embassy. The attack left at least 16 people, including two American soldiers, dead.
Then at the close of the month, on September 30, 2006, a suicide bombing outside the Ministry of
the Interior in the capital city of Kabul left over a dozen people dead and scores injured. As was
the case for several attacks of this sort in 2006, the resurgent Taliban claimed responsibility.
Meanwhile, Pakistan-Afghan relations were at an all-time low with both sides blaming one another
for the resurgent threat of Islamic militants in the region. United States President George W. Bush
presided over a September 2006 dinner meeting between the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan,
aimed at easing the tensions between the two South Asian neighbors.
As noted above, resurgent Taliban elements were gaining strength throughout the year. This
shift was manifest most clearly by the increase in attacks attributed to the extremist Islamic faction.
In 2006, over 75 suicide attacks had ensued in Afghanistan, leaving at least 200 hundred people
dead and even more injured. In contrast, there had been 21 suicide attacks in 2005, six in 2004
and two in 2003. The Taliban claimed responsibility for almost all of these episodes of violence,
which demonstrated quite clearly the exponential increase in 2006 and the concomitant level of
increasing instability.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 47 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The clear threat to regional security notwithstanding, the Taliban's comeback augured other
deleterious effects. Stated another way, in addition to intensified violence on the ground in
Afghanistan that could spread elsewhere, the increasingly-active Taliban has been attracting greater
membership into its fold. Some analysts have attributed the Taliban's renewed appeal to the
decreased support in the Middle East and South Asia for United States-led policies of late. Souring
sentiment about the United States-backed initiatives, thus, may be resulting in fresh appeal of the
Taliban. But others have dismissed that abstract explanation and blamed the trend on poor
conditions on the ground in Afghanistan, which are slowly eroding the popular support of the
current government.
It is this latter explanation that has been reflected in the view of NATO's top commander in
Afghanistan, General David Richards. The British-born Richards touted NATO's efforts in the
southern part of the country to quell the violence. At the same time, he warned that if most
Afghans continued to see little improvement in their lives, they were likely to ally themselves with
the Taliban, who, for better or worse, now represent a change from the status quo. In this regard,
the Associated Press reported that Richards said, "They will say, we do not want the Taliban but
then we would rather have that austere and unpleasant life ... than another five years of fighting."
Richards also called for an increase in the NATO troop levels in Afghanistan for the purpose of
assisting with the security issues, as well as accelerating the process of much-needed development
and reconstruction. Additionally, Richards urged cooperation with Pakistan, which has been
blamed for allowing attackers to traverse its border with Afghanistan.
Richards' comments came a week after NATO extended its mission across the country, effectively
taking control of operations, including the command of United States troops there. The mission in
Afghanistan now has the distinction of being the most substantial ground combat operation
undertaken by NATO.
Clashes between NATO forces and the Taliban left scores of militants dead in the Uruzgan
province of Afghanistan at the close of October 2006. The clashes were part of an offensive
operation against Taliban elements across the country. In a separate incident, one NATO soldier
died when his convoy hit a roadside bomb in the same area. Meanwhile, NATO's leadership in
Afghanistan had to apologize for the deaths of 12 civilian nomads in the province of Kandahar as a
result of a bombing raid. NATO nonetheless noted that the Taliban had strategically located
themselves amongst civilians. Afghan President Hamid Karzai expressed his dismay over the
unfortunate deaths.
In the province of Helmand where British forces were based, a peace deal was forged between the
tribal elders and the governor. In the agreement, security was given to the local elders to
administer, and effectively prevented NATO forces from entering the town. There was strong
external criticism about the deal because the area, which had seen a rash of fighting between
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 48 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
British troops and resurgent Taliban, would now be outside the realm of NATO control.
The country continued to be plagued by violent clashes in the latter part of 2006. For example, an
attack by a suicide bomber in Afghanistan in late November 2006 left more than 15 people dead
and about 25 others injured. Among the casualties were provincial officials, an army officer, and
several members of a security militia who had been working with United States troops. The attack
took place at a restaurant in the Orgun district close to the border with Pakistan. Much like
several other recent attacks of this kind, the blame was placed on resurgent elements of the
Taliban. Elsewhere in Afghanistan, NATO troops were engaged in bloody clashes with Taliban
fighters in battles in the southern part of the country.
Developments in 2007
On January 25, 2007, attention returned to Helmand when an air strike outside the town of Musa
Qala devastated a Taliban command post and killed senior militants. NATO said that the strike
was did not violate the prevailing peace agreement (discussed above), however, the provincial
governor warned that the Taliban viewed it as an assault worthy of retaliation.
Whether or nor the strike was to blame for the ensuing events in Musa Qala was unknown, but by
early February 2007, hundreds of Taliban had taken over the town, destroyed the government
center, taken weapons from the police, and were temporarily holding tribal elders as hostages. The
events were confirmed by a a NATO spokesperson. The situation indicated a possible end to the
peace deal forged months earlier. Moreover, it augured negatively for the prospects of stability in
Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, in February 2007, control of NATO forces in Afghanistan was transferred from British
General David Richards to American General Dan Mc Neil. The official transfer ensued at a
formal ceremony in the Afghan capital of Kabul.
United States (U.S.) Vice President Dick Cheney traveled to Afghanistan in late February 2007 to
meet with Afghan leader Hamid Karzai and to show support for U.S. troops in that country. An
attack at a base in Bagram left over a dozen people dead but Cheney was not harmed. The
resurgent Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack and apparent attempted assassination.
In military offensive by United States (U.S.) troops in Afghanistan in early March 2007, several
civilians were reported to have been killed. Apparently, a fire fight was sparked after a suicide
bomber in a minibus tried to attack a convoy. The incident, which occurred on a road from the
city of Jalalabad en route to Pakistan, was described in various media accounts as a "complex
ambush" while local Afghans accused U.S. forces of deliberately targeting civilians.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 49 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The U.S. military explained the incident by saying that some of the civilian deaths were likely
caused by incoming fire from the ambush; it also said that U.S. forces were trying to defend a
patrol unit and were returning fire after being attacked. However, thousands of local Afghans
demonstrated in the streets to protests the deaths of the civilians, and to accuse the U.S. of
deliberate action. Indeed, Mohammad Khan Katawazi, chief of Shinwar district, said that U.S.
troops opened fire on everyone, regardless of whether there was evidence of their involvement in
the ambush.
Just days later, more civilians were killed, this time in Kapisa. The civilians -- nine people
including five women and three children -- were killed as a result of an air strike in the area. Some
reports placed the blame for the air strike on NATO forces, however, NATO officials denied being
responsible. Later, U.S. officials said that it had dropped a bomb weighing 2,000 pounds in the
region. A U.S. military spokesperson placed the blame for the incident on an rocket attack, which
spurred retaliatory action. However, that retaliatory action appeared to have targeted a mud
building housing a family.
April 2007 saw the death of an Afghan reporter, Ajmal Naqshbandi, at the hand of the resurgent
Taliban. Naqshbandi worked as a guide to foreign journalists and had been abducted in March
2007in Helmand province, along with an Italian journalist, Daniele Mastrogiacomo. While
Mastrogiacomo was freed in exchange for the release of five members of the Taliban, his driver,
Sayed Agha, was reported to have been beheaded. Now, the Taliban announced that it made the
decision to kill Naqshbandi because the government refused to release certain leading members of
the Taliban from prison. A spokesman for Taliban said: "We killed Ajmal today because the
government did not respond to our demands."
Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, as well as the United Nations Special Envoy to Afghanistan,
Tom Koenigs, both responded to the news by condemning the killing of Naqshbandi. At home in
Afghanistan, people expressed outrage that the government would forge a deal to ensure the
freedom of a foreigner, while allowing an Afghan to die at the hands of the Taliban.
Meanwhile, April 2007 also saw the deaths of six Canadian troops serving with NATO-led forces in
the southern part of the country. The Canadians were reported to have been killed when their
vehicle hit an explosive device.
In early May 2007, fighting between United States-led troops and Taliban fighters took a tragic
turn when 50 civilians were killed in the western part of Afghanistan. The scenario drew attention
to ongoing concerns of Afghans about the methods employed by international forces in their fight
against the Taliban. Afghans have complained that seemingly careless coordination
by international forces have often resulted in the deaths of civilians. This particular case evoked
sharp criticism from President Hamid Karzai, who despite his strong support for the global war on
terror, was compelled to assert that his people would not tolerate such deaths. In response, NATO
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 50 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
forces pledged to improve their tactical coordination, for the purpose of avoiding such incidences in
the future.
On May 12, 2007, Mullah Dadullah -- the leading military commander of the Taliban in
Afghanistan -- was reported to have been killed. NATO said that he had been killed during clashes
in the restive province of Helmand. Dadullah gained notoriety for his brutal acts of terrorism,
which included bombings, beheadings and abductions. He was the most senior Taliban militant to
have been killed in recent times. His body was displayed in the city of Kandahar, where officials
from the Taliban confirmed his death. Both NATO and Taliban suggested that he would soon be
replaced by another leader.
Dadullah's body was handed over to the Taliban in the first week of June 2007. This act was soon
followed by the Taliban's release of four hostages. The Taliban said that they allowed the release
of the hostages in exchange for Dadullah's body. A spokesperson for the Taliban also noted that a
fifth hostage had been killed because of the government's slowness in responding to their demand
for Dadullah's body. The Afghan authorities confirmed the handing over of Dadullah's body, but
gave no indication that this move was enacted to secure the hostages' release.
In mid-June 2007, a bomb exploded in the Afghan capital of Kabul, destroying a bus, killing 35
people, and injuring more than 30 others. Civilians and foreigners were among the scores of
casualties. The resurgent Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, which took place close to
the police headquarters during rush hour. It was the fifth bombing within three days, but one of
the deadliest attacks in Kabul since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Until this point, Kabul had
been relatively immune from the violence plaguing other parts of the country. Now, with this spate
of attacks, which appeared to mirror events in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, there was fresh anxiety
about security in Afghanistan. As well, there were concerns about the effects on the country's
stability.
Meanwhile, violence was ongoing elsewhere in Afghanistan during this period. In Kandahar, a
roadside bomb killed three coalition soldiers and their Afghan interpreter, and in Mazar-e-Serif, a
suicide bombing left a civilian dead and several injured.
June 29, 2007 saw air strikes by foreign forces in Afghanistan apparently kill scores of people.
Among the dead in Helmand province were approximately 45 civilians and 62 Taliban fighters,
according to a local inquiry. However, United States-led coalition forces and NATO disputed this
claim. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who has increasingly expressed criticism of the "reckless
tactics" used by foreign forces fighting the Taliban in his country, ordered a formal investigation
into the matter. Karzai in late June 2007 accused foreign forces of using an "extreme use of
force," which often resulted in civilian deaths. He also complained that United States-led coalition
forces and NATO did not properly coordinate their military efforts with his government. For its
part, NATO welcomed the investigation and promised to cooperate.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 51 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In the second week of July 2007, Afghanistan was hit by twin bomb attacks. In eastern province
of Khost, a roadside bomb exploded near a police vehicle on patrol with international forces. At
least eight people, including six Afghan policemen and two civilians were killed in the attack,
although the soldiers on patrol appeared to have been spared from the bloodshed. Meanwhile, in
the province of Paktika, a vehicle was the target of a bombing that ultimately killed two civilians.
Days earlier, a suicide bombing in the southern part of the country killed 17 people -- most of
whom were children attending school. Resurgent Taliban claimed responsibility for the attacks.
The violence were fresh manifestations of the increase in bloodshed plaguing Afghanistan since
2006. Indeed, analysts warned that the country has been faced with the worst violence in six
years.
In mid-July 2007, a video of Osama bin Laden was released in which the al-Qaida leader expressed
support for Islamic martyrs. There was no verification about the actual time when the footage was
produced.
Also in mid-July 2007, 23 South Koreans were taken hostage by the Taliban in Afghanistan while
traveling from Kandahar -- a Taliban stronghold -- to the Afghan capital of Kabul on a Christian
mission. It was the most significant group abduction by the Taliban since the fall of its regime in
2001.
The Taliban said that the captives were in good health but would be killed if the Afghan
government did not release several Islamic militants from prison. The Taliban also demanded the
exit of the 200 South Korean forces operating in Afghanistan. South Korean forces were already
scheduled to withdraw from Afghanistan later in the year. South Korean envoys traveled to
Kabul to work with the Afghan government on securing the release of the hostages. These efforts
were grounded in serious diplomacy and were aimed at ensuring that the South Koreans were
released safely. For its part, the Taliban extended its deadline for negotiations for the purpose of
having their demands met. One South Korean hostage -- the group's leader, Bae Hyung-Kyu -was reported to have killed on July 25, 2007.
By the close of July 2007, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said that his government was expending
its best efforts to free the surviving 22 South Korean hostages -- most of whom were females -held by the Taliban. Karzai condemned their abductions as a "shameful" reflection of Islamic
religion and Afghan culture. There were also reports that the Afghan government was not
foreclosing the use of military action to free the South Korean missionary workers. However, the
Afghan government noted that it would not participate in a prisoner exchange.
On the other side of the equation, a spokesperson for the Taliban said that a new deadline would
be set for the killing of the hostages. To that end, in an interview with Agence France Presse,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 52 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Yousuf Ahmadi said that if the Afghan government did not meet its demands for the release of
several Islamic militants from prison, some of the South Koreans would be killed. Indeed, on July
30, 2007, one male South Korean hostage was shot to death because the Taliban said that the
government was not responding appropriately to its demands.
Meanwhile, two Germans along with several local Afghans were also taken hostage during the
same period. Both Germans had been working on an infrastructure development project. The
body of one German man was subsequently discovered in Wardak and authorities surmised that
the second German may have died while in captivity. There was no information available about
the Afghans who had been captured. A spokesperson for the Taliban said that both men had been
killed because Germany refused to meet their demands to withdraw its forces -- numbering about
3,000 -- from Afghanistan. Chancellor Angela Merkel made clear that Germany would not
acquiesce to "blackmail" by the Taliban.
Pope Benedict XVI entered the political fray to excoriate the Taliban kidnappers whom he said
were acting against "the most basic rules of civilization."
In the first week of August 2007, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was in the United States to meet
with President George W. Bush. The meeting was regarded as a "strategy session" regarding the
resurgent Taliban and al-Qaida in Aghanistan. To that end, the United States pledged $10 billion in
funds aimed at strengthening Afghan security forces and also compelling positive results. But on
the other side of the equation, the Afghan leader wanted to discuss the rising number of civilians
dying as a result of military operations by coalition forces. As well, Karzai was expected to ask
Bush to place pressure on Pakistan to intensify its efforts to curb cross-border extremist fighters.
In the background of these two sets of objectives has been the issue of Iran. Whereas the United
States has expressed anxiety about Iran possible involvement in the supply of weapons to the
Taliban, Afghanistan has cast Iraq as an ally in its causes. To that end, Karzai was reported to
have characterized Iran as "a supporter of Afghanistan, in the peace process that we have and the
fight against terror."
On September 29, 2007, a suicide bombing in the Afghan capital of Kabul left 30 people dead.
The Taliban claimed responsibility for the suicide bomb, which exploded on bus. In addition to the
30 people who died, a further 21 people were wounded. It was the bloodiest attack in the
Afghan capital since 2001, however, in the last year, the overall violence in Afghanistan has seen a
marked increase, with more than 3,000 people dying in 2007 alone as a result of fighting between
joint Afghan and foreign forces and the resurgent Taliban.
Presumably in an effort to deal with the problem of increased attacks by resurgent Taliban, Afghan
President Karzai said in late September 2007 that he would extend offers of government positions
to members of that group, if such reconciliatory action would result in peace. President Karzai
said he would ideally like to ask Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, and warlord, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 53 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
about their actions, which were destructive to Afghanistan.
A spokesman for the Taliban militants rejected this offer for talks with President Hamid Karzai,
and rebuffed the notion of joining the government. Qari Yusuf Ahmadi said that the Taliban would
not negotiate with the Afghan government at a time when foreign troops remained in the country.
He also noted that the Taliban was not interested in cabinet posts. Instead, Qari Yusuf Ahmad
asserted the following: "We want the withdrawal of foreign forces and we stand by our position.
As long as they have not withdrawn, we'll never talk with the Kabul administration." His statement
appeared to foreclose peace talks with Karzai since the Afghan president had said that he would
not agree to the withdrawal of foreign troops.
Late September 2007 saw the Taliban in Afghanistan release four Red Cross workers a few days
after they were kidnapped in the province of Wardak, to the west of the capital city of Kabul. The
international Red Cross said that the workers, two of whom were Afghans and two of whom were
foreigners, were unconditionally released. A leading member of the Taliban said that the workers
had been mistakenly abducted.
Late October 2007 saw clashes between United States-led coalition troops and Taliban in the
Helmand province of Afghanistan. Reports suggested that dozens of Taliban -- as many as 80 -had been killed as a result. The clashes ensued after a patrol made up of joint coalition and Afghan
troops was barraged by rocket attacks and gunfire. The patrol then called in air strikes to respond,
which hit a trench housing Taliban. However, there was also a battle that ensued in the Talibandominated town of Musa Qala. There were also unconfirmed reports that close to 20 local
villagers also died as a result of the fighting.
November 2007 saw two Canadian soldiers belonging to the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (Isaf) force in Afghanistan killed by a roadside bomb in the southern part of the
country. The attack took place north of a Canadian base in the province of Kandahar. In addition
one interpreter was died and three other soldiers were wounded. As 2007 drew to a close, more
than 200 Isaf soldiers had been killed over the course of the year. In the central province of Ghor,
militants attacked policemen, killing four. However, in other developments, the United States
military said that 23 insurgents were killed in a weapons search, with some reports indicating that a
truck filled with weaponry exploded in the province of Helmand. As well, ten militants were said to
have been killed in Kandahar.
The close of 2007 in Afghanistan was marked by ongoing violence. In one incident in the southern
part of the country in the province of Kandahar, an attack by Taliban at a checkpoint left at least
16 policemen dead. Afghan authorities said that police were being targeted because they were not
as well equipped or as well trained as either local military forces or NATO forces.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 54 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Developments in 2008
On January 14, 2008, an attack by the resurgent Taliban on the luxury Serena hotel in the capital
city of Kabul resulted in at least six deaths, although the actual number of casualties was unknown
at the time of writing. The hotel was popular among foreigner and guest at the time of the attack
included the Norwegian foreign minister. The attack, according to a Taliban spokesperson, was
carried out by four armed Taliban fighters, and included gunfire, grenades and suicide bombings. A
month earlier, a rocket attack close to the residence of the governor of Kabul left five people dead.
These attacks were continuing illustrations of the fact that the security situation in Afghanistan was
deteriorating.
A suicide bombing just outside the Afghan city of Kandahar in mid-February 2008 left more
than 100 people dead and authorities warning that the death toll would surely rise. It was the
deadliest attack since 2001. Many of the victims included people watching a dog fighting contest,
however, the apparent target of the attack was the now-deceased local police chief, Abdul
Hakim. Governor Assadullah Khalid, who escaped an assassination attempt a week before,
blamed the bloodshed on the resurgent Taliban. Indeed, the area of the attack in southern
Afghanistan has been a Taliban stronghold for many years, and Hakim was known to have been
strongly opposed to the extremist group.
On March 13, 2008, a suicide car bombing on a coalition convoy near the airport in the Afghan
capital city of Kabul left six people dead and more than 15 others injured. Resurgent Taliban
claimed responsibility for the attack. That attack occurred a month after a suicide bombing just
outside Kandahar killed more than 100 people, as noted just above. In other developments, the
governor of the province of Nimroz said that 41 Taliban died in clashes with coalition forces
around the same period. As well, United States forces said that 12 Taliban were killed as a result of
an offensive operation in the province of Helmand.
In late April 2008, a military parade attended by President Hamid Karzai was attacked. A week
later in early May 2008, Afghan authorities arrested two men in connection with the attack, which
killed three people, but spared the Afghan leader who was whisked away from the scene after
gunshots were fired. Among the dead were a child and a parliamentarian. The two detained men
were identified as a defense ministry employee and an interior ministry employee respectively. As
with other such attacks in Afghanistan, resurgent Taliban were ultimately deemed responsible for
orchestrating the violence. Intelligence chief Amrulleh Saleh said, "Al-Qaeda's role and
involvement in the attack is very clear." Indeed, following the incident, a Taliban spokesman
claimed responsibility saying that while Karzai not directly targeted, the extremist Islamic enclave
wanted to demonstrate its access abilities.
In June 2008, Taliban fighters in Afghanistan attacked a prison in Kandahar and released hundreds
of prisoners. A manhunt by joint Afghan and international troops resulted in 20 inmates being
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 55 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
recaptured, however, the rest were reported to have escaped. NATO announced that 17 insurgents
were dead but did not state whether any of the escapees were among the dead.
Two days after that incident, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said that in the interests of national
self-defense, he would send troops over the border into Pakistan to hunt down militants operating
across the border. Karzai said: "Afghanistan has the right of self-defense. When they cross the
territory from Pakistan to come and kill Afghans and to kill coalition troops it exactly gives us the
right to go back and do the same." Karzai also warned that he would actively search for Taliban
fighters, including Baitullah Mehsud, who was believed to be based in the South Waziristan region
of Pakistan. To that end, the Afghan leader said, "Baitullah Mehsud should know that we will go
after him now and hit him in his house." Karzai promised a similar fate to Taliban leader, Mullah
Omar.
While Afghanistan and Pakistan share ethnic and cultural ties, relations between the two countries
have become increasingly strained as extremist Islamic militants have traversed the cross-border
region with impunity, often carrying out attacks on either side. Karzai has often called on Pakistan
and the wider international community to deal with this problem. However, until the
aforementioned prison attack, he had never before threatened to pursue militants across the border.
In response, Pakistan lashed back by stating that it while it wanted regional stability, it would not
stand for interference in its affairs. Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said, "We want a
stable Afghanistan. It is in our interest." He went on to state, "Neither do we interfere in anyone
else's matters, nor will we allow anyone to interfere in our territorial limits and our affairs."
Soon after the Afghan leader publicly threatened to seek out Taliban across the border into
Pakistan, the threat presented by that militant Islamic enclave was brought into sharp relief. About
500 Taliban fighters took control of a number of several villages to the south of Kandahar in
Afghanistan. Joint Afghan and NATO forces were expected to confront the threat posed by the
Taliban's advance.
On July 7, 2008, a suicide bombing at the gates of the Indian embassy in the Afghan capital of
Kabul left more than 40 people dead and close to 150 injured. Embassy personnel, including a
senior diplomat, India's defense attache, and two security guards, were among the dead. The
death toll also affected the surrounding diplomatic area with five Afghans dying at the Indonesian
embassy. The attack appeared to have taken place as people were queued in visa lines.
While Afghanistan has experienced a sharp decline in its security situation over the course of the
previous year as a result of resurgent Taliban, most terror attacks have been concentrated in the
southern and eastern parts of the country where the Taliban have had a stronghold. Attacks in the
capital of Kabul have been something of a rarity by comparison. This latest suicide bombing held
the dubious distinction of being the deadliest terror attack in Kabul since the ousting of the Taliban
government in 2001. The location of the attack -- in one of the more secure parts of the capital
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 56 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
city -- was expected to cause great consternation among Afghan authorities.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai suggested that the attack was aimed at the Indian embassy for
geopolitical reasons. He said that those responsible may have wanted to negatively influence good
Indo-Afghan relations. India responded by condemning the "cowardly terrorists' attack" and
promising to continue its commitment to Afghanistan in the realm of humanitarian aid, relief and
reconstruction.
While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, the Interior Ministry of Afghanistan
intimated that the attack could not have been carried out without assistance from "an active
intelligence service in the region. The Afghan authorities did not detail the specific intelligence
service that might be involved, however, they have in the past accused Pakistani agents of
operating in Afghanistan.
July 2008 saw United States troops abandon an outpost located in a remote part of eastern
Afghanistan, located on the border of Nuristan and Kunar. The action was taken soon after 100200 Islamic militants stormed the military outpost, killing nine United States soldiers and leaving
more than a dozen injured. The attack was the most significant loss of American life in
Afghanistan since military operations commenced in that country in 2001. Officials said that
"regular patrols" in the area would continue although the outpost would no longer be maintained. A
formal statement by NATO's International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) noted that although
the outpost was "disestablished," there would be a "continued presence" in the area.
More than a dozen Afghan police and civilians were killed in two incidents involving international
forces in mid-July 2008. A seemingly accidental air strike by coalition forces in the province of
Farah left four Afghan police and five civilians dead as a result. In Pakitika province, at least four
civilians were also accidentally killed by coalition forces firing mortar rounds that did not hit exactly
on target. The two incidents occurred after more dozens died in Herat. Local tribal leaders
blamed that case on NATO. Earlier in the month, close to 50 people died at an Afghan wedding
after being bombed by United States forces.
On August 18, 2008, suicide bombers drove a car into the gates of a United States military base in
the Khost province of eastern Afghanistan. The attack came as Afghanistan was set to celebrate
its Independence Day and left about 10 Afghans dead and more than a dozen others wounded.
Police subsequently shot to death two more suicide bombers before they could detonate a second
explosives-laden car. The governor of Khost,Arsala Jamal, said that most of the victims of the
attack were "poor laborers and civilians."
Since militants, presumably allied with resurgent Taliban appeared intent upon disturbing the
Independence Day festivities, an anticipated national address by President Hamid Karzai was
cancelled and many international workers in Afghanistan were told to remain at home. As well,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 57 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
soldiers were deployed in the capital city of Kabul while security checkpoints were established
across the city.
An ambush by Taliban fighters in Afghanistan in the latter half of August 2008 left 10 French
troops dead and more than 20 others wounded The attack took place to the east of the Afghan
capital, Kabul, and reportedly resulted in fighting that went on for as many as 24 hours. It was one
of the bloodiest attacks suffered by coalition troops in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban
regime in 2001 and certainly the heaviest death toll suffered by the French military since 1983
when 58 paratroopers died in Beirut. For his part, French President Nicolas Sarkozy was
expected to travel to Kabul to express solidarity with the French troops.
In addition to the aforementioned ambush, two rockets were reported to have been fired on Kabul
in the same time period. As well, a NATO patrol unit was struck by a roadside bomb in the
province of Kandahar in the south of the country. In the south-eastern province of Khost, an
attempted attack on a NATO military base left around six suicide bombers dead. That same base,
called Camp Salerno, was also the site of a separate suicide bombing a day later that left nine
people dead.
Then, on August 22, 2008, six NATO troops died at the hands of the Taliban. Among the six were
three Canadians who died as a result of a roadside bomb in the southern part of Afghanistan.
Their deaths marked the bloodiest day for Canadian troops fighting in Afghanistan since 2007
when six Canadians died in an explosion. The overall Canadian death toll in Afghanistan thus
stood at 93. The other three soldiers killed were from Poland; they died in a separate attack using
an improvised explosive device in Ghazni in the central part of the country.
The attacks were the latest manifestations of an ever-devolving security situation in Afghanistan
whereby resurgent Taliban were reported to be moving closer toward Kabul. Brigadier General
Denis Thompson noted that the Taliban was intensifying its attacks saying, "I don't know that the
Taliban are getting stronger. What I'd say is they're much more aggressive this fighting season than
they've been in the past."
September 7, 2008 saw the southern Afghan city of Kandahar hit by two suicide bombings. The
attacks ensued one after the other and were targeted at a police station. At least two policemen
were among the six people who died, and more than 30 people were wounded as a result,
according to reports from the ground. Included in the casualties was a senior police commander,
General Abdul Razaaq, who may well have been the main target of the attacks. Elsewhere in the
country, a suicide bomber attacked a NATO convoy in the western city of Herat. There were no
deaths of injuries in that incident.
Meanwhile, at the start of September 2008, the United States said it would support an investigation
into the deaths of civilians in Afghanistan. At issue was an air raid in the western region of Herat.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 58 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The United States said that one of its joint Afghan-coalition patrols was trying to arrest a Taliban
commander named Mulla Sadiq when it came under fire. The United States insisted that the air
raid that followed left mostly militants and five civilians dead. However, Afghan officials disputed
this estimate saying that scores of civilians had been killed while the United Nations said that it had
"convincing evidence" from eyewitnesses on the ground that up to 90 people -- including 90
children -- had been killed. The investigation was to be carried out jointly by the United States,
Afghanistan and the United Nations.
In another development at the start of September 2008, a NATO raid in south eastern Afghanistan
left three children dead. The incident occurred when troops were returning fire after coming under
attack from resurgent Taliban in the Paktika province and they decided to return fire. One artillery
round hit a house, thus killing the children and injuring several others. NATO released a statement
expressing regret for the accident and noting that an investigation into the matter was under way.
In late September, 2008, a high profile Afghan policewoman, Malalai Kakar, was assassinated in
the southern Afghan city of Kandahar. Authorities said that Malalai Kakar, who led Kandahar's
department of crimes against women, was shot to death in her car as she prepared to leave for
work. Also seriously injured in the attack was her son. The resurgent Taliban, who prohibited
women from being in the police force while in power, claimed responsibility for her assassination.
A spokesperson for the Taliban said to Agence France Presse, "We killed Malalai Kakar. She was
our target, and we successfully eliminated our target." Malalai Kakar was well-known in
Afghanistan, partially because of a gun-fight in which she prevailed after killing three attempted
assassins. This time, however, she was the victim of assassins.
By October 2008, the larger war against the Taliban in Afghanistan was ongoing and with no
imminent victory in sight. In fact, the British commander in Helmand province warned that a
"decisive military victory" was not likely to be seen in Afghanistan. Instead, Brigadier Mark
Carleton-Smith said that his objective was to ensure the Afghan army's ability to secure the
country independently. He said, "We're not going to win this war... It's about reducing it to a
manageable level of insurgency that's not a strategic threat and can be managed by the Afghan
army." The British commander did not foreclose the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban on
the security of Afghanistan, perhaps even veering toward a political settlement. He said: "If the
Taliban were prepared to sit on the other side of the table and talk about a political settlement, then
that's precisely the sort of progress that concludes insurgencies like this."
In the third week of October 2008, three bus attacks by the Taliban in the southern Afghan
province of Kandahar left close to 30 people dead. The Taliban said that it had targeted soldiers,
however, Afghan authorities said that the victims were civilians, including women and children.
Regardless of their status, some of the male victims were reported to have been beheaded and the
bodies were dumped across a wide area around the Maiwand district.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 59 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
With killings and kidnappings of foreigners on the rise in the Afghan capital of Kabul, Westerners
in Afghanistan were worrying in November 2008 that they were actual targets of attacks by the
Taliban. Some analysts surmised that the increase in killings and kidnappings of foreigners were
simply a by-product of the overall devolving security situation in Kabul.
Meanwhile, the problem of civilian casualties, as a result of United States-led military operations,
was also continuing to present a challenge for the Western-backed government. The United States
acknowledged in the first week of November 2008 that 37 civilians had been killed and another 35
had been injured as a result of fighting in Kandahar province between insurgents and coalition
forces. The acknowledgment came days after the office of Afghan President Hamid Karzai
placed the blame for the accidental deaths of three dozen people at a wedding party on a United
States airstrike.
Editor's Note: The issue of civilian casualties has been a highly contentious one in Afghanistan
where President Hamid Karzai has to craft a delicate balance between playing host to security
forces while protecting his own people from harm. Mirwais Yasini, a deputy speaker for the lower
house of parliament, explained the sensitive nature of the situation saying, "These operations
widen the gap between the people and the government." That said, the vast majority of civilian
deaths in Afghanistan in recent times have been caused by resurgent Taliban, who in the same
period, had been behind a host of attacks that left a long list of civilian casualties. To date, the
Taliban has expressed the objective of overthrowing the Western-backed government of
Afghanistan.
In mid-November 2008, Afghan President Hamid Karzai offered a safety deal to the Taliban’s
leader, Mullah Omar, in the interests of advancing communications. Karzai said that the Taliban
leader would be granted safe passage it he agreed to participate in peace talks with the Afghan
government.
Karzai’s proposal was at odds with the United States’ multi-million dollar bounty being offered for
the capture of Mullah Omar. However, Karzai has been dealing with a devolving security situation
in a country with resurgent Taliban and a population increasingly disenchanted with being the
victims of crossfire violence. As such, he was clearly prepared to take drastic action. To that end,
Karzai actively challenged the United States and other Western powers to either leave his country
if they could not accept his overtures to make a deal with the Taliban, or, to themselves engage in
“regime change” in Afghanistan. At a news conference in the Afghan capital of Kabul, Karzai said:
"If I say I want protection for Mullah Omar, then the international community has two choices:
remove me, or leave if they disagree. And both are good.”
Special Report: Indications of Post-Bush Era Foreign Policy
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 60 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Benefiting from apparent support from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for United
States presidential nominee Barack Obama's 16-month phased withdrawal timetable from Iraq, the
Democratic contender for the American presidency urged greater focus on Afghanistan.
The Obama campaign quickly responded to Maliki's favorable stance on their proposed
withdrawal timetable by directing attention to Afghanistan. Obama's top foreign policy adviser, Dr.
Susan Rice, said: "Senator Obama welcomes Prime Minister Maliki's support for a 16 month
timeline for the redeployment of US combat brigades. This presents an important opportunity to
transition to Iraqi responsibility, while restoring our military and increasing our commitment to
finish the fight in Afghanistan."
These developments came at a time when Obama was launching an international tour, intended to
shore up his foreign policy credentials. Not surprisingly, the Democratic contender commenced his
trip in the country he has consistently said requires priority attention: Afghanistan.
During a visit to Kabul, Obama characterized the increasingly volatile landscape in Afghanistan
as "precarious and urgent." As such, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee said that
Afghanistan should be the main focus of the "war on terror." In his meeting with Afghan
President Hamid Karzai, he promised to continue the fight against terrorism "with vigor."
Additionally, Obama discussed the illicit narcotics trade and bilateral ties with Karzai.
Obama was interviewed for the CBS program "Face the Nation." In that interview he noted that
the Bush administration had been distracted by a "war of choice" in Iraq rather than fighting those
who were responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States. He asserted that
the time had come to correct to correct the mistakes made by the Bush administration. Obama
also called for more troops to be deployed to Afghanistan to fight resurgent Taliban, al-Qaida, and
other extremist Islamic elements.
Obama's priority on Afghanistan was backed by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who
expressed concurrence with the Democratic presidential contender on this matter.
Obama's rival for the American presidency, Republican presidential nominee, John McCain,
criticized him for espousing policies before traveling to the Middle East and South Asia to assess
the situation. Nevertheless, Obama's policies were receiving unexpected sanction from key global
players, as noted above.
Note: Obama's victory in November 2008 set the stage for potential shifts in policy yet to be seen.
Developments in 2009
In early February 2009, a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body inside a
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 61 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
police station in Afghanistan, killing at least 21 police officers and injuring several more. The
attack, which took place in Tirin Kot, the capital of Uruzgan province, also damaged surrounding
buildings. The area, while not as volatile as Kandahar or Helmand, was believed to be the home
province of Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. A spokesperson for the resurgent Taliban said that his
group claimed responsibility for the attack.
In recent times, resurgent Taliban have eschewed open clashes with NATO troops, increasingly
adopting tactics used by extremists and insurgents in Iraq instead. Indde, suicide bombings,
roadside bombings and ambushes have become increasingly prevalent in Afghanistan.
In mid-March 2009, a suicide attack at the police compound in Lashkar Gah in Helmand province
left nine police and two civilians dead. The attack, which also wounded around 30 others,
occurred when a suicide bomber posing as a policeman detonated the explosives strapped to his
body. In the province of Farah, one policeman died in a separate attack.
In addition to those two attacks, a roadside bombing in eastern Afghanistan left four United States
troops dead. Taliban fighters claimed responsibility for the explosion that targeted the military
convoy as it was passing by in the province of Nangarhar.
Around the same period, an attack on a NATO patrol unit in Kabul killed two bystanders and
injured 14 other civilians. Meanwhile, the mayor of Kandahar survived at attack on his convoy
although a bystander was killed and six others were wounded.
Earlier, three soldiers from the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) in Afghanistan were
killed in separate incidents. A French soldier and five Afghan soldiers died during battle with
Taliban militants in Kapisa. An explosion in the southern part of the country left on British soldier
dead. A traffic accident in northern Afghanistan claimed the third Isaf soldier.
Human casualties aside, militants operated from across the border in Pakistan to launch an attack
on a transport terminal used to supply NATO forces in Afghanistan.
Note: The spate of incidents were the latest evidence of a deeply devolving security situation in
Afghanistan, which spurred the new Obama administration in the United States to send 17,000
more troops to Afghanistan to stabilize the country's security situation.
By late March 2009, United States foreign policy in Afghanistan was on the agenda. On March
27, 2009, United States President Barack Obama unveiled a “stronger, smarter and more
comprehensive strategy” for dealing with Afghanistan. At issue was a new foreign policy approach
toward dealing with the threat posed by al-Qaida terrorists operating in the area from Afghanistan
to Pakistan. President Obama explained that this new course emerged from a "careful policy
review" that involved consultations with military commanders, diplomats, regional governments,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 62 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
strategic partners, NATO allies, as well as non governmental organizations.
Making it clear that the United States would not be involved in an open-ended war, President
Obama said that the new strategy would be carefully circumscribed with clear objectives. He said
that the United States effort in Afghanistan was only to confront our common enemy” and did not
seek to "control that country or dictate its future.",
Giving a glimpse of the new policy, President Obama had said during an interview on CBS
television show 60 Minutes on March 22, 2009 that there must be an "exit strategy" with regard to
the United States policy in Afghanistan. He said, "There's got to be a sense that this is not a
perpetual drift" and emphasized that the central mission was to ensure that al-Qaida was not able to
carry attacks against the United States.
Now, less than a week later, President Obama again emphasized these themes saying, “ So I want
the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and
defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” As before, the United States president again
emphasized the threat of al-Qaida in discussing the new strategy, noting that intensified efforts in
the Afghan-Pak region was needed to deal with that "increasingly perilous" terrain.
Flanked by United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and United States Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, President Obama depicted a grim situation in which the resurgent extremists were
consolidating control of the Afghan-Pak border zone. Indeed, he characterized that area as "the
most dangerous place in the world." President Obama noted that the United States’ strategy should
be directly related to the threat posed by al-Qaida to America and its allies. He also warned that
credible intelligence warned that fresh attacks were being planned by the terrorists.
President Obama emphasized that the terrorist threat was not directed solely at the United States
but also to Afghans at home, as well as the entire global community. To this end, President Obama
said, "This is not simply an American problem. Far from it.” He continued, "It is instead an
international security challenge of the highest order." Accordingly, the United States leader called
on NATO and other allies to assist in this effort.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signaled Russian support for the strategy during an interview
with the BBC. He indicated that Moscow would be "ready to participate in the efforts directed at
putting things in order" in Afghanistan. He also appeared to echo Obama’s view that Afghanistan
establish its own political system saying, "It is impossible to rule Afghanistan with the aid of the
alliance; it is impossible to rule Afghanistan from abroad. Afghanistan should find its own path to
democracy."
The Obama administration had already made good on an election promise to intensify its efforts in
Afghanistan by deploying 17,000 more troops to that country to deal with the resurgence of the
Taliban and the devolving security situation. But now President Obama was saying that there was a
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 63 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
need for increased non-combat personnel of 4,000 in Afghanistan to train and strengthen Afghan
security forces, and also to support civilian development.
Richard Holbrooke, the United States special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, has said that the
United States could no longer treat the two countries separately. He said, "In the past, the United
States government stove-piped it, they had an Afghan policy and a Pakistan policy. We have to
integrate the two and I hope the rest of the world will join us in that effort." Holbrooke has also
indicated there would be no further neglect of the region, suggesting more attention not just in
terms of military strength, but also in terms of aid and resources aimed at rebuilding infrastructure,
would be in the works.
Afghanistan was not the only country on the agenda, as suggested above. President Obama said
that the United States’ efforts against al-Qaida would also extend to Pakistan. He said that the
United States Congress would be asked to pass legislation authorizing an increase in expenditures
to Pakistan for the purpose of rebuilding schools, roads and hospitals. But President Obama noted
that he would not be granting a “blank check” to Pakistan, which would have to demonstrate a
commitment to crushing al-Qaida and aligned extremists in that country.
According to Reuters News, the government of Afghanistan welcomed the new strategy by the
United States, and particularly endorsed the regional approach. A presidential spokesman,
Humayun Hamidzada, said that Afghan President Hamid Karzai welcomed “the recognition of the
regional aspect of the problem in Afghanistan and specifically recognition that the al-Qaida threat is
mainly emanating from Pakistan."
In May 2009, United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the replacement of
General David McKiernan --the commander of United States-led forces in the field in Afghanistan.
Secretary Gates explained the decision had been made because the fight against the Taliban
required "new thinking." To that apparent end, Secretary Gates said the new commander would
be General Stanley McChrystal, whose background as a specialist in counter-insurgency would
apparently yield necessary insight and leadership in the fight against the Taliban.
The move was part of a strategic shift by the Obama administration to not only strengthen armed
forces on the ground, but also to use non-military methods to fight the Taliban. In fact, Secretary
Gates' announcement came at a time when the United States was set to increase its military
combat presence by 21,000 in Afghanistan (the existing force numbered 38,000). That move,
however, was sure to be met with resistance in Afghanistan where Afghan President Hamid Karzai
was under pressure to decrease combat operations in his country in the aftermath of a United
States airstrike that left 150 people dead.
In June 2009, a rocket attack on the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan killed two United States
troops and six other Americans. Authorities said that three rounds of rocket fire landed inside
Bagram while one round landed outside. Bagram -- the main American military base in Afghanistan
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 64 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
-- is located to the northeast of Kabul and has rarely been the target of such attacks. Indeed,
another rare attack on Bagram occurred in 2007 when then-Vice President Dick Cheney was
visiting the base; the Taliban claimed responsibility in that case for the attack that killed 23 Afghan
workers just outside the compound.
In other developments in Afghanistan, clashes between Taliban and United States forces ensued in
the southern part of the country. While United State fighter jets were able to destroy a Taliban
compound, two advancing marines came under attack from Taliban as the pressed further into
enemy territory. Thanks to fellow marines who hurled grenades at the Taliban, the marines were
able to escape to armored vehicles. The scenario was an illustration of the types of operations and
challenges that were in the offing for the increased United States troops in Afghanistan, charged
with reversing gains made by resurgent Taliban in recent years when the United States military was
bogged down in Iraq.
In late June 2009, a roadside bomb has killed three Afghan employees of the United Nations
refugee agency (UNHCR) in Afghanistan's northern Jowzjan province in late June 2009. The
provincial governor, Hashim Zari, placed the blame on the Taliban. It was yet another instance of
rising violence by the resurgent Taliban. That said, the attack took place in the northern part of
the country, which has been regarded as somewhat safer than the more volatile southern and
eastern portions of Afghanistan. Accordingly, there was some concern about the potential spread
of violence by the Taliban across the country.
Meanwhile, it was reported that New York Times reporter, David Rohde, escaped from the
clutches of the Taliban after seven months in captivity. Rohde and local reporter, Tahir Ludin,
escaped by climbing over the wall of the compound where they were being held in the North
Waziristan area of Pakistan. Rohde -- a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, was researching a book
on American involvement in Afghanistan, when he, Ludin, and their driver, Asadullah Mangal,
were abducted in the Afghan capital of Kabul in November 2008. In the interests of their safety,
news organizations across the world agreed to keep their abductions secret. While both Rohde and
Ludin were able to escape, Mangal remained in Taliban captivity.
With casualties mounting amidst troops from the United States and the United Kingdom fighting
the Taliban in Afghanistan, therewere increasing anxieties about Western efforts in that country to
crush Islamic militants. Indeed, resurgent Taliban have become increasingly violent in their
attacks while Western forces have seen ever-increasing casualty lists. In July 2009, the United
Kingdom and the United States had lost several soldiers as a result of attacks by resurgent Taliban.
As many as 15 British troops died in the space of days while four United States marines died in
two separate roadside bombings.
Given this climate, United States President Barack Obama sought to quell anxieties by staking out
a clear set of objectives for United States and allied troops trying to repel the Taliban in
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 65 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Afghanistan. To this end, President Obama characterized the war effort in Afghanistan a s a
"serious fight" against terrorism, and the crucial need to establish regional stability. President
Obama said that United States and allied troops had enjoyed some success but were immediately
tasked with the mission of seeing Afghanistan through the forthcoming presidential election set for
August 2009. Across the Atlantic in the United Kingdom, British Prime Minister was also
compelled to justify his country's continuing effort in Afghanistan by explaining that there was a
vital interest to his country in fighting terrorism. He was helped by President Obama's statement
as follows: "The mission in Afghanistan is one that the Europeans have as much if not more of a
stake in than we do. The likelihood of a terrorist attack in London is at least as high, if not higher,
than it is in the United States."
In other developments, a bomb exploded in the westen Afghan city of Herat, killing 12 people and
injuring more than 20 others on August 3, 2009. The bomb was detonated by remote control and
appeared to have targeted a police convoy, although both police and civilians were among the
victims. While violence has been increasing in Afghanistan, particularly ahead of presidential
elections set for later in August 2009, it has tended to be concentrated in the southern and eastern
part of the country where the Taliban holds sway. As such, this attack on the other side of the
country was a disturbing indication that violent attacks could spread across Afghanistan.
On August 4, 2009, Taliban militants fired at least nine rockets at the Afghan capital of Kabul. It
was the most significant attack in Kabul in several years, with some rockets landing close to major
Western embassies. Indeed, two rockets struck the Wazir Akbar Khan diplomatic area, where the
American and British embassies, as well as the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF)headquarters, have been located. As with the bombing at Herat, this latest episode was
another disturbing indication that violent attacks were spreading across Afghanistan ahead of the
presidential election. Indeed, the Taliban, which has been blamed for these attacks, has vowed to
disrupt the second presidential election since it was itself toppled from power in 2001. But the
election may not be the only driving force behind the Taliban's actions. United States Marines
launched an offensive into the Taliban stronghold of Helmand several weeks before. Accordingly,
the Taliban may be motivated to carry out retaliatory attacks.
Also in August 2009, a roadside bomb left 21 people dead, including some individuals en route to a
wedding, in Helmand province of southern Afghanistan. It was one of the deadliest strikes in the
weeks ahead of the Afghan presidential election, scheduled for August 20, 2009. In a separate
incident the very next day, another roadside bomb exploded close to a police vehicle, killing five
policemen and wounding three others. Helmand province has been the site of an ongoing military
offensive by joint United States and British forces, aimed at securing the area that has been
previously held by Taliban insurgents.
Taliban militants then attacked government buildings in eastern Afghanistan in the second week of
August 2009. The targets of rocket fire and grenade attacks included the governor's compound as
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 66 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
well as police headquarters in the eastern Logar province. Five Afghan police were among the
dead while more than 25 other individuals were reported to have been injured. The provicial
governor's life was spared as he was reportedly having lunch at the time of the violence. A
spokesperson for the Taliban claimed responsibility for the attacks. Indeed, it was the latest
manifestation of the Taliban's well-publicized vow to disrupt the impending elections.
The second week of August 2009 also saw Taliban fighters storm the police district headquarters in
Kunduz, leaving the police chief and two policemen dead. The attackers used small arms fire and
rocket-propelled grenades to penetrate the compound, followed by a gun battle between the two
sides that went on for several hours. The conflict came to an end when the police were augmented
by reinforcements and the militants abandoned the scene. The location of the attack in northern
Afghanistan was cause for concern, as the area in northern Afghanistan -- even further north from
the Hindu Kush mountains -- has not typically been subject to violence as per the eastern and
southern parts of the country where the Taliban hold sway. Accordingly, there were increasing
anxieties about the spread of violent attacks across Afghanistan ahead of the presidential elections,
which were set for August 20, 2009.
Editor's Primer on Afghanistan's 2009 Presidential Election
Afghanistan voters go the polls to vote in presidential election; rivals claim victory amidst rising
claims of vote fraud
Summary
Afghans were set to go to the polls on August 20, 2009 even as Taliban-orchestrated violence
plagued the country. Hundreds of thousands of troops were deployed across the country to protect
voters and poll workers. President Hamid Karzai was hoping for re-election by a clear majority,
thusly avoiding a second election round. To that end, his campaign platform and pre-election
machinations have spurred criticism, as discussed below. Early election results indicated that
Karzai was in the lead with Abdullah in second place, however, many presidential contenders said
the election was fraught with fraud.
Background
Afghans were originally scheduled to go to the polls to vote in the presidential election in May
2009. The devolving security situation forced the vote to be postponed until August 20, 2009.
One cause for the delay was the rising violence between resurgent Taliban militants and either
Afghan government forces or international (NATO) forces in the southern and eastern regions of
the country. But the Independent Election Commission noted that insufficient funds, cold weather
conditions as well as the security conditions made the presidential election impossible to be held on
time.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 67 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Candidates
By the time the election date controversy was settled, incumbent Afghan President Hamid Karzai
had already announced that he would seek re-election. But he would be presented with
competition from a host of presidential contenders including former government ministers Ali Jalali,
Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, as well as provincial governor Gul Agha Sherzai. Afghanborn Zalmay Khalilzad, who served as United States ambassador to the United Nations under the
Bush administration has also been rumored to be a possible candidate. Biographical information
for the main candidates is as follows -Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, was born in Kandahar, in the south of Afghanistan, on Dec. 34,
1957. He earned a master's degree in Political Science from Simla University of India in 1976. In
1992, Karzai served as Deputy Foreign Minister in the Mujahidin administration after the fall of
Moscow-backed regime in Kabul, but resigned a few months later. He then worked on
administration to the traditional Afghan Loya Jirga or Grand Assembly in the next several years. In
late 2001, after the fall of Taliban regime, Karzai was chosen as president of the provisional
administration. In June 2002, he was selected to be the head of the transitional government. In
the first presidential election in 2004 following the fall of the Taliban, Karzai won election to that
office and has been the president and head of state of Afghanistan since that time.
Abdullah Abdullah was born in 1960 in Kabul and came from a political family. Indeed, his father
-- Ghulam Mahyyod-Din Zamaryalay -- served as senator in the last parliament. Abdullah
graduated from Kabul's medical university in 1983. He worked in the political field as a special
advisor to the resistance leader, Ahmad Shah Masoud, until 2001 when Masoud was
assassinated. After the fall of the Taliban regime and establishment of the new administration,
Abdullah served in Karzai's government as Minister of Foreign Affairs until 2006. Abdullah has
been viewed as Karzai's main election rival for the post of president.
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai is Western educated, having gained a doctoral degree in Anthropology
from Colombia University in the United States. Known as a technocrat, GHani worked with the
United Nations, the World Bank, and also held the position of Chancellor of Kabul University.
Ghani additionally served as the Finance Minister in Karzai's cabinet from 2002 to 2004.
Election Prospects
While Karzai has been viewed as the election frontrunner and was expected to be re-elected
president., there was also a sense that he would be facing a surprisingly strong challenger in the
form of former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah. Since the winner would have to procure more
than 50 percent of the vote count to avoid a second round among the top two candidates from the
first round, there was increasing attention on the state of the race ahead of election day.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 68 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
To that end, an opinion poll by the American entity, the International Republican Institute, taken
in July 2009 showed that while Karzai leading the race with a clear plurality of 44 percent, this was
still short of a 50 percent majority. Meanwhile, his main rival, Abdullah Abdullah, who had
commanded only seven percent popularity in May 2009, was now increasing support to a solid
quarter of the electorate with 26 percent. Should that polling data prove to be on target, then
Karzai was indeed likely to contest a run-off election in the first part of October 2009.
Pre-election Landscape
Hoping to stave off a second election round with an outright victory in August 2009, Karzai began
to make his campaign platform and priorities clear. In July 2009, Afghan President Hamid Karzai
made the reduction of civilian casualties by foreign troops a part of his election manifesto. The
Afghan leader said that United States and NATO troops fighting Islamic insurgents in his country
should sign a framework governing their operations, with the objective of limiting civilian
casualties. Indeed, the issue of civilian casualties has been a source of great consternation in
Afghanistan even as foreign troops try to stave off resurgent Taliban at a time of escalating
violence.
Karzai's election manifesto also included plans for reconstruction. His campaign platform
additionally included talks with insurgents and to that end, his government managed to strike a
ceasefire deal with Taliban insurgents in the remote northwestern Badghis province, near the
border with Turkmenistan. The government has said that it wanted to forge similar agreements
with the Taliban elsewhere in the country. This approach has been criticized by opponents at home
and abroad, especially in light of the rising tide of Taliban-authored violence in Afghanistan. While
Karzai's cadre has argued that forging these ties could help reduce the violence, critics have said
that the incumbent president is trying to shore up support among the fundamentalist base of the
population ahead of the election.
But Karzai's alleged desire to curry favor with certain key voting blocs has had a social effect
among the female Shi'a population of Afghanistan, and has spurred outrage from human rights
groups and the wider international community.
At issue was the passage of controversial legislation affecting Shi'a Afghan women allowing
legalized rape within a marriage. Also, as noted by Human Rights Watch, "It also effectively
allows a rapist to avoid prosecution by paying 'blood money' to a girl who was injured when he
raped her."
Under international outrage and pressure, the earlier version of the bill was revoked. Among those
registering condemnation against this proposed legislation were United States President Barack
Obama and United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown. However, the final draft also
contained repressive provisions that contravene against the Afghan Constitution as well as
international treaties. Specifically, it allows men to deny their wives food and sustenance if they
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 69 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
refuse to comply with their husbands' sexual demands. The final version also grants guardianship
of children exclusively to their fathers and grandfathers, and mandates that women to obtain
permission from their husbands to work.
Nevertheless, the new legislation was supported by the hard-line Shi'a cleric, Ayatollah Mohseni.
Because Mohseni has been viewed as an influential player among the Shi'a population, which
makes up 20 percent of the Afghan population, there were suggestions that Karzai's support for the
amended law may be part of his election plan to procure support from this voting bloc. Human
Rights Watch has strongly condemned the quiet support by the government for this law saying that
Karzai "made an unthinkable deal to sell Afghan women out in the support of fundamentalists in
the August 20 election."
Meanwhile, Afghanistan was being plagued by pre-election violence. The Taliban had already
urged Afghans to boycott the election and were reported to have orchestrated attacks on people
working on vote registration. Now, only days ahead of the election, the Taliban was warning
people to stay at home on August 20, 2009, or risk their lives. The Taliban made it clear that it
would take drastic action to impede the election.
To that end, in the week before the election double explosions in Helmand and Kandahar left 14
people dead, including many children. Then, a suicide bombing just outside NATO headquarters in
Kabul left seven people dead and close to 100 wounded. Two days before the election, a suicide
car bomb exploded in the normally-calm Afghan capital of Kabul. That attack appeared to have
targeted a convoy of Western troops and left 10 people dead and 50 others injured. Among the
dead were a NATO soldier and nine Afghans, two of whom were United Nations staff. But
attacks elsewhere in the country took the death toll up to 20. These attacks included the firing of
rockets into the presidential compound in Kabul, the shooting death of an election candidate in
Jowzjan, the death of three poll workers in Badakhshan when their car hit a bomb, and the deaths
of two civilians and three Afghan soldiers at the hands of a suicide bomber in Uruzgan. United
States troops were also among the victims as a result of a roadside bomb in eastern Afghanistan.
As expected, the Taliban claimed responsibility. On the eve of the election, a spate of attacks
erupted across the country. In one case, Kabul was the site of gunfire between troops and
militants at a bank building. Three suspected militants were killed in that clash. Several more poll
workers were reported to have been killed.
Worried about the prospects of low voter turnout due to intimidation and fears of violence by the
Taliban, the government asked that the media refrain from reporting the attacks on election day. In
an interview with Reuters, Siamak Herawi, a spokesman for President Karzai, said: "This decision
will control the negative impact of the media. If something happens, this will prevent them from
exaggerating it, so that people will not be frightened to come out and vote." Foreign and local
media has reacted negatively to this call, naturally drawing upon their expressed duty to report the
truth. As noted above, hundreds of thousands of Afghan and foreign troops were placed on alert
to protect voters, who were expected to go to the polls in the face of the Taliban-authored
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 70 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
violence.
That threat of violence aside, there were also growing anxieties about fraud after a BBC
investigation uncovered the sale of thousands of voting cards, as well as bribery offers intended to
buy votes. For its part, the Afghan Independent Election Commission, which has been charged
with overseeing the election, has denied these allegations.
Election Day
As the election day dawned, the Taliban put forth a statement noting that 20 suicide bombers had
traveled to Kabul, where they intended to carry out preparing attacks. To that end, election day
was marked by the deaths of at least 26 Afghans before the polls closed. There were also reports
that the Taliban cut off the fingers of women who had voted in the election. The NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) reported that more than 400 attacks had taken place
on election day.
The threat of violence appeared to have had an effect on voter turnout with estimates that only 40
to 50 percent of the electorate actually went to the polls -- a marked decrease from the 70 percent
participation rate in the previous presidential election of 2004. Low turnout in the southern part of
the country, where Pashtuns dominate, was thought to adversely affect President Karzai's reelection prospects. By contrast, strong turnout in the north was believed to be to the advantage of
former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah.
Results
The early trickle of results from certain regions showed mixed results for the two main contenders
-- Karzai and Abdullah -- who were regarded to be in the lead. While Abdullah was ahead in some
provinces, such as Panjshir and Parwan, Karzai was ahead in other areas such as Kandahar and
Khost. Both men were competitive in places such as Helmand and Kunduz. But by August 25,
2009, partial results indicated that Karzai was advancing a lead,having won 46 percent of the votes
compared to Abdullah Abdullah with 31.4 percent, according to the Independent Election
Commission. Official results would not be available until mid-September 2009. Nevertheless,
both of the main presidential candidates -- Karzai and Abdullah - wasted no time in respectively
claiming victory with an outright majority. Yet to be determined if anyone actually had crossed the
50 percent threshold to avoid a second round.
In September 2009, vote-counting was ongoing after the August 2009 presidential election. At the
start of the month, incumbent Hamid Karzai was close to achieving the 50 percent threshold
needed to avoid a run-off election. The partial election results dave Karzai 48.6 percent and his
closest rival, Abdullah Abdullah, 31.7 percent. That advantage was extended by the end of the
first week of September 2009 when results showed Karzai moving past the 50 percent mark, on
track for an outright victory. Days later, preliminary election results indicated that Karzai received
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 71 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
more than 50 percent of the votes cast -- enough to avoid a second round. The Independent
Election Commission said that Karzai's main his challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, was in a distant
second place with 28 percent. However, the election result was being clouded by a sense of
illegitimacy as rising claims of electoral irregularities came to the fore.
Abdullah himself said that there was evidence of vote rigging in Karzai's favor, which would be
sent to the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) for investigation. Abdullah said that voter
turnout was inflated for regions areas without heavy turnout, and that the suspicious extra ballots
favored Karzai. In an interview with Reuters, Abdullah said, "The initial reports we are receiving
are alarming." Days after the election, other major presidential candidates, including former
Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and lawmaker Mirwasi Yasini, joined the chorus of those
challenging the legitimacy of the vote. Moreover, six presidential contenders put forth a joint
statement saying: "This election was characterized by widespread fraud which could result in
increasing tension and violence in the country and millions across the nation are concerned and the
international community is sharing this grave concern with us."
In early September 2009, there were more than 2,000 allegations of vote fraud being investigated.
By the close of the first week of September 2009, the United Nations-backed Electoral Complaints
Commission had ordered a partial recount of the ballots and it said that it was probing 762
allegations of serious fraud. On September 10, 2009, the Electoral Complaints Commission said
that it had invalidated an unspecified number of fraudulent ballots from Afghanistan's presidential
election. The commission also said that it was carrying out investigations into allegations of fraud
at more than 50 polling stations in Afghanistan's Kandahar province. The electoral commission also
ordered an audit and recount of ballots filed in the Shorabak, Spin Boldak and Khakrez districts.
According to the New York Times, residents of the Shorabak district of Kandahar said that their en
masse votes had been denied after they decided to Abdullah Abdullah. Tribal leaders said that an
ally of President Karzai had detained the district's governor and shut down all 45 polling sites on
election day. They also charged that police had engaged in ballot stuffing before the ballot boxes
were transported to Kabul. Ahmed Wali Karzai, the head of Kandahar's provincial council and
brother of the incumbent president, denied the allegations.
Election observers appeared to echo claims of the opposition candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, by
noting that both intimidation and voting fraud had taken place in the election on August 20, 2009.
Richard Holbrooke, the United States special envoy to Afghanistan, downplayed the claims of
voting irregularities saying that allegations of fraud were to be expected. He noted, "We have
disputed elections in the United States. There may be some questions here. That wouldn't surprise
me at all." Despite taking such a restrained position on the vote fraud allegations, subsequent
reports emerged that an "explosive meeting" took place between Holbrooke and Karzai in which
the United States special envoy to Afghanistan vociferously expressed concerns about ballotstuffing and other irregularities. The report suggested that the United States was clearly concerned
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 72 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
about the credibility of the election result, however, subsequent news stories indicated that both the
United States and Afghanistan did not want to emphasize the incident.
By the close of September 2009, the Electoral Complaints Commission ballot invalidation process
and electoral investigation process was ongoing due to massive irregularities including "state
sponsored" vote rigging, voter intimidation and phantom polling stations. With these developments
afoot, speculation began to rise that Karzai could be forced into a second election round, as
discussed above. Such a run-off poll could calm anxieties about the legitimacy of the vote in a
country mired by insecurity and chaos.
In the third week of October 2009, an investigation into fraud in Afghanistan's contested
presidential election reduced President Hamid Karzai's vote tally to about 47 percent. This tally -under the 50 percent threshold required for an outright majority -- would typically trigger a second
round or run-off election. This final result was on the verge of being made official by the United
Nations-backed Electoral Complaints Commission and, thusly, reported to the Independent
Election Commission. With the contested election result in Afghanistan unresolved, attention was
focused on whether or not a run-off election was likely. However, a crisis was possible since
Karzai was not keen on a second round, and the Independent Election Commission -- a body
dominated by President Karzai's supporters -- was signaling that it would not accept of findings of
the United Nations-backed the panel investigating claims of election fraud. Such a move would be
result in a deadlock and pave the way for a political crisis.
On Oct. 21, 2009, President Hamid Karzai begrudgingly indicated acceptance of a presidential
runoff. The decision to accept a second round on Nov. 7, 2009, came amidst a rising clamor to
establish a credible government in Afghanistan and amidst claims that the first round was mire by
fraud.
The Obama administration in the United States, which has been weighing whether or not to send
more troops to Afghanistan, made clear that there would be no action pending the establishment of
a legitimate government. In an interview with CNN, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel
said it would be "reckless" to make such a decision without thoroughly determining whether or not
the government at the helm of Afghanistan was legitimate. This view was interpreted as tacit
sanction for a second round in the presidential race, with an eye on removing doubts about who
was the true winner of the election.
Meanwhile, some controversy was brewing over the call for the firing of the head of Afghanistan's
electoral body. President Hamid Karzai's main rival, Abdullah Abdullah, was demanding that
Afghanistan's chief election official be sacked, ahead of the run-off vote set for Nov. 7, 2009.
Abdullah Abdullah explained his demand saying, "One of the conditions for having fair voting in
the second round is sacking Mr. Azizullah Ludin the chief of the so-called Independent Election
Commission (IEC)."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 73 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Then, by October 30, 2009, Abdullah Abdullah indicated that he might withdraw from the run-off
election. The move came in the wake of an apparent stalemate in the ongoing talks between the
two candidates and their supporters. Apart from the demand that the head of the Karzai-appointed
Independent Election Commission be fired, Abdullah Abdullah had also tried to force ministerial
changes, and had argued for a power-sharing deal with Karzai instead of a second election round.
However, Karzai emphatically rejected these demands, saying that there would be an election first,
and then perhaps, the establishment of a power-sharing agreement.A day later, Abdullah Abdullah
made his threat official and withdrew from the race, saying that an election would not be
conducted in a free and fair manner. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) responded by
cancelling the November 7, 2009 run-off election and declaring Karzai to be the winner by
default. IEC spokesman Azizullah Lodin -- whom Abdullah Abdullah wanted sacked -- said: "We
declare Hamid Karzai, which [sic] got the majority of votes in the first round and [since] he is the
only candidate for the second round... be declared as elected president of Afghanistan." Abdullah
Abdullah then characterized this announcement as "illegal," saying: "The decision announced by
the so-called Independent Election Commission (IEC) on Monday is illegal and I am determined to
continue my struggle for the betterment of the people."
Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who was re-elected by default when his rival withdrew from the
second round of the presidential election, as discussed above, promised to form an inclusive
government. Karzai also vowed "clean" governance. These commitments came as a result of
pressure by Western powers who reported warned Karzai that he would have to deal with
Afghanistan's corruption challenges. Clearly, the default re-election of Karzai amidst charges of
fraud and corruption has complicated the decision to be made by United States President Barack
Obama on a future Afghanistan policy, given the issue of legitimate and credible governance,
discussed above.
In other developments, Karzai also urged the resurgent and militant Taliban to lay down arms and
join the peace process. In a press conference, Karzai said, "I want the Taliban to give up
resistance, return home and help stabilize security in the country." He also called on the
international community for assistance in stabilizing the country saying, "I want the Taliban to
return home and in this regard we need the support of international community."
These developments were expected to complicate the decision to be made by United States
President Barack Obama on a future Afghanistan policy, given the issue of legitimate and credible
governance, discussed below.
Other Recent Developments (2009)
In late August 2009 well into September 2009, in the midst of a highly competitive and chaotic
presidential election, Afghanistan was in a state of instability and mired by violence and chaos as
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 74 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
resurgent Taliban carried out systematic attacks across the country. At issue has been the growing
sentiment that a government without legitimacy and popular backing would be unable to function
with peace and stability. Indeed, the political hostilities and tensions would only add to the
complex problems already facing the country. At the international level, countries with troops in
Afghanistan were reassessing their strategic purpose there.
Days after the election on August 25, 2009, a massive bomb in the southern Afghan city of
Kandahar left at least 40 people dead and more than 60 others wounded. It was not known
whether the explosives were packed in one truck or multiple cars that were detonated
simultaneously. The attack, which occurred just after the early election results began to be
publicized, took place in an area close to the provincial council, hotels and offices of nongovernmental organizations. A day later, another attack occurred in Kandahar, this time close to a
bank. There were early reports of casualties. While there was no immediate claim of
responsibility, the site of the attacks in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar, made the militant
Islamic group the most likely suspect, according to the Afghan authorities. Excoriating the Taliban
for the brutality of the attack, Mohammad Sher Shah, the deputy provincial police chief, said:
"Once again they've killed children, women, innocent Afghans. They are not human. They are
animals."
Meanwhile, four United States soldiers died while on patrol in what a NATO spokesperson
described as "one of the most violent areas of Afghanistan." Consequently, the death toll in 2009
for United States troops in Afghanistan was now the highest since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
The deteriorating security situation began to raise questions about United States involvement in that
conflict. While Afghanistan has, to date, enjoyed the public support of the American people, and
has not generally been subject to the same controversy as the Iraq war, the long engagement has
started to take a toll. The speculation about whether an increase in troop strength may be needed
to combat resurgent Taliban, particularly in eastern Afghanistan, has been met with some
skepticism in the war-weary United States.
By the start of September 2009, as the vote-counting in Afghanistan's aforementioned presidential
election continued, a suicide bombing east of Kabul left more than 20 people dead, including
Afghanistan's deputy chief of intelligence. The attack, which also left another 35 people injured,
took place outside a mosque in Mehtar Lam. Abdullah Laghmani -- second in command at the
National Directorate of Security (NDS) -- was regarded as a key figure in the national effort against
insurgencies. A Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, said that his group claimed responsibility
for the attack. In an interview with the Associated Press, Mujahid also acknowledged that
Laghmani was specifically targeted in the suicide bombing. In this way, it became apparent that the
Taliban was asserting its capacity to successfully carry out complicated assassinations.
Days after the suicide bombing in Kabul, a rocket attack by the Taliban in the Afghan capital of
Kabul left three members of a single family dead and two other family members wounded when a
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 75 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
house was hit. Then, an attack on an international convoy left at least three civilians dead and at
least one NATO soldier was injured. The Taliban quickly claimed responsibility.
Meanwhile the role of NATO forces in Afghanistan became a point of contention on September 4,
2009. On that day, a NATO air strike in the Kunduz province of northern Afghanistan killed 93
people, including both insurgents and civilians. The authorities in Kunduz confirmed that while 56
Taliban militants were among the dead, several civilians were also killed. The incident occurred
after Taliban militants hijacked two fuel trucks and got stuck in a river in Aliabad district. As
villagers rushed to the area to avail themselves of the fuel, the two trucks exploded as a result of
the NATO air strike.
For its part, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) , the NATO-led military alliance in
Afghanistan said: "after the ISAF observed the insurgent activity and assessed civilians were not in
the area, a local ISAF commander authorized an air strike." But the ISAF also acknowledged that it
had "received reports that civilians were killed and injured in this attack" and thusly, it would
conduct an investigation into the incident in conjunction with Afghan officials. Meanwhile, the
German-ordered air strike spurred German Chancellor Angela Merkel to echo the call for an urgent
investigation into the matter.
On September 12, 2009, it was announced that more than 600 prisoners held by the United States
military at the Bagram air base in Afghanistan would be given new legal rights to challenge their
detention. The new legal guidelines would include the right of each detainee to be represented by
a United States military official, and the right to present evidence before a military board, which
would determine whether or not continued detention was in order. The new legal guidelines
presented the first significant shift in overseas detention policies since the Bush administration was
in power. To date, human rights groups have condemned the practice of holding detainees as
"enemy combatants" indefinitely at Bagram, with many of them not knowing the reasons for their
imprisonment. Sahr Muhammed Ally of the Human Rights First cautiously welcomed the news
saying, "Any reform in U.S. detentions in Afghanistan is an improvement, but it remains to be
seen whether the new procedures will cure the ills of arbitrary and indefinite detention that have
been the hallmark of detentions in Bagram."
On September 13, 2009, an audio message, believed to have been recorded by al-Qaida terrorist
leader, Osama Bin Laden, was released on an Islamic website. The message was titled "a
statement to the American people" and in it, the taped voice argued that the United States
President Barack Obama was "powerless" to stop the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The taped
voice -- believed to be Bin Laden -- accused the new United States president of failing to
significantly change its foreign policy, as evidenced by the decision to retain officials from the
previous Bush administration, such as Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The timing of the release
of the message was significant, given that it occurred two days after the eighth anniversary of the
tragic 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Indeed, the taped voice said that one motivating
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 76 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
factor behind the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington was the United States
foreign policy towards Israel. To date, Bin Laden is believed to be alive and living in the
mountainous Afghan-Pak border region.
As of September 2009, the Taliban had extended its presence to almost every corner of
Afghanistan. Whereas the extremist Islamic movement held sway in the Pashtun-dominated south
of the country for some time, its insurgency has extended its control across the country in a gradual
manner over the course of recent years. Violent attacks by the Taliban have increased across the
entire terrain of Afghanistan, to the consternation of both Afghan and Western authorities, who
have had to deal with a deteriorating security situation on the ground. Indeed, on September 12,
2009, a spate of attacks across Afghanistan left 50 people --civilians, security forces and militants - dead.
Violence between Taliban militants and Western troops was also on an increase. In mid-September
of 2009, United States were ambushed by Taliban militants using two roadside bombs, gunfire and
rocket-propelled grenades. The attack left three American soldiers and seven Afghan troops dead.
Soon thereafter, a battle in the western part of the country ensued. NATO air strikes rained down
on the area for several consecutive hours following the ambush. A "spokesperson for the United
States military explained that the combined NATO and Afghan forces were "receiving significant
small-arms, RPG and indirect fire." Scores of militants were reported to have died as a result.
On October 8, 2009, a suicide car bomb exploded outside the Indian Embassy in the Afghan
capital city of Kabul, leaving 17 people dead and at least 83 others injured. Indian officials said the
suicide bomber tried to drive through gates and bomb the embassy building but hit civilians on the
street just as the nearby shops were opening in the morning. The Taliban claimed responsibility
and said that an Afghan national had carried out the attack while driving a sport-utility vehicle.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's office issued a statement that said, "The perpetrators of this
attack and those who planned it were vicious terrorists who killed innocent people for their
malicious goals."
More than a year earlier in July 2008, another suicide bomb exploded outside the Indian embassy
in Kabul. United States intelligence concluded that the 2008 attack, which killed 58 people
including two Indian diplomats and 14 students, had been carried out with assistance from
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. For its part, Pakistan denied that claim.
In late October 2009, at least 22 Americans died in a series of air crashes and bomb attacks in
Afghanistan. In one case, two helicopters were involved in a mid-air collision in the south of the
country, leaving four American soldiers dead and two others injured. In the western Badghis
province, another helicopter crash left seven United States soldiers and three American civilians
dead, as well as another 12 United States citizens and 14 Afghans injured. Colonel Wayne Shanks,
a spokesman for the Nato-led force in Afghanistan, said that the Badghis crash happened occurred
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 77 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
during troops an anti-narcotics trafficking operation. While the United States said it did not
believe either air crash could be attributed to hostile fire, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the
Badghis crash. Indeed, in an interview with Agence France Presse, Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf
Ahmedi said that militants shot down the United States helicopter.
Just a day after those two crashes, eight United States soldiers and one Afghan civilian died in
bombings by multiple complex improvised explosive devices in southern Afghanistan. Also in the
waning days of October 2009, Taliban militants in Afghanistan killed six United Nations foreign
staff during an attack on an international guest-house in the capital city of Kabul. It was the
second attack on the United Nations in 2009, and certainly, the more deadly of the two. October
thusly gained the notorious distinction of being the deadliest month for American forces in
Afghanistan after eight years of war in that country.
In early November 2009, the United Nations announced that it would evacuate hundreds of its
international staff from Afghanistan as a result of the deteriorating security situation in that
country. Indeed, five foreign United Nations staffers were killed by militants in Kabul only a week
earlier. A spokesperson for the United Nations said that about 600 personnel would be relocated
either to safe zones within Afghanistan or to other locations outside Afghanistan. The move could
complicate efforts by the United States and other Western powers to stabilize the country since
there was a clear need for civilian assistance to accompany the efforts of the military troops.\
On Nov. 15, 2009, extremist Islamic militants targeted a police checkpoint in the restive Afghan
province of Kandahar. At least three policemen were killed and six others were wounded as a
result; some reports suggested a higher death toll of as many as eight policemen dead.
By late November 2009, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said he was reaching out to the Taliban,
as part of a bid for national reconciliation in a country wracked by violence. That violence has
largely been authored by resurgent Taliban seeking political authority although other extremist
Islamic groups, including the terror enclave al-Qaida, have also been behind some of the attacks.
President Karzai -- who gained re-election following a contested election that was condemned for
fraudulence -- said that national reconciliation would be a central focus of his second term in
office. In an interview with journalists outside his palace in Kabul on the first day of the Muslim
Eid holiday, Karzai said: "I once again call upon our brothers, the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami and
everyone who is away from their land and who have taken up arms against their soil, to come back
to their country for peace, stability, prosperity." Hezb-e-Islami was a reference to supporters of a
former anti-Soviet guerrilla commander, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose Islamist inclinations have
been in line with the Taliban's aspirations to regain control of Afghanistan.
U.S. Policy on Afghanistan
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 78 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Meanwhile, as violence dominated Afghanistan's political landscape, United States President
Barack Obama was considering his new policy in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal, the
chief United States and NATO commander in Afghanistan, has called for more troops on the
ground. McChrystal agued that the United States risked failure in the war in Afghanistan without
such a commitment and he warned that the United States had to reverse the momentum of the
resurgent Taliban. In particular, he said that more troops were needed to help support the Afghan
security forces who were preparing to take full control over the country's security in 2013.
In October 2009, the commander of United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General
Stanley McChrystal, officially submitted a set of possible options to policymakers, aimed at
curbing the advance of resurgent Taliban. Among the proposals given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Mike Mullen and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridi,
was an option to deploy between 30,000 to 40,000 additional combat troops and trainers to
Afghanistan. This option was said to be strongly favored by McChrystal, although there were other
options, such as a more modest increase of troop strength by 10,000, as well as another plan
calling for a surge of 60,000 troops to be sent to Afghanistan, and an option for maintaining
current troop strength. While the actual content of the proposal has remained confidential,
McChrystal has himself said that more troops were needed to help support the Afghan security
forces who were preparing to take full control over the country's security in 2013.
General McChrystal's report was being reviewed by President Barack Obama who had said
earlier-- on September 20, 2009, during an interview on CNN -- that he would assess the findings
from his commander on the ground, before making a decision as to the possible deployment of
troops to an increasingly unpopular conflict. President Obama noted, "I don't want to put the
resource question before the strategy question." He then continued, "But right now, the question
is, the first question is, are we doing the right thing? Are we pursuing the right strategy?" The
president acknowledged that the original mission to hunt those responsible for 9/11 could be
subject to what is known as "mission creep."
Before considering McChrystal's request for more combat troops in Afghanistan, the White House
in the United States said it wanted to undergo an overall strategic review of its policy in the
Afghan-Pak region. At issue for the Obama administration was the question of whether to remain
on track with the existing mission, and perhaps with an extended nation-building imperative, aimed
at securing the cooperation of the Afghan populace. Alternatively, there was the question as to if
the mission should be recalibrated, perhaps with reduced military operations, and a concentration
purely on striking al-Qaida terrorists in the Afghan-Pak border area.
By the end of October, 2009, media reports emerged that the Obama administration would make
their Afghanistan strategy known after that country held its second or run-off round of its
contested presidential election. That second or run-off round was set for November 7, 2009 amidst
a rising clamor for the establishment of a credible government in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Obama
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 79 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
administration noted that there would be no action pending the establishment of a legitimate
government in Afghanistan. In an interview with CNN, White House Chief of Staff Rahm
Emanuel said it would be "reckless" to make such a decision without thoroughly determining
whether or not the government at the helm of Afghanistan held democratic authority. But clearly,
that timeline was thwarted due to the problematic conduct of the election and the "default" victory
of Karzai, as noted above. Indeed, the fact that Karzai was increasingly cast as corrupt created a
wrinkle in United States' policy in Afghanistan, since it required a credible and reliable governing
partner in Kabul.
For its part, the White House insisted that President Obama had not actually decided on the
question of troop strength and was actually still considering the strategic approach. To that end,
there were reports that the president had requested status reports from across Afghanistan to assess
specific conditions on the ground. At home in the United States, there was a clear division among
those -- disproportionately from the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party -- who wanted
the president to quickly assent to McChrystal's wishes, and the liberal base of the Democratic
Party, which has demanded that President Obama bring an end to the war in Afghanistan.
By the first part of November 2009, it was reported that President Barack Obama had, in fact,
rejected all four of the options for Afghanistan, which had been presented by security advisers. He
asserted that they did not satisfy his concerns over a clear exit strategy. In a related development,
the United States ambassador to Afghanistan was reported to have sent two classified cable to
Washington expressing concern over the deployment of further troops to Afghanistan, at a time
when the Karzai government in Kabul was re-elected amidst allegations of vote fraud -- the latest
manifestation of corruption and mismanagement at the core of governance. Indeed, it was the
very climate of corruption and mismanagement that facilitated the resurgence of the Taliban in the
first place. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry -- who served as the United States military
commander in Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007 before retiring from the military and taking on a
diplomatic role in April 2009 -- apparently characterized Afghan President Hamid Karzai as
erratic, excoriated senior Afghan government officials for their rampant corruption, and criticized
the installation of warlords and drug smugglers in influential positions on the Afghan governing
landscape. Eikenberry reportedly concluded that the Afghan leadership was incapable of being an
effective -- or appropriate -- partner, and accordingly, advised President Obama against escalating
troop strength in Afghanistan.
By late November 2009, President Obama had made his decision and was scheduled to address
the American people -- and, indeed, the world on December 1, 2009. During his adress, President
Obama ordered another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable starting in late
2009 and reaching an apex in mid-2010. The president explained that the mission at hand would
focus on "disrupting, dismantling, and defeating" al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and denying them any
further safehaven in Afghanistan under Taliban auspices. As such, a concomitant aspect of the
mission would include reversing recent Taliban momentum.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 80 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The troops would also be tasked with the training of Afghan security forces, with an eye on turning
over the security apparatus to locals. To that end, President Obama noted that the another
central component of the mission was to stabilize Afghanistan so that the Afghan people would
soon be able to take responsibility for their own security. Ahead of the speech, there were reports
that one "brigade-sized element" of between 3,000 to 5,000 troops would be solely tasked with
training of Afghan troops.
At the same time, the president noted that the redeployment of United States forces was expected
to commence within a year and end in mid-2011, pending favorable circumstances on the ground.
In this way, a timeline ending theoretically in 2011 appeared to be a core aspect of the exit
strategy. To that end, the president emphasized that he was ordering the fastest possible
deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan, in order to facilitate the conditions for a
responsible a exit from that country. Ultimately, the president said that the objective was to "come
together to end the war successfully... for common security."
President Obama called on the international community to continue to work with the United States
to deal with the global threat posed by militant Islamic extremists, noting that "this burden is not
ours alone to bear." According to media reports ahead of the speech, the president had already
conducted talks with the leaders of several key countries, including Denmark, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Russia, China and India, and had called for other countries to contribute up
to 10,000 troops for the NATO war effort in Afghanistan.
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan also factored highly in the president's speech, with
increased emphasis being placed on their responsibilities for advancing stable governance free of
corruption and fighting terrorism respectively. He additionally addressed the Afghan people in
saying that the United States did not seek to occupy their country, and sought to be a partner in the
process toward stability, rather than a patron. On Pakistan, he particularly emphasized the nuclear
capacity of that country and the heightened geopolitical stakes therein.
For his part, President Obama cast this war plan for Afghanistan as being a matter of necessity
and not choice -- a view consistent with his campaign position on the topic. In his speech,
however, he made clear that his decision was not made easily, saying: "I do not make this decision
lightly." The president's philosophical stance on the matter was made clear when he said that he
had opposed the Iraq war because he believe in restraint when it comes to the use of military
force. But at the same time, the president acknowledged that he believed the current course of
remaining in Afghanistan at current levels and without an exit strategy was "unsustainable." To
this end, President Obama said that "the status quo of muddling through" would only be a costly
option that served to prolong the current farrago, ultimately never generating the conditions in
which United States forces could leave Afghanistan. The president went on to state that the
decision was made in the interests of national security, noting that the dangers emanating from the
Afghan-Pak region were "no idle danger" and "no theoretical threat."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 81 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
While the president did not go into great detail about the Afghan-Pak strategy in his speech, his
administration's policy was illuminated in a separate interview with United Nations Ambassador
Susan Rice, which was conducted by MSNBC News. Dr. Rice explained that while many alQaida members had crossed the porous border from Afghanistan to Pakistan after the Taliban lost
power, they were still moving across the border regions, and could re-establish safehaven in
Afghanistan if resurgent Taliban in that country regained control over broad swaths of Afghan
territory. She explained the symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaida by
characterizing Afghanistan under Taliban rule as the "tissue" within which "the cancer of al-Qaida"
develops. In effect, resurgent Taliban can facilitate the ascendancy of al-Qaida. While the United
States and NATO forces were actively dealing with this threat on the Afghan side of the border,
there was pressure on the Pakistanis to continue their efforts to the to same on their side of the
border. Dr. Rice also emphasized the fact that although al-Qaida members could be found in
various countries across the world, the mountainous Afghan-Pak region was the very location of
terror training camps -- a venue for far more ambitious terrorist planning than single cell terror
operations. Moreover, she echoed the president's own words when she said that there was a
"proximate threat to national security emanating from Afghan- Pak border."
A week after United States President Barack Obama ordered another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan
as part of a new strategy, NATO announced that 25 countries had pledged a total of around 7,000
more troops to support the United States-led war effort in Afghanistan. At a news conference
following talks with NATO foreign ministers, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
said: "Nations are backing up their words with deeds." He continued, "At least 25 countries will
send more forces to the mission in 2010. They have offered around 7,000 new forces with more to
come ... That is solidarity in action and it will have a powerful effect on the ground." Rasmussen
also remarked on the new road map for operations, noting that the new NATO mission would
include amplified aid and training of Afghan security forces, consistent with the strategy outlined by
President Obama. He also emphasized that another core objective remained the same -- to prevent
Afghanistan from falling into the clutches of militant extremist Islamists.
For its part, the Afghan Taliban said that the plans outlined by President Obama and echoed by
Secretary-General Rasmussen would serve only to strengthen their resolve. Nevertheless, the
battlefield commander, General Stanley McChrystal, lauded the new war plan for Afghanistan, by
emphasizing the benefits of more troops in the field and conjuring up Winston Churchill in a
videophone speech as he declared "the end of the beginning" of the war.
Editor's Note -While Afghanistan has to date enjoyed the public support of the American people, and has not
generally been subject to the same controversy as the Iraq war, the long engagement has started to
take a toll. The speculation about whether an increase in troop strength may be needed to combat
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 82 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
resurgent Taliban, particularly in eastern Afghanistan, has been met with some skepticism in the
war-weary United States. The issue of civilian casualties during the battle between NATO forces
and Taliban militants has been an enduring source of consternation for both the Afghan authorities
and international forces operating in Afghanistan. As well, concerns over the proper conduct of the
2009 presidential election has sparked grave concern in the international community, which has
been backed the Afghan government. Consequently, the core purpose of international military
engagement in Afghanistan has become an increasingly significant matter of debate, with voices on
both sides of the Atlantic increasingly calling for an exit strategy. As noted above, on December 1,
2009, United States President Barack Obama ordered another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan on an
accelerated timetable starting in late 2009 and reaching an apex in mid-2010. The troops would be
tasked with fighting extremist Islamic elements as well as the training of Afghan security forces,
with an eye on turning over the security apparatus to locals. Obama also outlined a clear exit
strategy with redeployment expected to commence within a year and ending in mid-2011, pending
favorable circumstances on the ground.
Recent Developments from late 2009 to 2010 -On Dec. 30, 2009, seven Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers were killed by a suicide
bomber in the Afghan area of Khost -- a known hotbed of Taliban militant activity. One Jordanian
officer also died in the bombing. It was the worst attack against United States intelligence agents
since the American embassy was bombed in Beirut in 1983. United States intelligence officials later
said that CIA agents may have been trying to recruit the suicide bomber as a possible informant,
not knowing that he would turn out to be a "double agent" of sorts. It was possible that this
background may have accounted for the fact that he had not undergone a full body search before
entering the military base at Khost and was, therefore, able to move inside the base with the
explosives belt undetected. The Taliban claimed responsibility saying that one of its members
carried out the attack.
More than a week after the attack, a video surfaced showing the suicide bomber -- a Jordanian
national -- vowing revenge for the death of Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taliban leader. The
video, which was broadcast on al-Jazeera television, showed suicide Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal alBalawi seated next to the new Pakistani Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, saying that Baitullah
Mehsud must be avenged "inside and outside America."
In early January 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was under political pressure after the
Afghan parliament rejected most of his Cabinet nominees. In total, 17 of Karzai's 24 nominees
were voted down in a secret ballot, and demonstrated a show of power by parliamentarians who
were clearly ready to challenge the Afghan president's authority. At issue for parliamentarians was
Karzai's inclusion of candidates whom they perceived to be either lacking in qualifications or
beholden to the powerful armed factions that controlled the country in previous decades.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 83 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In an interview with the Washington Post, Kabul parliamentarian Shukria Barakzai said, "It means
the (parliament members) are thinking differently, and they want real change in the governance of
the country." Kabir Rangbar, an independent member from Kabul, expressed a similar sentiment
saying, "The members of the Parliament cast their vote based on merit, not based on tribal or
ideology or factional interests. This is a reaction against Karzai's choices." For his part, Karzai
appeared willing to accept the situation, although according to his spokesperson, Wahid Omar,
"The president was surprised by the rejections."
The rejection of the cabinet list raised concerns among Afghans and the international community
that there would be a delay in the governing process, which has had reform at the top of its
agenda. To that end, Kai Eide, the head of the United Nations operation in Kabul, warned that
Afghan could devolve into chaos without a functioning government. In an interview with the
Times of London, Eide said, "It [the delay in government formation] prolongs the situation without
a functioning government, and that's a situation that has lasted since the (August) election period."
That being said, a week later, President Karzai advanced a new list of cabinet nominees. The new
list excluded some controversial warlords but still fell short of the expectations of parliamentarians.
The absence of former guerilla leader Ismail Khan and allies of former warlord, Abdul Rashid
Dostum, was seen as a positive development. However, the new list appeared to lack strong
politicians with necessary credentials and competencies. As noted by parliamentarian, Sayed
Dawood Hashimi, in an interview with Reuters, "It looks like Karzai has picked them up from the
street." Meanwhile, among the allies of Khan and Dostum, there was a sense of outrage that their
enclaves had been omitted from the new list, despite their efforts to get Karzai elected. They
accused the Afghan president of deceiving them. As such, Karzai's latest maneuvering appeared to
have satisfied no one on the Afghan political landscape.
Also in January 2010, a United Nations report found that civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2009
rose 14 percent from the previous year. Accordingly, 2009 was the worst year for Afghan civilians
since the Taliban was ousted from official power in 2001. The report by the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan also found that extremist Islamic group, the Taliban, was
responsible for the "vast majority" of the deaths. Meanwhile, United States forces in Afghanistan
have been under stringent orders to avoid civilian casualties as it carries out its offensive
operations against the Taliban. To that end, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
also found that deaths attributed to international forces decreased by nearly 30 percent in 2009.
According to the report, "This decrease reflects measures taken by international military forces to
conduct operations in a manner that reduces the risk posed to civilians."
On Jan. 11, 2010, United States Army General Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander
in Afghanistan, said that Taliban forces in Afghanistan were feeling the pressure of the troop surge
in that country. McChrystal said he believed the Taliban's momentum in Afghanistan was stymied
by the recent increase of troops to Afghanistan. . In an interview with ABC News' Diane Sawyer,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 84 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
he said: "We've been at this for about seven months now and I believe we've made progress. It's
not a completed mission yet." McChrystal also observed that there was increased trust being built
between the people and United States forces. To this end, he said, "I believe that we have
changed the way we operate in Afghanistan. We changed some of our structures and I believe that
we are on the way to convincing the Afghan people that we are here to protect them."
Perhaps in keeping with these findings, a poll carried out by the news agency, BBC, found that 70
percent of Afghans surveyed believed that the country was headed in the right direction. This
finding showed a sharp increase in optimistic sentiment, given the fact that only 40 percent of
Afghans held that opinion in a poll taken in 2009.
By mid-January 2010, in the midst of claims that the Taliban was under pressure in Afghanistan,
Taliban militants launched an audacious attack on the Afghan capital of Kabul. Reports on the
ground noted that there was fighting taking place around the presidential palace, the Central Bank,
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Mines and Industry. There
were also reports of bomb explosions, gunfire and rocket fire around the diplomatic quarter, a
shopping district, as well as the Serena Hotel. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the Kabul
attacks via its website, and specifically said that its intent was to target key government buildings
and the aforementioned hotel, which was itself a target of an October 2009 attack. NATO forces
said they were working to contain the violence in partnership with Afghan security forces.
Regardless, the fact that Taliban militants were able to penetrate these strategic locations within the
Afghan capital city was sure to be regarded as a blow to claims that the militant extremist enclave
was under pressure.
On Jan. 19, 2010, United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that a plan by Afghan
President Hamid Karzai aimed at reconciliation with the Taliban leadership was highly unlikely to
succeed. Secretary Gates said that while it was plausible that some Taliban militants might accept
Karzai's offer to be re-integrated into Afghan society with jobs and benefits, such a plan could not
include Taliban leaders, such as the elusive Mullah Muhammad Omar. Secretary Gates said, "I'd
be very surprised to see reconciliation with Mullah Omar. And I think it's our view that until the
Taliban leadership sees a change in the momentum and begins to see that they are not going to win,
that the likelihood of significant reconciliation at senior levels is not terribly great."
Days later, Secretary Gates qualified his remarks noting that while Taliban militants should be
offered a path to legitimacy, due to their presence in Afghan social and political life, it was yet to be
seen as to whether they could play a constructive role. He said, "The question is whether they are
prepared to play a legitimate role in the political fabric of Afghanistan going forward, meaning
participate in elections, meaning not assassinating local officials and killing families and opposing
education of children and so on." Secretary Gates also warned that the onus was on the Taliban to
show that they would adhere to the Afghan constitution and acknowledge the Afghan government
as the sole and legitimate source of power in the country.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 85 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On Jan. 18, 2010, the Afghan parliament commenced its winter recess even though it had not yet
approved President Hamid Karzai all of the members of the 25-member cabinet. The
advancement of two cabinet lists ended in approval of only 14 cabinet nominees. With 11 seats yet
to be filled, and with the winter recess starting, President Karzai would have to wait until the close
of February 2010 to submit his third list for parliamentary approval.
On Jan. 24, 2010, election authorities in Afghanistan announced that the country's parliamentary
elections would be postponed until mid-September. The elections had been scheduled to take
place in May but there were concerns about security, organization and financing. concerns,
logistical problems, and insufficient funds. The plan was met with approval from among the
international community, who did not wish to see a repeat performance of the flawed presidential
election of 2009.
In the first week of February 2010, civilians fled portions of Taliban-controlled southern
Afghanistan ahead of a planned NATO offensive into that region. The International Committee of
the Red Cross said it was unable to properly quantify the number of people who fled the region
since many went to stay with relatives rather than register with emergency relief services. It also
acknowledged that some individuals simply refused to leave due to concern over their agricultural
fields and the risk of traveling on winter roads. That being said, emergency relief service workers
were busy gathering food and tents to accommodate an influx of people fleeing the region. For its
part, the Taliban appeared to be making its own plans for the operation by gathering weapons and
rocket-propelled grenades, presumably aimed at reinforcing their positions.
The United States, which has been leading the NATO operations in Afghanistan, said the offensive
was aimed at flushing militants out of the town of Marjah -- a Taliban stronghold and major
opium-production center -- in the southern province of Helmand. The United States military did
not specify a date for the offensive operation but began dropping leaflets informing people of the
impending action. That action appeared to have a two-fold purpose: While notification was
intended to give warning to civilians to remove themselves from the crossfire of violence, it was
also a warning to specific militants -- who were names in the leaflets -- to vacate the area of risk
being killed.
The United States commander on the ground, General Stanley McChrystal, said the success of the
operation was not focused so much on the military action or even the element of surprise, but on
the ability of the government to convince civilians that it could provide for their well-being. That is
to say, the real success of the mission would be measured in the Afghan government's ability to
demonstrate that it could take on the key leadership position in the region, rather than Taliban
militants and drug traffickers playing that role.
Meanwhile, in an article published by the New York Times, McChrystal struck a similar tone
noting that the war was less a military one than a matter of perceptions. He said, "The biggest
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 86 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
thing is in convincing the Afghan people ... This is all a war of perceptions. This is not a physical
war in terms of how many people you kill or how much ground you capture, how many bridges
you blow up. This is all in the minds of the participants"
By mid-month, the offensive was in full swing with NATO troops moving into Marjah and militant
trying to repel them using sniper fire. The mission was not without its challenges. Of concern was
the fact that two rockets hit a home outside Marjah and killed 12 civilians. There were some
reports from NATO suggesting that the rockets missed their target by between 300 to 600 meters.
As before, civilian casualties have been one of the main obstacles in the way of Afghan and NATO
efforts to build trust among the local population. For his part, General McChrystal apologized for
the tragedy and suspended use of sophisticated rocket systems pending a review, while Afghan
President Hamid Karzai called for an investigation into the matter.
By the third week of February 2010, NATO officials were claiming some success in their antiTaliban operations in the Taliban stronghold of Marjah. NATO officials said that Taliban militants
were running out of ammunition. They said that the current resistance was composed of small,
disorganized but determined cadres of Taliban fighters. However, only days earlier, United States
Marines called in air support having come under heavy fire from insurgents hiding in civilian
buildings and using "human shields."
Known as "Operation Moshtarak," meaning "together" in the Dari language, this was the largest
joint operation of Afghan, American and British troops since 2001 when a global coalition moved
to drive the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.
Quite separate from the NATO operation in Marjah, there have been other anti-Taliban efforts
elsewhere in Afghanistan and those regions have also suffered from unintended civilian casualties.
To that end, on February 21, 2010, an air strike in Uruzgan province was intended to target an
insurgent convoy but left about 27 civilians dead as well. In other developments, a suicide attack
in Nangahar in the eastern part of the country left 15 dead including the tribal chief Mohammad
Haji Zaman.
In the third week of February 2010, the Pakistani military said that the Afghan Taliban's top
military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was captured and in Pakistani custody.
Unidentified sources in both Pakistan and the United States said that Baradar had been captured in
the Pakistani city of Karachi in a raid carried out by joint Pakistani and United States agents.
By Feb. 26, 2010, Afghanistan's national flag was raised in Marjah and NATO's International
Security Assistance Force noted that residents were returning to the area. As well, a report by
NATO observed there had been an increased number of tips by residents notifying forces about
hidden roadside bombs, which is typically the most dangerous threat faced by coalition troops
operating in Afghanistan. This triad of developments signified some success in Operation
Moshtarak. However, complete control of Marjah was yet at hand, with Operation Moshtarak
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 87 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
expected to continue for some weeks. Meanwhile, despite the symbolic flag-raising exercise, locals
in Marjah expressed doubts that the Afghan government would be able to demonstrate their
effective leadership in the region.
Just as NATO was celebrating some success in its anti-Taliban operations in southern Afghanistan,
Taliban militants launched an attack in the capital city of Kabul. Taliban fighters opened fire,
threw grenades and carried out suicide bombings in the central part of the city in an attack that
went on for several hours. The first bomb attack ensued at a guesthouse used by Indian
contractors; the second explosion occurred at a hotel. At least 17 people were killed and more
than 30 others were injured as a result. Eight Afghan civilians, three police, four Indian nationals
and one Italian were among the dead, according to the Afghan Interior Ministry. Two days later, a
roadside bomb killed 11 civilians in the town of Nawzad in the southern Afghan province of
Helmand province. This attack took place to the north of the region where joint NATO and
Afghan troops were carrying out a major anti-Taliban offensive. In an ironic twist, this roadside
bomb occurred just as NATO was touting the fact that local Afghans in that very region of the
country were informing forces about hidden roadside explosives more frequently.
March 2010 in Afghanistan was marked by successive suicide bombings in the southern city of
Kandahar. At least 30 people died as a result and around 50 were wounded. Guests at a wedding
located close to one of the attacks, as well as policemen, were among the victims. The largest
suicide bombing targeted the city's main prison although the police headquarters was also targeted
in another of the attacks. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attacks and said that they had
been carried out as a warning to foreign NATOP troops operating in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the
United States, which has been leading the NATO effort against militant Islamists in Afghanistan,
has suggested that a military offensive in Kandahar -- the stronghold and "spiritual home" of the
Taliban -- might be in the offing. NATO forces were already carrying out a military offensive in
the neighboring Helmand province.
In mid-March 2010, a leading al-Qaida figure reportedly died in a strike by a United States drone
strike in the city of Miranshah in Pakistan. Hussein al-Yemeni, known as a top terrorism
orchestrator, has been on a target list of the United States in the aftermath of a deadly attack on a
base of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan in late 2009. Known for his
specialization in bombs and suicide operations al-Yemeni reportedly helped to plan the attack at a
base in Khost in which seven CIA agents and one Jordanian officer were killed. It was the worst
attack against United States intelligence officials since the American embassy in Beirut was
bombed in 1983.
In late March 2010, Afghanistan was in talks with the country's second biggest militant group.
According to officials, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was involved in direct negotiations with
envoys of former Premier Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami faction. Such talks were
regarded as a crucial aspect of a plan aimed at securing peace on the national landscape, although
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 88 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
an actual peace plan was still a theoretical endeavor. Former Premier Hekmatyar has argued that
the withdrawal of foreign troops in Afghanistan would be an integral aspect of a possible peace
plan. Other elements include a demand for fresh elections and a new constitution. While Hezb-eIslami -- a militant enclave based in the eastern part of the country -- has shared many of the same
ideals as the Taliban, the two groups have increasingly become ensconced in clashes in northern
Afghanistan. Meanwhile, in a similar development, a former United Nations envoy to Afghanistan,
Kai Eide, confirmed that clandestine talks with Taliban leaders had been going on for the past
year. Both developments indicate power brokers' acknowledgment that Afghanistan's future
stability cannot be reached purely via military operations and would have to involve peace
overtures to militants.
On March 28, 2010, United States President Obama made a surprise trip to Afghanistan to show
resolve for the peace and security effort in that country. It was his first trip to Afghanistan since
becoming president and lasted only a few hours; it was not pre-announced for ostensible security
reasons. Addressing United States troops at the Bagram air base close to Kabul, the president
thanked them for their service and sacrifice to the United States saying, "My main job here today
is to say thank you on behalf of the entire American people." To that end, President Obama
emphasized that the central mission of the United States forces in Afghanistan against al-Qaida and
the Taliban, noting that it was ultimately aimed at "keeping America safe and secure." President
Obama also met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whom he invited to the United States for
talks in May 2010. President Obama indicated that he wanted to press for progress on not only the
peace and security front, but also in terms of corruption and narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan.
Less than a week after the visit by United States President Obama to Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai
accused Western powers of being behind the election fraud that plagued the 2009 presidential
election. Karzai made the claim that United Nations and European Union officials had orchestrated
a plot aimed at installing a puppet at the helm of the government in Afghanistan. He said, "This
wasn't fraud by Afghans but the fraud of foreigners, the fraud of Galbraith, or Morillon, and the
votes of the Afghan nation were in the control of an embassy."
In fact, more than a million votes -- many of which were or Karzai -- were nullified following a
recount. At the time, eyes rested on the Karzai bloc as being behind the irregularities that marred
that election. The closeness of the race thusly prompted the prospect of a second round to
determine a conclusive winner with opposition figure, Abdullah Abdullah vying for the presidency
against Karzai. However, the opposition was so enraged by what they saw as blatant fraud that
Abdullah Abdullah withdrew from the second round, effectively handing Karzai a second term by
default. At the time, the international community condemned the irregularities of that disputed
election process, which ultimately ended in returning Karzai to power, and demanded attention on
the problem of corruption within Karzai's regime.
Given this background, the accusations now being levied by Karzai were regarded as problematic.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 89 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The timing of Karzai's remarks were of particular concern since they came in the aftermath of
President Obama's visit to Afghanistan, which was largely seen as an affirmation of United States
support for the Karzai regime, despite the controversy surrounding the 2009 presidential election.
The White House in the United States responded by characterizing Karzai's statements as
"troubling" with White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs noting they were "cause for real and
genuine concern." Indeed, with United States troops leading a sensitive multi-national mission in
one of the world's hot spots, bizarre statements by the Afghan leader would clearly evoke
anxieties. Perhaps with this in mind, Gibbs said: "The president was quite clear with President
Karzai over the weekend of the necessary steps that have to be taken to improve governance and
corruption in order to deal with the problems that we face there." For its part, the United States
Department of State said that it would seek clarification on Karzai's remarks.
Karzai's sudden penchant for strange statement did not end quickly. By April 5, 2010, it was
reported that he threatened to walk away from the political scene and join the Taliban. According
to several members of parliament, Karzai said he would join the Taliban if he was subject to
continuing pressure from the West to reform and deal with corruption. Farooq Marenai, a
representative of the eastern province of Nangarhar, explained Karzai's threat as follows: "He said
that 'if I come under foreign pressure, I might join the Taliban'." Two other members of parliament
said that Karzai threatened to join the Taliban more than once, and had described the militant
extremist enclave as a "national resistance" against foreign invaders, rather than a terrorist threat.
Lawmakers, including Marenai, characterized Karzai's rhetoric as hyperbole. Still, several other
lawmakers noted that Karzai appeared unconcerned about that these statements might jeopardize
relations with the United States.
Meanwhile, Hamid Karzai was being confronted with serious challenges on the domestic political
scene. In addition to questions and condemnation from the international community, tribal elders in
the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar were also registering their discontent with Karzai over
corruption. At the start of April 2010, some tribal elders in the region accused Karzai of not dealing
with nepotism and bribery. Other tribal elders were displeased by the lack of progress on the
security front and told Karzai that many people were too afraid to join the army due to fears of
reprisal by Islamic militants. They also decried the lack of integrity within the police force. Indeed,
media reports on the ground depicted scenes of angry tribal elders at a shura (i.e. tribal gathering)
of 1,500 tribesmen shouting angry accusations at Karzai. For these Afghans, the Karzai
government was as much of a challenge to their daily lives as the Taliban. Accordingly, Karzai had
a difficult task ahead of him in building trust and demonstrating effective governance.
It was this very matter of showing effective governance that resided at the heart of a recent
military offensive by NATO forces in the southern part of Afghanistan. The United States, which
has been leading the NATO operations in Afghanistan, said the offensive was aimed at flushing
militants out of the town of Marjah -- a Taliban stronghold and major opium-production center -in the southern province of Helmand. At the time, the United States commander on the ground,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 90 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
General Stanley McChrystal, said the success of the operation was not focused so much on the
military action or even the element of surprise, but on the ability of the government to convince
civilians that it could provide for their well-being. That is to say, the real success of the mission
would be measured in the Afghan government's ability to demonstrate that it could take on the key
leadership position in the region, rather than Taliban militants and drug traffickers playing that role.
Two months after the operation, it was clear that residents of southern Afghanistan harbored grave
doubts about the government's ability to meet its leadership objectives.
For his part, Karzai has had to walk a difficult tightrope on the political scene. He has had to
accommodate foreign NATO forces who have been carrying out operations in Afghanistan for the
purpose of national and geopolitical security. But he has also had to assuage the doubts of those
who rail against the presence of foreign troops in its borders, especially when local Afghans
become collateral damage in the conflict between NATO forces and the Taliban. As noted above,
he was also dealing with frustrated tribal elders who were anxious for reform and better security.
Thusly, it was plausible that with all these competing demands at hand, Karzai might be attempting
to establish himself as a national leader and not a puppet of the West.
At the same time, Karzai's bizarre rhetoric may be interpreted as currying favor with various
unsavory characters on the Afghan scene -- from the Taliban to the warlords -- who were likely to
remain important players on the political landscape for some time to come. Indeed, with a
resurgent Taliban on his heels, Karzai was not keen to suffer the same fate as the former Sovietbacked leader, Najibullah, who was executed by the Taliban seven years after the withdrawal of
the Red Army from Afghanistan. For Karzai, he may be making political calculations with an eye
on the inevitable future date when foreign troops exit the scene in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, Karzai's rhetoric would likely feed sentiment that the Afghan leader was an
unpredictable and erratic player on the geopolitical scene. It would certainly do little to help the
increasing perception by the West that he was not acting in good faith and could not be counted on
as a stable partner for the peace effort in Afghanistan. The actual degree of damage to relations
between Washington D.C. and Kabul was yet to be measured at the time of writing.
On May 17, 2010, a a suicide car bomb in the Afghan capital of Kabul left 18 people dead
including five United States soldiers. Over 50 others were injured when the suicide bomber
detonated the explosives-laden vehicle, with most of the victims being civilians. The appeared to
target a NATO convoy on the Darulaman road, as it passed close to the parliament building. The
Taliban claimed responsibility even as a military offensive was being planned for the Taliban
stronghold of Kandahar. One day later, a battle between Taliban militants and United States troops
ensued at the Bagram air base. Taliban militants used grenades and machine guns to lauch their
attack at dawn on one of the largest and most-heavily fortified American bases in Afghanistan.
While ten Taliban militants died as a result of the ensuing clash, seven United States troops were
injured and the gun battle went on for many hours.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 91 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On June 1, 2010, Mustafa Abu Yazid -- also known as Sheik Saeed al-Masri -- was killed in a
missile strike in Pakistan's tribal areas. The death of the commander of al-Qaida, who was
regarded as "number three" on the terrorist group's hierarchy, was regarded as a significant
development in the global effort against al-Qaida, which is still spiritually centered in Afghanistan.
In a report by the Washington Post, an unnamed intelligence official in the United States said: "AlMasri was the group's chief operating officer, with a hand in everything from finances to
operational planning. He was also the organization's prime conduit to [Osama] bin Laden and
[Ayman al-] Zawahiri." Indeed, ties between Yazid, also known as al-Masri, and al-Zawahiri,
were deep with both men serving time in prison together for their role in the 1981 assassination of
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
On June 9, 2010, four NATO soldiers were killed when their helicopter was shot down by hostile
fire in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. The Taliban claimed responsibility for their
deaths, saying that their militant extremist fighters shot down the aircraft using a rocket-propelled
grenade in the area of the Sangin district. NATO suffered a fifth death on the same day as another
soldier died as a result of a roadside bomb. Earlier in the week, 10 NATO soldiers died in separate
incidents. In one particularly deadly case, five United States soldiers died when a roadside bomb
exploded as their convoy was traveling in eastern Afghanistan. A sixth soldier died due to gunfire
in the eastern part of the country. A seventh soldier was killed by an Improvised Explosive Device
(IED) in the southern part of Afghanistan. In addition, three NATO soldiers died in separate
shooting and bomb attacks in southern Afghanistan. Together, it was the deadliest week for NATO
servicemen operating in Afghanistan and came ahead of a planned offensive against the Taliban in
the southern province of Kandahar.
Attention, therefore, focused on the matter of foreign troop strength in Afghanistan. While, total
foreign troop numbers in Afghanistan was expected to peak at 150,000 by August 2010, many
contributing countries have had to contend with a domestic political scene inhospitable to the idea
of expending further resources on the effort in Afghanistan. Indeed, the need for austerity
mechanisms and deficit-reduction has been a priority across Europe and in the United States. To
that end, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen warned federal governments not to
make harsh defense budget cuts that would deleteriously affect the war effort in Afghanistan.
An explosion left at least 40 people dead and more than 70 others wounded at a wedding in
Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan on June 10, 2010. At the time of writing, the cause of
the explosion was unknown, as was the reason for targeting the wedding party. That being said,
the surrounding district of Arghandab has been known to a Taliban base. As a result, attention
quickly resided on the militant, extremist, Islamic enclave as being behind the attack.
On June 13, 2010, the New York Times reported that a team of Pentagon officials and American
geologists discovered untapped mineral deposits potentially worth $1 trillion in Afghanistan. This
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 92 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
revelation could potentially transform Afghanistan's landscape, potentially altering its economy, and
possibly influencing the ongoing war in that country. The deposits, which include iron, copper,
cobalt, gold and lithium, were described as so extensive and include so many minerals essential to
modern industry that "Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most important
mining centers in the world."
Clearly, the development of a mining industry in Afghanistan would be a time-consuming endeavor,
with the rewards to be seen in the future. However, in the meanwhile, the process would mean a
increased employment opportunities in a country where the main career paths for vast majorities of
the people have involved either illicit poppy cultivation for opium production, narcotics trafficking,
or, warfare. Moreover, with this potential at hand, Afghanistan was now positioned to attract
foreign investment at unprecedented levels.
Jalil Jumriany, an adviser to the Afghan minister of mines, said of this mineral wealth windfall in
impoverished and war-torn Afghanistan, “This will become the backbone of the Afghan economy.”
While this may, indeed, be true, it was also possible that warfare between the government and the
resurgent Taliban could intensify as the two sides fight for control over these resources. Likewise,
struggles could emerge between the government and tribal leaders for the same reason. Indeed,
while the mineral deposits were dispersed across Afghanistan, large mineral-rich swaths of territory
were said to be located in the eastern and southern parts of the country where most of the conflict
between NATO forces and the Taliban have taken place in recent years.
Even without these negative scenarios, there were prevailing questions over how the mineral
wealth would be administered and used to advance the economic development of te country, given
Afghanistan's unsavory reputation for rampant institutional corruption. It should also be noted that
as a country without a legacy of industrial development, Afghanistan also has no experience in the
area of environmental protection. Without such provisions, the damaging effects on the country's
eco-system could be manifold.
Also in June 2010, Afghanistan's geopolitical relationship with Pakistan took center stage. At issue
were revelations that the Pakistani intelligence service, known as ISI, has been funding, training,
and providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban. For several years, there have been suspicions
about such a clandestine relationship between the two entities, however, the closeness and
extensive nature of their ties was something of a revelation. Indeed, in a report issued by the
London School of Economics support for the Afghan Taliban was described as "official ISI policy."
As noted by the author of the report, Matt Waldman of Harvard University, "This goes far beyond
just limited, or occasional support. This is very significant levels of support being provided by the
ISI." Waldman also asserted, "We're also saying this is official policy of that agency, and we're
saying that it is very extensive. It is both at an operational level, and at a strategic level, right at the
senior leadership of the Taliban movement."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 93 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The report also included references to interviews with Taliban field commanders who said that ISI
agents attented Taliban council meetings. Shoring up the veracity of this claim was the following
citation from the report: "These accounts were corroborated by former Taliban ministers, a
Western analyst, and a senior United Nations official based in Kabul, who said the Taliban largely
depend on funding from the ISI and groups in Gulf countries." Corroborating evidence was also
available from a source unrelated to the LSE report. In an interview with Reuters, the head of
Afghan intelligence, Amrullah Saleh, who had just resigned from that position, said that the ISI
was "part of the landscape of destruction" in Afghanistan and accused Pakistan of sheltering
Taliban leaders in safe houses.
Some observers have noted that with the impending exit of foreign troops from Afghanistan
expected in 2011, Pakistan's actions may be related to its desire to more deeply influence
Afghanistan. However, ISI activities related to Islamic militant extremists are not recent
developments in response to the current landscape. Indeed, the ISI has been accused of funding
and training Islamic militant extremists in Afghanistan from as far back as the 1979 Soviet
invasion. That being said, since the 2001 terror attacks in the United States, Pakistan has accepted
billions of dollars in aid funding from the United States, supposedly for its support in the fight
against terror enclaves like al-Qaida and its Taliban allies. Clearly, a continued relationship
between the Pakistani ISI and the Afghan Taliban would run counter to its expressed objectives of
helping the United States quell the threat of terrorism emanating from such entities in the AfghanPak region. As stated in the LSE report, "Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game of
astonishing magnitude."
On July 1, 2010, Taliban militants launched an attack on a NATO military base at an airfield just
outside Jalalabad. The attack, which ensued close to the border with Pakistan, involved a car
bomb and the firing of rocked-propelled grenades. The attack appeared to involve careful planning
and coordination on the part of the Taliban militants, thus evoking fears about their growing level
of sophistication nine years into the war. However, the International Security and Assistance
Force (ISAF) pointed to that fact that only Taliban died, thus demonstrating success in repelling the
attack.
On July 2, 2010, four suicide bombers stormed a building being used by Development
Alternatives -- an international firm providing social and economic development assistance in
developing countries. This attack occurred in the northern Afghanistan town of Kunduz. While
two of the suicide bombers detonated the explosives strapped to their bodies causing an explosion
outside the compound, the other suicide bombers entered the building used by Development
Alternatives. At least one Afghan policeman died as a result, while a second policeman was
wounded along with three guards protecting the compound.
Several days later by the second week of July, five United States troops died in separate incidents
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 94 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
of violence in Afghanistan. NATO said that three soldiers had died in eastern Afghanistan and two
died as a result of roadside bombings in the southern part of the country. In the Taliban stronghold
of Kandahar, extremist Islamic militants killed one person using a bomb strapped to a motorcycle.
Meanwhile, Afghan civilians took to the streets in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif to protest the
escalating rate of civilian deaths. Their efforts were not directed at the Taliban but at United States
forces, and were motivated by the accidental deaths of civilians by United States troops on July 7,
2010. General David Petraeus, the new United States commander of NATO forces in
Afghanistan (as discussed below), has said he would continue the existing policy of reducing
civilian casualties in the war effort.
On Aug. 7, 2010, ten medical volunteers were brutally killed by the Taliban in the first week of
August 2010. Their medical aid services were organized by International Assistance Mission, and
they were charged with providing medical care for villagers in the remote regions of northern
Afghanistan. The group was ambushed and murdered by the Taliban while returning to the Afghan
capital of Kabul.
The Taliban claimed that their fighters executed the volunteers because they tried to convert
Afghans to Christianity. The bodies of the 10 victims -- six Americans, one German, one British,
and two Afghans -- were flown back to Kabul on Aug. 8, 2010. An 11th victim -- their Afghan
driver -- had been spared because he was a Muslim; however, suspicion surrounded his role as
Afghan police said they were not sure if the survivor was a witness or in cahoots with the Taliban.
United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton expressed condolences regarding the
murder of the ten volunteers saying, "We are heartbroken by the loss of these heroic, generous
people." She condemned the Taliban's justification for the killing of the ten volunteers saying it was
a "transparent attempt to justify the unjustifiable by making false accusations about their activities."
In mid-September 2010, ahead of parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, approximately 30 Islamic
extremist insurgents were killed during action in various clashes across the country. Indeed, NATO
and Afghan officials said that 23 Taliban were killed in the southern Helmand province, three in the
eastern Wardak province, and another four Taliban were killed in the southeastern Zabul
province. No casualties were reported form among the joint NATO-Afghan forces. NATO and
Afghan authorities hailed these deaths as measures of success in their anti-Taliban efforts since
these Islamic extremist insurgents sought to undermine the security in the country ahead of
parliamentary elections in Afghanistan. Lt. Col. Dan Morgan, Regional Command-East chief of
operations, issued the following statement: "The removal of these criminals effectively removed a
potential threat to the people of Afghanistan. We will continue to work with our Afghan partners to
provide a secure environment for the upcoming elections."
Update on U.S. Policy and War Effort in Afghanistan:
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 95 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On June 23, 2010, United States President Barack Obama announced that General Stanley
McChrystal, the commander of United States forces in Afghanistan, was relieved of his duties. The
president also announced the nomination of General David Petraeus, commander of United States
Central Command, to take over command of the war in Afghanistan against the resurgent Taliban
and al-Qaida. President Obama explained that he had decided to replace Gen McChrystal "with
considerable regret." The president explained that McChrystal failed to "meet the standard that
should be set by a commanding general." President Obama called on the Senate to quickly
confirm Petraeus to his new position in Afghanistan.
At issue were pejorative remarks attributed to McChrystal and his aides about the civilian
command, which were published in a well-known American magazine, Rolling Stone. The politics
of the situation demanded that President Obama had no choice but to dismiss McChrystal or risk
being viewed as a weak commander in chief. , President Obama warned that some of the
sentiments expressed by McChrystal and his aides via the Rolling Stone article "undermines the
civilian control of the military that's at the core of our democratic system."
It should be noted that the Afghan war strategy -- to fight resurgent Taliban and al-Qaida, improve
security in Afghanistan, and develop governing stability in that country as an alternative to a culture
of warfare -- is founded on the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN). The long-term objectives
of COIN entail not only the clearing the field of insurgents by the military, but also political
imperative of replacing the insurgent power base with more stable governance. Effective
counterinsurgency strategies, therefore, require close collaboration of the military, political,
economic and diplomatic spheres in the conflict zone. Clearly, puerile and openly-disdainful
remarks about senior members of the Obama administration -- as uttered by McChrystal and his
aides -- would not help the climate of effective cooperation, where support from the varying
spheres would be critical to success of the mission.
President Obama's decision to name Petraeus as Chrystal’s replacement was hailed positively by
politicians on both sides of the proverbial aisle in the United States, as well as the Karzai
government in Afghanistan, which was anxious about effects on the war effort. The selection of
Petraeus -- a celebrated military figure thanks to his stewardship of the "surge" in Iraq, and one of
the key authors of United States modern counterinsurgency strategy in war zones -- clearly
banished such anxieties. The president's assertion that there was "a change in personnel but not a
change in policy" further augmented the widespread support for his decision. Indeed, the
controversy ensconced within the Rolling Stone article, titled "Runaway General," did not overtly
extend to dissonance over the policy itself. Certainly, McChrystal expressed support for President
Obama's strategy in Afghanistan saying, "I strongly support the president's strategy in Afghanistan
and am deeply committed to our coalition forces, our partner nations, and the Afghan people." As
well, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen affirmed that the Western military
alliance's Afghan war strategy remained unchanged.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 96 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On June 27, 2010, days after President Obama announced the dismissal of McChrystal and named
Petraeus as his replacement, attention was on the timeline attached to the Afghanistan strategy.
That is to say, when President Obama first outlined his plan to deploy an additional 30,000 troops
to Afghanistan, he also noted that the United States would begin a redeployment of those troops by
2011. With debt worries prevalent in the United States and other NATO countries, questions arose
as to whether or not the continued war effort in Afghanistan was a financially feasible endeavor.
That is to say, the war and counterinsurgency mission requires a substantial outlay of resources
that few governments (including the United States) could realistically commit to for the long term.
Complicating matters further has been the rising death toll of NATO forces in a war that has
continued for close to a decade. That increased death toll has contributed to decreasing support for
the Afghanistan war effort.
Moreover, analysts have pointed to the fact that COIN involves the idea of clearing the landscape
of insurgents, followed by the establishment of a government as an alternative to the war culture.
But clearance in one area often results in the relocation of the terrorists elsewhere and a perpetual
pursuit of the strategic enemy. Meanwhile, the establishment of more stable governance, which has
seen some success in the more politically mature Iraq, cannot easily be transposed to the largely
tribal cultural orientation of Afghanistan, which does not have a strong legacy of governmental
authority.
Taken together, these factors have contributed to rising emphasis on a "date certain" exit from
Afghanistan in 2011. Of course, on the other side of the equation, counterinsurgency advocates
have argued that the objectives of the mission could require an extended timeline beyond 2011.
With no consensus on the matter, the McChrystal fracas has thusly revealed deeper questions
about the strategy and mission in Afghanistan. Despite the aforementioned assertions from the
Obama administration and military ranks that there would be no change in policy on Afghanistan,
there were now emerging questions about the precise nature of that policy itself.
Those questions were intensified in July 2010 when the Iceland-based website, known as
Wikileaks, released six years worth of classified United States documents, numbering around
90,000, dealing with the war in Afghanistan. Several news organizations were given access to the
documents prior to actual publication, although United States authorities have argued that the
dissemination of classified information was a threat to national security, an act of gross
irresponsibility, and quite possibly, imbued with illegality. From Afghanistan, President Hamid
Karzai charged that the release of Wikileaks documents have endangered the lives of Afghan
citizens who worked with NATO-led international forces. The Afghan leader said that the
disclosure of the names of Afghans who cooperated with the NATO-led forces was "shocking" and
"irresponsible." For its part, Wikileaks has defended the release of the documents, noting that it
presented an unvarnished view of the war in Afghanistan since 2004.
Regardless of these competing views, the contents of the controversial documents have spurred
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 97 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
debate about the United States' role in the war in Afghanistan, as well as the conduct of the war
itself. To these ends, two Wikileaks revelations could raise questions about the Obama
administration's broader "Afghan-Pak" strategy, which considers not only "ground zero" of the war
effort -- Afghanistan -- but also Pakistan next door. While the strategy appropriately focuses on the
region instead of one country, taking into consideration shared extremist Islamic influences, shared
Pashtun culture, and a landscape on the borderland that is a stronghold for Taliban and al-Qaida,
two Wikileaks reveal strong doubts regarding the effectiveness of the strategy.
Firstly, according to the document review by the New York Times, even as Pakistan receives funds
from the United States to help combat Islamic extremists militants and the threat of terrorism, the
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was said to be helping the Taliban, even collaborating
with them on terror attacks and assassination plots.
Secondly, the tactic of using drone attacks in the tribal border regions has been lauded by the
Obama administration as a means of crushing the enemy and eliminating high value Taliban and alQaida targets. However, according the review by Der Spiegel, 38 Predator and Reaper drones
crashed while on combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, requiring "elaborate -- and dangerous -salvage operations." On the ground, "in country," there are additional worries about the political
costs of the civilian casualties caused by drone attacks.
The civilian costs provide a transition to discuss a third issue revealed by Wikileaks. According to
the review by Marc Ambinder of The Atlantic, there were "at least 144 separate incidents" of
civilian casualties that led to "cover-ups." Ambinder particularly took note of the unsuccessful
attempt to kill Abu Layth Ali Libi, which resulted in the deaths of several civilians and that resulted
in a "cover-up" by Afghan officials.
Finally, another key -- and bizarre -- revelation was that Osama Bin Laden -- the lynch pin of the
extremist Islamic terror network, al-Qaida, has taken up the practice of gifting insurgents with
wives. According to the associated report by The Guardian, an insurgent known to be an expert in
radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was presented with an Arab wife by Bin
Laden as an expression of thanks for his efforts in plotting terror attacks.
By the second week of August 2010, Wikileaks said that it would not stop publishing classified
government files, despite United States demands that it cease such activity. Wikileaks argued that
the publication of classified documents about the Afghanistan war was intended to inform the
public of the conflict. A Wikileaks spokesperson, Daniel Schmitt, said, "Hopefully with this
understanding, public scrutiny will then influence governments to develop better politics." Schmitt
rejected the United States government's claim that the publication of leaked documents was a
threat to that country's national security saying, "For this reason, we conveyed a request to the
White House prior to the publication, asking that the International Security Assistance Force
provide us with reviewers. That request remains open. However, the Pentagon has stated that it is
not interested in 'harm minimization' and has not contacted us, directly, or indirectly to discuss this
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 98 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
offer." But in late July 2010, the White House denied that Wikileaks ever made an offer to allow
government officials to review the documents.
The war effort was at the top of the political agenda on August 1, 2010 when the Netherlands
ended its combat mission in Afghanistan. While the withdrawal of less than 2,000 Dutch troops
was unlikely to affect NATO operations on the ground in Afghanistan, it nonetheless drew attention
to growing doubts about the war effort by citizens of participating NATO countries. Indeed,
objections to the war in the Netherlands had been the cause of the fall of the Dutch government
only months prior.
With Canada slated to withdraw its 2,700 troops in 2011 and Poland indicating its 2,600 troops
would go home in 2012, there would be increased responsibility on United States troops in
Afghanistan, despite the fact that United States President Barack Obama had promised to begin
redeployment in mid-2011. But ahead of that date, the United States was ramping up its forces in
Afghanistan as part of a temporary surge tactic, not unlike the approach taken in Iraq. As was the
case in Iraq, the objective was to take control of key areas via offensive operations, forcing
militants and terrorists out, ultimately improving the security landscape. That increased security
would, in turn, allow the government to increase its effectiveness and build confidence with the
citizenry.
Meanwhile, as noted above, there were increasing doubts about success of the war strategy in
Afghanistan, given the fact that the conflict was ongoing for nine years. Of particular concern was
the rising – rather than decreasing – level of violence and insecurity. In fact, July 2010 was the
deadliest month for United States troops since the start of the war. As well, more than 270
civilians were killed and about 600 wounded as a result of violence in July 2010. The first day of
August 2010 was marked by the roadside bombing of a bus in southern Afghanistan that left six
people dead.
Experts argued that increased troops in Taliban strongholds, such as Kandahar and Helmand,
would automatically result in increased military and civilian casualties in those areas. Stated
another way, a higher death toll was an inevitable consequence of the war strategy. That being
said, the counter-argument was that a rise in civilian casualties could undermine the goal of
capturing the “hearts and minds” of local Afghans. While statistics from the United Nations have
made clear that most civilian casualties have actually been carried out by the Taliban via suicide
bombings and roadside bombings, ordinary Afghans have instead directed their ire at NATO
troops. In fact, on August 1, 2010, hundreds of Afghans participated in a rally in the capital of
Kabul to protest the apparent deaths of civilians from a NATO rocket attack a week before in the
southern part of the country. Many of the protestors shouted, “Death to America! Death to
NATO!” For its part, NATO vociferously denied the disputed the allegations of civilian deaths in
that case.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 99 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In mid-August 2010, United States President Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai
convened an hour-long video conference talk in which they confirmed their united commitment to
fighting the Taliban. A statement issued by the White House read as follows: "Both leaders
agreed to continue in our shared efforts to combat violent extremism, protect the Afghan people,
improve governance, and deliver basic services, particularly at the local level." President Obama
also recapitulated his country's commitment to partnering with Afghans to bring increased stability
to that country. Such an objective could prove difficult given the fact that recent months have
seen the greatest casualties of United States forces in Afghanistan since the start of the war in late
2001.
Around the same period, Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that private security
companies would have to end their operations and leave Afghanistan within four months. The
president said: "After some thorough and legal review I am approving the annulment of foreign and
national security companies within four months." President Karzai made the ultimatum official by
signing a decree in the Afghan capital of Kabul.
The decision would likely help the Afghan leader's standing in a country where he has to balance a
difficult tightrope between a population with ties to the Taliban and an international presence of
soldiers helping to stabilize the country. At issue for Karzai have been "tragic incidents" whereby
the actions of private contractors led to the deaths of innocent Afghan civilians. Such accidents
have raised the ire of local Afghans who blame the foreign presence in the country for acts of
violence, even though most deaths are disproportionately due to the Taliban. That being said,
Karzai's decree would likely be viewed positively by many Afghans given his inauguration promise
to limit the operations of security companies in Afghanistan.
The decree was likely to be met with objections from NATO forces that often have used private
contractors to guard convoys and bases. Such private contractors would have to disband and
leave the country, or, join local Afghan police. An exception would be made for private
contractors working for international embassies, so long as their security personnel remained
confided to their compounds.
Primer on Afghanistan's Parliamentary Elections
Afghanistan was scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on September 18, 2010. At stake were
the 249 seats in Afghanistan's Wolesi Jirga or lower house of parliament -- a test of growing
stability in conflict-ridden Afghanistan ahead of the withdrawal of the roughly 140,000 NATO-led
foreign troops. On the matter of the election, the United Nations envoy for Afghanistan, Staffan
de Mistura, warned that the upcoming elections would not be perfect. However, he noted that the
polls would likely go off more successfully than the presidential election held a year prior, which
was mired by allegations of electoral fraud and reports of widespread irregularities. Describing the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 100 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
election landscape in Afghanistan, the United Nations envoy for Afghanistan said, "Security is the
biggest concern before these elections. Let's remember we are not in Switzerland, we are in
Afghanistan at the most critical period of the conflict.
Ahead of election day, there was limited campaign activity with few candidates convening public
meetings -- a likely effect of the poor security situation in Afghanistan. To that end, candidates has
utilized billboard advertisements and televised expositions to give voice to their campaign
platforms. Meanwhile, security forces were on high alert. Already, several candidates contesting
the elections, the aides of a particular female candidate contesting the elections, as well as two
election workers, had all been assassinated in separate incidences across the country. The killings
were blamed on the Taliban, which promised to derail the voting process.
In addition to the security concerns, there were also worries that this election, much like the earlier
presidential election, would be beset by fraud and voting irregularities. In fact, there were already
reports of fraudulent voting cards being printed. Still, Afghan Independent Election (IEC) Chief
Fazal Ahmad Manawi made the claim that all the preparations were on track for Afghanistan's
parliamentary elections. He said, "Based on electoral timeline IEC has already sent all the sensitive
electoral materials which include ballot papers from head office to provincial offices but delivering
of materials to polling centers across the country has 60 percent completed." As well, Manawi
confirmed that thousands of accreditation cards were issued by IEC to national and international
observers and media representatives to monitor the elections.
Election day saw low voter turnout with about 40 percent of the electorate casting ballots,
presumably as a result of the prevailing security concerns. Indeed, a dozen civilians and three
police officers apparently died by the time the polls closed. As well, in the pre-dawn hours of
September 18, 2010 – the day of the elections -- a rocket attack ensued in Kabul; it was believed
to have been launched by the Taliban.
Reports of electoral irregularities soon began circulating. Once complaint was the fact that the ink
used to mark fingers and prevent repeat voting was washable; clearly, if one could wash off the
ink, there was a high possibility of vote fraud. According to the Free and Fair Election Foundation
of Afghanistan, this problem was pervasive with reports of the ink problem coming from 2,950
polling stations across the country. As well, there were reports of fake voting cards, which also
suggested the potentiality for further vote fraud.
The actual effect of these irregularities on the outcome of the elections, and indeed, the results
themselves, would not soon be known. This was because of the remoteness of many polling
stations from which ballot boxes would have to be transported via donkeys to central locations, and
only then the hand counting would begin. Election results were not anticipated before late October
2010. In the last week of September 2010, a week after the vote, Afghan election officials
ordered recounts in seven provinces. The recount added to anxieties about fraud, which were
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 101 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
confirmed in October 2010 when election officials disqualified more than a million ballots,
effectively embarrassing the government of President Hamid Karzai, which promised a fair election
in contrast to the fiasco surrounding the presidential race. In so far as preliminary election results
were concerned, Fazal Ahmad Manawi, the head of the Independent Election Commission (IEC)
said, "Over 50 percent of members of Wolesi Jirga or Lower House of Afghan parliament are new
faces." He also noted that there had been notable victories for women in the western Nimroz
province. No official results were expected until November 2010.
Post-Election Developments (2010)
On Oct. 1, 2010, extremist Islamic militants in southern Pakistan set ablaze more than two dozen
oil tankers carrying fuel for NATO and United States troops across the border to Afghanistan. The
incident in Sindh province occurred after the Pakistani government decided to close a border
crossing with Afghanistan following a NATO incursion that left three soldiers dead. The tankers
were believed to be headed to another border crossing when the attack took place. As gunmen
opened fire, drivers and other personnel on the tankers were forced to flee; the gunmen then set
fire to the tankers. Days after the attacks on tankers at the Khyber Pass, militants again attacked
and set ablaze at least 20 tankers carrying fuel for NATO and United States troops en route to
Afghanistan. This round of attacks ensued close to the Pakistani capital of Islamabad. It was the
latest in a succession of attacks by militants on NATO supply trucks traversing Pakistan en route to
Afghanistan were military operations were taking place.
At the close of the first week of October 2010, a Senate Armed Forces Committee report titled
"The Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan," contended that a number
of security contractors "funneled money from their Pentagon contracts to warlords and strongmen
linked to murder, kidnapping and bribery." According to the inquiry that lasted about a year,
contractors (most of whom were Afghans) paid money to Taliban supporters, many of whom were
responsible for attacks against NATO forces. The report specified the 2010 case of an American
marine being killed by private security forces. One of the report's main conclusions was as
follows: “The proliferation of private security personnel in Afghanistan is inconsistent with the
counterinsurgency strategy.” Connected to that finding was the other conclusion that private
Afghan security contractors have often acted against the interests of the United States and Afghan
governments. Also of particular significance was the finding that private security contractors
operating under the aegis of the Department of Defense have failed to adequately vet their armed
personnel. Given these conclusions, Senate Armed Forces Committee Chairman Carl Levin of
Michigan said that there was a need to “shut off the spigot” of American dollars going into the
“pockets of warlords.” Earlier, General David Petraeus, the top commander in Afghanistan, had
said that corrective actions, including the termination of contracts, should be be "on the table” in
such instances. Whatever course of action is ultimately determined, the matter was sure to
reinvigorate the debate regarding the United States strategy in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 102 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Meanwhile, on October 8, 2010, a bomb exploded at a crowded mosque in the northern part of
Afghanistan, killing an Afghan governor and several other people. More than 35 others were also
injured in the attack in Taluqan, the capital of Takhar province. Mohammad Omar, the governor
of neighboring Kunduz province who died in the attack, had only days earlier warned of increased
security risks at the hand of the Taliban, even calling for measures to counteract them. The attack
in the northern part of the country -- with such a high ranking official as a victim -- underscored
the success of the Taliban in expanding their reign of terror beyond their stronghold in the south
and border regions with Pakistan.
Days after the October 8, 2010 attack on a crowded mosque in southern Afghanistan, Afghan
President Hamid Karzai confirmed during an interview with the cable news channel, CNN, that
"unofficial contacts" had been taking place with the Taliban, aimed at ending the violent
insurgency. He said, "We have been talking to the Taliban as countryman to countryman, talk in
that manner." The Afghan president sought to draw a distinction between the Taliban and the
terror enclave, al-Qaida, which he characterized as "working against Afghanistan." These
developments came in the aftermath of the establishment of the High Peace Council, which
President Karzai has said was intended to fuel dialogue with the Taliban.
By mid-October 2010, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the alliance would
assist in the plan for peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Speaking at a
NATO meeting in the Belgian capital city of Brussels, Rasmussen said that NATO forces in
Afghanistan could potentially provide "practical assistance" in the peace and reconciliation efforts.
That potentiality was already in practice to some degree given reports that NATO had facilitated
the movement of Taliban commanders to Kabul, presumably for the informal talks mentioned by
President Karzai. Indeed, the New York Times reported that high level, face to face, negotiations
between the two sides -- the Afghan government and the leadership of the Taliban and the hardline guerrilla Haqqani network -- were taking place, and as noted here, with the logistical assistance
of NATO. At the same time, Rasmussen noted that NATO would not end its military campaign
against the Taliban and al-Qaida elements operating in Afghanistan. To that latter end, reports from
the ground in Afghanistan suggested that coalition forces were routing Taliban militants in the
southern province of Kandahar province. Indeed, Taliban fighters were reported to be abandoning
some of their long-held bases in that militant stronghold.
In November 2010, the landscape was another story entirely. NATO forces on November 15, 2010
suffered their worst losses in some time while Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar,
dispatched a statement announcing that the Taliban was opposed to peace talks and would not
engage the possibility until all foreign troops exited Afghanistan. To this end, he said, "The cunning
enemy which has occupied our country is trying, on the one hand, to expand its military operations
... and, on the other hand, wants to throw dust in the eyes of the people by spreading the rumors
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 103 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
of negotiation." The statement came only days before Afghan President Hamid Karzai's peace
plan, which has included reconciliation talks with the Taliban, would be addressed at a summit in
Portugal.
There, in Lisbon, NATO announced its plans to exit Afghanistan and transfer control over the antiTaliban struggle to Afghan forces by the close of 2014. Afghan President Karzai formalized the
agreement by signing a long-term security partnership with NATO. At the heart of the matter was
NATO's contention that the Taliban not be allowed to simply wait out the presence of foreign
forces. As stated by NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the security bloc would
remain committed to security and stability of Afghanistan. He said, "One thing must be very clear
- NATO is in this for the long term." The NATO head then continued, "If the enemies of
Afghanistan have the idea that they can wait it out until we leave, they have the wrong idea. We
will stay as long as it takes to finish our job." For his part, Afghan President Karzai expressed
gratitude for NATO's contributions to his country's interest but stated, "I also informed them of the
concerns of the Afghan people with regard to civilian casualties, with regard to detentions, with
regard to, at times, NATO's posture."
It should be noted that this decision by NATO did not necessarily coincide with an official decision
by the United States on the duration of combat operations by its forces in Afghanistan.
On that latter consideration, there was some indication of the direction of the United States in
December 2010 when a much-anticipated report dealing with United States President Barack
Obama's strategy for the war in Afghanistan surfaced in the public purview. That report concluded
that United States forces were on track to begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2011, as
scheduled in the United States' president's war plan. This conclusion was reached despite the fact
there were mixed reports of success in the field. On that matter, the summary of the report said
that the United States forces continued to pursue and eliminate al-Qaida leadership figures, was
successful in reducing the terror enclave's ability to carry out attacks from the Afghan-Pak region,
and had halted the progress of the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the summary
noted that those gains were tenuous and could well be reversed in the future.
Meanwhile, on December 12, 2010, six NATO soldiers were killed close to the southern Afghan
city of Kandahar as a result of an attack by Islamic militants. Two Afghan soldiers were also killed
in the suicide car bombing at a security checkpoint outside a military base in the Zhari district.
The area has been a stronghold of the Taliban.
Update (2011)
On January 7, 2011, a Taliban suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body at a
bathhouse in the town of Spin Boldak in southern Afghanistan. The attack, which ensued ahead
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 104 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
of Friday prayers, left around 17 people dead, including the suicide bomber. Meanwhile, roadside
bombs killed three NATO troops in the south and east of the country, and a police inspector was
shot to death in Kandahar. The total death toll on this one day was 21. The spate of attacks
appeared to suggest that despite the ongoing NATO offensive, and even in the face of heavy
fighting between NATO and the Taliban, the extremist Islamic militant group has been able to
continue its campaign of violence and bloodshed.
On January 16, 2011, a roadside bomb in the northern province of Baghlan in Afghanistan left
several people dead. At least nine victims were guests at a wedding traveling from the provincial
capital of Pul-e-Khumri to a village in the same province. One day earlier, a roadside bomb killed
six civilians in the Helmand province in the southern part of the country. While the southern part of
the country has been known to be a Taliban stronghold, the attack in Baghlan in the north -normally a more peaceful region -- raised fears that the violent insurgency by Islamic extremists
was spreading across the country, even into previously safer areas of Afghanistan.
On January 19, 2011, a roadside bomb left 13 civilians dead in eastern Afghanistan. Women and
children en route to a health clinic were among the victims of the attack, which took place in the
Khoshamand district of Paktika province. Given the fact that the area -- located on the border with
Pakistan -- has been a hotbed of Taliban and al-Qaida militants, suspicion naturally fell on these
groups as being behind the attack.
On January 28, 2011, a high end supermarket in the Afghan capital of Kabul was the target of a
deadly suicide bombing. The "Finest" supermarket, located close to the British embassy in the
heavily guarded Wazir Akbar Khan area of the city, had been frequented by foreign nationals. The
particular clientele may well have been part of the rationale behind the suicide attack. Both foreign
nationals and Afghans were among the victims. According to both authorities and eyewitnesses on
the scene, the suicide bomber began by opening fire on the people in the store before detonating
the explosives strapped to his body. Zabiullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, announced that his
militant Islamic group was behind the attack saying, "We claim responsibility for the attack, and it
was carried out at a time when foreigners were shopping.”
A targeted suicide bombing in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar appeared to target the
convoy of Deputy Governor Abdul Latif Ashna on January 29, 2011. A suicide bomber on a
motorcycle reportedly slammed into the car of the deputy governor en route to his office, resulting
in injuries to three of his bodyguards and the death of Ashna. Kandahar Governor Tooryalai Wesa
described the events leading to the death of his deputy as follows: "Deputy governor Abdul Latif
Ashna had just left his home and was on his way to his office when a suicide bomber on a
motorcycle blew himself up near his vehicle." The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.
According to Agence France Presse, a Taliban spokesman, Yousuf Ahmadi, said, "One of our
jihadists... blew up his motorcycle near the vehicle of Abdul Latif Ashna, the deputy governor of
Kandahar, killing the deputy governor."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 105 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On February 12, 2011, the Taliban attacked the police headquarters in the southern Afghan city of
Kandahar. Around 20 people died as a result, including 15 policemen, one Afghan intelligence
official, two Afghan soldiers, and two civilians, according to the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force. The Taliban militants used suicide bombs, guns, and rocket-propelled grenades
in an audacious raid on the police headquarters in the center of the city. The raid began with
bombings but a battle between the two sides continued for several hours. The Taliban was quick
to claim responsibility for the violent assault. For his part, Afghan President Hamid Karzai
condemned the attack, saying, The enemies of Afghanistan have once again shown their evil
intent."
Meanwhile, in the realm of government and politics, on January 20, 2011, Afghan President Hamid
Karzai, acting on the recommendation of a special court, ordered a one-month delay to the opening
of the Afghan parliament. At issue was the report from a special court appointed by President
Karzai to investigate fraud complaints in the parliamentary elections held in September 2010. The
court's chief judge charged that the elections were tainted by fraud, requiring further time to rule
on the results. However, critics of the president said that the president's court-ordered investigation
aimed only to increase the number of Karzai's Pashtun community in parliament and not to uphold
the integrity of the vote. Such complaints were echoed from those in the West that President
Karzai was trying to avoid the inevitable -- a parliament no longer disproportionately stacked with
his stalwarts. It was not known how the political landscape would be affected if the court ruled to
invalidate some of the election results. Since the time of the elections, the Afghan parliament had
not been convened. But on January 25, 2011, a special agreement was forged with members of
parliament, paving the way for the parliament of Afghanistan to finally open on January 26, 2011.
On February 21, 2011, at least 30 people died as a result of a suicide bombing in the Kunduz
province of northern Afghanistan. The attack left the most damage on a government census
building in the Imam Saheb district at a time when people were lined up to collect identity cards.
As expected, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, but insisted that the target was
actually an army recruitment center. One day earlier, the Taliban attacked a Kabul Bank in the
eastern city of Jalalabad. In that case, the people targeted appeared to be police and intelligence
officers collecting their salaries. While attacks in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan
have tended to be commonplace as they are strongholds of the insurgent Taliban, until recently,
attacks in the northern part of the country had been infrequent. Clearly, as attacks such as the
suicide bombing in Kunduz increase, it would seem that no part of the country is safe from the
threat of terrorism. Indeed, in October 2010, the governor of Kunduz was killed in a bombing at
a mosque in the neighboring Takhar province.
On March 14, 2011, an attack by a suicide bomber disguised as an army volunteer at an army
recruiting center in northern Afghanistan left at least 35 people dead, including several children. It
was the second suicide bombing in five days in Kunduz. The development raised questions about
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 106 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the security situation in Afghanistan and the ability of the Afghan authorities to attract youth
recruits into military service. Indeed, reports from Afghanistan have indicated that militant
extremists from the Taliban, al-Qaida, the Haqqani network, Hizb-i-Islami and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, are flooding the area and increasing their attacks. The trend suggests
that the center of conflict is expanding beyond southern Afghanistan where there is a strong
presence of international troops in an effort to rout out terror enclaves. Now, the north of the
country was providing softer targets from extremist militants bent on discouraging youth from
entering military service. It should be noted that while Kunduz and the surrounding provinces -while not the center of the battles in Afghanistan of late -- are nonetheless areas known to be hideouts for the Taliban, al-Qaida, and other militant groups. Elsewhere in Afghanistan, attacks were
ongoing. A roadside bombing in southern Zabul left three people dead and an explosion in the
Nangarhar province left another three people dead.
In quite a different dynamic on March 19, 2011, 17 members of the Taliban in Afghanistan put
down their arms and said that they would be joining the government in Herat. The provincial police
chief if Herat, Syed Aqa Saqib, said that these former Taliban had been active in the Shindand
district; now, with their decision to join the government, he believed that the security situation in
the province would see some stabilization. Indeed, a member of the group, Mohammad Tamim,
said in an interview with the Chinese news agency, Xinhua, that he and his comrades were ready
for peace and development in Afghanistan. Over the course of a year, up to 100 Taliban fighters
have joined the government in Herat.
Meanwhile, March 2011 was marked by the plan for the withdrawal of international forces from
operations in Aghanistan after close to a decade of military operations there. With the United States
and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) preparing to step back from its role
in fighting the Taliban and al-Qaida forces, on March 16, 2011, the Afghan government announced
that it was ready to take over security responsibilities. Afghan Defense Ministry spokesperson,
General Zahir Azimi admitted that Afghan security forces had challenges as regards recruitment,
training and equipment, but maintained that Afghanistan was committed to the plan saying,
"Although we have problems in terms of equipments, training and number of troops, we have
agreements with international community and with its support we would be able to successfully
complete the process by the end of 2014," The transfer of security responsibility from NATO-led
troops to Afghan forces was scheduled to begin on March 21, 2011 and would take place on a
phased basis until 2014. On March 22, 2011, Afghan President Hamid Karzai clarified this stance
by noting that seven areas of the country would be transferred to the jurisdiction of Afghan
security forces in July 2011. It was hoped that the transition would assuage tensions between
Afghanistan and the international community due to civilian casualties caused by military
operations. Indeed, in February 2011, several children died as a result of a NATO-led operation in
Kunar province, prompting both NATO commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, and
United States Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, to offer separate apologies to Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 107 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On April 1, 2011, 14 people including seven United Nations staffers were brutally killed in Mazare-Sharif in Afghanistan a month after a fundamentalist American pastor, Pastor Wayne Sapp,
carried out a threat made by his cohort, Pastor Terry Jones, to burn the Koran. According to
reports on the ground, protesters charged onto a United Nations compound in Mazar-e-Sharif,
seized weapons from guards who failed to fire on the crowd, and then stormed the building.
Among the dead were four United Nations guards from Nepal, as well as nationals from Norway,
Sweden and Romania. Some victims were said to have been subjected to beheading.
Further violence ensued in the days following the attack on the United Nations compound, with
protests spreading across Afghanistan in cities such as Kandahar, Jalalabad, and the Parwan
province to the north of Kabul. At least ten people were said to have died in Kandahar following
protests there. The scene in Jalalabad appeared to be more peaceful, although protesters called for
the exit of United States troops from Afghanistan and burned an effigy of United States President
Barack Obama.
The United Nations' chief envoy to Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura, placed blame for the killing of
the 14 victims on April 1, 2011 in Mazar-e-Sharif on the American pastor saying, "We should be
blaming the person who produced the news -- the one who burned the Koran. Freedom of speech
does not mean freedom from offending culture, religion, traditions." He also said that he would
redeploy the United Nations staff to Kabul on a temporary basis. For their part, the pastors at the
center of the controversy have dismissed any culpability in the brutal deaths of the 14 victims.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai reacted to the killings by urging the United States Congress to
condemn the burning of the Islamic holy book, and impose restrictions on such acts, constitutional
freedom of expression in the United States notwithstanding. United States President Obama took
a different approach to the cycle of aggression, characterizing the burning of the Koran as
"intolerance and bigotry," while focusing on the "outrageous" murder of the United Nations staffers
and others. He said, "The desecration of any holy text, including the Koran, is an act of extreme
intolerance and bigotry. However, to attack and kill innocent people in response is outrageous, and
an affront to human decency and dignity." President Obama also emphasized the fact that "No
religion tolerates the slaughter and beheading of innocent people.”
On April 13, 2011, an Afghan elder -- Malik Zarin -- was killed during a suicide bombing in eastern
Afghanistan. Zarin was among the 10 victims, of an attack on a group of elders participating in a
village "shura" or meeting in the Kunar province, located close to the border with Pakistan. He
was attending the shura for the purpose of urging locals to assist the government in fighting the
Taliban. The suicide bomber made a point of hugging Zarin, effectively illustrating that the elder
was the intended target of attack. Zarin -- known as a hero in the fight against the Soviets, a
commander of the Northern Alliance during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s, and most recently, a
stalwart of Afghan President Hamid Karzai -- may have been the chosen target due to his progovernment orientation. Indeed, the Taliban wasted no time in taking responsibility for the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 108 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
attack. For his part, Afghan President Karzai characterized Zarin's death as "a tragic loss."
On April 15, 2011, a suicide bombing left Khan Mohammad Mujahi dead after an attack on police
headquarters; Khan Mohammad Mujahid -- the police chief of the southern Kandahar province -had survived previous attempts on his life. The suicide bomber, disguised in a police uniform, was
able to get past the gate of the police headquarters. He then shot the police chief before detonating
the explosives strapped to his body. Coming on the heels of the assassination of a well known
tribal elder and war hero, Malik Zarin, in the eastern Kunar province, the killing of Khan
Mohammad Mujahi highlighted an aggressive assassination campaign being carried out by the
Taliban. Indeed, like Zarin, Khan was also known as a war hero in the war against the Soviets,
and additionally worked as a commander on behalf of the Northern Alliance in the civil war. After
the fall of the Taliban, Khan worked through the government hierarchy in security roles before
being promoted to lieutenant general and then chief of police in Kandahar.
Note that on April 16, 2011, coming on the heels of the deaths of Zarin and Khan, a suicide
bombing took place at a large military base in the remote Gamberi desert in eastern Afghanistan
between the Laghman and Nangarhan provinces. The suicide bomber was disguised by wearing an
army uniform and was able to detonate the explosives strapped to his body, and thus killing five
foreign NATO troops and four Afghan soldiers at the army base.
In late April 2011, eight United States soldiers and one American civilian contractor died when a
veteran Afghan military pilot opened fire on them at the Kabul airport. The victims were
responsible for training and advising Afghanistan's burgeoning security forces. The shooting
erupted following an argument and appeared to have been precipitated by Ahmad Gul's stress over
his personal finances. That being said, some analysts have pointed to the rise in attacks by Afghans
on Americans as being at least partially attributable to increasing anti-foreigner sentiment in the
country. Despite the fact that the Taliban was eager to claim responsibility for the attack, Gul's
brother insisted that he (the attacker) had no connections to militant extremists such as the Taliban
and al-Qaida. Indeed, it may well be that the Taliban exploited the incident for its own purpose.
For his part, Afghan President Hamid Karzai condemned the shooting and conveyed his sympathy
to the relatives of the victims.
In the first part of May 2011, a military offensive by Afghan security forces left as many as two
dozen Taliban militants dead in the southern province of Kandahar. The situation was sparked on
May 7, 2011 when Taliban militants attempted to storm the residence of the regional governor as
well as the office of an intelligence agency. There were several casualties as a result, including
unarmed women and children. The security response was carried out by Afghan forces and ended
in the aforementioned offensive and the deaths of about 23 Taliban fighters. This outcome
appeared to demonstrate that Afghan forces were increasing their ability to take responsibility for
the country's security.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 109 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On May 21, 2011, a suicide bombing at a hospital in the Afghan capital of Kabul left six people
dead and 23 others wounded. The attack ensued when the suicide bomber detonated the
explosives strapped to his body at the lunch tent where students were gathered at Charsad Bestar
Hospital. Most of the victims were either medical students or civilians. The heavily fortified
hospital, which has traditionally treated Afghan military, was located close to the headquarters for
international forces operating in Afghanistan, as well as the United States embassy. Blame quickly
rested on the Taliban. President Hamid Karzai condemned the attack, characterizing the
orchestrators as "so ruthless and cowardly that, in contradiction of all humane and Islamic
principles, they attack even hospital patients and doctors."
On May 22, 2011, gunmen stormed an Afghan government building in the eastern city of Khost,
opening fire and occupying the upper floor of the government compound. The gunmen were
disguised as police officers and wore suicide bomb vests under police uniforms. United States
soldiers backed Afghan troops in an effort to end the raid, but two of the attackers detonated the
explosives strapped to their bodies. Six people in total died as a result of the assault, which was
almost immediately attributed to Taliban fighters. Indeed, Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid,
claimed responsibility for the attack via text message.
Elsewhere in Afghanistan on May 22, 2011, a NATO soldier was killed in a bomb attack in the
eastern part of the country, while a roadside bomb exploded in the southern province of Zabul,
killing two people. Later on, a roadside bomb exploded in Kandahar, killing one police officer and
wounding three others.
Days later, as May 2011 entered its final week, seven United States troops were killed as a result
of a roadside bomb in Kandahar. Meanwhile, even as NATO-led forced have made the claim that
they were repelling Taliban and other extremist forces in the area close to the Pakistani border, it
was clear that they were still Taliban fighters there capable of carrying out attacks. More
disturbing was the claim made by local Afghan officials that hundreds of Taliban fighters were able
to take control over the Doab district. NATO officials dismissed this claim saying that the center of
Doab was never under the control of the Taliban and, indeed, a number of air strikes were carried
out there. Then, on May 27, 2011, a NATO helicopter crashed in eastern Afghanistan, killing at
least one soldier.
May 2011 ended with double bombings in the central Afghan city of Herat. At least five people
died and more than 30 were wounded as a result of the two explosions. The first explosion was
attributed to a roadside bomb in the center of Herat while the second explosion was caused by
suicide bombers who targeted the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) base located
on the outskirts of the city. Around the same period, one NATO soldier was killed by an Afghan
soldier in the province of Uruzgan. This killing was reported as being a case of local security
forces "going rogue."
Clearly, the spate of attacks in May 2011 raised questions about the very effectiveness of the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 110 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
NATO mission in Afghanistan to rout out the Taliban. For its part, the Taliban was making good
on its promise to carry out a "spring offensive" in Afghanistan. On the other side of the equation,
NATO insisted it was making progress in its own effort although it was still possible for the Taliban
to carry out such attacks. In fact, it would appear that Taliban fighters have been resourceful
enough to acquire uniforms and weapons, and even penetrate seemingly fortified interests across
Afghanistan, despite the strong presence of both NATO and local Afghan forces. Moreover, the
infiltration of the Afghan security forces by individuals from the Taliban (who then carry out rogue
attacks) present challenges for NATO, which ultimately seeks to handover security to local forces.
NATO has said that a full handover of control of security to Afghan forces will be complete by
2014. As well, efforts were in the works to sign off on a formal agreement between Kabul and
Washington as a guiding framework for the continuing presence of United States troops in
Afghanistan. Officials in Washington were reportedly reviewing a proposal from Kabul.
Such discussions would be complicated by Afghan President Hamid Karzai's angry response to
civilian casualties caused by NATO airstrikes. Karzai was responding to an airstrike in late May
2011 in Helmand province that left a number of civilians dead, evoking apologies by NATO
generals. Karzai issued a passionate declaration that he would no longer allow air strikes on
houses. To be clear, it was unclear how Karzai could actually enforce such a dictate since only
NATO was empowered to make command decisions about airstrikes. As noted by NATO
spokesperson, Major Sunset Belinsky, "Coalition forces constantly strive to reduce the chance of
civilian casualties and damage to structures, but when the insurgents use civilians as a shield and
put our forces in a position where their only option is touse airstrikes, then they will take that
option."
As June 2011 was in its third week, violence continued to plagued Afghanistan in the form of an
attack in the capital city of Kabul. On June 18, 2011, militant extremists disguised as Afghan army
troops attacked a police station, and killed around 10 people before being eliminated themselves.
Then, in northern Kunduz, a suicide bomber detonated the explosives in his car close to a German
military convoy; at least three people died in that attack. In both cases, blame was attributed to the
Taliban.
Ironically, these attacks occurred at a time when the Karzai government in that country was
claiming that it was engaging in peace talks with the Taliban. For its part, the Taliban would not
publicly admit that such negotiations were taking place, and insisted that no talks could really ensue
in earnest until the exit of foreign troops from Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States
outgoing defense secretary, Robert Gates, was saying that although there had been "outreach" to
the militant extremist Islamist group, he had little confidence that the Taliban would participate in
serious peace negotiations.
These developments came at a time when the United Nations voted unanimously to treat the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 111 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
terror enclaves al-Qaida and separately when it comes to United Nations sanctions. The move
appeared aimed at facilitating the Karzai government's reconciliation overtures towards the
Taliban.
Meanwhile, around the same time in mid-June 2011, the Obama administration in the United States
was outlining a strategy for the possible redeployment of some troops from Afghanistan. With the
killing of Osama Bin Laden by United States special forces in May 2011, the argument from some
quarters was that the United States could convincingly declare victory and accelerate its withdrawal
from Afghanistan ahead of 2014, or at least redeploy a significant contingent of troops. Of course,
more hawkish elements have argued that a premature withdrawal would reverse gains made against
the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan.
Note also in mid-June 2011, al-Qaida, announced that Ayman al-Zawahri would stand as its new
leader. Zawahri was Bin Laden's deputy and was now being tapped to take over the top role,
given Bin Laden's death. A statement by al-Qaida announcing the succession plan offered few
details about the manner in which Zawahri was selected as the new terrorism enclave chief.
However, the statement included rhetorical declarations about an ongoing effort to "conquer
infidels," such as the United States and Israel, and drew connections between protest movements
in the Middle East and North Africa and its global Jihadist agenda.
In late June 2011, a suicide car bomber targeted a health clinic in eastern Afghanistan, killing at
least 35 people. The suicide bomber struck just as women and children were standing in a line
awaiting maternity care and vaccinations at the Akbarkhail Public Medical Center. Perhaps with
an eye on the civilian casualties in this attack, the Taliban was not keen to claim responsibility for
this bout of violence. Instead, in an interview with the Associated Press, Taliban spokesman
Zabiullah Mujahid said, "This attack was not done by our fighters." That being said, there has
been some fragmentation within the Taliban as regards tactics so it was yet possible that a
particular wing of the militant Islamic movement was indeed behind the attack. Only a day earlier,
explosives attacked to a bicycle was the cause of an attack at a bazaar in Kunduz province in
northern Afghanistan; at least 10 people died and two dozen others were injured as a result,
including a police officer. Ironically, these incidences occurred at a time when United States
President Barack Obama announced that he intended to immediately begin a redeployment
program of United States forces operating in Afghanistan, with a final "date certain" exit in 2014.
(See below for details.)
In late June 2011, a siege by militants at the heavily-fortified Intercontinental Hotel in the Afghan
capital of Kabul raised questions about the capability of Afghan security forces to ensure the
stability of the country. Heavily-armed Taliban militants attacked the hotel, which was popular
with Western guests, leading to the deaths of at least 10 people dead, including hotel staff. Even
after the initial six suicide attackers died, the attack continued and morphed into a siege as militants
battled with NATO security forces; the conflict ended after a rooftop battle.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 112 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Ironically, this brazen attack occurred a week after United States President Barack Obama
announced that he intended to immediately begin a redeployment program of United States forces
operating in Afghanistan, with a final "date certain" exit in 2014. While blame quickly rested on
the Taliban for the attack, in fact, it was the terrorist Haqqani network that identified as being the
likely culprits -- while working "in conjunction" with the Taliban. A militant Islamic entity closely
aligned with the Taliban and al-Qaida, the Haqqani network members share clan and tribal
membership, and have targeted Western targets across the Afghanistan border region. United
States officials have noted that the Haqqani network may be among the greatest threats to Afghan
stability, along with the Taliban and al-Qaida.
As regards this attack, these militant Islamic insurgents had successfully demonstrated that they still
had the ability to strike in the heart of the capital, on a pro-Western interest, despite heavy
fortifications there. The Taliban -- which was apparently working with the Haqqani network -was also delivering a message that the notion of serious, reconciliation-oriented dialogue between
the militant extremist group and the Afghan government was an illusion at this time.
On July 12, 2011, Ahmad Wali Karzai -- the brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai -- was
assassinated in Kandahar. Ahmad Wali Karzai, known to be a powerful player in the southern part
of the country, was shot to death by his own bodyguard at his home. Sardar Mohammed, the
head of security for the president's brother, was himself killed right after by loyal security
personnel. Right after the news of the assassination broke, the Taliban claimed responsibility for
the attack, characterizing it as one of its greatest achievements in a decade.
The White House condemned the assassination, which would undoubtedly evoke scrutiny of the
United States' plan to exit Afghanistan fully within less than three years. Indeed, Ahmad Wali
Karzai was instrumental in addressing the problem of the Taliban insurgency in its southern
stronghold, as well as bringing tribes together in the region. Without him and with a dangerous
power chasm looming in the south, President Karzai faced even more daunting challenges in trying
to stabilize his chaos and violence-ridden country. That being said, Ahmad Wali Karzai was
viewed by his critics as something of a warlord with a record of corruption and narcotics
trafficking.
For his part, President Karzai lamented the killing of his brother as follows: "This is the way of life
for the people of Afghanistan. The homes of all Afghans feel this pain. Our hope is this will come
to an end, and peace and happiness will come to our homes and will come to rule in our country."
It should be noted that days after the assassination of President Hamid Karzai's brother, news
emerged from the Independent suggesting that the assassin had been a trusted contact of the
Central Intelligence Agency before joining the Taliban. This information indicated that far from
being motivated by personal grievance, Sardar Mohammed was acting on the basis of politics and
ideology.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 113 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In other development, on July 17, 2011, armed men reportedly raided the home of Jan
Mohammad Khan, the former governor of Uruzgan province and an adviser to President Karzai.
Khan, as well as a guest, were both killed during the attack, which was believed to have been
orchestrated and carried out by the Taliban.
Then, on July 27, 2011, the mayor of Kandahar was killed in a suicide attack. As Ghulam Haidar
Hameedi offered an address at the city hall to tribal elders, the suicide bomber detonated the
explosives hidden in his turban. The Taliban immediately asserted its claim for orchestrating the
assassination in Kandahar. Haidar was generally well-regarded as mayor due to his willingness to
oppose militias and strongmen, his attempts to deal with illegal land grabs, as well as the fact that
he oversaw the much-needed building of city infrastructure.
Coming on the heels of the assassination of the president's brother, and the killing of the former
governor of Uruzgan province, it appeared that the Taliban was actively targeting the President
Karzai's inner circle, as well as other influential and high level officials.
Note that on July 29, 2011, southern Afghanistan was again the site of brutality and violence as
suicide attackers carried out an assault on government buildings in Uruzgan province, killing at
least 19 people -- 12 of whom were young children -- and wounding 35 civilians. The assault
began with two remote-controlled car bombs, one of which exploded outside the provincial
governor's compound, and another that exploded close to the offices for a television. Soon
thereafter, six assailants stormed into the compounds for the governor and the police chief. Three
of the attackers detonated the explosives strapped to their bodies, while the others were embroiled
in a gun fight with the police that went on for several hours. The Taliban claimed responsibility
for the attacks.
On Aug. 7, 2011, an apparent rocket-propelled grenade attack by the Taliban on a Chinook
helicopter in Afghanistan, left 30 United States troops and eight Afghan commandos dead.
Several of the American troops who died in the incident were members of the vaunted elite Seal
Team Six, which carried out the raid into Pakistan, which eliminated al-Qaida leader, Osama Bin
Laden. United States authorities said that the attack did not demonstrate gains for the Taliban and
would not affect ongoing policy on Afghanistan, as discussed here. (See "Special Report" below
for more details).
A week later on Aug. 14, 2011, one of Afghanistan's most peaceful provinces was the site of
violence when six suicide bommbers carried out an attack on a security meeting. The governor
of Parwan, who convened the meeting, survived the attack but 22 other people were not so lucky
and lost their lives, while part of the governor's offices were destroyed. The attack made it clear
that the Taliban was capable of launching such acts of terrorism in even seemingly secure zones of
the country.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 114 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The spate of violence continued days later when on Aug. 18, 2011, a roadside bomb left 22
people dead in Herat province. As before, blame was placed on the Taliban for the attack that hit
a crowded minibus, and left women and children among the casualties.
A day later on Aug. 19, 2011, there were reports that the British Council was hit by bombs in the
Afghan capital of Kabul. As information filtered through, the death toll was estimated at being
around 10. Among the dead were at least eight Afghan policemen and a special services soldier
from New Zealand. Reports indicated that the attack began when a suicide attacker detonated his
explosive vest at a police checkpoint in western Kabul, effectively clearing the way for the
terrorists to move on. Then, a suicide car bomb decimated the outer wall of the compound,
followed by gunmen storming the offices of the British Council. The gunmen attempted to
undertake a siege of sorts but they were soon confronted with British and United States troops
and a lengthy gunfight ensued ending only when all the gunmen were eliminated. The Taliban
wasted little time in claiming responsibility for the brazen attack and said that it was intended to
mark the anniversary of Afghanistan's independence from the United Kingdom in 1919. British
Prime Minister David Cameron characterized the assault as a "cowardly" and "particularly vicious"
attack", while British ambassador in Kabul William Patey said, "This was a dastardly and cowardly
attack."
On Aug. 27, 2011, southern Afghanistan was hit by two suicide car bombings; at least five people
died as a result with many more enduring injuries. One attack ensued outside a bank in the town
of Lashkar Gah in Helmand province, in close proximity to the governor's office. The attack took
place just as workers were collecting their paychecks. Police, soldiers and other government
workers were among the casualties. In the other attack in Kandahar, a suicide bomber detonated
his explosives-laden vehicle at a police checkpoint. More than a dozen children were among the
casualties in that case. Not surprisingly, the Taliban quickly claimed responsibility.
At the close of August 2011, more than 25 Pakistani security forces -- police and soldiers -- were
killed when about 200 Taliban fighters crossed the border from Afghanistan to Pakistan to carry
out a series of attacks on seven military checkpoints in the northwestern Chitral district. Pakistani
security forces were eventually able to repel the Taliban fighters, forcing many of them back over
the border, albeit not without theoccurrence of casualties. The flare up of violence in the AfghanPak border region was sure to raise already-heightened bilateral tensions between the two
countries. Pakistani authorities complained that Taliban fighters werefinding refuge in the Kunar
and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan -- areas from which United States forces withdrew a year
prior. They noted that an insufficient NATO presence in the area, along with a dearth of local
Afghan security forces there, have allowed the extremist Islamic group to use the region as a safe
haven, and to operate with some degree of impunity.
On Sept. 10, 2011, a suicide truck bomb targeted United states troops at a a military base in the
eastern Wardak province of Afghanistan. Two Afghan civilians died as a result of the attack, while
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 115 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
80 United States troops were injured. The day also saw a United States base in Bagram attacked
by rockets. Both attacks coincided with the 10th anniversary of the terror attacks by al-Qaida in
the United States a decade earlier on Sept. 11, 2001.
The Taliban quickly claimed responsibility and said that they were seeking revenge for the
continued presence of United States troops in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Taliban accused the United
States of using the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks as justification for invading Afghanistan. Of course, it
was those terror attacks, and the alliance between the Afghanistan-based Taliban and al-Qaida,
which had spurred the war in Afghanistan.
Ousted from power as a result of the war in Afghanistan, the Taliban has been carrying out an
insurgency for years, aimed at repelling international forces and ending rule by the new
government. For their part, United States forces have stayed in Afghanistan to fight the resurgent
Taliban despite decreased popularity among both Afghans and Americans for the long-running
war. Speaking to this issue, United States Ambassador Ryan Crocker said the United States
troops needed to remain in Afghanistan to prevent extremists from using Afghan territory to plan
another catastrophic terror attack. In an interview with Agence France Presse, he said, "We're
here so there is never again another 9/11 coming from Afghanistan's soil."
While these attacks were also linked with the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks
in the United States, according to NATO, they were also aimed at derailing the effort to handover
security to Afghan-led forces during a phased withdrawal schedule beginning in the next year.
Indeed, 2011 has seen the most bloodshed in Afghanistan since December 2011 when United
States-led forces toppled the rule of the Taliban in that country. Nevertheless, NATOappeared
undeterred by this latest bout of violence and asserted its intent to stay the course. As noted by
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "We have confidence in the Afghan authorities'
ability to deal with this situation. Transition is on track and it will continue."
Islamic militants carried out a complicated siege of the Afghan capital of Kabul on Sept. 13, 2011.
Particular targets of the siege included the United States embassy, NATO headquarters, and police
stations in Kabul.
The assault, which was carried out by Islamic terrorist militants disguised in burqas, continued for
as many as 20 hours -- in fact, well into the next day -- with both Afghan and international
security forces contending with multiple points of conflict. NBC News, among other international
news media, reported that about seven militants, likely from the Pakistan-based Haqqani network - occupied a high-rise building in the area of the Abdul Haq roundabout. From their perch there,
they were able to shoot and fire rockets at targets in Kabul's embassy district including the United
States embassy and the NATO headquarters close by. While there were no casualties at the United
States embassy or at NATO headquarters, the scene was not without bloodshed. The assailants
shot and killed people at other locations in the area, with the list of victims including Afghan
civilians and policemen. In addition to the attacks ensuing from the high-rise building, there were
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 116 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
also a number of suicide attacks in Kabul by about four other militants, including one at a police
station in the western part of the capital. Back at the embassy district, the scene devolved into a
standoff of sorts as Afghan security forces attempted to ferret out the assailants occupying that
building. The siege and gun battle finally ended in the early hours of Sept. 14, 2011, with all of the
assailants dead.
At first, it appeared that the Taliban was claiming responsibility, as the militant extremist group
conveyed a message that it was carrying out "a massive suicide attack on local and foreign
intelligence facilities" to mark the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks in the
United States. But United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker, said that it was the
Pakistan-based Haqqani network that had orchestrated the siege of Kabul. Of course, the
Haqqani network has been closely allied with the Taliban and al-Qaida both in terms of extremist
Islamic ideology and in terms of its brutal use of terrorism.
Subsequently, Cameron Munter, the United States ambassador to Pakistan asserted that there were
links between the Haqqani network and the Pakistani government. During an interview with Radio
Pakistan, Ambassador Munter said that there was evidence linking the Haqqani militant network to
Pakistan's government. "The attack that took place in Kabul a few days ago that was the work of
the Haqqani network, and the fact that, as we have said in the past, that there are problems, there
is evidence linking the Haqqani network to the Pakistan government, this is something that must
stop," said Munter. Soon thereafter, outgoing United States chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Mike Mullen, suggested that the Pakistan's intelligence agency helped the terrorist who
attacked his country's embassy in Kabul , according to a report by the New York Times. Already,
the United States government warned that if Pakistani authorities failed to take action against the
Pakistan-based Haqqani network for its attack on the United States embassy and NATO
headquarters in Kabul, then it would retaliate. For its part, Pakistani authorities have continued to
deny any connection to militant groups, the manifold evidence linking Pakistani intelligence to the
Taliban notwithstanding.
Meanwhile, Ambassador Crocker asserted that the plague of violence in Afghanistan ten years after
the 2001 terror attacks in the United States, which spurred the was in Afghanistan, would not
change his country's plans. Earlier, in the aftermath of the attack by the Taliban on United Stated
bases in Afghanistan, Crocker said the United States troops needed to remain in Afghanistan to
prevent extremists from using Afghan territory to plan another catastrophic terror attack. But
Crocker on Sept. 14, 2011, was also adamant about the fact that the actions of militant extremists
would not deter the United States from its transition schedule -- including the transfer of security
duties from coalition forces to Afghan forces, and the phased exit of United States troops from
Afghanistan.
Note: Of the 100,000 United States troops in Afghanistan, about 33,000 were due to be redeployed
in 2012. A full withdrawal of foreign combat troops was scheduled to take place in 2014.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 117 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On Sept. 25, 2011, at attack by an Afghan at a compound in Kabul housing a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) station resulted in the deaths of one United States citizen and injury to another. The
assailant, who was subsequently shot dead himself, was believed to be an employee at the
compound, which once served as the Ariana Hotel. The attack entailed an explosion and gunfire,
according to witnesses. This attack in the capital of Afghanistan came only two weeks after
extremist Islamists attacked the United States embassy and NATO offices in Kabul, leaving more
than two dozen people dead. Due to rigorous security measures typically enacted at CIA premises,
the ability of a gunman to open fire at the CIA station raised serious questions about screening
procedures. There was no immediate information as to the motive of the attack or the possible
linkage to extremist entities.
Meanwhile, on Sept. 20, 2011, former Afghanistan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was
assassinated in a bomb attack at his home in the capital city of Kabul. Rabbani's home was located
in the upscale Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood close to the United States Embassy. According to
the Afghan Ministry of Interior, the attack on Rabbani's home was carried out by two suicide
bombers. Four other officials were killed in the attack while a senior adviser to President Hamid
Karzai, Mohammed Masoon Stanekzai, was seriously injured as well.
Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, was a key player in the mujahedin that brought an end to the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s . He then served as Afghanistan's president
from 1992 until 1996 when the Taliban siezed power. After the rise of the Taliban , he served as
the nominal head of the Northern Alliance, which was embroiled in a civil war with the Taliban
until it was itself routed in a United States-led effort in December 2001. In more recent times,
Rabbani served as chairman of the Afghan High Peace Council, which has been charged with
peace negotiations with the Taliban. In that capacity, Rabbani has functioned as a key mediator.
Indeed, Rabbani was meeting with two members of the Taliban in apparent peace negotiations
when the bomb exploded at his home. It was not known if the two Taliban representatives were
part of the plot to kill the former president. Regardless, this development could not be interpreted
as anything other than a blow to the peace process in Afghanistan, and a reminder of the continued
danger and instability rocking this country. Clearly, there were extremist Islamic factions in
Afghanistan that were determined to undermine -- even destroy -- unifying efforts in a country
with a history of civil warfare.
At the close of September 2011, in the aftermath of the assassination of peace envoy, Rabbani,
Afghan President Hamid Karzai made it clear that his government was ending peace talks with
the Taliban. He noted that he believed neighboring Pakistan was the power base of the Taliban,
therefore making any negotiations with the Taliban useless. Referring to the role of Pakistan at the
helm and the Taliban in the trenches, Karzai said, "In reality we are confronted with governments
not the forces which are dependent on them. Therefore we should talk to the main side, which has
got the authority."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 118 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
By the start of October 2011, Afghan President Karzai was taking a harsh tone as he accused
Pakistan of playing a "double game" in his country's fight against militants. He accused Pakistan of
failing to cooperate on security issues. At issue were findings of an Aghan investigation that the
Pakistani-based Haqqani network, with connections to al-Qaida and the Taliban, was responsible
for Rabbani's assassination The investigation also pointed blame at Pakistan's intelligence agency
for its involvement in the killing of the Afghan statesman. These were similar to claims being made
by the United States that the Pakistan-based Haqqani network had orchestrated the September
2011 siege of Kabul, which included attacks on the United States embassy and NATO
headquarters. The United States likewise suggested complicity of the Pakistan's intelligence agency
in the siege of Kabul.
For its part, Pakistani authorities have continued to deny any connection to militant groups, the
manifold evidence linking Pakistani intelligence to the Taliban and extremist Islamist elements
notwithstanding. Meanwhile, the Haqqani network denied culpability in the assassination of
Rabbani.
Note that on Oct. 4, 2011, there was a suicide attack at the Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. As
reported by General Abdol Razaq Sherzai, the commander of the air brigade in Kandahar, during
an interview with local media: "A suicide bomber managed to bring an explosive-laden vehicle into
the airport. When security forces suspected and asked him to stop, he detonated the explosives,
killing himself alone. No one else was hurt." While the only person who died was the suicide
bomber, the attack itself raised questions about the already-poor state of national security in
Afghanistan. Indeed, the Kandahar airport was a hard target given the presence of both Afghan
and international forces in the area.
In the autumn of 2011, Afghanistan was rocked by a spate of relentless attacks, most of which
were attributed to the Taliban. On Oct. 29, 2011, a suicide attack near Darulaman Palace on the
southwestern outskirts of Kabul killed more than a dozen foreign personnel. Most of the victims
were members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the Afghan capital,
although three Afghan civilians and a police officer also died in the explosion. ISAF commander
Gen John R. Allen, said he was "saddened and outraged" at their deaths. It was one of the worst
attacks on foreign troops in Afghanistan in recent years, and came on the heels of the August 2011
case of the Taliban shooting down a United States helicopter and killing 30 special forces.
Together, they raised questions about security since it occurred in the heavily-fortified capital.
In a separate attack at the close of October 2011, a gunman wearing an Afghan army uniform
killed three Australian soldiers in the south of the country. A female youth suicide bomber
additionally carried out a suicide attack on the National Directorate of Security in the eastern
province of Kunar; she was the only death although there were several injuries to personnel. There
was also an attempted attack by the Taliban on a compound housing Western officials and military
personnel in the city of Kandahar, which was ultimately repelled following a long battle. Also in
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 119 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Kandahar, a truck bomb left at several people, including three civilians, dead around the same
period. The target of attack appeared to be the International Relief and Development (IRD), which
has been involved in reconstruction and development projects in Kandahar province. The
explosion completely destroyed the IRD office building and damaged the surrounding houses. Also
at the close of October 2011, a coordinated attack by Taliban militants on the compound housing
United Nations (UN) agencies in Kandahar left three UN employees dead.
On Nov. 6, 2011, as Afghans celebrated the Muslim festival of Eid al-Adha, at least seven people
were killed and close to 20 others were wounded in a suicide attack in Baghlan province. The
suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his vest just as worshipers were leaving the
mosque in Old Baghlan City after prayers. On Nov. 8, 2011, an Afghan soldier opened fire on
three Australian military trainers in Uruzgan, seriously wounding them. The attacker fled the scene
in an army vehicle but was being sought. Only a week before, a similar incident left three
Australian troops dead. Around the same time, the governor of Paktika's Sarwaza district,
Mohammad Akbar, died on from injuries sustained in a roadside attack.
With the death toll in Afghanistan rising over the course of less than a week, the elusive Taliban
leader, Mullah Omar, emerged to deliver a message. Speaking on the the eve of Eid al-Adha,
Mullah Omar pledged to continue fighting against NATO-led forces in Afghanistan and the
Western-backed government of the country. He was quoted as saying, "Our courageous
Mujahideen (holy warriors) have been engaging in Jihad (holy war) against a cruel and incursive
enemy for a noble cause and presenting countless sacrifices on this path every day." Mullah Omar
also urged Taliban fighters to avoid hurting civilians.
Meanwhile, NATO forces registered a battle victory as November 2011 moved into its second
week. Militants fighters reportedly carried out an attack on a NATO outpost in Afghanistan's
eastern province of Paktika close to the border with Pakistan, but were quickly repelled by NATO
aircraft and ground forces. As many as 60 militant fighters were killed in the counter-assault while
there were no coalition or civilian casualties. In an interview with BBC News, Mokhlis Afghan, a
spokesman for the governor of Paktika,said: "Between 60 and 70 insurgents attacked a joint
NATO-Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) base in Bermal district's Margha area on the
border with the Durand line. The insurgents were armed with heavy and light weapons. In
retaliation, ANSF launched their own attack. After a fierce gun battle and air support from NATO,
all of the insurgents were killed. There were no civilian, NATO or ANSF casualties." In this case,
there were conflicting accounts as to whether the fighters were from the Taliban or from the
Taliban-affiliated Haqqani network. There was some evidence that the Haqqani network may
have been trying to exact revenge for a recent offensive that resulted in the killing and capture of
their commanders and fighters.
It should be noted that at the start of November 2011, reports were emerging that the Obama
administration was considering an accelerated shift of the United States' military's mission in
Afghanistan to an advisory role. High level discussions to this end were said to be underway
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 120 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
although no decisions had been made. Clearly, should such a shift beenacted , there would be
broad implications for the United States strategy in Afghanistan, potentially scaling back United
States combat duties in that country well ahead of the 2014 date when remaining troops would
finally be withdrawn.
An international conference on Afghanistan's future was set to be convened in the German city of
Bonn on Dec. 5, 2011. The gathering was to occur a decade after the previous Bonn conference;
that 2001 conference aimed to set Afghanistan on the path to peace and democracy in the
aftermath of the ousting of the Taliban from power. Now, in 2011, the main objective was the
matter of long-term international engagement with Afghanistan and the restoration of security in
that country. Of particular concern was the security scenario in 2014 when all international forces
were set to withdraw from Afghanistan, and the prevailing fears that the Taliban and its terrorist
allies could again gain strong footing in Afghanistan.
Of course, no discussion of security in Afghanistan could ensue without considering the border
with Pakistan. Indeed, the resurgent Taliban and remnants of al-Qaida were famously functioning
in the Afghan-Pak border region. Nevertheless, Pakistan made it clear that it was boycotting the
talks, as an apparent protest measure in the aftermath of the accidental NATO strike on a border
checkpoint in Pakistan in late November 2011. Moreover, news was emerging that the Pakistani
military might be temporarily withdrawing some of its troops from centers intended to coordinate
activity with international forces across the Afghan border. Pakistan was supposedly going to take
time to undergo consultations intended to improve coordination with NATO troops following the
accidental NATO strike. The United States expressed concerns about the move, saying that it
would negatively impact the efforts to work cooperatively, and risk further accidents. In the
background of this development was the growing suspicion by the United States and other Western
powers that Pakistan was complicit in attacks by the Taliban and other militant extremist groups,
such as the Haqqani network.
Note that in the early hours of Dec. 6, 2011, international news media was reporting that an
apparent suicide bombing had occurred at a shrine in Kabul. Scores of victims were reported to
have died as hundreds of people gathered at the shrine to mark the Shi'a festival of Ashura. A
second bomb blast occurred close to a Shi'a mosque in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif -- this
time with a smaller death count of four victims. These attacks against the Shi'a community in
Afghanistan were regarded as unprecedented since sectarian killings have not really been the
norm. Indeed, most attacks by extremist Islamic militants in Afghanistan in recent years have
targeted government officials or international forces. The situation only exacerbated existing fears
that the violence in Afghanistan may be turning in a sectarian direction. Days later, at least 19
Afghan civilians died as a result of a roadside bomb in southern Helmand province. Among the
dead were women and children.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 121 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Update (as of 2012/2013)
On Feb. 5, 2012, an explosion and gunfire in the southern Afghanistan city of Kandahar left nine
people dead and close to 20 other injured. The explosion was caused by a car bombing outside a
police station; it was followed by a gun fight. Among the dead were five Afghan police officers.
While there was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack, all expectations were that the
Taliban was likely responsible, given the site of the attack. Indeed, Kandahar has long been the
central stronghold of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
On Feb. 26, 2012, at least nine people died and several others were injured as a result of a suicide
car bomb attack at the Jalalabad airport in eastern Afghanistan. The victims were all civilians,
although the airport serves both civilian and international military aircraft. The Afghan Taliban
wasted little time in claiming responsibility for the attack.
Late February 2012 saw a spate of deadly protests in Afghanistan following the burning of Muslim
holy books by soldier at a United States military base near Kabul. United States officials said that
the books were destroyed inadvertently at the Bagram air base; however, this explanation did little
to quell the wave of anger among Afghans. As many as 30 people had died in the protests and
more than 200 other were injured.
Of particular concern was the death of two senior NATO officers at the hands of a young Afghan
policeman at the interior ministry in the Afghan capital. According to reports, the policeman
opened fire at close range in one of the highest security buildings in Kabul. Afghan authorities
were on the look out for the person believed to be responsible.
Meanwhile, United States President Barack Obama apologized to Afghan President Hamid Karzai
for the Koran burning incident, hoping to minimize any further violent backlash. As explained by
United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: "It was the right thing to do to have our president
on record as saying this was not intentional, we deeply regret it." Secretary of State Clinton also
criticized Republican presidential candidates in the United States for condemning President
Obama's apology, saying, "I find it somewhat troubling that our politics would enflame such a
dangerous situation in Afghanistan." Indeed, Afghanistan was now seeing unprecedented antiAmerican sentiment as a result of the Koran burning incident.
Regrets aside, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, respectively
withdrew their civilian staff from Afghan government institutions in the aftermath of the killings of
the two NATO officers. As well, Afghan President Hamid Karzai appealed for calm.
On March 11, 2012, a United States soldier reportedly went on a house-to-house killing spree in
the southern Afghan province of Kandahar, taking the lives of 17 civilians, including women and
children.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 122 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The suspect was eventually identified as Army Staff Sergeant Robert Bales -- a 38-year old soldier
who had already served three tours of duty in Iraq and was on his first deployment to Afghanistan.
Bales was diagnosed in 2010 with a traumatic brain injury after a vehicle in which he was riding
rolled over in a crash; he was, though, deemed fit for duty after that incident. According to media
reports, Bales had been drinking alcohol, which was a violation of military rules in combat zones,
and appeared to be stressed from the repeated deployments to combat zones. General John Allen,
the United States commander in Afghanistan and the head of the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan, said that Bales' medical history would be examined by the
military authorities investigating the incident. On March 19, the Associated Press reported that
Bales owed $1.5 million from a 2003 arbitration ruling that found him guilty of securities fraud
while he was working as a stockbroker. And on March 22, 2012, it was announced that Bales
would be charged with 17 counts of murder, six counts of attempted murder, six counts of
aggravated assault, as well as dereliction of duty and other violations of military law.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai called the shooting rampage "unforgivable" and "an act of terror."
In the United States, President Barack Obama said, "I am deeply saddened by the reported killing
and wounding of Afghan civilians." He continued, "I offer my condolences to the families and
loved ones of those who lost their lives, and to the people of Afghanistan, who have endured too
much violence and suffering. This incident is tragic and shocking, and does not represent the
exceptional character of our military and the respect that the United States has for the people of
Afghanistan."
United States officials said the suspect was in military custody and would be held responsible for
his actions. Indeed, United States Defense Secretary Leon Panetta offered assurances to Afghan
President Karzai, saying that the Pentagon would "spare no effort" in holding responsible Bales
accountable. In a statement, Panetta said, "This tragic incident does not reflect the commitment of
the U.S. military to protect the Afghan people and help build a strong and stable Afghanistan."
But Afghan President Karzai gave a very different impression of the handling of the massacre by
American military authorities. Karzai said in an interview that he was at “the end of the rope” due
to the United States’ lack of cooperation in investigating the incident. Moreover, Karzai was
further demanding that NATO troops end operations in rural areas, withdraw from villages, and
retreat to major bases. Karzai also called for accelerating the target date for Afghan forces to
assume security duties from 2014 to the end of 2013.
A day after the tragic rampage of violence, the Taliban entered the fray, vowing revenge for the
attack by "sick-minded American savages" on the 16 villagers in southern Afghanistan. T h e
militant Islamist Taliban promised that retribution was in the offing, asserting the following in a
statement: "The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, while sympathizing with the victims of this
savage act as part of its Islamic and human obligation, gives assurance to their heirs that it shall
take revenge from the invaders and the savage murderers for every single martyr with the help of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 123 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Allah and they shall receive punishment for their barbaric actions."
By mid-March 2012, Taliban leaders also made clear that they were suspending talks with the
United States. Such talks were aimed at stabilizing the country. Now in a climate of increased
tensions, such efforts were clearly not likely to yield positive results. That being said, the actual
statement from the Taliban did not specifically mention the rampage by the United States solider in
southern Afghanistan. Instead, the official Taliban position was that the United States was offering
"unacceptable" conditions for talks to take place, and so the group was "compelled to suspend all
dialogue with the Americans."
Meanwhile, the scene in Afghanistan was becoming more difficult. On March 13, 2012, as a
delegation visited the area of Kandahar where the tragic killing spree by the United States soldier
took place to attend a memorial service, militants carried out an attack. One Afghan soldier died as
a result. Nevertheless, the delegation -- which included two of President Karzai's brothers -- paid
compensation to the victims wounded in the attack, as well as the families of those killed. The
government of the United States suggested that it also intended to pay compensation to victims and
the families of the dead.
One day later on March 14, 2012, another hint of ongoing turbulence in Afghanistan was issued
when an Afghan driver drove a stolen truck into a fence around the airplane runway of Camp
Bastion in Helmand province, just as the aircraft carrying United States Defense Secretary Panetta
was landing.
These incidences clearly gave rise to anxieties that the killings of the Afghan villagers could reignite the spate of riots that ensued a month prior over the mishandling of Korans. At that time in
late February 2012, deadly anti-American protests broke out following the burning of Muslim holy
books by soldiers at a United States military base near Kabul. United States officials said that the
books were destroyed inadvertently at the Bagram air base; however, this explanation did little to
quell the wave of anger among Afghans.
In addition to fears over another wave of such violence was the fear that strained relations between
Afghanistan and the United States would further devolve. Afghan President Karzai's angry
accusations about the Pentagon's lack of cooperation on accountability for Bales, as well as his
demand that NATO troops retreat to major bases, fortified perceptions of devolving bilateral
relations.
A further dimension to the consequences of the killings of the Afghan villagers was the effect on
United States foreign policy regarding Afghanistan. Some evidence pointed to the fact that Bales
was suffering from extreme stress related to his fourth combat tour. With the United States
involved in its longest-running war in recent history, and with soldiers being forced to re-deploy to
harsh and difficult war zones, there was an argument to be made that such rampages -- i.e. cases
where soldiers could have some type of psychotic break -- may well occur again. With an
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 124 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
American public already war-weary after such a lengthy engagement in Afghanistan and clamoring
for "nation-building" at home on the domestic front, the calls for an even earlier exit strategy from
Afghanistan were increasing.
That being said, the United States and its closest ally, the United Kingdom, indicated that the
current schedule for ending engagement in Afghanistan would remain intact. Leaders of both
countries addressed the matter while British Prime Minister David Cameron was in the United
States for a state visit with American President Barack Obama. They said their respective countries
would end combat roles in Afghanistan by mid-to-late 2013. Before then, 23,000 United States
troops would return from Afghanistan by September 2012 (10,000 already returned in June 2011),
as promised by President Obama. For its part, the United Kingdom would send 500 British troops
home in the early autumn of 2012. These moves would assure that American and British forces
would shift from lead combat roles to support and training capacities by the second half of 2013,
with the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014.
United States President Obama said his intent was to ensure a "responsible" end to the war in
Afghanistan. Speaking of this issue, the American president said, "We have a strategy that will
allow us to responsibly wind down this [Afghan] war. We're steadily transitioning to the Afghans
who are moving into the lead. And that's going to allow us to bring our troops home. Already we're
scheduled to remove 23,000 troops by the end of this summer ... following the 10,000 that we
withdrew last year. And meanwhile, we will continue the work of devastating al-Qaida's leadership
and denying them a safe haven." Referring to the recent tragedies and unfortunate incidents that
raised tensions with Afghanistan, President Obama said, "There's no question that we face a
difficult challenge in Afghanistan, but I am ... confident that we can continue the work of meeting
our objectives, protecting our country and responsibly bringing this war to a close."
It should be noted that France was set to withdraw 1,000 of its soldiers from Afghanistan by the
end of 2012, leaving about 3,000 "in country." Belgium had begun withdrawing half of its force at
the start of 2012. Norway likewise began its withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and was
looking towards a complete exit. Spain said that 2012 would mark the start of its withdrawal of
troops from Afghanistan, with a complete exit set for 2014. Canada withdrew its combat troops in
2011 and had already made its transition to a training role in Afghanistan.
With an eye on smoothing tensions with Afghanistan, especially after Afghan President Karzai
urged a faster exit of NATO forces from his country (as noted above), President Obama reportedly
convened a telephone meeting with the Afghan leader. In that call, the White House said that
President Obama and President Karzai "affirmed that they share the goal of building capable
Afghan security forces and strengthening Afghan sovereignty so that Afghans are increasingly in
charge of their own security, with the lead for combat operations shifting to Afghan forces, with
U.S. forces in support, in 2013."
As March 2012 was entering its final week, the White House confirmed the exit schedule noting
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 125 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
that the United States would have about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan in 2013 after surge forces
withdraw from that country. Obviously, this schedule would also mean that the "date certain" for
the deadline of the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014
remained intact.
See "Special Report" below for details.
In mid-April 2012, Afghanistan was hit by a spate of attacks. Bomb explosions and gun shootings
ensued in the eastern cities of Jalalabad and Gardez as well as the capital city of Kabul. In
Jalalabad, a suicide car bomber and a suicide attacker on foot stormed the gates of the office of
NATO's provincial reconstruction team. The airport at Jalalabad was also hit by missile attacks. In
Gardez, bomb explosions and shootings were reported at the police headquarters in the downtown
portion of the city. In the Afghan capital of Kabul, shootings and bomb blasts were ongoing for an
extended period (up to 18 hours) at various locations, including the downtown Kabul Star hotel,
the parliament, diplomatic compounds such as the American and British embassies, and at an
intelligence base office. Before the spate of attacks ended, more than 50 people were dead across
Afghanistan.
While security personnel at these various locations across the country were ultimately able to repel
the Taliban who carried out these actions, the attacks made it clear that the militant Islamic enclave
was active at the start of the spring fighting season. Indeed, the Taliban wasted no time in claiming
responsibility and warning that it was launching a major spring offensive. The counter-narrative,
however, was that Afghan security forces were successful in their endeavors to secure the areas
being hit by attacks. In fact, Afghan security officials were reportedly able to kill 13 militants and
capture 15 others, including two apparent suicide bombers who were detained before they could
reach their targets.
As April 2012 entered its final week, Afghan security officials announced they had foiled a
massive attack on the Afghan capital of Kabul. Coming only a week after the spate of attacks
discussed above, the seizure of 10 tonnes of explosives in a truck along with the arrest of five
militants, demonstrated that Afghanistan remained in a state of turmoil. That being said, as was the
case the previous week, it was also clear that Afghan security forces were getting more adept at
protecting the homeland. It should be noted that three of the militants who were arrested in
connection with the attempted terror plot on Kabul were Pakistani nationals. All five of the
suspects reportedly confessed to coordinating the plan of attack with two Taliban commanders
who themselves were linked with Pakistan's main intelligence organization -- the Inter-Services
Intelligence agency (ISI). Afghan security forces said that in addition to foiling this attempted
attack on Kabul, they were also able to uncover a plot by the Pakistan-based Haqqani network to
assassinate Vice-President Mohammed Khalili.
In mid-May 2012, a senior peace negotiator was shot to death in Afghanistan's capital of Kabul.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 126 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Arsala Rahmani -- a leading member of Afghanistan's High Peace Council -- was part of the
Afghan effort to forge some sort of peace agreement with the Taliban. Rahmani was shot by an
unidentified gunman while he was traveling en route to work in western Kabul. Undoubtedly
questions would be raised about why Rahmani was not accompanied by a bodyguard. It should be
noted that this killing occurred a year after the chief of Afghanistan's peace council was killed in a
suicide attack. In 2011, Burhannudin Rabbani was killed by a bomb concealed in the turban of a
suicide attacker who was pretending to be a Taliban peace envoy. Now, in 2012, Rahmani's death
was a clear blow to the peace process in Afghanistan and the outreach effort to the Taliban. Most
experts conclude that peace in Afghanistan cannot be realized without some sort of peace
agreement with the Taliban, even as the Afghan Security Forces were getting ready to take control
over broad swaths of the country. That being said, the Taliban made the claim that they were not
behind the killing of Rahmani.
Days after the assassination of Rahmani, at least six policemen and a civilian were killed and more
than a dozen others were wounded in a suicide attack on a governor's compound in western
Afghanistan. The assault was carried out by four individuals (including one suicide bomber) in the
province of Farah that borders Iran. The suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his
body at the gates of the compound while three insurgents disguised in police uniforms charged
inside using rocket propelled grenades, hand grenades, and small arms, to carry out their attack. A
gun battle ensued for about an hour before the three attackers were themselves shot dead by
security forces. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack; however, the Taliban
has long been active in Farah province.
The spate of violence saw little end as on May 19, 2012, a suicide bomber killed at least ten people
-- including children -- at a checkpoint in the eastern Afghan province of Khost. The attack
occurred when the suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden vest just as police were checking
vehicles. Afghan authorities said that the objective of this particular attack was clearly to target
both police and civilians. There was no claim of responsibility in this case, although attacks at
police checkpoints are typical of Taliban militants.
It should be noted that the spate of attacks occurred during the spring so-called "fighting season"
and just ahead of a NATO summit in the United States that was intended to focus on
Afghanistan's security transition. Despite this wave of violence, United States President Barack
Obama affirmed his country's exit schedule of combat troops in 2013 with a final withdrawal in
2014. NATO, meanwhile, emphasized its intent to transfer security of the country to local Afghan
forces.
On June 20, 2012, a suicide bombing in the eastern Afghan city of Khost left more than 20 people
dead, including three NATO soldiers, two police, several civilians, and a local interpreter. More
than 35 others were wounded in the attack. The suicide bomber reportedly used an explosivesladen motorcycle laden to target a joint NATO-Afghan military checkpoint at a crowded bazaar.
The United States embassy condemned the attack, saying that it showed how the Taliban and
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 127 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
other extremist militant groups were "indiscriminately continuing their murderous campaign against
all, including women and children." It was not known if the Taliban was actually responsible for
the Khost suicide bombing; however, the region of southern and eastern Afghanistan have been
hotbeds of insurgent groups including the Taliban and the Naquin group, Given the fact that
Naquin militants have often targeted United States and Afghan troops using suicide bombers,
blame in this case was moving in that direction. It should be noted that a separate attack occurred
in the southern Logar province, where a roadside bomb left six civilians on a wagon dead.
A day later on June 21, 2012, it was the Taliban who claimed responsibility for an attack on a
hotel outside Kabul. The Taliban fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns
charged the Spozhmai Hotel in the area of Lake Qargha, effectively spurring a gun battle with
security forces. Hostages -- including women and children -- were seized although many were
subsequently released. Still, about 20 deaths -- including those of hotel guests and the Taliban
fighters -- were reported at the Spozhmai, while survivors recounted stories of jumping out of
hotel windows to escape the terrorists. According to Reuters News, the Taliban said it selected the
Spozhmai Hotel as a target for attack because it was a frequent venue for parties attended by
foreigners and wealthy Afghans.
On July 8, 2012, a roadside bomb in eastern Afghanistan killed six soldiers serving under the aegis
of NATO forces. The United States Pentagon subsequently confirmed that the fallen soldiers were
all United States citizens. On the same day, more than a dozen civilians died as a result of two
roadside bombs in the southern Kandahar province. Women and children were among the dead.
Meanwhile, videotaped footage emerged showing the assassination-style execution of a woman in a
village to the north of Kabul at the hands of the Taliban. According to the reports, the woman was
accused of adultery. The incident was reminiscent of the dark chapter of modern Afghan history
when the country was under the rule of the Taliban and human rights for women were at a nadir.
At that time, executions of women for so-called immorality was common place. It was clear that
more than a decade later, such episodes were not simply to be consigned to the history books. In
fact, a report by Action Aid suggested that violence against women in Afghanistan was on an
upward swing.
On Sept. 4, 2012, Afghanistan was hit by another bout of violence when a suicide bomber
detonated the explosives strapped to his body during a funeral, resulting in the deaths of several
people. The carnage occurred as people gathered for the funeral ceremony of a tribal elder in the
border district of Dur Baba in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarha. The suicide bombing left
at least 25 people dead, including the son of a district governor. The district governor himself,
Hamesha Gul, was among the dozens of people injured in the attack. Authorities placed the
blame for the attack on the Taliban, which appeared to be exacting revenge against the locals who
carried out an uprising against Taliban militants in the remote area of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 128 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Days later on Sept. 8, 2012, a teenage suicide bomber carried out a attack close to the entrance of
the main NATO headquarters in the Afghan capital city of Kabul. The suicide bombing clearly
targeted the headquarters of the NATO-led international coalition (known as the International
Security Assistance Force, or, ISAF), which was located in close proximity to the United States
embassy, the embassy of Italy, and the Afghan presidential palace. The teenage suicide bomber
was riding a motorcycle and detonated his explosives as he drew close to the entrance of the
NATO complex. Several people were killed as a result of the attack, including children; no NATO
personnel were believed to have been casualties. As stated by a police official in an interview with
Agence France Presse, "Most of the victims are young children who gather around ISAF to sell
small items to soldiers leaving or getting into the base."
Two days after on Sept. 10, 2012, a suicide attack in the Afghan city of Kunduz left 16 people
dead, including 11 police officers, while more than 20 others were injured. Afghan authorities in
the area said the security personnel had been specifically targeted in the attack. A month prior,
Kunduz had been the site of violence when several attacks were carried out at the end of the
Muslim month of Ramadan.
On Oct. 1, 2012, a suicide bombing in the eastern city of Khost in Afghanistan killed 20 people.
The victims included civilians, police, three NATO troops, and an Afghan interpreter for NATO.
Approximately 60 people were injured and with many of them in critical condition, the death toll
was expected to rise. The suicide bomber was reported to have been riding on a motorcycle and
targeted a joint patrol of Afghan and NATO troops as they exited their vehicles in a crowded part
of Khost. The suicide bomber was not a lone actor as the Taliban wasted no time in claiming
responsibility for the attack.
Then, in mid-October 2012, a mixture of suicide attacks and roadside bombs left at least five
Afghan security staff dead in the southern province of Kandahar. In one incident involving a a
suicide bomber, at least three intelligence officers died outside an intelligence agency building.
Included in the dead were a Central Intelligence Agency officer and a United States army
intelligence analyst. An investigation was ongoing to determine if the attack was a so-called "inside
job" that included Taliban infiltrators. Meanwhile, in Zabul province, a roadside left two
policemen dead and wounded three others.
On Oct. 26, 2012, more than 40 people had died as a result of a suicide bombing at a mosque in
Maymana, the capital of Faryab province in Afghanistan. Children were reported to be among the
dead. The suicide bomber struck as people gathered at the Eid Gah mosque to mark Eid al-Adha.
In an interview with Agence France Presse, deputy provincial governor Abdul Satar Barez
explained the attack as follows: "We had just finished Eid al-Adha prayers and we were
congratulating and hugging each other. Suddenly a big explosion took place and the area was full of
dust and smoke and body parts of police and civilians were all over the place. It was a very
powerful explosion. On survivor on the scene said the suicide bomber was wearing a police
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 129 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
uniform, which appeared to have helped him evade scrutiny and get past security. The attack came
on the heels of the assassination of a former Taliban commander, who had left the extremist entity
and defected to the government.
On Nov. 8, 2012, a series of attacks by extremist Taliban militants left more than 20 people dead
across Afghanistan. In one case, a roadside bomb left ten people dead -- including women and
children traveling on a minibus to a wedding in the southern Helmand province. In Laghman, in the
eastern part of the country, an attack using an improvised explosive device (IED) killed five Afghan
soldiers. The terrain of Laghman, which includes both mountains and valleys, has become an
attractive target area for the Taliban, which has stepped up attacks there. In the volatile southern
province of Kandahar, which has also been a long-standing stronghold for the Taliban, three police
died as a result of an attack by a suicide bomber outside a police station in that area. In Zabul
province, two boys were the victims when a remote-controlled bomb in a bazaar was detonated
there.
At the start of December 2012, the Taliban in Afghanistan attempted to carry out multiple suicide
and armed attacks at NATO military base in Jalalabad. Three Afghan security forces, two
civilians, and nine militants died in the fracas that ensued as a result of those attacks. Fighting
went for two hours, according to reports from Afghanistan, before the situation was stabilized.
Elsewhere in Afghanistan, attacks at police checkpoints in Baghlan to the north of Kabul left two
police officers and two Taliban militants dead. In Uruzgan province, three people, including two
children, died as a result of a suicide bomb attack near a girls' school. Meanwhile, one NATO
coalition soldier was killed in southern Afghanistan on Dec. 2, 2012. These incidences aside, joint
Afghan security and NATO forces during the same period announced the successful elimination of
more than two dozen Taliban militants in operations across the country. A statement from the
Afghan Interior Ministry read as follows: "During the operations in Nangarhar, Baghlan, Balkh,
Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Maidan Wardak, Logar, Farah, Helmand and Nimroz provinces, 34
more insurgents have been detained."
On Jan. 25, 2013, a suicide bomber used a vehicle to attack a NATO convoy in the Kapisa
province; several people were killed, including five civilians, while more than a dozen others were
wounded in that incident. Then, on Jan. 26, 2013, a suicide bomber on a motorbike killed 10
police officers in the northern province of Kunduz. On the same day, a suicide bomber on a
bicycle killed two people -- a police officer and a civilian -- in the province of Ghazni province.
The next day, on Jan. 27, 2013, a roadside bomb left at least ten people dead in the southern city
of Kandahar. Police officers were among the dead in that attack. There were no immediate claims
of responsibility in either case although suspicion fell on Taliban-linked insurgents.
In mid-March 2013, several people died at the hands of a suicide bomber at a sports event in the
Imam Sahib district of Kunduz province in north-eastern Afghanistan. Among the dead were the
brother and father of speaker of the Afghan parliament, with authorities warning that the death toll
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 130 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
was expected to rise. It was not confirmed if they had been targets of attack or not. The attack
took place as hundreds of spectators watched the traditional sport of buzkashi, which is similar to
polo and played on horseback but uses the headless carcass of a goat instead of a ball.
Meanwhile, on March 11, 2013, a man clad in the uniform of an Afghan police officer opened fire
on security forces at a police station in Afghanistan, killing two United States troops and three
Afghan troops, and wounding several others. The attack took place as United States and Afghan
troops were holding an early morning meeting. Officials said the attack was an "insider" operation
and the killer was identified as a member of the Afghan security forces. Although the killer was
eventually eliminated and the area was said to have been secured, the United States military
characterized the violence as a "betrayal."
This incident in Wardak occurred only one day after United States special forces withdrew from
the province. It also occurred just after the Afghan government, led by President Hamid Karzai,
made the bizarre assertion of collusion between United States forces and the Taliban. Karzai made
this claim on March 10, 2013, following a bombing in the Aghan capital of Kabul that left around
ten people dead. Karzai suggested that there were "ongoing daily talks between Taliban, American
and foreigners in Europe and in the Gulf states" and advanced the notion that the "Taliban want
longer presence of foreigners -- not their departure from Afghanistan." The commander of the
NATO-led forces in Afghanistan, Marine General Joseph Dunford, took vociferous exception to
Karzai's claim, declaring: "We have fought too hard over the past 12 years. We have shed too
much blood over the past 12 years. We have done too much to help the Afghan Security Forces
grow over the last 12 years to ever think that violence or instability would be to our advantage." It
should be noted that Karzai has described by political insiders, including a fomer United States
ambassador to Afghanistan, as having a history of erratic behavior.
On April 3, 2013, Taliban militants carried out a series of bombings and gun battles in the western
province of Farah in Afghanistan, located close to the border with Iran. The militants started the
assault by detonating an explosives-laden army vehicle located close to a governor's office and two
banks. Ferocious gun battles between the Taliban fighters and Afghan security forces followed,
while the militants clothed in military garb also tried to unsuccessfully release a number of fellow
extremist fighters who were being transferred to a courthouse for trial. The entire series of attacks
left more than 50 people dead and close to 100 others injured. Most of the victims were reported
to be civilians -- many of whom were in the aforementioned banks. The incident was a blow to
Afghan intelligence and security forces since the attackers were able to get past several checkpoints
to get to the targeted area.
Days later on April 6, 2013, a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden vehicle in the
southern Zahul province of Afghanistan, located close to the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar on
the border with Pakistan. The suicide bombing occurred as two convoys were passing one another
-- one transporting the provincial governor and another carrying members of the United States
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 131 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
military. The suicide bombing left several people dead including five Americans and one Afghan.
The victims were composed of three soldiers, two civilians, and one doctor, all of whom were
serving under the aegis of NATO forces in Afghanistan. It should be noted a United States
diplomat -- Anne Smedinghoff -- was among the five Americans killed in the car bombing in
Zahul.
Then, on April 7, 2013, there were claims that 11 children died as a result of a NATO air strike in
eastern Afghanistan, which also reportedly killed a number of Taliban militants. Afghan President
Hamid Karzai condemned the deaths of the children and his office released a statement noting that
a ban on aerial attacks on civilian areas was in effect. But the statement also condemned the use of
civilian shields by extremists as follows: "The president also strongly condemns the Taliban's tactic
of using civilians and their homes as their shields." A statement from the NATO-led International
Security Assistant Force (Isaf) read as follows: "No Isaf personnel were involved on the ground,
but Isaf provided fire support from the air, killing several insurgents. We are also aware of reports
of several civilians injured from the engagement, but no reports of civilian deaths. Isaf takes all
reports of civilian casualties seriously, and we are currently assessing the incident." It should be
noted that the area of the air strike in eastern Afghanistan -- Kunar -- is characterized by dense
forest and known to be as a hiding place for extremist militants.
On April 8, 2013, a roadside bomb in the volatile Afghan province of Wardak left nine people dead
and more than 20 other injured. Women and children were among the victims. The explosion hit a
bus known for daily service between the capital of Kabul and the province of Ghazni. The area of
Wardak has become something of a flashpoint, given the dissonance between NATO forces
operating there and the Afghan government, with Afghan President Hamid Karzai accusing NATO
forces of harassing civilians in Wardak.
The third week of April 2013 saw eastern Afghanistan hit by violence. On April 19, 2013, Taliban
fighters attacked a police checkpoint in the Andar district of Ghazni province, killing 13 police
officers. Days later on 21, 2013, the Taliban ambushed a security checkpoint in the Dayak
district of Ghazni province, killing six police officers. Ghazni has been a known stronghold of the
al-Qaida terror enclave. In another incident, three people died at a shopping bazaar in the Paktika
province, which borders Ghazni, at the hands of a suicide bomber. Among the dead in that attack
was Asanullah Sadat, the former district governor. The Taliban made it clear they were
responsible for this attack, noting that Sadat was the specific target for assassination because of his
close relations with both the Afghan government and the United States.
Other parts of the country were not immune from the violence. In a disturbing act, Taliban
militants cuts off a hand and foot off of two villagers on the basis of claims that they escorted
coalition convoys in the western Herat province. While the Taliban has a long record of killing
government employees or civilians deemed to be helping coalition forces in Afghanistan, the
removal of limbs as punishment for "enemy collaboration" was a new measure.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 132 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Meanwhile, on April 21, 2013, reports were emerging that more than 70 school girls may have
been poisoned by noxious gases. The Taliban and other extremist Islamic entities have long
opposed the notion of education for females and have, in the past, been responsible for mass
poisonings at schools that educate girls. It was thus possible that this incident at the Bibi Maryam
school in the Takhar province was the target of a poisoning attack. The Takhar governor's
spokesman, Sulaiman Moradi, seemed to substantiate this view as he blamed "enemies of the
government and the country" for the illness suffered by the students and made it clear that the
objective of the attack was to prevent girls from attending school. While many of the victims were
hospitalized in critical condition, some were released after receiving medical treatment. Samples of
their blood were dispatched to the Ministry of Public Health for investigative purposes.
The steady stream of violence and bloodshed in April 2013 -- with over 200 people dead in this
month alone -- was an example of the findings of an independent security entity. The the
Afghanistan NGO Safety Office warned that 2013 was shaping up to be one of the most violent
years in Afghanistan since the start of the war against the Taliban and extremist Jihadists such as
al-Qaida. The report issued the following finding: "We assess that the current re-escalation trend
will be preserved throughout the entire season and that 2013 is set to become the second most
violent year after 2011."
On May 24, 2013, Taliban militants carried out an attack in the Afghan capital of Kabul on the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) -- an operational subsidiary of the United Nations'
Assistance Mission. The attack started with a suicide car bombing and then triggered a five-hour
gun battle with security forces. The fracas was punctuated by intermittent explosions. One
Afghan police officer was killed and 10 other people -- including three staff members of the IOM
an one employee of the International Labor Organization -- were injured as a result of the
violence. It should be noted that approximately a week earlier in mid-May 2013, a separate suicide
car bombing in Kabul left six Americans and nine Afghans dead. Both attacks were attributed to
the Taliban and were linked to the group's ambition to repel Western forces operating in
Afghanistan and ultimately re-establish an ultra-Islamist extremist state in Afghanistan.
On May 29, 2013, bloodshed again marked the Afghan landscape as Taliban militants attacked a
Red Cross office in the city of Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. Afghan police said the militants
tossed a grenade into the Red Cross compound, sparking a fierce gun battle between the Taliban
and security forces that went on for at least two hours. Although the head of the Red Cross
office was injured in the ensuing fracas, seven foreign Red Cross workers were successfully
rescued. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) responded to the attack with the
head of operations for South Asia, Jacques de Maio, saying via Twitter: "We condemn this attack
in the strongest possible terms." It should be noted that the International Committee of the Red
Cross has long been regarded as a neutral entity and has rarely been the target of attack due to the
humanitarian nature of its work. Not surprisingly, in an interview with the Associated Press, Robin
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 133 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Waudo, the communications coordinator of the ICRC said: "We are very concerned that the office
has been attacked deliberately, knowing that the ICRC is a neutral organization working in
Afghanistan for almost three decades to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of the
armed conflict."
On May 30, 2013, Afghan authorities said that an attack on Kabul had been thwarted. Officials
from the National Directorate of Security indicated that a terror cell of the Pakistan-based extremist
Islamic Haqqani network cell had the goal of carrying out a series of major -- potentially
devastating -- attacks on government buildings. The National Directorate of Security said its
intelligence forces carried out a raid on a militant stronghold in the Khair Khana area of Kabul,
leading to the death of six people, including at least one militant from the Haqqani network, and
the discovery of a significant cache of weapons and ammunition . On the scene, Pakistani mobile
cards were also recovered, adding to suspicions that the Pakistani intelligence agency may have
been complicit in the plan. For its part, Pakistan offered no comment on that suggestion of
involvement.
On June 3, 2013, a suicide bombing targeted an attack on an international military patrol in
eastern Afghanistan. The suicide bomber was driving on a motorcycle as he charged the convoy
and detonated the explosives strapped to his body. The attack left more than a dozen people -most of them children -- dead. Other fatalities included two NATO soldiers and an Afghan police
officer. About 20 other persons were wounded in the same incident at a market in the Samkani
district of the Paktia province close to the border with Pakistan. In a separate attack on the same
day, a roadside bomb in the eastern province of Laghman left seven people dead.
On June 10, 2013, Islamic militants seized a building close to the airport in Kabul, which is also the
site of the NATO military base. Afghan security forces then engaged the militants and a fierce
fire fight ensued. With the extremist militants firing rocket propelled grenades into the area,
flights were canceled at Kabul international airport and embassies located in that area of Kabul
were placed on "lock down." The violence ultimately ended with the deaths of seven gunmen.
Afghan officials said the attack had been dealt with with no assistance from international forces
while the Taliban claimed responsibility.
On June 11, 2013, a suicide bomb attack occurred outside the Supreme Court in Kabul. At least
16 people were killed and more than 40 others were wounded in the incident. That attack ensued
as an Islamic extremist militant drove an explosives-laden car drove a car directly into buses
transporting court staff. The Taliban again took responsibility, this time dispatching a statement
that claimed to kill judges who "obey Western powers."
On June 18, 2013 -- the very same day NATO transferred responsibility for security to Afghan
forces -- a blast in western Kabul left three people dead and dozens injured. Afghan officials said
the intended target of attack was Mohammad Mohaqiq, a politician from the minority Hazara
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 134 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
community, who survived the attack. However, several of his bodyguards were among the
wounded.
On June 25, an attack broke out close to the Afghan presidential palace in Kabul. Militants
disguised in security uniforms and carrying falsified identification cards used guns, grenades, and
bombs in the assault, which appeared to initially target the eastern gate of the presidential palace,
but extended to the Ariana Hotel. Ultimately, the attack left eights militants and six security guards
dead although President Hamid Karzai was reported to be safe. The Taliban claimed responsibility
for this assault, which lasted several hours and was ultimately neutralized by Afghan security
forces.
It should be noted that the presidential palace and the Ariana Hotel are located in the central
district of Shash Darak -- one of the safest and most heavily-guarded areas of Afghanistan's
capital city. Indeed, both the headquarters for both the Defense Ministry the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force, were in close proximity, while a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) office was located at the Ariana Hotel.
Meanwhile, peace talks were on the agenda in Afghanistan in June 2013 between the Afghan
government and the Taliban. However, less than 24 hours after the Taliban opened an office in
Qatar, and before the discussion could ever commence, the Afghan government walked away from
the negotiating table. It should be noted that Afghanistan also broke off talks with the United
States on future military cooperation beyond 2014 -- when United States forces were scheduled to
fully withdraw from Afghanistan.
United States and NATO officials have been consistent advocates of bilateral negotiations between
the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, as they believe that some sort of ceasefire
agreement must be forged between the two sides if Afghanistan hopes to have a stable future. But
previous proposals for peace have ended in failure, and this effort was already on the rocks.
Afghan President Karzai said he was protesting the United States' outreach to the Taliban, which
apparently Karzai viewed as objectionable. Of particular concern to Karzai was the title of the
Taliban office in Qatar, as well as the Taliban flag flying over the office compound. A
spokesperson for President Karzai said "We oppose the title -- the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan - because such a thing doesn't exist." The spokesperson continued, "The U.S. was aware of the
president's stance." From the point of President Karzai, the Taliban was attempting to portray itself
as a government in exile. Accordingly, the Afghan president made it clear that it would not be
engaging in peace talks unless those activities were "Afghan-led."
On July 2, 2013, the Taliban launched an attack on a logistics company that supplies NATO and
United States forces in the Afghan capital of Kabul. The attack began with a suicide bombing at
the gate of the compound, but continued with a gun battle with security forces that went on for 30
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 135 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
minutes. Five guards and two civilians were among the victims in the attack.
The assault at this logistics firm was the latest in a series of attacks on the Afghan capital of Kabul
in recent times. Only a week earlier, an attack broke out close to the Afghan presidential palace in
Kabul. Militants disguised in security uniforms and carrying falsified identification cards used
guns, grenades, and bombs in the assault, which appeared to initially target the eastern gate of the
presidential palace, but extended to the Ariana Hotel. Ultimately, the attack left eights militants and
six security guards dead although President Hamid Karzai was reported to be safe. The Taliban
claimed responsibility for that assault as well.
But violence was also occurring elsewhere in Afghanistan. On July 5, 2013, a suicide bomber
dressed in a police uniform killed a dozen people at a police station in the southern province of
Uruzgan. Most of the victims were police officers on a lunch break. Because the police station
was located at Tirin Kot in the vicinity of the road to Kandahar -- the Taliban's stronghold -- all
expectations were that the Islamic militant entity was behind this attack as well. In a separate attack
on the same day, two children died as a result of a roadside bomb in the Chora district.
Meanwhile, at the Spin Boldak border with Pakistan, a suicide bomber killed another two
individuals, including one border police officer.
Note: This spate of attacks aimed to display the Taliban's capacity to infiltrate security protocols
and strike at high value targets in the Afghan capital of Kabul. There also seemed to be no lull in
the efforts by the militants to carry out their spring fighting, irrespective of the fact that they were
getting ready to engage in peace talks. In fact, there was an emerging theory that the attacks in
Kabul, and specifically on the presidential palace, were aimed at getting concessions at the future
peace talks.. Meanwhile, the wave of attacks revitalized doubts about the ability of Afghan forces
to combat the violence and unrest, particularly with the full withdrawal of NATO combat troops by
the end of 2014.
On Aug. 13, 2013, the Taliban abducted a female member of parliament in Afghanistan. Fariba
Ahmadi Kakar was kidnapped in the central province of Ghazni as she and her three daughters
were traversing a rural part of the country. Kakar was abducted by armed gunmen in full view of
her children who were also taken with her. The children were subsequently freed in an operation
involving joint Afghan intelligence and NATO forces; however, Kakar remained in Taliban captivity
and was relocated to a new hiding spot. The Taliban has demanded that four Islamist extremists of
their ranks be released from prison in exchange for Kakar.
The disturbing action marked the first time a female member of parliament has been targeted for
attack or abduction by extremist Islamists in Afghanistan. That being said, Afghanistan was seeing
an increase in anti-female violence with prominent Afghan women being the preferred targets.
Significantly, a month earlier in July 2013, the most senior female police officer was shot to death
on her way to work in the southern Helmand province. More recently in August 2013, there was
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 136 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
an assassination attack on the family of a female senator, Rooh Gul, that left her daughter dead.
As such, there were rising anxieties that the oppression of women -- so common in Talibangoverned Afghanistan prior to the ousting of the Taliban in 2001 -- was making a comeback.
Whereas the oppression of women was administered under the aegis of the feared "Vice and Virtue
Ministry" during the period of Taliban rule, women have continued to be persecuted by the
Taliban in Afghanistan, which was now resorting to extra-judicial means.
On Sept. 2, 2013, Taliban militants attacked a military base in eastern Afghanistan that hosts
United States and other international troops operating in that country. The incident occurred when
Taliban militants set NATO supply trucks ablaze along the main highway leading to the Torkham
base in Nangarhar province. A protracted gun battle followed, ending in the deaths of three
militants. There were no death incurred by either Afghan and American forces and the militants
were not allowed to enter the base.
On Sept. 2, 2013, Taliban militants attacked a military base in eastern Afghanistan that hosts
United States and other international troops operating in that country. The incident occurred when
Taliban militants set NATO supply trucks ablaze along the main highway leading to the Torkham
base in Nangarhar province. A protracted gun battle followed, ending in the deaths of three
militants. There were no deaths incurred by either Afghan and American forces and the militants
were not allowed to enter the base. As noted by the International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan, "Our initial assessment of this morning's events, which occurred in the vicinity of a
forward operating base located in Nangarhar province, is that it was an attempted but unsuccessful
coordinated attack by enemy forces."
While that outcome was regarded as good news, the fact of the matter was that the damage to the
NATO supply vehicles was estimated to be extremely high. For its part, a spokesperson for the
Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. The general consensus was that increased violence at
the hands of the Taliban was being driven by the extremist Islamist group's desire to display its
influence ahead of the planned withdrawal of United States-led international forces from
Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Undoubtedly, the Taliban was also testing its effectiveness against
local Afghan forces. These local Afghan forces would have to confront the security challenges in
Afghanistan on their own from 2014 and beyond.
Ten days after the attack on the military base, there was an attack outside the United States
consulate in the western city of Herat. According to reports from the ground, a suicide bomber
detonated the explosives placed inside his vehicle outside the diplomatic compound. Soon
thereafter, a truck arrived on the scene and was used as the base from which to fire rocket
propelled grenades. That truck ultimately exploded, effectively damaging the consulate complex.
Then, other assailants opened fire using assault rifles and attempted to storm the complex. Fighting
thus ensued between security forces and Taliban fighters, who were behind the attack. The fracas
left several Afghan police either dead or injured, and the outer perimeter of the consulate complex
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 137 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
damaged. Accordingly, the Taliban fighters were able to take direct aim at the consulate structure
itself. Two Afghan police and a consulate guard were reported to have been killed in the battle,
while 17 civilians, including women an children, were injured. However, the Taliban fighters who
launched the attack were ultimately vanquished with the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (Isaf) reporting via Twitter that the United States consulate was secure and "with
all enemy forces being killed." As well, a spokesperson for the United States Department of State
said in an interview with the Associated Press that "all consulate personnel" were safe.
It should be noted that this attack on a United States' diplomatic facility occurred roughly a year
after the infamous attack on the United States embassy in Benghazi, Libya, and around the 12th
anniversary of the tragic terror attacks in the United States at the hands of the Taliban's ally -- alQaida. Indeed, it was the 2001 terror attacks on the United States by al-Qaida that spurred the
United States' military effort in Afghanistan, ultimately leading to the ousting of the Taliban from
power. Since that time, the Taliban has been on a relentless quest to return to the helm in
Afghanistan, with the presence of international forces in that country being its biggest obstacle to
achieving that end. With the withdrawal of the remaining United States troops from Afghanistan
slated to occur in 2014, it was to be seen if the Taliban would achieve it aspiration.
On Sept. 20, 2013, northern Afghanistan was the scene of violence as militants carried out an
attack in the province of Badakhshan -- located in the Pamir and Hindu Kush mountain ranges.
At least 18 Afghan police officers died and more than a dozen were wounded when Taliban
militants launched an ambush on police returning from an anti-insurgent operation in the
provincial capital.
It should be noted that around this period, Pakistan announced that it was releasing its leading
Taliban leader, Abdul Ghani Baradar, from jail. Because Baradar was one of few Taliban leaders
interested in pursuing a negotiated peace settlement to end an ongoing conflict between the Islamic
militants and the authorities, the government of Afghanistan welcomed the move. It was to be
seen if the release of Baradar in Pakistan would influence the prospects for peace -- or at least,
increased stability -- in Afghanistan where the Taliban has been carrying out a relentless campaign
of violence, and where international troops were expected to exit the country in 2014.
In October 2013, United States special forces raided a terrorist enclave in Afghanistan. The
operation took place in eastern Afghanistan, ultimately ending in the capture of a senior Pakistan
Taliban commander, Latif Mehsud. Few details were made available following this operation,
although Afghan officials admitted that Latif Mehsud was seized as he was returning from
negotiations over a prison exchange deal in the eastern Afghan province of Logar and transferred
to the Bagram base close to the Afghan capital of Kabul. The incident apparently raised the ire of
Afghan President Hamid Karzai, however, the United States seemed undeterred and confident in
the wisdom if its action. The United States Department of State noted that Latif Mehsud was a
"terrorist leader," a stalwart of the Pakistani Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, and the Pakistani
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 138 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Taliban was believed to be responsible for the attempted bombing of Times Square in New York in
2010. Furthermore, around the same time that Latif Mehsud was seized, Hakimullah Mehsud
said in an interview that the Pakistani Taliban would continue to target "America and its friends" in
its campaign of terror.
In mid-October 2013, Islamist extremist militants from the Taliban assassinated the governor of
the Afghan province of Logar. It was not known if Governor Arsala Jamal was targeted because
of his close relationship with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, or simply because he was the
governor of Logar and thus deemed a high value target by the Taliban. There were also suggestions
that the assassination of the governor of Logar may have been related to the raid by United States
special forces in eastern Afghanistan, ultimately ending in the capture of a senior Pakistan Taliban
commander, Latif Mehsud (discussed just above). The seizure of Mehsud by United States forces
in the province where Arsala Jamal was governor may have been a motivating factor for the
Taliban, and was sure to continue to blight President Karzai who was walking a tightrope of trying
to deal with the security threat posed by th Taliban, while also showing that he was not controlled
by foreign forces. Of course, the seizure of Mehsud in Afghan territory, the death of one of his
stalwarts, and the overall continued security crisis that characterized Afghanistan in 2013 made it
clear that Karzai was seeing little success in this goal.
On Oct. 18, 2013, Taliban Islamic militants attacked a convoy of vehicles belonging to foreign
forces in the Afghan capital of Kabul, leaving two people dead and several other wounded.
Children were among the casualties. The attack commenced when a suicide bomber detonated the
explosives in his car close to the area of "Green Village" -- a residential compound for military
contractors and civilian staff. That bombing yielded the destruction of several vehicles owned by
international powers operating in Afghanistan. That initial assault was followed an apparent gun
battle. Ultimately, the assailants were not able to enter the compound. Nevertheless, the Taliban
was eager to claim responsibility for the incident with a Taliban spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid,
saying on Twitter: "This attack was carried out on a foreign invaders' convoy and also the
important Green Village center."
In the last week of October 2013, a roadside bomb in the Ander district of Ghazni province left
close to 20 people dead. Afghan officials said that the victims were guests traveling in a mini-bus
to a wedding and that the vehicle was completely destroyed in the blast. Most of the victims were
believed to be women and children. It should be noted that the Taliban denied responsibility for
this particular attack; however, roadside bombs are frequently used by the Taliban against high
value targets, such as military and political officials, and often end up killing civilians as well. Also
of note was the fact that the Ander district has been characterized by NATO as one of the most
dangerous zones in Ghazni province.
On Nov. 16, 2013, a suicide bombing occurred in the Afghan capital city of Kabul with deadly
results. Indeed, as many as ten people were reported to have been killed and more than 20 others
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 139 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
were injured as a result of the suicide attack for which the Taliban soon claimed responsibility.
Included in the dead was one police officer while most of the victims were said to be civilians.
The explosion took place close to a compound where the council of tribal elders, who make up
Afghanistan's Loya Jirga, were expected to gather the following week to discuss an emerging
security deal between the Aghan government and the government of the United States. At issue
was an agreement for United States military forces remaining in Afghanistan beyond the 2014
deadline when most NATO-led international forces, including those from the United States, were
due to officially withdraw. Of particular concern was a key provision that would give United
States military personnel immunity from prosecution in Afghanistan.
In the last week of November 2013, the council of tribal elders who make up Afghanistan's Loya
Jirga convened a meeting to decide whether to approve the Bilateral Security Agreement with the
United States. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Loya Jirga approved the document and urged
that the deal be signed at the end of the year (2013), as requested by the United States. The
declaration read as follows: "Given the current situation in, and Afghanistan's need... the contents
of this agreement as a whole is endorsed by the members of this Loya Jirga. The Loya Jirga
requests the president to sign the agreement before the end of 2013."
Presumably to show that he was an independent actor and not beholden to the United States,
which was ironically ensuring the safety of Afghanistan for more than a decade, Afghan President
Hamid Karzai said he was toying with the idea of waiting until 2014 to sign the agreement. The
United States reacted to this move by Karzai by warning that there would be no delay. United
States Department of State spokesperson Jen Psaki, said: "We believe that signing sooner rather
than later is essential to give Afghans certainty about their future before the upcoming elections,
and enable the United States and other partners to plan for U.S. presence after 2014. It is neither
practical nor possible for us to further delay because of the uncertainty it would create."
As November 2013 came to a close, President Karzai maintained his stance in refusing to sign the
security deal with the United States until 2014, when a new president was elected to power in
Afghanistan. The United States warned that delay on a matter of such importance could result in
the "zero option" of withdrawing all United States troops from Afghanistan in 2014.
In a meeting with United States National Security Advisor Susan Rice in Kabul, Karzai also added
further conditions to the deal, demanding that the United States immediately end military raids on
Afghan homes. He also called for the United States to return any Afghan detainees currently being
held at Guantanamo Bay. The Obama administration responded to these new demands by
nothing that Karzai was making it clear that he was not prepared to sign the bilateral security
agreement. A statement by National Security Advisor Rice warned, "Without a prompt signature,
the U.S. would have no choice but to initiate planning for a post-2014 future in which there would
be no U.S. or NATO troop presence in Afghanistan."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 140 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On Dec. 25, 2013, the Taliban fired rockets at the well-fortified United States embassy in the
Afghan capital of Kabul. The attack on Christmas Day forced diplomats and aid workers at the
embassy to take shelter in fortified bunkers; however, the attack ended without any injuries. There
were other rocket attacks elsewhere in Kabul; three police officers were injured as they tried to
diffuse one rocket that landed without exploding but there were no deaths as a result.
On Dec. 28, 2013, the Taliban confirmed that one of its senior leaders had been shot to death in
the Pakistan city of Quetta. The Taliban attributed the killing of Noorullah Hotak to Afghan
intelligence agents. In a separate development, Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps reportedly
seized a large store of weapons during an offensive operation on the outskirts of the same Pakistani
city of Quetta. Included in the store of arms were 480 hand grenades, more than 5,500 pounds of
explosive material, several suicide jackets, and equipment for land mines. Pakistani authorities said
the weapons had likely been smuggled across the border from Afghanistan. The two developments
highlighted the reality that Islamic militants continued to be active across the Afghan-Pak region.
Update (2014):
On Jan. 17, 2014, a joint gun and suicide attack on a restaurant in the Afghan capital city of
Kabul left more than 20 people dead and many more injured. The attack began with a suicide
bombing outside the gate of the heavily fortified restaurant, and was followed by a gun attack as
assailants opened fire on the restaurant diners. The Taliban wasted no time in claiming
responsibility for the bloodshed, and made it clear that they intended to target high-ranking foreign
nationals who consumed alcohol, which is prohibited by Islam.
Among the dead was Wabel Abdallah, a senior official from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Also among those who lost their lives in the attack were four employees of the United
Nations (UN). The restaurant -- Taverna du Liban -- was known to be popular with foreign
nationals. In fact, the list of victims reflected the international orientation of the restaurant clientele
as they were identified as citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark,
Russia, Malaysia, and Lebanon. But the victims also included those closer to home, such as the
owner of Taverna du Liban.
Christine Lagarde, the head of the IMF, confirmed the death of Wabel Abdallah, a Lebanese
national, and expressed shock over the tragic loss of life saying, "This is tragic news, and we at the
fund are all devastated." United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned the "horrific
attack" on the restaurant "in the strongest terms" and expressed sadness over the deaths of the
victims, including the four UN personnel. He said, "Such targeted attacks against civilians are
completely unacceptable and are in flagrant breach of international humanitarian law. They must
stop immediately."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 141 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Two days after the attack at the Taverna du Liban restaurant, Afghanistan's National Security
Council was accusing "foreign intelligence services" of being behind the bloodshed. While the
National Security Council acknowledged that the Taliban had already claimed responsibility for the
attack, it intimated that this incident at Taverna du Liban was not a run of the mill or conventional
act of terrorism by the Taliban. Instead, according to a report by Agence France Presse, the
National Security Council was suggesting that the sophisticated and targeted nature of this
operation was "not the work of the ordinary Taliban" and added that "foreign intelligence services
beyond the border" were responsible.
There certainly was an unprecedented response to the attack with demonstrators gathering at the
scene of the bloodshed to protest against the Taliban. The anti-Taliban rally appeared to indicate a
flare of outrage over the campaign of terror being launched by the extremist Islamic militant group.
But violence at the hands of the Taliban continued on Jan. 25, 2014, with a deadly suicide
bombing in Kabul. In this incident, a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body
in close proximity to a bus carrying soldiers in the southeastern part of the capital city. At least
four people, including two soldiers, died in that attack.
The continuing violence highlighted the security challenges facing Afghanistan. Of concern was the
matter of how the country would deal with the violence when international forces exited
Afghanistan at the close of 2014. To that end, there was a pending security agreement under
consideration to be forged between Afghanistan and the United States.
That proposal would mean that as many as 10,000 United States troops would be remain in
Afghanistan after the 2014 deadline for a withdrawal of international forces; that remaining
contingent would be responsible for counter-terrorism and training of Afghan forces. President
Karzai has not been quick to sign the agreement and the United States has made it clear that
without a signed agreement, it would fully exit Afghanistan at the close of 2014, as planned to this
point. To date, relations between the United States and the Karzai government in Afghanistan
have been decidedly conflicted, with the United States frequently frustrated by Karzai's erratic and
unstable behavior, marked occasionally by Karzai's threats to "join the Taliban."
In February 2014, the United States made clear that it was entertaining the possibility of
withdrawing all its troops from Afghanistan unless the security agreement is soon signed. Indeed,
on Feb. 12, 2014, White House spokesperson Jay Carney emphasized that the Obama
administration had no intention of renegotiating the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). At a
White House briefing, he said, "Planning has to place around the contingencies that exist -- with
either a signed BSA or a BSA that is not signed. And as time progresses into this year, it becomes
more difficult to plan for a post-2014 troop presence."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 142 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Meanwhile, around the same period in February 2014, reports were emerging from Afghanistan
about talks between President Karzai's government and the Taliban. A spokesperson for the
Karzai government, Aimal Faizi, said in an interview with the New York Times, "I can confirm that
... Taliban are willing more than ever to join the peace process. Contacts have been made and we
are also in touch with them."
The United States issued a statement supportive of such overtures of reconciliation. Jen Psaki of
the United States Department of State said, "It's important to note here that we've long strongly
supported an Afghan-led reconciliation, which would, of course, be Afghans talking to Afghans. So
the notion that we wouldn't support that dialogue is inaccurate." That being said, she made it clear
that the United States was not involved in any peace talks with the Taliban.
The United States was not so sanguine about the news that Karzai allowed the release of 65
detainees from the high-security Bagram prison to the north of Kabul. The United States had
strenuously urged Afghanistan not to release these detainees, warning that there were extremist
Taliban fighters who were responsible for the deaths of international forces, including both Afghan
and American soldiers, as well as civilians. But Karzai went forward with the release of these
extremists in defiance of the United States’ expressed request. The move was sure to further
complicate already dismal relations between the governments of the two countries.
As February 2014 came to a close, the White House in the United States announced that
President Barack Obama had ordered the Pentagon to prepare to withdraw all United States
troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year. President Obama issued the order in the face of
Karzai's dithering over the Bilateral Security Agreement that would allow the United States t o
keep a limited contingent of troops in Afghanistan after 2014. President Obama apparently
delivered the news directly to President Karzai during a telephone call.
Around the same period, the violence continued in Afghanistan; a suicide bomb attack in the
southern province of Oruzgan left several people dead and at least a dozen others injured. With
the aforementioned withdrawal in the offing, the United States was intensifying its operations to
damage the terror networks, such as the Taliban and Haqqani network, which were operating in
the Afghan-Pak region.
On March 18, 2014, a suicide attack in northern Afghanistan left 17 people dead -- including
women and children -- and more than 60 others wounded. Just days later, an attack by the Taliban
on a police station in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan left at least 18 people dead, including 10
police officers, including the district police chief. The attack started with a bomb blast, which
sparked a gun battle with Afghan security forces who were backed up by NATO helicopter
gunships; it ended with the deaths of seven assailants. The Taliban claimed responsibility and
made it clear that the Islamist militant group intended to make good on its promise to disrupt the
presidential election set for April 5, 2014.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 143 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On March 20, 2014, gunmen attacked the Serena luxury hotel in the Afghan capital of Kabul.
That heavily-fortified hotel was known to be popular with foreigners and home to several United
Nations staffers who were in Afghanistan to monitor the impending presidential election. The
assailants reportedly entered the hotel with weapons hidden in their shoes and apparently waited
several hours before opening fire on guests. They also hid in bathrooms when security arrived on
the scene, essentially prolonging the chaos.
This particular attack ended with the deaths of several assailants following gun battles with Afghan
security forces. However, that conclusion occurred only after the attack exacted a heavy death toll
on international election missions, with election monitors who were in Afghanistan to witness the
country's presidential election among the casualties. Indeed, among the dead were Luis Maria
Duarte, an election monitor from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and several other
foreign nationals from Canada and India.
International monitoring missions were thus making a hasty exit from Afghanistan. In the aftermath
of the tragic bloodshed, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) removed its observers from
Afghanistan, while observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) had been withdrawn and taken to Turkey. As such, the European Union's international
monitoring mission was the only major election witnessing operation still remaining in Afghanistan.
The lack of election monitors in Afghanistan would ostensibly taint the legitimacy of the polls.
It should be noted that Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesperson, claimed responsibility for the
attack. With the exit of international monitoring missions from Afghanistan in the aftermath of this
brutal assault at the Serena Hotel, it was fair to say that the Taliban had, to some extent, achieved
its goals of disrupting the presidential election of 2014.
On the same day as the attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul, the Taliban carried out a separate
assault in the southern Kandahar province. In that incident, the assailants employed a new tactic
of terrorism by flinging an explosives-packed bottle that detonated when it landed on the ground.
The death toll in this case the head of the provincial media center chief and two police officers.
On March 25, 2014, a suicide bomber attacked the office of the Independent Election Commission
in Kabul, killing two police officers. Days later on March 28, 2014, militants targeted a guest
house for foreign aid workers in Kabul, trapping people inside for several hours. A child who was
playing outside in the street was killed as a result of that incident.
On March 29, 2014, the Taliban continued its campaign to disrupt the impending presidential
election by attacking the heavily-fortified headquarters of the Independent Election Commission.
The assailants, disguised as women in burqas, stormed the compound of the election commission
and fired guns and rocket-propelled grenades in the direction of the security forces protecting the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 144 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Independent Election Commission. The assault continued for several hours, with security forces
attempting to repel the Taliban fighters for up to five hours. The attack ended with the deaths of
all the militants while there were no casualties among the election commission staff.
As the month came to a close -- on March 31, 2014 -- close to 20 people were killed in a series of
attacks across Afghanistan. In the northern province of Kunduz, eight members of the family of
an anti-Taliban commander, Mohammad Omar, were the victims of an attack. Omar himself
escaped the apparent attempted assassination as he was not traveling in the vehicle that was struck
by a roadside bomb. As before, electoral personnel factored highly among the targets of attack by
the Taliban with six members of camapign teams in other bombings incidents on the same day.
As well, in the province of Sar-i-Pul, four Afghan police officers were died during an offensive
assault on the Taliban. Meanwhile gunmen abducted Hussain Nazari, a candidate contesting the
provincial council election in Sar-i-Pul, along with about 10 people in his entourage as they traveled
from Balkhab district to central Sar-e-Pul to attend a campaign event. There was some
disagreement over whether a rescue operation should be launched or if negotiations should be
pursued instead. Ultimately, the issue was rendered mute when it was announced days later that
almost all the hostages, including Nazari, had been shot to death by the Taliban. Only one person
escaped death but remained gravely wounded.
At the start of April 2014, with only days to go until the election was to be held, the Taliban
continued its rampage of violence and bloodshed with an attack on the country's Interior Ministry
in the center of the capital of Kabul. In this incident, the assailant was disguised in a military
uniform and detonated the explosives strapped to his body as he approached the main gate at the
entrance of the government compound. Because he was unable to enter the compound, the
suicide bomber chose to blow himself up when he was in the vicinity of some police officers. As a
result, the death toll in this attack included six police officers and the suicide bomber himself. The
Taliban relished the success of this incident, taking responsibility in an email missive in which it
declared success at having penetrated the third ring of security at the Interior Ministry before
carrying out the suicide blast.
With the election set to start in only days, the Taliban warned that it would be turning its attention
from election observers, workers, and candidates to voters. The Islamist extremist entity
threatened to attack voters daring to participate in what it characterized as a phony election process
as it put forth the following statement: "The Islamic Emirates announces one last time that all
elements of the fake elections will be under our Mujahideen attack. Every official and every voting
center will be in danger and a surge of attacks will start all over the country."
On April 24, 2014, an attack at a pediatric hospital in the Afghan capital of Kabul left three
American medical staffers dead and two others wounded. The hospital, specializing in care of
women and children, has been administered by a small Christian charitable organization, Cure.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 145 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The attack ensued when a Chicago-based pediatric doctor walked outside to greet a group of
medical aid professionals who were arriving at the facility. A police officer charged with providing
security at the hospital opened fire on the entourage with deadly results. While there was no
explicit motive for the attack by a security professional employed by the Afghan Public Protection
Force (APPF), it was apparent that this incident was one more in a spate of attacks by Islamist
extremists around the time of the country's presidential election. Many of those attacks have
targeted foreign nationals working in Afghanistan.
NOTE: See "Special Entry" below on the 2014 presidential election, keeping in mind that some
portions of that report will include elements of the coverage discussed above. See also "Special
Report" below for details on the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan.
Special Entry on 2014 Presidential Election
--- Note that some aspects of this entry includes content on the security landscape in Afghanistan
already covered directly above. --A presidential election took place in Afghanistan on April 5, 2014. At issue was the question of
who would be the successor to outgoing President Hamid Karzai, who has served as the Afghan
head of state since 2002 when the Islamist extremist cabal, the Taliban, was toppled from power.
The 2001 terror attacks in the United States sparked a joint international effort to drive the
Taliban from power and rid the country of al-Qaida terrorist training camps, which had been
allowed to flourish in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. By 2002, the Taliban was removed and
Karzai was appointed to position as interim leader. In the 2004 elections, held under the aegis of
the Bonn Agreement, Karzai won the presidency at the ballot box. His stint as chief of state and
head of government was renewed following the 2009 elections, although those polls were marked
by fraud and controversy, and ultimately ended with the second election round being canceled.
Indeed, the 2009 elections were clouded by a sense of illegitimacy as rising claims of electoral
irregularities came to the fore and reduced President Karzai's vote tally to less than 50 percent,
thus triggering a second round or runoff election. However, Karzai's closest rival, Abdullah
Abdullah, withdrew from the second round, charging that it would be as corrupt as the first round.
This action set Karzai in place to be re-elected to power by default.
There were high hopes that the 2014 contest would be free of the controversies that marred the
previous contest. As well, many in the international community were hoping for a new Afghan
leader who would be less volatile than Karzai, who became infamous for his intemperate
comments, including his threats to "join the Taliban."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 146 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
That being said, the months leading up to the elections promised to be difficult. In January 2014,
two election campaigners working for a presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, were shot to
death in the western city of Herat. The two elections workers were killed as they departed from a
campaign office. It should be noted that Abdullah Abdullah (mentioned above) contested the
previous election and intended to be on the ballot again in 2014. Abdullah Abdullah's
spokesperson, Sayed Fazel Sangcharaki, addressed the issue of the deaths of the campaign
workers as follows: "This incident at the beginning of election campaign is a bad sign as either the
security forces are incapable of providing security for the election campaign or they do not take
their job seriously." Meanwhile, the Taliban was making it clear that it intended to interrupt the
election process.
Nevertheless, the election was set to move forward and there were several candidates set to
contest the race. The main contenders included the following individuals -- Qayum Karzai, the older brother of outgoing President Karzai, was the most likely to extend his
brother's legacy. His campaign platform has focused on addressing corruption; howeve, corruption
has been a blight upon the incumbent Karzai regime so it was difficult to determine how a new
Karzai regime would differ. He has indicated a continuing role in government for his brother,
should he win the presidency. His support base was among his Pashtun community.
- Zamay Rassoul, a close confidante of outgoing President Karzai and a former foreign minister
educated in France; he has backed the peace process with the Taliban although he has also said
that those who commit crimes should be punished. Like Qayum Karzai, Zamay Rassoul's support
base was among his Pashtun community.
-Asraf Ghani Ahmadzai, an anthropologist educated in the United States who had also served as
finance minister in cabinet; he was viewed as pro-Western and most likely to sign onto a security
pact with the United States.
- Abdullah Abdullah, a former ophthalmologist, he was headed to a runoff with Karzai in the
previous presidential contest before bowing out due to fears that the run-off would be fraudulent.
Abdullah Adullah was once an adviser to late guerilla leader, Massoud; he now is open to
negotiations with the Taliban but does not favor peace at any price; he has been an advocate for
women's rights in Afghanistan. His support base was to be found in the Tajik community and the
north of the country (vis a vis the Pashtun background of Karzai and Rassoul).
- Abdul Rahim Wardak, a former guerrilla commander and a former defense minister; he has taken
a strong anti-Taliban stance and has said his record as the person who created the modern Afghan
army positioned him to be president.
- Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf, a skilled orator and notorious former warlord who fought against Soviet
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 147 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
occupation; he was known as a hardline Islamist with the dubious distinction of having invited
terrorist Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida to Afghanistan; however, in more recent times, he has
opposed the Taliban.
Note that in March 2014, discussions were underway about the possibility of Qayum Karzai, the
older brother of outgoing President Karzai, withdrawing from the presidential contest and throwing
his weight behind former Foreign Minister Zalmay Rassoul. The objective was to consolidate proKarzai support under one candidate -- preferably a Pashtun -- who would be likely to extend the
outgoing president's legacy. Later in that very month, this move was formalized as Karzai ended
his bid for the presidency and endorsed Rassoul. Because of the lateness of his exit from the
presidential context, Karzai's name would yet appear on the ballot. As such, Karzai instructed his
supporters to cast their votes for Rassoul instead.
Regardless of a consolidated Pashtun/pro-Karzai effort, the last polling data (available at the close
of 2013) showed that Abdulla Abdullah and Ghani Ahmadzai were the two candidates with
notable leads ahead of the rest of the field. That being said, with no funds available to pay for
polling surveys as the election approached in 2014, the actual election landscape in the spring of
2014 was unknown. Therefore, at the start of April 2014 - with only days to go until voting day there was no clear sign of which candidate was in the lead or had an advantage in the minds of the
voters.
Meanwhile, in March 2014, with a month to go before Afghanistan's presidential election, the
country was struck by relentless violence at the hands of the Taliban. Among the brutal attacks
was the execution-style death of a Swedish journalist on the street. His killing was linked with the
Taliban's promise to use violence and bloodshed to disrupt the impending presidential election.
On March 18, 2014, a suicide attack in northern Afghanistan left 17 people dead -- including
women and children -- and more than 60 others wounded. Just days later, an attack by the Taliban
on a police station in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan left at least 18 people dead, including several
police officers and the district police chief. The attack started with a bomb blast that sparked a gun
battle with Afghan security forces who were backed up by NATO helicopter gunships; it ended
with the deaths of seven assailants. The Taliban claimed responsibility and made it clear that the
Islamist militant group intended to make good on its promise to disrupt the presidential election set
for April 5, 2014.
On March 20, 2014, gunmen attacked the Serena luxury hotel in the Afghan capital of Kabul.
That heavily-fortified hotel was known to be popular with foreigners and home to several United
Nations staffers who were in Afghanistan to monitor the impending presidential election. The
assailants reportedly entered the hotel with weapons hidden in their shoes and apparently waited
several hours before opening fire on guests. They also hid in bathrooms when security arrived on
the scene, essentially prolonging the chaos.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 148 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
This particular attack ended with the deaths of several assailants following gun battles with Afghan
security forces. However, that conclusion occurred only after the attack exacted a heavy death toll
on international election missions, with election monitors who were in Afghanistan to witness the
country's presidential election among the casualties. Indeed, among the dead were Luis Maria
Duarte, an election monitor from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and several other
foreign nationals from Canada and India.
International monitoring missions were thus making a hasty exit from Afghanistan. In the aftermath
of the tragic bloodshed, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) removed its observers from
Afghanistan, while observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) had been withdrawn and taken to Turkey. As such, the European Union's international
monitoring mission was the only major election witnessing operation still remaining in Afghanistan.
The lack of election monitors in Afghanistan would ostensibly taint the legitimacy of the polls.
It should be noted that Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesperson, claimed responsibility for the
attack. With the exit of international monitoring missions from Afghanistan in the aftermath of this
brutal assault at the Serena Hotel, it was fair to say that the Taliban had, to some extent, achieved
its goals of disrupting the presidential election of 2014.
On the same day as the attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul, the Taliban carried out a separate
assault in the southern Kandahar province. In that incident, the assailants employed a new tactic
of terrorism by flinging an explosives-packed bottle that detonated when it landed on the ground.
The death toll in this case included the head of the provincial media center chief and two police
officers.
On March 25, 2014, a suicide bomber attacked the office of the Independent Election Commission
in Kabul, killing two police officers. Days later on March 28, 2014, militants targeted a guest
house for foreign aid workers in Kabul, trapping people inside for several hours. A child who was
playing outside in the street was killed as a result of that incident.
On March 29, 2014, the Taliban continued its campaign to disrupt the impending presidential
election by attacking the heavily-fortified headquarters of the Independent Election Commission.
The assailants, disguised as women in burqas, stormed the compound of the election commission
and fired guns and rocket-propelled grenades in the direction of the security forces protecting the
Independent Election Commission. The assault continued for several hours, with security forces
attempting to repel the Taliban fighters for up to five hours. The attack ended with the deaths of
all the militants while there were no casualties among the election commission staff.
As the month came to a close -- on March 31, 2014 -- close to 20 people were killed in a series of
attacks across Afghanistan. In the northern province of Kunduz, eight members of the family of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 149 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
an anti-Taliban commander, Mohammad Omar, were the victims of an attack. Omar himself
escaped the apparent attempted assassination as he was not traveling in the vehicle that was struck
by a roadside bomb. As before, electoral personnel factored highly among the targets of attack by
the Taliban with six members of campaign teams in other bombings incidents on the same day.
As well, in the province of Sar-i-Pul, four Afghan police officers died during an offensive assault
on the Taliban. Meanwhile gunmen abducted Hussain Nazari, a candidate contesting the provincial
council election in Sar-i-Pul, along with about 10 people in his entourage as they traveled from
Balkhab district to central Sar-e-Pul to attend a campaign event. There was some disagreement
over whether a rescue operation should be launched or if negotiations should be pursued instead.
Ultimately, the issue was rendered mute when it was announced days later that almost all the
hostages, including Nazari, had been shot to death by the Taliban. Only one person escaped death
but remained gravely wounded.
At the start of April 2014, with only days to go until the election was to be held, the Taliban
continued its rampage of violence and bloodshed with an attack on the country's Interior Ministry
in the center of the capital of Kabul. In this incident, the assailant was disguised in a military
uniform and detonated the explosives strapped to his body as he approached the main gate at the
entrance of the government compound. Because he was unable to enter the compound, the
suicide bomber chose to blow himself up when he was in the vicinity of some police officers. As a
result, the death toll in this attack included six police officers and the suicide bomber himself. The
Taliban relished the success of this incident, taking responsibility in an email missive in which it
declared success at having penetrated the third ring of security at the Interior Ministry before
carrying out the suicide blast.
With the election set to start in only days, the Taliban warned that it would be turning its attention
from election observers, workers, and candidates to voters. The Islamist extremist entity
threatened to attack voters daring to participate in what it characterized as a phony election process
as it put forth the following statement: "The Islamic Emirates announces one last time that all
elements of the fake elections will be under our Mujahideen attack. Every official and every voting
center will be in danger and a surge of attacks will start all over the country."
The Election:
Despite the pre-election climate of violence and bloodshed, and irrespective of the Taliban's threats
to voters, the 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan went off successfully, evoking a sense of
relief from Afghans at home and observers abroad. Voters in Afghanistan defied the cruel threats
by the Taliban to bravely stand in long lines to cast their ballots. Male and female Afghans
triumphantly displayed fingers with purple ink to journalists on the ground in Afghanistan to show
that they had exercised their democratic right and voted in the presidential contest.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 150 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Outgoing President Karzai, who was hoping to continue his stamp on power via a win for Roussol,
hailed the election saying, "Today we proved to the world that this is a people driven country." He
continued, "On behalf of the people, I thank the security forces, election commission and people
who exercised democracy and ... turned another page in the glorious history of Afghanistan."
The results were not to be known for several weeks due to the difficult mountainous terrain in
some parts of the country where donkeys had been used to transport ballots. If no one candidate
secured 50 percent of the vote share, then a run-off election would follow to determine a new
president and would add to the protracted election process. Nonetheless, there was satisfaction
that the first-ever democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan was -- at this point -- moving along
in a productive fashion.
There were some blights on the election process. In addition to the bloodshed and violence
discussed above, there was also the murder of a veteran photographer from the Associated Press
(AP) and the wounding of a senior correspondent (also from the AP) at the hands of a police
officer, presumably with an alliance to Islamist extremists and opposed to the presence of foreign
nationals in Afghanistan. As well, there were isolated stories of some polling stations running out
of supplies, ballot stuffing, and other incidences of election fraud.
Several days after the holding of the election, the head of Afghanistan’s Independent Election
Complaints Commission acknowledged that there may have been more incidences of election fraud
than originally though. At a news conference, Abdul Satar Sadaat said, "I want to say election
fraud did take place and it might not have been a small amount."
The exit of international monitors from Afghanistan following the brutal attack on the Serena Hotel
in Kabul (as detailed above) has only added to anxieties over the legitimacy of the vote, and would
limit the capacity to objectively determine the extent to which these voting irregularities would have
affected the election result.
By the third week of April 2014, with the vote counting well underway, Afghanistan's elections
officials authorized a recount of ballots in as many as 500 polling stations.
Amidst the discussion of electoral irregularities was also the discussion of whom might be
determined to be the winner. To that end, there were suggestions that the early frontrunners in the
election were Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani, and Zalmay Rassoul. Of course, this speculation
was yet to be confirmed. Abdullah and Ghani were the two anti-Karzai options, while Rassoul was
regarded as the guardian of the Karzai legacy.
Update on Election Result:
The full preliminary result of the Afghan presidential election was expected by May 2014. If no
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 151 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
candidate secured an outright victory, a second round between the two top performers could be in
the offing. On the other hand, there were some political experts saying that a second round might
not materialize at all. After the allegations of fraud in the previous election, Karzai was handed
victory by default when Abdullah Abdullah refused to stand for the second round, asserting that
there was no guarantee that it would be any fairer a contest than the first round. It was possible
that a similar scenario could occur in 2014.
Another possibility might be a power-sharing deal whereby the top performers would be
participants in a some type of inclusive government. However, the details of such a proposal were
yet to be determined as Abdullah has said while he would embrace inclusion, he was not warm to
notion of a coalition deal. He was on the record saying, "The team which will govern Afghanistan
will not be an exclusive team. The inclusiveness is part of our strategy. But that does not suggest
that we are making a coalition government in order to avoid a runoff or anything like it."
In mid-April 2014, Abdullah Abdullah made clear that he would contest a runoff round, if
necessary, saying that a second round "in order for the people to give their final verdict." He also
reiterated his stance of inclusion, saying in an exclusive interview with Radio Free Europe / Radio
Liberty, "We are making no exclusions...to those who share our vision."
Around this time, with the vote count underway, partial results gave the slight advantage to
Abdullah Abdullah, with Ashraf Ghani trailing just behind. This early tally showed Abdullah
Abdullah with almost 42 percent while Ashraf Ghani had 38 percent. It was to be seen if this trend
would hold or if the frontrunner would change as the counting continued. As noted by Ahmad
Yousuf Nouristani of the Election Commission: "Maybe today one candidate looks strong.
Tomorrow, maybe another will pull ahead."
In the third week of April 2014, all indications were that Abdullah Abdullah was extending his lead
over his closest rival, Ashraf Ghani. Now Abdullah was carrying about 44 percent of the vote share
while Ghani was trailing with 33 percent. Rassoul, the Karzai stalwart, was far behind with 10
percent. Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, the head of the Independent Election Commission, said that it
was likely that Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani would be contesting the run-off election.
Nuristani said, "With the 17.5 percent of the votes that are going to be counted, it is doubtful that
anyone will win in the first round."
By the last week of April 2014, with the vote count complete, Abdullah Abdullah had maintained
his lead of more than 10 percent over his closest rival, Ashraf Ghani. Abdullah Abdullah secured
the plurality of the vote share with about 45 percent, while Ashraf Ghani held 31.5 percent of
support; the pro-Karzai candidate, Zalmai Rassoul, was in a distant third place position with 11.5
percent.
With no one candidate securing an outright majority, the presidential contest was headed onto a
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 152 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
second round. To that end, a runoff election was set -- at the time -- to take place on May 28,
2014, between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani.
Round 2
There remained continued speculation that the two men might form a unity government, thus
foreclosing the possibility of a runoff round. However, Abdullah Abdullah had earlier emphasized
that he was ready to contest a second round, as needed, saying in an interview with the Associated
Press, "If it goes to the second round in accordance to the rule of law, we are ready for that as
well. At this stage, we believe that another round might not be needed." He continued, "It's
important that the process is a free and fair one." But with the presidential contest, in fact,
guaranteed to go to a second round, Abdullah Abdullah dismissed the notion of a power-sharing
deal with Ashraf Ghani, saying, "We have not talked or negotiated with anyone about forming a
coalition government."
Note that in mid-May 2014, weeks ahead of the scheduled second round of voting, Abdullah
Abdullah won the support of a key rival -- the pro-Karzai candidate in the first round, Zalmai
Rassoul. By the start of June 2014, Abdullah Abdullah consolidated the support of former rivals by
gaining the backing of the inner circle of former warlord, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. While Sayyaf
himself opted to remain neutral his two vice-presidential running mates made it clear they were
supporting Abdullah Abdullah.
Earlier, there had been some speculation that the second round might be delayed until mid-June
2014, if deemed necessary. That news soon was formalized with the new runoff date set for
June 14, 2014.
Alert -Meanwhile, the Taliban was promising to disrupt the second election round and was reported to be
recruiting radical Islamic fighter -- presumably with an eye on carrying out attacks. Indeed, the last
week of May 2014 in Afghanistan was marked by a spate of suicide attacks, shootouts, and
roadside bombings.
The scene turned more disturbing on June 6, 2014 -- just one week before the election -- when
two bombings targeted the convoy carrying presidential frontrunner, Abdullah Abdullah. The
attacks took place in the capital of Kabul where he was staging a campaign rally. One bombing
was caused by a suicide bomber and obliterated a vehicle traveling in the convoy, while the cause
of the second bombing as unknown. Six people died in the attacks, including one of Abdullah
Abdullah's bodyguards, while more than 20 others were injured. Abdullah Abdullah narrowly
escaped the bloodshed unscathed and was shown on television reassuring supporters and explaining
what transpired. He said, "When I was leaving the rally from the People's Islamic Unity Party, our
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 153 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
car was hit by a roadside bomb and destroyed."
It should be noted that have been plots afoot to disrupt the elections, including an earlier assault on
Abdullah Abdullah's convoy in February 2014 as the presidential contender was traveling between
the capital and the eastern city of Jalalabad. But clearly, this June 2014 attack in Kabul was the
most serious attempt on Abdullah Abdullah's life, reminiscent of the assassination of former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto in neighboring Pakistan several years prior, which also ensued at a
campaign event.
It should be noted that although a roadside bomb exploded killing about a dozen people -- including
election workers -- in the northern part of Afghanistan on the day of the second round, the voting
went off in that country.
Note on results and electoral challenges:
While no official election results were available at the time of writing, early returns indicated a lead
of about one million votes for Ashraf Ghani rather than Abdullah Abdullah. Since this advantage
for Ghani was at odds with conventional wisdom that Abdullah Abdullah had the advantage going
into the second round, it was not surprising that claims of massive fraud were emerging.
Given that he was the likely victim of fraud once again (fraud was also a factor in the previous
elections that he contested against Karzai in 2009), Abdullah Abdullah made it abdundantly clear
that he would not be bowing out easily. While Abdullah Abdullah said, "I have always maintained
that the main rival is fraud," his inner circle made it abundantly clear that they believed Ghani, his
supporters, along with a pro-Karzai cabal were involved in padding the vote to Ghani's benefit.
Their argument held merit since Ghani lagged so far behind Abdullah in the first round. Bolstering
their argument was the reality that turnout reported in certain Pashtun areas, such as Khost, were
suspiciously (some might say impossibly) high. Moreover, according to the independent
Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA), which deployed thousands of election
observers across the country, the number of votes counted in the eastern provinces where Ghani
has his support base was higher than the entire adult population. As noted by TEFA head, Naeem
Ayubzada, "We think the increase in numbers was due to fraud.” Nader Naderi, the head of
another independent observer group, said in an interview with international media such as Reuters
News, that there was "double and in some cases a three-fold increase" in votes cast in the eastern
part of Afghanistan. The central question, as noted by Abdullah, was as follows: "In which part of
the country did the situation change so dramatically, the people changed their mind and then all of
them came out and voted? Our rallies in the second round were more energetic and effective."
Of note was the fact that the meta-grievance of Abdullah Abdullah was separate from the more
than 500 complaints of election fraud already registers with the country's election commission.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 154 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Preliminary results were expected at the start of July 2014 but the Abdullah Abdullah camp was
making it clear that they would challenge the legitimacy of the vote if the outcome was
questionable. Indeed, on June 18, 2014, Abdullah Adullah called for a stoppage of the counting of
ballots on the basis of fraud. He also announced that he would cease cooperation with electoral
authorities, with whom he no longer held any confidence. Abdullah Abdullah said, "The counting
process should stop immediately and if that continues, it will have no legitimacy. From now on,
today, we announce that we have no confidence or trust in the election bodies." He continued,
"Any undertakings will be regarded as illegal and whatever results are announced, are not
acceptable to us." He also blamed Karzai for the impasse, saying of the situation, "This
unfortunately has created a political stalemate and the president of this country and the electoral
commissions are responsible for this stalemate and any consequences."
In Afghanistan, the authorities of the election commission -- the Independent Election Commission
(IEC) -- dismissed Abdullah Abdullah's call for a halt to the vote tabulation and said the process
would continue. As well, the United Nations indicated that it was in no hurry to jump into the
fracas, suggesting instead that Abdullah Abdullah "return" to the electoral process. United Nations
deputy chief, Nicholas Haysom, said, "We believe that the task ahead of us is to have the
candidates re-engage fully in the electoral process...We would want to emphasize that there is no
other way of electing a legitimate leader."
But as June 2014 was in its final week, the Abdullah Abdullah campaign team released audio
recordings possibly containing evidence of fraud by the IEC. The recordings purported to be
conversations between IEC secretary, Zia-ul-Haq Amarkhail, other IEC officials, and someone
from Ghani's campaign. In the recordings, Amarkhail was heard promising Ghani's representative
that certain measures would be taken to favor Ghani’s election to power. The conversation
appeared to also include veiled references to ballot box stuffing, with Amarkhail suggesting that
another IEC staffer bring "the sheep stuffed and not empty."
For his part, Ghani dismissed the fraud allegations and instead asserted that all the ballots cast for
him were legitimate. He said, "Our votes are clean, and we will defend each vote." However, with
the release of the aforementioned audio recordings, IEC Secretary Amirkhail resigned from his
post. While Amarkhail said he was stepping down "for the national interest and for the sake of the
election process," the fact of the matter was that the allegations of ballot stuffing had taken on
greater significance with the release of the audio recordings.
At the start of July 2014, ahead of the planned announcement of the preliminary election results,
the IEC said it would re-assess the vote count from approximately 2,000 polling stations amidst
rising accusations of vote rigging and fraud.
That being said, Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission soon announced its preliminary
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 155 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
results from second round of the presidential election, noting that Ashraf Ghani had 56.44 percent
of the vote compared to 43.56 percent for Abdullah Abdullah. Cognizant of the vote rigging
controversy that has surrounded the presidential contest, the election commission chairman,
Ahmad Yousuf Nouristani, acknowledged there had been "technical mistakes" and "shortcomings"
in the election, which included fraud and other violations. He also emphasized the fact that the
election results were preliminary and could change once the review of votes and allegations of
fraud had been fully addressed. Final results were not expected to be announced until later in July
2014. To this end, Nouristani said, "The announcement of preliminary results does not mean that
the leading candidate is the winner and there is possibly the outcome might change after we inspect
complaints."
Regardless of the measured nature of the election result announcement, Fazel Rahman Orya, a
spokesman for Abdullah's electoral team, wasted little time in blasting Afghanistan's Independent
Election Commission. He said that the electoral body had "no legitimacy" and condemned the
results as "illegal" and "illegitimate." Soon thereafter, Abdullah Abdullah's camp cast the election
result as a "coup" against the people, and Abdullah Abdullah himself declared victory. At a victory
speech in Kabul, Abdullah Abdullah declared, "We are proud. We respect the votes of the people.
We were the winner...We will not accept a fraudulent result -- not today, not tomorrow, never."
Meanwhile, his supporters called for the establishment of a parallel government if Ashraf Ghani
was ultimately inaugurated into office.
It should be noted that Ashraf Ghani has ruled out the notion of a coalition government with
Abdullah Abdullah, effectively burying the idea that a power-sharing government would resolve the
election crisis. As stated by Ghani, "People are concerned and the question they have been asking
is if we have made any deal. Our answer is clear: we have not made any deal. We assure the
people that we will not betray their votes."
With Ghani not interested in a power-sharing government, and with Abdullah Abdullah's base
prepared to establish his own power center, Afghanistan was on track for a political catastrophe -something the war-torn and security-challenged crisis state could not likely endure with ease.
Overall, the international community has viewed the presidential contest in Afghanistan to choose a
successor to Karzai as a test; however, the burgeoning electoral crisis suggested passing that test
would be difficult. Indeed, if Abdullah Abdullah was not willing to accept admittedly questionable
election results, or if Ashraf Ghani remained cold to the notion of a power-sharing government,
Afghanistan could again be plunged into political turmoil at a time when international powers were
preparing to withdraw their troops.
A taste of that turmoil came when protesters began to mobilize for mass action to register their
outrage over what was being perceived as massive vote-rigging in the so-called landmark
presidential election of 2014. There were fears of an ethnic dimension to the hostilities between
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 156 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the respective camps of Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani because the former was half-Tajik
while the latter was a member of the majority Pashtun community. That "taste" was about to
break wide open for a full menu of conflict if the election crisis was not resolved.
With such an end in mind, United States Secretary of State John Kerry was set to meet with the
two presidential contenders, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, as well as Afghan President
Hamid Karzai. It was to be seen if Kerry's presence would advance the negotiations between the
various parties, although Washington was clearly prepared to use its weight to pressure Afghanistan
into settling the impasse. Indeed, Secretary of State Kerry was on the record noting that violent or
"extra-constitutional means" to resolve the election crisis would result in the United States
withdrawing its assistance -- military and financial -- to Afghanistan.
By mid-July 2014, United States Secretary of State John Kerry had conducted productive
negotiations with Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani that lasted more than 20 hours. Kerry
emerged from those talks having successfully brokered a deal intended to end the election
impasse. Under the Kerry deal, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani had agreed to a complete
recount of all the ballots cast in the June 14, 2014, "runoff" round of the presidential election.
Once the recount, which would be supervised by the United Nations, was complete, both
candidates would have to respect the outcome regardless of whom was declared to be the winner.
That winner would then be expected to form a unity government. The Kerry deal essentially
resolved the election crisis, ensured that a fresh count would be conducted under transparent
conditions, and set the path for what was previously believed to be implausible: the formation of an
inclusive national unity government.
In Afghanistan, United States Secretary of State John Kerry was being hailed as a hero with locals
lauding him for saving the country from a possible descent into civil war. In an interview with
NBC News, Maqsood Parwani -- a local Afghan shopkeeper -- was quoted as saying, "John Kerry
is the greatest American and the best friend of Afghanistan. He helped prevent this country from
going to civil war two times." He continued, "I wish if we could elect him as our president, but we
cannot so hope the American people elect him as their president." Another local Afghan, Noor
Ahmad, issued similarly effusive praise for Kerry's efforts, saying to NBC News, "I ask the
government of Afghanistan to give this tall man —- I call him Jan Agha -— Afghan citizenship so
he might be able to run for president next time. I am so grateful for Jan Agha’s tireless efforts to
bring our politicians together and help end the uncertainty." Afghan politicians, such as Dr.
Mohiuddin Mahdi (a member of parliament), called for Kerry to be nominated for the Nobel Peace
Prize for his efforts to end the election crisis and prevent Afghanistan from slipping into a civil war.
The internationally supervised audit of the ballots from the second round of the presidential
election commenced in mid-July 2014. The process was not without controversy. By the start of
August 2014, Abdullah Abdullah's camp accused the pro-Karzai faction of political machinations
intended to benefit Ghani.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 157 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
United States Secretary of State John Kerry landed in Afghanistan on Aug. 7, 2014, in a bid to try
to calm the re-emerging election-related acrimony. There, Secretary of State Kerry urged both
Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani to agree to an arrangement by which the losing candidate
would become a hitherto nonexistent position called "chief executive." The occupant of that
position would share power with the president in certain arenas, such as defense, security, and
intelligence. That overture by Secretary of State Kerry yielded only temporary effects because by
mid-August 2014, Ghani was casting doubt on the power-sharing agreement, claiming that the deal
was too ambiguous, and staking out the stance that absolute authority would remain in the hands of
the president. He said, "The position of the chief executive will solely depend on the discretion of
the president." Ghani also complained that the Kerry deal was written in English and he thus
would "not sign a document in English on Afghan soil."
As August 2014 came to a close, the re-counting of election ballots continued along amidst
growing anxieties that the Kerry unity deal might collapse. With the prospect of a presidential
stalemate in sight, a security deal between the United States and Afghanistan would also be in
jeopardy. Accordingly, the United States military made it known that plans were afoot for a fast
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin Dempsey said that optimally,
the United States would need four months to pull all its troops and equipment out of Afghanistan;
however, Dempsey said a faster withdrawal was possible if there was no security agreement in
place allowing for the continued presence of United States troops in Afghanistan in 2015.
At the start of September 2014, the Kerry unity deal to end the presidential election impasse
appeared to collapse despite attempts to rehabilitate negotiations. Two issues emerged as
particularly problematic. First, the team of the presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew
from the United Nation's audit of votes, complaining that fraudulent votes were not being properly
handled. Second, the two sides could not agree on the powers of the chief executive -- the
newly-conceived position that would share power with the presidency.
As a result of pressure from NATO leaders, who were meeting at the time in September 2014, the
two rival presidential candidates agreed to close ranks. With the stakes of national security and
unity in mind, Abdullah Abdullah and Asraf Ghani recommitted themselves to the goal of forming
a government of national unity. But that commitment seemed to be a perfunctory move since
Ghani, who was clearly anticipating being declared the victor, soon said that while he would
continue to engage in discussions aimed at forming a national unity government, there would only
be one leader of Afghanistan -- presumably, him. For his part, Abdullah said that he would not
accept a fraudulent vote result. Thus, one could conclude that the presidential impasse remained in
place.
The Independent Election Commission said that the final results of the presidential election would
be announced in mid-September 2014. There were concerns that the declaration of a winner
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 158 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
without a unity government deal solidified could lead to political instability. But the Independent
Election Commission said the final result would be made public regardless of whether such the
unity agreement was implemented.
The election result was ultimately announced in the third week of September when Ashraf Ghani
was named to be the winner and thus the new president of Afghanistan. This announcement was
simultaneous with agreement on a difficult power-sharing deal that would give Abdullah Abdullah
the right, as the winner of the second most votes, to name a chief executive. This post would most
easily be compared to the role of a prime minister in a parliamentary democracy with both a
president and a prime minister. It was conceivable that Abdullah could name himself to the role.
The announcement of Ghani as the president, along with the settling of the power sharing deal,
brought an end to the chaos and dissonance that has marked the landmark Afghan presidential
elections.
That power sharing deal was the product of strenuous diplomacy by United States Secretary of
State John Kerry, and was rescued when it was on its so-called "death bed" as a result of Kerry's
dedicated efforts. A statement from the White House in the United States lauded the agreement
saying that the power sharing deal would help bring "closure" to Afghanistan's political crisis and
restore "confidence in the way forward."
For his part, Ghani pledged to end the political instability and turmoil that has mired Afghanistan,
saying: "Afghanistan's stability is most important for us. Let's build up this nation and put the past
behind us." Ghani also indicated that Afghanistan's significant institutional problem of corruption
would be addressed, as he said, "Our focus will be on merit in every sector of the government, and
there will be no place for nepotism. It will be a government of transparency, accountability and
taking responsibility."
Note that Ashraf Ghani was set to be inaugurated into power at the end of September 2014. Once
he assumed the presidency, Ghani promised to sign the security agreement that would allow United
States troops to remain in Afghanistan and assist in the terrorism threat emanating from the Taliban
and other Islamic terrorist entities operating in that country.
As expected, the Taliban condemned the power-sharing deal as a product of United States control,
and indicated that it would do its part to continue to destabilize Afghanistan. Taliban
spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, issued a statement via email that commenced as follows:
"Installing Ashraf Ghani and forming a bogus administration will never be acceptable to the
Afghans." The statement continued as follows: The Americans must understand that our soil and
land belong to us and all decisions and agreements are made by Afghans, not by the U.S. foreign
secretary or ambassador. We reject this American process and vow to continue our jihad until we
free our nation from occupation and until we pave the way for a pure Islamic government."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 159 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Post-Election Developments:
Meanwhile, at the start of July 2014, Afghan forces were battling the Taliban in the Helmand
province in the southern part of Afghanistan. It should be noted that Helmand province has been
the center of illicit opium production in Afghanistan, which actually grew in 2013 to the financial
benefit of the Taliban which has been aligned with narcotics-oriented criminal networks. That
being said, this operation was occurring as Afghan authorities sought to claim control over the
Islamist extremist stronghold in the aftermath of the departure of United States troops from
Helmand province.
The effort would be a test for Afghan forces to determine whether they would be able to
successfully reassert control over the region at a time when the Taliban was determined to take
advantage of the exit of international forces from Afghanistan. Locals in the area said that Afghan
forces were seeing some success, and forcing the Taliban to use guerilla tactics. That being said,
such tactics meant that both soldiers and civilians were subject to roadside bombs.
Meanwhile, the Taliban remained active elsewhere in Afghanistan with a suicide bombing taking
place on July 2, 2014, in the Afghan capital of Kabul. That attack targeted a bus carrying military
personnel and left eight people dead and more than a dozen other individuals wounded. Among the
dead were members of the air force. Despite the aforementioned operation in Helmand, this attack
in Kabul was a grave reminder that the security landscape in Afghanistan was dire, and was likely
to worsen with the looming exit of United States troops. The contested presidential race, now
mired by serious allegations of ballot stuffing and vote rigging, could only exacerbate the alreadytumultuous scene in Afghanistan.
In mid-2014, Afghan forces were battling the Taliban, who remained active across the country. In
fact, the political scene in Afghanistan had been improving thanks to the fact that a deal had been
brokered by United States Secretary of State John Kerry to resolve the election standoff. Kerry
forged an agreement between the two presidential candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf
Ghani, that would ensure a complete recount of all the ballots cast in the June 14, 2014, "runoff"
round of the presidential election. Once the recount was complete, both candidates would have to
respect the outcome regardless of whom was declared to be the winner. That winner would then
be expected to form a unity government.
But even as the election deal was at risk of being derailed due to ongoing accusations of political
machinations by pro-President Karzai factions, so too was the security landscape devolving with a
continual barrage of attacks by the Taliban. According to findings by the United Nations, as many
as 5,000 civilians were killed in the first six months of 2014, marking a significant increase of 25
percent when compared to the same time period in 2013. It was apparent that the Taliban and
other extremist Islamic terror entities were not waiting for the full withdrawal of United States
forces from Afghanistan to stake their claim in returning the country to its pre-2001 landscape.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 160 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On July 17, 2014, the Taliban launched an audacious attack at the Kabul International Airport. A
battle ensued between security forces and the militants, who were armed with grenades and
automatic weapons. After five hours, the fighting was over and the four Taliban militants were
dead. As noted by Deputy Interior Minister for Security Mohammad Ayub Salangi, the airport had
been "completely cleared" of the militants. He added, "The last insurgent has just blown himself
up, because he knew Afghan forces were on the way to capture him."
Several days later on July 22, 2014, the Kabul airport was again the site of audacious violence
when militants armed with guns and grenades ambushed the counter-narcotics facility there.
Around the same time, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle detonated his explosives as he
approached the main entrance, killing himself, several other insurgents, and three security guards
-- all of whom were foreign nationals. Six other security guards survived the attack but were badly
injured. Separately, a roadside bomb close to the Afghan meteorology department of the Kabul
airport left a civiian wounded. The Taliban immediately claimed responsibility for the violence.
A few days earlier, members of President Karzai's security team were ambushed in Zurmat as
they traveled to Paktika Province. Eight members of the president's protective service were
injured while nine others were abducted. Days later, the beheaded corpses of the nine missing
security services personnel were discovered in the village of Sag. The security team had been
traveling to the Urgun district to investigate a suicide car bombing at a marketplace that killed more
than 40 people only days prior.
As July 2014 entered its final week, the violence continued in Afghanistan with the killing of 15
people who were traveling through on buses in the central province of Ghor. Both vehicles were
stopped by armed Taliban militants; the passengers -- most of whom were from the minority
Hazara group -- were ordered to exit the buses, positioned in a single line, at then summarily
executed. Included in the dead were a recently married couple, three women, and one child. In the
same period, two women from Finland who were employed with a Christian humanitarian aid
agency were shot to death in Herat.
The violence in Afghanistan touched the highest echelon of governance with the cousin of
President Karzai being killed in a suicide bombing on July 29, 2014. Hashmat Karzai, who was
also a stalwart friend of presidential candidate, Ashraf Ghani, died while he hosted an Eid al-Fitr
celebration at his home in Kandahar. A man who presented himself as a guest was actually a
suicide bomber who detonated the explosives strapped to his body while in close proximity to the
president's cousin.
International forces were also not immune from the violence. On Aug. 5, 2014, an Afghan army
soldier opened fire on international troops at the well-fortified British military base to the west of
Kabul. The attack at Camp Qargha resulted with the killing of a United States army general,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 161 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
injuries to a German general, and the wounding of several other soldiers. The assailant was
ultimately killed by a bodyguard but not before he was able to carry out his bloody assault. While
the Afghan army recruit who opened fire on coalition officers was not revealed to be carrying out a
Taliban operation, the Islamic extremist group nonetheless congratulated him post-humously for his
efforts to hurt coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.
The general who died was identified as General Harold Greene -- the deputy commanding general
for the Combined Security Transition Command, who was tasked with preparing for the
withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan. The death of General Harold Greene marked the
highest level fatality of a member of the United States military since the start of the war in
Afghanistan.
By mid-August 2014, Afghan security forces were battling Taliban militants in the area of Logar
located relatively close to Kabul. Control over Logar was being regarded as a key control for
Afghan authorities given the tendency of the Taliban to use such satellite communities as bases
from which they carry out attacks on the capital. Afghan authorities on the ground said that the
Taliban militants were armed with heavy machine guns were ensconced in battles in the residential
Charkh district. As such, Afghan forces were approaching the clashes with caution, given the
concern over possible civilian casualties.
As Afghan forces were battling the Taliban, who remained active across the country, the political
scene in Afghanistan had been improving thanks to the fact that a deal had been brokered by
United States Secretary of State John Kerry to resolve the election standoff. Kerry forged an
agreement between the two presidential candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, that
would ensure a complete recount of all the ballots cast in the June 14, 2014, "runoff" round of the
presidential election. Once the recount was complete, both candidates would have to respect the
outcome regardless of whom was declared to be the winner. That winner would then be expected
to form a unity government.
But the election deal was soon at risk of being derailed due to ongoing accusations of political
machinations by pro-President Karzai factions. So too was the security landscape devolving with a
continual barrage of attacks by the Taliban. According to findings by the United Nations, as many
as 5,000 civilians were killed in the first six months of 2014, marking a significant increase of 25
percent when compared to the same time period in 2013.
In late August 2014, the Taliban carried out suicide bomb attacks against the Afghan intelligence
agency in the eastern city of Jalalabad. Four agents of the National Directorate of Security, two
civilians, and seven militants were reported to have died as a result. Elsewhere in the country, in
the western province of Farah, about dozen construction workers with no connection to the
government were killed in a separate attack. A common emerging complaint was that Afghan
security forces were having trouble fending off attacks by the Taliban, who were now better armed
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 162 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
that national forces. It was apparent that the Taliban and other extremist Islamic terror entities were
not waiting for the full withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan to stake their claim in
returning the country to its pre-2001 landscape.
In the first week of September 2014, an attack by the Taliban targeted the office of the Afghan
intelligence agency office and a police station in the central town of Ghazni. The insurgents
detonated truck bombs and fired rocket-propelled grenades outside the two compounds, killing 18
people, and wounding 150 others. It was the latest strike by Taliban insurgents against government
installations across the country. In an official claim of responsibility, Taliban spokesperson
Zabihullah Mujahid said: "It is a success for us and failure to our enemies that they didn't even
notice how our fighters in big numbers reached the intelligence agency with explosive-laden cars
and carried out attacks."
In mid-September 2014, a Taliban fighter carried out a suicide car bombing attack in the Afghan
capital of Kabul, killing three NATO troops. The Taliban suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a
NATO convoy with deadly consequences. Among the dead were two United States troops and
one Polish soldier; all three victims were serving as part of the International Security Assistance
Force (Isaf) under the aegis of NATO. Another soldier from Isaf/NATO and more than a dozen
civilians were also injured in the attack. The Taliban took responsibility for the attack, declaring its
claim via the social media outlet Twitter. Elsewhere in the western Afghan city of Herat, another
NATO soldier was killed when the assailant, dressed in an Afghan National Army uniform, hurled
grenades at his NATO trainers.
Meanwhile, the political developments was ongoing with the re-counting of presidential election
ballots, the growing anxieties that the Kerry unity deal might collapse, the associated plans for a
fast withdrawal from Afghanistan if there was no security agreement in place allowing for the
continued presence of United States troops in Afghanistan in 2015, and ultimately, the declaration
that Ghani had won the presidency. This announcement in late September 2014 was simultaneous
with agreement on a difficult power-sharing deal that would give Abdullah Abdullah the right, as
the winner of the second most votes, to name a chief executive. This post would most easily be
compared to the role of a prime minister in a parliamentary democracy with both a president and a
prime minister. It was conceivable that Abdullah could name himself to the role. The
announcement of Ghani as the president, along with the settling of the power sharing deal, brought
an end to the chaos and dissonance that has marked the landmark Afghan presidential elections.
That power sharing deal was the product of strenuous diplomacy by United States Secretary of
State John Kerry. A statement from the White House in the United States lauded the agreement
saying that the power sharing deal would help bring "closure" to Afghanistan's political crisis and
restore "confidence in the way forward."
As expected, the Taliban condemned the power-sharing deal as a product of United States control,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 163 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
and indicated that it would do its part to continue to destabilize Afghanistan. Taliban
spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, issued a statement via email that commenced as follows:
"Installing Ashraf Ghani and forming a bogus administration will never be acceptable to the
Afghans." The statement continued as follows: The Americans must understand that our soil and
land belong to us and all decisions and agreements are made by Afghans, not by the U.S. foreign
secretary or ambassador. We reject this American process and vow to continue our jihad until we
free our nation from occupation and until we pave the way for a pure Islamic government."
On Oct. 13, 2014, a suicide car bomber struck a convoy carrying foreign nationals along the
Jalalabad Road -- a major thoroughfare in Afghanistan's capital of Kabul upon which a United
Nations housing compound and a United States military base were located. At least one person
was reported to have died and several others were injured as a result of the attack. The Taliban,
via a spokesperson Zabihullah Majahid, soon claimed responsibility for the bloodshed. The
violence was evidence that security in Afghanistan continued to be a challenge, especially given the
proposed exit of international troops from Afghanistan.
Less than a week later on Oct. 18, 2014, those security challenges were illustrated by two deadly
attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Logar province in eastern Afghanistan was the site of one
incident of violence where Taliban terrorists targeted security posts, killing at least four soldiers.
Ghor province in central Afghanistan was the venue for the second incidence of bloodshed when
as many as 500 Taliban terrorists attacked two villages. The level of casualties were unknown at
the time of writing but promised to be disturbing. The attacks underlined the challenges posed in
rescuing Afghanistan from the threat of terrorism, especially with a withdrawal of United States
troops from the country in the offing.
In late October 2014, United States and United Kingdom forces exited their main military bases in
Helmand province, effectively turning security over to Afghan forces. While the complete
withdrawal of United States forces would not ensue until 2016, a phased draw-down was certainly
taking place and would continue over the course of the next year. At the same time, this particular
exit from Helmand was significant for the United Kingdom as it marked the withdrawal of the last
British combat forces from Afghanistan after being in the Afghan combat zone for more than a
decade. For its part, the Afghan military said that it was prepared to take responsibility for the
security of the country, pointing to the fact that increasingly, support from United States and
United Kingdom forces had become more psychological than in the battlefield.
On Nov. 16, 2014, a suicide bomber targeted a convoy in Kabul carrying a well-known female
politician and women's right advocate, Shukria Barakzai. That attack left three people dead and
Barakzai wounded. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident. Days later on Nov. 18,
2014, a suicide truck bombing in Afghan capital of Kabul left at least two security guards dead and
several other injured. The attack took place in the eastern part of the country where international
military bases and multinational companies have been located.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 164 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
NOTE: See entry above on the 2014 presidential election. See also "Special Report" below for
more details on the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan.
Special Report: U.S. Policy on Afghanistan (2010-2014)
U.S. President Obama unveils withdrawal plan for troops serving in Afghanistan
Summary
This Special Report details the withdrawal and exit strategy plan for United States troops from
Afghanistan. The Special Report includes an inquiry into counter-insurgency strategy for fighting
the Taliban and al-Qaida. The report additionally considers accusations of the Pakistani intelligence
agency's complicity with the Afghan Taliban. Also considered in this report are the politicallydriven financial constraints at home in the United States related to the funding of the war effort.
These issues collectively have influenced emerging questions about the United States' policy in
Afghanistan and the timeline for continued engagement there. Finally, this report looks at the
Afghanistan exit strategy as a jumping off point to consider the Obama doctrine of foreign policy.
Background
In June 2010, United States President Barack Obama announced that General Stanley McChrystal,
the commander of United States forces in Afghanistan, was relieved of his duties. The president
also announced the nomination of General David Petraeus, commander of United States Central
Command, to take over command of the war in Afghanistan against the resurgent Taliban and alQaida. President Obama explained that he had decided to replace Gen McChrystal "with
considerable regret." The president explained that McChrystal failed to "meet the standard that
should be set by a commanding general." At issue were controversial statements by McCrystal that
were recorded in a recent Rolling Stone article. The politics of the situation demanded that
President Obama dismiss McChrystal, or, risk being viewed as a weak commander in chief. A
week after the announcement about the dismissal of McChrystal, Petraeus was unanimously
confirmed as the new commander of the Afghanistan war with a vote of 99-0 in the Senate.
Petraeus, as expected, garnered praise from both Republicans and Democrats, irrespective of
their core disagreements on the policy toward Afghanistan. Indeed, Petraeus was known as a
celebrated military figure, thanks to his stewardship of the "surge" in Iraq, as well as his notoriety
as one of the key authors of United States modern counterinsurgency strategy in war zones.
During confirmation hearings, Petraeus painted a grim picture of the war effort in Afghanistan,
noting that an "industrial-strength insurgency" by the Taliban and al-Qaida elements were in the
offing. As well, Petraeus warned that the fighting and violence would "get more intense in the next
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 165 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
few months." That being said, he indicated that it was part of the counterinsurgency process. He
said, "My sense is that the tough fighting will continue; indeed, it may get more intense in the next
few months. As we take away the enemy's safe havens and reduce the enemy's freedom of action,
the insurgents will fight back." Additionally, Petraeus did not foreclose the possibility of
recommending that President Barack Obama extend United States' troops engagement in
Afghanistan beyond the August 2011 timeline to begin redeployment.
Costs and complications of counterinsurgency strategy and human terrain units -It should be noted that the Afghan war strategy -- to fight resurgent Taliban and al-Qaida, improve
security in Afghanistan, and develop governing stability in that country as an alternative to a culture
of warfare -- is founded on the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN). The long-term objectives
of COIN entail not only the clearing the field of insurgents by the military, but also political
imperative of replacing the insurgent power base with more stable governance. Effective
counterinsurgency strategies, therefore, require close collaboration of the military, political,
economic and diplomatic spheres in the conflict zone. While a respected strategy, with an exit
timeline expected to be completed in 2014, there has been increased skepticism about the ongoing
involvement in Afghanistan as the war has gone on for a decade.
One particularly key reason for a sense of skepticism about the war strategy and its associated
timeline were matters of financial costs of the war, and the timeline attached to the Afghanistan
strategy. That is to say, when President Obama first outlined his plan to deploy an additional
30,000 troops to Afghanistan, he also noted that the United States would begin a redeployment of
those troops by 2011. With debt worries prevalent in the United States and other NATO countries
(as discussed below), questions arose as to whether or not the continued war effort in Afghanistan
was a financially feasible endeavor. That is to say, the war and counterinsurgency mission requires
a substantial outlay of resources that few governments (including the United States) could
realistically commit to for the long term.
Complicating matters further has been the rising death toll of NATO forces in a war that has
continued for close to a decade. That increased death toll has contributed to decreasing support for
the Afghanistan war effort.
Moreover, analysts have pointed to the fact that COIN involves the idea of clearing the landscape
of insurgents, followed by the establishment of a government as an alternative to the war culture.
But clearance in one area often results in the relocation of the terrorists elsewhere and a perpetual
pursuit of the strategic enemy. Meanwhile, the establishment of more stable governance, which has
seen some success in the more politically mature Iraq, cannot easily be transposed to the largely
tribal cultural orientation of Afghanistan, which does not have a strong legacy of governmental
authority.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 166 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
With an eye on understanding that tribal cultural orientation of Afghanistan, the United States
military has employed anthropologists in the war zone to garner a more granular understanding of
the complicated social and cultural dynamics of Afghanistan. Anthropologists' command of
ethnographic fieldwork may be uniquely positioned to map the complex social structure of the
company, ultimately helping the military to draw Afghans away from the Taliban.
Known as the army-funded "Human Terrain System," as discussed in an article published in Time
Magazine by Jason Motlagh, the idea has been the source of debate with no consensus on its
success. Academia has frowned on anthropologists being actively involved in the war theater. As
noted in a report by the American Anthropological Association, because human terrain teams are
ultimately oriented toward the objectives of the military mission, there is an ethical question of
whether such work is "a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology." Nevertheless, General
Petraeus has been reported to be a strong supporter of the human terrain teams, suggesting that
they would for the immediate future continue to be part of the broader counterinsurgency
strategy. That being said, most anthropologists would agree that more than a year of intensive
fieldwork is needed before conclusions can be made; thus, the success of human terrain units in
Afghanistan would require a longer timeline than currently expected for United States forces to
remain "in country."
Financial Cost of the War in Afghanistan -In late June 2010, legislators in the United States voted to cut almost $4 billion in aid to the
government of Afghanistan. The move was in response to allegations of corruption by the
Afghan government, and in the aftermath of a report by the Wall Street Journal that significant
funds had been flown out of the airport at Kabul. The report alleged that Afghan officials and their
allies were diverting funds earmarked for aid and logistics to financial safe havens outside the
country.
Explaining the Congress' decision to make these cuts, Congresswoman Nita Lowey, the chair of
the subcommittee responsible for aid appropriations, said, "I do not intend to appropriate one more
dime until I have confidence that US taxpayer money is not being abused to line the pockets of
corrupt Afghan government officials, drug lords and terrorists." Lowey additionally called for an
audit of the billions of dollars already expended in Afghanistan.
While the funding cuts would not directly affect military operations of humanitarian aid to
Afghanistan, it could very well affect infrastructure projects, which are part of the nation building
efforts in Afghanistan. To this end, Congressman Mark Kirk, made note of Kandahar's electrical
system; he said that obstacles to its construction, and other such infrastructure projects, could
negatively affect the war, which included the effort to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan
people.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 167 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The issue has evoked questions about the financial costs of the war at large at a time when debt
worries plague not only the United States, but also allied countries with troops operating in
Afghanistan, as discussed in the section above. As NATO countries, including the United States,
have been forced to consider austerity measures at home, the financial costs of the war in
Afghanistan have taken on added importance. In fact, that significance was apparent on July 1,
2010, when President Barack Obama requested $33 billion in military funding to support the surge
of 30,000 additional troops in Afghanistan.
Pakistan's complicity with Afghan Taliban raises questions about U.S. strategy in region -Since June 2010, Afghanistan's geopolitical relationship with Pakistan has taken center stage. At
issue were revelations that the Pakistani intelligence service, known by the acronym ISI, has been
funding, training, and providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban. For several years, there have
been suspicions about such a clandestine relationship between the two entities, however, the
closeness and extensive nature of their ties was something of a revelation. Indeed, in a report
issued by the London School of Economics support for the Afghan Taliban was described as
"official ISI policy."
As noted by the author of the report, Matt Waldman of Harvard University, "This goes far beyond
just limited, or occasional support. This is very significant levels of support being provided by the
ISI." Waldman also asserted, "We're also saying this is official policy of that agency, and we're
saying that it is very extensive. It is both at an operational level, and at a strategic level, right at the
senior leadership of the Taliban movement."
The report also included references to interviews with Taliban field commanders who said that ISI
agents attended Taliban council meetings. Shoring up the veracity of this claim was the following
citation from the report: "These accounts were corroborated by former Taliban ministers, a
Western analyst, and a senior United Nations official based in Kabul, who said the Taliban largely
depend on funding from the ISI and groups in Gulf countries." Corroborating evidence was also
available from a source unrelated to the LSE report. In an interview with Reuters, the head of
Afghan intelligence, Amrullah Saleh, who had just resigned from that position, said the ISI was
"part of the landscape of destruction" in Afghanistan and accused Pakistan of sheltering Taliban
leaders in safe houses.
Editor's Update: More recently in September 2011 (as discussed above), a siege by extremist
Islamic terrorist on Kabul targeted the United States embassy, NATO headquarters, and police
stations. Blame was placed on the Pakistan-based Haqqani network, which has been closely allied
with the Taliban and al-Qaida both in terms of extremist Islamic ideology and in terms of its brutal
use of terrorism. Cameron Munter, the United States ambassador to Pakistan asserted that there
were links between the Haqqani network and the Pakistani government. As well, outgoing United
States chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, suggested that the Pakistan's
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 168 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
intelligence agency helped the terrorist who attacked his country's embassy in Kabul, according to
a report by the New York Times.
Some observers have noted that with the impending exit of foreign troops from Afghanistan
expected in 2011, Pakistan's actions may be related to its desire to more deeply influence
Afghanistan. However, ISI activities related to Islamic militant extremists are not recent
developments in response to the current landscape. Indeed, the ISI has been accused of funding
and training Islamic militant extremists in Afghanistan from as far back as the 1979 Soviet
invasion. That being said, since the 2001 terror attacks in the United States, Pakistan has accepted
billions of dollars in aid funding from the United States, supposedly for its support in the fight
against terror enclaves like al-Qaida and its Taliban allies. Clearly, a continued relationship
between the Pakistani ISI and the Afghan Taliban would run counter to its expressed objectives of
helping the United States quell the threat of terrorism emanating from such entities in the AfghanPak region. As stated in the LSE report, "Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game of
astonishing magnitude."
Developments in 2010 on the war in Afghanistan -In July 2010, the Iceland-based website, known as Wikileaks, released six years worth of classified
United States documents, numbering around 90,000, dealing with the war in Afghanistan. Several
news organizations were given access to the documents prior to actual publication, although United
States authorities have argued that the dissemination of classified information was a threat to
national security, an act of gross irresponsibility, and quite possibly, imbued with illegality. From
Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai charged that the release of Wikileaks documents have
endangered the lives of Afghan citizens who worked with NATO-led international forces. The
Afghan leader said that the disclosure of the names of Afghans who cooperated with the NATO-led
forces was "shocking" and "irresponsible." For its part, Wikileaks has defended the release of the
documents, noting that it presented an unvarnished view of the war in Afghanistan since 2004.
Regardless of these competing views, the contents of the controversial documents have spurred
debate about the United States' role in the war in Afghanistan, as well as the conduct of the war
itself. To these ends, two Wikileaks revelations could raise questions about the Obama
administration's broader "Afghan-Pak" strategy, which considers not only "ground zero" of the war
effort -- Afghanistan -- but also Pakistan next door. While the strategy appropriately focuses on the
region instead of one country, taking into consideration shared extremist Islamic influences, shared
Pashtun culture, and a landscape on the borderland that is a stronghold for Taliban and al-Qaida,
two Wikileaks revelations strong doubts on the effectiveness of the strategy.
Firstly, according to the document review by the New York Times, even as Pakistan receives funds
from the United States to help combat Islamic extremists militants and the threat of terrorism, the
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was said to be helping the Taliban, even collaborating
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 169 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
with them on terror attacks and assassination plots.
Secondly, the tactic of using drone attacks in the tribal border regions has been lauded by the
Obama administration as a means of crushing the enemy and eliminating high value Taliban and alQaida targets. However, according to the review by Der Spiegel, 38 Predator and Reaper drones
crashed while on combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, requiring "elaborate -- and dangerous -salvage operations." On the ground, "in country," there are additional worries about the political
costs of the civilian casualties caused by drone attacks.
The civilian costs provide a transition to discuss a third issue revealed by Wikileaks. According to
the review by Marc Ambinder of The Atlantic, there were "at least 144 separate incidents" of
civilian casualties that led to "cover-ups." Ambinder particularly took note of the unsuccessful
attempt to kill Abu Layth Ali Libi, which resulted in the deaths of several civilians and that resulted
in a "cover-up" by Afghan officials.
Analysis of Afghan Strategy by late 2010 -Taken together, these issues both inform and fuel emerging questions about a timeline for
continued engagement in Afghanistan. Indeed, these factors -- from financial costs to the strategic
considerations -- have contributed to rising emphasis on a "date certain" exit from Afghanistan,
starting in 2011 and to end in 2014. Of course, on the other side of the equation,
counterinsurgency advocates have argued that the objectives of the mission could require an
extended timeline.
There were also been emerging questions about the precise nature of that policy itself, which have
only been intensified with the Wikileaks revelations. Indeed, can counterinsurgency succeed in
Afghanistan? If so, what are the benchmarks for success? Can the United States and its allies
afford to fund the mission, given the demands on the domestic front? And is Pakistan -- an
apparent ally -- actually undermining the effort to succeed in Afghanistan?
Note that in late 2010, NATO announced its plans to exit Afghanistan and transfer control over the
anti-Taliban struggle to Afghan forces by the close of 2014. Afghan President Karzai formalized
the agreement by signing a long-term security partnership with NATO. At the heart of the matter
was NATO's contention that the Taliban not be allowed to simply wait out the presence of foreign
forces. As stated by NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the security bloc would
remain committed to security and stability of Afghanistan. He said, "One thing must be very clear
- NATO is in this for the long term." The NATO head then continued, "If the enemies of
Afghanistan have the idea that they can wait it out until we leave, they have the wrong idea. We
will stay as long as it takes to finish our job." For his part, Afghan President Karzai expressed
gratitude for NATO's contributions to his country's interest but stated, "I also informed them of the
concerns of the Afghan people with regard to civilian casualties, with regard to detentions, with
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 170 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
regard to, at times, NATO's posture."
It should be noted that this decision by NATO did not necessarily coincide with an official decision
by the United States on the duration of combat operations by its forces in Afghanistan.
On that latter consideration, there was some indication of the direction of the United States in
December 2010 when a much-anticipated report dealing with United States President Barack
Obama's strategy for the war in Afghanistan surfaced in the public purview. That report concluded
that United States forces were on track to begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2011, as
scheduled in the United States' president's war plan. This conclusion was reached despite the fact
there were mixed reports of success in the field. On that matter, the summary of the report said
that the United States forces continued to pursue and eliminate al-Qaida leadership figures, was
successful in reducing the terror enclave's ability to carry out attacks from the Afghan-Pak region,
and had halted the progress of the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the summary
noted that those gains were tenuous and could well be reversed in the future.
June 2011 Update: President Obama unveils Afghan exit strategy
On June 22, 2011, President Barack Obama was scheduled to unveil his exit strategy from
Afghanistan. At issue was the number of United States troops expected to leave Afghanistan and
the associated pace of withdrawal from that country.
Ahead of the president's much-anticipated address regarding the Afghanistan exit strategy,
speculation abounded about whether or not the more hawkish advisers in government would
prevail, and only a nominal number of troops would be withdrawn, along with a vague exit date.
They pointed to the need for enough forces on the ground as the region entered its summer fighting
season. As well, many military commanders argued that a premature withdrawal would result in a
reversal of the fragile military gains made against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan.
Among these elements advocating only a modest "draw down" of forces, and at a slow place of
withdrawal, were outgoing Defense Secretary William Gates and the United States commander in
Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, who was expected to soon come home to the United States
to take the position of the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Outgoing CIA director,
Leon Panetta, was to take on the defense portfolio in the wake of Gates; it was not known if this
shift in personnel was imbued with a hint of a shift in strategy.
At the other end of the philosophical spectrum was a cadre of advisers who were against the initial
surge strategy in Afghanistan, favoring instead targeted attacks in the Afghan-Pak region. This
camp, led by vice President Joseph Biden, has been lobbying for a significant "draw down" of the
troops from Afghanistan as early as mid-2011, with a steady ongoing withdrawal from that point,
culminating in a date-certain exit, preferably by a 2014 deadline.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 171 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Biden-led camp has argued that the security gains in Afghanistan to date, in combination with
the disruption of the al-Qaida network in that country, and the death of Osama bin Laden in
neighboring Pakistan at the hands of United States special forces in May 2011, collectively pave
the way for the United States to declare victory and begin the process of ending the war.
It should be noted that the American citizenry was war-weary after a decade of combat operations
across the world. Indeed, a recent survey by the Pew Institute showed that as many as 56 percent
of respondents favored an end to the war in Afghanistan as soon as possible. Even outgoing
Defense Secretary Gates, who has stood on the side of the generals in favoring only a modest
withdrawal of Afghanistan, was cognizant of the public support conundrum. To that end, Gates
acknowledged during a new conference to the State Department that President Obama would
have to consider the concerns of the American people in his decision regarding the war in
Afghanistan. Gate said, "It goes without saying that there are a lot of reservations in the Congress
about the war in Afghanistan and our level of commitment. There are concerns among the
American people who are tired of a decade of war."
The United States Congress was itself growing increasingly anxious about the costs of constant
warfare at a time when debt concerns dominated the domestic political spectrum. A bipartisan
group of United States senators dispatched a letter to President Obama calling for a shift in the
Afghanistan war strategy and advocating a substantial withdrawal of United States troops from that
country. The letter included the following statement: "Given our successes, it is the right moment
to initiate a sizable and sustained reduction in forces, with the goal of steadily redeploying all
regular combat troops. The costs of prolonging the war far outweigh the benefits."
That being said, there was an equally vocal coterie of senators expressing the opposite view, urging
instead that the president heed the generals and hold steady in Afghanistan. Of note was Senator
John McCain, a Republican from Arizona who was President Obama's rival in the 2008
presidential election. McCain said during an interview with ABC News' "Good Morning America,"
that his views lined up with Gates in calling for only a modest "draw down" since he did not want
to see a reversal of the fragile gains already made. McCain also suggested that a continued full
throttle effort could potentially end in success saying, "I believe that one more fighting season and
we can get this thing pretty well wrapped up."
Ahead of the June 22, 2011 national address, White House spokesperson, Jay Carney, confirmed
that President Obama had made a decision on the withdrawal plan and was in the process of
informing the national security team. Without disclosing the details, Carney noted that the the
"draw down" of the troops would commence in July 2011, on a phased basis, with a complete
withdrawal by 2014. While the president himself has been on the record saying that he would
favor a "significant" withdrawal of United States troops from Afghanistan, the actual meaning of
the term "significant" was yet a matter of interpretation.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 172 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
To be clear, since coming to office, President Obama tripled the number of United States forces
operating in Afghanistan, for a total of about 100,000 troops "in country." Included in this 100,000
number were the 30,000 troops that were added as part of the "surge" aimed at providing
reinforcements in the mission to reverse the Taliban's battlefield momentum. At the time,
President Obama had said that he would begin to redeploy United States forces in mid-July 2011.
Carney's aforementioned statement indicated that the president intended to abide with the promised
timeline; the main question rested on the number of troops to be withdrawn along with the actual
pace.
On June 22, 2011, in keeping with his pledge made in late 2009, President Obama unveiled a plan
to redeploy United States troops from Afghanistan and effectively end its commitments in that
country that had now lasted a decade. Explaining that al-Qaida was under pressure, with as much
as half of the al-Qaida leadership, including Bin Laden killed, and serious losses inflicted upon the
Taliban, the United States was well-positioned to begin to close out the war in Afghanistan.
To that end, President Obama ordered the withdrawal of 10,000 United States troops from
Afghanistan in 2011, with another 23,000 troops to be redeployed the following year. This "draw
down" of 33,000 United States forces from Afghanistan would essentially end the aforementioned
surge by the summer of 2012. Remaining "in country" would be the rest of the troops -- about
67,000 in total -- which would themselves undergo a steady pace of phased withdrawal to end by
a final deadline of 2014. It was expected that commanders on the ground in Afghanistan would be
given the autonomy to sort out the "battlefield geometry" and decide on what types of troops
would be needed in certain capacities from special forces, to trainers, intelligence officers, and
combat troops.
President Obama explained that the withdrawal plan would take time, saying, "This is the beginning
-- but not the end -- of our effort to wind down this war." That being said, President Obama told
the American people that they should take comfort in knowing that the tide of war was receding.
To that end, he noted that combat operations were over in Iraq, and "light was to be seen in
distance" in Afghanistan.
According to the president, the specific mission in Afghanistan going forward was to be: "No safehaven from which al-Qaida or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland, or our allies.
We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place. We will not police its streets or patrol its
mountains indefinitely. That is the responsibility of the Afghan government, which must step up its
ability to protect its people."
In this way, the president was not only putting the Afghan authorities on notice that they had to
take responsibility for their own country, he was simultaneously emphasizing a circumscribed role
for the United States in Afghanistan. With an eye on handing over security control in Afghanistan,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 173 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
President Obama announced that the United States would play host to a summit in 2012, which
would include NATO allies, and would focus on transitioning Afghanistan to a new future. The
president noted that a peaceful future for Afghanistan would entail a political solution and
accordingly, the United States would "join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including
the Taliban." In this way, the president -- for the first time -- appeared to back the notion of talks
with the Taliban, pending that group's renunciation of violence and separation from al-Qaida.
All told, the new mission would transition from that of comprehensive counter-insurgency (COIN)
strategy to a focused and targeted counter-terrorism strategy, aimed at capturing and killing
terrorists and insurgents. There would also be a clear "date-certain" exit deadline. Borrowing from
the experience in Iraq, the Obama administration believed that it was vital that the Afghan
government be pressured towards taking full responsibility for the country's security, and the
United States Congress needed to have clear targets to be used as mileposts for evaluation.
This plan would fall within the parameters of the Biden camp as the troop reductions were deeper
than initially anticipated; it also included a faster redeployment schedule than recommended by the
military advisers. According to the New York Times, the plan was a validation of Vice President
Biden's position. As expected, the plan was not easily endorsed by General Petraeus, who wanted
to see United States forces remain in place for a longer time horizon. The president was expected
to draw attention to the success of a more limited counter-terrorism strategy, as exemplified by the
capture and killing of Bin Laden.
At a broader level, President Obama used the exit strategy from Afghanistan to craft his own vision
of United States foreign policy. Indeed, the president said that while the United States would not
retreat from its role as a global power, the country had to chart a new pragmatic and strategic
course as regards international engagement. President Obama said, "Already this decade of war
has caused many to question the nature of America’s engagement around the world. Some would
have America retreat from our responsibility as an anchor of global security, and embrace an
isolation that ignores the very real threats that we face. Others would have America over-extend
ourselves, confronting every evil that can be found abroad."
Rather than selecting from this dyad, President Obama opted for a third way, which he
characterized as "a more centered course." He said, "Like generations before, we must embrace
America’s singular role in the course of human events. But we must be as pragmatic as we are
passionate; as strategic as we are resolute. When threatened, we must respond with force –- but
when that force can be targeted, we need not deploy large armies overseas. When innocents are
being slaughtered and global security endangered, we don’t have to choose between standing idly
by or acting on our own. Instead, we must rally international action, which we are doing in Libya,
where we do not have a single soldier on the ground, but are supporting allies in protecting the
Libyan people and giving them the chance to determine their destiny."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 174 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In this one paragraph, one finds something of an Obama doctrine that embraces: (1) strategic
pragmatism, reliant more on intelligence and targeted operations than excessive boots on the
ground, (2) multilateralism, in which an engaged United States of America works within an
international framework to solve global problems; and (3) fidelity to democratic ideals, in which the
United States would support self-determination of freedom-seeking people, while eschewing the
notion of American hegemony and empire.
President Obama ended his address to the nation by stating that the time had come for the United
States to concentrate on nation building in the domestic sphere, emphasizing that the costs of war
had been high, and the time had come to focus on the plight of the American people at home.
Clearly, the United States president was responding to the political climate at home, which was
growing increasingly frustrated with economic strife at home and its concomitant link to the heavy
price tag of war abroad.
Late 2011/Early 2012 Update:
United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker has asserted that the plague of violence in
Afghanistan ten years after the 2001 terror attacks in the United States, which spurred the war in
Afghanistan, would not change his country's plans. Crocker has said the United States troops
needed to remain in Afghanistan to prevent extremists from using Afghan territory to plan another
catastrophic terror attack. But Crocker on Sept. 14, 2011, was also adamant about the fact that
the actions of militant extremists would not deter the United States from its transition schedule -including the transfer of security duties from coalition forces to Afghan forces, and the phased exit
of United States troops from Afghanistan.
It should be noted that in November 2011, reports were emerging that the Obama administration
was considering an accelerated shift of the United States' military's mission in Afghanistan to an
advisory role. High level discussions to this end were said to be underway although no decisions
had been made. Clearly, should such a shift beenacted , there would be broad implications for the
United States strategy in Afghanistan, potentially scaling back United States combat duties in that
country well ahead of the 2014 date when remaining troops would finally be withdrawn.
At the close of January 2012, it was reported that the Taliban in Afghanistan refused to assent to a
ceasefire demand by the United States in Afghanistan. The demand was part of a prisoner
exchange/peace proposal, which focused on the release of five leading Taliban commanders who
were being held at the United States military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay (Cuba) since
2002. As reported by NBC news, a Taliban spokesperson said: "Our stance is the same. We will
announce a ceasefire when the foreign forces start their withdrawal from Afghanistan."
By the start of February 2012, attention switched to the security scene in Afghanistan, with NATO
affirming that local forces would play a leading role in defending the country in mid-2013, ahead
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 175 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
of the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014.
Speaking of these developments to come, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said:
From that time [2013], the role of our troops will gradually change from combat to support."
Consistent with this plan, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced his intention to withdraw
his country's troops from Afghanistan by 2013. Meanwhile, United States Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta was asserting success in the anti-extremist operations in Afghanistan, noting that
insurgent forces there had been successfully weakened. Panetta said that the United States' goal in
Afghanistan was to complete the transition "from a combat role to a training, advice and assist role"
in 2013.
In March 2012, following a series of incidents (the unfortunate burning of Korans and the killing of
civilians by a United States soldier), there was accentuated emphasis on United States foreign
policy regarding Afghanistan. The American public was war-weary after such a lengthy
engagement in Afghanistan and clamoring for "nation-building" at home on the domestic front.
Accordingly, the calls for an even earlier exit strategy from Afghanistan were increasing.
That being said, the United States and its closest ally, the United Kingdom, indicated that the
current schedule for ending engagement in Afghanistan would remain intact. Leaders of both
countries addressed the matter while British Prime Minister David Cameron was in the United
States for a state visit with American President Barack Obama. They said their respective countries
would end combat roles in Afghanistan by mid-to-late 2013. Before then, 23,000 United States
troops would return from Afghanistan by September 2012 (10,000 already returned in June 2011),
as promised by President Obama. For its part, the United Kingdom would send 500 British troops
home in the early autumn of 2012. These moves would assure that American and British forces
would shift from lead combat roles to support and training capacities by the second half of 2013,
with the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014.
United States President Obama said his intent was to ensure a "responsible" end to the war in
Afghanistan. Speaking of this issue, the American president said, "We have a strategy that will
allow us to responsibly wind down this [Afghan] war. We're steadily transitioning to the Afghans
who are moving into the lead. And that's going to allow us to bring our troops home. Already we're
scheduled to remove 23,000 troops by the end of this summer ... following the 10,000 that we
withdrew last year. And meanwhile, we will continue the work of devastating al-Qaida's leadership
and denying them a safe haven." Referring to the recent tragedies and unfortunate incidents that
raised tensions with Afghanistan, President Obama said, "There's no question that we face a
difficult challenge in Afghanistan, but I am ... confident that we can continue the work of meeting
our objectives, protecting our country and responsibly bringing this war to a close."
It should be noted that France was set to withdraw 1,000 of its soldiers from Afghanistan by the
end of 2012, leaving about 3,000 "in country." Belgium had begun withdrawing half of its force at
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 176 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the start of 2012. Norway likewise began its withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and was
looking towards a complete exit. Spain said that 2012 would mark the start of its withdrawal of
troops from Afghanistan, with a complete exit set for 2014. Canada withdrew its combat troops in
2011 and had already made its transition to a training role in Afghanistan.
With an eye on smoothing tensions with Afghanistan, especially after Afghan President Karzai
urged a faster exit of NATO forces from his country (as noted above), President Obama reportedly
convened a telephone meeting with the Afghan leader. In that call, the White House said that
President Obama and President Karzai "affirmed that they share the goal of building capable
Afghan security forces and strengthening Afghan sovereignty so that Afghans are increasingly in
charge of their own security, with the lead for combat operations shifting to Afghan forces, with
U.S. forces in support, in 2013." Obviously, this schedule would also mean that the "date certain"
for the deadline of the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014
remained intact.
As March 2012 was entering its final week, the White House confirmed the exit schedule noting
that the United States would have about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan in 2013 after surge forces
withdraw from that country. Obviously, this schedule would also mean that the "date certain" for
the deadline of the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014
remained in tact.
As of May 2012, attention was on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, as well the
handover of security responsibilities to the Afghans. Speaking from the NATO summit in Chicago
on May 20, 2012, President Obama again affirmed the exit schedule from Afghanistan in 2014,
while making it clear that all combat operations led by United States forces end in 2013. The end
of the war in Afghanistan dominated the NATO summit where France's newly-elected President
Francois Hollande made it clear that French troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2012 -- two
years ahead of the schedule. (As noted above, France was to withdraw 1,000 troops in 2012 with
the rest to remain "in country" until 2014.) Acknowledging that there would be "hard days ahead"
for Afghanistan, President Obama urged allied countries to "pool resources" to assist in completing
the mission. NATO leadership and the Obama administration also placed pressure on Pakistan to
re-open key NATO supply routes through that country into Afghanistan, which were closed in late
2011 after air strikes accidentally killed Pakistani troops.
United States considering complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan -In January 2013, as Afghan President Hamid Karzai arrived in the United States capital of
Washington D.C. for meetings, the Obama administration was reported to be considering a
complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. In a conference call, Ben Rhodes -- the deputy
national security adviser for strategic communication -- acknowledged that the total withdrawal of
troops (known as the "zero option") was indeed an option that the Obama administration had on
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 177 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the proverbial table. Rhodes said, "The U.S. does not have an inherent objective of X number of
troops in Afghanistan. We have an objective of making sure there's no safe haven for al-Qaida
within Afghanistan and making sure that the Afghan government has a security force that is
sufficient to ensure the stability of the Afghan government and the denial of that safe haven." He
continued, "So that's what guides us and that's what causes us to look for different potential troop
numbers, or not having potential troops in the country." One possibility was the notion of using
non-military means of meeting the national interests in Afghanistan.
Rhodes' statement was an indication that in his second term, President Barack Obama intended to
put more of his own stamp on foreign policy, as shown by his selection of former Senator Chuck
Hagel as defense secretary. The Vietnam war veteran holds that military engagement should be
used judiciously and shares Obama's skepticism over the Iraq war; perhaps most pertinently, Hagel
has advocated a faster withdrawal from Afghanistan. Overall, many aspects of Hagel's foreign
policy orientation tracks harmoniously with that of President Obama, and was certainly a departure
from the neo-conservative foreign policy, which was vociferously championed by Republicans
during the previous Bush administration.
A report in the Washington Post noted that some elements of the Obama administration have
advanced the idea of reducing the United States' troop presence in Afghanistan radically to only
2,500 after 2014. By way of comparison, there were about 68,000 United States troops stationed
in Afghanistan at the start of 2013. Those voices in the Obama administration -- quite in contrast to
certain military officials -- have suggested that it would be the best way to end a long, expensive,
and increasingly unpopular war. But some military officials believe that an accelerated withdrawal
from Afghanistan would be irresponsible. Certainly, some reports from the Pentagon indicate that
Afghanistan security forces are barely able to manage their duties without support from United
States forces.
Regardless of the efficiency of Afghan security forces, the reality was that the foreign troop
presence in Afghanistan was highly unpopular and the Afghan government itself was not restrained
in casting aspersions on the United States' troops stationed in Afghanistan. Indeed, just ahead of
his trip to the United States in January 2013, Afghan President Hamid Karzai blamed the United
States troop presence for the rise in corruption and violence in his country, the actual causality of
bloodshed in that country over decades notwithstanding. The formulation of a post-2014 foreign
troop presence in Afghanistan was expected to be the main agenda item to be discussed during
Karzai's visit to the United States.
There appeared to be little concurrence between the United States and Afghanistan on the nature
of a continued United States troops presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014. According to the New
York Times, despite his bluster about the United States military in Afghanistan being the cause of
troubles in his country, Karzai wanted as many as 15,000 troops to remain past the official end of
the war. By contrast, the United States was considering a total withdrawal by 2014.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 178 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Note that on Jan. 11, 2013, after a meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, United States
President Barack Obama said that a transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces would
ensue over the course of 2013 with a complete end of the war in Afghanistan at the end of 2014.
The Obama White House also released a statement making it clear that the year 2013 was intended
to bring an end to United States combat operations in Afghanistan. Explaining his exit strategy
from Afghanistan, President Obama said, "But let me say it as plainly as I can: Starting this spring,
our troops will have a different mission -- training, advising, assisting Afghan forces. And by the
end of next year, 2014, the transition will be complete -- Afghans will have full responsibility for
their security, and this war will come to a responsible end."
Meanwhile, the governments of the United States and Afghanistan additionally agreed to a plan to
engage Taliban officials in future peace talks, which Karzai said were intended to return "peace
and stability to Afghanistan as soon as possible."
Update (2013-2014) -In mid-2013, dissonance between Afghan President Karzai and United States President Obama led
the Obama administration to consider a complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan ahead of
the scheduled timeline to exit Afghanistan in 2014. The Obama administration was also
considering whether or not to bypass the option of retaining a residual presence past the 2014
deadline.
Note that peace talks were on the agenda in Afghanistan a month earlier -- in June 2013 -between the Afghan government and the Taliban. However, less than 24 hours after the Taliban
opened an office in Qatar, and before the discussion could ever commence, the Afghan
government walked away from the negotiating table. It should be noted that Afghanistan also
broke off talks with the United States on future military cooperation beyond 2014 -- when United
States forces were scheduled to fully withdraw from Afghanistan.
United States and NATO officials have been consistent advocates of bilateral negotiations between
the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, as they believe that some sort of ceasefire
agreement must be forged between the two sides if Afghanistan hopes to have a stable future. But
previous proposals for peace have ended in failure, and this effort was already on the rocks.
Afghan President Karzai said he was protesting the United States' outreach to the Taliban, which
apparently Karzai viewed as objectionable. Of particular concern to Karzai was the title of the
Taliban office in Qatar, as well as the Taliban flag flying over the office compound. A
spokesperson for President Karzai said "We oppose the title -- the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan - because such a thing doesn't exist." The spokesperson continued, "The U.S. was aware of the
president's stance." From the point of President Karzai, the Taliban was attempting to portray itself
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 179 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
as a government in exile. Accordingly, the Afghan president made clear that the country officials
would not be engaging in peace talks unless those activities were "Afghan-led."
Continued dissonance between Afghan President Karzai and United States President Barack
Obama in July 2013 led the Obama administration to consider a complete withdrawal of troops
from Afghanistan ahead of the scheduled timeline to exit Afghanistan in 2014. The Obama
administration was also considering whether or not to bypass the option of retaining a residual
presence past the 2014 deadline. Increasing tensions between President Barack Obama and
Afghan President Hamid Karzai appeared to be at the heart of the matter.
Those tensions were sparked by Karzai's reaction to the United States outreach to the Taliban and
the coordination of formal peace talks in Qatar. However, the tensions increased following a
particular fractious telephone call between the two leaders. The result was that President Obama
was not looking into a "zero option" that would withdraw all forces from Afghanistan, including
residual counter-terrorism and advisory force that were expected to remain in Afghanistan even
after the exit of United States military troops in 2014.
White House Press Secretary Jay Carney insisted that President Obama had not yet made a
decision on the matter and was in no hurry to do so. Carney said, “I want to make clear, today’s
story notwithstanding, that this is not a decision that is imminent. And we are talking about a
residual force, a potential residual force, in a year and a half. So these are ongoing conversations."
It should be noted that earlier in the year, the president’s deputy national security adviser, Ben
Rhodes, said that the "zero option" would be considered if all the United States' goals in
Afghanistan were met. To that end, Rhodes said: “The objective of the bilateral security
agreement negotiations is not to accomplish a number of U.S. troops in a country. It is to
accomplish the two goals of denying a safe haven to al-Qaida, and training and equipping Afghan
national security forces."
President Obama himself addressed the fact that those objectives when he said, “We achieved our
central goal, which is -- or have come very close to achieving our central goal, which is to decapacitate al-Qaida, to dismantle them, to make sure that they cannot attack us again."
That being said, in the last week of July 2013, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began closing
down its clandestine bases in Afghanistan. The move coincided with the United States' military
withdrawal from Afghanistan, as well a shift in focus as the United States was now likely to
concentrate its counter-terrorism efforts in more active hotspots, such as Yemen and North Africa
where al-Qaida is more active, and possibly look towards monitoring the complicated landscape in
Syria. The closure of CIA bases in Afghanistan also indirectly exemplified the transition over the
last decade of the spy agency being a predominantly -- and classically -- espionage entity to one
with military capability at its disposal, such as the use of bases and drones.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 180 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Note that in November 2013, the United States and Afghanistan were in the process of forging a
proposed security deal. At issue was an agreement for United States military forces remaining in
Afghanistan beyond the 2014 deadline when most NATO-led international forces, including those
from the United States, were due to officially withdraw. Of particular concern was a key
provision that would give United States military personnel immunity from prosecution in
Afghanistan.
In the last week of November 2013, the council of tribal elders who make up Afghanistan's Loya
Jirga convened a meeting to decide whether to approve the Bilateral Security Agreement with the
United States. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Loya Jirga approved the document and urged
that the deal be signed at the end of the year (2013), as requested by the United States. The
declaration read as follows: "Given the current situation in, and Afghanistan's need... the contents
of this agreement as a whole is endorsed by the members of this Loya Jirga. The Loya Jirga
requests the president to sign the agreement before the end of 2013."
Presumably to show that he was an independent actor and not beholden to the United States,
which was ironically ensuring the safety of Afghanistan for more than a decade, Afghan President
Hamid Karzai said that he was toying with the idea of waiting until 2014 to sign the agreement.
The United States reacted to this move by Karzai by warning that there would be no delay. United
States Department of State spokesperson, Jen Psaki, said: "We believe that signing sooner rather
than later is essential to give Afghans certainty about their future before the upcoming elections,
and enable the United States and other partners to plan for U.S. presence after 2014. It is neither
practical nor possible for us to further delay because of the uncertainty it would create."
As November 2013 came to a close, President Karzai maintained his stance in refusing to sign the
security deal with the United States until 2014, when a new president was elected to power in
Afghanistan. The United States warned that delay on a matter of such importance could result in
the "zero option" of withdrawing all United States troops from Afghanistan in 2014.
In a meeting with United States National Security Advisor Susan Rice in Kabul, Karzai also added
further conditions to the deal, demanding that the United States immediately end military raids on
Afghan homes. He also called for the United States to return any Afghan detainees currently being
held at Guantanamo Bay. The Obama administration responded to these new demands by
nothing that Karzai was making it clear that he was not prepared to sign the bilateral security
agreement. A statement by National Security Advisor Rice warned, "Without a prompt signature,
the U.S. would have no choice but to initiate planning for a post-2014 future in which there would
be no U.S. or NATO troop presence in Afghanistan."
The continuing violence at the start of 2014 highlighted the security challenges facing Afghanistan.
Of concern was the matter of how the country would deal with the violence when international
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 181 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
forces exited Afghanistan at the close of the year (2014). To that end, there was the pending
security agreement (discussed above) under consideration to be forged between Afghanistan and
the United States.
That proposal would mean that as many as 10,000 United States troops would be remain in
Afghanistan after the 2014 deadline for a withdrawal of international forces; that remaining
contingent would be responsible for counter-terrorism and training of Afghan forces. President
Karzai has not been quick to sign the agreement and the United States has made it clear that
without a signed agreement, it would fully exit Afghanistan at the close of 2014, as planned to this
point. To date, relations between the United States and the Karzai government in Afghanistan
have been decidedly conflicted, with the United States frequently frustrated by Karzai's erratic and
unstable behavior, marked occasionally by Karzai's threats to "join the Taliban."
In February 2014, the United States made clear that it was entertaining the possibility of
withdrawing all its troops from Afghanistan unless the security agreement is soon signed. Indeed,
on Feb. 12, 2014, White House spokesperson Jay Carney emphasized that the Obama
administration had no intention of renegotiating the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). At a
White House briefing, he said, "Planning has to place around the contingencies that exist -- with
either a signed BSA or a BSA that is not signed. And as time progresses into this year, it becomes
more difficult to plan for a post-2014 troop presence."
Meanwhile, around the same period in February 2014, reports were emerging from Afghanistan
about talks between President Karzai's government and the Taliban. A spokesperson for the
Karzai government, Aimal Faizi, said in an interview with the New York Times, "I can confirm that
... Taliban are willing more than ever to join the peace process. Contacts have been made and we
are also in touch with them."
The United States issued a statement supportive of such overtures of reconciliation. Jen Psaki of
the United States Department of State said, "It's important to note here that we've long strongly
supported an Afghan-led reconciliation, which would, of course, be Afghans talking to Afghans. So
the notion that we wouldn't support that dialogue is inaccurate." That being said, she made it clear
that the United States was not involved in any peace talks with the Taliban.
The United States was not so sanguine about the news that Karzai allowed the release of 65
detainees from the high-security Bagram prison to the north of Kabul. The United States had
strenuously urged Afghanistan not to release these detainees, warning that there were extremist
Taliban fighters who were responsible for the deaths of international forces, including both Afghan
and American soldiers, as well as civilians. But Karzai went forward with the release of these
extremists in defiance of the United States’ expressed request. The move was sure to further
complicate already dismal relations between the governments of the two countries.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 182 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
As February 2014 came to a close, the White House in the United States announced that
President Barack Obama had ordered the Pentagon to prepare to withdraw all United States
troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year. President Obama issued the order in the face of
Karzai's dithering over the Bilateral Security Agreement that would allow the United States t o
keep a limited contingent of troops in Afghanistan after 2014. President Obama apparently
delivered the news directly to President Karzai during a telephone call.
With the aforementioned withdrawal in the offing, the United States was intensifying its operations
to damage the terror networks, such as the Taliban and Haqqani network, which were operating in
the Afghan-Pak region.
President Obama announces all combat troops will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2016 -On May 27, 2014, United States President Obama announced that a complete withdrawal of
American combat troops from Afghanistan would be completed at the end of 2016. That new
"date-certain" timeline would be an extension of a previous 2014 exit schedule announced by
President Obama in the past, but would nevertheless bring a conclusion to the United States
military engagement in Afghanistan, which commenced following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington D.C.
President Obama's new schedule would call for a pullout of the majority of United States troops
from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, but would leave in place 9,800 troops in that country through
2015, when that number would be reduced by half. The remaining troops would then be
withdrawn in 2016. The new schedule, including the decision to keep in place a select number of
combat troops through 2016 was due to the fact that President Obama wanted to see further
training for Afghan security forces along with the ability to launch counterterrorism missions in the
interests of maintaining the progress made in a war that has gone on for more than a dozen years
and left more than 2,000 United States troops dead.
Of course, this plan would be contingent upon the signing of a new bilateral security agreement
between the United States and Afghanistan. With the increasingly eccentric President Hamid
Karzai at the helm in Afghanistan, there has been no progress in forging such an agreement.
However, with fresh leadership in the offing following the conclusion of the 2014 presidential
elections in Afghanistan, there were indications that a new Afghan government would be highly
interested in signing onto such an agreement.
It should be noted that while liberals in the United States were frustrated that a complete exit from
Afghanistan -- and an end to a war that had been ongoing for more than a decade -- would not
come at the end of 2014, some Republicans in Congress criticized President Obama's exit schedule
from Afghanistan. For conservatives, such as Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Kelly
Ayotte, issuing a date-certain deadline was tantamount to surrender. The three Republicans issued a
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 183 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
statement that read as follows: "The president's decision to set an arbitrary date for the full
withdrawal of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is a monumental mistake and a triumph of politics over
strategy."
But President Obama was vociferous in his stance that the engagement of United States military
forces in Afghanistan was coming to an end, and the specific mission in Afghanistan was on the
verge of being completed. According to the United States president, it was time for Afghans to
take responsibility for their country. As noted by President Obama in his drawdown announcement
from the White House's Rose Garden, "We have to recognize that Afghanistan will not be a perfect
place, and it is not America's responsibility to make it one."
President Obama made it clear that significant progress had been made in the years since the 2001
terror attacks -- a time when Afghanistan was the locus of the terrorist Islamist group, al-Qaida.
Indeed, United States military forces since that time have carried out a relentless assault on the
terrorist group, eliminating its leadership, and preventing Afghanistan from being used as a safe
haven and a base for attacks against the United States. With the death of Osama bin Laden -- a
perilous operation authorized by President Obama himself in 2011 -- the United States president
could conceivably argue that the time to exit Afghanistan had come. However, the president was
clearly looking towards a phased withdrawal, and one on a somewhat more protracted timeline
than he had indicated in recent years. To this end, he said: "Now we're finishing the job we've
started."
Another bone of contention for Republicans came as a result of a deal that secured the release of a
United States prisoner of war -- Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl -- from Afghan militants. Because
Bergdahl was released in exchange for five Afghan detainees from Guantanamo, several
Republican lawmakers attacked the administration for “negotiating with terrorists.”
However, as noted by National Security Advisor Susan Rice in an interview with CBS News,
Bergdahl was not actually a “hostage,” but a “prisoner of war, taken on the battlefield,” and that
the United States had a “sacred obligation” to free such prisoners of war. In an interview with
CNN, Rice also clarified that the United States did not, in fact, negotiate with the Haqqani
network, but with the government of Qatar, which was responsible for holding the five Afghans
for a period of one year. Rice also addressed Republicans' complaint that the Obama
administration did not provide Congress with the required 30-day notice required for releasing
prisoners of war, noting that Congress had already been notified that negotiations intended to
secure Bergdahl's release were in process. Several member of Congress -- from across party lines - complained that limited communications years prior on the matter of a prisoner exchange did not
constitute a proper notification.
It should be noted that the questionable circumstances of Begdahl's disappearance in Afghanistan
fueled accusations that he was a military deserter and thus, undeserving of the efforts to bring him
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 184 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
home. In truth, however, the precise circumstances remained murky and would be the subject of
military investigation, with the possibility of court martial, dishonorable discharge, or other legal
measures in the offing.
Those pathways were yet to be taken since the immediate discussion in the American political
purview was whether the return of one prisoner of war was worth the release of five Afghan
detainees (albeit into Qatari custody for one year). Also in the political purview was the question
of whether the negotiations brokered by the government of Qatar, which led to the prisoner
exchange deal, constituted "negotiations with terrorists" as alleged by many Republicans.
For his part, President Barack Obama made no apologies for the deal, saying "I make absolutely
no apologies for making sure we get a young man back to his parents." He continued, "We had a
prisoner of war whose health had deteriorated and ... we saw an opportunity and we seized it, and
I make no apologies for that." In answer to the question of whether the price of a prisoner
exchange was worth the security risks posed, especially if Bergdahl did turn out to be a deserter,
President Obama pointed to a guiding principle of the United States that "we do not leave anybody
wearing the American uniform behind" and emphasizing, "We don't condition whether we make
the effort to get them back."
U.S. general killed in Afghanistan ahead of departure of United States troops
On Aug. 5, 2014, an Afghan army soldier opened fire on international troops at the well-fortified
British military base to the west of Kabul. The attack at Camp Qargha resulted with the killing of
a United States army general, injuries to a German general, and the wounding of several other
soldiers. The assailant was ultimately killed by a bodyguard but not before he was able to carry
out his bloody assault. While the Afghan army recruit who opened fire on coalition officers was
not revealed to be carrying out a Taliban operation, the Islamic extremist group nonetheless
congratulated him post-humously for his efforts to hurt coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.
The general who died was identified as General Harold Greene -- the deputy commanding general
for the Combined Security Transition Command, who was tasked with preparing for the
withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan. The death of General Harold Greene marked the
highest level fatality of a member of the United States military since the start of the war in
Afghanistan.
U.S. says it has plans for quick exit from Afghanistan if presidential stalemate remains unresolved
In mid-2014, Afghan forces were battling the Taliban, who remained active across the country. In
fact, the political scene in Afghanistan had been improving thanks to the fact that a deal had been
brokered by United States Secretary of State John Kerry to resolve the election standoff. Kerry
forged an agreement between the two presidential candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 185 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Ghani, that would ensure a complete recount of all the ballots cast in the June 14, 2014, "runoff"
round of the presidential election. Once the recount was complete, both candidates would have to
respect the outcome regardless of whom was declared to be the winner. That winner would then
be expected to form a unity government.
But the election deal was soon at risk of being derailed due to ongoing accusations of political
machinations by pro-President Karzai factions. So too was the security landscape devolving with a
continual barrage of attacks by the Taliban. According to findings by the United Nations, as many
as 5,000 civilians were killed in the first six months of 2014, marking a significant increase of 25
percent when compared to the same time period in 2013. It was apparent that the Taliban and
other extremist Islamic terror entities were not waiting for the full withdrawal of United States
forces from Afghanistan to stake their claim in returning the country to its pre-2001 landscape.
In late August 2014, the Taliban was carrying out suicide bomb attacks, includiing a significant
assault against the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security, in the eastern
city of Jalalabad. Elsewhere in the country, other attacks were taking place. A common emerging
complaint was that Afghan security forces were having trouble fending off attacks by the Taliban,
who were now better armed that national forces. It was apparent that the Taliban and other
extremist Islamic terror entities were not waiting for the full withdrawal of United States forces
from Afghanistan to stake their claim in returning the country to its pre-2001 landscape.
As August 2014 came to a close, the re-counting of election ballots continued along amidst
growing anxieties that the Kerry unity deal might collapse. With the prospect of a presidential
stalemate in sight, a security deal between the United States and Afghanistan would also be in
jeopardy. Accordingly, the United States military made it known that plans were afoot for a fast
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin Dempsey said that optimally,
the United States would need four months to pull all its troops and equipment out of Afghanistan;
however, Dempsey said a faster withdrawal was possible if there was no security agreement in
place allowing for the continued presence of United States troops in Afghanistan in 2015.
At the start of September 2014, the Kerry unity deal to end the presidential election impasse
appeared to collapse despite attempts to rehabilitate negotiations. Two issues emerged as
particularly problematic. First, the team of the presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew
from the United Nation's audit of votes, complaining that fraudulent votes were not being properly
handled. Second, the two sides could not agree on the powers of the chief executive -- the
newly-conceived position that would share power with the presidency.
As a result of pressure from NATO leaders, who were meeting at the time in September 2014, the
two rival presidential candidates agreed to close ranks. With the stakes of national security and
unity in mind, Abdullah Abdullah and Asraf Ghani recommitted themselves to the goal of forming
a government of national unity. But that commitment seemed to be a perfunctory move since
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 186 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Ghani, who was clearly anticipating being declared the victor, soon said that while he would
continue to engage in discussions aimed at forming a national unity government, there would only
be one leader of Afghanistan -- presumably, him. For his part, Abdullah said that he would not
accept a fraudulent vote result. Thus, one could conclude that the presidential impasse remained in
place. Ultimately Ghani was officially named the winner of the election and the set was path for
the possibility of a security agreement with the United States.
British combat troops exit Afghanistan and U.S. forces begin phased withdrawal
In late October 2014, United States and United Kingdom forces exited their main military bases in
Helmand province, effectively turning security over to Afghan forces. While the complete
withdrawal of United States forces would not ensue until 2016, a phased draw-down was certainly
taking place and would continue over the course of the next year. At the same time, this particular
exit from Helmand was significant for the United Kingdom as it marked the withdrawal of the last
British combat forces from Afghanistan after being in the Afghan combat zone for more than a
decade. For its part, the Afghan military said that it was prepared to take responsibility for the
security of the country, pointing to the fact that increasingly, support from United States and
United Kingdom forces had become more psychological than in the battlefield.
U.S. President Obama quietly extends combat role in Afghanistan in response to plague of
continuing Taliban attacks
In late November 2014, United States President Barack Obama quietly moved to extend the
combat role for United States troops in Afghanistan by another year. President Obama's exit
strategy from Afghanistan had originally called for an end to combat operations in Afghanistan at
the end of 2014. But in May 2014, he modified the exit strategy, calling for troop levels to be cut
to 9,800 by the end of the year (2014), by half again in 2015, and then moving to simply an
embassy presence and a security assistance presence in Kabul by the end of 2016.
Now at the end of 2014, with the Taliban continuing to pose a threat, President Obama issued an
order authorizing United States troops to continue their combat operations against Taliban and
other Islamist terrorist militants in Afghanistan, if they threatened either American forces or the
Afghan government. The order also authorized the use of United States air support for Afghan
combat missions. Moreover, the United States made clear it was prepared to deploy an additional
1,000 troops to Afghanistan to deal with the security threat.
That security threat was displayed in full relief in the month of November 2014. On Nov. 16,
2014, a suicide bomber targeted a convoy in Kabul carrying a well-known female politician and
women's right advocate, Shukria Barakzai. That attack left three people dead and Barakzai
wounded. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident. Days later on Nov. 18, 2014, a
suicide truck bombing in Afghan capital of Kabul left at least two security guards dead and several
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 187 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
other injured. The attack took place in the eastern part of the country where international military
bases and multinational companies have been located. Then, at the end of the month, the Taliban
carried out a series of brazen attacks at a compound in Kabul frequented by foreigners, killing at
least three foreign nationals (South Africans) and an Afghan. Suddenly and dramatically, Kabul
was "Ground Zero" of the Taliban's war against the Afghan government, with the number of
attacks in the capital doubled in number from 2013, and with foreigners as the high value targets.
The chaos spurred Kabul’s police chief, General Mohammed Zahir to suddenly resign from his
post.
NATO formally ends its 13-year combat mission in Afghanistan
The close of 2014 marked the conclusion of NATO's 13-year long combat mission in Afghanistan,
which began in late 2001 following the horrific terror attacks by al-Qaida on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon in the United States. While the NATO combat mission had come to an
end, a residual force of approximately 12,000 NATO troops were expected to remain in
Afghanistan as part of a non-combat operation. The new operation, referred to as "Resolute
Support," was set to begin on Jan. 1, 2015, and was aimed at supporting local Afghan troops. As
the NATO flag for the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) was lowered during a
ceremony marking the occasion in the Afghan capital of Kabul, mission commander General John
Campbell paid tribute to the United States-led NATO effort, saying, "We have lifted the Afghan
people out of the darkness of despair and given them hope for the future." Meanwhile, NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg released a statement that read as follows: "The security of
Afghanistan will be fully in the hands of the country's 350,000 Afghan soldiers and police. But
NATO allies, together with many partner nations, will remain to train, advise and assist them." The
task ahead for local Afghan troops would be formidable with 2014 being marked as a particularly
bloody year in the war against the Taliban and other Islamist extremists in the region.
New Exit Schedule
Note that in the spring of 2015, as discussed below, United States President Obama announced an
adjustment to the United States' existing withdrawal schedule from Afghanistan. President Barack
Obama's existing exit schedule called for a withdrawal of the majority of United States troops
from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, but left in place 9,800 troops in that country through 2015,
when over the course of that year, the number would be reduced by half to 4,900. The remaining
troops would then be withdrawn in 2016. Now, in March 2015, President Obama was responding
for a request by newly-elected Afghan President Ghani for continued United States engagement in
Afghanistan. That new adjusted schedule would hold the current deployment of 9,800 troops in
place in Afghanistan through the end of 2015, and would outline a new phased withdrawal
schedule through 2016, with any remaining troops at the end of 2016 tasked with securing the
Kabul embassy. While the final 2016 exit schedule remained in place, the pace of withdrawal was
now changed with most of the movement occuring in 2016.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 188 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
See "Special Foreign Policy Note" below and ""Editor's Note" for details.
2015 Update
In mid-January 2015, after months of wrangling and negotiations, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani
formed a government, nominating ministers for his new cabinet. The move brought an end to an
extended period of political paralysis that continued to plague the country in the aftermath of the
contested 2014 presidential election. The new cabinet was announced by Ghani's chief of staff,
Abdul Salam Rahimi, who said during the nomination ceremony for the 25 cabinet candidates,
"The government will refer them to the parliament for a vote of confidence."
Ghani made good on his commitment made following the controversial presidential contest that
awarded him victory over his rival, Abdullah Abdullah, by including stalwarts from both camps.
Indeed, the cabinet excluded former government ministers and members of parliament, while
including ethnic and regional power-brokers.
The main complaint was that by looking towards a cabinet of fresh faces, there might not be
enough individuals with governing experience in top administrative positions. But a bigger problem
soon emerged as the eligibility of several proposed cabinet ministers came under scrutiny for
reasons ranging from dual citizenship, to being underage, and extending to alleged criminal activity.
At the end of January 2015, the Afghan political scene turned tumultuous as the parliament dealt
a blow to President Ghani, approving only eight of the 25 cabinet nominees. Among the rejected
nominees were those intended to hold key cabinet portfolios for ministries such as defense, justice,
and eocnomy, as well as the candidate for the governorship of the central bank.
With parliament set for winter recess, President Ghani would have to wait until mid-March 2015
before be could advance a new slate of ministerial candidates for consideration by parliament.
In late February 2015, Afghanistan's capital city of Kabul was struck by violence when a suicide
attacker used a car packed with explosives to target NATO forces in that country. The attack in the
heavily-fortified center of Kabul killed one Turkish soldier and wounded at least one other
person. The Turkish military confirmed that the attack hit the vehicle of the security team of the
Turkish envoy, Ismail Aramaz. However, it appeared that the actual targets of the attack were
United States forces. While the Taliban claimed responsibility for the violence, a Taliban
spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, said via the social media outlet, Twitter, "The purpose of
today's attack in Kabul was a convoy of U.S. troops." Even with Afghan forces now in 2015
being fully responsible for the security efforts in that country, and even with the withdrawal of
most foreign troops in late 2014, it was apparent that NATO forces, led by the United States, have
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 189 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
remained a prime target for the Taliban.
On May 13, 2015, the Taliban carried out a terror attack at the Park Hotel in Afghanistan's capital
city of Kabul. The attack ensued as people gathered for a concert and quickly devolved into the
type of siege scenario that Islamist extremists have come to increasingly favor due to its extended
period of terror.
In this case, the assailants made a point of going room to room in search of foreign nationals. In its
claim of responsibility, the Taliban made clear it mission to target foreigners as it released a
statement as follows: "The attack was planned carefully to target the party in which important
people and Americans were attending."
As many as 14 people died at the hands of the gunmen with Afghan civilians, four Indians, two
Pakistanis, and one citizen the United Kingdom, Italy, Kazakhstan, and the United States
respectively among the dead. Afghan security forces brought a conclusion to the attack only after
several hours. Ultimately, the gunmen were eliminated before they could conduct a suicide attack.
Nevertheless, the bloodshed highlighted the challenge of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to deal
with the threat posed by terrorism in that country.
The Afghan Parliament's five year term was scheduled to end on June 22, 2015; however, with the
2015 parliamentary elections not yet held, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani issued a decree
extending the mandate of the country's legislative body until a fresh vote could be held. It should
be noted that parliamentary elections were expected to be held in April 2015 but were delayed due
to security concerns as well as disputes over electoral reforms. That postponement meant that the
expiration of the parliament's term was looming ahead. In order to avert a governing crisis,
President Ghani consulted with the country's judiciary and other branches of government, and
concluded that a special extension would be the best option. The president was also set to
announce a date for elections to finally be held.
Note that while these governing machinations were ongoing, the Afghan parliament was struck by
terror at the hands of Taliban militants. The Taliban fighters commenced their assault with a
massive car bomb outside the gates of the parliament, and then used the ensuing melee to storm
the parliamentary compound. Security forces evacuated the building and were able to successfully
repel the attack, killing all six gunmen. No members of parliament were hurt.
Special Foreign Policy Note:
President Ghani thanks U.S. for help in stabilizing Afghanistan; President Obama unveils new
withdrawal schedule from Afghanistan
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 190 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On a visit to the United States to meet with President Barack Obama in the spring of 2015, Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani signaled a sea change in relations between the two countries as he visited
the tomb of the unknown soldier to pay tribute to the lives of American soldiers lost in the war in
Afghanistan. Ghani's predecessor, Hamid Karzai gained notoriety for his sharp criticism for
United States troops in Afghanistan who ironically helped to liberate his country from the Taliban.
Indeed, it was only as a result of international intervention and support that the path was paved for
the very democratic government in Afghanistan that Karzai would eventually lead. Karzai often
displayed erratic behavior, attacking the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan to stabilize his
country, threatening to join the Taliban, and refusing to sign a bilateral security agreement with
the United States.
In a joint news conference with President Obama, President Ghani -- who immediately signed the
bilateral security agreement upon coming to power in 2014, made a point of thanking United
States soldiers for their efforts to secure Afghanistan. President Ghani also went so far as to thank
United States tax payers for their contributions to the stabilization of Afghanistan. Moreover,
President Ghani thanked Secretary of State John Kerry, working on behalf of the Obama admin,
for his unflagging diplomatic efforts to reach a reconciliation deal after the controversial elections of
2014. Those elections left Ghani in a power struggle with his rival, Abdullah Abdullah. However, a
Kerry-forged agreement that officialized GHani as president and Abdullah as chief executive was
credited for rescuing Afghanistan from the brink of political crisis, and has since left Afghans
regarding the United States' top diplomat as a hero of sorts.
The visit by Ghani was also marked by foreign policy business, as President Obama announced an
adjustment to the United States' existing withdrawal schedule from Afghanistan. President Barack
Obama's stated (read: existing) exit schedule called for a withdrawal of the majority of United
States troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, but left in place 9,800 troops in that country
through 2015, when over the course of that year, the number would be reduced by half to 4,900.
The remaining troops would then be withdrawn in 2016. Now, in March 2015, President Obama
was responding for a request by President Ghani for continued United States engagement in
Afghanistan. That new adjusted schedule would hold the current deployment of 9,800 troops in
place in Afghanistan through the end of 2015, and would outline a new phased withdrawal
schedule through 2016, with any remaining troops at the end of 2016 tasked with securing the
Kabul embassy. In effect, the "bones" of the 2016 exit schedule remained in place, but the pace of
withdrawal was now changed, with the lion's share of the movement occuring in 2016.
A White House statement on the matter read as follows: "Based on President Ghani's request for
flexibility in the U.S. drawdown timeline, the U.S. will maintain its current posture of 9,800 troops
through the end of 2015. The specific trajectory of the 2016 U.S. troop drawdown will be
established later in 2015 to enable the U.S. troop consolidation to a Kabul-based embassy presence
by the end of 2016."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 191 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
It should be noted that on March 25, 2015, while President Ghani was in the United States, a
suicide attack rocked the Afghan capital of Kabul. The blast occurred in the Muradkhani district of
Kabul close to the presidential palace, the defense ministry, and the finance ministry. Seven people
were reported to have died and more than 20 others were wounded as a result of the attack.
Editor's Note
President Barack Obama's blueprint for the exit of United States troops in Afghanistan called for
the withdrawal of the majority of troops at the end of 2014, but left in place 9,800 troops in that
country through 2015, when over the course of that year, the number would be reduced by half to
4,900. The remaining troops would then be withdrawn in 2016.
It should be noted that while liberals in the United States were frustrated that a complete exit from
Afghanistan -- and an end to a war that had been ongoing for more than a decade -- did not come
at the end of 2014, some Republicans in Congress criticized President Obama's exit schedule from
Afghanistan. For conservatives, such as Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Kelly
Ayotte, issuing a date-certain deadline was tantamount to surrender. The three Republicans issued a
statement that read as follows: "The president's decision to set an arbitrary date for the full
withdrawal of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is a monumental mistake and a triumph of politics over
strategy." But President Obama was vociferous in his stance that the engagement of United States
military forces in Afghanistan was coming to an end, and the specific mission in Afghanistan was
on the verge of being completed. According to the United States president, it was time for Afghans
to take responsibility for their country. As noted by President Obama in his drawdown
announcement from the White House's Rose Garden, "We have to recognize that Afghanistan will
not be a perfect place, and it is not America's responsibility to make it one."
President Obama made clear that significant progress had been made in the years since the 2001
terror attacks -- a time when Afghanistan was the locus of the terrorist Islamist group, al-Qaida.
Indeed, United States military forces since that time have carried out a relentless assault on the
terrorist group, eliminating its leadership, and preventing Afghanistan from being used as a safe
haven and a base for attacks against the United States. With the death of Osama bin Laden -- a
perilous operation authorized by President Obama himself in 2011 -- the United States president
could conceivably argue that the time to exit Afghanistan had come. However, the president was
clearly looking towards a phased withdrawal, and one on a somewhat more protracted timeline
than he had indicated in recent years. To this end, he said: "Now we're finishing the job we've
started."
In October 2014, progress was being made in the effort to "finish the job" as United States and
United Kingdom forces exited their main military bases in Helmand province, turning security over
to Afghan forces. While the complete withdrawal of United States forces would not take place
until 2016, a phased drawdown was certainly taking place. Meanwhile, this particular exit would
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 192 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
mark the withdrawal of the last British combat forces from Afghanistan.
In November 2014, President Obama authorized United States troops to continue their combat
operations against Taliban and other Islamist terrorist militants in Afghanistan, if they threatened
either American forces or the Afghan government. The order also authorized the use of United
States air support for Afghan combat missions. Moreover, the United States made clear that it
would deploy an additional 1,000 troops to Afghanistan to deal with the security threat if needed.
In March 2015, President Obama responded to a request by the newly-elected President Ghani
for continued United States engagement in Afghanistan, under the aegis of a new bilateral security
agreement, and with an adjusted withdrawal schedule. That new adjusted schedule would hold
the current deployment of 9,800 troops in place in Afghanistan through the end of 2015, and
would outline a new phased withdrawal schedule through 2016, with any remaining troops at the
end of 2016 tasked with securing the Kabul embassy. In effect, the structure of the 2016 exit
schedule would be maintained, but the pace of withdrawal was now changed, with most
redeployment occuring in 2016.
The schedule, including the decision to keep in place a select number of combat troops through
2016, was due to the fact that President Obama wanted to see further training for Afghan security
forces along with the ability to launch counterterrorism missions in the interests of maintaining the
progress made in a war that had gone on for more than a dozen years and left more than 2,000
United States troops dead.
Note: To date, more than 2,000 American and approximately 450 British soldiers have died in the
war in Afghanistan that began in late 2001.
Special Security Entry
Afghan intelligence confirms the 2013 death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar
At the end of July 2015, Afghan authorities confirmed that Mullah Omar, the notorious leader of
the Taliban, died in 2013 in Pakistan.
Mullah Omar gained notoriety prior to 2001 when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan a n d
established its hardline and brutal Islamist policies in the south Asian country. After the 2001
terror attacks in the United States by al-Qaida, the war in Afghanistan was sparked and the
Taliban was overthrown. Mullah Omar -- an ally of Osama bin Laden -- was reported to have fled
the country and never again seen in public. Now, in 2015, Afghanistan's authorities were finally
confirming Mullah Omar's demise with a statement from the presidential palace reading as
follows: "The government ... based on credible information, confirms that Mullah Mohammad
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 193 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Omar, leader of the Taliban, died in April 2013 in Pakistan."
It should be noted that the White House in the United States said that it veiwed the reports from
Afghanistan confirming the death of Mullah Omar to be "credible." It also should be noted that the
Taliban has claimed that Mullah Omar never left Afghanistan for Pakistan and his death was
actually more recent than 2013.
Regardless of the actual facts surrounding the timing of Mullah Omar's death, the government of
Afghanistan, led by President Ashraf Ghani, went onto assert its belief that the conditions were
now favorable for peace negotiations with the Taliban. For its part, however, the Taliban made
clear through its official spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, that the Islamist terror group was not
even aware of this renewed pursuit of peace with the Afghan government. Mujahid said, "We
have heard from the news media that the second round of talks between the Islamic Emirate and
the Kabul administration will start soon in Pakistan or China. The Islamic Emirate has handed all
authorization to its political office and they are not aware of this process."
Meanwhile, reports from neighboring Pakistan indicated that Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour
had been chosen to be the new leader of the Islamist terror group, which was continuing its
insurgent efforts in Afghanistan. In fact, in the same period of late July 2015, the Taliban had
managed to take control over the Now Zad district of the southern Helmand province after days of
fierce fighting.
Leader of the Islamist militan Haqqani network reported to have died in 2014
At the end of July 2015, news outlets were reporting that Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Afghan founder
of the terror group known as the Haqqani network, died in 2014 after a prolonged illness. There
was no actual confirmation of this claim. In fact, the Haqqani network refused to confirm the
demise of its leader, claiming instead that he remained alive albeit in poor health. Should Haqqani's
death actually be verified, it would be an important development in the West's fight against Islamist
terrorists in the Afghan-Pak region. Of significance was the fact that the Haqqani network -- based
in Pakistan -- was responsible for many sophisticated attacks on NATO forces in the region in
recent times. It should be noted that the news (however shaky it might be) about the death of the
Afghan terror leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani, came only days after Afghan authorities confirmed that
Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, died in 2013 in Pakistan.
Afghan VP Dostum counter-attacks Taliban ambush; diplomatic zone of Kabul hit by bombing
In the third week of August 2015, the Islamist extremist Taliban launched an ambush on the
convoy of Afghan Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum along a remote highway in the province
of Faryab.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 194 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
An ethnic Uzbek, Dostum was a famed rebel leader in the fight against the Taliban regime prior to
2001 when Western powers forced the Islamist extremist entity from power. Dostum moved from
the battlefield to the political field as President Ashraf Ghani's running mate in the 2014 elections.
But even in his political capacity, Dostum had never quite relinquished his urge to see the Taliban
defeated militarily. As such, when his convoy was ambushed, Dostum and his personnel reacted
with a counter-attack, killing several Taliban fighters and capturing a dozen more following a gun
battle than went on for several hours. This was not the only example of Dostum showing his
military acumen. In July 2015, he assisted the army and villagers in a fight against the Taliban in
northern Afghanistan. Speaking of his active role in government and on the battlefield, Dostum
said, "Whether I command or don’t command, my presence will get things done. My presence will
be felt. The police, the army know this very well. You will see –- even the women will be throwing
rocks at the Taliban."
Meanwhile, the Taliban continued its campaign of violence, carrying out an attack on the
diplomatic area of the Aghan capital of Kabul in the third week of August 2015. Afghan authorities
said that the explosion in the Macrorayan district of Kabul was caused by a suicide attack on a
foreign military convoy and it resulted in the deaths of 12 people and injuries to scores more.
Three American contractors and nine Afghans were among the dead.
Special Entry:
Afghan forces backed by US warplanes carry out offensive to retake control over Kunduz; air
strikes kill MSF staff in horrific tragedy
At the end of September 2015, the Islamist terror group, the Taliban, carried out an audacious
assault on the northern Afghan city of Kunduz, capturing the provincial capital in what could only
be understood as their most significant strategic victory since their time in power. Cognizant of
the stakes, President Ashraf Ghani ordered an immediate offensive operation aimed at retaking
control of Kunduz, and soon, Afghan forces, backed by United States warplanes, were battling
Taliban forces. Afghan officials said that the operation was seeing success and its forces had
regained control over several government buildings while eliminating scores of Taliban fighters.
Battles between the two sides went on at the airport although the city center was growing quiet.
While many Taliban were killed or had fled Kunduz to escape the assault by U.S.-backed Afghan
forces, there remained several Taliban fighters in the city and continuing to pose a threat. The
process of retaking control over Kunduz would not be rapid, though, as the Taliban was reportedly
using civilians as human shields, even hiding in people's homes and in hospitals.
The effort to retake control of Kunduz took a tragic turn at the start of October 2015 when air
strikes hit an Afghan hospital in Kunduz, killing at least 22 people and injuring scores more. The
esteemed French medical charity, Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF, or "Doctors without Borders"
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 195 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
in English), which operated at that facility, reported that the air strikes killed 12 of its staff and
seven of its patients, while its hospital was badly damaged.
It should be noted that the Afghan interior ministry reported that 10 to 15 Taliban militants were
found hiding in the hospital, and were killed in the air strikes although this claim was not
independently confirmed. Of course, along with the deaths of those terrorists were the deaths of
doctors trying to save lives in a war zone, along with patients already fighting for their lives.
NATO acknowledged that its forces were carrying out an offensive operation against the Taliban in
Kunduz at the time, and air strikes by United States forces might be responsible for the unfolding
tragedy. NATO noted that the aerial bombardment campaign may have yielded unfortunate
collateral damage consequences and promised a full investigation into the matter.
MSF was unimpressed by this explanation, with MSF's President Meinie Nicolai casting the
incident as "abhorrent" and issuing the following statement: "We demand total transparency from
coalition forces. We cannot accept that this horrific loss of life will simply be dismissed as collateral
damage." Indeed, officials from MSF also noted that the hospital's coordinates were well-known
to coalition forces, and that once the air strikes began, its staff tried desperately to contact NATO
to inform the security bloc that its hospital was being struck. Likewise, MSF President Joanne Liu
declared: "Until proven otherwise, we are working on the presumption of a war crime...This
attack cannot be brushed aside as a mere mistake or an inevitable consequence of war."
Meanwhile, the United Nations human rights chief, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, expressed his
condemnation for the air strikes that hit the MSF hospital saying it was "tragic, inexcusable and
possibly even criminal."
In response to the Kunduz tragedy, United States Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said: "While
we are still trying to determine exactly what happened, I want to extend my thoughts and prayers
to everyone affected. A full investigation into the tragic incident is under way in coordination with
the Afghan government." In a later statement, Carter said that the United States military took
responsibility for the tragic air strikes on the MSF hospital facility. The statement read as follows:
"The U.S. military takes the greatest care in our operations to prevent the loss of innocent life, and
when we make mistakes, we own up to them. That's exactly what we're doing right now. We will
do everything we can to understand this tragic incident, learn from it, and hold people accountable
as necessary."
United States President Barack Obama also entered the fray, as he personally apologized to the
MSF chief, Joanne Liu, for the loss of life. As reported by White House Press Secretary Josh
Earnest: "The President assured Dr. Liu that the Department of Defense investigation currently
under way would provide a transparent, thorough and objective accounting of the facts and
circumstances of the incident and, if necessary, the President would implement changes that would
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 196 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
make tragedies like this one less likely to occur in the future." However, it was unclear that this
overture from the leader of the free world had any significant impact. In fact, MSF was calling
for an independent investigation into the matter, while noting that the institutional investigations
underway by the United States Pentagon, NATO, and joint United States and Afghan entities were
unacceptable.
The investigatory and accountability process was beginning in the political sphere. During
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the United States, the American
commander of international forces in Afghanistan, Army General John Campbell, said that United
States air support had been requested by Afghan officials, although he indicated that the deadly air
strikes on the MSF facility were the result of a mistake within the United States' own military
chain of command. Explaining that the United States military would never intentionally target a
medical facility, Campbell said, "A hospital was mistakenly struck. We would never intentionally
target a protected medical facility. With an eye on preventing further deadly mistakes of the type
made in Kunduz, Campbell ordered military forces under his command to review the operational
rules of engagement and to undergo retraining with respect to these rules.
Campbell also made it clear that the existing exit strategy to withdraw all remaining United State
troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2016 should be extended due to continuing threats posed by
al Qaida and Islamic State. Campbell's stance on a continuing military presence in Afghanistan was
well-received by conservatives in the Senate who have never been on board with President Barack
Obama's "date certain" schedule for withdrawal. As stated by Republican Senator John McCain,
"The world walked away from Afghanistan once before and it descended into chaos that
contributed to the worst terrorist attack ever against our homeland. We cannot afford to repeat that
mistake." Indeed, with the threat of terrorism increasing in the region, NATO was also warming
to the idea of an extended military engagement in Afghanistan. To this end, NATO SecretaryGeneral Jens Stoltenberg said, "I sense that many allies are willing to stay longer if needed."
The fact of the matter, though, was that as much as there were increasing calls for the United
States and its allies to consider a more flexible schedule with regard to Afghanistan, the Kunduz
tragedy was also spurring a debate on the Afghanistan policy in totality. After more than a decade
of war in that country, critics were questioning the objectives of the engagement, and challenging
the effectiveness of aerial bombardment campaigns in modern warfare. While air strikes and
drone strikes favored by the United States in recent times have been deemed preferable to socalled "boots on the ground," it was unclear whether they were actually effective in accomplishing
the goals of counter-terrorism. Instead, while such air strikes might target malignant actors, such
as terrorists from al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Islamic State, they often result in the deaths of
civilians as well, which tends only to fuel further terrorism. Meanwhile, even as the strikes may hit
high value terror targets on occasion, the corpus of research done on the doctrine of air power
indicates that aerial bombardment often serves only to disrupt the activities and strongholds of
terrorists, who simply flee the targeted zone for more fertile ground. In their wake are civilians
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 197 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
who bear the brunt of the assault from the skies, and ultimately are consigned to the category
known infamously as "collateral damage."
Afghanistan's Taliban in power struggle with Islamic State; minority Hazara in crosshairs
The start of November 2015 in Afghanistan was marked by the gruesome murders of seven
members of the country's minority Hazara community in the southern province of Zabul. The
victims included women and children and occurred during a period when Taliban militants and
Islamic State fighters were embroiled in fighting. The United Nations condemned the killing as a
likely war crime.
While the actual assailants in the murders of the seven individuals were unknown, there has been a
pattern of deliberate abduction followed by assassination of Hazaras in Afghanistan over the years.
In fact, the Hazaras have long been subject to persecution in Afghanistan due to their Persianspeaking and Shi'a Islamic background. Specifically, the Taliban and al-Qaida -- both of which
subscribe to an extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam -- regard the Shi'a Hazaras as apostates of
sorts and culturally distinct when compared with the dominant Pashtun ethno-cultural community.
As such, thousands of Hazaras were subject to massacre by these two Islamist terror groups
during the 1990s. However, in more recent years, the Taliban has refocused its energies on
interests of Afghanistan's Western-backed government rather than ethnic and religious minorities,
such as the Hazaras. The uptick in targeted attacks on Hazaras in recent years marks a shift of
sorts. The trend was attributed to the rise of other extremist Islamist groups, such as sympathizers
to the notorious terror enclave Islamic State.
Meanwhile, regardless of the membership of the assailants, angry protests were erupting in the
capital of Kabul. Indeed, thousands of participants from the Hazara community as they
demanded that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani seek justice on their behalf. The president issued a
response to protesters as follows: "We are committed to avenging our countrymen's blood. We will
spare no effort. We must avoid reactions that end in anarchy."
In the background of these developments was an ongoing power struggle in Afghanistan within the
Taliban among rival factions. At the same time, it was facing a challenge from Islamic State for
power and influence.
National Security Update
Taliban and Islamic State launch attacks in Afghanistan
December 2015 was marked by a spate of attacks across Afghanistan at the hands of the notorious
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 198 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Islamist extremist group, the Taliban. In the second week of December 2015, Taliban terrorists
launched an attack at the Kandahar airport in Afghanistan, holding sway there for up to 24 hours
before being neutralized by defense forces. As many as 50 people -- both security forces and
civilians -- died before the standoff ended.
Days later in mid-December 2015, terrorists from the Taliban carried out a siege at an outpost of
the Spanish embassy in Kabul. The assailants commenced the attack with a car bombing close to
a guesthouse attached to the Spanish embassy, and then continued as they opened fire on the
security personnel posted at the heavily fortified diplomatic compound. Two Spanish police
officers, four Afghan police, and one Afghan civilians had died as a result of the attack, which
ended several hours later. Abdul Rahman Rahimi, the police chief responsible for Kabul, said in
an interview with international media that the siege went on for several hours due to the sensitivity
and difficulty of the rescue mission. He explained, "The operation took time because we wanted
to rescue the people trapped in surrounding buildings and we had to move cautiously and in a
proper tactical manner."
The timing of the attacks occurred at a time when a regional peace conference was taking place in
Pakistan aimed at revitalizing the peace process between the government and the Taliban. As
such, there were some concerns that the peace talks would be an exercise in futility. Of
significance was a statement of responsibility from the Taliban that read as follows: "The presence
of our Mujahideen with weapons and a car loaded with explosives in such a high security area
shows God's support and the cooperation of the poor and Muslim people."
In the third week of December 2015, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle struck at a joint AfghanUnited States patrol close to the Bagram air defense base, killing several of troops and wounding
others. United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter observed that these deaths stood as a
"painful reminder" of the ongoing perils faced by remaining United States troops still operating in
Afghanistan. Left unsaid by the defense secretary, though, was the fact that even after more than a
decade of being under military pressure, the Taliban continued to present a threat to regional
security, and continued to carry out high profile attacks on high value targets in Afghanistan.
Indeed, as December 2015 entered its final week, the Taliban was making progress in the souther
Helmand province, gaining control over the Sangin district. A battle with Afghan forces was
ongoing at the end of the year 2015 as the country's defense forces attempted to repel the Taliban
and reverse its gains in the region. Both sides issued conflicting statements claiming that they were
respectively winning control of the area.
The start of 2016 was marked by a spate of attacks across Afghanistan at the hands of the
notorious Islamist extremist groups, the Taliban and Islamic State.
January 2016 began with an attack on the Indian diplomatic mission in the northern Afghan city of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 199 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Mazar-e-Sharif. The assailants were not able to penetrate the compound for the Indian consulate
and instead had occupied a building close by. Nevertheless, there were reports of gun battles and
explosions at the scene. Indeed, a siege went on at that building for a full 24 hour period before
the assailants were neutralized by Afghan special forces. The Indian ambassador made it clear
that no consular staff were hurt in the incident. It should be noted that Indian diplomatic missions
have long been favored targets for Islamist terrorists in Afghanistan. The Indian embassy in
Kabul was hit in both 2008 and 2009 with deadly consequences, while the Indian consulate in
Jalalabad was struck in 2013 and also led to the deaths of several people. In 2015, the Indian
consulate in Herat was the target of attack by gunmen, with this attack at the start of 2016 being
the latest effort of this type.
Meanwhile, a battle between the Taliban and joint Afghan and United States forces was raging in
the southern Afghan province of Helmand for several months. By January 2016, three Americans
and several Afghan forces died during operations in the Taliban stronghold. A day after those
death, United States forces carried out air strikes around the area of the town in Marjah in
Helmand. As noted by United States military spokesperson, Colonel Michael Lawhorn, "U.S.
forces have conducted 12 air strikes in support of operations in and around Marjah." The Afghan
police chief for the region, Abdul Rahman Sarjang, noted that despite the loss of joint United
States-Afghan forces the day before, the operation against the Taliban had actually been
successful. He said, "We have had a lot of achievements from this operation and we will continue
until we free Marjah from Taliban."
In mid-January 2016, yet another diplomatic mission was struck by Islamist extremist terrorists. In
this case, the target was the Pakistani consulate in the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad, the
assailants were terrorists from Islamic State, and their tactics involved suicide bombings and
gunfire. Seven members of the security personnel at the compound, as well as three terrorists,
died as a result. The attack occurred at a time when there were efforts afoot to restart stalled
peace talks with the Taliban. It should also be distinguished as an unprecedented terrorist strike
by Islamic State on a diplomatic target in the Afghan-Pak region where other terrorist groups, such
as the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and al-Qaida, have been perceived as the main threats. The
introduction of Islamic State -- perhaps the world's most bloodthirsty group -- to the Afghan-Pak
terrain marked a disturbing expansion of the terror group's Jihadist ambitions.
On April 11, 2016, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle targeted a bus in the eastern Nangarhar
province of Afghanistan, killing at least 12 army recruits and injuring close to two dozen others.
In a separate but similar attack in the capital city of Kabul, two people were killed and several
more were injured when a bomb exploded on bus carrying employees of the Education Ministry.
Later in April 2016 -- on April 19, 2016 -- a series of bombings and gun shootings left close to 30
people dead and another 300 others injured in the Afghan capital city of Kabul. The violence began
with a suicide truck bombing in Pul-e-Mahmud - a bustling neighborhood located close to several
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 200 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
government ministries. Following the initial blast, which appeared to be intended to create enough
distraction for fighters to enter the target area, a gun battle ensued.
The Taliban claimed responsibility for the first and third attacks, although Islamist militants of
some sort were believed to be responsible for expectations the second one. The attacks augured
an uptick in violence in Afghanistan, with all expectations being that the Taliban was commencing
its annual spring fighting offensive.
Primer on parliamentary elections in Afghanistan
Parliamentary elections were expected to be held in Afghanistan in 2016. Initially, the schedule for
those polls was set for Jan. 31, 2016; however, at the start of 2016, that date was postponed until
Oct. 15, 2016. There remained some prevarication regarding the firmness of this timeline with
Ahmad Yousuf Nuristani, the head of the election commission, saying during a news conference
that the elections would only be held on Oct. 15, 2016 if the government actually ensured the
security of candidates and provided the budget needed to pay for election staff and ballot boxes.
Under the 2004 constitution, the bicameral National Assembly in Afghanistan consists of the
Wolesi Jirga or House of People (no more than 250 seats), directly elected for a five-year term,
and the Meshrano Jirga or House of Elders (102 seats), one-third elected from provincial councils
for four-year terms, one-third elected from local district councils for three-year terms, and onethird nominated by the president for five-year terms.
The action in these elections would be in the Wolesi Jirga or House of People, which was last
contested in September 2010. In truth, the parliament's five-year term expired in mid-2015 but
elections were not immediately held at that time due to a mix of security anxieties and political
acrimony over ensuring the fairness of the vote. President Asraf Ghani signed a decree extending
the mandate of the parliament until an election could be deemed feasible. Finally, in 2016, Afghans
would be returning to the polls to choose their members of parliament. But with the security
scenario actually worsening, the election exercise was being viewed as a test of the stability in
conflict-ridden Afghanistan.
Note that in March 2016, the planning effort towards this vote was compromised by the fact that
Afghanistan's top electoral official, Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, from his post. A spokesperson for the
head of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) said Nuristani resigned in the "national
interest." Of significance was the fact that Nuristani had accused the government of interfering in
the electoral process.
Attack in Afghan capital of Kabul kills 80; Islamic State claims responsibility
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 201 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On July 23, 2016, twin terror attacks struck a demonstration of Afghanistan's mainly Shi'ite
Hazara minority in the Afghan capital city of Kabul, killing at least 80 people and wounding
hundreds. The double suicide attack was subsequently claimed by the terror group, Islamic State.
In a statement of responsibility broadcast on the group's Amaq news agency, Islamic State
declared,
"Two fighters from Islamic State detonated explosive belts at a gathering of Shi'ites in the city of
Kabul in Afghanistan." The targeting of the Shi'ite Hazara minority suggested that the sectarian
nature of such attacks was now spreading to Afghanistan from the Middle East where it has held
sway. To date, the sectarian conflict has not been a factor in Afghanistan. There were fears these
two explosions constituted something of a game changer.
-- August 2016
Written by Dr. Denise Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com. General sources used
in all Country Reviews listed in the Bibliography. Specific sources used in the "Political
Conditions" include the following: The Afghan Times, Afghan News, CNN, BBC, Xinhua,
rediff.com; IDSA, New Delhi; Newsweek: New York Times, The Guardian, The Atlantic; Der
Spiegel.
Political Risk Index
Political Risk Index
The Political Risk Index is a proprietary index measuring the level of risk posed to governments,
corporations, and investors, based on a myriad of political and economic factors. The Political Risk
Index is calculated using an established methodology by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is
based on varied criteria* including the following consideration: political stability, political
representation, democratic accountability, freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of
conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency, economic risk, foreign
investment considerations, possibility of sovereign default, and corruption. Scores are assigned
from 0-10 using the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the highest political risk, while a
score of 10 marks the lowest political risk. Stated differently, countries with the lowest scores pose
the greatest political risk. A score of 0 marks the most dire level of political risk and an ultimate
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 202 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
nadir, while a score of 10 marks the lowest possible level of political risk, according to this
proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries contain
complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to greater
risk.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Country
Assessment
Afghanistan
2
Albania
4
Algeria
6
Andorra
9
Angola
4
Antigua
8
Argentina
4
Armenia
4-5
Australia
9.5
Austria
9.5
Azerbaijan
4
Bahamas
8.5
Page 203 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Bahrain
6
Bangladesh
3.5
Barbados
8.5-9
Belarus
3
Belgium
9
Belize
8
Benin
5
Bhutan
5
Bolivia
5
Bosnia-Herzegovina
4
Botswana
7
Brazil
7
Brunei
7
Bulgaria
6
Burkina Faso
4
Burma (Myanmar)
4.5
Burundi
3
Cambodia
4
Page 204 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Cameroon
5
Canada
9.5
Cape Verde
6
Central African Republic
3
Chad
4
Chile
9
China
7
China: Hong Kong
8
China: Taiwan
8
Colombia
7
Comoros
5
Congo DRC
3
Congo RC
4
Costa Rica
8
Cote d'Ivoire
4.5
Croatia
7
Cuba
4-4.5
Cyprus
5
Page 205 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Czech Republic
8
Denmark
9.5
Djibouti
4.5
Dominica
7
Dominican Republic
6
East Timor
5
Ecuador
6
Egypt
5
El Salvador
7
Equatorial Guinea
4
Eritrea
3
Estonia
8
Ethiopia
4
Fiji
5
Finland
9
Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia
5
France
9
Gabon
5
Page 206 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Gambia
4
Georgia
5
Germany
9.5
Ghana
6
Greece
4.5-5
Grenada
8
Guatemala
6
Guinea
3.5
Guinea-Bissau
3.5
Guyana
4.5
Haiti
3.5
Holy See (Vatican)
9
Honduras
4.5-5
Hungary
7
Iceland
8.5-9
India
7.5-8
Indonesia
6
Iran
3.5-4
Page 207 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Iraq
2.5-3
Ireland
8-8.5
Israel
8
Italy
7.5
Jamaica
6.5-7
Japan
9
Jordan
6.5
Kazakhstan
6
Kenya
5
Kiribati
7
Korea, North
1
Korea, South
8
Kosovo
4
Kuwait
7
Kyrgyzstan
4.5
Laos
4.5
Latvia
7
Lebanon
5.5
Page 208 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Lesotho
6
Liberia
3.5
Libya
2
Liechtenstein
9
Lithuania
7.5
Luxembourg
9
Madagascar
4
Malawi
4
Malaysia
8
Maldives
4.5
Mali
4
Malta
8
Marshall Islands
6
Mauritania
4.5-5
Mauritius
7
Mexico
6.5
Micronesia
7
Moldova
5
Page 209 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Monaco
9
Mongolia
5
Montenegro
6
Morocco
6.5
Mozambique
4.5-5
Namibia
6.5-7
Nauru
6
Nepal
4
Netherlands
9.5
New Zealand
9.5
Nicaragua
5
Niger
4
Nigeria
4.5
Norway
9.5
Oman
7
Pakistan
3.5
Palau
7
Panama
7.5
Page 210 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Papua New Guinea
5
Paraguay
6.5-7
Peru
7
Philippines
6
Poland
8
Portugal
7.5
Qatar
7.5
Romania
5.5
Russia
5.5
Rwanda
5
Saint Kitts and Nevis
8
Saint Lucia
8
Saint Vincent and Grenadines
8
Samoa
7
San Marino
9
Sao Tome and Principe
5.5
Saudi Arabia
6
Senegal
6
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 211 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Serbia
5
Seychelles
7
Sierra Leone
4.5
Singapore
9
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)
8
Slovenia
8
Solomon Islands
6
Somalia
2
South Africa
7
Spain
7.5
Sri Lanka
5
Sudan
3.5
Suriname
5
Swaziland
5
Sweden
9.5
Switzerland
9.5
Syria
2
Tajikistan
4.5
Page 212 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Tanzania
6
Thailand
6.5
Togo
4.5
Tonga
7
Trinidad and Tobago
8
Tunisia
6
Turkey
7
Turkmenistan
4.5
Tuvalu
7
Uganda
6
Ukraine
3.5-4
United Arab Emirates
7
United Kingdom
9
United States
9.5
Uruguay
8
Uzbekistan
4
Vanuatu
7
Venezuela
4
Page 213 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Vietnam
5
Yemen
3
Zambia
4.5
Zimbabwe
3
*Methodology
The Political Risk Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the
combined scoring of varied criteria as follows -1. political stability (record of peaceful transitions of power, ability of government to stay in office
and carry out policies as a result of productive executive-legislative relationship, perhaps with
popular support vis a vis risk of government collapse)
2. political representation (right of suffrage, free and fair elections, multi-party participation, and
influence of foreign powers)
3. democratic accountability (record of respect for political rights, human rights, and civil liberties,
backed by constitutional protections)
4. freedom of expression (media freedom and freedom of expression, right to dissent or express
political opposition, backed by constitutional protections)
5. security and crime (the degree to which a country has security mechanisms that ensures safety
of citizens and ensures law and order, without resorting to extra-judicial measures)
6. risk of conflict (the presence of conflict; record of coups or civil disturbances; threat of war;
threats posed by internal or external tensions; threat or record of terrorism or insurgencies)
7. human development (quality of life; access to education; socio-economic conditions; systemic
concern for the status of women and children)
8. jurisprudence and regulatory transparency (the impartiality of the legal system, the degree of
transparency within the regulatory system of a country and the durability of that structure)
9. economic conditions (economic stability, investment climate, degree of nationalization of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 214 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
industries, property rights, labor force development)
10. corruption ( the degree of corruption in a country and/or efforts by the government to address
graft and other irregularities)
Editor's Note:
As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -has affected the ratings for several countries across the world.
North Korea, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe -- retain their low rankings.
Several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iraq
and Yemen were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of
unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. The worst downgrades affected
Syria where civil war is at play, along with the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamist
terrorists who have also seized control over part of Syrian territory. Iraq has been further
downgraded due to the rampage of Islamist terrorists and their takeover of wide swaths of Iraqi
territory. Libya has also been downgraded further due to its slippage into failed state status; at
issue in Libya have been an ongoing power struggle between rival militias. Yemen continues to
hold steady with a poor ranking due to continued unrest at the hands of Houthi rebels,
secessinionists, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and Islamic State. Its landscape has been
further complicated by the fact that it is now the site of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Conversely, Tunisia and Egypt have seen slight upgrades as these countries stabilize.
In Africa, Zimbabwe continues to be one of the bleak spots of the world with the Mugabe regime
effectively destroying the country's once vibrant economy, and miring Zimbabwe with an
exceedingly high rate of inflation, debilitating unemployment, devolving public services, and critical
food shortages; rampant crime and political oppression round out the landscape. Somalia also
sports a poor ranking due to the continuing influence of the terror group, al-Shabab, which was not
operating across the border in Kenya. On the upside, Nigeria, which was ineffectively dealing with
the threat posed by the terror group, Boko Haram, was making some strides on the national
security front with its new president at the helm. Mali was slightly upgraded due to its efforts to
return to constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and
Islamists. But the Central African Republic was downgraded due to the takeover of the
government by Muslim Seleka rebels and a continued state of lawlessness in that country. South
Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has not been officially included in this assessment;
however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and
economic challenges. Burkina Faso, Burundi and Guinea have been downgraded due to political
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 215 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
unrest, with Guinea also having to deal with the burgeoning Ebola crisis.
In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan
revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also
implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as
well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Strains on the infrastructure of
southern and eastern European countries, such as Serbia, Croatia, and Hungary, due to an influx of
refugees was expected to pose social and economic challenges, and slight downgrades were made
accordingly. So too, a corruption crisis for the Romanian prime minister has affected the ranking
of that country. Meanwhile, the rankings for Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were maintained
due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation,
was earlier downgraded due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, no further downgrade was added
since the country was able to successfully forge a bailout rescue deal with creditor institutions.
Cyprus' exposure to Greek banks yielded a downgrade in its case.
In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability and a constitutional
crisis that prevails well after landmark elections were held. Both India and China retain their
rankings; India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic
representation and accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in
a downgrade for this country's already low rating. Meanwhile, Singapore retained its strong
rankings due to its continued effective stewardship of the economy and political stability.
In the Americas, ongoing political and economic woes, as well as crime and corruption have
affected the rankings for Mexico , Guatemala, and Brazil. Argentina was downgraded due to its
default on debt following the failure of talks with bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to
its mix of market unfriendly policies and political oppression. For the moment, the United States
maintains a strong ranking along with Canada, and most of the English-speaking countries of the
Caribbean; however, a renewed debt ceiling crisis could cause the United States to be downgraded
in a future edition. Finally, a small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent
pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States.
Source:
Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
2015
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 216 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Political Stability
Political Stability
The Political Stability Index is a proprietary index measuring a country's level of stability,
standard of good governance, record of constitutional order, respect for human rights, and overall
strength of democracy. The Political StabilityIndex is calculated using an established methodology*
by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on a given country's record of peaceful
transitions of power, ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk
credible risks of government collapse. Threats include coups, domestic violence and instability,
terrorism, etc. This index measures the dynamic between the quality of a country's government
and the threats that can compromise and undermine stability. Scores are assigned from 0-10 using
the aforementioned criteria. A score of 0 marks the lowest level of political stability and an
ultimate nadir, while a score of 10 marks the highest level of political stability possible, according to
this proprietary index. Rarely will there be scores of 0 or 10 due to the reality that countries
contain complex landscapes; as such, the index offers a range of possibilities ranging from lesser to
greater stability.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Country
Assessment
Afghanistan
2
Albania
4.5-5
Algeria
5
Andorra
9.5
Angola
4.5-5
Antigua
8.5-9
Page 217 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Argentina
7
Armenia
5.5
Australia
9.5
Austria
9.5
Azerbaijan
5
Bahamas
9
Bahrain
6
Bangladesh
4.5
Barbados
9
Belarus
4
Belgium
9
Belize
8
Benin
5
Bhutan
5
Bolivia
6
Bosnia-Herzegovina
5
Botswana
8.5
Brazil
7
Page 218 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Brunei
8
Bulgaria
7.5
Burkina Faso
4
Burma (Myanmar)
4.5
Burundi
4
Cambodia
4.5-5
Cameroon
6
Canada
9.5
Cape Verde
6
Central African Republic
3
Chad
4.5
Chile
9
China
7
China: Hong Kong
8
China: Taiwan
8
Colombia
7.5
Comoros
5
Congo DRC
3
Page 219 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Congo RC
5
Costa Rica
9.5
Cote d'Ivoire
3.5
Croatia
7.5
Cuba
4.5
Cyprus
8
Czech Republic
8.5
Denmark
9.5
Djibouti
5
Dominica
8.5
Dominican Republic
7
East Timor
5
Ecuador
7
Egypt
4.5-5
El Salvador
7.5-8
Equatorial Guinea
4.5
Eritrea
4
Estonia
9
Page 220 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Ethiopia
4.5
Fiji
5
Finland
9
Fr.YugoslavRep.Macedonia
6.5
France
9
Gabon
5
Gambia
4.5
Georgia
5
Germany
9.5
Ghana
7
Greece
6
Grenada
8.5
Guatemala
7
Guinea
3.5-4
Guinea-Bissau
4
Guyana
6
Haiti
3.5-4
Holy See (Vatican)
9.5
Page 221 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Honduras
6
Hungary
7.5
Iceland
9
India
8
Indonesia
7
Iran
3.5
Iraq
2.5
Ireland
9.5
Israel
8
Italy
8.5-9
Jamaica
8
Japan
9
Jordan
6
Kazakhstan
6
Kenya
5
Kiribati
8
Korea, North
2
Korea, South
8.5
Page 222 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Kosovo
5.5
Kuwait
7
Kyrgyzstan
5
Laos
5
Latvia
8.5
Lebanon
5.5
Lesotho
5
Liberia
3.5-4
Libya
2
Liechtenstein
9
Lithuania
9
Luxembourg
9.5
Madagascar
4
Malawi
5
Malaysia
8
Maldives
4.5-5
Mali
4.5-5
Malta
9
Page 223 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Marshall Islands
8
Mauritania
6
Mauritius
8
Mexico
6.5-7
Micronesia
8
Moldova
5.5
Monaco
9.5
Mongolia
6.5-7
Montenegro
8
Morocco
7
Mozambique
5
Namibia
8.5
Nauru
8
Nepal
4.5
Netherlands
9.5
New Zealand
9.5
Nicaragua
6
Niger
4.5
Page 224 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Nigeria
4.5
Norway
9.5
Oman
7
Pakistan
3
Palau
8
Panama
8.5
Papua New Guinea
6
Paraguay
8
Peru
7.5
Philippines
6
Poland
9
Portugal
9
Qatar
7
Romania
7
Russia
6
Rwanda
5
Saint Kitts and Nevis
9
Saint Lucia
9
Page 225 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Saint Vincent and Grenadines
9
Samoa
8
San Marino
9.5
Sao Tome and Principe
7
Saudi Arabia
6
Senegal
7.5
Serbia
6.5
Seychelles
8
Sierra Leone
4.5
Singapore
9.5
Slovak Republic (Slovakia)
8.5
Slovenia
9
Solomon Islands
6.5-7
Somalia
2
South Africa
7.5
Spain
9
Sri Lanka
5
Sudan
3
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 226 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Afghanistan Review 2017
Pending
Suriname
5
Swaziland
5
Sweden
9.5
Switzerland
9.5
Syria
2
Tajikistan
4.5
Tanzania
6
Thailand
6
Togo
5
Tonga
7
Trinidad and Tobago
8
Tunisia
5
Turkey
7.5
Turkmenistan
5
Tuvalu
8.5
Uganda
6
Ukraine
3.5-4
United Arab Emirates
7
Page 227 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
United Kingdom
9
United States
9
Uruguay
8.5
Uzbekistan
4
Vanuatu
8.5
Venezuela
4.5-5
Vietnam
4.5
Yemen
2.5
Zambia
5
Zimbabwe
3
*Methodology
The Political Stability Index is calculated by CountryWatch's Editor-in-Chief and is based on the
combined scoring of varied criteria as follows -1. record of peaceful transitions of power ( free and fair elections; adherence to political accords)
2. record of democratic representation, presence of instruments of democracy; systemic
accountability
3. respect for human rights; respect for civil rights
4. strength of the system of jurisprudence, adherence to constitutional order, and good governance
5. ability of a government to stay in office and carry out its policies vis a vis risk credible risks of
government collapse (i.e. government stability versus a country being deemed "ungovernable")
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 228 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
6. threat of coups, insurgencies, and insurrection
7. level of unchecked crime and corruption
8. risk of terrorism and other threats to national security
9. relationship with regional powers and international community; record of bilateral or multilateral
cooperation
10. degree of economic strife (i.e. economic and financial challenges)
Editor's Note:
As of 2015, the current climate of upheaval internationally -- both politically and economically -has affected the ratings for several countries across the world. The usual suspects -- North Korea,
Afghanistan, and Somalia -- retain their low rankings. The reclusive and ultra-dictatorial North
Korean regime, which has terrified the world with its nuclear threats, has exhibited internal
instability. Of note was a cut-throat purge of hundreds of high ranking officials deemed to be a
threat to Kim Jung-un. Despite their attempts to recover from years of lawlessness, war, and
warlordism, both Afghanistan and Somalia continue to be beset by terrorism and turmoil. In
Afghanistan, while international forces have seen success in the effort against the terror group, alQaida, the other Islamist extremist group, the Taliban, continues to carry out a vicious insurgency
using terrorism. In Somalia, while the government attempts to do the nation's business, the terror
group, al-Shabab continues to make its presence known not only in Somalia, but across the border
into Kenya with devastating results/ Also in this category is Iraq, which continues to be rocked
by horrific violence and terrorism at the hands of Islamic State, which has taken over wide swaths
of Iraqi territory.
Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been added to this unfortunate echelon of the world's most
politically unstable countries. Syria has been mired by the twin hazards of 1. a civil war as rebels
oppose the Assad regime; and 2. the rampage of terror being carried out by Islamic State, which
also seized control over vast portions of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, the post-Qaddhafi landscape
of Libya has devolved into chaos as rival militias battle for control -- the elected government of the
country notwithstanding. Rounding out this grim triad is Yemen, which was dealing with a Houthi
rebellion, secesionists in the south, as well as the threat of terrorism from al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula as well as Islamic State, while also being the site of a proxy war between Shi'a Iran and
Sunni Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, several Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 229 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Bahrain were downgraded in recent years due to political instability occurring in the "season of
unrest" sweeping the region since 2011 and continuing today. All three of these countries have
stabilized in recent years and have been upgraded accordingly. In Bahrain, the landscape had
calmed. In Egypt, the secular military-backed government has generated criticism for its
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood; however, the country had ratified the presidency via
democratic elections and were on track to hold parliamentary elections as the country moved along
the path of democratization. Perhaps the most impressive story was coming out of Tunisia -- the
country whose Jasmine Revolution sparked the entire Arab Spring -- and where after a few years
of strife, a new progressive constitution was passed into law and a secular government had been
elected to power. Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain have seen slight upgrades as these countries
stabilize.
In Africa, the Central African Republic was downgraded the previous year due to the takeover of
the government by Muslim Seleka rebels. Although the country has been trying to emerge from
this crisis, the fact of the matter was that it was difficult to halt the precipitous decline into
lawlessness in that country. Zimbabwe has maintained its consistently poor ranking due to the
dictatorial regime of Mugabe, who continues to hold a tight grip on power, intimidates the
opposition, squashes dissent, and oppresses the white farmer population of the country. Moving in
a slightly improved direction is Nigeria, which has sported abysmal ratings due to the government's
fecklessness in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamist terror group, Boko Haram. Under its
newly-elected government, there appears to be more of a concerted effort to make national
security a priority action item. Mali was also slightly upgraded due to its efforts to return to
constitutional order following the 2012 coup and to neutralize the threat of separatists and
Islamists. Political instability has visited Burkina Faso and Burundi as the leaders of those
countries attempted to side-step constitutional limits to hold onto power. In Burundi, an attempted
coup ensued but quelled, and the president won a (questionable) new term in office; unrest has
since punctuated the landscape. In Burkina Faso, the political climate has turned stormy as a result
of a successful coup that ended the rule of the president, and then a putsch against the transitional
government. These two African countries have been downgraded as a result.
It should be noted that the African country of South Sudan -- the world's newest nation state -- has
not been officially included in this assessment; however, it can be unofficially assessed to be in the
vicinity of "3" due to its manifold political and economic challenges. Guinea has endured poor
rankings throughout, but was slightly downgraded further over fears of social unrest and the Ebola
heath crisis.
In Europe, Ukraine was downgraded due to the unrest facing that country following its Maidan
revolution that triggered a pro-Russian uprising in the eastern part of the country. Russia was also
implicated in the Ukrainian crisis due to its intervention on behalf of pro-Russian separatists, as
well as its annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Serbia and Albania were slightly
downgraded due to eruptions of unrest, while Romania was slightly downgraded on the basis of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 230 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
corruption charges against the prime minister. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy were downgraded
due to debt woes and the concomitant effect on the euro zone. Greece, another euro zone nation,
was downgraded the previous year due to its sovereign debt crisis; however, the country
successfully forged a rescue deal with international creditors and stayed within the Euro zone.
Greek voters rewarded the hitherto unknown upstart party at the polls for these efforts. As a
result, Greece was actually upgraded slightly as it proved to the world that it could endure the
political and economic storms. Meanwhile, Germany, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries continue to post impressive ranking consistent
with these countries' strong records of democracy, freedom, and peaceful transfers of power.
In Asia, Nepal was downgraded in response to continuous political instability well after landmark
elections that prevails today. Cambodia was very slighly downgraded due to post-election
instability that has resulted in occasional flares of violence. Despite the "trifecta of tragedy" in
Japan in 2011 -- the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and the resulting nuclear crisis -- and the
appreciable destabilization of the economic and political terrain therein, this country has only
slightly been downgraded. Japan's challenges have been assessed to be transient, the government
remains accountable, and there is little risk of default. Both India and China retain their rankings;
India holds a slightly higher ranking than China due to its record of democratic representation and
accountability. Increasing violence and political instability in Pakistan resulted in a downgrade for
this country's already low rating.
In the Americas, Haiti retained its downgraded status due to ongoing political and economic woes.
Mexico was downgraded due to its alarming rate of crime. Guatemala was downgraded due to
charges of corruption, the arrest of the president, and uncertainty over the outcome of elections.
Brazil was downgraded due to the corruption charges erupting on the political landscape, the
stalling of the economy, and the increasingly loud calls for the impeachment of President
Rousseff. Argentina was downgraded due to its default on debt following the failure of talks with
bond holders. Venezuela was downgraded due to the fact that the country's post-Chavez
government is every bit as autocratic and nationalistic, but even more inclined to oppress its
political opponents. Colombia was upgraded slightly due to efforts aimed at securing a peace deal
with the FARC insurgents. A small but significant upgrade was attributed to Cuba due to its recent
pro-business reforms and its normalization of ties with the Unitd States. Meanwhile, the United
States, Canada, Costa Rica, Panama, and most of the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean
retain their strong rankings due to their records of stability and peaceful transfers of power.
In the Pacific, Fiji was upgraded due to its return to constitutional order and democracy with the
holding of the first elections in eight years.
In Oceania, Maldives has been slightly downgraded due to the government's continued and rather
relentless persecution of the country's former pro-democracy leader - former President Nasheed.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 231 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Source:
Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Inc. www.countrywatch.com
Updated:
2015
Freedom Rankings
Freedom Rankings
Freedom in the World
Editor's Note: This ranking by Freedom House quantifies political freedom and civil liberties into a
single combined index on each sovereign country's level of freedom and liberty. The initials "PR"
and "CL" stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively. The number 1 represents the
most free countries and the number 7 represents the least free. Several countries fall in the
continuum in between. The freedom ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.
Country
Afghanistan
PR
6?
CL
Freedom Status
6
Not Free
Albania*
3
3
Partly Free
Algeria
6
5
Not Free
Afghanistan Review 2017
Trend
Arrow
Page 232 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Andorra*
1
1
Free
Angola
6
5
Not Free
2
Free
Antigua and Barbuda*
3?
Argentina*
2
2
Free
Armenia
6
4
Partly Free
Australia*
1
1
Free
Austria*
1
1
Free
Azerbaijan
6
5
Not Free
Bahamas*
1
1
Free
Bahrain
6?
5
Not Free ?
Bangladesh*
3?
4
Partly Free
Barbados*
1
1
Free
Belarus
7
6
Not Free
Belgium*
1
1
Free
Belize*
1
2
Free
Benin*
2
2
Free
Bhutan
4
5
Partly Free
Bolivia*
3
3
Partly Free
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 233 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Bosnia-Herzegovina*
Botswana*
Pending
4
3?
3
Partly Free
2
Free
Brazil*
2
2
Free
Brunei
6
5
Not Free
Bulgaria*
2
2
Free
Burkina Faso
5
3
Partly Free
Burma
7
7
Not Free
Burundi*
4
5
Partly Free
⇑
Cambodia
6
5
Not Free
⇓
Cameroon
6
6
Not Free
Canada*
1
1
Free
Cape Verde*
1
1
Free
Central African Republic
5
5
Partly Free
Chad
7
6
Not Free
Chile*
1
1
Free
China
7
6
Not Free
Colombia*
3
4
Partly Free
Comoros*
3
4
Partly Free
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 234 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Congo (Brazzaville )
6
5
Not Free
⇓
Congo (Kinshasa)
6
6
Not Free
⇓
Costa Rica*
1
1
Free
Cote d’Ivoire
6
5
Not Free
2
Free
Croatia*
1?
Cuba
7
6
Not Free
Cyprus*
1
1
Free
Czech Republic*
1
1
Free
Denmark*
1
1
Free
Djibouti
5
5
Partly Free
Dominica*
1
1
Free
Dominican Republic*
2
2
Free
East Timor*
3
4
Partly Free
Ecuador*
3
3
Partly Free
Egypt
6
5
Not Free
El Salvador*
2
3
Free
Equatorial Guinea
7
7
Not Free
Eritrea
7
7?
Not Free
Afghanistan Review 2017
⇓
Page 235 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Estonia*
1
1
Free
Ethiopia
5
5
Partly Free
Fiji
6
4
Partly Free
Finland*
1
1
Free
France*
1
1
Free
Gabon
6
5?
The Gambia
5
5?
Partly Free
Georgia
4
4
Partly Free
Germany*
1
1
Free
Ghana*
1
2
Free
Greece*
1
2
Free
Grenada*
1
2
Free
4?
4
Partly Free
Guinea
7
6?
Guinea-Bissau*
4
4
Partly Free
Guyana*
2
3
Free
Haiti*
4
5
Partly Free
4?
4?
Partly Free
Guatemala*
Honduras
Afghanistan Review 2017
⇓
Not Free ?
Not Free
Page 236 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Hungary*
1
1
Free
Iceland*
1
1
Free
India*
2
3
Free
Indonesia*
2
3
Free
Iran
6
6
Not Free
Iraq
5?
6
Not Free
Ireland*
1
1
Free
Israel*
1
2
Free
Italy*
1
2
Free
Jamaica*
2
3
Free
Japan*
1
2
Free
Jordan
6?
5
Not Free ?
Kazakhstan
6
5
Not Free
Kenya
4
4?
Kiribati*
1
1
Kosovo
5?
4?
Partly Free ?
Kuwait
4
4
Partly Free
6?
5?
Kyrgyzstan
Afghanistan Review 2017
⇓
⇓
Partly Free
Free
Not Free ?
Page 237 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Laos
7
6
Not Free
Latvia*
2
1
Free
Lebanon
5
3?
Partly Free
Lesotho*
3?
3
Partly Free ?
Liberia*
3
4
Partly Free
Libya
7
7
Not Free
Liechtenstein*
1
1
Free
Lithuania*
1
1
Free
Luxembourg*
1
1
Free
Macedonia*
3
3
Partly Free
Madagascar
6?
4?
Partly Free
Malawi*
3?
4
Partly Free
Malaysia
4
4
Partly Free
Maldives*
3?
4
Partly Free
Mali*
2
3
Free
Malta*
1
1
Free
Marshall Islands*
1
1
Free
Mauritania
6
5
Not Free
Afghanistan Review 2017
⇑
⇓
Page 238 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Mauritius*
1
2
Free
Mexico*
2
3
Free
Micronesia*
1
1
Free
Moldova*
3?
4
Partly Free
Monaco*
2
1
Free
Mongolia*
2
2
Free
Montenegro*
3
2?
Free ?
Morocco
5
4
Partly Free
4?
3
Partly Free
Namibia*
2
2
Free
Nauru*
1
1
Free
Nepal
4
4
Partly Free
Netherlands*
1
1
Free
New Zealand*
1
1
Free
Nicaragua*
4
4?
Partly Free
5?
4
Partly Free
Nigeria
5
4
Partly Free
⇓
North Korea
7
7
Not Free
⇓
Mozambique
Niger
Afghanistan Review 2017
⇑
⇓
Page 239 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Norway*
1
1
Free
Oman
6
5
Not Free
Pakistan
4
5
Partly Free
Palau*
1
1
Free
Panama*
1
2
Free
Papua New Guinea*
4
3
Partly Free
Paraguay*
3
3
Partly Free
Peru*
2
3
Free
Philippines
4
3
Partly Free
Poland*
1
1
Free
Portugal*
1
1
Free
Qatar
6
5
Not Free
Romania*
2
2
Free
Russia
6
5
Not Free
Rwanda
6
5
Not Free
Saint Kitts and Nevis*
1
1
Free
Saint Lucia*
1
1
Free
Saint Vincent and
Grenadines*
2
1
Free
Afghanistan Review 2017
⇓
⇓
Page 240 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Samoa*
2
2
Free
San Marino*
1
1
Free
Sao Tome and Principe*
2
2
Free
Saudi Arabia
7
6
Not Free
Senegal*
3
3
Partly Free
Serbia*
2?
2
Free
Seychelles*
3
3
Partly Free
Sierra Leone*
3
3
Partly Free
Singapore
5
4
Partly Free
Slovakia*
1
1
Free
Slovenia*
1
1
Free
Solomon Islands
4
3
Partly Free
Somalia
7
7
Not Free
South Africa*
2
2
Free
South Korea*
1
2
Free
Spain*
1
1
Free
Sri Lanka*
4
4
Partly Free
Sudan
7
7
Not Free
Afghanistan Review 2017
⇓
Page 241 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Suriname*
2
2
Free
Swaziland
7
5
Not Free
Sweden*
1
1
Free
Switzerland*
1
1
Free
Syria
7
6
Not Free
Taiwan*
1?
2?
Tajikistan
6
5
Not Free
Tanzania
4
3
Partly Free
Thailand
5
4
Partly Free
Togo
5
4?
Partly Free
Tonga
5
3
Partly Free
Trinidad and Tobago*
2
2
Free
Tunisia
7
5
Not Free
Turkey*
3
3
Partly Free
Turkmenistan
7
7
Not Free
Tuvalu*
1
1
Free
Uganda
5
4
Partly Free
Ukraine*
3
2
Free
Afghanistan Review 2017
⇓
Free
⇓
Page 242 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
United Arab Emirates
6
5
Not Free
United Kingdom*
1
1
Free
United States*
1
1
Free
Uruguay*
1
1
Free
Uzbekistan
7
7
Not Free
Vanuatu*
2
2
Free
Venezuela
5?
4
Partly Free
Vietnam
7
5
Not Free
Yemen
6?
5
Not Free ?
3
4?
6?
6
Zambia*
Zimbabwe
⇓
Partly Free
Not Free
Methodology:
PR and CL stand for political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and
7 the least free rating. The ratings reflect an overall judgment based on survey results.
? ? up or down indicates a change in political rights, civil liberties, or status since the last survey.
⇑ ⇓ up or down indicates a trend of positive or negative changes that took place but that were
not sufficient to result in a change in political rights or civil liberties ratings of 1-7.
* indicates a country’s status as an electoral democracy.
Source:
This data is derived from the latest edition of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2010
edition.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 243 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Available at URL: http://www.freedomhouse.org
Updated:
Reviewed in 2015
Human Rights
Overview of Human Rights in Afghanistan
In the years since the ousting of the Taliban, Afghanistan has made progress in stabilizing its
system of governance, but still continues to suffer from serious instability in its infrastructure.
Afghanistan faces increasing violence from insurgents in some areas and warlords in others.
Insecurity and lawlessness continue to hamper efforts towards peace and security in the region.
Nearly 80 percent of the world’s heroin was produced in Afghanistan in recent years. Narcotics
production as well as drug and human trafficking brought substantial revenue to the Afghan
economy, making the black-market economy the single greatest source of income for the nation.
Warlords and drug traffickers contribute to the constant resistance to the rule of law in the nation.
Afghanistan’s Constitutional Loya Jirga adopted a new constitution in January 2005. While this
document did contain several human rights guarantees, it lacked specific safeguards to protect
against both government and individual human rights abuses.
In May 2005, 16 protestors were killed by both police and army troops during demonstrations in
several cities. These deaths have yet to be brought to justice.
Today, armed groups also continue to commit abuses against civilians, including abduction, rape,
and murder. As well, terrorism and violence by resurgent Taliban and extremist allies has been on
a steady increase in recent years, with civilians being the victims in many cases. Justice regarding
these and other crimes appears to be elusive.
Meanwhile, the last presidential election was marred by fraud in a country where corruption runs
rampant, and the government is willing to trade slightly improved women's rights for votes.
Human Developmnent Index (HDI) Rank:
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 244 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
See Social Overview of Country Review for full listing of rankings for all countries.
Human Poverty Index Rank:
Not ranked
Gini Index:
Not ranked
Life Expectancy at Birth (years):
44.5 years
Unemployment Rate:
40%
% of Population living on $1 a day:
N/A
% of Population living on $2 a day:
N/A
Population living beneath the Poverty Line (%):
53%
Internally Displaced People:
N/A
Total Crime Rate (%):
N/A
Health Expenditure (% of GDP):
Public: N/A
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 245 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
% of GDP Spent on Education:
N/A
Human Rights Conventions Party to:
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
• Convention on the Rights of the Child
• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
*Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the level of well-being in
177 nations in the world. It uses factors such as poverty, literacy, life-expectancy, education, gross
domestic product, and purchasing power parity to assess the average achievements in each nation.
It has been used in the United Nation’s Human Development Report since 1993.
*Human Poverty Index Ranking is based on certain indicators used to calculate the Human
Poverty Index. Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, adult literacy rate, population without
sustainable access to an improved water source, and population below income poverty line are the
indicators assessed in this measure.
*The Gini Index measures inequality based on the distribution of income or consumption. A value
of 0 represents perfect equality (income being distributed equally), and a value of 100 perfect
inequality (income all going to one individual).
*The calculation of the total crime rate is the % of the total population which has been effected by
property crime, robbery, sexual assault, assault, or bribery (corruption) related occurrences.
Government Functions
General Relations
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 246 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Before the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan pursued a policy of neutrality and nonalignment in its
foreign relations. In international forums, Afghanistan generally followed the voting patterns of
Asian and African nonaligned countries. Following the Marxist coup of April 1978, the Taraki
government developed significantly closer ties with the Soviet Union and its communist satellites.
After the December 1979 invasion, Afghanistan's foreign policy mirrored that of the Soviet Union.
Afghan foreign policy-makers attempted, with little success, to increase their regime's standing in
the non-communist world. With the signing of the 1988 Geneva Accords and the end of the Soviet
occupation, Najibullah attempted to expand Afghanistan's international relations. He was, however,
largely unsuccessful.
Most Western countries, including the United States, maintained small diplomatic missions in Kabul
during the Soviet occupation. Many subsequently closed their missions due to instability and heavy
fighting. Although a few states re-established a diplomatic presence, most embassies, including that
of the United States, remained closed. The ascendancy of the Taliban did nothing to engender
positive diplomatic relations. Only recently has diplomatic contact been resumed in the aftermath
of the overthrow of the Taliban.
Regional Relations:
Pakistan and Afghanistan -Ever since independence in 1947, Pakistan has shared an often-tumultuous history of bilateral
relations with its northern neighbor, Afghanistan. And for a country of its size, Pakistan has
wielded tremendous influence on events in Afghanistan. The first signs of overt Pakistani influence
in Afghani affairs came in March 1963 when Pakistan managed to get Prime Minister Sardar
Mohammed Daoud fired from his position, for his backing and encouragement of Pashtunistan, an
idea that threatened Pakistan's integrity.
Pashtuns make up nearly 40 percent of the Afghan population and the tribe is also the largest
ethnic group in the underdeveloped and fractious Northwestern frontier province of Pakistan.
Daoud mooted the idea of uniting the tribe by doing away with the artificial border laid down by
the British. Fearing that the concept of Pashtunistan would find favor in its unstable NWFP region,
Pakistan's foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan have been dictated by the aim of curbing the
idea of Pashtunistan.
Though Daoud was ousted in 1963, he was far from finished. He staged a comeback in 1973 with
the help of the PPDA and assumed power as president and prime minister, overthrowing King
Zahir Shah. And once again he sought to consolidate his hold on the country by encouraging the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 247 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
idea of Pashtunistan, unsettling the leaders in Islamabad. It was with this aim that Pakistan funded
and encouraged revolt in the eastern Afghan province of Nuristan as early as 1974.
Pakistan may have heaved a sigh of relief at the ouster of Daoud in 1978, but it was soon faced
with the prospect of having Soviet troops in the immediate vicinity and the Indians on the other
border. This pushed Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in the long and deadly campaign against
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Initially, it was the CIA clearly calling the shots, with Pakistan
providing simply the base for the CIA operations. But over time, and especially closer to the mid1980s when it was clear that the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan, Islamabad realized
that it had a very powerful card in its hand and began playing it almost all by itself.
During the battle for Jalalabad in 1989-three years after the Soviets had quit and Kabul seemed
within the sights of the "mujahidin-Pakistan strongly favored backing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader
of one of the several "mujahidin" factions operating from Pakistan. Though Hekmatyar was far
from the most popular leader, Pakistan backed him due to their grip on him. And it also became
clear soon enough that Pakistani army had been actively involved in the failed battle for Jalalabad.
This was perhaps the first time that Pakistan used its cards in Afghanistan for its own ends. But
soon enough the Pakistan military and its intelligence agency, ISI, were to start calling the shots in
the country, through the various "mujahidin" groups.
Indeed, the Taliban's push towards Kabul almost five years ago was directed and controlled from
Islamabad. Right until the very end of the Taliban, Pakistan continued to wield tremendous
influence on the Taliban. Pakistan has been able to derive other dividends from its Afghanistan
policy. At the end of the Soviet occupation, Pakistan began using the same tactics of training and
arming Islamic militants on its other border-with India. Though Pakistan continually denies any
armed support to Kashmir militants, the country is widely believed to provide bases and armed
assistance for the militants. Plus, it is hardly a coincidence that the Kashmir militancy began its
ascendance in 1989, just the time when Pakistan was able to shift its attention from Afghanistan
towards Kashmir.
The civil war had strained relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors. Leaders of these states
had made attempts to broker peace between the warring factions and some took steps to protect
themselves from spillover from the conflict. Pakistan's early recognition of the Taliban's rule
suggested it had been a major supporter of the group. During talks in early March 1999 with
Kazakhstan, however, Pakistan called for peace talks between the Taliban and opposition forces
and for the establishment of a coalition government consisting of representatives from both sides.
Pakistan has continued to call for an arms embargo on Afghanistan to help reduce the fighting.
Pakistan has also been flooded with approximately 1.3 million refugees from Afghanistan. On
March 31, 1999, in an attempt to stem the continuing flow of refugees, Pakistan sealed its border
with Afghanistan. Over the course of 1998, Pakistan resettled 80,000 refugees and 50,000 more in
the first half of 1999. Pakistan expressed concern that the U.N. sanctions imposed on the Taliban
in November 1999 would increase the flow of refugees from Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 248 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Pak-Afghan relations have undergone a complete change since September 11 terror attacks. As the
United States pointed accusing fingers towards the Taliban regime and threatened action against it
if it failed to turn over Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaida activists, Pakistan found itself in a
difficult situation considering it has historically been the key supporter of the Taliban. And as the
military campaign against Afghanistan began, it became apparent that Pakistan would have to
sooner than later break all ties with the Taliban regime. Before the September 11 attacks, only two
countries, besides Pakistan, recognized the Taliban regime. Soon after the attacks, the U.S. named
Osama bin Laden as the man responsible for the attacks and asked the Taliban to hand him over.
When the Taliban refused, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - the only other countries
that recognized the Taliban regime-broke off diplomatic ties with the Taliban, leaving Pakistan as
the only country to have any relations with the Taliban. With so much global scrutiny, Pakistan
was under pressure to break the ties and isolate the Taliban. In November, apparently under the
American instructions, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf first asked the Taliban to shut down
all the consulates in the country, saying they did not serve any purpose since Pakistan had anyway
closed its borders with Afghanistan.
Finally, in early December, Pakistan broke off all ties with Taliban, a day after the United States
State Department publicly asked the Pakistani government to do so. The Taliban officials were
ordered to leave Pakistani soil within 48 hours. This marked, at least officially, the end of a very
close relationship that Pakistan and the Taliban enjoyed for nearly a decade.
Though Musharraf may have found it expedient to sacrifice the Taliban in order to preserve his
regime and his country's national interests, Pakistan was in no way prepared to cede ground in
Afghanistan. For several years, Pakistan has claimed a special interest and role in Afghanistan,
saying that it has a large Pashtun population itself and hence it needs to be involved in any long
term settlement in Afghanistan. Pashtuns are the largest tribe in Afghanistan and make up about 40
percent of the population.
Throughout the military campaign, Musharraf kept on playing the Pashtun card. And as the
international community began talking of a post-war government in Afghanistan, Musharraf
stressed the importance of involving the Taliban in any settlement in Afghanistan, this was until
Islamabad was forced to break ties with Kabul. After the ties were severed with the Taliban,
Musharraf began talking of the 'moderate' Taliban elements and emphasized they ought to be
involved in any settlement in Afghanistan.
The rapid gains made by the Northern Alliance on the ground in Afghanistan and the capitulation
by thousands of Taliban soldiers within weeks and without much resistance was hardly the sort of
news that Pakistan wanted to hear. The relations between the Northern Alliance and Pakistan had
always been chilly or outright hostile due to the role played by Pakistan in arming and training the
Taliban. Seeing the military gains of Northern Alliance, Musharraf began expressing fears about
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 249 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
stability of Afghanistan and that Pakistan would like to have a friendly government in power at
Kabul. In order to calm Pakistani fears, the United States urged the Northern Alliance not to enter
Kabul until an interim government had been formed in order to replace the Taliban. However, the
military machine of the Northern Alliance continued its march and on November 23, Kabul fell to
the Northern Alliance, making Pakistan's worst fears come true.
The fall of Kabul precipitated international efforts to find an interim regime that would be
acceptable to all and bring stability to the war-torn Afghanistan until the country could hold
democratic elections. Thus when the United Nations invited various Afghan factions to begin
negotiations in Bonn on the structure and composition of an interim administration in Afghanistan,
it was clear that the Northern Alliance would have a significant say in how things went. This
prompted Pakistan once again to emphasize the need to have a 'well represented' interim
administration that reflected the true composition of the Afghan society. Pakistan was hoping it
would be able to get pro-Pakistan Pashtun leaders onto the interim administration.
The election of Hamid Karzai, a moderate Pashtun, as the head of the interim administration was
small consolation for Islamabad, which was perturbed by the large number of important seats
retained by the Northern Alliance in the interim administration. The impact was even greater since
the Northern Alliance leaders chose to visit almost all the neighboring countries with the exception
of Pakistan. The Pakistan government was also worried about the rapid development of ties
between Kabul and New Delhi. The leaders in Islamabad were worried that close ties between
Afghanistan and India would not only rob Pakistan of its strategic depth but also create a severe
headache for the government in Islamabad.
The Pakistani support for the Taliban, both overt and covert continued until almost the very end.
As one Taliban stronghold after another continued to fall to the Northern Alliance army, Pakistani
Air Force carried out several emergency sorties, extricating Pakistani army officials from various
tight corners. Thus it was hardly surprising that Pakistan and the Northern Alliance treated each
other with open contempt and outright hostility. With a new government installed in Kabul, the
relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were expected to be tense in the future.
As the interim administration took charge in Kabul, the Pakistan-Afghan relations looked set to
deteriorate especially as several senior ministers in the new Afghan dispensation did not seem to be
in a hurry to forget the role played by Pakistan in deposing them from the government in 1996 and
in propping up the Taliban regime. Then in the next few years, relations appeared less dire as the
respective governments dealt with similar challenges of Islamic extremists and remnants of the
Taliban seeking to depose their administrations.
But by 2006, Pakistan-Afghan relations were at an all-time low with both sides blaming one
another for the threat of Islamic militants in the region. United States President George W. Bush
presided over a September 2006 dinner meeting between the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 250 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
aimed at easing the tensions between the two South Asian neighbors. Since then, relations between
the two countries have continued to be strained.
In June 2008, Taliban fighters in Afghanistan attacked a prison in Kandahar and released hundreds
of prisoners. A manhunt by joint Afghan and international troops resulted in 20 inmates being
recaptured, however, the rest were reported to have escaped. NATO announced that 17 insurgents
were dead but did not state whether any of the escapees were among the dead.
Two days after that incident, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said that in the interests of national
self-defense, he would send troops over the border into Pakistan to hunt down militants operating
across the border. Karzai said: "Afghanistan has the right of self-defense. When they cross the
territory from Pakistan to come and kill Afghans and to kill coalition troops it exactly gives us the
right to go back and do the same." Karzai also warned that he would actively search for Taliban
fighters, including Baitullah Mehsud, who was believed to be based in the South Waziristan region
of Pakistan. To that end, the Afghan leader said, "Baitullah Mehsud should know that we will go
after him now and hit him in his house." Karzai promised a similar fate to Taliban leader, Mullah
Omar.
While Afghanistan and Pakistan share ethnic and cultural ties, relations between the two countries
have become increasingly strained as extremist Islamic militants have traversed the cross-border
region with impunity, often carrying out attacks on either side. Karzai has often called on Pakistan
and the wider international community to deal with this problem. However, until the
aforementioned prison attack, he had never before threatened to pursue militants across the border.
In response, Pakistan lashed back by stating that it while it wanted regional stability, it would not
stand for interference in its affairs. Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said, "We want a
stable Afghanistan. It is in our interest." He went on to state, "Neither do we interfere in anyone
else's matters, nor will we allow anyone to interfere in our territorial limits and our affairs."
Soon after the Afghan leader publicly threatened to seek out Taliban across the border into
Pakistan, the threat presented by that militant Islamic enclave was brought into sharp relief. About
500 Taliban fighters took control of a number of several villages to the south of Kandahar in
Afghanistan. Joint Afghan and NATO forces were expected to confront the threat posed by the
Taliban's advance. The issue was expected to further contribute to devolving Afghan-Pakistani
relations.
Special Report
Pakistan ISI reportedly supporting Afghan Taliban --
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 251 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In June 2010, Afghanistan's geopolitical relationship with Pakistan took center stage. At issue
were revelations that the Pakistani intelligence service, known as ISI, has been funding, training,
and providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban. For several years, there have been suspicions
about such a clandestine relationship between the two entities, however, the closeness and
extensive nature of their ties was something of a revelation. Indeed, in a report issued by the
London School of Economics support for the Afghan Taliban was described as "official ISI policy."
As noted by the author of the report, Matt Waldman of Harvard University, "This goes far beyond
just limited, or occasional support. This is very significant levels of support being provided by the
ISI." Waldman also asserted, "We're also saying this is official policy of that agency, and we're
saying that it is very extensive. It is both at an operational level, and at a strategic level, right at the
senior leadership of the Taliban movement."
The report also included references to interviews with Taliban field commanders who said that ISI
agents attented Taliban council meetings. Shoring up the veracity of this claim was the following
citation from the report: "These accounts were corroborated by former Taliban ministers, a
Western analyst, and a senior United Nations official based in Kabul, who said the Taliban largely
depend on funding from the ISI and groups in Gulf countries." Corroborating evidence was also
available from a source unrelated to the LSE report. In an interview with Reuters, the head of
Afghan intelligence, Amrullah Saleh, who had just resigned from that position, said that the ISI
was "part of the landscape of destruction" in Afghanistan and accused Pakistan of sheltering
Taliban leaders in safe houses.
Some observers have noted that with the impending exit of foreign troops from Afghanistan
expected in 2011, Pakistan's actions may be related to its desire to more deeply influence
Afghanistan. However, ISI activities related to Islamic militant extremists are not recent
developments in response to the current landscape. Indeed, the ISI has been accused of funding
and training Islamic militant extremists in Afghanistan from as far back as the 1979 Soviet
invasion. That being said, since the 2001 terror attacks in the United States, Pakistan has accepted
billions of dollars in aid funding from the United States, supposedly for its support in the fight
against terror enclaves like al-Qaida and its Taliban allies. Clearly, a continued relationship
between the Pakistani ISI and the Afghan Taliban would run counter to its expressed objectives of
helping the United States quell the threat of terrorism emanating from such entities in the AfghanPak region. As stated in the LSE report, "Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game of
astonishing magnitude."
Relations with the United Nations (U.N.)
In August 1998, after the assassination of an Italian United Nations (U.N.) staff member and two
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 252 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
U.N. Afghan employees, the U.N. withdrew from Afghanistan.
In March 1999, neighboring governments and the U.N. praised the successes of the second round
of meetings between the Taliban and the northern opposition forces and encouraged further
negotiations between the warring factions. The talks, sponsored by the U.N. from March 11-14 in
Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, resulted in an agreement to exchange prisoners of war; to establish a
coalition government including all parties to the conflict; and to continue negotiation of a cease-fire
agreement.
On March 18, 1999, U.N. Special Envoy Brahimi met with Ahmad Shah Masoud, leader of the
Afghan Northern Alliance forces. Their discussion focused on the talks between the Taliban and
the opposition forces scheduled for April 1999.
After a meeting on March 21, 1999, between the U.N. Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Lakhdar
Brahimi, and Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, chief of the Taliban Interim Council, U.N. staff began
to return to Afghanistan. Although the Taliban have promised to maintain the safety of all U.N.
staff, for the time being, U.S. and British U.N. staff will not return because of their governments'
security concerns. These concerns stem from reports that the Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden,
alleged to be responsible for the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August
1998, may still be in Afghanistan. U.N. officials believe that bin Laden has left Afghanistan and
gone to Somalia and are currently investigating whether or not to return U.S. and British staff to
Afghanistan.
On April 12, 1999, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his disappointment that the
Taliban had decided not to continue the peace talks and pledged to continue attempts to broker
peace between the warring factions. The United Nations Security Council echoed Annan, calling
for all warring parties to resume the peace process. On April 26, the U.N. sent a two-week
technical mission to Afghanistan to assess the humanitarian situation on the ground.
Afghani women and children staged an anti-Taliban rally in Islamabad, Pakistan on April 28. The
rally was led by the "Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan," a human rights
group which has petitioned the United Nations for assistance. The U.N. has consistently criticized
the Taliban for their treatment of women. However, the Taliban has allegedly eased some
restrictions on women by allowing widows to work in health care and girls to attend primary
schools.
The United Nations has expressed concern about the increased production of opium in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces more opium than any other country in the world and
production is expected to double in 1999. Land usage by opium producers is drastically reducing
the amount of land used to produce grain and the U.N. fears that this, along with the worst drought
in several decades, may lead to a famine in 2000.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 253 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In October 1999, the U.N. Order 1267 allowed a 30-day period, within which the Taliban
government of Afghanistan was to unconditionally extradite Osama bin Laden, the person
suspected to have orchestrated the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.
In response, the Taliban regime refused to extradite bin Laden, claiming that such a measure would
violate their traditional belief of protecting those considered to be guests of their homeland, but
they also requested a delay on the U.N. sanctions. The request was ultimately denied, and U.N.
sanctions went into effect on Nov. 14, 1999. Thousands of Afghanis protested in adamant
demonstrations in the streets of Kabul attacking U.N. offices and the abandoned U.S. Embassy.
Other protests ensued in other Islamic countries. Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar,
criticized the U.N. for working in the interest of the United States.
In October 1999, U.N. Special Envoy for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi withdrew from
Afghanistan after failing to secure an agreement from the warring factions. In the early months of
2000, the fighting continued unabated and all involved agree that peace was unlikely so long as
outside factions continue to supply to the combatants arms, economic support and even cross
border refuge for regrouping for battle. Pakistan appeared to provide the primary outside base of
support for the Taliban while the Central Asia republics Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
as well as Iran were the main conduits for support to the opposition forces.
In December 2000, after fresh warnings about handing over Osama bin Laden, the United Nations
Security Council passed another resolution strengthening the sanctions against the Taliban regime.
The new set of sanctions, initially valid for a period of 12 months, call for the closing down of all
Taliban offices outside Afghanistan and also for a severe curtailment on the international travel by
Taliban representatives. The Taliban reacted strongly to the fresh sanctions and threatened to break
off the peace talks if the sanctions were actually imposed.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism and the subsequent installation of a
new transitional government in Afghanistan, it is presumed that relations between the country and
the United Nations will improve significantly.
Relations with the United States (U.S.)
The tense relations between the United States (U.S.) and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan offered
a perfect cover for the intense relationship that the two sides enjoyed until the mid-1990s.
The Taliban, like so many other Islamic groups in Afghanistan, was often viewed by critics as a
creation of the U.S. intelligence agency, the CIA. (Note: CountryWatch does not assert this
position; it simply reports a perception held by certain critics. Whether or not this perception is true
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 254 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
is beyond the purview of this review.) Although the U.S. has officially denied this charge, it was
apparent that it armed certain Islamic groups in Afghanistan soon after the coup by PPDA in 1978,
since it viewed the PPDA as a communist government propped up by the Soviet Union. Former
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzeznski recently confirmed that the U.S. aid to Afghan
"mujahidin" began more than six months before the Soviet invasion and this was soon to become
the largest covert operation mounted by the U.S., since the World War II, costing over $5 billion.
The operation picked up speed as the Soviet forces landed in Kabul in December 1979. The timing
was especially bad for the U.S., as it had lost a valuable ally in Iran, with the overthrow of the
Shah of Iran in January of the same year. Having already lost Iran, the U.S. feared that the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan was just the first step in Moscow's principle aim of gaining control over
either Iran or Pakistan. Worried about the implications on its South Asia and Middle East policies,
the U.S. launched a massive operation to oust the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Using Pakistan
as the base for these operations, the U.S. covertly pumped in billions of dollars into arming and
training the militant Islamic forces that were trying to fight the Soviets.
The CIA, along with the Pakistan authorities, set up scores of training camps along the PakistanAfghanistan border and some even inside southern Afghanistan, an area where the Soviets could
never hold a complete sway. And the camps found a huge supply of ready students among the five
million Afghans who had fled their country and were seeking refuge in Pakistan, most of them in
the northern city of Peshawar, just a few kilometers from the border.
Thus, for over a decade, Peshawar became the nerve center of the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence
agencies and their operations in Afghanistan. The region was soon flooded with the state of the art
weapons to enable the guerrillas wage a battle against the Soviet occupying forces. The Afghan
"mujahidin" were soon furnished with the best weapons - be it handheld anti-aircraft and anti-tank
weapons, the best rifles that the U.S. army could offer and the best communications systems.
Within a short while, Peshawar emerged as the largest illegal arms bazaar in the world, with
millions of small and light weapons floating around. It was and still is easier and cheaper to buy a
sophisticated rifle than a portable radio in the city.
The first years of the "mujahidin" battles saw formation of nearly a dozen groups of armed
guerrillas that were dispatched into various parts of the country. Among these groups was the
group that later transformed itself into the Taliban. The transformation began in the early 1990s
under the supervision of the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI. With an additional supply of arms
originating from the U.S., the Taliban was able to control nearly 90 percent of the country and
hence become de facto rulers of the country.
The Taliban, however, was founded on the principles of religious extremism, and soon its policies
were to come in conflict with the stated aims of the U.S., especially over the Taliban's eagerness to
export Islamic extremism and terrorism from Afghanistan to practically all over the world - from
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 255 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the U.S. and the Middle East to Central Asia and India and Philippines. Though the Taliban
received adequate funding from the outside sources - principally the ISI and the Saudi Arabians, it
also began developing its own internal revenue sources - through drugs. Over the last few years,
Afghanistan has emerged as the world's second largest producer of opium, the raw material for
heroin. It is also now a major conduit for the drugs being smuggled into Europe and also the U.S.
The U.S. administration was perhaps slow in detecting danger signals from the Taliban. Despite its
close relations with and deep influence over the Pakistan government, the U.S. has been unable to
put any tangible pressure regarding the direction in which the ISI was sending the Taliban. It was
around the same time that Taliban offered refuge to Osama bin Laden, today topping the most
wanted list of the U.S.
It finally took the bombings of U.S. missions in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 to crystallize U.S.
action. Accusing bin Laden of masterminding the operations, the U.S. demanded that the Taliban
hand over bin Laden. When the Taliban refused to comply, the U.S. declared the Taliban a
terrorist organization and also steered the United Nations to clamp sanctions on the regime in
November 1999. The U.S. has also been strongly opposing the Taliban attempts to get recognition
at the United Nations as the legitimate regime of Afghanistan.
Initially, however, the relations between the two countries were cordial. After the establishment of
diplomatic relations in 1934, the U.S. policy of helping developing nations boost their standards of
living was an important factor in maintaining and improving U.S.-Afghan ties. From 1950 to 1979,
U.S. foreign assistance provided Afghanistan with more than $500 million in loans, grants and
surplus agricultural commodities to develop transportation facilities, increase agricultural
production, expand the educational system, stimulate industry and improve government
administration.
The re-establishment of the U.S. embassy in Kabul in December 2001 after the fall of the Taliban
regime marked the beginning of a new chapter in the U.S.-Afghanistan relations. The installation of
a new government in Kabul has led to much smoother relations between the two sides. Afghanistan
could once again begin cooperation with the U.S. in the two key areas of regional peace and
stability and the battle against drugs. Relations, however, have become somewhat strained as the
United States has focused more of its attention on Iraq and the Middle East, even forgetting to
budget for much-publicized financial and security assistance for Afghanistan. The severe increase
in violence and the resurgence of the Taliban in 2006 has drawn increasing attention to this matter.
In August 2007, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was in the United States to meet with President
George W. Bush. The meeting was regarded as a "strategy session" regarding the resurgent
Taliban and al-Qaida in Aghanistan. To that end, the United States pledged $10 billion in funds
aimed at strengthening Afghan security forces and also compelling positive results. But on the
other side of the equation, the Afghan leader wanted to discuss the rising number of civilians dying
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 256 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
as a result of military operations by coalition forces. As well, Karzai was expected to ask Bush to
place pressure on Pakistan to intensify its efforts to curb cross-border extremist fighters. In the
background of these two sets of objectives has been the issue of Iran. Whereas the United States
has expressed anxiety about Iran possible involvement in the supply of weapons to the Taliban,
Afghanistan has cast Iraq as an ally in its causes. To that end, Karzai was reported to have
characterized Iran as "a supporter of Afghanistan, in the peace process that we have and the fight
against terror."
Special Report: Post-Bush Era Foreign Policy
Benefiting from apparent support from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for United
States presidential nominee Barack Obama's 16-month phased withdrawal timetable from Iraq, the
Democratic contender for the American presidency urged greater focus on Afghanistan.
The Obama campaign quickly responded to Maliki's favorable stance on their proposed
withdrawal timetable by directing attention to Afghanistan. Obama's top foreign policy adviser, Dr.
Susan Rice, said: "Senator Obama welcomes Prime Minister Maliki's support for a 16 month
timeline for the redeployment of US combat brigades. This presents an important opportunity to
transition to Iraqi responsibility, while restoring our military and increasing our commitment to
finish the fight in Afghanistan."
These developments came at a time when Obama was launching an international tour, intended to
shore up his foreign policy credentials. Not surprisingly, the Democratic contender commenced his
trip in the country he has consistently said requires priority attention: Afghanistan.
During a visit to Kabul, Obama characterized the increasingly volatile landscape in Afghanistan
as "precarious and urgent." As such, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee said that
Afghanistan should be the main focus of the "war on terror." In his meeting with Afghan
President Hamid Karzai, he promised to continue the fight against terrorism "with vigor."
Additionally, Obama discussed the illicit narcotics trade and bilateral ties with Karzai.
Obama was interviewed for the CBS program "Face the Nation." In that interview he noted that
the Bush administration had been distracted by a "war of choice" in Iraq rather than fighting those
who were responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States. He asserted that
the time had come to correct to correct the mistakes made by the Bush administration. Obama
also called for more troops to be deployed to Afghanistan to fight resurgent Taliban, al-Qaida, and
other extremist Islamic elements.
Obama's priority on Afghanistan was backed by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who
expressed concurrence with the Democratic presidential contender on this matter.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 257 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Obama's rival for the American presidency, Republican presidential nominee, John McCain,
criticized him for espousing policies before traveling to the Middle East and South Asia to assess
the situation. Nevertheless, Obama's policies were receiving unexpected sanction from key global
players, as noted above.
By 2009, Obama had won the presidency. Faced with a spate of violence and a deeply devolving
security situation in Afghanistan, the new Obama administration in the United States decided to
send 17,000 more troops to Afghanistan to stabilize the country's security situation.
By late March 2009, United States foreign policy in Afghanistan was on the agenda. On March
27, 2009, United States President Barack Obama unveiled a “stronger, smarter and more
comprehensive strategy” for dealing with Afghanistan. At issue was a new foreign policy approach
toward dealing with the threat posed by al-Qaida terrorists operating in the area from Afghanistan
to Pakistan. President Obama explained that this new course emerged from a "careful policy
review" that involved consultations with military commanders, diplomats, regional governments,
strategic partners, NATO allies, as well as non governmental organizations.
Making it clear that the United States would not be involved in an open-ended war, President
Obama said that the new strategy would be carefully circumscribed with clear objectives. He said
that the United States effort in Afghanistan was only to confront our common enemy” and did not
seek to "control that country or dictate its future.",
Giving a glimpse of the new policy, President Obama had said during an interview on CBS
television show 60 Minutes on March 22, 2009 that there must be an "exit strategy" with regard to
the United States policy in Afghanistan. He said, "There's got to be a sense that this is not a
perpetual drift" and emphasized that the central mission was to ensure that al-Qaida was not able to
carry attacks against the United States.
Now, less than a week later, President Obama again emphasized these themes saying, “ So I want
the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and
defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” As before, the United States president again
emphasized the threat of al-Qaida in discussing the new strategy, noting that intensified efforts in
the Afghan-Pak region was needed to deal with that "increasingly perilous" terrain.
Flanked by United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and United States Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, President Obama depicted a grim situation in which the resurgent extremists were
consolidating control of the Afghan-Pak border zone. Indeed, he characterized that area as "the
most dangerous place in the world." President Obama noted that the United States’ strategy should
be directly related to the threat posed by al-Qaida to America and its allies. He also warned that
credible intelligence warned that fresh attacks were being planned by the terrorists.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 258 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
President Obama emphasized that the terrorist threat was not directed solely at the United States
but also to Afghans at home, as well as the entire global community. To this end, President Obama
said, "This is not simply an American problem. Far from it.” He continued, "It is instead an
international security challenge of the highest order." Accordingly, the United States leader called
on NATO and other allies to assist in this effort.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signaled Russian support for the strategy during an interview
with the BBC. He indicated that Moscow would be "ready to participate in the efforts directed at
putting things in order" in Afghanistan. He also appeared to echo Obama’s view that Afghanistan
establish its own political system saying, "It is impossible to rule Afghanistan with the aid of the
alliance; it is impossible to rule Afghanistan from abroad. Afghanistan should find its own path to
democracy."
The Obama administration had already made good on an election promise to intensify its efforts in
Afghanistan by deploying 17,000 more troops to that country to deal with the resurgence of the
Taliban and the devolving security situation. But now President Obama was saying that there was a
need for increased non-combat personnel of 4,000 in Afghanistan to train and strengthen Afghan
security forces, and also to support civilian development.
Richard Holbrooke, the United States special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, has said that the
United States could no longer treat the two countries separately. He said, "In the past, the United
States government stove-piped it, they had an Afghan policy and a Pakistan policy. We have to
integrate the two and I hope the rest of the world will join us in that effort." Holbrooke has also
indicated there would be no further neglect of the region, suggesting more attention not just in
terms of military strength, but also in terms of aid and resources aimed at rebuilding infrastructure,
would be in the works.
Afghanistan was not the only country on the agenda, as suggested above. President Obama said
that the United States’ efforts against al-Qaida would also extend to Pakistan. He said that the
United States Congress would be asked to pass legislation authorizing an increase in expenditures
to Pakistan for the purpose of rebuilding schools, roads and hospitals. But President Obama noted
that he would not be granting a “blank check” to Pakistan, which would have to demonstrate a
commitment to crushing al-Qaida and aligned extremists in that country.
According to Reuters News, the government of Afghanistan welcomed the new strategy by the
United States, and particularly endorsed the regional approach. A presidential spokesman,
Humayun Hamidzada, said that Afghan President Hamid Karzai welcomed “the recognition of the
regional aspect of the problem in Afghanistan and specifically recognition that the al-Qaida threat is
mainly emanating from Pakistan.
In May 2009, United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the replacement of
General David McKiernan --the commander of United States-led forces in the field in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 259 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Secretary Gates explained the decision had been made because the fight against the Taliban
required "new thinking." To that apparent end, Secretary Gates said the new commander would
be General Stanley McChrystal, whose background as a specialist in counter-insurgency would
apparently yield necessary insight and leadership in the fight against the Taliban.
The move was part of a strategic shift by the Obama administration to not only strengthen armed
forces on the ground, but also to use non-military methods to fight the Taliban. In fact, Secretary
Gates' announcement came at a time when the United States was set to increase its military
combat presence by 21,000 in Afghanistan (the existing force numbered 38,000). That move,
however, was sure to be met with resistance in Afghanistan where Afghan President Hamid Karzai
was under pressure to decrease combat operations in his country in the aftermath of United States
airstrikes that have left a lengthy list of casualties.
With casualties mounting amidst troops from the United States and the United Kingdom fighting
the Taliban in Afghanistan, there were increasing anxieties about Western efforts in that country to
crush Islamic militants. Indeed, resurgent Taliban have become increasingly violent in their
attacks while Western forces have seen ever-increasing casualty lists. In July 2009, the United
Kingdom and the United States had lost several soldiers as a result of attacks by resurgent Taliban.
As many as 15 British troops died in the space of days while four United States marines died in
two separate roadside bombings.
Given this climate, United States President Barack Obama sought to quell anxieties by staking out
a clear set of objectives for United States and allied troops trying to repel the Taliban in
Afghanistan. To this end, President Obama characterized the war effort in Afghanistan as a
"serious fight" against terrorism, and the crucial need to establish regional stability. President
Obama said that United States and allied troops had enjoyed some success but were immediately
tasked with the mission of seeing Afghanistan through the forthcoming presidential election set for
August 2009. Across the Atlantic in the United Kingdom, British Prime Minister was also
compelled to justify his country's continuing effort in Afghanistan by explaining that there was a
vital interest to his country in fighting terrorism. He was helped by President Obama's statement
as follows: "The mission in Afghanistan is one that the Europeans have as much if not more of a
stake in than we do. The likelihood of a terrorist attack in London is at least as high, if not higher,
than it is in the United States."
Relations between the United States and Afghanistan were on the agenda in July 2009 when the
United States (U.S.) Pentagon confirmed that an American soldier who disappeared from his
military base in Afghanistan has been captured by the Taliban. The Defense Department said that
Private Bowe Bergdahl, who had been serving with an Alaska-based infantry regiment, was last
seen walking away from the base in a Taliban stronghold. The Defense Department said that a
video showing footage of the captured soldier was a violation of international law and characterized
it as a "Taliban propaganda video."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 260 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Meanwhile, also in July 2009, Afghan President Hamid Karzai made the reduction of civilian
casualties by foreign troops a part of his election manifesto (re: presidential election ofAugust
2009). The Afghan leader said that United States and NATO troops fighting Islamic insurgents in
his country should sign a framework governing their operations, with the objective of limiting
civilian casualties. Indeed, the issue of civilian casualties has been a source of great consternation in
Afghanistan even as foreign troops try to stave off resurgent Taliban at a time of escalating
violence.
While the saga of Afghanistan's contested and controversial presidential election was ongoing in
the early autumn of 2009, and as violence dominated Afghanistan's political landscape, United
States President Barack Obama was considering his new policy in Afghanistan. At the
international level, countries with troops in Afghanistan were reassessing their strategic purpose
there.
General Stanley McChrystal, the chief United States and NATO commander in Afghanistan, has
called for more troops on the ground. McChrystal agued that the United States risked failure in
the war in Afghanistan without such a commitment and he warned that the United States had to
reverse the momentum of the resurgent Taliban. In particular, he said that more troops were
needed to help support the Afghan security forces who were preparing to take full control over the
country's security in 2013.
In October 2009, the commander of United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General
Stanley McChrystal, officially submitted a set of possible options to policymakers, aimed at
curbing the advance of resurgent Taliban. Among the proposals given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Mike Mullen and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridi,
was an option to deploy between 30,000 to 40,000 additional combat troops and trainers to
Afghanistan. This option was said to be strongly favored by McChrystal, although there were other
options, such as a more modest increase of troop strength by 10,000, as well as another plan
calling for a surge of 60,000 troops to be sent to Afghanistan, and an option for maintaining
current troop strength. While the actual content of the proposal has remained confidential,
McChrystal has himself said that more troops were needed to help support the Afghan security
forces who were preparing to take full control over the country's security in 2013.
General McChrystal's report was being reviewed by President Barack Obama who had said
earlier-- on September 20, 2009, during an interview on CNN -- that he would assess the findings
from his commander on the ground, before making a decision as to the possible deployment of
troops to an increasingly unpopular conflict. President Obama noted, "I don't want to put the
resource question before the strategy question." He then continued, "But right now, the question
is, the first question is, are we doing the right thing? Are we pursuing the right strategy?" The
president acknowledged that the original mission to hunt those responsible for 9/11 could be
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 261 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
subject to what is known as "mission creep."
Before considering McChrystal's request for more combat troops in Afghanistan, the White House
in the United States said it wanted to undergo an overall strategic review of its policy in the
Afghan-Pak region. At issue for the Obama administration was the question of whether to remain
on track with the existing mission, and perhaps with an extended nation-building imperative, aimed
at securing the cooperation of the Afghan populace. Alternatively, there was the question as to if
the mission should be recalibrated, perhaps with reduced military operations, and a concentration
purely on striking al-Qaida terrorists in the Afghan-Pak border area.
By the end of October, 2009, media reports emerged that the Obama administration would make
their Afghanistan strategy known after that country held its second or run-off round of its
contested presidential election. That second or run-off round was set for November 7, 2009 amidst
a rising clamor for the establishment of a credible government in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Obama
administration noted that there would be no action pending the establishment of a legitimate
government in Afghanistan. In an interview with CNN, White House Chief of Staff Rahm
Emanuel said it would be "reckless" to make such a decision without thoroughly determining
whether or not the government at the helm of Afghanistan held democratic authority. But clearly,
that timeline was thwarted due to the problematic conduct of the election and the "default" victory
of Karzai, as noted above. Indeed, the fact that Karzai was increasingly cast as corrupt created a
wrinkle in United States' policy in Afghanistan, since it required a credible and reliable governing
partner in Kabul.
For its part, the White House insisted that President Obama had not actually decided on the
question of troop strength and was actually still considering the strategic approach. To that end,
there were reports that the president had requested status reports from across Afghanistan to assess
specific conditions on the ground. At home in the United States, there was a clear division among
those -- disproportionately from the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party -- who wanted
the president to quickly assent to McChrystal's wishes, and the liberal base of the Democratic
Party, which has demanded that President Obama bring an end to the war in Afghanistan.
By the first part of November 2009, it was reported that President Barack Obama had, in fact,
rejected all four of the options for Afghanistan, which had been presented by security advisers. He
asserted that they did not satisfy his concerns over a clear exit strategy. In a related development,
the United States ambassador to Afghanistan was reported to have sent two classified cable to
Washington expressing concern over the deployment of further troops to Afghanistan, at a time
when the Karzai government in Kabul was re-elected amidst allegations of vote fraud -- the latest
manifestation of corruption and mismanagement at the core of governance. Indeed, it was the
very climate of corruption and mismanagement that facilitated the resurgence of the Taliban in the
first place. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry -- who served as the United States military
commander in Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007 before retiring from the military and taking on a
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 262 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
diplomatic role in April 2009 -- apparently characterized Afghan President Hamid Karzai as
erratic, excoriated senior Afghan government officials for their rampant corruption, and criticized
the installation of warlords and drug smugglers in influential positions on the Afghan governing
landscape. Eikenberry reportedly concluded that the Afghan leadership was incapable of being an
effective -- or appropriate -- partner, and accordingly, advised President Obama against escalating
troop strength in Afghanistan.
By late November 2009, President Obama had made his decision and was scheduled to address
the American people -- and, indeed, the world on December 1, 2009. During his adress, President
Obama ordered another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable starting in late
2009 and reaching an apex in mid-2010. The president explained that the mission at hand would
focus on "disrupting, dismantling, and defeating" al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and denying them any
further safehaven in Afghanistan under Taliban auspices. As such, a concomitant aspect of the
mission would include reversing recent Taliban momentum.
The troops would also be tasked with the training of Afghan security forces, with an eye on turning
over the security apparatus to locals. To that end, President Obama noted that the another
central component of the mission was to stabilize Afghanistan so that the Afghan people would
soon be able to take responsibility for their own security. Ahead of the speech, there were reports
that one "brigade-sized element" of between 3,000 to 5,000 troops would be solely tasked with
training of Afghan troops.
At the same time, the president noted that the redeployment of United States forces was expected
to commence within a year and end in mid-2011, pending favorable circumstances on the ground.
In this way, a timeline ending theoretically in 2011 appeared to be a core aspect of the exit
strategy. To that end, the president emphasized that he was ordering the fastest possible
deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan, in order to facilitate the conditions for a
responsible a exit from that country. Ultimately, the president said that the objective was to "come
together to end the war successfully... for common security."
President Obama called on the international community to continue to work with the United States
to deal with the global threat posed by militant Islamic extremists, noting that "this burden is not
ours alone to bear." According to media reports ahead of the speech, the president had already
conducted talks with the leaders of several key countries, including Denmark, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Russia, China and India, and had called for other countries to contribute up
to 10,000 troops for the NATO war effort in Afghanistan.
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan also factored highly in the president's speech, with
increased emphasis being placed on their responsibilities for advancing stable governance free of
corruption and fighting terrorism respectively. He additionally addressed the Afghan people in
saying that the United States did not seek to occupy their country, and sought to be a partner in the
process toward stability, rather than a patron. On Pakistan, he particularly emphasized the nuclear
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 263 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
capacity of that country and the heightened geopolitical stakes therein.
For his part, President Obama cast this war plan for Afghanistan as being a matter of necessity
and not choice -- a view consistent with his campaign position on the topic. In his speech,
however, he made clear that his decision was not made easily, saying: "I do not make this decision
lightly." The president's philosophical stance on the matter was made clear when he said that he
had opposed the Iraq war because he believe in restraint when it comes to the use of military
force. But at the same time, the president acknowledged that he believed the current course of
remaining in Afghanistan at current levels and without an exit strategy was "unsustainable." To
this end, President Obama said that "the status quo of muddling through" would only be a costly
option that served to prolong the current farrago, ultimately never generating the conditions in
which United States forces could leave Afghanistan. The president went on to state that the
decision was made in the interests of national security, noting that the dangers emanating from the
Afghan-Pak region were "no idle danger" and "no theoretical threat."
While the president did not go into great detail about the Afghan-Pak strategy in his speech, his
administration's policy was illuminated in a separate interview with United Nations Ambassador
Susan Rice, which was conducted by MSNBC News. Dr. Rice explained that while many alQaida members had crossed the porous border from Afghanistan to Pakistan after the Taliban lost
power, they were still moving across the border regions, and could re-establish safehaven in
Afghanistan if resurgent Taliban in that country regained control over broad swaths of Afghan
territory. She explained the symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaida by
characterizing Afghanistan under Taliban rule as the "tissue" within which "the cancer of al-Qaida"
develops. In effect, resurgent Taliban can facilitate the ascendancy of al-Qaida. While the United
States and NATO forces were actively dealing with this threat on the Afghan side of the border,
there was pressure on the Pakistanis to continue their efforts to the to same on their side of the
border. Dr. Rice also emphasized the fact that although al-Qaida members could be found in
various countries across the world, the mountainous Afghan-Pak region was the very location of
terror training camps -- a venue for far more ambitious terrorist planning than single cell terror
operations. Moreover, she echoed the president's own words when she said that there was a
"proximate threat to national security emanating from Afghan- Pak border."
A week after United States President Barack Obama ordered another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan
as part of a new strategy, NATO announced that 25 countries had pledged a total of around 7,000
more troops to support the United States-led war effort in Afghanistan. At a news conference
following talks with NATO foreign ministers, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
said: "Nations are backing up their words with deeds." He continued, "At least 25 countries will
send more forces to the mission in 2010. They have offered around 7,000 new forces with more to
come ... That is solidarity in action and it will have a powerful effect on the ground." Rasmussen
also remarked on the new road map for operations, noting that the new NATO mission would
include amplified aid and training of Afghan security forces, consistent with the strategy outlined by
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 264 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
President Obama. He also emphasized that another core objective remained the same -- to prevent
Afghanistan from falling into the clutches of militant extremist Islamists.
For its part, the Afghan Taliban said that the plans outlined by President Obama and echoed by
Secretary-General Rasmussen would serve only to strengthen their resolve. Nevertheless, the
battlefield commander, General Stanley McChrystal, lauded the new war plan for Afghanistan, by
emphasizing the benefits of more troops in the field and conjuring up Winston Churchill in a
videophone speech as he declared "the end of the beginning" of the war.
On March 28, 2010, United States President Obama made a surprise trip to Afghanistan to show
resolve for the peace and security effort in that country. It was his first trip to Afghanistan since
becoming president and lasted only a few hours; it was not pre-announced for ostensible security
reasons. Addressing United States troops at the Bagram air base close to Kabul, the president
thanked them for their service and sacrifice to the United States saying, "My main job here today
is to say thank you on behalf of the entire American people." To that end, President Obama
emphasized that the central mission of the United States forces in Afghanistan against al-Qaida
and the Taliban, noting that it was ultimately aimed at "keeping America safe and secure."
President Obama also met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whom he invited to the United
States for talks in May 2010. President Obama indicated that he wanted to press for progress on
not only the peace and security front, but also in terms of corruption and narcotics trafficking in
Afghanistan.
In a strange twist, following this visit from President Obama, Afghan President Karzai accused
the West of election fraud plot and threatened to join Taliban. Karzai's rhetoric would likely feed
sentiment that the Afghan leader was an unpredictable and erratic player on the geopolitical
scene.　It would certainly do little to help the increasing perception by the West that he was not
acting in good faith and could not be counted on as a stable partner for the peace effort in
Afghanistan.　The actual degree of damage to relations between Washington D.C. and Kabul was
yet to be measured at the time of writing.
Editor's Note -While Afghanistan has to date enjoyed the public support of the American people, and has not
generally been subject to the same controversy as the Iraq war, the long engagement has started to
take a toll. The speculation about whether an increase in troop strength may be needed to combat
resurgent Taliban, particularly in eastern Afghanistan, has been met with some skepticism in the
war-weary United States. The issue of civilian casualties during the battle between NATO forces
and Taliban militants has been an enduring source of consternation for both the Afghan authorities
and international forces operating in Afghanistan. As well, concerns over the proper conduct of the
2009 presidential election has sparked grave concern in the international community, which has
been backed the Afghan government. Consequently, the core purpose of international military
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 265 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
engagement in Afghanistan has become an increasingly significant matter of debate, with voices on
both sides of the Atlantic increasingly calling for an exit strategy. As noted above, on December 1,
2009, United States President Barack Obama ordered another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan on an
accelerated timetable starting in late 2009 and reaching an apex in mid-2010. The troops would be
tasked with fighting extremist Islamic elements as well as the training of Afghan security forces,
with an eye on turning over the security apparatus to locals. Obama also outlined a clear exit
strategy with redeployment expected to commence within a year and ending in mid-2011, pending
favorable circumstances on the ground.
Special Report: -Suicide bomber kills seven CIA agents; may have been courted as possible informant
On Dec. 30, 2009, seven Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers were killed by a suicide
bomber in the Afghan area of Khost -- a known hotbed of Taliban militant activity. It was the
worst attack against United States intelligence agents since the American embassy was bombed in
Beirut in 1983. United States intelligence officials later said that CIA agents may have been trying
to recruit the suicide bomber as a possible informant, not knowing that he would turn out to be a
"double agent" of sorts. It was possible that this background may have accounted for the fact that
he had not undergone a full body search before entering the military base at Khost and was,
therefore, able to move inside the base with the explosives belt undetected. The Taliban claimed
responsibility saying that one of its members carried out the attack.
Government Structure
Names:
conventional long form:
Islamic State of Afghanistan
conventional short form:
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 266 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Afghanistan
local long form:
Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Afghanestan
local short form:
Afghanestan
former:
Republic of Afghanistan
Type
Islamic republic
Background on the Bonn Agreement:
A U.S.-led international coalition was formed following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the
United States. After several weeks of aerial bombardment by coalition forces and military action on
the ground, including Afghan opposition forces, the Taliban was ousted from power on Nov. 17,
2001; in December 2001, a number of prominent Afghans met under United Nations auspices in
Bonn, Germany, to decide on a plan for governing the country; as a result, the Afghan Interim
Authority (A.I.A.) - made up of 30 members, headed by a chairman - was inaugurated on Dec. 22,
2001, with a six-month mandate, to be followed by a two-year Transitional Authority (T.A.), after
which elections are to be held; the structure of the follow-on T.A. was announced on June 10,
2002, when the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) convened and established the Transitional Islamic
State of Afghanistan (T.I.S.A.), which had an 18-month mandate to hold a Loya Jirga in which a
constitution was to be adopted, and a 24-month mandate in which to hold nationwide elections. In
January 2004, the Loya Jirga agreed to a new constitution, which provided for strong presidential
powers. Note that presidential elections were held in 2004, 2009, and in 2014. See below for
details related to the latest election contest.
Executive Branch:
Head of State:
President Ashraf Ghani (since 2014)
Head of Government:
Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah (since 2014)
Note on Head of State and Head of Government:
Ashraf GHANI succeeded Hamid KARZAI as the president of Afghanistan. Karzai had come to
power in 2002 following the overthrow of the Taliban. He was appointed to position as interim
leader; in 2004, elections were held and on December 7, 2004, Karzai became president officially);
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 267 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the president is both the chief of state and head of government. The next presidential election was
held on August 20, 2009 with a second round cancelled under controversial cicrumstances and
amidst widespread accusations of fraud. Fresh elections were held in 2014, as discussed in the
primer below. Ghani became the new president, with Abdullah Abdullah, the second place
winner, positioned to hold the newly-established post of chief executive. See primer below for full
details.
Primer on 2014 Presidential Election in Afghanistan
first round April 5, 2014; second round June 14, 2014 -A presidential election took place in Afghanistan on April 5, 2014. At issue was the question of
who would be the successor to outgoing President Hamid Karzai, who has served as the Afghan
head of state since 2002 when the Islamist extremist cabal, the Taliban, was toppled from power.
The 2001 terror attacks in the United States sparked a joint international effort to drive the
Taliban from power and rid the country of al-Qaida terrorist training camps, which had been
allowed to flourish in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. By 2002, the Taliban was removed and
Karzai was appointed to position as interim leader. In the 2004 elections, held under the aegis of
the Bonn Agreement, Karzai won the presidency at the ballot box. His stint as chief of state and
head of government was renewed following the 2009 elections, although those polls were marked
by fraud and controversy, and ultimately ended with the second election round being canceled.
Indeed, the 2009 elections were clouded by a sense of illegitimacy as rising claims of electoral
irregularities came to the fore and reduced President Karzai's vote tally to less than 50 percent,
thus triggering a second round or runoff election. However, Karzai's closest rival, Abdullah
Abdullah, withdrew from the second round, charging that it would be as corrupt as the first round.
This action set Karzai in place to be re-elected to power by default.
There were high hopes that the 2014 contest would be free of the controversies that marred the
previous contest. As well, many in the international community were hoping for a new Afghan
leader who would be less volatile than Karzai, who became infamous for his intemperate
comments, including his threats to "join the Taliban."
That being said, the months leading up to the elections promised to be difficult. In January 2014,
two election campaigners working for a presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, were shot to
death in the western city of Herat. The two elections workers were killed as they departed from a
campaign office. It should be noted that Abdullah Abdullah (mentioned above) contested the
previous election and intended to be on the ballot again in 2014. Abdullah Abdullah's
spokesperson, Sayed Fazel Sangcharaki, addressed the issue of the deaths of the campaign
workers as follows: "This incident at the beginning of election campaign is a bad sign as either the
security forces are incapable of providing security for the election campaign or they do not take
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 268 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
their job seriously." Meanwhile, the Taliban was making it clear that it intended to interrupt the
election process.
Nevertheless, the election was set to move forward and there were several candidates set to
contest the race. The main contenders included the following individuals -- Qayum Karzai, the older brother of outgoing President Karzai, was the most likely to extend his
brother's legacy. His campaign platform has focused on addressing corruption; howeve, corruption
has been a blight upon the incumbent Karzai regime so it was difficult to determine how a new
Karzai regime would differ. He has indicated a continuing role in government for his brother,
should he win the presidency. His support base was among his Pashtun community.
- Zamay Rassoul, a close confidante of outgoing President Karzai and a former foreign minister
educated in France; he has backed the peace process with the Taliban although he has also said
that those who commit crimes should be punished. Like Qayum Karzai, Zamay Rassoul's support
base was among his Pashtun community.
-Asraf Ghani Ahmadzai, an anthropologist educated in the United States who had also served as
finance minister in cabinet; he was viewed as pro-Western and most likely to sign onto a security
pact with the United States.
- Abdullah Abdullah, a former ophthalmologist, he was headed to a runoff with Karzai in the
previous presidential contest before bowing out due to fears that the run-off would be fraudulent.
Abdullah Adullah was once an adviser to late guerilla leader, Massoud; he now is open to
negotiations with the Taliban but does not favor peace at any price; he has been an advocate for
women's rights in Afghanistan. His support base was to be found in the Tajik community and the
north of the country (vis a vis the Pashtun background of Karzai and Rassoul).
- Abdul Rahim Wardak, a former guerrilla commander and a former defense minister; he has taken
a strong anti-Taliban stance and has said his record as the person who created the modern Afghan
army positioned him to be president.
- Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf, a skilled orator and notorious former warlord who fought against Soviet
occupation; he was known as a hardline Islamist with the dubious distinction of having invited
terrorist Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida to Afghanistan; however, in more recent times, he has
opposed the Taliban.
Note that in March 2014, discussions were underway about the possibility of Qayum Karzai, the
older brother of outgoing President Karzai, withdrawing from the presidential contest and throwing
his weight behind former Foreign Minister Zalmay Rassoul. The objective was to consolidate proKarzai support under one candidate -- preferably a Pashtun -- who would be likely to extend the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 269 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
outgoing president's legacy. Later in that very month, this move was formalized as Karzai ended
his bid for the presidency and endorsed Rassoul. Because of the lateness of his exit from the
presidential context, Karzai's name would yet appear on the ballot. As such, Karzai instructed his
supporters to cast their votes for Rassoul instead.
Regardless of a consolidated Pashtun/pro-Karzai effort, the last polling data (available at the close
of 2013) showed that Abdulla Abdullah and Ghani Ahmadzai were the two candidates with
notable leads ahead of the rest of the field. That being said, with no funds available to pay for
polling surveys as the election approached in 2014, the actual election landscape in the spring of
2014 was unknown. Therefore, at the start of April 2014 - with only days to go until voting day there was no clear sign of which candidate was in the lead or had an advantage in the minds of the
voters.
Meanwhile, in March 2014, with a month to go before Afghanistan's presidential election, the
country was struck by relentless violence at the hands of the Taliban. Among the brutal attacks
was the execution-style death of a Swedish journalist on the street. His killing was linked with the
Taliban's promise to use violence and bloodshed to disrupt the impending presidential election.
On March 18, 2014, a suicide attack in northern Afghanistan left 17 people dead -- including
women and children -- and more than 60 others wounded. Just days later, an attack by the Taliban
on a police station in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan left at least 18 people dead, including several
police officers and the district police chief. The attack started with a bomb blast that sparked a gun
battle with Afghan security forces who were backed up by NATO helicopter gunships; it ended
with the deaths of seven assailants. The Taliban claimed responsibility and made it clear that the
Islamist militant group intended to make good on its promise to disrupt the presidential election set
for April 5, 2014.
On March 20, 2014, gunmen attacked the Serena luxury hotel in the Afghan capital of Kabul.
That heavily-fortified hotel was known to be popular with foreigners and home to several United
Nations staffers who were in Afghanistan to monitor the impending presidential election. The
assailants reportedly entered the hotel with weapons hidden in their shoes and apparently waited
several hours before opening fire on guests. They also hid in bathrooms when security arrived on
the scene, essentially prolonging the chaos.
This particular attack ended with the deaths of several assailants following gun battles with Afghan
security forces. However, that conclusion occurred only after the attack exacted a heavy death toll
on international election missions, with election monitors who were in Afghanistan to witness the
country's presidential election among the casualties. Indeed, among the dead were Luis Maria
Duarte, an election monitor from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and several other
foreign nationals from Canada and India.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 270 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
International monitoring missions were thus making a hasty exit from Afghanistan. In the aftermath
of the tragic bloodshed, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) removed its observers from
Afghanistan, while observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) had been withdrawn and taken to Turkey. As such, the European Union's international
monitoring mission was the only major election witnessing operation still remaining in Afghanistan.
The lack of election monitors in Afghanistan would ostensibly taint the legitimacy of the polls.
It should be noted that Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesperson, claimed responsibility for the
attack. With the exit of international monitoring missions from Afghanistan in the aftermath of this
brutal assault at the Serena Hotel, it was fair to say that the Taliban had, to some extent, achieved
its goals of disrupting the presidential election of 2014.
On the same day as the attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul, the Taliban carried out a separate
assault in the southern Kandahar province. In that incident, the assailants employed a new tactic
of terrorism by flinging an explosives-packed bottle that detonated when it landed on the ground.
The death toll in this case included the head of the provincial media center chief and two police
officers.
On March 25, 2014, a suicide bomber attacked the office of the Independent Election Commission
in Kabul, killing two police officers. Days later on March 28, 2014, militants targeted a guest
house for foreign aid workers in Kabul, trapping people inside for several hours. A child who was
playing outside in the street was killed as a result of that incident.
On March 29, 2014, the Taliban continued its campaign to disrupt the impending presidential
election by attacking the heavily-fortified headquarters of the Independent Election Commission.
The assailants, disguised as women in burqas, stormed the compound of the election commission
and fired guns and rocket-propelled grenades in the direction of the security forces protecting the
Independent Election Commission. The assault continued for several hours, with security forces
attempting to repel the Taliban fighters for up to five hours. The attack ended with the deaths of
all the militants while there were no casualties among the election commission staff.
As the month came to a close -- on March 31, 2014 -- close to 20 people were killed in a series of
attacks across Afghanistan. In the northern province of Kunduz, eight members of the family of
an anti-Taliban commander, Mohammad Omar, were the victims of an attack. Omar himself
escaped the apparent attempted assassination as he was not traveling in the vehicle that was struck
by a roadside bomb. As before, electoral personnel factored highly among the targets of attack by
the Taliban with six members of campaign teams in other bombings incidents on the same day.
As well, in the province of Sar-i-Pul, four Afghan police officers died during an offensive assault
on the Taliban. Meanwhile gunmen abducted Hussain Nazari, a candidate contesting the provincial
council election in Sar-i-Pul, along with about 10 people in his entourage as they traveled from
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 271 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Balkhab district to central Sar-e-Pul to attend a campaign event. There was some disagreement
over whether a rescue operation should be launched or if negotiations should be pursued instead.
Ultimately, the issue was rendered mute when it was announced days later that almost all the
hostages, including Nazari, had been shot to death by the Taliban. Only one person escaped death
but remained gravely wounded.
At the start of April 2014, with only days to go until the election was to be held, the Taliban
continued its rampage of violence and bloodshed with an attack on the country's Interior Ministry
in the center of the capital of Kabul. In this incident, the assailant was disguised in a military
uniform and detonated the explosives strapped to his body as he approached the main gate at the
entrance of the government compound. Because he was unable to enter the compound, the
suicide bomber chose to blow himself up when he was in the vicinity of some police officers. As a
result, the death toll in this attack included six police officers and the suicide bomber himself. The
Taliban relished the success of this incident, taking responsibility in an email missive in which it
declared success at having penetrated the third ring of security at the Interior Ministry before
carrying out the suicide blast.
With the election set to start in only days, the Taliban warned that it would be turning its attention
from election observers, workers, and candidates to voters. The Islamist extremist entity
threatened to attack voters daring to participate in what it characterized as a phony election process
as it put forth the following statement: "The Islamic Emirates announces one last time that all
elements of the fake elections will be under our Mujahideen attack. Every official and every voting
center will be in danger and a surge of attacks will start all over the country."
The Election:
Despite the pre-election climate of violence and bloodshed, and irrespective of the Taliban's threats
to voters, the 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan went off successfully, evoking a sense of
relief from Afghans at home and observers abroad. Voters in Afghanistan defied the cruel threats
by the Taliban to bravely stand in long lines to cast their ballots. Male and female Afghans
triumphantly displayed fingers with purple ink to journalists on the ground in Afghanistan to show
that they had exercised their democratic right and voted in the presidential contest.
Outgoing President Karzai, who was hoping to continue his stamp on power via a win for Roussol,
hailed the election saying, "Today we proved to the world that this is a people driven country." He
continued, "On behalf of the people, I thank the security forces, election commission and people
who exercised democracy and ... turned another page in the glorious history of Afghanistan."
The results were not to be known for several weeks due to the difficult mountainous terrain in
some parts of the country where donkeys had been used to transport ballots. If no one candidate
secured 50 percent of the vote share, then a run-off election would follow to determine a new
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 272 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
president and would add to the protracted election process. Nonetheless, there was satisfaction
that the first-ever democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan was -- at this point -- moving along
in a productive fashion.
There were some blights on the election process. In addition to the bloodshed and violence
discussed above, there was also the murder of a veteran photographer from the Associated Press
(AP) and the wounding of a senior correspondent (also from the AP) at the hands of a police
officer, presumably with an alliance to Islamist extremists and opposed to the presence of foreign
nationals in Afghanistan. As well, there were isolated stories of some polling stations running out
of supplies, ballot stuffing, and other incidences of election fraud.
Several days after the holding of the election, the head of Afghanistan’s Independent Election
Complaints Commission acknowledged that there may have been more incidences of election fraud
than originally though. At a news conference, Abdul Satar Sadaat said, "I want to say election
fraud did take place and it might not have been a small amount."
The exit of international monitors from Afghanistan following the brutal attack on the Serena Hotel
in Kabul (as detailed above) has only added to anxieties over the legitimacy of the vote, and would
limit the capacity to objectively determine the extent to which these voting irregularities would have
affected the election result.
By the third week of April 2014, with the vote counting well underway, Afghanistan's elections
officials authorized a recount of ballots in as many as 500 polling stations.
Amidst the discussion of electoral irregularities was also the discussion of whom might be
determined to be the winner. To that end, there were suggestions that the early frontrunners in the
election were Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani, and Zalmay Rassoul. Of course, this speculation
was yet to be confirmed. Abdullah and Ghani were the two anti-Karzai options, while Rassoul was
regarded as the guardian of the Karzai legacy.
Update on Election Result:
The full preliminary result of the Afghan presidential election was expected by May 2014. If no
candidate secured an outright victory, a second round between the two top performers could be in
the offing. On the other hand, there were some political experts saying that a second round might
not materialize at all. After the allegations of fraud in the previous election, Karzai was handed
victory by default when Abdullah Abdullah refused to stand for the second round, asserting that
there was no guarantee that it would be any fairer a contest than the first round. It was possible
that a similar scenario could occur in 2014.
Another possibility might be a power-sharing deal whereby the top performers would be
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 273 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
participants in a some type of inclusive government. However, the details of such a proposal were
yet to be determined as Abdullah has said while he would embrace inclusion, he was not warm to
notion of a coalition deal. He was on the record saying, "The team which will govern Afghanistan
will not be an exclusive team. The inclusiveness is part of our strategy. But that does not suggest
that we are making a coalition government in order to avoid a runoff or anything like it."
In mid-April 2014, Abdullah Abdullah made clear that he would contest a runoff round, if
necessary, saying that a second round "in order for the people to give their final verdict." He also
reiterated his stance of inclusion, saying in an exclusive interview with Radio Free Europe / Radio
Liberty, "We are making no exclusions...to those who share our vision."
Around this time, with the vote count underway, partial results gave the slight advantage to
Abdullah Abdullah, with Ashraf Ghani trailing just behind. This early tally showed Abdullah
Abdullah with almost 42 percent while Ashraf Ghani had 38 percent. It was to be seen if this trend
would hold or if the frontrunner would change as the counting continued. As noted by Ahmad
Yousuf Nouristani of the Election Commission: "Maybe today one candidate looks strong.
Tomorrow, maybe another will pull ahead."
In the third week of April 2014, all indications were that Abdullah Abdullah was extending his lead
over his closest rival, Ashraf Ghani. Now Abdullah was carrying about 44 percent of the vote share
while Ghani was trailing with 33 percent. Rassoul, the Karzai stalwart, was far behind with 10
percent. Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, the head of the Independent Election Commission, said that it
was likely that Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani would be contesting the run-off election.
Nuristani said, "With the 17.5 percent of the votes that are going to be counted, it is doubtful that
anyone will win in the first round."
By the last week of April 2014, with the vote count complete, Abdullah Abdullah had maintained
his lead of more than 10 percent over his closest rival, Ashraf Ghani. Abdullah Abdullah secured
the plurality of the vote share with about 45 percent, while Ashraf Ghani held 31.5 percent of
support; the pro-Karzai candidate, Zalmai Rassoul, was in a distant third place position with 11.5
percent.
With no one candidate securing an outright majority, the presidential contest was headed onto a
second round. To that end, a runoff election was set -- at the time -- to take place on May 28,
2014, between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani.
Round 2
There remained continued speculation that the two men might form a unity government, thus
foreclosing the possibility of a runoff round. However, Abdullah Abdullah had earlier emphasized
that he was ready to contest a second round, as needed, saying in an interview with the Associated
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 274 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Press, "If it goes to the second round in accordance to the rule of law, we are ready for that as
well. At this stage, we believe that another round might not be needed." He continued, "It's
important that the process is a free and fair one." But with the presidential contest, in fact,
guaranteed to go to a second round, Abdullah Abdullah dismissed the notion of a power-sharing
deal with Ashraf Ghani, saying, "We have not talked or negotiated with anyone about forming a
coalition government."
Note that in mid-May 2014, weeks ahead of the scheduled second round of voting, Abdullah
Abdullah won the support of a key rival -- the pro-Karzai candidate in the first round, Zalmai
Rassoul. By the start of June 2014, Abdullah Abdullah consolidated the support of former rivals by
gaining the backing of the inner circle of former warlord, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. While Sayyaf
himself opted to remain neutral his two vice-presidential running mates made it clear they were
supporting Abdullah Abdullah.
Earlier, there had been some speculation that the second round might be delayed until mid-June
2014, if deemed necessary. That news soon was formalized with the new runoff date set for
June 14, 2014.
Alert -Meanwhile, the Taliban was promising to disrupt the second election round and was reported to be
recruiting radical Islamic fighter -- presumably with an eye on carrying out attacks. Indeed, the last
week of May 2014 in Afghanistan was marked by a spate of suicide attacks, shootouts, and
roadside bombings.
The scene turned more disturbing on June 6, 2014 -- just one week before the election -- when
two bombings targeted the convoy carrying presidential frontrunner, Abdullah Abdullah. The
attacks took place in the capital of Kabul where he was staging a campaign rally. One bombing
was caused by a suicide bomber and obliterated a vehicle traveling in the convoy, while the cause
of the second bombing as unknown. Six people died in the attacks, including one of Abdullah
Abdullah's bodyguards, while more than 20 others were injured. Abdullah Abdullah narrowly
escaped the bloodshed unscathed and was shown on television reassuring supporters and explaining
what transpired. He said, "When I was leaving the rally from the People's Islamic Unity Party, our
car was hit by a roadside bomb and destroyed."
It should be noted that have been plots afoot to disrupt the elections, including an earlier assault on
Abdullah Abdullah's convoy in February 2014 as the presidential contender was traveling between
the capital and the eastern city of Jalalabad. But clearly, this June 2014 attack in Kabul was the
most serious attempt on Abdullah Abdullah's life, reminiscent of the assassination of former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto in neighboring Pakistan several years prior, which also ensued at a
campaign event.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 275 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
It should be noted that although a roadside bomb exploded killing about a dozen people -- including
election workers -- in the northern part of Afghanistan on the day of the second round, the voting
went off in that country.
Note on results and electoral challenges:
While no official election results were available at the time of writing, early returns indicated a lead
of about one million votes for Ashraf Ghani rather than Abdullah Abdullah. Since this advantage
for Ghani was at odds with conventional wisdom that Abdullah Abdullah had the advantage going
into the second round, it was not surprising that claims of massive fraud were emerging.
Given that he was the likely victim of fraud once again (fraud was also a factor in the previous
elections that he contested against Karzai in 2009), Abdullah Abdullah made it abdundantly clear
that he would not be bowing out easily. While Abdullah Abdullah said, "I have always maintained
that the main rival is fraud," his inner circle made it abundantly clear that they believed Ghani, his
supporters, along with a pro-Karzai cabal were involved in padding the vote to Ghani's benefit.
Their argument held merit since Ghani lagged so far behind Abdullah in the first round. Bolstering
their argument was the reality that turnout reported in certain Pashtun areas, such as Khost, were
suspiciously (some might say impossibly) high. Moreover, according to the independent
Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA), which deployed thousands of election
observers across the country, the number of votes counted in the eastern provinces where Ghani
has his support base was higher than the entire adult population. As noted by TEFA head, Naeem
Ayubzada, "We think the increase in numbers was due to fraud.” Nader Naderi, the head of
another independent observer group, said in an interview with international media such as Reuters
News, that there was "double and in some cases a three-fold increase" in votes cast in the eastern
part of Afghanistan. The central question, as noted by Abdullah, was as follows: "In which part of
the country did the situation change so dramatically, the people changed their mind and then all of
them came out and voted? Our rallies in the second round were more energetic and effective."
Of note was the fact that the meta-grievance of Abdullah Abdullah was separate from the more
than 500 complaints of election fraud already registers with the country's election commission.
Preliminary results were expected at the start of July 2014 but the Abdullah Abdullah camp was
making it clear that they would challenge the legitimacy of the vote if the outcome was
questionable. Indeed, on June 18, 2014, Abdullah Adullah called for a stoppage of the counting of
ballots on the basis of fraud. He also announced that he would cease cooperation with electoral
authorities, with whom he no longer held any confidence. Abdullah Abdullah said, "The counting
process should stop immediately and if that continues, it will have no legitimacy. From now on,
today, we announce that we have no confidence or trust in the election bodies." He continued,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 276 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
"Any undertakings will be regarded as illegal and whatever results are announced, are not
acceptable to us." He also blamed Karzai for the impasse, saying of the situation, "This
unfortunately has created a political stalemate and the president of this country and the electoral
commissions are responsible for this stalemate and any consequences."
In Afghanistan, the authorities of the election commission -- the Independent Election Commission
(IEC) -- dismissed Abdullah Abdullah's call for a halt to the vote tabulation and said the process
would continue. As well, the United Nations indicated that it was in no hurry to jump into the
fracas, suggesting instead that Abdullah Abdullah "return" to the electoral process. United Nations
deputy chief, Nicholas Haysom, said, "We believe that the task ahead of us is to have the
candidates re-engage fully in the electoral process...We would want to emphasize that there is no
other way of electing a legitimate leader."
But as June 2014 was in its final week, the Abdullah Abdullah campaign team released audio
recordings possibly containing evidence of fraud by the IEC. The recordings purported to be
conversations between IEC secretary, Zia-ul-Haq Amarkhail, other IEC officials, and someone
from Ghani's campaign. In the recordings, Amarkhail was heard promising Ghani's representative
that certain measures would be taken to favor Ghani’s election to power. The conversation
appeared to also include veiled references to ballot box stuffing, with Amarkhail suggesting that
another IEC staffer bring "the sheep stuffed and not empty."
For his part, Ghani dismissed the fraud allegations and instead asserted that all the ballots cast for
him were legitimate. He said, "Our votes are clean, and we will defend each vote." However, with
the release of the aforementioned audio recordings, IEC Secretary Amirkhail resigned from his
post. While Amarkhail said he was stepping down "for the national interest and for the sake of the
election process," the fact of the matter was that the allegations of ballot stuffing had taken on
greater significance with the release of the audio recordings.
At the start of July 2014, ahead of the planned announcement of the preliminary election results,
the IEC said it would re-assess the vote count from approximately 2,000 polling stations amidst
rising accusations of vote rigging and fraud.
That being said, Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission soon announced its preliminary
results from second round of the presidential election, noting that Ashraf Ghani had 56.44 percent
of the vote compared to 43.56 percent for Abdullah Abdullah. Cognizant of the vote rigging
controversy that has surrounded the presidential contest, the election commission chairman,
Ahmad Yousuf Nouristani, acknowledged there had been "technical mistakes" and "shortcomings"
in the election, which included fraud and other violations. He also emphasized the fact that the
election results were preliminary and could change once the review of votes and allegations of
fraud had been fully addressed. Final results were not expected to be announced until later in July
2014. To this end, Nouristani said, "The announcement of preliminary results does not mean that
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 277 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the leading candidate is the winner and there is possibly the outcome might change after we inspect
complaints."
Regardless of the measured nature of the election result announcement, Fazel Rahman Orya, a
spokesman for Abdullah's electoral team, wasted little time in blasting Afghanistan's Independent
Election Commission. He said that the electoral body had "no legitimacy" and condemned the
results as "illegal" and "illegitimate." Soon thereafter, Abdullah Abdullah's camp cast the election
result as a "coup" against the people, and Abdullah Abdullah himself declared victory. At a victory
speech in Kabul, Abdullah Abdullah declared, "We are proud. We respect the votes of the people.
We were the winner...We will not accept a fraudulent result -- not today, not tomorrow, never."
Meanwhile, his supporters called for the establishment of a parallel government if Ashraf Ghani
was ultimately inaugurated into office.
It should be noted that Ashraf Ghani has ruled out the notion of a coalition government with
Abdullah Abdullah, effectively burying the idea that a power-sharing government would resolve the
election crisis. As stated by Ghani, "People are concerned and the question they have been asking
is if we have made any deal. Our answer is clear: we have not made any deal. We assure the
people that we will not betray their votes."
With Ghani not interested in a power-sharing government, and with Abdullah Abdullah's base
prepared to establish his own power center, Afghanistan was on track for a political catastrophe -something the war-torn and security-challenged crisis state could not likely endure with ease.
Overall, the international community has viewed the presidential contest in Afghanistan to choose a
successor to Karzai as a test; however, the burgeoning electoral crisis suggested passing that test
would be difficult. Indeed, if Abdullah Abdullah was not willing to accept admittedly questionable
election results, or if Ashraf Ghani remained cold to the notion of a power-sharing government,
Afghanistan could again be plunged into political turmoil at a time when international powers were
preparing to withdraw their troops.
A taste of that turmoil came when protesters began to mobilize for mass action to register their
outrage over what was being perceived as massive vote-rigging in the so-called landmark
presidential election of 2014. There were fears of an ethnic dimension to the hostilities between
the respective camps of Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani because the former was half-Tajik
while the latter was a member of the majority Pashtun community. That "taste" was about to
break wide open for a full menu of conflict if the election crisis was not resolved.
With such an end in mind, United States Secretary of State John Kerry was set to meet with the
two presidential contenders, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, as well as Afghan President
Hamid Karzai. It was to be seen if Kerry's presence would advance the negotiations between the
various parties, although Washington was clearly prepared to use its weight to pressure Afghanistan
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 278 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
into settling the impasse. Indeed, Secretary of State Kerry was on the record noting that violent or
"extra-constitutional means" to resolve the election crisis would result in the United States
withdrawing its assistance -- military and financial -- to Afghanistan.
By mid-July 2014, United States Secretary of State John Kerry had conducted productive
negotiations with Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani that lasted more than 20 hours. Kerry
emerged from those talks having successfully brokered a deal intended to end the election
impasse. Under the Kerry deal, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani had agreed to a complete
recount of all the ballots cast in the June 14, 2014, "runoff" round of the presidential election.
Once the recount, which would be supervised by the United Nations, was complete, both
candidates would have to respect the outcome regardless of whom was declared to be the winner.
That winner would then be expected to form a unity government. The Kerry deal essentially
resolved the election crisis, ensured that a fresh count would be conducted under transparent
conditions, and set the path for what was previously believed to be implausible: the formation of an
inclusive national unity government.
In Afghanistan, United States Secretary of State John Kerry was being hailed as a hero with locals
lauding him for saving the country from a possible descent into civil war. In an interview with
NBC News, Maqsood Parwani -- a local Afghan shopkeeper -- was quoted as saying, "John Kerry
is the greatest American and the best friend of Afghanistan. He helped prevent this country from
going to civil war two times." He continued, "I wish if we could elect him as our president, but we
cannot so hope the American people elect him as their president." Another local Afghan, Noor
Ahmad, issued similarly effusive praise for Kerry's efforts, saying to NBC News, "I ask the
government of Afghanistan to give this tall man —- I call him Jan Agha -— Afghan citizenship so
he might be able to run for president next time. I am so grateful for Jan Agha’s tireless efforts to
bring our politicians together and help end the uncertainty." Afghan politicians, such as Dr.
Mohiuddin Mahdi (a member of parliament), called for Kerry to be nominated for the Nobel Peace
Prize for his efforts to end the election crisis and prevent Afghanistan from slipping into a civil war.
The internationally supervised audit of the ballots from the second round of the presidential
election commenced in mid-July 2014. The process was not without controversy. By the start of
August 2014, Abdullah Abdullah's camp accused the pro-Karzai faction of political machinations
intended to benefit Ghani.
United States Secretary of State John Kerry landed in Afghanistan on Aug. 7, 2014, in a bid to try
to calm the re-emerging election-related acrimony. There, Secretary of State Kerry urged both
Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani to agree to an arrangement by which the losing candidate
would become a hitherto nonexistent position called "chief executive." The occupant of that
position would share power with the president in certain arenas, such as defense, security, and
intelligence. That overture by Secretary of State Kerry yielded only temporary effects because by
mid-August 2014, Ghani was casting doubt on the power-sharing agreement, claiming that the deal
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 279 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
was too ambiguous, and staking out the stance that absolute authority would remain in the hands of
the president. He said, "The position of the chief executive will solely depend on the discretion of
the president." Ghani also complained that the Kerry deal was written in English and he thus
would "not sign a document in English on Afghan soil."
As August 2014 came to a close, the re-counting of election ballots continued along amidst
growing anxieities that the Kerry unity deal might collapse. With the prospect of a presidential
stalemate in sight, a security deal between the United States and Afghanistan would also be in
jeopardy. Accordingly, the United States military made it known that plans were afoot for a fast
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin Dempsey said that optimally,
the United States would need four months to pull all its troops and equipment out of Afghanistan;
however, Dempsey said a faster withdrawal was possible if not security agreement was signed
allowing for the continued presence of United States troops in Afghanistan in 2015.
At the start of September 2014, the Kerry unity deal to end the presidential election impasse
appeared to collapse despite attempts to rehabilitate negotiations. Two issues emerged as
particularly problematic. First, the team of the presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew
from the United Nation's audit of votes, complaining that fraudulent votes were not being properly
handled. Second, the two sides could not agree on the powers of the chief executive -- the
newly-conceived position that would share power with the presidency.
As a result of pressure from NATO leaders, who were meeting at the time in September 2014, the
two rival presidential candidates agreed to close ranks. With the stakes of national security and
unity in mind, Abdullah Abdullah and Asraf Ghani recommitted themselves to the goal of forming
a government of national unity. But that commitment seemed to be a perfunctory move since
Ghani, who was clearly anticipating being declared the victor, soon said that while he would
continue to engage in discussions aimed at forming a national unity government, there would only
be one leader of Afghanistan -- presumably, him. For his part, Abdullah said that he would not
accept a fraudulent vote result. Thus, one could conclude that the presidential impasse remained in
place.
The Independent Election Commission said that the final results of the presidential election would
be announced in mid-September 2014. There were concerns that the declaration of a winner
without a unity government deal solidified could lead to political instability. But the Independent
Election Commission said the final result would be made public regardless of whether such the
unity agreement was implemented.
The election result was ultimately announced in the third week of September when Ashraf Ghani
was named to be the winner and thus the new president of Afghanistan. This announcement was
simultaneous with agreement on a difficult power-sharing deal that would give Abdullah Abdullah
the right, as the winner of the second most votes, to name a chief executive. This post would most
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 280 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
easily be compared to the role of a prime minister in a parliamentary democracy with both a
president and a prime minister. It was conceivable that Abdullah could name himself to the role.
The announcement of Ghani as the president, along with the settling of the power sharing deal,
brought an end to the chaos and dissonance that has marked the landmark Afghan presidential
elections.
That power sharing deal was the product of strenuous diplomacy by United States Secretary of
State John Kerry, and was rescued when it was on its so-called "death bed" as a result of Kerry's
dedicated efforts. A statement from the White House in the United States lauded the agreement
saying that the power sharing deal would help bring "closure" to Afghanistan's political crisis and
restore "confidence in the way forward."
For his part, Ghani pledged to end the political instability and turmoil that has mired Afghanistan,
saying: "Afghanistan's stability is most important for us. Let's build up this nation and put the past
behind us." Ghani also indicated that Afghanistan's significant institutional problem of corruption
would be addressed, as he said, "Our focus will be on merit in every sector of the government, and
there will be no place for nepotism. It will be a government of transparency, accountability and
taking responsibility."
Note that Ashraf Ghani was set to be inaugurated into power at the end of September 2014. Once
he assumed the presidency, Ghani promised to sign the security agreement that would allow United
States troops to remain in Afghanistan and assist in the terrorism threat emanating from the Taliban
and other Islamic terrorist entities operating in that country.
As expected, the Taliban condemned the power-sharing deal as a product of United States control,
and indicated that it would do its part to continue to destabilize Afghanistan. Taliban
spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, issued a statement via email that commenced as follows:
"Installing Ashraf Ghani and forming a bogus administration will never be acceptable to the
Afghans." The statement continued as follows: The Americans must understand that our soil and
land belong to us and all decisions and agreements are made by Afghans, not by the U.S. foreign
secretary or ambassador. We reject this American process and vow to continue our jihad until we
free our nation from occupation and until we pave the way for a pure Islamic government."
Editor's Note:
The president and two vice presidents are elected by direct vote for a five-year term (eligible for a
second term); if no candidate receives 50 percent or more of the vote in the first round of voting,
the two candidates with the most votes will participate in a second round; a president can only be
elected for two terms; election last held in 2014.
Cabinet:
25 ministers; under the new constitution, ministers are appointed by the president and approved by
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 281 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the National Assembly
Note: In mid-January 2015, after months of wrangling and negotiations, Afghan President Ashraf
Ghani formed a government, nominating ministers for his new cabinet. The move brought an end
to an extended period of political paralysis that continued to plague the country in the aftermath of
the contested 2014 presidential election. The new cabinet was announced by Ghani's chief of
staff, Abdul Salam Rahimi, who said during the nomination ceremony for the 25 cabinet
candidates,
"The government will refer them to the parliament for a vote of confidence."
Ghani made good on his commitment made following the controversial presidential contest that
awarded him victory over his rival, Abdullah Abdullah, by including stalwarts from both camps.
Indeed, the cabinet excluded former government ministers and members of parliament, while
including ethnic and regional power-brokers.
The main complaint was that by looking towards a cabinet of fresh faces, there might not be
enough individuals with governing experience in top administrative positions. But a bigger problem
soon emerged as the eligibility of several proposed cabinet ministers came under scrutiny for
reasons ranging from dual citizenship, to being underage, and extending to alleged criminal activity.
At the end of January 2015, the Afghan political scene turned tumultuous as the parliament dealt
a blow to President Ghani, approving only eight of the 25 cabinet nominees. Among the rejected
nominees were those intended to hold key cabinet portfolios for ministries such as defense, justice,
and eocnomy, as well as the candidate for the governorship of the central bank.
With parliament set for winter recess, President Ghani would have to wait until mid-March 2015
before be could advance a new slate of ministerial candidates for consideration by parliament.
Legislative Branch:
Bicameral National Assembly:
Under the new (2004) constitution, the bicameral National Assembly consists of the Wolesi Jirga or
House of People (no more than 250 seats), directly elected for a five-year term, and the Meshrano
Jirga or House of Elders (102 seats), one-third elected from provincial councils for four-year terms,
one-third elected from local district councils for three-year terms, and one-third nominated by the
president for five-year terms.
The Bonn Agreement laid down a June 2004 deadline for elections for the first session of the
National Assembly. The security situation on the ground meant that elections had to be postponed
until 2005 (but subject to further delay if the security situation intensified). On rare occasions the
government may convene the Loya Jirga on issues of independence, national sovereignty, and
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 282 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
territorial integrity; it can amend the provisions of the constitution and prosecute the president; it is
made up of members of the National Assembly and chairpersons of the provincial and district
councils. See "Background" on provisions for the Bonn Agreement detailed above.
Elections (2010):
Afghanistan was scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on September 18, 2010. At stake were
the 249 seats in Afghanistan's Wolesi Jirga or lower house of parliament -- a test of growing
stability in conflict-ridden Afghanistan ahead of the withdrawal of the roughly 140,000 NATO-led
foreign troops.
Election results (2010):
See "Political Conditions" for details.
Primer on 2016 parliamentary elections in Afghanistan
Oct. 15, 2016 -Parliamentary elections were expected to be held in Afghanistan in 2016. Initially, the schedule for
those polls was set for Jan. 31, 2016; however, at the start of 2016, that date was postponed until
Oct. 15, 2016. There remained some prevarication regarding the firmness of this timeline with
Ahmad Yousuf Nuristani, the head of the election commission, saying during a news conference
that the elections would only be held on Oct. 15, 2016 if the government actually ensured the
security of candidates and provided the budget needed to pay for election staff and ballot boxes.
Under the 2004 constitution, the bicameral National Assembly in Afghanistan consists of the
Wolesi Jirga or House of People (no more than 250 seats), directly elected for a five-year term,
and the Meshrano Jirga or House of Elders (102 seats), one-third elected from provincial councils
for four-year terms, one-third elected from local district councils for three-year terms, and onethird nominated by the president for five-year terms.
The action in these elections would be in the Wolesi Jirga or House of People, which was last
contested in September 2010. In truth, the parliament's five-year term expired in mid-2015 but
elections were not immediately held at that time due to a mix of security anxieties and political
acrimony over ensuring the fairness of the vote. President Asraf Ghani signed a decree extending
the mandate of the parliament until an election could be deemed feasible. Finally, in 2016, Afghans
would be returning to the polls to choose their members of parliament. But with the security
scenario actually worsening, the election exercise was being viewed as a test of the stability in
conflict-ridden Afghanistan.
Note that in March 2016, the planning effort towards this vote was compromised by the fact that
Afghanistan's top electoral official, Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, from his post. A spokesperson for the
head of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) said Nuristani resigned in the "national
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 283 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
interest." Of significance was the fact that Nuristani had accused the government of interfering in
the electoral process.
Judicial Branch:
The new (2004) constitution establishes a nine-member Stera Mahkama or Supreme Court (its
nine justices are appointed for 10-year terms by the president with approval of the Wolesi Jirga)
and subordinate High Courts and Appeals Courts; there is also a Minister of Justice; a separate
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission established by the Bonn Agreement is charged
with investigating human rights abuses and war crimes. See "Background Note" on provisions for
the Bonn Agreement detailed above.
Constitution:
New constitution signed on January 16, 2004. See "Background" on provisions for the Bonn
Agreement detailed above.
Legal System:
Based on mixed civil and Shari'a law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
Note:
According to the new (2004) constitution, no law is contrary to Islam; the state is obliged to create
a prosperous and progressive society based on social justice, protection of human dignity,
protection of human rights, realization of democracy, and to ensure national unity and equality
among all ethnic groups and tribes; the state shall abide by the United Nations charter, international
treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. See "Background" on provisions for the Bonn Agreement detailed above.
Suffrage:
18 years of age; universal suffrage
Political Parties and Leaders:
There were more than 80 political parties registered in recent years.
Political pressure groups and leaders:
Various religious groups; tribal leaders; ethnically based groups; Taliban
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 284 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Principal Government Officials
Leadership and Cabinet of Afghanistan
Pres.
Ashraf GHANI
CEO
Abdullah ABDULLAH , Dr.
First Vice Pres.
Abdul Rashid DOSTAM
Second Vice Pres.
Sarwar DANESH
First Deputy CEO
Khyal Mohammad KHAN
Second Deputy CEO
Mohammad MOHAQQEQ
Min. of Agriculture, Irrigation, & Livestock
Assadullah ZAMIR
Min. of Border & Tribal Affairs
Mohammad Gulab MANGAL
Min. of Commerce & Industry
Homayoun RASA
Min. of Communications
Abdul Razaq WAHIDI
Min. of Counternarcotics
Salamat AZIMI
Min. of Defense (Acting)
Mohammad Masoom STANEKZAI
Min. of Economy
Abdul Satar MURAD
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 285 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Min. of Education
Asadullah HANIF Balkhi
Min. of Energy & Water
Ali Ahmad OSMANI
Min. of Finance
Eklil Ahmad HAKIMI
Min. of Foreign Affairs
Salahuddin RABBANI
Min. of Hajj & Islamic Affairs
Faiz Muhammad OSMANI
Min. of Higher Education
Farida MOHMAND
Min. of Information & Culture
Abdul Bari JAHANI
Min. of Interior
Noor ul-Haq ULUMI , Lt. Gen.
Min. of Justice
Abdul Basir ANWAR
Min. of Martyred, Disabled, Labor, & Social Affairs
Nasreen ORYAKHIL
Min. of Mines & Petroleum
Daud SABA
Min. of Parliamentary Affairs (Acting)
Karim BAZ , Dr.
Min. of Public Health
Ferozuddin FEROZ
Min. of Public Works
Mahmoud BALEGH
Min. of Refugees & Repatriation
Sayed Hussain Alemi BALKHI
Min. of Rural Rehabilitation & Development
Nasir Ahmad DURRANI
Min. of Transportation & Civil Aviation
Mohammadullah BATASH
Min. of Urban Development
Sayed Sadat NADERI
Min. of Women's Affairs
Dilbar NAZARI
National Security Adviser
Mohammad Hanif ATMAR
Dir. Gen., National Directorate of Security
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 286 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Rahmatullah NABIL , Gen.
Dir. Gen., Independent Directorate for Local Governance
Ghulam Jelani POPAL
Governor (Acting), Da Afghanistan Bank
Khan Afzal HADAWAL
Ambassador to the US
Permanent Representative to the UN, New York
Zahir TANIN
-- as of 2016
Leader Biography
Leader Biography
BIOGRAPHY: Head of State and Head of Government
Executive Branch:
Head of State:
President Ashraf Ghani (since 2014)
Head of Government:
Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah (since 2014)
Note on Head of State and Head of Government:
Ashraf GHANI succeeded Hamid KARZAI as the president of Afghanistan. Karzai had come to
power in 2002 following the overthrow of the Taliban. He was appointed to position as interim
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 287 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
leader; in 2004, elections were held and on December 7, 2004, Karzai became president officially);
the president is both the chief of state and head of government. The next presidential election was
held on August 20, 2009 with a second round cancelled under controversial cicrumstances and
amidst widespread accusations of fraud. Fresh elections were held in 2014, as discussed in the
primer below. Ghani became the new president, with Abdullah Abdullah, the second place
winner, positioned to hold the newly-established post of chief executive. See primer below for full
details.
Primer on 2014 Presidential Election in Afghanistan
first round April 5, 2014; second round June 14, 2014 --
A presidential election took place in Afghanistan on April 5, 2014. At issue was the question of
who would be the successor to outgoing President Hamid Karzai, who has served as the Afghan
head of state since 2002 when the Islamist extremist cabal, the Taliban, was toppled from power.
The 2001 terror attacks in the United States sparked a joint international effort to drive the
Taliban from power and rid the country of al-Qaida terrorist training camps, which had been
allowed to flourish in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. By 2002, the Taliban was removed and
Karzai was appointed to position as interim leader. In the 2004 elections, held under the aegis of
the Bonn Agreement, Karzai won the presidency at the ballot box. His stint as chief of state and
head of government was renewed following the 2009 elections, although those polls were marked
by fraud and controversy, and ultimately ended with the second election round being canceled.
Indeed, the 2009 elections were clouded by a sense of illegitimacy as rising claims of electoral
irregularities came to the fore and reduced President Karzai's vote tally to less than 50 percent,
thus triggering a second round or runoff election. However, Karzai's closest rival, Abdullah
Abdullah, withdrew from the second round, charging that it would be as corrupt as the first round.
This action set Karzai in place to be re-elected to power by default.
There were high hopes that the 2014 contest would be free of the controversies that marred the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 288 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
previous contest. As well, many in the international community were hoping for a new Afghan
leader who would be less volatile than Karzai, who became infamous for his intemperate
comments, including his threats to "join the Taliban."
That being said, the months leading up to the elections promised to be difficult. In January 2014,
two election campaigners working for a presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, were shot to
death in the western city of Herat. The two elections workers were killed as they departed from a
campaign office. It should be noted that Abdullah Abdullah (mentioned above) contested the
previous election and intended to be on the ballot again in 2014. Abdullah Abdullah's
spokesperson, Sayed Fazel Sangcharaki, addressed the issue of the deaths of the campaign
workers as follows: "This incident at the beginning of election campaign is a bad sign as either the
security forces are incapable of providing security for the election campaign or they do not take
their job seriously." Meanwhile, the Taliban was making it clear that it intended to interrupt the
election process.
Nevertheless, the election was set to move forward and there were several candidates set to
contest the race. The main contenders included the following individuals --
- Qayum Karzai, the older brother of outgoing President Karzai, was the most likely to extend his
brother's legacy. His campaign platform has focused on addressing corruption; howeve, corruption
has been a blight upon the incumbent Karzai regime so it was difficult to determine how a new
Karzai regime would differ. He has indicated a continuing role in government for his brother,
should he win the presidency. His support base was among his Pashtun community.
- Zamay Rassoul, a close confidante of outgoing President Karzai and a former foreign minister
educated in France; he has backed the peace process with the Taliban although he has also said
that those who commit crimes should be punished. Like Qayum Karzai, Zamay Rassoul's support
base was among his Pashtun community.
-Asraf Ghani Ahmadzai, an anthropologist educated in the United States who had also served as
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 289 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
finance minister in cabinet; he was viewed as pro-Western and most likely to sign onto a security
pact with the United States.
- Abdullah Abdullah, a former ophthalmologist, he was headed to a runoff with Karzai in the
previous presidential contest before bowing out due to fears that the run-off would be fraudulent.
Abdullah Adullah was once an adviser to late guerilla leader, Massoud; he now is open to
negotiations with the Taliban but does not favor peace at any price; he has been an advocate for
women's rights in Afghanistan. His support base was to be found in the Tajik community and the
north of the country (vis a vis the Pashtun background of Karzai and Rassoul).
- Abdul Rahim Wardak, a former guerrilla commander and a former defense minister; he has taken
a strong anti-Taliban stance and has said his record as the person who created the modern Afghan
army positioned him to be president.
- Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf, a skilled orator and notorious former warlord who fought against Soviet
occupation; he was known as a hardline Islamist with the dubious distinction of having invited
terrorist Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida to Afghanistan; however, in more recent times, he has
opposed the Taliban.
Note that in March 2014, discussions were underway about the possibility of Qayum Karzai, the
older brother of outgoing President Karzai, withdrawing from the presidential contest and throwing
his weight behind former Foreign Minister Zalmay Rassoul. The objective was to consolidate proKarzai support under one candidate -- preferably a Pashtun -- who would be likely to extend the
outgoing president's legacy. Later in that very month, this move was formalized as Karzai ended
his bid for the presidency and endorsed Rassoul. Because of the lateness of his exit from the
presidential context, Karzai's name would yet appear on the ballot. As such, Karzai instructed his
supporters to cast their votes for Rassoul instead.
Regardless of a consolidated Pashtun/pro-Karzai effort, the last polling data (available at the close
of 2013) showed that Abdulla Abdullah and Ghani Ahmadzai were the two candidates with
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 290 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
notable leads ahead of the rest of the field. That being said, with no funds available to pay for
polling surveys as the election approached in 2014, the actual election landscape in the spring of
2014 was unknown. Therefore, at the start of April 2014 - with only days to go until voting day there was no clear sign of which candidate was in the lead or had an advantage in the minds of the
voters.
Meanwhile, in March 2014, with a month to go before Afghanistan's presidential election, the
country was struck by relentless violence at the hands of the Taliban. Among the brutal attacks
was the execution-style death of a Swedish journalist on the street. His killing was linked with the
Taliban's promise to use violence and bloodshed to disrupt the impending presidential election.
On March 18, 2014, a suicide attack in northern Afghanistan left 17 people dead -- including
women and children -- and more than 60 others wounded. Just days later, an attack by the Taliban
on a police station in Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan left at least 18 people dead, including several
police officers and the district police chief. The attack started with a bomb blast that sparked a gun
battle with Afghan security forces who were backed up by NATO helicopter gunships; it ended
with the deaths of seven assailants. The Taliban claimed responsibility and made it clear that the
Islamist militant group intended to make good on its promise to disrupt the presidential election set
for April 5, 2014.
On March 20, 2014, gunmen attacked the Serena luxury hotel in the Afghan capital of Kabul.
That heavily-fortified hotel was known to be popular with foreigners and home to several United
Nations staffers who were in Afghanistan to monitor the impending presidential election. The
assailants reportedly entered the hotel with weapons hidden in their shoes and apparently waited
several hours before opening fire on guests. They also hid in bathrooms when security arrived on
the scene, essentially prolonging the chaos.
This particular attack ended with the deaths of several assailants following gun battles with Afghan
security forces. However, that conclusion occurred only after the attack exacted a heavy death toll
on international election missions, with election monitors who were in Afghanistan to witness the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 291 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
country's presidential election among the casualties. Indeed, among the dead were Luis Maria
Duarte, an election monitor from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and several other
foreign nationals from Canada and India.
International monitoring missions were thus making a hasty exit from Afghanistan. In the aftermath
of the tragic bloodshed, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) removed its observers from
Afghanistan, while observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) had been withdrawn and taken to Turkey. As such, the European Union's international
monitoring mission was the only major election witnessing operation still remaining in Afghanistan.
The lack of election monitors in Afghanistan would ostensibly taint the legitimacy of the polls.
It should be noted that Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesperson, claimed responsibility for the
attack. With the exit of international monitoring missions from Afghanistan in the aftermath of this
brutal assault at the Serena Hotel, it was fair to say that the Taliban had, to some extent, achieved
its goals of disrupting the presidential election of 2014.
On the same day as the attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul, the Taliban carried out a separate
assault in the southern Kandahar province. In that incident, the assailants employed a new tactic
of terrorism by flinging an explosives-packed bottle that detonated when it landed on the ground.
The death toll in this case included the head of the provincial media center chief and two police
officers.
On March 25, 2014, a suicide bomber attacked the office of the Independent Election Commission
in Kabul, killing two police officers. Days later on March 28, 2014, militants targeted a guest
house for foreign aid workers in Kabul, trapping people inside for several hours. A child who was
playing outside in the street was killed as a result of that incident.
On March 29, 2014, the Taliban continued its campaign to disrupt the impending presidential
election by attacking the heavily-fortified headquarters of the Independent Election Commission.
The assailants, disguised as women in burqas, stormed the compound of the election commission
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 292 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
and fired guns and rocket-propelled grenades in the direction of the security forces protecting the
Independent Election Commission. The assault continued for several hours, with security forces
attempting to repel the Taliban fighters for up to five hours. The attack ended with the deaths of
all the militants while there were no casualties among the election commission staff.
As the month came to a close -- on March 31, 2014 -- close to 20 people were killed in a series of
attacks across Afghanistan. In the northern province of Kunduz, eight members of the family of
an anti-Taliban commander, Mohammad Omar, were the victims of an attack. Omar himself
escaped the apparent attempted assassination as he was not traveling in the vehicle that was struck
by a roadside bomb. As before, electoral personnel factored highly among the targets of attack by
the Taliban with six members of campaign teams in other bombings incidents on the same day.
As well, in the province of Sar-i-Pul, four Afghan police officers died during an offensive assault
on the Taliban. Meanwhile gunmen abducted Hussain Nazari, a candidate contesting the provincial
council election in Sar-i-Pul, along with about 10 people in his entourage as they traveled from
Balkhab district to central Sar-e-Pul to attend a campaign event. There was some disagreement
over whether a rescue operation should be launched or if negotiations should be pursued instead.
Ultimately, the issue was rendered mute when it was announced days later that almost all the
hostages, including Nazari, had been shot to death by the Taliban. Only one person escaped death
but remained gravely wounded.
At the start of April 2014, with only days to go until the election was to be held, the Taliban
continued its rampage of violence and bloodshed with an attack on the country's Interior Ministry
in the center of the capital of Kabul. In this incident, the assailant was disguised in a military
uniform and detonated the explosives strapped to his body as he approached the main gate at the
entrance of the government compound. Because he was unable to enter the compound, the
suicide bomber chose to blow himself up when he was in the vicinity of some police officers. As a
result, the death toll in this attack included six police officers and the suicide bomber himself. The
Taliban relished the success of this incident, taking responsibility in an email missive in which it
declared success at having penetrated the third ring of security at the Interior Ministry before
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 293 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
carrying out the suicide blast.
With the election set to start in only days, the Taliban warned that it would be turning its attention
from election observers, workers, and candidates to voters. The Islamist extremist entity
threatened to attack voters daring to participate in what it characterized as a phony election process
as it put forth the following statement: "The Islamic Emirates announces one last time that all
elements of the fake elections will be under our Mujahideen attack. Every official and every voting
center will be in danger and a surge of attacks will start all over the country."
The Election:
Despite the pre-election climate of violence and bloodshed, and irrespective of the Taliban's threats
to voters, the 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan went off successfully, evoking a sense of
relief from Afghans at home and observers abroad. Voters in Afghanistan defied the cruel threats
by the Taliban to bravely stand in long lines to cast their ballots. Male and female Afghans
triumphantly displayed fingers with purple ink to journalists on the ground in Afghanistan to show
that they had exercised their democratic right and voted in the presidential contest.
Outgoing President Karzai, who was hoping to continue his stamp on power via a win for Roussol,
hailed the election saying, "Today we proved to the world that this is a people driven country." He
continued, "On behalf of the people, I thank the security forces, election commission and people
who exercised democracy and ... turned another page in the glorious history of Afghanistan."
The results were not to be known for several weeks due to the difficult mountainous terrain in
some parts of the country where donkeys had been used to transport ballots. If no one candidate
secured 50 percent of the vote share, then a run-off election would follow to determine a new
president and would add to the protracted election process. Nonetheless, there was satisfaction
that the first-ever democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan was -- at this point -- moving along
in a productive fashion.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 294 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
There were some blights on the election process. In addition to the bloodshed and violence
discussed above, there was also the murder of a veteran photographer from the Associated Press
(AP) and the wounding of a senior correspondent (also from the AP) at the hands of a police
officer, presumably with an alliance to Islamist extremists and opposed to the presence of foreign
nationals in Afghanistan. As well, there were isolated stories of some polling stations running out
of supplies, ballot stuffing, and other incidences of election fraud.
Several days after the holding of the election, the head of Afghanistan’s Independent Election
Complaints Commission acknowledged that there may have been more incidences of election fraud
than originally though. At a news conference, Abdul Satar Sadaat said, "I want to say election
fraud did take place and it might not have been a small amount."
The exit of international monitors from Afghanistan following the brutal attack on the Serena Hotel
in Kabul (as detailed above) has only added to anxieties over the legitimacy of the vote, and would
limit the capacity to objectively determine the extent to which these voting irregularities would have
affected the election result.
By the third week of April 2014, with the vote counting well underway, Afghanistan's elections
officials authorized a recount of ballots in as many as 500 polling stations.
Amidst the discussion of electoral irregularities was also the discussion of whom might be
determined to be the winner. To that end, there were suggestions that the early frontrunners in the
election were Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani, and Zalmay Rassoul. Of course, this speculation
was yet to be confirmed. Abdullah and Ghani were the two anti-Karzai options, while Rassoul was
regarded as the guardian of the Karzai legacy.
Update on Election Result:
The full preliminary result of the Afghan presidential election was expected by May 2014. If no
candidate secured an outright victory, a second round between the two top performers could be in
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 295 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the offing. On the other hand, there were some political experts saying that a second round might
not materialize at all. After the allegations of fraud in the previous election, Karzai was handed
victory by default when Abdullah Abdullah refused to stand for the second round, asserting that
there was no guarantee that it would be any fairer a contest than the first round. It was possible
that a similar scenario could occur in 2014.
Another possibility might be a power-sharing deal whereby the top performers would be
participants in a some type of inclusive government. However, the details of such a proposal were
yet to be determined as Abdullah has said while he would embrace inclusion, he was not warm to
notion of a coalition deal. He was on the record saying, "The team which will govern Afghanistan
will not be an exclusive team. The inclusiveness is part of our strategy. But that does not suggest
that we are making a coalition government in order to avoid a runoff or anything like it."
In mid-April 2014, Abdullah Abdullah made clear that he would contest a runoff round, if
necessary, saying that a second round "in order for the people to give their final verdict." He also
reiterated his stance of inclusion, saying in an exclusive interview with Radio Free Europe / Radio
Liberty, "We are making no exclusions...to those who share our vision."
Around this time, with the vote count underway, partial results gave the slight advantage to
Abdullah Abdullah, with Ashraf Ghani trailing just behind. This early tally showed Abdullah
Abdullah with almost 42 percent while Ashraf Ghani had 38 percent. It was to be seen if this trend
would hold or if the frontrunner would change as the counting continued. As noted by Ahmad
Yousuf Nouristani of the Election Commission: "Maybe today one candidate looks strong.
Tomorrow, maybe another will pull ahead."
In the third week of April 2014, all indications were that Abdullah Abdullah was extending his lead
over his closest rival, Ashraf Ghani. Now Abdullah was carrying about 44 percent of the vote share
while Ghani was trailing with 33 percent. Rassoul, the Karzai stalwart, was far behind with 10
percent. Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, the head of the Independent Election Commission, said that it
was likely that Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani would be contesting the run-off election.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 296 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nuristani said, "With the 17.5 percent of the votes that are going to be counted, it is doubtful that
anyone will win in the first round."
By the last week of April 2014, with the vote count complete, Abdullah Abdullah had maintained
his lead of more than 10 percent over his closest rival, Ashraf Ghani. Abdullah Abdullah secured
the plurality of the vote share with about 45 percent, while Ashraf Ghani held 31.5 percent of
support; the pro-Karzai candidate, Zalmai Rassoul, was in a distant third place position with 11.5
percent.
With no one candidate securing an outright majority, the presidential contest was headed onto a
second round. To that end, a runoff election was set -- at the time -- to take place on May 28,
2014, between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani.
Round 2
There remained continued speculation that the two men might form a unity government, thus
foreclosing the possibility of a runoff round. However, Abdullah Abdullah had earlier emphasized
that he was ready to contest a second round, as needed, saying in an interview with the Associated
Press, "If it goes to the second round in accordance to the rule of law, we are ready for that as
well. At this stage, we believe that another round might not be needed." He continued, "It's
important that the process is a free and fair one." But with the presidential contest, in fact,
guaranteed to go to a second round, Abdullah Abdullah dismissed the notion of a power-sharing
deal with Ashraf Ghani, saying, "We have not talked or negotiated with anyone about forming a
coalition government."
Note that in mid-May 2014, weeks ahead of the scheduled second round of voting, Abdullah
Abdullah won the support of a key rival -- the pro-Karzai candidate in the first round, Zalmai
Rassoul. By the start of June 2014, Abdullah Abdullah consolidated the support of former rivals by
gaining the backing of the inner circle of former warlord, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. While Sayyaf
himself opted to remain neutral his two vice-presidential running mates made it clear they were
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 297 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
supporting Abdullah Abdullah.
Earlier, there had been some speculation that the second round might be delayed until mid-June
2014, if deemed necessary. That news soon was formalized with the new runoff date set for
June 14, 2014.
Alert --
Meanwhile, the Taliban was promising to disrupt the second election round and was reported to be
recruiting radical Islamic fighter -- presumably with an eye on carrying out attacks. Indeed, the last
week of May 2014 in Afghanistan was marked by a spate of suicide attacks, shootouts, and
roadside bombings.
The scene turned more disturbing on June 6, 2014 -- just one week before the election -- when
two bombings targeted the convoy carrying presidential frontrunner, Abdullah Abdullah. The
attacks took place in the capital of Kabul where he was staging a campaign rally. One bombing
was caused by a suicide bomber and obliterated a vehicle traveling in the convoy, while the cause
of the second bombing as unknown. Six people died in the attacks, including one of Abdullah
Abdullah's bodyguards, while more than 20 others were injured. Abdullah Abdullah narrowly
escaped the bloodshed unscathed and was shown on television reassuring supporters and explaining
what transpired. He said, "When I was leaving the rally from the People's Islamic Unity Party, our
car was hit by a roadside bomb and destroyed."
It should be noted that have been plots afoot to disrupt the elections, including an earlier assault on
Abdullah Abdullah's convoy in February 2014 as the presidential contender was traveling between
the capital and the eastern city of Jalalabad. But clearly, this June 2014 attack in Kabul was the
most serious attempt on Abdullah Abdullah's life, reminiscent of the assassination of former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto in neighboring Pakistan several years prior, which also ensued at a
campaign event.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 298 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
It should be noted that although a roadside bomb exploded killing about a dozen people -- including
election workers -- in the northern part of Afghanistan on the day of the second round, the voting
went off in that country.
Note on results and electoral challenges:
While no official election results were available at the time of writing, early returns indicated a lead
of about one million votes for Ashraf Ghani rather than Abdullah Abdullah. Since this advantage
for Ghani was at odds with conventional wisdom that Abdullah Abdullah had the advantage going
into the second round, it was not surprising that claims of massive fraud were emerging.
Given that he was the likely victim of fraud once again (fraud was also a factor in the previous
elections that he contested against Karzai in 2009), Abdullah Abdullah made it abdundantly clear
that he would not be bowing out easily. While Abdullah Abdullah said, "I have always maintained
that the main rival is fraud," his inner circle made it abundantly clear that they believed Ghani, his
supporters, along with a pro-Karzai cabal were involved in padding the vote to Ghani's benefit.
Their argument held merit since Ghani lagged so far behind Abdullah in the first round. Bolstering
their argument was the reality that turnout reported in certain Pashtun areas, such as Khost, were
suspiciously (some might say impossibly) high. Moreover, according to the independent
Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA), which deployed thousands of election
observers across the country, the number of votes counted in the eastern provinces where Ghani
has his support base was higher than the entire adult population. As noted by TEFA head, Naeem
Ayubzada, "We think the increase in numbers was due to fraud.” Nader Naderi, the head of
another independent observer group, said in an interview with international media such as Reuters
News, that there was "double and in some cases a three-fold increase" in votes cast in the eastern
part of Afghanistan. The central question, as noted by Abdullah, was as follows: "In which part of
the country did the situation change so dramatically, the people changed their mind and then all of
them came out and voted? Our rallies in the second round were more energetic and effective."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 299 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Of note was the fact that the meta-grievance of Abdullah Abdullah was separate from the more
than 500 complaints of election fraud already registers with the country's election commission.
Preliminary results were expected at the start of July 2014 but the Abdullah Abdullah camp was
making it clear that they would challenge the legitimacy of the vote if the outcome was
questionable. Indeed, on June 18, 2014, Abdullah Adullah called for a stoppage of the counting of
ballots on the basis of fraud. He also announced that he would cease cooperation with electoral
authorities, with whom he no longer held any confidence. Abdullah Abdullah said, "The counting
process should stop immediately and if that continues, it will have no legitimacy. From now on,
today, we announce that we have no confidence or trust in the election bodies." He continued,
"Any undertakings will be regarded as illegal and whatever results are announced, are not
acceptable to us." He also blamed Karzai for the impasse, saying of the situation, "This
unfortunately has created a political stalemate and the president of this country and the electoral
commissions are responsible for this stalemate and any consequences."
In Afghanistan, the authorities of the election commission -- the Independent Election Commission
(IEC) -- dismissed Abdullah Abdullah's call for a halt to the vote tabulation and said the process
would continue. As well, the United Nations indicated that it was in no hurry to jump into the
fracas, suggesting instead that Abdullah Abdullah "return" to the electoral process. United Nations
deputy chief, Nicholas Haysom, said, "We believe that the task ahead of us is to have the
candidates re-engage fully in the electoral process...We would want to emphasize that there is no
other way of electing a legitimate leader."
But as June 2014 was in its final week, the Abdullah Abdullah campaign team released audio
recordings possibly containing evidence of fraud by the IEC. The recordings purported to be
conversations between IEC secretary, Zia-ul-Haq Amarkhail, other IEC officials, and someone
from Ghani's campaign. In the recordings, Amarkhail was heard promising Ghani's representative
that certain measures would be taken to favor Ghani’s election to power. The conversation
appeared to also include veiled references to ballot box stuffing, with Amarkhail suggesting that
another IEC staffer bring "the sheep stuffed and not empty."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 300 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
For his part, Ghani dismissed the fraud allegations and instead asserted that all the ballots cast for
him were legitimate. He said, "Our votes are clean, and we will defend each vote." However, with
the release of the aforementioned audio recordings, IEC Secretary Amirkhail resigned from his
post. While Amarkhail said he was stepping down "for the national interest and for the sake of the
election process," the fact of the matter was that the allegations of ballot stuffing had taken on
greater significance with the release of the audio recordings.
At the start of July 2014, ahead of the planned announcement of the preliminary election results,
the IEC said it would re-assess the vote count from approximately 2,000 polling stations amidst
rising accusations of vote rigging and fraud.
That being said, Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission soon announced its preliminary
results from second round of the presidential election, noting that Ashraf Ghani had 56.44 percent
of the vote compared to 43.56 percent for Abdullah Abdullah. Cognizant of the vote rigging
controversy that has surrounded the presidential contest, the election commission chairman,
Ahmad Yousuf Nouristani, acknowledged there had been "technical mistakes" and "shortcomings"
in the election, which included fraud and other violations. He also emphasized the fact that the
election results were preliminary and could change once the review of votes and allegations of
fraud had been fully addressed. Final results were not expected to be announced until later in July
2014. To this end, Nouristani said, "The announcement of preliminary results does not mean that
the leading candidate is the winner and there is possibly the outcome might change after we inspect
complaints."
Regardless of the measured nature of the election result announcement, Fazel Rahman Orya, a
spokesman for Abdullah's electoral team, wasted little time in blasting Afghanistan's Independent
Election Commission. He said that the electoral body had "no legitimacy" and condemned the
results as "illegal" and "illegitimate." Soon thereafter, Abdullah Abdullah's camp cast the election
result as a "coup" against the people, and Abdullah Abdullah himself declared victory. At a victory
speech in Kabul, Abdullah Abdullah declared, "We are proud. We respect the votes of the people.
We were the winner...We will not accept a fraudulent result -- not today, not tomorrow, never."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 301 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Meanwhile, his supporters called for the establishment of a parallel government if Ashraf Ghani
was ultimately inaugurated into office.
It should be noted that Ashraf Ghani has ruled out the notion of a coalition government with
Abdullah Abdullah, effectively burying the idea that a power-sharing government would resolve the
election crisis. As stated by Ghani, "People are concerned and the question they have been asking
is if we have made any deal. Our answer is clear: we have not made any deal. We assure the
people that we will not betray their votes."
With Ghani not interested in a power-sharing government, and with Abdullah Abdullah's base
prepared to establish his own power center, Afghanistan was on track for a political catastrophe -something the war-torn and security-challenged crisis state could not likely endure with ease.
Overall, the international community has viewed the presidential contest in Afghanistan to choose a
successor to Karzai as a test; however, the burgeoning electoral crisis suggested passing that test
would be difficult. Indeed, if Abdullah Abdullah was not willing to accept admittedly questionable
election results, or if Ashraf Ghani remained cold to the notion of a power-sharing government,
Afghanistan could again be plunged into political turmoil at a time when international powers were
preparing to withdraw their troops.
A taste of that turmoil came when protesters began to mobilize for mass action to register their
outrage over what was being perceived as massive vote-rigging in the so-called landmark
presidential election of 2014. There were fears of an ethnic dimension to the hostilities between
the respective camps of Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani because the former was half-Tajik
while the latter was a member of the majority Pashtun community. That "taste" was about to
break wide open for a full menu of conflict if the election crisis was not resolved.
With such an end in mind, United States Secretary of State John Kerry was set to meet with the
two presidential contenders, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, as well as Afghan President
Hamid Karzai. It was to be seen if Kerry's presence would advance the negotiations between the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 302 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
various parties, although Washington was clearly prepared to use its weight to pressure Afghanistan
into settling the impasse. Indeed, Secretary of State Kerry was on the record noting that violent or
"extra-constitutional means" to resolve the election crisis would result in the United States
withdrawing its assistance -- military and financial -- to Afghanistan.
By mid-July 2014, United States Secretary of State John Kerry had conducted productive
negotiations with Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani that lasted more than 20 hours. Kerry
emerged from those talks having successfully brokered a deal intended to end the election
impasse. Under the Kerry deal, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani had agreed to a complete
recount of all the ballots cast in the June 14, 2014, "runoff" round of the presidential election.
Once the recount, which would be supervised by the United Nations, was complete, both
candidates would have to respect the outcome regardless of whom was declared to be the winner.
That winner would then be expected to form a unity government. The Kerry deal essentially
resolved the election crisis, ensured that a fresh count would be conducted under transparent
conditions, and set the path for what was previously believed to be implausible: the formation of an
inclusive national unity government.
In Afghanistan, United States Secretary of State John Kerry was being hailed as a hero with locals
lauding him for saving the country from a possible descent into civil war. In an interview with
NBC News, Maqsood Parwani -- a local Afghan shopkeeper -- was quoted as saying, "John Kerry
is the greatest American and the best friend of Afghanistan. He helped prevent this country from
going to civil war two times." He continued, "I wish if we could elect him as our president, but we
cannot so hope the American people elect him as their president." Another local Afghan, Noor
Ahmad, issued similarly effusive praise for Kerry's efforts, saying to NBC News, "I ask the
government of Afghanistan to give this tall man —- I call him Jan Agha -— Afghan citizenship so
he might be able to run for president next time. I am so grateful for Jan Agha’s tireless efforts to
bring our politicians together and help end the uncertainty." Afghan politicians, such as Dr.
Mohiuddin Mahdi (a member of parliament), called for Kerry to be nominated for the Nobel Peace
Prize for his efforts to end the election crisis and prevent Afghanistan from slipping into a civil war.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 303 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The internationally supervised audit of the ballots from the second round of the presidential
election commenced in mid-July 2014. The process was not without controversy. By the start of
August 2014, Abdullah Abdullah's camp accused the pro-Karzai faction of political machinations
intended to benefit Ghani.
United States Secretary of State John Kerry landed in Afghanistan on Aug. 7, 2014, in a bid to try
to calm the re-emerging election-related acrimony. There, Secretary of State Kerry urged both
Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani to agree to an arrangement by which the losing candidate
would become a hitherto nonexistent position called "chief executive." The occupant of that
position would share power with the president in certain arenas, such as defense, security, and
intelligence. That overture by Secretary of State Kerry yielded only temporary effects because by
mid-August 2014, Ghani was casting doubt on the power-sharing agreement, claiming that the deal
was too ambiguous, and staking out the stance that absolute authority would remain in the hands of
the president. He said, "The position of the chief executive will solely depend on the discretion of
the president." Ghani also complained that the Kerry deal was written in English and he thus
would "not sign a document in English on Afghan soil."
As August 2014 came to a close, the re-counting of election ballots continued along amidst
growing anxieities that the Kerry unity deal might collapse. With the prospect of a presidential
stalemate in sight, a security deal between the United States and Afghanistan would also be in
jeopardy. Accordingly, the United States military made it known that plans were afoot for a fast
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin Dempsey said that optimally,
the United States would need four months to pull all its troops and equipment out of Afghanistan;
however, Dempsey said a faster withdrawal was possible if not security agreement was signed
allowing for the continued presence of United States troops in Afghanistan in 2015.
At the start of September 2014, the Kerry unity deal to end the presidential election impasse
appeared to collapse despite attempts to rehabilitate negotiations. Two issues emerged as
particularly problematic. First, the team of the presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew
from the United Nation's audit of votes, complaining that fraudulent votes were not being properly
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 304 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
handled. Second, the two sides could not agree on the powers of the chief executive -- the
newly-conceived position that would share power with the presidency.
As a result of pressure from NATO leaders, who were meeting at the time in September 2014, the
two rival presidential candidates agreed to close ranks. With the stakes of national security and
unity in mind, Abdullah Abdullah and Asraf Ghani recommitted themselves to the goal of forming
a government of national unity. But that commitment seemed to be a perfunctory move since
Ghani, who was clearly anticipating being declared the victor, soon said that while he would
continue to engage in discussions aimed at forming a national unity government, there would only
be one leader of Afghanistan -- presumably, him. For his part, Abdullah said that he would not
accept a fraudulent vote result. Thus, one could conclude that the presidential impasse remained in
place.
The Independent Election Commission said that the final results of the presidential election would
be announced in mid-September 2014. There were concerns that the declaration of a winner
without a unity government deal solidified could lead to political instability. But the Independent
Election Commission said the final result would be made public regardless of whether such the
unity agreement was implemented.
The election result was ultimately announced in the third week of September when Ashraf Ghani
was named to be the winner and thus the new president of Afghanistan. This announcement was
simultaneous with agreement on a difficult power-sharing deal that would give Abdullah Abdullah
the right, as the winner of the second most votes, to name a chief executive. This post would most
easily be compared to the role of a prime minister in a parliamentary democracy with both a
president and a prime minister. It was conceivable that Abdullah could name himself to the role.
The announcement of Ghani as the president, along with the settling of the power sharing deal,
brought an end to the chaos and dissonance that has marked the landmark Afghan presidential
elections.
That power sharing deal was the product of strenuous diplomacy by United States Secretary of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 305 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
State John Kerry, and was rescued when it was on its so-called "death bed" as a result of Kerry's
dedicated efforts. A statement from the White House in the United States lauded the agreement
saying that the power sharing deal would help bring "closure" to Afghanistan's political crisis and
restore "confidence in the way forward."
For his part, Ghani pledged to end the political instability and turmoil that has mired Afghanistan,
saying: "Afghanistan's stability is most important for us. Let's build up this nation and put the past
behind us." Ghani also indicated that Afghanistan's significant institutional problem of corruption
would be addressed, as he said, "Our focus will be on merit in every sector of the government, and
there will be no place for nepotism. It will be a government of transparency, accountability and
taking responsibility."
Note that Ashraf Ghani was set to be inaugurated into power at the end of September 2014. Once
he assumed the presidency, Ghani promised to sign the security agreement that would allow United
States troops to remain in Afghanistan and assist in the terrorism threat emanating from the Taliban
and other Islamic terrorist entities operating in that country.
As expected, the Taliban condemned the power-sharing deal as a product of United States control,
and indicated that it would do its part to continue to destabilize Afghanistan. Taliban
spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, issued a statement via email that commenced as follows:
"Installing Ashraf Ghani and forming a bogus administration will never be acceptable to the
Afghans." The statement continued as follows: The Americans must understand that our soil and
land belong to us and all decisions and agreements are made by Afghans, not by the U.S. foreign
secretary or ambassador. We reject this American process and vow to continue our jihad until we
free our nation from occupation and until we pave the way for a pure Islamic government."
Editor's Note:
The president and two vice presidents are elected by direct vote for a five-year term (eligible for a
second term); if no candidate receives 50 percent or more of the vote in the first round of voting,
the two candidates with the most votes will participate in a second round; a president can only be
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 306 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
elected for two terms; election last held in 2014.
Cabinet:
25 ministers; under the new constitution, ministers are appointed by the president and approved by
the National Assembly
Foreign Relations
General Relations
Before the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan pursued a policy of neutrality and nonalignment in its
foreign relations. In international forums, Afghanistan generally followed the voting patterns of
Asian and African nonaligned countries. Following the Marxist coup of April 1978, the Taraki
government developed significantly closer ties with the Soviet Union and its communist satellites.
After the December 1979 invasion, Afghanistan's foreign policy mirrored that of the Soviet Union.
Afghan foreign policy-makers attempted, with little success, to increase their regime's standing in
the non-communist world. With the signing of the 1988 Geneva Accords and the end of the Soviet
occupation, Najibullah attempted to expand Afghanistan's international relations. He was, however,
largely unsuccessful.
Most Western countries, including the United States, maintained small diplomatic missions in Kabul
during the Soviet occupation. Many subsequently closed their missions due to instability and heavy
fighting. Although a few states re-established a diplomatic presence, most embassies, including that
of the United States, remained closed. The ascendancy of the Taliban did nothing to engender
positive diplomatic relations. Only recently has diplomatic contact been resumed in the aftermath
of the overthrow of the Taliban.
Regional Relations: Pakistan and Afghanistan
Ever since independence in 1947, Pakistan has shared an often-tumultuous history of bilateral
relations with its northern neighbor, Afghanistan. And for a country of its size, Pakistan has
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 307 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
wielded tremendous influence on events in Afghanistan. The first signs of overt Pakistani influence
in Afghani affairs came in March 1963 when Pakistan managed to get Prime Minister Sardar
Mohammed Daoud fired from his position, for his backing and encouragement of Pashtunistan, an
idea that threatened Pakistan's integrity.
Pashtuns make up nearly 40 percent of the Afghan population and the tribe is also the largest
ethnic group in the underdeveloped and fractious Northwestern frontier province of Pakistan.
Daoud mooted the idea of uniting the tribe by doing away with the artificial border laid down by
the British. Fearing that the concept of Pashtunistan would find favor in its unstable NWFP region,
Pakistan's foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan have been dictated by the aim of curbing the
idea of Pashtunistan.
Though Daoud was ousted in 1963, he was far from finished. He staged a comeback in 1973 with
the help of the PPDA and assumed power as president and prime minister, overthrowing King
Zahir Shah. And once again he sought to consolidate his hold on the country by encouraging the
idea of Pashtunistan, unsettling the leaders in Islamabad. It was with this aim that Pakistan funded
and encouraged revolt in the eastern Afghan province of Nuristan as early as 1974.
Pakistan may have heaved a sigh of relief at the ouster of Daoud in 1978, but it was soon faced
with the prospect of having Soviet troops in the immediate vicinity and the Indians on the other
border. This pushed Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in the long and deadly campaign against
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Initially, it was the CIA clearly calling the shots, with Pakistan
providing simply the base for the CIA operations. But over time, and especially closer to the mid1980s when it was clear that the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan, Islamabad realized
that it had a very powerful card in its hand and began playing it almost all by itself.
During the battle for Jalalabad in 1989-three years after the Soviets had quit and Kabul seemed
within the sights of the "mujahidin-Pakistan strongly favored backing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader
of one of the several "mujahidin" factions operating from Pakistan. Though Hekmatyar was far
from the most popular leader, Pakistan backed him due to their grip on him. And it also became
clear soon enough that Pakistani army had been actively involved in the failed battle for Jalalabad.
This was perhaps the first time that Pakistan used its cards in Afghanistan for its own ends. But
soon enough the Pakistan military and its intelligence agency, ISI, were to start calling the shots in
the country, through the various "mujahidin" groups.
Indeed, the Taliban's push towards Kabul almost five years ago was directed and controlled from
Islamabad. Right until the very end of the Taliban, Pakistan continued to wield tremendous
influence on the Taliban. Pakistan has been able to derive other dividends from its Afghanistan
policy. At the end of the Soviet occupation, Pakistan began using the same tactics of training and
arming Islamic militants on its other border-with India. Though Pakistan continually denies any
armed support to Kashmir militants, the country is widely believed to provide bases and armed
assistance for the militants. Plus, it is hardly a coincidence that the Kashmir militancy began its
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 308 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
ascendance in 1989, just the time when Pakistan was able to shift its attention from Afghanistan
towards Kashmir.
The civil war had strained relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors. Leaders of these states
had made attempts to broker peace between the warring factions and some took steps to protect
themselves from spillover from the conflict. Pakistan's early recognition of the Taliban's rule
suggested it had been a major supporter of the group. During talks in early March 1999 with
Kazakhstan, however, Pakistan called for peace talks between the Taliban and opposition forces
and for the establishment of a coalition government consisting of representatives from both sides.
Pakistan has continued to call for an arms embargo on Afghanistan to help reduce the fighting.
Pakistan has also been flooded with approximately 1.3 million refugees from Afghanistan. On
March 31, 1999, in an attempt to stem the continuing flow of refugees, Pakistan sealed its border
with Afghanistan. Over the course of 1998, Pakistan resettled 80,000 refugees and 50,000 more in
the first half of 1999. Pakistan expressed concern that the U.N. sanctions imposed on the Taliban
in November 1999 would increase the flow of refugees from Afghanistan.
Pak-Afghan relations have undergone a complete change since September 11 terror attacks. As the
United States pointed accusing fingers towards the Taliban regime and threatened action against it
if it failed to turn over Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaida activists, Pakistan found itself in a
difficult situation considering it has historically been the key supporter of the Taliban. And as the
military campaign against Afghanistan began, it became apparent that Pakistan would have to
sooner than later break all ties with the Taliban regime. Before the September 11 attacks, only two
countries, besides Pakistan, recognized the Taliban regime. Soon after the attacks, the U.S. named
Osama bin Laden as the man responsible for the attacks and asked the Taliban to hand him over.
When the Taliban refused, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - the only other countries
that recognized the Taliban regime-broke off diplomatic ties with the Taliban, leaving Pakistan as
the only country to have any relations with the Taliban. With so much global scrutiny, Pakistan
was under pressure to break the ties and isolate the Taliban. In November, apparently under the
American instructions, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf first asked the Taliban to shut down
all the consulates in the country, saying they did not serve any purpose since Pakistan had anyway
closed its borders with Afghanistan.
Finally, in early December, Pakistan broke off all ties with Taliban, a day after the United States
State Department publicly asked the Pakistani government to do so. The Taliban officials were
ordered to leave Pakistani soil within 48 hours. This marked, at least officially, the end of a very
close relationship that Pakistan and the Taliban enjoyed for nearly a decade.
Though Musharraf may have found it expedient to sacrifice the Taliban in order to preserve his
regime and his country's national interests, Pakistan was in no way prepared to cede ground in
Afghanistan. For several years, Pakistan has claimed a special interest and role in Afghanistan,
saying that it has a large Pashtun population itself and hence it needs to be involved in any long
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 309 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
term settlement in Afghanistan. Pashtuns are the largest tribe in Afghanistan and make up about 40
percent of the population.
Throughout the military campaign, Musharraf kept on playing the Pashtun card. And as the
international community began talking of a post-war government in Afghanistan, Musharraf
stressed the importance of involving the Taliban in any settlement in Afghanistan, this was until
Islamabad was forced to break ties with Kabul. After the ties were severed with the Taliban,
Musharraf began talking of the 'moderate' Taliban elements and emphasized they ought to be
involved in any settlement in Afghanistan.
The rapid gains made by the Northern Alliance on the ground in Afghanistan and the capitulation
by thousands of Taliban soldiers within weeks and without much resistance was hardly the sort of
news that Pakistan wanted to hear. The relations between the Northern Alliance and Pakistan had
always been chilly or outright hostile due to the role played by Pakistan in arming and training the
Taliban. Seeing the military gains of Northern Alliance, Musharraf began expressing fears about
stability of Afghanistan and that Pakistan would like to have a friendly government in power at
Kabul. In order to calm Pakistani fears, the United States urged the Northern Alliance not to enter
Kabul until an interim government had been formed in order to replace the Taliban. However, the
military machine of the Northern Alliance continued its march and on November 23, Kabul fell to
the Northern Alliance, making Pakistan's worst fears come true.
The fall of Kabul precipitated international efforts to find an interim regime that would be
acceptable to all and bring stability to the war-torn Afghanistan until the country could hold
democratic elections. Thus when the United Nations invited various Afghan factions to begin
negotiations in Bonn on the structure and composition of an interim administration in Afghanistan,
it was clear that the Northern Alliance would have a significant say in how things went. This
prompted Pakistan once again to emphasize the need to have a 'well represented' interim
administration that reflected the true composition of the Afghan society. Pakistan was hoping it
would be able to get pro-Pakistan Pashtun leaders onto the interim administration.
The election of Hamid Karzai, a moderate Pashtun, as the head of the interim administration was
small consolation for Islamabad, which was perturbed by the large number of important seats
retained by the Northern Alliance in the interim administration. The impact was even greater since
the Northern Alliance leaders chose to visit almost all the neighboring countries with the exception
of Pakistan. The Pakistan government was also worried about the rapid development of ties
between Kabul and New Delhi. The leaders in Islamabad were worried that close ties between
Afghanistan and India would not only rob Pakistan of its strategic depth but also create a severe
headache for the government in Islamabad.
The Pakistani support for the Taliban, both overt and covert continued until almost the very end.
As one Taliban stronghold after another continued to fall to the Northern Alliance army, Pakistani
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 310 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Air Force carried out several emergency sorties, extricating Pakistani army officials from various
tight corners. Thus it was hardly surprising that Pakistan and the Northern Alliance treated each
other with open contempt and outright hostility. With a new government installed in Kabul, the
relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were expected to be tense in the future.
As the interim administration took charge in Kabul, the Pakistan-Afghan relations looked set to
deteriorate especially as several senior ministers in the new Afghan dispensation did not seem to be
in a hurry to forget the role played by Pakistan in deposing them from the government in 1996 and
in propping up the Taliban regime. Then in the next few years, relations appeared less dire as the
respective governments dealt with similar challenges of Islamic extremists and remnants of the
Taliban seeking to depose their administrations.
But by 2006, Pakistan-Afghan relations were at an all-time low with both sides blaming one
another for the threat of Islamic militants in the region. United States President George W. Bush
presided over a September 2006 dinner meeting between the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan,
aimed at easing the tensions between the two South Asian neighbors. Since then, relations between
the two countries have continued to be strained.
In June 2008, Taliban fighters in Afghanistan attacked a prison in Kandahar and released hundreds
of prisoners. A manhunt by joint Afghan and international troops resulted in 20 inmates being
recaptured, however, the rest were reported to have escaped. NATO announced that 17 insurgents
were dead but did not state whether any of the escapees were among the dead.
Two days after that incident, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said that in the interests of national
self-defense, he would send troops over the border into Pakistan to hunt down militants operating
across the border. Karzai said: "Afghanistan has the right of self-defense. When they cross the
territory from Pakistan to come and kill Afghans and to kill coalition troops it exactly gives us the
right to go back and do the same." Karzai also warned that he would actively search for Taliban
fighters, including Baitullah Mehsud, who was believed to be based in the South Waziristan region
of Pakistan. To that end, the Afghan leader said, "Baitullah Mehsud should know that we will go
after him now and hit him in his house." Karzai promised a similar fate to Taliban leader, Mullah
Omar.
While Afghanistan and Pakistan share ethnic and cultural ties, relations between the two countries
have become increasingly strained as extremist Islamic militants have traversed the cross-border
region with impunity, often carrying out attacks on either side. Karzai has often called on Pakistan
and the wider international community to deal with this problem. However, until the
aforementioned prison attack, he had never before threatened to pursue militants across the border.
In response, Pakistan lashed back by stating that it while it wanted regional stability, it would not
stand for interference in its affairs. Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said, "We want a
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 311 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
stable Afghanistan. It is in our interest." He went on to state, "Neither do we interfere in anyone
else's matters, nor will we allow anyone to interfere in our territorial limits and our affairs."
Soon after the Afghan leader publicly threatened to seek out Taliban across the border into
Pakistan, the threat presented by that militant Islamic enclave was brought into sharp relief. About
500 Taliban fighters took control of a number of several villages to the south of Kandahar in
Afghanistan. Joint Afghan and NATO forces were expected to confront the threat posed by the
Taliban's advance. The issue was expected to further contribute to devolving Afghan-Pakistani
relations.
As of 2011, security in Afghanistan has been threatened by Islamic extremist militants operating
across the border from Pakistan. The siege in September 2011 in Kabul (see below for details)
underlined the complicity of the Pakistani intelligence agency in such attacks, and serve only to
further damage already-poor Afghan-Pak relations with regard to national interests of Afghanistan.
Relations with the United Nations (U.N.)
In August 1998, after the assassination of an Italian United Nations (U.N.) staff member and two
U.N. Afghan employees, the U.N. withdrew from Afghanistan.
In March 1999, neighboring governments and the U.N. praised the successes of the second round
of meetings between the Taliban and the northern opposition forces and encouraged further
negotiations between the warring factions. The talks, sponsored by the U.N. from March 11-14 in
Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, resulted in an agreement to exchange prisoners of war; to establish a
coalition government including all parties to the conflict; and to continue negotiation of a cease-fire
agreement.
On March 18, 1999, U.N. Special Envoy Brahimi met with Ahmad Shah Masoud, leader of the
Afghan Northern Alliance forces. Their discussion focused on the talks between the Taliban and
the opposition forces scheduled for April 1999.
After a meeting on March 21, 1999, between the U.N. Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Lakhdar
Brahimi, and Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, chief of the Taliban Interim Council, U.N. staff began
to return to Afghanistan. Although the Taliban have promised to maintain the safety of all U.N.
staff, for the time being, U.S. and British U.N. staff will not return because of their governments'
security concerns. These concerns stem from reports that the Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden,
alleged to be responsible for the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August
1998, may still be in Afghanistan. U.N. officials believe that bin Laden has left Afghanistan and
gone to Somalia and are currently investigating whether or not to return U.S. and British staff to
Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 312 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
On April 12, 1999, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his disappointment that the
Taliban had decided not to continue the peace talks and pledged to continue attempts to broker
peace between the warring factions. The United Nations Security Council echoed Annan, calling
for all warring parties to resume the peace process. On April 26, the U.N. sent a two-week
technical mission to Afghanistan to assess the humanitarian situation on the ground.
Afghani women and children staged an anti-Taliban rally in Islamabad, Pakistan on April 28. The
rally was led by the "Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan," a human rights
group which has petitioned the United Nations for assistance. The U.N. has consistently criticized
the Taliban for their treatment of women. However, the Taliban has allegedly eased some
restrictions on women by allowing widows to work in health care and girls to attend primary
schools.
The United Nations has expressed concern about the increased production of opium in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces more opium than any other country in the world and
production is expected to double in 1999. Land usage by opium producers is drastically reducing
the amount of land used to produce grain and the U.N. fears that this, along with the worst drought
in several decades, may lead to a famine in 2000.
In October 1999, the U.N. Order 1267 allowed a 30-day period, within which the Taliban
government of Afghanistan was to unconditionally extradite Osama bin Laden, the person
suspected to have orchestrated the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.
In response, the Taliban regime refused to extradite bin Laden, claiming that such a measure would
violate their traditional belief of protecting those considered to be guests of their homeland, but
they also requested a delay on the U.N. sanctions. The request was ultimately denied, and U.N.
sanctions went into effect on Nov. 14, 1999. Thousands of Afghanis protested in adamant
demonstrations in the streets of Kabul attacking U.N. offices and the abandoned U.S. Embassy.
Other protests ensued in other Islamic countries. Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar,
criticized the U.N. for working in the interest of the United States.
In October 1999, U.N. Special Envoy for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi withdrew from
Afghanistan after failing to secure an agreement from the warring factions. In the early months of
2000, the fighting continued unabated and all involved agree that peace was unlikely so long as
outside factions continue to supply to the combatants arms, economic support and even cross
border refuge for regrouping for battle. Pakistan appeared to provide the primary outside base of
support for the Taliban while the Central Asia republics Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
as well as Iran were the main conduits for support to the opposition forces.
In December 2000, after fresh warnings about handing over Osama bin Laden, the United Nations
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 313 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Security Council passed another resolution strengthening the sanctions against the Taliban regime.
The new set of sanctions, initially valid for a period of 12 months, call for the closing down of all
Taliban offices outside Afghanistan and also for a severe curtailment on the international travel by
Taliban representatives. The Taliban reacted strongly to the fresh sanctions and threatened to break
off the peace talks if the sanctions were actually imposed.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism and the subsequent installation of a
new transitional government in Afghanistan, it is presumed that relations between the country and
the United Nations will improve significantly.
Relations with the United States (U.S.)
The tense relations between the United States (U.S.) and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan offered
a perfect cover for the intense relationship that the two sides enjoyed until the mid-1990s.
The Taliban, like so many other Islamic groups in Afghanistan, was often viewed by critics as a
creation of the U.S. intelligence agency, the CIA. (Note: CountryWatch does not assert this
position; it simply reports a perception held by certain critics. Whether or not this perception is true
is beyond the purview of this review.) Although the U.S. has officially denied this charge, it was
apparent that it armed certain Islamic groups in Afghanistan soon after the coup by PPDA in 1978,
since it viewed the PPDA as a communist government propped up by the Soviet Union. Former
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzeznski recently confirmed that the U.S. aid to Afghan
"mujahidin" began more than six months before the Soviet invasion and this was soon to become
the largest covert operation mounted by the U.S., since the World War II, costing over $5 billion.
The operation picked up speed as the Soviet forces landed in Kabul in December 1979. The timing
was especially bad for the U.S., as it had lost a valuable ally in Iran, with the overthrow of the
Shah of Iran in January of the same year. Having already lost Iran, the U.S. feared that the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan was just the first step in Moscow's principle aim of gaining control over
either Iran or Pakistan. Worried about the implications on its South Asia and Middle East policies,
the U.S. launched a massive operation to oust the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Using Pakistan
as the base for these operations, the U.S. covertly pumped in billions of dollars into arming and
training the militant Islamic forces that were trying to fight the Soviets.
The CIA, along with the Pakistan authorities, set up scores of training camps along the PakistanAfghanistan border and some even inside southern Afghanistan, an area where the Soviets could
never hold a complete sway. And the camps found a huge supply of ready students among the five
million Afghans who had fled their country and were seeking refuge in Pakistan, most of them in
the northern city of Peshawar, just a few kilometers from the border.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 314 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Thus, for over a decade, Peshawar became the nerve center of the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence
agencies and their operations in Afghanistan. The region was soon flooded with the state of the art
weapons to enable the guerrillas wage a battle against the Soviet occupying forces. The Afghan
"mujahidin" were soon furnished with the best weapons - be it handheld anti-aircraft and anti-tank
weapons, the best rifles that the U.S. army could offer and the best communications systems.
Within a short while, Peshawar emerged as the largest illegal arms bazaar in the world, with
millions of small and light weapons floating around. It was and still is easier and cheaper to buy a
sophisticated rifle than a portable radio in the city.
The first years of the "mujahidin" battles saw formation of nearly a dozen groups of armed
guerrillas that were dispatched into various parts of the country. Among these groups was the
group that later transformed itself into the Taliban. The transformation began in the early 1990s
under the supervision of the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI. With an additional supply of arms
originating from the U.S., the Taliban was able to control nearly 90 percent of the country and
hence become de facto rulers of the country.
The Taliban, however, was founded on the principles of religious extremism, and soon its policies
were to come in conflict with the stated aims of the U.S., especially over the Taliban's eagerness to
export Islamic extremism and terrorism from Afghanistan to practically all over the world - from
the U.S. and the Middle East to Central Asia and India and Philippines. Though the Taliban
received adequate funding from the outside sources - principally the ISI and the Saudi Arabians, it
also began developing its own internal revenue sources - through drugs. Over the last few years,
Afghanistan has emerged as the world's second largest producer of opium, the raw material for
heroin. It is also now a major conduit for the drugs being smuggled into Europe and also the U.S.
The U.S. administration was perhaps slow in detecting danger signals from the Taliban. Despite its
close relations with and deep influence over the Pakistan government, the U.S. has been unable to
put any tangible pressure regarding the direction in which the ISI was sending the Taliban. It was
around the same time that Taliban offered refuge to Osama bin Laden, today topping the most
wanted list of the U.S.
It finally took the bombings of U.S. missions in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 to crystallize U.S.
action. Accusing bin Laden of masterminding the operations, the U.S. demanded that the Taliban
hand over bin Laden. When the Taliban refused to comply, the U.S. declared the Taliban a
terrorist organization and also steered the United Nations to clamp sanctions on the regime in
November 1999. The U.S. has also been strongly opposing the Taliban attempts to get recognition
at the United Nations as the legitimate regime of Afghanistan.
Initially, however, the relations between the two countries were cordial. After the establishment of
diplomatic relations in 1934, the U.S. policy of helping developing nations boost their standards of
living was an important factor in maintaining and improving U.S.-Afghan ties. From 1950 to 1979,
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 315 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
U.S. foreign assistance provided Afghanistan with more than $500 million in loans, grants and
surplus agricultural commodities to develop transportation facilities, increase agricultural
production, expand the educational system, stimulate industry and improve government
administration.
The re-establishment of the U.S. embassy in Kabul in December 2001 after the fall of the Taliban
regime marked the beginning of a new chapter in the U.S.-Afghanistan relations. The installation of
a new government in Kabul has led to much smoother relations between the two sides. Afghanistan
could once again begin cooperation with the U.S. in the two key areas of regional peace and
stability and the battle against drugs. Relations, however, have become somewhat strained as the
United States has focused more of its attention on Iraq and the Middle East, even forgetting to
budget for much-publicized financial and security assistance for Afghanistan. The severe increase
in violence and the resurgence of the Taliban in 2006 has drawn increasing attention to this matter.
In August 2007, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was in the United States to meet with President
George W. Bush. The meeting was regarded as a "strategy session" regarding the resurgent
Taliban and al-Qaida in Aghanistan. To that end, the United States pledged $10 billion in funds
aimed at strengthening Afghan security forces and also compelling positive results. But on the
other side of the equation, the Afghan leader wanted to discuss the rising number of civilians dying
as a result of military operations by coalition forces. As well, Karzai was expected to ask Bush to
place pressure on Pakistan to intensify its efforts to curb cross-border extremist fighters. In the
background of these two sets of objectives has been the issue of Iran. Whereas the United States
has expressed anxiety about Iran possible involvement in the supply of weapons to the Taliban,
Afghanistan has cast Iraq as an ally in its causes. To that end, Karzai was reported to have
characterized Iran as "a supporter of Afghanistan, in the peace process that we have and the fight
against terror."
Special Report: Post-Bush Era Foreign Policy
Benefiting from apparent support from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for United
States presidential nominee Barack Obama's 16-month phased withdrawal timetable from Iraq, the
Democratic contender for the American presidency urged greater focus on Afghanistan.
The Obama campaign quickly responded to Maliki's favorable stance on their proposed
withdrawal timetable by directing attention to Afghanistan. Obama's top foreign policy adviser, Dr.
Susan Rice, said: "Senator Obama welcomes Prime Minister Maliki's support for a 16 month
timeline for the redeployment of US combat brigades. This presents an important opportunity to
transition to Iraqi responsibility, while restoring our military and increasing our commitment to
finish the fight in Afghanistan."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 316 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
These developments came at a time when Obama was launching an international tour, intended to
shore up his foreign policy credentials. Not surprisingly, the Democratic contender commenced his
trip in the country he has consistently said requires priority attention: Afghanistan.
During a visit to Kabul, Obama characterized the increasingly volatile landscape in Afghanistan
as "precarious and urgent." As such, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee said that
Afghanistan should be the main focus of the "war on terror." In his meeting with Afghan
President Hamid Karzai, he promised to continue the fight against terrorism "with vigor."
Additionally, Obama discussed the illicit narcotics trade and bilateral ties with Karzai.
Obama was interviewed for the CBS program "Face the Nation." In that interview he noted that
the Bush administration had been distracted by a "war of choice" in Iraq rather than fighting those
who were responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States. He asserted that
the time had come to correct to correct the mistakes made by the Bush administration. Obama
also called for more troops to be deployed to Afghanistan to fight resurgent Taliban, al-Qaida, and
other extremist Islamic elements.
Obama's priority on Afghanistan was backed by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who
expressed concurrence with the Democratic presidential contender on this matter.
Obama's rival for the American presidency, Republican presidential nominee, John McCain,
criticized him for espousing policies before traveling to the Middle East and South Asia to assess
the situation. Nevertheless, Obama's policies were receiving unexpected sanction from key global
players, as noted above.
By 2009, Obama had won the presidency. Faced with a spate of violence and a deeply devolving
security situation in Afghanistan, the new Obama administration in the United States decided to
send 17,000 more troops to Afghanistan to stabilize the country's security situation.
By late March 2009, United States foreign policy in Afghanistan was on the agenda. On March
27, 2009, United States President Barack Obama unveiled a “stronger, smarter and more
comprehensive strategy” for dealing with Afghanistan. At issue was a new foreign policy approach
toward dealing with the threat posed by al-Qaida terrorists operating in the area from Afghanistan
to Pakistan. President Obama explained that this new course emerged from a "careful policy
review" that involved consultations with military commanders, diplomats, regional governments,
strategic partners, NATO allies, as well as non governmental organizations.
Making it clear that the United States would not be involved in an open-ended war, President
Obama said that the new strategy would be carefully circumscribed with clear objectives. He said
that the United States effort in Afghanistan was only to confront our common enemy” and did not
seek to "control that country or dictate its future.",
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 317 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Giving a glimpse of the new policy, President Obama had said during an interview on CBS
television show 60 Minutes on March 22, 2009 that there must be an "exit strategy" with regard to
the United States policy in Afghanistan. He said, "There's got to be a sense that this is not a
perpetual drift" and emphasized that the central mission was to ensure that al-Qaida was not able to
carry attacks against the United States.
Now, less than a week later, President Obama again emphasized these themes saying, “ So I want
the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and
defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” As before, the United States president again
emphasized the threat of al-Qaida in discussing the new strategy, noting that intensified efforts in
the Afghan-Pak region was needed to deal with that "increasingly perilous" terrain.
Flanked by United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and United States Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, President Obama depicted a grim situation in which the resurgent extremists were
consolidating control of the Afghan-Pak border zone. Indeed, he characterized that area as "the
most dangerous place in the world." President Obama noted that the United States’ strategy should
be directly related to the threat posed by al-Qaida to America and its allies. He also warned that
credible intelligence warned that fresh attacks were being planned by the terrorists.
President Obama emphasized that the terrorist threat was not directed solely at the United States
but also to Afghans at home, as well as the entire global community. To this end, President Obama
said, "This is not simply an American problem. Far from it.” He continued, "It is instead an
international security challenge of the highest order." Accordingly, the United States leader called
on NATO and other allies to assist in this effort.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signaled Russian support for the strategy during an interview
with the BBC. He indicated that Moscow would be "ready to participate in the efforts directed at
putting things in order" in Afghanistan. He also appeared to echo Obama’s view that Afghanistan
establish its own political system saying, "It is impossible to rule Afghanistan with the aid of the
alliance; it is impossible to rule Afghanistan from abroad. Afghanistan should find its own path to
democracy."
The Obama administration had already made good on an election promise to intensify its efforts in
Afghanistan by deploying 17,000 more troops to that country to deal with the resurgence of the
Taliban and the devolving security situation. But now President Obama was saying that there was a
need for increased non-combat personnel of 4,000 in Afghanistan to train and strengthen Afghan
security forces, and also to support civilian development.
Richard Holbrooke, the United States special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, has said that the
United States could no longer treat the two countries separately. He said, "In the past, the United
States government stove-piped it, they had an Afghan policy and a Pakistan policy. We have to
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 318 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
integrate the two and I hope the rest of the world will join us in that effort." Holbrooke has also
indicated there would be no further neglect of the region, suggesting more attention not just in
terms of military strength, but also in terms of aid and resources aimed at rebuilding infrastructure,
would be in the works.
Afghanistan was not the only country on the agenda, as suggested above. President Obama said
that the United States’ efforts against al-Qaida would also extend to Pakistan. He said that the
United States Congress would be asked to pass legislation authorizing an increase in expenditures
to Pakistan for the purpose of rebuilding schools, roads and hospitals. But President Obama noted
that he would not be granting a “blank check” to Pakistan, which would have to demonstrate a
commitment to crushing al-Qaida and aligned extremists in that country.
According to Reuters News, the government of Afghanistan welcomed the new strategy by the
United States, and particularly endorsed the regional approach. A presidential spokesman,
Humayun Hamidzada, said that Afghan President Hamid Karzai welcomed “the recognition of the
regional aspect of the problem in Afghanistan and specifically recognition that the al-Qaida threat is
mainly emanating from Pakistan.
In May 2009, United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the replacement of
General David McKiernan --the commander of United States-led forces in the field in Afghanistan.
Secretary Gates explained the decision had been made because the fight against the Taliban
required "new thinking." To that apparent end, Secretary Gates said the new commander would
be General Stanley McChrystal, whose background as a specialist in counter-insurgency would
apparently yield necessary insight and leadership in the fight against the Taliban.
The move was part of a strategic shift by the Obama administration to not only strengthen armed
forces on the ground, but also to use non-military methods to fight the Taliban. In fact, Secretary
Gates' announcement came at a time when the United States was set to increase its military
combat presence by 21,000 in Afghanistan (the existing force numbered 38,000). That move,
however, was sure to be met with resistance in Afghanistan where Afghan President Hamid Karzai
was under pressure to decrease combat operations in his country in the aftermath of United States
airstrikes that have left a lengthy list of casualties.
With casualties mounting amidst troops from the United States and the United Kingdom fighting
the Taliban in Afghanistan, there were increasing anxieties about Western efforts in that country to
crush Islamic militants. Indeed, resurgent Taliban have become increasingly violent in their
attacks while Western forces have seen ever-increasing casualty lists. In July 2009, the United
Kingdom and the United States had lost several soldiers as a result of attacks by resurgent Taliban.
As many as 15 British troops died in the space of days while four United States marines died in
two separate roadside bombings.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 319 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Given this climate, United States President Barack Obama sought to quell anxieties by staking out
a clear set of objectives for United States and allied troops trying to repel the Taliban in
Afghanistan. To this end, President Obama characterized the war effort in Afghanistan as a
"serious fight" against terrorism, and the crucial need to establish regional stability. President
Obama said that United States and allied troops had enjoyed some success but were immediately
tasked with the mission of seeing Afghanistan through the forthcoming presidential election set for
August 2009. Across the Atlantic in the United Kingdom, British Prime Minister was also
compelled to justify his country's continuing effort in Afghanistan by explaining that there was a
vital interest to his country in fighting terrorism. He was helped by President Obama's statement
as follows: "The mission in Afghanistan is one that the Europeans have as much if not more of a
stake in than we do. The likelihood of a terrorist attack in London is at least as high, if not higher,
than it is in the United States."
Relations between the United States and Afghanistan were on the agenda in July 2009 when the
United States (U.S.) Pentagon confirmed that an American soldier who disappeared from his
military base in Afghanistan has been captured by the Taliban. The Defense Department said that
Private Bowe Bergdahl, who had been serving with an Alaska-based infantry regiment, was last
seen walking away from the base in a Taliban stronghold. The Defense Department said that a
video showing footage of the captured soldier was a violation of international law and characterized
it as a "Taliban propaganda video."
Meanwhile, also in July 2009, Afghan President Hamid Karzai made the reduction of civilian
casualties by foreign troops a part of his election manifesto (re: presidential election ofAugust
2009). The Afghan leader said that United States and NATO troops fighting Islamic insurgents in
his country should sign a framework governing their operations, with the objective of limiting
civilian casualties. Indeed, the issue of civilian casualties has been a source of great consternation in
Afghanistan even as foreign troops try to stave off resurgent Taliban at a time of escalating
violence.
While the saga of Afghanistan's contested and controversial presidential election was ongoing in
the early autumn of 2009, and as violence dominated Afghanistan's political landscape, United
States President Barack Obama was considering his new policy in Afghanistan. At the
international level, countries with troops in Afghanistan were reassessing their strategic purpose
there.
General Stanley McChrystal, the chief United States and NATO commander in Afghanistan, has
called for more troops on the ground. McChrystal agued that the United States risked failure in
the war in Afghanistan without such a commitment and he warned that the United States had to
reverse the momentum of the resurgent Taliban. In particular, he said that more troops were
needed to help support the Afghan security forces who were preparing to take full control over the
country's security in 2013.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 320 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In October 2009, the commander of United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General
Stanley McChrystal, officially submitted a set of possible options to policymakers, aimed at
curbing the advance of resurgent Taliban. Among the proposals given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Mike Mullen and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridi,
was an option to deploy between 30,000 to 40,000 additional combat troops and trainers to
Afghanistan. This option was said to be strongly favored by McChrystal, although there were other
options, such as a more modest increase of troop strength by 10,000, as well as another plan
calling for a surge of 60,000 troops to be sent to Afghanistan, and an option for maintaining
current troop strength. While the actual content of the proposal has remained confidential,
McChrystal has himself said that more troops were needed to help support the Afghan security
forces who were preparing to take full control over the country's security in 2013.
General McChrystal's report was being reviewed by President Barack Obama who had said
earlier-- on September 20, 2009, during an interview on CNN -- that he would assess the findings
from his commander on the ground, before making a decision as to the possible deployment of
troops to an increasingly unpopular conflict. President Obama noted, "I don't want to put the
resource question before the strategy question." He then continued, "But right now, the question
is, the first question is, are we doing the right thing? Are we pursuing the right strategy?" The
president acknowledged that the original mission to hunt those responsible for 9/11 could be
subject to what is known as "mission creep."
Before considering McChrystal's request for more combat troops in Afghanistan, the White House
in the United States said it wanted to undergo an overall strategic review of its policy in the
Afghan-Pak region. At issue for the Obama administration was the question of whether to remain
on track with the existing mission, and perhaps with an extended nation-building imperative, aimed
at securing the cooperation of the Afghan populace. Alternatively, there was the question as to if
the mission should be recalibrated, perhaps with reduced military operations, and a concentration
purely on striking al-Qaida terrorists in the Afghan-Pak border area.
By the end of October, 2009, media reports emerged that the Obama administration would make
their Afghanistan strategy known after that country held its second or run-off round of its
contested presidential election. That second or run-off round was set for November 7, 2009 amidst
a rising clamor for the establishment of a credible government in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Obama
administration noted that there would be no action pending the establishment of a legitimate
government in Afghanistan. In an interview with CNN, White House Chief of Staff Rahm
Emanuel said it would be "reckless" to make such a decision without thoroughly determining
whether or not the government at the helm of Afghanistan held democratic authority. But clearly,
that timeline was thwarted due to the problematic conduct of the election and the "default" victory
of Karzai, as noted above. Indeed, the fact that Karzai was increasingly cast as corrupt created a
wrinkle in United States' policy in Afghanistan, since it required a credible and reliable governing
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 321 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
partner in Kabul.
For its part, the White House insisted that President Obama had not actually decided on the
question of troop strength and was actually still considering the strategic approach. To that end,
there were reports that the president had requested status reports from across Afghanistan to assess
specific conditions on the ground. At home in the United States, there was a clear division among
those -- disproportionately from the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party -- who wanted
the president to quickly assent to McChrystal's wishes, and the liberal base of the Democratic
Party, which has demanded that President Obama bring an end to the war in Afghanistan.
By the first part of November 2009, it was reported that President Barack Obama had, in fact,
rejected all four of the options for Afghanistan, which had been presented by security advisers. He
asserted that they did not satisfy his concerns over a clear exit strategy. In a related development,
the United States ambassador to Afghanistan was reported to have sent two classified cable to
Washington expressing concern over the deployment of further troops to Afghanistan, at a time
when the Karzai government in Kabul was re-elected amidst allegations of vote fraud -- the latest
manifestation of corruption and mismanagement at the core of governance. Indeed, it was the
very climate of corruption and mismanagement that facilitated the resurgence of the Taliban in the
first place. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry -- who served as the United States military
commander in Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007 before retiring from the military and taking on a
diplomatic role in April 2009 -- apparently characterized Afghan President Hamid Karzai as
erratic, excoriated senior Afghan government officials for their rampant corruption, and criticized
the installation of warlords and drug smugglers in influential positions on the Afghan governing
landscape. Eikenberry reportedly concluded that the Afghan leadership was incapable of being an
effective -- or appropriate -- partner, and accordingly, advised President Obama against escalating
troop strength in Afghanistan.
By late November 2009, President Obama had made his decision and was scheduled to address
the American people -- and, indeed, the world on December 1, 2009. During his adress, President
Obama ordered another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable starting in late
2009 and reaching an apex in mid-2010. The president explained that the mission at hand would
focus on "disrupting, dismantling, and defeating" al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and denying them any
further safehaven in Afghanistan under Taliban auspices. As such, a concomitant aspect of the
mission would include reversing recent Taliban momentum.
The troops would also be tasked with the training of Afghan security forces, with an eye on turning
over the security apparatus to locals. To that end, President Obama noted that the another
central component of the mission was to stabilize Afghanistan so that the Afghan people would
soon be able to take responsibility for their own security. Ahead of the speech, there were reports
that one "brigade-sized element" of between 3,000 to 5,000 troops would be solely tasked with
training of Afghan troops.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 322 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
At the same time, the president noted that the redeployment of United States forces was expected
to commence within a year and end in mid-2011, pending favorable circumstances on the ground.
In this way, a timeline ending theoretically in 2011 appeared to be a core aspect of the exit
strategy. To that end, the president emphasized that he was ordering the fastest possible
deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan, in order to facilitate the conditions for a
responsible a exit from that country. Ultimately, the president said that the objective was to "come
together to end the war successfully... for common security."
President Obama called on the international community to continue to work with the United States
to deal with the global threat posed by militant Islamic extremists, noting that "this burden is not
ours alone to bear." According to media reports ahead of the speech, the president had already
conducted talks with the leaders of several key countries, including Denmark, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Russia, China and India, and had called for other countries to contribute up
to 10,000 troops for the NATO war effort in Afghanistan.
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan also factored highly in the president's speech, with
increased emphasis being placed on their responsibilities for advancing stable governance free of
corruption and fighting terrorism respectively. He additionally addressed the Afghan people in
saying that the United States did not seek to occupy their country, and sought to be a partner in the
process toward stability, rather than a patron. On Pakistan, he particularly emphasized the nuclear
capacity of that country and the heightened geopolitical stakes therein.
For his part, President Obama cast this war plan for Afghanistan as being a matter of necessity
and not choice -- a view consistent with his campaign position on the topic. In his speech,
however, he made clear that his decision was not made easily, saying: "I do not make this decision
lightly." The president's philosophical stance on the matter was made clear when he said that he
had opposed the Iraq war because he believe in restraint when it comes to the use of military
force. But at the same time, the president acknowledged that he believed the current course of
remaining in Afghanistan at current levels and without an exit strategy was "unsustainable." To
this end, President Obama said that "the status quo of muddling through" would only be a costly
option that served to prolong the current farrago, ultimately never generating the conditions in
which United States forces could leave Afghanistan. The president went on to state that the
decision was made in the interests of national security, noting that the dangers emanating from the
Afghan-Pak region were "no idle danger" and "no theoretical threat."
While the president did not go into great detail about the Afghan-Pak strategy in his speech, his
administration's policy was illuminated in a separate interview with United Nations Ambassador
Susan Rice, which was conducted by MSNBC News. Dr. Rice explained that while many alQaida members had crossed the porous border from Afghanistan to Pakistan after the Taliban lost
power, they were still moving across the border regions, and could re-establish safehaven in
Afghanistan if resurgent Taliban in that country regained control over broad swaths of Afghan
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 323 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
territory. She explained the symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaida by
characterizing Afghanistan under Taliban rule as the "tissue" within which "the cancer of al-Qaida"
develops. In effect, resurgent Taliban can facilitate the ascendancy of al-Qaida. While the United
States and NATO forces were actively dealing with this threat on the Afghan side of the border,
there was pressure on the Pakistanis to continue their efforts to the to same on their side of the
border. Dr. Rice also emphasized the fact that although al-Qaida members could be found in
various countries across the world, the mountainous Afghan-Pak region was the very location of
terror training camps -- a venue for far more ambitious terrorist planning than single cell terror
operations. Moreover, she echoed the president's own words when she said that there was a
"proximate threat to national security emanating from Afghan- Pak border."
A week after United States President Barack Obama ordered another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan
as part of a new strategy, NATO announced that 25 countries had pledged a total of around 7,000
more troops to support the United States-led war effort in Afghanistan. At a news conference
following talks with NATO foreign ministers, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
said: "Nations are backing up their words with deeds." He continued, "At least 25 countries will
send more forces to the mission in 2010. They have offered around 7,000 new forces with more to
come ... That is solidarity in action and it will have a powerful effect on the ground." Rasmussen
also remarked on the new road map for operations, noting that the new NATO mission would
include amplified aid and training of Afghan security forces, consistent with the strategy outlined by
President Obama. He also emphasized that another core objective remained the same -- to prevent
Afghanistan from falling into the clutches of militant extremist Islamists.
For its part, the Afghan Taliban said that the plans outlined by President Obama and echoed by
Secretary-General Rasmussen would serve only to strengthen their resolve. Nevertheless, the
battlefield commander, General Stanley McChrystal, lauded the new war plan for Afghanistan, by
emphasizing the benefits of more troops in the field and conjuring up Winston Churchill in a
videophone speech as he declared "the end of the beginning" of the war.
On March 28, 2010, United States President Obama made a surprise trip to Afghanistan to show
resolve for the peace and security effort in that country. It was his first trip to Afghanistan since
becoming president and lasted only a few hours; it was not pre-announced for ostensible security
reasons. Addressing United States troops at the Bagram air base close to Kabul, the president
thanked them for their service and sacrifice to the United States saying, "My main job here today
is to say thank you on behalf of the entire American people." To that end, President Obama
emphasized that the central mission of the United States forces in Afghanistan against al-Qaida
and the Taliban, noting that it was ultimately aimed at "keeping America safe and secure."
President Obama also met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whom he invited to the United
States for talks in May 2010. President Obama indicated that he wanted to press for progress on
not only the peace and security front, but also in terms of corruption and narcotics trafficking in
Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 324 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In a strange twist, following this visit from President Obama, Afghan President Karzai accused
the West of election fraud plot and threatened to join Taliban. Karzai's rhetoric would likely feed
sentiment that the Afghan leader was an unpredictable and erratic player on the geopolitical scene.
It would certainly do little to help the increasing perception by the West that he was not acting in
good faith and could not be counted on as a stable partner for the peace effort in Afghanistan. The
actual degree of damage to relations between Washington D.C. and Kabul was yet to be measured
at the time of writing.
Editor's Note -While Afghanistan has to date enjoyed the public support of the American people, and has not
generally been subject to the same controversy as the Iraq war, the long engagement has started to
take a toll. The speculation about whether an increase in troop strength may be needed to combat
resurgent Taliban, particularly in eastern Afghanistan, has been met with some skepticism in the
war-weary United States. The issue of civilian casualties during the battle between NATO forces
and Taliban militants has been an enduring source of consternation for both the Afghan authorities
and international forces operating in Afghanistan. As well, concerns over the proper conduct of the
2009 presidential election has sparked grave concern in the international community, which has
been backed the Afghan government. Consequently, the core purpose of international military
engagement in Afghanistan has become an increasingly significant matter of debate, with voices on
both sides of the Atlantic increasingly calling for an exit strategy. As noted above, on December 1,
2009, United States President Barack Obama ordered another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan on an
accelerated timetable starting in late 2009 and reaching an apex in mid-2010. The troops would be
tasked with fighting extremist Islamic elements as well as the training of Afghan security forces,
with an eye on turning over the security apparatus to locals. Obama also outlined a clear exit
strategy with redeployment expected to commence within a year and ending in mid-2011, pending
favorable circumstances on the ground.
Update on U.S. Policy and War Effort in Afghanistan:
On June 23, 2010, United States President Barack Obama announced that General Stanley
McChrystal, the commander of United States forces in Afghanistan, was relieved of his duties. The
president also announced the nomination of General David Petraeus, commander of United States
Central Command, to take over command of the war in Afghanistan against the resurgent Taliban
and al-Qaida. President Obama explained that he had decided to replace Gen McChrystal "with
considerable regret." The president explained that McChrystal failed to "meet the standard that
should be set by a commanding general." President Obama called on the Senate to quickly
confirm Petraeus to his new position in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 325 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
At issue were pejorative remarks attributed to McChrystal and his aides about the civilian
command, which were published in a well-known American magazine, Rolling Stone. The politics
of the situation demanded that President Obama had no choice but to dismiss McChrystal or risk
being viewed as a weak commander in chief. , President Obama warned that some of the
sentiments expressed by McChrystal and his aides via the Rolling Stone article "undermines the
civilian control of the military that's at the core of our democratic system."
It should be noted that the Afghan war strategy -- to fight resurgent Taliban and al-Qaida, improve
security in Afghanistan, and develop governing stability in that country as an alternative to a culture
of warfare -- is founded on the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN). The long-term objectives
of COIN entail not only the clearing the field of insurgents by the military, but also political
imperative of replacing the insurgent power base with more stable governance. Effective
counterinsurgency strategies, therefore, require close collaboration of the military, political,
economic and diplomatic spheres in the conflict zone. Clearly, puerile and openly-disdainful
remarks about senior members of the Obama administration -- as uttered by McChrystal and his
aides -- would not help the climate of effective cooperation, where support from the varying
spheres would be critical to success of the mission.
President Obama's decision to name Petraeus as Chrystal’s replacement was hailed positively by
politicians on both sides of the proverbial aisle in the United States, as well as the Karzai
government in Afghanistan, which was anxious about effects on the war effort. The selection of
Petraeus -- a celebrated military figure thanks to his stewardship of the "surge" in Iraq, and one of
the key authors of United States modern counterinsurgency strategy in war zones -- clearly
banished such anxieties. The president's assertion that there was "a change in personnel but not a
change in policy" further augmented the widespread support for his decision. Indeed, the
controversy ensconced within the Rolling Stone article, titled "Runaway General," did not overtly
extend to dissonance over the policy itself. Certainly, McChrystal expressed support for President
Obama's strategy in Afghanistan saying, "I strongly support the president's strategy in Afghanistan
and am deeply committed to our coalition forces, our partner nations, and the Afghan people." As
well, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen affirmed that the Western military
alliance's Afghan war strategy remained unchanged.
On June 27, 2010, days after President Obama announced the dismissal of McChrystal and named
Petraeus as his replacement, attention was on the timeline attached to the Afghanistan strategy.
That is to say, when President Obama first outlined his plan to deploy an additional 30,000 troops
to Afghanistan, he also noted that the United States would begin a redeployment of those troops by
2011. With debt worries prevalent in the United States and other NATO countries, questions arose
as to whether or not the continued war effort in Afghanistan was a financially feasible endeavor.
That is to say, the war and counterinsurgency mission requires a substantial outlay of resources
that few governments (including the United States) could realistically commit to for the long term.
Complicating matters further has been the rising death toll of NATO forces in a war that has
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 326 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
continued for close to a decade. That increased death toll has contributed to decreasing support for
the Afghanistan war effort.
Moreover, analysts have pointed to the fact that COIN involves the idea of clearing the landscape
of insurgents, followed by the establishment of a government as an alternative to the war culture.
But clearance in one area often results in the relocation of the terrorists elsewhere and a perpetual
pursuit of the strategic enemy. Meanwhile, the establishment of more stable governance, which has
seen some success in the more politically mature Iraq, cannot easily be transposed to the largely
tribal cultural orientation of Afghanistan, which does not have a strong legacy of governmental
authority.
Taken together, these factors have contributed to rising emphasis on a "date certain" exit from
Afghanistan in 2011. Of course, on the other side of the equation, counterinsurgency advocates
have argued that the objectives of the mission could require an extended timeline beyond 2011.
With no consensus on the matter, the McChrystal fracas has thusly revealed deeper questions
about the strategy and mission in Afghanistan. Despite the aforementioned assertions from the
Obama administration and military ranks that there would be no change in policy on Afghanistan,
there were now emerging questions about the precise nature of that policy itself.
Those questions were intensified in July 2010 when the Iceland-based website, known as
Wikileaks, released six years worth of classified United States documents, numbering around
90,000, dealing with the war in Afghanistan. Several news organizations were given access to the
documents prior to actual publication, despite the fact that United States authorities have argued
that the dissemination of classified information was a threat to national security, an act of gross
irresponsibility, and quite possibly, imbued with illegality. In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai
charged that the release of Wikileaks documents have endangered the lives of Afghan citizens who
worked with NATO-led international forces. The Afghan leader said that the disclosure of the
names of Afghans who cooperated with the NATO-led forces was "shocking" and "irresponsible."
For its part, Wikileaks has defended the release of the documents, noting that it presented an
unvarnished view of the war in Afghanistan since 2004.
Regardless of these competing views, the contents of the controversial documents have spurred
debate about the United States' role in the war in Afghanistan, as well as the conduct of the war
itself. To these ends, two Wikileaks revelations could raise questions about the Obama
administration's broader "Afghan-Pak" strategy, which considers not only "ground zero" of the war
effort -- Afghanistan -- but also Pakistan next door. While the strategy appropriately focuses on the
region instead of one country, taking into consideration shared extremist Islamic influences, shared
Pashtun culture, and a landscape on the borderland that is a stronghold for Taliban and al-Qaida,
two Wikileaks revelations strong doubts on the effectiveness of the strategy.
Firstly, according to the document review by the New York Times, even as Pakistan receives funds
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 327 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
from the United States to help combat Islamic extremists militants and the threat of terrorism, the
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was said to be helping the Taliban, even collaborating
with them on terror attacks and assassination plots.
Secondly, the tactic of using drone attacks in the tribal border regions has been lauded by the
Obama administration as a means of crushing the enemy and eliminating high value Taliban and alQaida targets. However, according the review by Der Spiegel, 38 Predator and Reaper drones
crashed while on combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, requiring "elaborate -- and dangerous -salvage operations." On the ground, "in country," there are additional worries about the political
costs of the civilian casualties caused by drone attacks.
The civilian costs provide a transition to discuss a third issue revealed by Wikileaks. According to
the review by Marc Ambinder of The Atlantic, there were "at least 144 separate incidents" of
civilian casualties that led to "cover-ups." Ambinder particularly took note of the unsuccessful
attempt to kill Abu Layth Ali Libi, which resulted in the deaths of several civilians and that resulted
in a "cover-up" by Afghan officials.
Finally, another key -- and bizarre -- revelation was that Osama Bin Laden -- the lynch pin of the
extremist Islamic terror network, al-Qaida, has taken up the practice of gifting insurgents with
wives. According to the associated report by The Guradian, an insurgent known to be an expert in
radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was presented with an Arab wife by Bin
Laden as an expression of thanks for his efforts in plotting terror attacks.
The war effort was at the top of the political agenda on August 1, 2010 when the Netherlands
ended its combat mission in Afghanistan. While the withdrawal of less than 2,000 Dutch troops
was unlikely to affect NATO operations on the ground in Afghanistan, it nonetheless drew attention
to growing doubts about the war effort by citizens of participating NATO countries. Indeed,
objections to the war in the Netherlands had been the cause of the fall of the Dutch government
only months prior.
With Canada slated to withdraw its 2,700 troops in 2011 and Poland indicating its 2,600 troops
would go home in 2012, there would be increased responsibility on United States troops in
Afghanistan, despite the fact that United States President Barack Obama had promised to begin
redeployment in mid-2011. But ahead of that date, the United States was ramping up its forces in
Afghanistan as part of a temporary surge tactic, not unlike the approach taken in Iraq. As was the
case in Iraq, the objective was to take control of key areas via offensive operations, forcing
militants and terrorists out, ultimately improving the security landscape. That increased security
would, in turn, allow the government to increase its effectiveness and build confidence with the
citizenry.
Meanwhile, as noted above, there were increasing doubts about success of the war strategy in
Afghanistan, given the fact that the conflict was ongoing for nine years. Of particular concern was
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 328 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the rising – rather than decreasing – level of violence and insecurity. In fact, July 2010 was the
deadliest month for United States troops since the start of the war. As well, more than 270
civilians were killed and about 600 wounded as a result of violence in July 2010. The first day of
August 2010 was marked by the roadside bombing of a bus in southern Afghanistan that left six
people dead.
Experts argued that increased troops in Taliban strongholds, such as Kandahar and Helmand,
would automatically result in increased military and civilian casualties in those areas. Stated
another way, a higher death toll was an inevitable consequence of the war strategy. That being
said, the counter-argument was that a rise in civilian casualties could undermine the goal of
capturing the “hearts and minds” of local Afghans. While statistics from the United Nations have
made clear that most civilian casualties have actually been carried out by the Taliban via suicide
bombings and roadside bombings, ordinary Afghans have instead directed their ire at NATO
troops. In fact, on August 1, 2010, hundreds of Afghans participated in a rally in the capital of
Kabul to protest the apparent deaths of civilians from a NATO rocket attack a week before in the
southern part of the country. Many of the protestors shouted, “Death to America! Death to
NATO!” For its part, NATO vociferously denied the disputed the allegations of civilian deaths in
that case.
In October 2010, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the alliance would assist
in the plan for peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Speaking at a NATO
meeting in the Belgian capital city of Brussels, Rasmussen said that NATO forces in Afghanistan
could potentially provide "practical assistance" in the peace and reconciliation efforts. That
potentiality was already in practice to some degree given reports that NATO had facilitated the
movement of Taliban commanders to Kabul, presumably for the informal talks mentioned by
President Karzai. Indeed, the New York Times reported that high level, face to face, negotiations
between the two sides -- the Afghan government and the leadership of the Taliban and the hardline guerrilla Haqqani network -- were taking place, and as noted here, with the logistical assistance
of NATO. At the same time, Rasmussen noted that NATO would not end its military campaign
against the Taliban and al-Qaida elements operating in Afghanistan. To that latter end, reports from
the ground in Afghanistan suggested that coalition forces were routing Taliban militants in the
southern province of Kandahar province. Indeed, Taliban fighters were reported to be abandoning
some of their long-held bases in that militant stronghold.
In November 2010, the landscape was another story entirely. NATO forces on November 15, 2010
suffered their worst losses in some time while Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar,
dispatched a statement announcing that the Taliban was opposed to peace talks and would not
engage the possibility until all foreign troops exited Afghanistan. To this end, he said, "The cunning
enemy which has occupied our country is trying, on the one hand, to expand its military operations
... and, on the other hand, wants to throw dust in the eyes of the people by spreading the rumors
of negotiation." The statement came only days before Afghan President Hamid Karzai's peace
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 329 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
plan, which has included reconciliation talks with the Taliban, would be addressed at a summit in
Portugal.
There, in Lisbon, NATO announced its plans to exit Afghanistan and transfer control over the antiTaliban struggle to Afghan forces by the close of 2014. Afghan President Karzai formalized the
agreement by signing a long-term security partnership with NATO. At the heart of the matter was
NATO's contention that the Taliban not be allowed to simply wait out the presence of foreign
forces. As stated by NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the security bloc would
remain committed to security and stability of Afghanistan. He said, "One thing must be very clear
- NATO is in this for the long term." The NATO head then continued, "If the enemies of
Afghanistan have the idea that they can wait it out until we leave, they have the wrong idea. We
will stay as long as it takes to finish our job." For his part, Afghan President Karzai expressed
gratitude for NATO's contributions to his country's interest but stated, "I also informed them of the
concerns of the Afghan people with regard to civilian casualties, with regard to detentions, with
regard to, at times, NATO's posture."
It should be noted that this decision by NATO did not necessarily coincide with an official decision
by the United States on the duration of combat operations by its forces in Afghanistan.
On that latter consideration, there was some indication of the direction of the United States in
December 2010 when a much-anticipated report dealing with United States President Barack
Obama's strategy for the war in Afghanistan surfaced in the public purview. That report concluded
that United States forces were on track to begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2011, as
scheduled in the United States' president's war plan. This conclusion was reached despite the fact
there were mixed reports of success in the field. On that matter, the summary of the report said
that the United States forces continued to pursue and eliminate al-Qaida leadership figures, was
successful in reducing the terror enclave's ability to carry out attacks from the Afghan-Pak region,
and had halted the progress of the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the summary
noted that those gains were tenuous and could well be reversed in the future.
March 2011 was marked by the plan for the withdrawal of international forces from operations in
Aghanistan after close to a decade of military operations there. With the United States and NATOled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) preparing to step back from its role in fighting
the Taliban and al-Qaida forces, on March 16, 2011, the Afghan government announced that it was
ready to take over security responsibilities. Afghan Defense Ministry spokesperson, General Zahir
Azimi admitted that Afghan security forces had challenges as regards recruitment, training and
equipment, but maintained that Afghanistan was committed to the plan saying, "Although we have
problems in terms of equipments, training and number of troops, we have agreements with
international community and with its support we would be able to successfully complete the
process by the end of 2014," The transfer of security responsibility from NATO-led troops to
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 330 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Afghan forces was scheduled to begin on March 21, 2011 and would take place on a phased basis
until 2014.
On March 22, 2011, Afghan President Hamid Karzai clarified this stance by noting that seven
areas of the country would be transferred to the jurisdiction of Afghan security forces in July 2011.
It was hoped that the transition would assuage tensions between Afghanistan and the international
community due to civilian casualties caused by military operations. Indeed, in February 2011,
several children died as a result of a NATO-led operation in Kunar province, prompting both
NATO commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, and United States Defense Secretary,
Robert Gates, to offer separate apologies to Afghanistan.
Note:
The multinational coalition functioning in Afghanistan has been concerned with the matter of longterm international engagement with Afghanistan and the restoration of security in that country. Of
particular concern has been the security scenario in 2014 when all international forces are set to
withdraw from Afghanistan, and the prevailing fears tha al-Qaida and its terrorist allies could again
gain strong footing in Afghanistan. Of course, no discussion of security in Afghanistan could ensue
without considering the border with Pakistan. Indeed, the resurgent Taliban and remnants of alQaida were famously functioning in the Afghan-Pak border region. Of significance has been the
growing suspicion by the United States and other Western powers that Pakistan was complicit in
attacks by the Taliban and other militant extremist groups, such as the Haqqani network.
Special Report: U.S. Policy on Afghanistan (as of 2010-2013)
U.S. President Obama unveils withdrawal plan for troops serving in Afghanistan
Summary
This Special Report details the withdrawal and exit strategy plan for United States troops from
Afghanistan. The Special Report includes an inquiry into counter-insurgency strategy for fighting
the Taliban and al-Qaida. The report additionally considers accusations of the Pakistani intelligence
agency's complicity with the Afghan Taliban. Also considered in this report are the politicallydriven financial constraints at home in the United States related to the funding of the war effort.
These issues collectively have influenced emerging questions about the United States' policy in
Afghanistan and the timeline for continued engagement there. Finally, this report looks at the
Afghanistan exit strategy as a jumping off point to consider the Obama doctrine of foreign policy.
Background
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 331 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In June 2010, United States President Barack Obama announced that General Stanley McChrystal,
the commander of United States forces in Afghanistan, was relieved of his duties. The president
also announced the nomination of General David Petraeus, commander of United States Central
Command, to take over command of the war in Afghanistan against the resurgent Taliban and alQaida. President Obama explained that he had decided to replace Gen McChrystal "with
considerable regret." The president explained that McChrystal failed to "meet the standard that
should be set by a commanding general." At issue were controversial statements by McCrystal that
were recorded in a recent Rolling Stone article. The politics of the situation demanded that
President Obama dismiss McChrystal, or, risk being viewed as a weak commander in chief. A
week after the announcement about the dismissal of McChrystal, Petraeus was unanimously
confirmed as the new commander of the Afghanistan war with a vote of 99-0 in the Senate.
Petraeus, as expected, garnered praise from both Republicans and Democrats, irrespective of
their core disagreements on the policy toward Afghanistan. Indeed, Petraeus was known as a
celebrated military figure, thanks to his stewardship of the "surge" in Iraq, as well as his notoriety
as one of the key authors of United States modern counterinsurgency strategy in war zones.
During confirmation hearings, Petraeus painted a grim picture of the war effort in Afghanistan,
noting that an "industrial-strength insurgency" by the Taliban and al-Qaida elements were in the
offing. As well, Petraeus warned that the fighting and violence would "get more intense in the next
few months." That being said, he indicated that it was part of the counterinsurgency process. He
said, "My sense is that the tough fighting will continue; indeed, it may get more intense in the next
few months. As we take away the enemy's safe havens and reduce the enemy's freedom of action,
the insurgents will fight back." Additionally, Petraeus did not foreclose the possibility of
recommending that President Barack Obama extend United States' troops engagement in
Afghanistan beyond the August 2011 timeline to begin redeployment.
Costs and complications of counterinsurgency strategy and human terrain units -It should be noted that the Afghan war strategy -- to fight resurgent Taliban and al-Qaida, improve
security in Afghanistan, and develop governing stability in that country as an alternative to a culture
of warfare -- is founded on the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN). The long-term objectives
of COIN entail not only the clearing the field of insurgents by the military, but also political
imperative of replacing the insurgent power base with more stable governance. Effective
counterinsurgency strategies, therefore, require close collaboration of the military, political,
economic and diplomatic spheres in the conflict zone. While a respected strategy, with an exit
timeline expected to be completed in 2014, there has been increased skepticism about the ongoing
involvement in Afghanistan as the war has gone on for a decade.
One particularly key reason for a sense of skepticism about the war strategy and its associated
timeline were matters of financial costs of the war, and the timeline attached to the Afghanistan
strategy. That is to say, when President Obama first outlined his plan to deploy an additional
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 332 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
30,000 troops to Afghanistan, he also noted that the United States would begin a redeployment of
those troops by 2011. With debt worries prevalent in the United States and other NATO countries
(as discussed below), questions arose as to whether or not the continued war effort in Afghanistan
was a financially feasible endeavor. That is to say, the war and counterinsurgency mission requires
a substantial outlay of resources that few governments (including the United States) could
realistically commit to for the long term.
Complicating matters further has been the rising death toll of NATO forces in a war that has
continued for close to a decade. That increased death toll has contributed to decreasing support for
the Afghanistan war effort.
Moreover, analysts have pointed to the fact that COIN involves the idea of clearing the landscape
of insurgents, followed by the establishment of a government as an alternative to the war culture.
But clearance in one area often results in the relocation of the terrorists elsewhere and a perpetual
pursuit of the strategic enemy. Meanwhile, the establishment of more stable governance, which has
seen some success in the more politically mature Iraq, cannot easily be transposed to the largely
tribal cultural orientation of Afghanistan, which does not have a strong legacy of governmental
authority.
With an eye on understanding that tribal cultural orientation of Afghanistan, the United States
military has employed anthropologists in the war zone to garner a more granular understanding of
the complicated social and cultural dynamics of Afghanistan. Anthropologists' command of
ethnographic fieldwork may be uniquely positioned to map the complex social structure of the
company, ultimately helping the military to draw Afghans away from the Taliban.
Known as the army-funded "Human Terrain System," as discussed in an article published in Time
Magazine by Jason Motlagh, the idea has been the source of debate with no consensus on its
success. Academia has frowned on anthropologists being actively involved in the war theater. As
noted in a report by the American Anthropological Association, because human terrain teams are
ultimately oriented toward the objectives of the military mission, there is an ethical question of
whether such work is "a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology." Nevertheless, General
Petraeus has been reported to be a strong supporter of the human terrain teams, suggesting that
they would for the immediate future continue to be part of the broader counterinsurgency
strategy. That being said, most anthropologists would agree that more than a year of intensive
fieldwork is needed before conclusions can be made; thus, the success of human terrain units in
Afghanistan would require a longer timeline than currently expected for United States forces to
remain "in country."
Financial Cost of the War in Afghanistan -In late June 2010, legislators in the United States voted to cut almost $4 billion in aid to the
government of Afghanistan. The move was in response to allegations of corruption by the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 333 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Afghan government, and in the aftermath of a report by the Wall Street Journal that significant
funds had been flown out of the airport at Kabul. The report alleged that Afghan officials and their
allies were diverting funds earmarked for aid and logistics to financial safe havens outside the
country.
Explaining the Congress' decision to make these cuts, Congresswoman Nita Lowey, the chair of
the subcommittee responsible for aid appropriations, said, "I do not intend to appropriate one more
dime until I have confidence that US taxpayer money is not being abused to line the pockets of
corrupt Afghan government officials, drug lords and terrorists." Lowey additionally called for an
audit of the billions of dollars already expended in Afghanistan.
While the funding cuts would not directly affect military operations of humanitarian aid to
Afghanistan, it could very well affect infrastructure projects, which are part of the nation building
efforts in Afghanistan. To this end, Congressman Mark Kirk, made note of Kandahar's electrical
system; he said that obstacles to its construction, and other such infrastructure projects, could
negatively affect the war, which included the effort to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan
people.
The issue has evoked questions about the financial costs of the war at large at a time when debt
worries plague not only the United States, but also allied countries with troops operating in
Afghanistan, as discussed in the section above. As NATO countries, including the United States,
have been forced to consider austerity measures at home, the financial costs of the war in
Afghanistan have taken on added importance. In fact, that significance was apparent on July 1,
2010, when President Barack Obama requested $33 billion in military funding to support the surge
of 30,000 additional troops in Afghanistan.
Pakistan's complicity with Afghan Taliban raises questions about U.S. strategy in region -Since June 2010, Afghanistan's geopolitical relationship with Pakistan has taken center stage. At
issue were revelations that the Pakistani intelligence service, known by the acronym ISI, has been
funding, training, and providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban. For several years, there have
been suspicions about such a clandestine relationship between the two entities, however, the
closeness and extensive nature of their ties was something of a revelation. Indeed, in a report
issued by the London School of Economics support for the Afghan Taliban was described as
"official ISI policy."
As noted by the author of the report, Matt Waldman of Harvard University, "This goes far beyond
just limited, or occasional support. This is very significant levels of support being provided by the
ISI." Waldman also asserted, "We're also saying this is official policy of that agency, and we're
saying that it is very extensive. It is both at an operational level, and at a strategic level, right at the
senior leadership of the Taliban movement."
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 334 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The report also included references to interviews with Taliban field commanders who said that ISI
agents attended Taliban council meetings. Shoring up the veracity of this claim was the following
citation from the report: "These accounts were corroborated by former Taliban ministers, a
Western analyst, and a senior United Nations official based in Kabul, who said the Taliban largely
depend on funding from the ISI and groups in Gulf countries." Corroborating evidence was also
available from a source unrelated to the LSE report. In an interview with Reuters, the head of
Afghan intelligence, Amrullah Saleh, who had just resigned from that position, said the ISI was
"part of the landscape of destruction" in Afghanistan and accused Pakistan of sheltering Taliban
leaders in safe houses.
Editor's Update: More recently in September 2011 (as discussed above), a siege by extremist
Islamic terrorist on Kabul targeted the United States embassy, NATO headquarters, and police
stations. Blame was placed on the Pakistan-based Haqqani network, which has been closely allied
with the Taliban and al-Qaida both in terms of extremist Islamic ideology and in terms of its brutal
use of terrorism. Cameron Munter, the United States ambassador to Pakistan asserted that there
were links between the Haqqani network and the Pakistani government. As well, outgoing United
States chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, suggested that the Pakistan's
intelligence agency helped the terrorist who attacked his country's embassy in Kabul, according to
a report by the New York Times.
Some observers have noted that with the impending exit of foreign troops from Afghanistan
expected in 2011, Pakistan's actions may be related to its desire to more deeply influence
Afghanistan. However, ISI activities related to Islamic militant extremists are not recent
developments in response to the current landscape. Indeed, the ISI has been accused of funding
and training Islamic militant extremists in Afghanistan from as far back as the 1979 Soviet
invasion. That being said, since the 2001 terror attacks in the United States, Pakistan has accepted
billions of dollars in aid funding from the United States, supposedly for its support in the fight
against terror enclaves like al-Qaida and its Taliban allies. Clearly, a continued relationship
between the Pakistani ISI and the Afghan Taliban would run counter to its expressed objectives of
helping the United States quell the threat of terrorism emanating from such entities in the AfghanPak region. As stated in the LSE report, "Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game of
astonishing magnitude."
Developments in 2010 on the war in Afghanistan -In July 2010, the Iceland-based website, known as Wikileaks, released six years worth of classified
United States documents, numbering around 90,000, dealing with the war in Afghanistan. Several
news organizations were given access to the documents prior to actual publication, although United
States authorities have argued that the dissemination of classified information was a threat to
national security, an act of gross irresponsibility, and quite possibly, imbued with illegality. From
Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai charged that the release of Wikileaks documents have
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 335 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
endangered the lives of Afghan citizens who worked with NATO-led international forces. The
Afghan leader said that the disclosure of the names of Afghans who cooperated with the NATO-led
forces was "shocking" and "irresponsible." For its part, Wikileaks has defended the release of the
documents, noting that it presented an unvarnished view of the war in Afghanistan since 2004.
Regardless of these competing views, the contents of the controversial documents have spurred
debate about the United States' role in the war in Afghanistan, as well as the conduct of the war
itself. To these ends, two Wikileaks revelations could raise questions about the Obama
administration's broader "Afghan-Pak" strategy, which considers not only "ground zero" of the war
effort -- Afghanistan -- but also Pakistan next door. While the strategy appropriately focuses on the
region instead of one country, taking into consideration shared extremist Islamic influences, shared
Pashtun culture, and a landscape on the borderland that is a stronghold for Taliban and al-Qaida,
two Wikileaks revelations strong doubts on the effectiveness of the strategy.
Firstly, according to the document review by the New York Times, even as Pakistan receives funds
from the United States to help combat Islamic extremists militants and the threat of terrorism, the
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was said to be helping the Taliban, even collaborating
with them on terror attacks and assassination plots.
Secondly, the tactic of using drone attacks in the tribal border regions has been lauded by the
Obama administration as a means of crushing the enemy and eliminating high value Taliban and alQaida targets. However, according to the review by Der Spiegel, 38 Predator and Reaper drones
crashed while on combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, requiring "elaborate -- and dangerous -salvage operations." On the ground, "in country," there are additional worries about the political
costs of the civilian casualties caused by drone attacks.
The civilian costs provide a transition to discuss a third issue revealed by Wikileaks. According to
the review by Marc Ambinder of The Atlantic, there were "at least 144 separate incidents" of
civilian casualties that led to "cover-ups." Ambinder particularly took note of the unsuccessful
attempt to kill Abu Layth Ali Libi, which resulted in the deaths of several civilians and that resulted
in a "cover-up" by Afghan officials.
Analysis of Afghan Strategy by late 2010 -Taken together, these issues both inform and fuel emerging questions about a timeline for
continued engagement in Afghanistan. Indeed, these factors -- from financial costs to the strategic
considerations -- have contributed to rising emphasis on a "date certain" exit from Afghanistan,
starting in 2011 and to end in 2014. Of course, on the other side of the equation,
counterinsurgency advocates have argued that the objectives of the mission could require an
extended timeline.
There were also been emerging questions about the precise nature of that policy itself, which have
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 336 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
only been intensified with the Wikileaks revelations. Indeed, can counterinsurgency succeed in
Afghanistan? If so, what are the benchmarks for success? Can the United States and its allies
afford to fund the mission, given the demands on the domestic front? And is Pakistan -- an
apparent ally -- actually undermining the effort to succeed in Afghanistan?
Note that in late 2010, NATO announced its plans to exit Afghanistan and transfer control over the
anti-Taliban struggle to Afghan forces by the close of 2014. Afghan President Karzai formalized
the agreement by signing a long-term security partnership with NATO. At the heart of the matter
was NATO's contention that the Taliban not be allowed to simply wait out the presence of foreign
forces. As stated by NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the security bloc would
remain committed to security and stability of Afghanistan. He said, "One thing must be very clear
- NATO is in this for the long term." The NATO head then continued, "If the enemies of
Afghanistan have the idea that they can wait it out until we leave, they have the wrong idea. We
will stay as long as it takes to finish our job." For his part, Afghan President Karzai expressed
gratitude for NATO's contributions to his country's interest but stated, "I also informed them of the
concerns of the Afghan people with regard to civilian casualties, with regard to detentions, with
regard to, at times, NATO's posture."
It should be noted that this decision by NATO did not necessarily coincide with an official decision
by the United States on the duration of combat operations by its forces in Afghanistan.
On that latter consideration, there was some indication of the direction of the United States in
December 2010 when a much-anticipated report dealing with United States President Barack
Obama's strategy for the war in Afghanistan surfaced in the public purview. That report concluded
that United States forces were on track to begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2011, as
scheduled in the United States' president's war plan. This conclusion was reached despite the fact
there were mixed reports of success in the field. On that matter, the summary of the report said
that the United States forces continued to pursue and eliminate al-Qaida leadership figures, was
successful in reducing the terror enclave's ability to carry out attacks from the Afghan-Pak region,
and had halted the progress of the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the summary
noted that those gains were tenuous and could well be reversed in the future.
June 2011 Update: President Obama unveils Afghan exit strategy
On June 22, 2011, President Barack Obama was scheduled to unveil his exit strategy from
Afghanistan. At issue was the number of United States troops expected to leave Afghanistan and
the associated pace of withdrawal from that country.
Ahead of the president's much-anticipated address regarding the Afghanistan exit strategy,
speculation abounded about whether or not the more hawkish advisers in government would
prevail, and only a nominal number of troops would be withdrawn, along with a vague exit date.
They pointed to the need for enough forces on the ground as the region entered its summer fighting
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 337 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
season. As well, many military commanders argued that a premature withdrawal would result in a
reversal of the fragile military gains made against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan.
Among these elements advocating only a modest "draw down" of forces, and at a slow place of
withdrawal, were outgoing Defense Secretary William Gates and the United States commander in
Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, who was expected to soon come home to the United States
to take the position of the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Outgoing CIA director,
Leon Panetta, was to take on the defense portfolio in the wake of Gates; it was not known if this
shift in personnel was imbued with a hint of a shift in strategy.
At the other end of the philosophical spectrum was a cadre of advisers who were against the initial
surge strategy in Afghanistan, favoring instead targeted attacks in the Afghan-Pak region. This
camp, led by vice President Joseph Biden, has been lobbying for a significant "draw down" of the
troops from Afghanistan as early as mid-2011, with a steady ongoing withdrawal from that point,
culminating in a date-certain exit, preferably by a 2014 deadline.
The Biden-led camp has argued that the security gains in Afghanistan to date, in combination with
the disruption of the al-Qaida network in that country, and the death of Osama bin Laden in
neighboring Pakistan at the hands of United States special forces in May 2011, collectively pave
the way for the United States to declare victory and begin the process of ending the war.
It should be noted that the American citizenry was war-weary after a decade of combat operations
across the world. Indeed, a recent survey by the Pew Institute showed that as many as 56 percent
of respondents favored an end to the war in Afghanistan as soon as possible. Even outgoing
Defense Secretary Gates, who has stood on the side of the generals in favoring only a modest
withdrawal of Afghanistan, was cognizant of the public support conundrum. To that end, Gates
acknowledged during a new conference to the State Department that President Obama would
have to consider the concerns of the American people in his decision regarding the war in
Afghanistan. Gate said, "It goes without saying that there are a lot of reservations in the Congress
about the war in Afghanistan and our level of commitment. There are concerns among the
American people who are tired of a decade of war."
The United States Congress was itself growing increasingly anxious about the costs of constant
warfare at a time when debt concerns dominated the domestic political spectrum. A bipartisan
group of United States senators dispatched a letter to President Obama calling for a shift in the
Afghanistan war strategy and advocating a substantial withdrawal of United States troops from that
country. The letter included the following statement: "Given our successes, it is the right moment
to initiate a sizable and sustained reduction in forces, with the goal of steadily redeploying all
regular combat troops. The costs of prolonging the war far outweigh the benefits."
That being said, there was an equally vocal coterie of senators expressing the opposite view, urging
instead that the president heed the generals and hold steady in Afghanistan. Of note was Senator
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 338 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
John McCain, a Republican from Arizona who was President Obama's rival in the 2008
presidential election. McCain said during an interview with ABC News' "Good Morning America,"
that his views lined up with Gates in calling for only a modest "draw down" since he did not want
to see a reversal of the fragile gains already made. McCain also suggested that a continued full
throttle effort could potentially end in success saying, "I believe that one more fighting season and
we can get this thing pretty well wrapped up."
Ahead of the June 22, 2011 national address, White House spokesperson, Jay Carney, confirmed
that President Obama had made a decision on the withdrawal plan and was in the process of
informing the national security team. Without disclosing the details, Carney noted that the the
"draw down" of the troops would commence in July 2011, on a phased basis, with a complete
withdrawal by 2014. While the president himself has been on the record saying that he would
favor a "significant" withdrawal of United States troops from Afghanistan, the actual meaning of
the term "significant" was yet a matter of interpretation.
To be clear, since coming to office, President Obama tripled the number of United States forces
operating in Afghanistan, for a total of about 100,000 troops "in country." Included in this 100,000
number were the 30,000 troops that were added as part of the "surge" aimed at providing
reinforcements in the mission to reverse the Taliban's battlefield momentum. At the time,
President Obama had said that he would begin to redeploy United States forces in mid-July 2011.
Carney's aforementioned statement indicated that the president intended to abide with the promised
timeline; the main question rested on the number of troops to be withdrawn along with the actual
pace.
On June 22, 2011, in keeping with his pledge made in late 2009, President Obama unveiled a plan
to redeploy United States troops from Afghanistan and effectively end its commitments in that
country that had now lasted a decade. Explaining that al-Qaida was under pressure, with as much
as half of the al-Qaida leadership, including Bin Laden killed, and serious losses inflicted upon the
Taliban, the United States was well-positioned to begin to close out the war in Afghanistan.
To that end, President Obama ordered the withdrawal of 10,000 United States troops from
Afghanistan in 2011, with another 23,000 troops to be redeployed the following year. This "draw
down" of 33,000 United States forces from Afghanistan would essentially end the aforementioned
surge by the summer of 2012. Remaining "in country" would be the rest of the troops -- about
67,000 in total -- which would themselves undergo a steady pace of phased withdrawal to end by
a final deadline of 2014. It was expected that commanders on the ground in Afghanistan would be
given the autonomy to sort out the "battlefield geometry" and decide on what types of troops
would be needed in certain capacities from special forces, to trainers, intelligence officers, and
combat troops.
President Obama explained that the withdrawal plan would take time, saying, "This is the beginning
-- but not the end -- of our effort to wind down this war." That being said, President Obama told
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 339 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
the American people that they should take comfort in knowing that the tide of war was receding.
To that end, he noted that combat operations were over in Iraq, and "light was to be seen in
distance" in Afghanistan.
According to the president, the specific mission in Afghanistan going forward was to be: "No safehaven from which al-Qaida or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland, or our allies.
We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place. We will not police its streets or patrol its
mountains indefinitely. That is the responsibility of the Afghan government, which must step up its
ability to protect its people."
In this way, the president was not only putting the Afghan authorities on notice that they had to
take responsibility for their own country, he was simultaneously emphasizing a circumscribed role
for the United States in Afghanistan. With an eye on handing over security control in Afghanistan,
President Obama announced that the United States would play host to a summit in 2012, which
would include NATO allies, and would focus on transitioning Afghanistan to a new future. The
president noted that a peaceful future for Afghanistan would entail a political solution and
accordingly, the United States would "join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including
the Taliban." In this way, the president -- for the first time -- appeared to back the notion of talks
with the Taliban, pending that group's renunciation of violence and separation from al-Qaida.
All told, the new mission would transition from that of comprehensive counter-insurgency (COIN)
strategy to a focused and targeted counter-terrorism strategy, aimed at capturing and killing
terrorists and insurgents. There would also be a clear "date-certain" exit deadline. Borrowing from
the experience in Iraq, the Obama administration believed that it was vital that the Afghan
government be pressured towards taking full responsibility for the country's security, and the
United States Congress needed to have clear targets to be used as mileposts for evaluation.
This plan would fall within the parameters of the Biden camp as the troop reductions were deeper
than initially anticipated; it also included a faster redeployment schedule than recommended by the
military advisers. According to the New York Times, the plan was a validation of Vice President
Biden's position. As expected, the plan was not easily endorsed by General Petraeus, who wanted
to see United States forces remain in place for a longer time horizon. The president was expected
to draw attention to the success of a more limited counter-terrorism strategy, as exemplified by the
capture and killing of Bin Laden.
At a broader level, President Obama used the exit strategy from Afghanistan to craft his own vision
of United States foreign policy. Indeed, the president said that while the United States would not
retreat from its role as a global power, the country had to chart a new pragmatic and strategic
course as regards international engagement. President Obama said, "Already this decade of war
has caused many to question the nature of America’s engagement around the world. Some would
have America retreat from our responsibility as an anchor of global security, and embrace an
isolation that ignores the very real threats that we face. Others would have America over-extend
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 340 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
ourselves, confronting every evil that can be found abroad."
Rather than selecting from this dyad, President Obama opted for a third way, which he
characterized as "a more centered course." He said, "Like generations before, we must embrace
America’s singular role in the course of human events. But we must be as pragmatic as we are
passionate; as strategic as we are resolute. When threatened, we must respond with force –- but
when that force can be targeted, we need not deploy large armies overseas. When innocents are
being slaughtered and global security endangered, we don’t have to choose between standing idly
by or acting on our own. Instead, we must rally international action, which we are doing in Libya,
where we do not have a single soldier on the ground, but are supporting allies in protecting the
Libyan people and giving them the chance to determine their destiny."
In this one paragraph, one finds something of an Obama doctrine that embraces: (1) strategic
pragmatism, reliant more on intelligence and targeted operations than excessive boots on the
ground, (2) multilateralism, in which an engaged United States of America works within an
international framework to solve global problems; and (3) fidelity to democratic ideals, in which the
United States would support self-determination of freedom-seeking people, while eschewing the
notion of American hegemony and empire.
President Obama ended his address to the nation by stating that the time had come for the United
States to concentrate on nation building in the domestic sphere, emphasizing that the costs of war
had been high, and the time had come to focus on the plight of the American people at home.
Clearly, the United States president was responding to the political climate at home, which was
growing increasingly frustrated with economic strife at home and its concomitant link to the heavy
price tag of war abroad.
Late 2011/Early 2012 Update:
United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker has asserted that the plague of violence in
Afghanistan ten years after the 2001 terror attacks in the United States, which spurred the war in
Afghanistan, would not change his country's plans. Crocker has said the United States troops
needed to remain in Afghanistan to prevent extremists from using Afghan territory to plan another
catastrophic terror attack. But Crocker on Sept. 14, 2011, was also adamant about the fact that
the actions of militant extremists would not deter the United States from its transition schedule -including the transfer of security duties from coalition forces to Afghan forces, and the phased exit
of United States troops from Afghanistan.
It should be noted that in November 2011, reports were emerging that the Obama administration
was considering an accelerated shift of the United States' military's mission in Afghanistan to an
advisory role. High level discussions to this end were said to be underway although no decisions
had been made. Clearly, should such a shift beenacted , there would be broad implications for the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 341 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
United States strategy in Afghanistan, potentially scaling back United States combat duties in that
country well ahead of the 2014 date when remaining troops would finally be withdrawn.
At the close of January 2012, it was reported that the Taliban in Afghanistan refused to assent to a
ceasefire demand by the United States in Afghanistan. The demand was part of a prisoner
exchange/peace proposal, which focused on the release of five leading Taliban commanders who
were being held at the United States military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay (Cuba) since
2002. As reported by NBC news, a Taliban spokesperson said: "Our stance is the same. We will
announce a ceasefire when the foreign forces start their withdrawal from Afghanistan."
By the start of February 2012, attention switched to the security scene in Afghanistan, with NATO
affirming that local forces would play a leading role in defending the country in mid-2013, ahead
of the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014.
Speaking of these developments to come, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said:
From that time [2013], the role of our troops will gradually change from combat to support."
Consistent with this plan, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced his intention to withdraw
his country's troops from Afghanistan by 2013. Meanwhile, United States Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta was asserting success in the anti-extremist operations in Afghanistan, noting that
insurgent forces there had been successfully weakened. Panetta said that the United States' goal in
Afghanistan was to complete the transition "from a combat role to a training, advice and assist role"
in 2013.
In March 2012, following a series of incidents (the unfortunate burning of Korans and the killing of
civilians by a United States soldier), there was accentuated emphasis on United States foreign
policy regarding Afghanistan. The American public was war-weary after such a lengthy
engagement in Afghanistan and clamoring for "nation-building" at home on the domestic front.
Accordingly, the calls for an even earlier exit strategy from Afghanistan were increasing.
That being said, the United States and its closest ally, the United Kingdom, indicated that the
current schedule for ending engagement in Afghanistan would remain intact. Leaders of both
countries addressed the matter while British Prime Minister David Cameron was in the United
States for a state visit with American President Barack Obama. They said their respective countries
would end combat roles in Afghanistan by mid-to-late 2013. Before then, 23,000 United States
troops would return from Afghanistan by September 2012 (10,000 already returned in June 2011),
as promised by President Obama. For its part, the United Kingdom would send 500 British troops
home in the early autumn of 2012. These moves would assure that American and British forces
would shift from lead combat roles to support and training capacities by the second half of 2013,
with the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014.
United States President Obama said his intent was to ensure a "responsible" end to the war in
Afghanistan. Speaking of this issue, the American president said, "We have a strategy that will
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 342 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
allow us to responsibly wind down this [Afghan] war. We're steadily transitioning to the Afghans
who are moving into the lead. And that's going to allow us to bring our troops home. Already we're
scheduled to remove 23,000 troops by the end of this summer ... following the 10,000 that we
withdrew last year. And meanwhile, we will continue the work of devastating al-Qaida's leadership
and denying them a safe haven." Referring to the recent tragedies and unfortunate incidents that
raised tensions with Afghanistan, President Obama said, "There's no question that we face a
difficult challenge in Afghanistan, but I am ... confident that we can continue the work of meeting
our objectives, protecting our country and responsibly bringing this war to a close."
It should be noted that France was set to withdraw 1,000 of its soldiers from Afghanistan by the
end of 2012, leaving about 3,000 "in country." Belgium had begun withdrawing half of its force at
the start of 2012. Norway likewise began its withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and was
looking towards a complete exit. Spain said that 2012 would mark the start of its withdrawal of
troops from Afghanistan, with a complete exit set for 2014. Canada withdrew its combat troops in
2011 and had already made its transition to a training role in Afghanistan.
With an eye on smoothing tensions with Afghanistan, especially after Afghan President Karzai
urged a faster exit of NATO forces from his country (as noted above), President Obama reportedly
convened a telephone meeting with the Afghan leader. In that call, the White House said that
President Obama and President Karzai "affirmed that they share the goal of building capable
Afghan security forces and strengthening Afghan sovereignty so that Afghans are increasingly in
charge of their own security, with the lead for combat operations shifting to Afghan forces, with
U.S. forces in support, in 2013." Obviously, this schedule would also mean that the "date certain"
for the deadline of the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014
remained intact.
As March 2012 was entering its final week, the White House confirmed the exit schedule noting
that the United States would have about 68,000 troops in Afghanistan in 2013 after surge forces
withdraw from that country. Obviously, this schedule would also mean that the "date certain" for
the deadline of the complete termination of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014
remained intact.
NOTE:
To recapitulate: Of the 100,000 United States troops in Afghanistan, about 33,000 were due to be
redeployed in 2012. A full withdrawal of foreign combat troops was scheduled to take place in
2014; however, as noted below, that timeline has been extended until 2016..
United States considering complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan -In January 2013, as Afghan President Hamid Karzai arrived in the United States capital of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 343 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Washington D.C. for meetings, the Obama administration was reported to be considering a
complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. In a conference call, Ben Rhodes -- the deputy
national security adviser for strategic communication -- acknowledged that the total withdrawal of
troops (known as the "zero option") was indeed an option that the Obama administration had on
the proverbial table. Rhodes said, "The U.S. does not have an inherent objective of X number of
troops in Afghanistan. We have an objective of making sure there's no safe haven for al-Qaida
within Afghanistan and making sure that the Afghan government has a security force that is
sufficient to ensure the stability of the Afghan government and the denial of that safe haven." He
continued, "So that's what guides us and that's what causes us to look for different potential troop
numbers, or not having potential troops in the country." One possibility was the notion of using
non-military means of meeting the national interests in Afghanistan.
Rhodes' statement was an indication that in his second term, President Barack Obama intended to
put more of his own stamp on foreign policy, as shown by his selection of former Senator Chuck
Hagel as defense secretary. The Vietnam war veteran holds that military engagement should be
used judiciously and shares Obama's skepticism over the Iraq war; perhaps most pertinently, Hagel
has advocated a faster withdrawal from Afghanistan. Overall, many aspects of Hagel's foreign
policy orientation tracks harmoniously with that of President Obama, and was certainly a departure
from the neo-conservative foreign policy, which was vociferously championed by Republicans
during the previous Bush administration.
A report in the Washington Post noted that some elements of the Obama administration have
advanced the idea of reducing the United States' troop presence in Afghanistan radically to only
2,500 after 2014. By way of comparison, there were about 68,000 United States troops stationed
in Afghanistan at the start of 2013. Those voices in the Obama administration -- quite in contrast to
certain military officials -- have suggested that it would be the best way to end a long, expensive,
and increasingly unpopular war. But some military officials believe that an accelerated withdrawal
from Afghanistan would be irresponsible. Certainly, some reports from the Pentagon indicate that
Afghanistan security forces are barely able to manage their duties without support from United
States forces.
Regardless of the efficiency of Afghan security forces, the reality was that the foreign troop
presence in Afghanistan was highly unpopular and the Afghan government itself was not restrained
in casting aspersions on the United States' troops stationed in Afghanistan. Indeed, just ahead of
his trip to the United States in January 2013, Afghan President Hamid Karzai blamed the United
States troop presence for the rise in corruption and violence in his country, the actual causality of
bloodshed in that country over decades notwithstanding. The formulation of a post-2014 foreign
troop presence in Afghanistan was expected to be the main agenda item to be discussed during
Karzai's visit to the United States.
There appeared to be little concurrence between the United States and Afghanistan on the nature
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 344 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
of a continued United States troops presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014. According to the New
York Times, despite his bluster about the United States military in Afghanistan being the cause of
troubles in his country, Karzai wanted as many as 15,000 troops to remain past the official end of
the war. By contrast, the United States was considering a total withdrawal by 2014.
Note that on Jan. 11, 2013, after a meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, United States
President Barack Obama said that a transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces would
ensue over the course of 2013 with a complete end of the war in Afghanistan at the end of 2014.
The Obama White House also released a statement making it clear that the year 2013 was intended
to bring an end to United States combat operations in Afghanistan. Explaining his exit strategy
from Afghanistan, President Obama said, "But let me say it as plainly as I can: Starting this spring,
our troops will have a different mission -- training, advising, assisting Afghan forces. And by the
end of next year, 2014, the transition will be complete -- Afghans will have full responsibility for
their security, and this war will come to a responsible end."
Meanwhile, the governments of the United States and Afghanistan additionally agreed to a plan to
engage Taliban officials in future peace talks, which Karzai said were intended to return "peace
and stability to Afghanistan as soon as possible."
On March 11, 2013, a man clad in the uniform of an Afghan police officer opened fire on security
forces at a police station in Afghanistan, killing two United States troops and three Afghan troops,
and wounding several others. The attack took place as United States and Afghan troops were
holding an early morning meeting. Officials said the attack was an "insider" operation and the killer
was identified as a member of the Afghan security forces. Although the killer was eventually
eliminated and the area was said to have been secured, the United States military characterized the
violence as a "betrayal."
This incident in Wardak occurred only one day after United States special forces withdrew from
the province. It also occurred just after the Afghan government, led by President Hamid Karzai,
made the bizarre assertion of collusion between United States forces and the Taliban. Karzai made
this claim on March 10, 2013, following a bombing in the Aghan capital of Kabul that left around
ten people dead. Karzai suggested that there were "ongoing daily talks between Taliban, American
and foreigners in Europe and in the Gulf states" and advanced the notion that the "Taliban want
longer presence of foreigners -- not their departure from Afghanistan." The commander of the
NATO-led forces in Afghanistan, Marine General Joseph Dunford, took vociferous exception to
Karzai's claim, declaring: "We have fought too hard over the past 12 years. We have shed too
much blood over the past 12 years. We have done too much to help the Afghan Security Forces
grow over the last 12 years to ever think that violence or instability would be to our advantage." It
should be noted that Karzai has described by political insiders, including a fomer United States
ambassador to Afghanistan, as having a history of erratic behavior.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 345 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Note that peace talks were on the agenda in Afghanistan in June 2013 between the Afghan
government and the Taliban. However, less than 24 hours after the Taliban opened an office in
Qatar, and before the discussion could ever commence, the Afghan government walked away from
the negotiating table. It should be noted that Afghanistan also broke off talks with the United
States on future military cooperation beyond 2014 -- when United States forces were scheduled to
fully withdraw from Afghanistan.
United States and NATO officials have been consistent advocates of bilateral negotiations between
the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, as they believe that some sort of ceasefire
agreement must be forged between the two sides if Afghanistan hopes to have a stable future. But
previous proposals for peace have ended in failure, and this effort was already on the rocks.
Afghan President Karzai said he was protesting the United States' outreach to the Taliban, which
apparently Karzai viewed as objectionable. Of particular concern to Karzai was the title of the
Taliban office in Qatar, as well as the Taliban flag flying over the office compound. A
spokesperson for President Karzai said "We oppose the title -- the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan - because such a thing doesn't exist." The spokesperson continued, "The U.S. was aware of the
president's stance." From the point of President Karzai, the Taliban was attempting to portray itself
as a government in exile. Accordingly, the Afghan president made it clear that it would not be
engaging in peace talks unless those activities were "Afghan-led."
In mid-2013, dissonance between Afghan President Karzai and United States President Obama led
the Obama administration to consider a complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan ahead of
the scheduled timeline to exit Afghanistan in 2014. The Obama administration was also
considering whether or not to bypass the option of retaining a residual presence past the 2014
deadline.
Note that peace talks were on the agenda in Afghanistan a month earlier -- in June 2013 -between the Afghan government and the Taliban. However, less than 24 hours after the Taliban
opened an office in Qatar, and before the discussion could ever commence, the Afghan
government walked away from the negotiating table. It should be noted that Afghanistan also
broke off talks with the United States on future military cooperation beyond 2014 -- when United
States forces were scheduled to fully withdraw from Afghanistan.
United States and NATO officials have been consistent advocates of bilateral negotiations between
the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, as they believe that some sort of ceasefire
agreement must be forged between the two sides if Afghanistan hopes to have a stable future. But
previous proposals for peace have ended in failure, and this effort was already on the rocks.
Afghan President Karzai said he was protesting the United States' outreach to the Taliban, which
apparently Karzai viewed as objectionable. Of particular concern to Karzai was the title of the
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 346 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Taliban office in Qatar, as well as the Taliban flag flying over the office compound. A
spokesperson for President Karzai said "We oppose the title -- the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan - because such a thing doesn't exist." The spokesperson continued, "The U.S. was aware of the
president's stance." From the point of President Karzai, the Taliban was attempting to portray itself
as a government in exile. Accordingly, the Afghan president made it clear that it would not be
engaging in peace talks unless those activities were "Afghan-led."
Continued dissonance between Afghan President Karzai and United States President Barack
Obama in July 2013 led the Obama administration to consider a complete withdrawal of troops
from Afghanistan ahead of the scheduled timeline to exit Afghanistan in 2014. The Obama
administration was also considering whether or not to bypass the option of retaining a residual
presence past the 2014 deadline. Increasing tensions between President Barack Obama and
Afghan President Hamid Karzai appeared to be at the heart of the matter.
Those tensions were sparked by Karzai's reaction to the United States outreach to the Taliban and
the coordination of formal peace talks in Qatar. However, the tensions increased following a
particular fractious telephone call between the two leaders. The result was that President Obama
was not looking into a "zero option" that would withdraw all forces from Afghanistan, including
residual counter-terrorism and advisory force that were expected to remain in Afghanistan even
after the exit of United States military troops in 2014.
White House Press Secretary Jay Carney insisted that President Obama had not yet made a
decision on the matter and was in no hurry to do so. Carney said, “I want to make clear, today’s
story notwithstanding, that this is not a decision that is imminent. And we are talking about a
residual force, a potential residual force, in a year and a half. So these are ongoing conversations."
It should be noted that earlier in the year, the president’s deputy national security adviser, Ben
Rhodes, said that the "zero option" would be considered if all the United States' goals in
Afghanistan were met. To that end, Rhodes said: “The objective of the bilateral security
agreement negotiations is not to accomplish a number of U.S. troops in a country. It is to
accomplish the two goals of denying a safe haven to al-Qaida, and training and equipping Afghan
national security forces."
President Obama himself addressed the fact that those objectives when he said, “We achieved our
central goal, which is -- or have come very close to achieving our central goal, which is to decapacitate al-Qaida, to dismantle them, to make sure that they cannot attack us again."
That being said, in the last week of July 2013, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began closing
down its clandestine bases in Afghanistan. The move coincided with the United States' military
withdrawal from Afghanistan, as well a shift in focus as the United States was now likely to
concentrate its counter-terrorism efforts in more active hotspots, such as Yemen and North Africa
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 347 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
where al-Qaida is more active, and possibly look towards monitoring the complicated landscape in
Syria. The closure of CIA bases in Afghanistan also indirectly exemplified the transition over the
last decade of the spy agency being a predominantly -- and classically -- espionage entity to one
with military capability at its disposal, such as the use of bases and drones.
Note that in November 2013, the governments of the United States and Afghanistan were in the
process of forging a security deal. At issue was an agreement for United States military forces
remaining in Afghanistan beyond the 2014 deadline when most NATO-led international forces,
including those from the United States, were due to officially withdraw. Of particular concern was
a key provision that would give United States military personnel immunity from prosecution in
Afghanistan.
In the last week of November 2013, the council of tribal elders, who make up Afghanistan's Loya
Jirga, convened a meeting to decide whether to approve the Bilateral Security Agreement with the
United States. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Loya Jirga approved the document and urged
that the deal be signed at the end of the year (2013), as requested by the United States. The
declaration read as follows: "Given the current situation in, and Afghanistan's need... the contents
of this agreement as a whole is endorsed by the members of this Loya Jirga. The Loya Jirga
requests the president to sign the agreement before the end of 2013."
Presumably to show that he was an independent actor and not beholden to the United States,
which was ironically ensuring the safety of Afghanistan for more than a decade, Afghan President
Hamid Karzai said he was toying with the idea of waiting until 2014 to sign the agreement. The
United States reacted to this move by Karzai by warning that there would be no delay. United
States Department of State spokesperson Jen Psaki, said: "We believe that signing sooner rather
than later is essential to give Afghans certainty about their future before the upcoming elections,
and enable the United States and other partners to plan for U.S. presence after 2014. It is neither
practical nor possible for us to further delay because of the uncertainty it would create."
As November 2013 came to a close, President Karzai maintained his stance in refusing to sign the
security deal with the United States until 2014, when a new president was elected to power in
Afghanistan. The United States warned that delay on a matter of such importance could result in
the "zero option" of withdrawing all United States troops from Afghanistan in 2014.
In a meeting with United States National Security Advisor Susan Rice in Kabul, Karzai also added
further conditions to the deal, demanding that the United States immediately end military raids on
Afghan homes. He also called for the United States to return any Afghan detainees currently being
held at Guantanamo Bay. The Obama administration responded to these new demands by
nothing that Karzai was making it clear that he was not prepared to sign the bilateral security
agreement. A statement by National Security Advisor Rice warned, "Without a prompt signature,
the U.S. would have no choice but to initiate planning for a post-2014 future in which there would
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 348 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
be no U.S. or NATO troop presence in Afghanistan."
The continuing violence at the start of 2014 highlighted the security challenges facing Afghanistan.
Of concern was the matter of how the country would deal with the violence when international
forces exited Afghanistan at the close of the year (2014). To that end, there was the pending
security agreement (discussed above) under consideration to be forged between Afghanistan and
the United States.
That proposal would mean that as many as 10,000 United States troops would be remain in
Afghanistan after the 2014 deadline for a withdrawal of international forces; that remaining
contingent would be responsible for counter-terrorism and training of Afghan forces. President
Karzai has not been quick to sign the agreement and the United States has made it clear that
without a signed agreement, it would fully exit Afghanistan at the close of 2014, as planned to this
point. To date, relations between the United States and the Karzai government in Afghanistan
have been decidedly conflicted, with the United States frequently frustrated by Karzai's erratic and
unstable behavior, marked occasionally by Karzai's threats to "join the Taliban."
In February 2014, the United States made clear that it was entertaining the possibility of
withdrawing all its troops from Afghanistan unless the security agreement is soon signed. Indeed,
on Feb. 12, 2014, White House spokesperson Jay Carney emphasized that the Obama
administration had no intention of renegotiating the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). At a
White House briefing, he said, "Planning has to place around the contingencies that exist -- with
either a signed BSA or a BSA that is not signed. And as time progresses into this year, it becomes
more difficult to plan for a post-2014 troop presence."
Meanwhile, around the same period in February 2014, reports were emerging from Afghanistan
about talks between President Karzai's government and the Taliban. A spokesperson for the
Karzai government, Aimal Faizi, said in an interview with the New York Times, "I can confirm that
... Taliban are willing more than ever to join the peace process. Contacts have been made and we
are also in touch with them."
The United States issued a statement supportive of such overtures of reconciliation. Jen Psaki of
the United States Department of State said, "It's important to note here that we've long strongly
supported an Afghan-led reconciliation, which would, of course, be Afghans talking to Afghans. So
the notion that we wouldn't support that dialogue is inaccurate." That being said, she made it clear
that the United States was not involved in any peace talks with the Taliban.
The United States was not so sanguine about the news that Karzai allowed the release of 65
detainees from the high-security Bagram prison to the north of Kabul. The United States had
strenuously urged Afghanistan not to release these detainees, warning that there were extremist
Taliban fighters who were responsible for the deaths of international forces, including both Afghan
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 349 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
and American soldiers, as well as civilians. But Karzai went forward with the release of these
extremists in defiance of the United States’ expressed request. The move was sure to further
complicate already dismal relations between the governments of the two countries.
As February 2014 came to a close, the White House in the United States announced that
President Barack Obama had ordered the Pentagon to prepare to withdraw all United States
troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year. President Obama issued the order in the face of
Karzai's dithering over the Bilateral Security Agreement that would allow the United States to
keep a limited contingent of troops in Afghanistan after 2014. President Obama apparently
delivered the news directly to President Karzai during a telephone call.
President Obama announces all combat troops will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2016 -On May 27, 2014, United States President Obama announced that a complete withdrawal of
American combat troops from Afghanistan would be completed at the end of 2016. That new
"date-certain" timeline would be an extension of a previous 2014 exit schedule announced by
President Obama in the past, but would nevertheless bring a conclusion to the United States
military engagement in Afghanistan, which commenced following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks in New York and Washington D.C.
President Obama's new schedule would call for a pullout of the majority of United States troops
from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, but would leave in place 9,800 troops in that country through
2015, when that number would be reduced by half. The remaining troops would then be
withdrawn in 2016. The new schedule, including the decision to keep in place a select number of
combat troops through 2016 was due to the fact that President Obama wanted to see further
training for Afghan security forces along with the ability to launch counterterrorism missions in the
interests of maintaining the progress made in a war that has gone on for more than a dozen years
and left more than 2,000 United States troops dead.
Of course, this plan would be contingent upon the signing of a new bilateral security agreement
between the United States and Afghanistan. With the increasingly eccentric President Hamid
Karzai at the helm in Afghanistan, there has been no progress in forging such an agreement.
However, with fresh leadership in the offing following the conclusion of the 2014 presidential
elections in Afghanistan, there were indications that a new Afghan government would be highly
interested in signing onto such an agreement.
It should be noted that while liberals in the United States were frustrated that a complete exit from
Afghanistan -- and an end to a war that had been ongoing for more than a decade -- would not
come at the end of 2014, some Republicans in Congress criticized President Obama's exit schedule
from Afghanistan. For conservatives, such as Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Kelly
Ayotte, issuing a date-certain deadline was tantamount to surrender. The three Republicans issued a
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 350 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
statement that read as follows: "The president's decision to set an arbitrary date for the full
withdrawal of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is a monumental mistake and a triumph of politics over
strategy."
But President Obama was vociferous in his stance that the engagement of United States military
forces in Afghanistan was coming to an end, and the specific mission in Afghanistan was on the
verge of being completed. According to the United States president, it was time for Afghans to
take responsibility for their country. As noted by President Obama in his drawdown announcement
from the White House's Rose Garden, "We have to recognize that Afghanistan will not be a perfect
place, and it is not America's responsibility to make it one."
President Obama made it clear that significant progress had been made in the years since the 2001
terror attacks -- a time when Afghanistan was the locus of the terrorist Islamist group, al-Qaida.
Indeed, United States military forces since that time have carried out a relentless assault on the
terrorist group, eliminating its leadership, and preventing Afghanistan from being used as a safe
haven and a base for attacks against the United States. With the death of Osama bin Laden -- a
perilous operation authorized by President Obama himself in 2011 -- the United States president
could conceivably argue that the time to exit Afghanistan had come. However, the president was
clearly looking towards a phased withdrawal, and one on a somewhat more protracted timeline
than he had indicated in recent years. To this end, he said: "Now we're finishing the job we've
started."
Another bone of contention for Republicans came as a result of a deal that secured the release of a
United States prisoner of war -- Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl -- from Afghan militants. Because
Bergdahl was released in exchange for five Afghan detainees from Guantanamo, several
Republican lawmakers attacked the administration for “negotiating with terrorists.”
However, as noted by National Security Advisor Susan Rice in an interview with CBS News,
Bergdahl was not actually a “hostage,” but a “prisoner of war, taken on the battlefield,” and that
the United States had a “sacred obligation” to free such prisoners of war. In an interview with
CNN, Rice also clarified that the United States did not, in fact, negotiate with the Haqqani
network, but with the government of Qatar, which was responsible for holding the five Afghans
for a period of one year. Rice also addressed Republicans' complaint that the Obama
administration did not provide Congress with the required 30-day notice required for releasing
prisoners of war, noting that Congress had already been notified that negotiations intended to
secure Bergdahl's release were in process. Several member of Congress -- from across party lines - complained that limited communications years prior on the matter of a prisoner exchange did not
constitute a proper notification.
It should be noted that the questionable circumstances of Begdahl's disappearance in Afghanistan
fueled accusations that he was a military deserter and thus, undeserving of the efforts to bring him
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 351 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
home. In truth, however, the precise circumstances remained murky and would be the subject of
military investigation, with the possibility of court martial, dishonorable discharge, or other legal
measures in the offing.
Those pathways were yet to be taken since the immediate discussion in the American political
purview was whether the return of one prisoner of war was worth the release of five Afghan
detainees (albeit into Qatari custody for one year). Also in the political purview was the question
of whether the negotiations brokered by the government of Qatar, which led to the prisoner
exchange deal, constituted "negotiations with terrorists" as alleged by many Republicans.
For his part, President Barack Obama made no apologies for the deal, saying "I make absolutely
no apologies for making sure we get a young man back to his parents." He continued, "We had a
prisoner of war whose health had deteriorated and ... we saw an opportunity and we seized it, and
I make no apologies for that." In answer to the question of whether the price of a prisoner
exchange was worth the security risks posed, especially if Bergdahl did turn out to be a deserter,
President Obama pointed to a guiding principle of the United States that "we do not leave anybody
wearing the American uniform behind" and emphasizing, "We don't condition whether we make
the effort to get them back."
NOTE:
See above information regarding the exit schedule of United States troops from Afghanistan. To
recapitulate: Of the 100,000 United States troops in Afghanistan, about 33,000 were due to be
redeployed in 2012. A full withdrawal of foreign combat troops was scheduled to take place in
2014; however, that exit timeline was extended until 2016, as detailed above.
Special Note
U.S. special forces carry out terrorist raid in Afghanistan
In October 2013, United States special forces raided a terrorist enclave in Afghanistan. The
operation took place in eastern Afghanistan, ultimately ending in the capture of a senior Pakistan
Taliban commander, Latif Mehsud. Few details were made available following this operation,
although Afghan officials admitted that Latif Mehsud was seized as he was returning from
negotiations over a prison exchange deal in the eastern Afghan province of Logar and transferred
to the Bagram base close to the Afghan capital of Kabul. The incident apparently raised the ire of
Afghan President Hamid Karzai, however, the United States seemed undeterred and confident in
the wisdom if its action. The United States Department of State noted that Latif Mehsud was a
"terrorist leader," a stalwart of the Pakistani Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, and the Pakistani
Taliban was believed to be responsible for the attempted bombing of Times Square in New York in
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 352 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
2010. Furthermore, around the same time that Latif Mehsud was seized, Hakimullah Mehsud
said in an interview that the Pakistani Taliban would continue to target "America and its friends" in
its campaign of terror.
Special Note
U.S. general killed in Afghanistan ahead of departure of United States troops
On Aug. 5, 2014, an Afghan army soldier opened fire on international troops at the well-fortified
British military base to the west of Kabul. The attack at Camp Qargha resulted with the killing of
a United States army general, injuries to a German general, and the wounding of several other
soldiers. The assailant was ultimately killed by a bodyguard but not before he was able to carry
out his bloody assault. While the Afghan army recruit who opened fire on coalition officers was
not revealed to be carrying out a Taliban operation, the Islamic extremist group nonetheless
congratulated him post-humously for his efforts to hurt coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.
The general who died was identified as General Harold Greene -- the deputy commanding general
for the Combined Security Transition Command, who was tasked with preparing for the
withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan. The death of General Harold Greene marked the
highest level fatality of a member of the United States military since the start of the war in
Afghanistan.
Special Note
U.S. says it has plans for quick exit from Afghanistan if presidential stalemate remains unresolved
In mid-2014, Afghan forces were battling the Taliban, who remained active across the country. In
fact, the political scene in Afghanistan had been improving thanks to the fact that a deal had been
brokered by United States Secretary of State John Kerry to resolve the election standoff. Kerry
forged an agreement between the two presidential candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf
Ghani, that would ensure a complete recount of all the ballots cast in the June 14, 2014, "runoff"
round of the presidential election. Once the recount was complete, both candidates would have to
respect the outcome regardless of whom was declared to be the winner. That winner would then
be expected to form a unity government.
But the election deal was soon at risk of being derailed due to ongoing accusations of political
machinations by pro-President Karzai factions, so too was the security landscape devolving with a
continual barrage of attacks by the Taliban. According to findings by the United Nations, as many
as 5,000 civilians were killed in the first six months of 2014, marking a significant increase of 25
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 353 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
percent when compared to the same time period in 2013. It was apparent that the Taliban and
other extremist Islamic terror entities were not waiting for the full withdrawal of United States
forces from Afghanistan to stake their claim in returning the country to its pre-2001 landscape.
As August 2014 came to a close, the re-counting of election ballots continued along amidst
growing anxieties that the Kerry unity deal might collapse. With the prospect of a presidential
stalemate in sight, a security deal between the United States and Afghanistan would also be in
jeopardy. Accordingly, the United States military made it known that plans were afoot for a fast
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin Dempsey said that optimally,
the United States would need four months to pull all its troops and equipment out of Afghanistan;
however, Dempsey said a faster withdrawal was possible if there was no security agreement in
place allowing for the continued presence of United States troops in Afghanistan in 2015.
At the start of September 2014, the Kerry unity deal to end the presidential election impasse
appeared to collapse despite attempts to rehabilitate negotiations. Two issues emerged as
particularly problematic. First, the team of the presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew
from the United Nation's audit of votes, complaining that fraudulent votes were not being properly
handled. Second, the two sides could not agree on the powers of the chief executive -- the
newly-conceived position that would share power with the presidency.
However, as a result of pressure from NATO leaders, who were meeting at the time in September
2014, the two rival presidential candidates agreed to close ranks. With the stakes of national
security and unity in mind, Abdullah Abdullah and Asraf Ghani recommitted themselves to the
goal of forming a government of national unity. The two men also said they would sign a proposed
security agreement that would allow international troops to remain in Afghanistan through 2015.
British combat troops exit Afghanistan and U.S. forces begin phased withdrawal
In late October 2014, United States and United Kingdom forces exited their main military bases in
Helmand province, effectively turning security over to Afghan forces. While the complete
withdrawal of United States forces would not ensue until 2016, a phased draw-down was certainly
taking place and would continue over the course of the next year. At the same time, this particular
exit from Helmand was significant for the United Kingdom as it marked the withdrawal of the last
British combat forces from Afghanistan after being in the Afghan combat zone for more than a
decade. For its part, the Afghan military said that it was prepared to take responsibility for the
security of the country, pointing to the fact that increasingly, support from United States and
United Kingdom forces had become more psychological than in the battlefield.
U.S. President Obama quietly extends combat role in Afghanistan in response to plague of
continuing Taliban attacks
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 354 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
In late November 2014, United States President Barack Obama quietly moved to extend the
combat role for United States troops in Afghanistan by another year. President Obama's exit
strategy from Afghanistan had originally called for an end to combat operations in Afghanistan at
the end of 2014. But in May 2014, he modified the exit strategy, calling for troop levels to be cut
to 9,800 by the end of the year (2014), by half again in 2015, and then moving to simply an
embassy presence and a security assistance presence in Kabul by the end of 2016.
Now at the end of 2014, with the Taliban continuing to pose a threat, President Obama issued an
order authorizing United States troops to continue their combat operations against Taliban and
other Islamist terrorist militants in Afghanistan, if they threatened either American forces or the
Afghan government. The order also authorized the use of United States air support for Afghan
combat missions. Moreover, the United States made clear it was prepared to deploy an additional
1,000 troops to Afghanistan to deal with the security threat.
That security threat was displayed in full relief in the month of November 2014. On Nov. 16,
2014, a suicide bomber targeted a convoy in Kabul carrying a well-known female politician and
women's right advocate, Shukria Barakzai. That attack left three people dead and Barakzai
wounded. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident. Days later on Nov. 18, 2014, a
suicide truck bombing in Afghan capital of Kabul left at least two security guards dead and several
other injured. The attack took place in the eastern part of the country where international military
bases and multinational companies have been located. Then, at the end of the month, the Taliban
carried out a series of brazen attacks at a compound in Kabul frequented by foreigners, killing at
least three foreign nationals (South Africans) and an Afghan. Suddenly and dramatically, Kabul
was "Ground Zero" of the Taliban's war against the Afghan government, with the number of
attacks in the capital doubled in number from 2013, and with foreigners as the high value targets.
The chaos spurred Kabul’s police chief, General Mohammed Zahir to suddenly resign from his
post.
NATO formally ends its 13-year combat mission in Afghanistan
The close of 2014 marked the conclusion of NATO's 13-year long combat mission in Afghanistan,
which began in late 2001 following the horrific terror attacks by al-Qaida on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon in the United States. While the NATO combat mission had come to an
end, a residual force of approximately 12,000 NATO troops were expected to remain in
Afghanistan as part of a non-combat operation. The new operation, referred to as "Resolute
Support," was set to begin on Jan. 1, 2015, and was aimed at supporting local Afghan troops. As
the NATO flag for the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) was lowered during a
ceremony marking the occasion in the Afghan capital of Kabul, mission commander General John
Campbell paid tribute to the United States-led NATO effort, saying, "We have lifted the Afghan
people out of the darkness of despair and given them hope for the future." Meanwhile, NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg released a statement that read as follows: "The security of
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 355 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Afghanistan will be fully in the hands of the country's 350,000 Afghan soldiers and police. But
NATO allies, together with many partner nations, will remain to train, advise and assist them." The
task ahead for local Afghan troops would be formidable with 2014 being marked as a particularly
bloody year in the war against the Taliban and other Islamist extremists in the region.
New Exit Schedule
Note that in the spring of 2015, as discussed below, United States President Obama announced an
adjustment to the United States' existing withdrawal schedule from Afghanistan. President Barack
Obama's existing exit schedule called for a withdrawal of the majority of United States troops
from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, but left in place 9,800 troops in that country through 2015,
when over the course of that year, the number would be reduced by half to 4,900. The remaining
troops would then be withdrawn in 2016. Now, in March 2015, President Obama was responding
for a request by newly-elected Afghan President Ghani for continued United States engagement in
Afghanistan. That new adjusted schedule would hold the current deployment of 9,800 troops in
place in Afghanistan through the end of 2015, and would outline a new phased withdrawal
schedule through 2016, with any remaining troops at the end of 2016 tasked with securing the
Kabul embassy. While the final 2016 exit schedule remained in place, the pace of withdrawal was
now changed with most of the movement occuring in 2016.
See "Special Foreign Policy Note" below and ""Editor's Note" for details.
Special Foreign Policy Note:
President Ghani thanks U.S. for help in stabilizing Afghanistan; President Obama unveils new
withdrawal schedule from Afghanistan
On a visit to the United States to meet with President Barack Obama in the spring of 2015, Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani signaled a sea change in relations between the two countries as he visited
the tomb of the unknown soldier to pay tribute to the lives of American soldiers lost in the war in
Afghanistan. Ghani's predecessor, Hamid Karzai gained notoriety for his sharp criticism for
United States troops in Afghanistan who ironically helped to liberate his country from the Taliban.
Indeed, it was only as a result of international intervention and support that the path was paved for
the very democratic government in Afghanistan that Karzai would eventually lead. Karzai often
displayed erratic behavior, attacking the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan to stabilize his
country, threatening to join the Taliban, and refusing to sign a bilateral security agreement with
the United States.
In a joint news conference with President Obama, President Ghani -- who immediately signed the
bilateral security agreement upon coming to power in 2014, made a point of thanking United
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 356 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
States soldiers for their efforts to secure Afghanistan. President Ghani also went so far as to thank
United States tax payers for their contributions to the stabilization of Afghanistan. Moreover,
President Ghani thanked Secretary of State John Kerry, working on behalf of the Obama admin,
for his unflagging diplomatic efforts to reach a reconciliation deal after the controversial elections of
2014. Those elections left Ghani in a power struggle with his rival, Abdullah Abdullah. However, a
Kerry-forged agreement that officialized GHani as president and Abdullah as chief executive was
credited for rescuing Afghanistan from the brink of political crisis, and has since left Afghans
regarding the United States' top diplomat as a hero of sorts.
The visit by Ghani was also marked by foreign policy business, as President Obama announced an
adjustment to the United States' existing withdrawal schedule from Afghanistan. President Barack
Obama's stated (read: existing) exit schedule called for a withdrawal of the majority of United
States troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, but left in place 9,800 troops in that country
through 2015, when over the course of that year, the number would be reduced by half to 4,900.
The remaining troops would then be withdrawn in 2016. Now, in March 2015, President Obama
was responding for a request by President Ghani for continued United States engagement in
Afghanistan. That new adjusted schedule would hold the current deployment of 9,800 troops in
place in Afghanistan through the end of 2015, and would outline a new phased withdrawal
schedule through 2016, with any remaining troops at the end of 2016 tasked with securing the
Kabul embassy. In effect, the "bones" of the 2016 exit schedule remained in place, but the pace of
withdrawal was now changed, with the lion's share of the movement occuring in 2016.
A White House statement on the matter read as follows: "Based on President Ghani's request for
flexibility in the U.S. drawdown timeline, the U.S. will maintain its current posture of 9,800 troops
through the end of 2015. The specific trajectory of the 2016 U.S. troop drawdown will be
established later in 2015 to enable the U.S. troop consolidation to a Kabul-based embassy presence
by the end of 2016."
It should be noted that on March 25, 2015, while President Ghani was in the United States, a
suicide attack rocked the Afghan capital of Kabul. The blast occurred in the Muradkhani district of
Kabul close to the presidential palace, the defense ministry, and the finance ministry. Seven people
were reported to have died and more than 20 others were wounded as a result of the attack.
Editor's Note
President Barack Obama's blueprint for the exit of United States troops in Afghanistan called for
the withdrawal of the majority of troops at the end of 2014, but left in place 9,800 troops in that
country through 2015, when over the course of that year, the number would be reduced by half to
4,900. The remaining troops would then be withdrawn in 2016.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 357 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
It should be noted that while liberals in the United States were frustrated that a complete exit from
Afghanistan -- and an end to a war that had been ongoing for more than a decade -- did not come
at the end of 2014, some Republicans in Congress criticized President Obama's exit schedule from
Afghanistan. For conservatives, such as Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and Kelly
Ayotte, issuing a date-certain deadline was tantamount to surrender. The three Republicans issued a
statement that read as follows: "The president's decision to set an arbitrary date for the full
withdrawal of U.S. troops in Afghanistan is a monumental mistake and a triumph of politics over
strategy." But President Obama was vociferous in his stance that the engagement of United States
military forces in Afghanistan was coming to an end, and the specific mission in Afghanistan was
on the verge of being completed. According to the United States president, it was time for Afghans
to take responsibility for their country. As noted by President Obama in his drawdown
announcement from the White House's Rose Garden, "We have to recognize that Afghanistan will
not be a perfect place, and it is not America's responsibility to make it one."
President Obama made clear that significant progress had been made in the years since the 2001
terror attacks -- a time when Afghanistan was the locus of the terrorist Islamist group, al-Qaida.
Indeed, United States military forces since that time have carried out a relentless assault on the
terrorist group, eliminating its leadership, and preventing Afghanistan from being used as a safe
haven and a base for attacks against the United States. With the death of Osama bin Laden -- a
perilous operation authorized by President Obama himself in 2011 -- the United States president
could conceivably argue that the time to exit Afghanistan had come. However, the president was
clearly looking towards a phased withdrawal, and one on a somewhat more protracted timeline
than he had indicated in recent years. To this end, he said: "Now we're finishing the job we've
started."
In October 2014, progress was being made in the effort to "finish the job" as United States and
United Kingdom forces exited their main military bases in Helmand province, turning security over
to Afghan forces. While the complete withdrawal of United States forces would not take place
until 2016, a phased drawdown was certainly taking place. Meanwhile, this particular exit would
mark the withdrawal of the last British combat forces from Afghanistan.
In November 2014, President Obama authorized United States troops to continue their combat
operations against Taliban and other Islamist terrorist militants in Afghanistan, if they threatened
either American forces or the Afghan government. The order also authorized the use of United
States air support for Afghan combat missions. Moreover, the United States made clear that it
would deploy an additional 1,000 troops to Afghanistan to deal with the security threat if needed.
In March 2015, President Obama responded to a request by the newly-elected President Ghani
for continued United States engagement in Afghanistan, under the aegis of a new bilateral security
agreement, and with an adjusted withdrawal schedule. That new adjusted schedule would hold
the current deployment of 9,800 troops in place in Afghanistan through the end of 2015, and
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 358 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
would outline a new phased withdrawal schedule through 2016, with any remaining troops at the
end of 2016 tasked with securing the Kabul embassy. In effect, the structure of the 2016 exit
schedule would be maintained, but the pace of withdrawal was now changed, with most
redeployment occuring in 2016.
The schedule, including the decision to keep in place a select number of combat troops through
2016, was due to the fact that President Obama wanted to see further training for Afghan security
forces along with the ability to launch counterterrorism missions in the interests of maintaining the
progress made in a war that had gone on for more than a dozen years and left more than 2,000
United States troops dead.
Note: To date, more than 2,000 American and approximately 450 British soldiers have died in the
war in Afghanistan that began in late 2001.
Special Security Entry
Afghan intelligence confirms the 2013 death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar
At the end of July 2015, Afghan authorities confirmed that Mullah Omar, the notorious leader of
the Taliban, died in 2013 in Pakistan.
Mullah Omar gained notoriety prior to 2001 when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan and
established its hardline and brutal Islamist policies in the south Asian country. After the 2001
terror attacks in the United States by al-Qaida, the war in Afghanistan was sparked and the
Taliban was overthrown. Mullah Omar -- an ally of Osama bin Laden -- was reported to have fled
the country and never again seen in public. Now, in 2015, Afghanistan's authorities were finally
confirming Mullah Omar's demise with a statement from the presidential palace reading as
follows: "The government ... based on credible information, confirms that Mullah Mohammad
Omar, leader of the Taliban, died in April 2013 in Pakistan."
It should be noted that the White House in the United States said that it veiwed the reports from
Afghanistan confirming the death of Mullah Omar to be "credible." It also should be noted that the
Taliban has claimed that Mullah Omar never left Afghanistan for Pakistan and his death was
actually more recent than 2013.
Regardless of the actual facts surrounding the timing of Mullah Omar's death, the government of
Afghanistan, led by President Ashraf Ghani, went onto assert its belief that the conditions were
now favorable for peace negotiations with the Taliban. For its part, however, the Taliban made
clear through its official spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, that the Islamist terror group was not
even aware of this renewed pursuit of peace with the Afghan government. Mujahid said, "We
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 359 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
have heard from the news media that the second round of talks between the Islamic Emirate and
the Kabul administration will start soon in Pakistan or China. The Islamic Emirate has handed all
authorization to its political office and they are not aware of this process."
Meanwhile, reports from neighboring Pakistan indicated that Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour
had been chosen to be the new leader of the Islamist terror group, which was continuing its
insurgent efforts in Afghanistan. In fact, in the same period of late July 2015, the Taliban had
managed to take control over the Now Zad district of the southern Helmand province after days of
fierce fighting.
Leader of the Islamist militan Haqqani network reported to have died in 2014
At the end of July 2015, news outlets were reporting that Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Afghan founder
of the terror group known as the Haqqani network, died in 2014 after a prolonged illness. There
was no actual confirmation of this claim. In fact, the Haqqani network refused to confirm the
demise of its leader, claiming instead that he remained alive albeit in poor health. Should Haqqani's
death actually be verified, it would be an important development in the West's fight against Islamist
terrorists in the Afghan-Pak region. Of significance was the fact that the Haqqani network -- based
in Pakistan -- was responsible for many sophisticated attacks on NATO forces in the region in
recent times. It should be noted that the news (however shaky it might be) about the death of the
Afghan terror leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani, came only days after Afghan authorities confirmed that
Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, died in 2013 in Pakistan.
Written by Dr. Denise Youngblood Coleman, Editor in Chief, www.countrywatch.com . S e e
Bibliography for list of research sources.
National Security
External Threats
At the present time, there are no overt threats to Afghanistan’s national security stemming from
foreign nations. However, relations with foreign nations have had a profound influence on
Afghanistan’s development. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, setting in motion a
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 360 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
chain of events that have played a major role in shaping the modern state.
Amongst other countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Statesbacked a band of resistance
fighters, known generally as the mujahidin, who, after a decade of fighting, drove Soviet forces out
of the country. Intense infighting ensued, as indigenous groups fought each other to fill the power
vacuum left by the departed superpowers and to gain control of Afghanistan.
By 1996, the Taliban, the local purveyors of a highly orthodox brand of Sunni Islam, had extended
effective rule over most of the country. Only a handful of countries, including Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, recognized the Taliban’s legitimacy (Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates withdrew support after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
States).
The Taliban incurred the wrath of the broad international community by allowing the reputed
leader of the al-Qaida terrorist network, Osama bin Laden, to set up a base of operations and
continuing to harbor him after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, perpetuated by agents of that
organization. The latter prompted Operation Enduring Freedom, during which a multinational
coalition of forces, led by the United States, removed the Taliban from power. Once the Taliban
was removed from power, Hamid Karzai was elected President of the Transitional Islamic State of
Afghanistan.
In the years since his election, President Karzai has worked to foster progress both within and
outside of Afghanistan. He also is actively pursuing regional stability to ensure that other entities,
like al-Qaida, will not pose a threat to Afghanistanagain. He has, however, been limited in these
efforts by the dissolution of the security situation on the ground in recent times.
Note: While there is, indeed, no overt external threat to Afghanistan at this time, it should be noted
that in recent years, Pakistan-Afghan relations have devolved with both sides blaming one another
for the threat of Islamic militants in the region. United States President George W. Bush presided
over a September 2006 dinner meeting between the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan, aimed at
easing the tensions between the two South Asian neighbors. That said, relations between the two
countries continued to be strained. Since coming to power, it was yet to be seen if United States
President Barack Obama's foreign policy of addressing the Afghan-Pak region jointly would shift
bilateral relations or improve the increasingly grim security situation domestically in Afghanistan.
Please see "Political Conditions" for details.
Crime
Criminal activity is one of the principle challenges to the authority of Afghanistan’s government.
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 361 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Much of it stems from narcotics trafficking. Afghanistanis the world’s leading producer of opium,
producing over 200,000 hectares per year, according to recent estimates. It is the source of
upwards of 80 percent of all heroin trafficked in Europe. Money laundering, principally through
hawala networks, is an offshoot of the illicit trafficking in narcotics from Afghanistan, as are
violence and general corruption. There is evidence to support that there are regional government
officials who participate or profit from the lucrative drug trade.
Other criminal activity such as robbery and other random acts of violence also persist throughout
Afghanistan. The new police force is trying to get crime under control, but they have a ways to go
before their authority is fully recognized. Unfortunately, foreign aid workers are often the victims
of choice, hampering efforts to foster stability in Afghanistan.
Insurgencies
Afghanistanhas a long history internal strife, partially the result a multi-ethnic population. One of
the many negative repercussions of Afghanistan’s perpetual infighting is that both the government
and the international community are struggling to deal with the preponderance of landmines
throughout the country. As well, there are other indigenous groups who oppose the authority of the
new coalition government to varying degrees operating inside of Afghanistan.
Most significant, though, has been the fact that local and coalition forces continue to
battle resurgent elements of the Taliban and trace elements of al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Today,
these forces increasingly destabilize Afghanistan's political landscape.
Note: In recent years, resurgent Taliban have presented an increasly grave threat to Afghanistan's
security. The Taliban seeks to do more than simply destabilize the country. Indeed, the Taliban
has expressed the clear objective of overthrowing the Western-backed government of
Afghanistan. As of 2011, attacks by resurgent Taliban have expanded well beyond Taliban
strongholds in the south and eastern parts of the country to affect the country at large. There has
been a growing sense of anxiety at home and abroad about Afghanistan's grim security situation,
given the frequency of attacks by the Taliban in recent times. Please see "Political Conditions" for
details.
Terrorism
The Taliban’s affiliation with the al-Qaida terrorist network precipitated the 2001 invasion of a
multinational coalition of forces and their ultimate removal from power in Afghanistan. Trace
elements of al-Qaida and their affiliates remain in Afghanistan. Coalition forces continue to search
for them. The interim government has demonstrated its commitment to assisting their efforts. One
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 362 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
of its most essential tasks is to garner support amongst the many rival ethnic and regional factions,
in order to prevent the re-emergence of the Taliban or any other organization that supports the use
of terrorist tactics. Such efforts have not been fully realized, and in the last year, the Taliban
appeares to be experiencing a resurgence. Meanwhile, the precise whereabouts of al-Qaida’s
leader, Osama bin-Laden, remain unknown. It is widely speculated that, if he is alive, he may be
hiding in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Note: In recent years, resurgent Taliban have presented an increased threat to Afghanistan's
security. Indeed, the Taliban has expressed the clear objective of overthrowing the Westernbacked government of Afghanistan. In recent years, attacks by resurgent Taliban have expanded
well beyond Taliban strongholds in the south and eastern parts of the country to affect the country
at large. There has been a growing sense of anxiety at home and abroad about Afghanistan's grim
security situation, given the frequency of attacks by the Taliban in recent years.
*** Please see "Political Conditions" for details related to Afghanistan's national security
situation.***
Defense Forces
Military Data
Military Branches:
Afghan National Army (includes Afghan Air Force)
Eligible age to enter service:
18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription
Manpower available for military service:
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 363 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
males age 16-49: 7,056,339
females age 16-49: 6,653,419
Manpower reaching eligible age annually:
male: 392,116
females: 370,295
Military Expenditures:
4.74% of GDP
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 364 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Chapter 3
Economic Overview
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 365 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Economic Overview
Overview
More than two decades of conflict destroyed much of Afghanistan’s limited infrastructure and
disrupted normal patterns of economic activity. Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the
country’s economic outlook has improved significantly and shown strong signs of recovery. With
the help of the international community, the Afghan government has made impressive progress in
rebuilding institutions and implementing sound macroeconomic policies. Since the new currency
was successfully launched in October 2002, the exchange rate has remained stable and the Afghani
has strengthened recently. In June 2006, the IMF approved a PRGF (Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility) arrangement with Afghanistan in support of the economic program aimed at
maintaining macroeconomic stability, implementing structural reforms to boost growth, and
reducing poverty. Despite a very difficult security and political environment, performance under
the program has improved since early 2009. Economic activity, particularly in the agricultural
sector, has been recovering strongly from the severe drought in 2008, while higher spending by the
government has supported the other sectors of the economy. Lower world food prices and prudent
monetary policy have brought down inflation, and the fiscal position has strengthened supported by
higher domestic revenues and tightly managed non-security operation expenditures. In 2010, the
country dealt with a scandal involving Kabulbank, which gave hundreds of millions of dollars in
unsecured and undocumented loans to the country's elite, including sitting ministers. The scandal
had a severe impact on the reputation of Afghan financial institutions.
In November 2011, the IMF approved a three-year, US$133.6 million arrangement under the
Extended Credit Facility that was designed to support the nation's economic program from 2011 to
2014. The agency was anticipating the withdrawal of the international monetary presence by 2014
and a decline in foreign aid would pose significant economic policy challenges over the next three
to five years. The government will have to take over activities currently financed by donors,
including shouldering a larger share of security spending. The World Bank predicted that
Afghanistan may need around $7.8 billion a year in foreign funding to help pay its security and
other bills after most U.S.-led NATO combat troops leave. The country is likely to receive about
$4.1 billion in aid for its security forces per year after 2014, but that number could decline. On the
positive side, economic activity has been strong with real GDP growth averaging more than 10
percent annually since 2008. Still, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world.
Per-capita income was US$530 in 2010 and 2011. In May 2012, Afghanistan said it intended to
sell Islamic bonds as it prepared for a potentially sharp decline in Western financial support as the
war against the Taliban wound down. “The purpose is so that the ministry of finance can have
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 366 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
tools for their financing to cover their expenses,” Khan Afzal Hadawal, first deputy governor at the
Afghan central bank, told Reuters in an interview. In July 2012, the donors at the Tokyo
conference pledged an additional $16 billion in civilian aid to Afghanistan through 2015. Despite
this help, the Government of Afghanistan will need to overcome a number of challenges, including
low revenue collection, anemic job creation, high levels of corruption, weak government capacity,
and poor public infrastructure.
By February 2013, the IMF was describing the economic outlook for Afghanistan as broadly
positive. It noted that the country’s growth and inflation were better than expected in 2012 aided
by a large crop. In March 2013, Reuters reported that Afghanistan’s taxes and customs department
raised $1.64 billion in the previous financial year, which was more than 14 times what was raised a
decade prior. The country’s stricter enforcement procedures had led to the country’s tax to GDP
ratio to reaching more than 11 percent, higher even than neighboring Pakistan. This meant that – in
line with the planned 2014 NATO troop withdrawal from the country and the expected reduction in
donor aid – Afghanistan was making progress toward its goal of independence by increasing its
revenues.
Afghanistan's growth rate slowed markedly in 2013. Overall, economic activity has been affected
by political and security uncertainties and the drawdown of international troops. These
uncertainties reduced confidence, discouraged private investment, and held back economic activity.
Growth decelerated from double digits in 2012 (boosted by a bumper harvest) to an estimated 3.6
percent in 2013. Meanwhile, inflation remained in single digits. International reserves also remained
at a comfortable level equivalent to over seven months of imports.
By mid-June 2014, the most pressing challenge awaiting Afghanistan's new leader appeared to be
an international blacklist hanging over the country's banks due to their alleged failure to do enough
to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. If the blacklist is ever enforced, the Afghan
economy would officially be in crisis.
The country was mired in political controversy in 2014 and by August, the outcome to the
country’s presidential election had yet to be determined. The year would be crucial to
Afghanistan’s future in terms of the political and security transitions taking place. Assuming smooth
political and security transitions, continued reform and donor financing, the outlook for the country
should be positive, said the IMF.
Overall, Afghanistan’s situation remains remarkably difficult. Its geographical disadvantages
(landlocked and mountainous), the damage caused by decades of conflict, and the economy’s high
dependence on agriculture, which is extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions, all
contribute to Afghanistan being one of the poorest countries in the world. In addition, its security
situation has been worsening, political uncertainty has been high, and policy implementation has
often been hampered by corruption, limited administrative capacity, and political tensions. Looking
ahead, continuing the economic reforms and exerting the political will to implement them will be
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 367 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
critical to fostering sustainable growth and poverty reduction.
Afghanistan's growth rate slowed markedly in 2014 although the country completed a peaceful
transfer of power in September, with the conclusion of the presidential elections and establishment
of the national unity government. While newly-elected President Ashraf Ghani is dedicated to
instituting economic reforms, the drawdown of international security forces that occurred in 2014
was expected to negatively affect economic growth considering that a substantial portion of
commerce, especially in the services sector, has catered to the ongoing international troop presence
in the country.
Still, the new government appeared resolved to push ahead with economic reforms and improve
governance to promote economic growth and development that benefits all Afghans. The
international community and key donors reaffirmed their partnership and commitment to
Afghanistan at the London Conference held in December 2014. They welcomed the new
government’s commitment to macroeconomic stability and reforms that will promote sustainable
and inclusive growth.
The World Bank Afghanistan Economic Update April 2015 noted that economic growth slowed in
2014 also due to the slow pace of reforms, which were reducing investor and consumer confidence
in the economy. The growth outlook for 2015 remained weak as unfavorable weather conditions
for agriculture production and lagged effects from 2014 were expected to undermine economic
recovery. Also, the government was still grappling with containing the fiscal crisis that unfolded in
2014. The economic slowdown, compounded by increased governance vulnerabilities and
weaknesses in tax and customs enforcement, resulted in a signficant decline of domestic revenues
from a peak of 11.6 percent of GDP in 2011 to 8.4 percent in 2014, according to the World Bank.
In spite of measures to restrain expenditures, the government faced a financing shortfall in excess
of $500 million in 2014, which it managed with the help of exceptional donor assistance and by
drawing down cash reserves and accumulating arrears. As such, the government started the year
with a relatively weak fiscal position, further strained by stagnating revenues in the first quarter of
2015. Overall, economic growth edged up slightly – at an estimated 0.8 percent – in 2015.
Continued insecurity, political uncertainty, weak institutions and corruption continued to prevent
robust and inclusive economic growth.
In July 2016, the IMF approved a three-year, $44.9 million Extended Credit Facility (ECF)
arrangement for Afghanistan to help raise growth. An uptick in growth to 2 percent was projected
for 2016, but that was still far below the level needed to ensure increased employment and
improved living standards.
In August 2016, Afghanistan's campaign to clear millions of landmines left by the Soviet invasion
and ensuing civil war was in danger of stalling. The massive task, crucial to the country's economic
recovery, was supposed to have been done by 2013, and nearly four-fifths of the country was now
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 368 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
considered mine-free. International funding earmarked for demining in 2016 was $22 million - a
fraction of the $85 million United Nations officials said was required.
Updated in 2016
Supplementary Sources: The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Reuters
Current Economic Conditions
In 2015, Afghanistan experienced real economic growth of 0.0%
The GDP was US$19.7 million at the current exchange rate of 59.57 Afghan afghani per US dollar.
Per capita GDP totaled US$615.
The trade deficit was US$7.4 million or -37.8% of GDP and the government ran a budget deficit
equivalent to 0.3% of nominal GDP.
Foreign exchange reserves (including gold) at the end of 2015 totaled US$6.2 million. This
represented 9 months of imports at current import levels in 2015.
Forecast Economic Performance
Real GDP is projected to grow at an average rate of 4.8% over the next five years, with GDP
reaching US$25.5 million by 2020. This would equate to a GDP per capita of US$747.
The inflation rate is expected to average 4.2% over this period and the unemployment rate is
expected to average 7.5%
By 2020 the government is projected to have a budget deficit totaling 0.4% of GDP and a trade
deficit totaling 34.2% of GDP.
Sources: CIA World Factbook, CountryWatch 2016 Macroeconomic Forecast
Updated in 2016
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 369 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2008
359.830000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2009
433.240000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2010
368.865165
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2011
395.654584
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2012
452.145504
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
3.400000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
20.400000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
8.433290
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
6.328478
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
14.277837
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
612.500000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
623.350000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
749.719542
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 370 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
930.792131
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
1108.560099
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
54.640000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
71.800000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
104.639000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
109.884000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
131.176000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
97.970000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
110.060000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
130.420755
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
141.792000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
178.448000
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 371 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2008
93.420000
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2009
121.580000
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2010
1.597479
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2011
1.092591
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2012
1.119699
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2008
285.930000
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2009
427.800000
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2010
7.162545
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2011
7.906297
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2012
7.944340
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 372 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2008
600.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2009
714.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2010
729.900688
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2011
856.323131
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2012
1061.312099
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
23.711340
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
19.000000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
18.667001
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
17.320499
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
23.938272
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
32.520000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
33.440000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
28.397812
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
29.105000
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 373 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
29.825000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
2.831299
Population growth (%)
%
2009
2.831301
Population growth (%)
%
2010
2.488885
Population growth (%)
%
2011
2.489611
Population growth (%)
%
2012
2.473801
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2008
18.500000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2009
21.400000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2010
0.561197
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2011
29421.856430
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2012
35584.647088
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2010
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 374 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2012
Afghanistan Review 2017
Value
Page 375 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
54.640000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
71.800000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
104.639000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
109.884000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
131.176000
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
20.016717
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
16.987324
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
33.168627
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
23.753816
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
41.192009
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
15.605000
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
17.701400
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 376 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
15.831626
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
20.765642
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
24.551778
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
93.630000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
126.390000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
115.555152
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
177.821000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
260.571000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
-21.240000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
-8.000000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
-10.916152
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
-5.399000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
1.879000
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 377 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
-0.328000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
-0.519000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
1.495566
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-0.630486
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
0.177044
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 378 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2008
152.010000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2009
202.240000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2010
256.726781
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2011
311.433123
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2012
338.839582
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
31.383817
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
33.045067
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
26.947127
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
21.309168
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
8.800110
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
9.437794
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
10.337795
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 379 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
8.453463
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
14.917500
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
15.000000
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
15.690000
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
15.145833
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
15.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
35.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
35.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
8.500000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
8.200000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
8.782952
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 380 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2008
50.250000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2009
50.330000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2010
45.799746
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2011
47.866021
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2012
52.291687
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-192.520000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-306.230000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-5.565065
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-6.813705
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-6.824641
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 381 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
0.540000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
0.200000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
0.620000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
0.610000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
0.100000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
1.900000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
0.880000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
0.060000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
0.490000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
-2.570000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
2.440000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
1.080000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
0.680000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
1.100000
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 382 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
-2.470000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
2.440000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
3.510000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
5.162440
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
6.344642
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
7.152304
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
0.001777
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
0.000542
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
0.001660
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
0.001407
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
0.009386
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 383 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2008
359.830000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2009
433.240000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2010
368.865165
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2011
395.654584
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2012
452.145504
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
3.400000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
20.400000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
8.433290
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
6.328478
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
14.277837
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
612.500000
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 384 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
623.350000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
749.719542
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
930.792131
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
1108.560099
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
54.640000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
71.800000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
104.639000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
109.884000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
131.176000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
97.970000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
110.060000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
130.420755
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 385 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
141.792000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
178.448000
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2008
93.420000
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2009
121.580000
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2010
1.597479
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2011
1.092591
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2012
1.119699
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2008
285.930000
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2009
427.800000
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2010
7.162545
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2011
7.906297
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2012
7.944340
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 386 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2008
600.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2009
714.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2010
729.900688
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2011
856.323131
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2012
1061.312099
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
23.711340
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
19.000000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
18.667001
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
17.320499
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
23.938272
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
32.520000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
33.440000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
28.397812
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011
29.105000
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 387 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Population, total (million)
Millions
2012
29.825000
Population growth (%)
%
2008
2.831299
Population growth (%)
%
2009
2.831301
Population growth (%)
%
2010
2.488885
Population growth (%)
%
2011
2.489611
Population growth (%)
%
2012
2.473801
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2008
18.500000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2009
21.400000
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2010
0.561197
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2011
29421.856430
Nominal GDP per Capita (LCU
1000s)
Af thousands
thousands
2012
35584.647088
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2008
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2009
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2010
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 388 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2011
Nominal GDP Per Capita Growth
Rate
%
2012
Afghanistan Review 2017
Value
Page 389 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Government Spending and Taxation
Government Spending and Taxation
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
54.640000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
71.800000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
104.639000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
109.884000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
131.176000
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
20.016717
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
16.987324
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
33.168627
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
23.753816
Government Expenditure Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
41.192009
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2008
15.605000
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2009
17.701400
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 390 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2010
15.831626
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2011
20.765642
National Tax Rate Net of Transfers (%)
%
2012
24.551778
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2008
93.630000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2009
126.390000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2010
115.555152
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2011
177.821000
Government Revenues Net of Transfers (LCU
billions)
2012
260.571000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
-21.240000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
-8.000000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
-10.916152
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
-5.399000
Government Surplus(-) Deficit(+) (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
1.879000
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 391 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2008
-0.328000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2009
-0.519000
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2010
1.495566
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2011
-0.630486
Government Surplus(+) Deficit(-) (%GDP)
%
2012
0.177044
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 392 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Money, Prices and Interest Rates
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2008
152.010000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2009
202.240000
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2010
256.726781
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2011
311.433123
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) (LCU billions)
Af billions
2012
338.839582
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
31.383817
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
33.045067
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
26.947127
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
21.309168
Money Supply Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
8.800110
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2008
0.022113
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2009
0.010634
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2010
9.437794
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2011
10.337795
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 393 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Inflation, GDP Deflator (%)
%
2012
8.453463
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2008
14.917500
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2009
15.000000
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2010
15.690000
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2011
15.145833
Lending Interest Rate (%)
%
2012
15.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2008
35.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2009
35.000000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2010
8.500000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2011
8.200000
Unemployment Rate (%)
%
2012
8.782952
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 394 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Trade and the Exchange Rate
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2008
50.250000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2009
50.330000
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2010
45.799746
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2011
47.866021
Official Exchange Rate (LCU/$US)
Af/$
2012
52.291687
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2008
-192.520000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2009
-306.230000
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2010
-5.565065
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2011
-6.813705
Trade Balance NIPA ($US billions)
$US Millions
2012
-6.824641
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 395 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
The Balance of Payments
The Balance of Payments
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Current Account
$US Billions
2008
0.540000
Current Account
$US Billions
2009
0.200000
Current Account
$US Billions
2010
0.620000
Current Account
$US Billions
2011
0.610000
Current Account
$US Billions
2012
0.100000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2008
1.900000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2009
0.880000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2010
0.060000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2011
0.490000
Capital and Financial Account
$US Billions
2012
-2.570000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2008
2.440000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2009
1.080000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2010
0.680000
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2011
1.100000
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 396 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Overall Balance
$US Billions
2012
-2.470000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2008
2.440000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2009
3.510000
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2010
5.162440
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2011
6.344642
Total Foreign Exchange Reserves ($US billions)
$US Billions
2012
7.152304
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2008
0.001777
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2009
0.000542
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2010
0.001660
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2011
0.001407
Current Account (% of GDP)
%
2012
0.009386
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 397 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Real GDP and GDP Per Capita
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2008
359.830000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2009
433.240000
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2010
368.865165
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2011
395.654584
Real Gross Domestic Product (LCU billions 2005
base)
Af
billions
2012
452.145504
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
3.400000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
20.400000
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
8.433290
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
6.328478
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
14.277837
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
612.500000
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 398 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
623.350000
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
749.719542
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
930.792131
Consumption (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
1108.560099
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
54.640000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
71.800000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
104.639000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
109.884000
Government Expenditure (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
131.176000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2008
97.970000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2009
110.060000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2010
130.420755
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 399 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2011
141.792000
Gross Capital Formation (LCU billions)
Af
billions
2012
178.448000
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2008
93.420000
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2009
121.580000
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2010
1.597479
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2011
1.092591
Exports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2012
1.119699
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2008
285.930000
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2009
427.800000
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2010
7.162545
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2011
7.906297
Imports ($US billions)
Af
billions
2012
7.944340
Afghanistan Review 2017
Page 400 of 616 pages
Country OverView
Pending
Nominal GDP and Components
Nominal GDP and Components
Name
Unit
Year
Value
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2008
600.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2009
714.000000
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2010
729.900688
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2011
856.323131
Nominal GDP (LCU billions)
Af billions
2012
1061.312099
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2008
23.711340
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2009
19.000000
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2010
18.667001
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2011
17.320499
Nominal GDP Growth Rate (%)
%
2012
23.938272
Population, total (million)
Millions
2008
32.520000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2009
33.440000
Population, total (million)
Millions
2010
28.397812
Population, total (million)
Millions
2011