Virtù and the Example of Agathocles in Machiavelli's Prince
Author(s): Victoria Kahn
Source: Representations, No. 13 (Winter, 1986), pp. 63-83
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2928494
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VICTORIA
KAHN
Virtuand the Example
of Agathoclesin
Machiavelli'sPrince
Onlyat a remove
fromlifecan thementallifeexist,and trulyengagetheempirical.
dependsno
them,itsmovement
relatestofactsand movesbycriticizing
Whilethought
becausewhat
whatis,precisely
exactly
ofdistance.It expresses
lesson themaintenance
it.Essentialtoit is an element
ofexaggeration,
expresses
is is neverquiteas thought
theobject,ofself-detachment
fromtheweightofthefactual,so that
ofover-shooting
andfree,determine
it.
insteadofmerely
reproducing
beingit can, at oncerigorous
-Theodor Adorno
Whatgodswillbe able tosave usfromall theseironies?
-FriedrichSchlegel'
M AC H I AV E L L 'S I N N OVAT I O N in the historyof politicalthought,
it is oftenargued, lies in his revisionnot only of scholasticbut also of humanist
notions of imitationand representation,a revisionthat is reflectedin his own
representationof the realm of politics.When humanismand scholasticismalike
are seen as proposing an idealist or a priori notion of truth,this case is easily
made. As many criticsof The Prince have remarked,Machiavelliscandalizes his
readers not because he advises the prince to act in wayspreviouslyunheard of,
but because he refusesto cloak his advice in the pietiesof scholasticor Christian
humanistidealism. Instead, he insiststhat the prince acts in a world in which
in which order and
there are "no prefiguredmeanings,no implicitteleology,"2
than
the
a priori objects of
of
action
rather
the
human
products
legibilityare
human cognition.To recognize this,he argues, is to acknowledge the realityor
truthof power,over against an idealist notion of truthconceived in terms of
representation,as correspondence to some a priori standard of judgment or,
to some a priori moral ideal. Machiavelliaccordinglydeclares
more specifically,
his divergencefromthe idealist traditionof reflectionon politicalaffairsin the
famous opening to chapter 15:
reader,it seemed
useful[utile]to an understanding
Since I intendto writesomething
ofthematter
thantorepeatwhatpeople
bettertogo aftertherealtruth[laverita
effettuale]
suchas nobody
haveimagined.A greatmanymenhaveimaginedstatesand princedoms
eversawor knewintherealworld,forthere'ssucha difference
betweenthewaywereally
liveand thewayweoughttolivethatthemanwhoneglectstherealto studytheidealwill
hisruin,nothispreservation.3
learnhowto accomplish
REPRESENTATIONS
13 * Winter1986 C) THE
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
63
It is importantto see, however,thatwhile Machiavellicriticizesthe stoicand
idealistmoral philosophyof some humanists,he borrowsfromthe more flexible
pragmatism of others, according to whom truth is governed by an intrinsically ethical standard of decorum and consensus. Only when we recognize
Machiavelli'simitationof and final divergence from this humanisttraditionof
willmostoftenbe used
pragmatism(and it is in thissense thatthe termhumanist
in the followingpages), willwe be able to charthis innovationin politicalthought
withany precision.I willargue thatMachiavellimoves beyond the constraintsof
previous humanistreflectionon the pragmaticnature of truth-which fromhis
perspectiveoffersyetanother versionof a mimetic,correspondence,or idealist
theory-to a conception of truth as power, in which the pragmatic humanist
versionof truthitselfbecomes one weapon among othersin the prince'sstrategic
arsenal.
Imitation and Representation
From the very beginning of The Princeit is clear that Machiavelli is
drawing on the resources of humanism, in particular its notion of imitation.4
Like the humanists,he wants to educate his reader's practicaljudgment, the
facultyof deliberationthatallowsforeffectiveactionwithinthe contingentrealm
of fortune,and likethemhe recognizesthatsuch education mustthereforefocus
on particularexamples ratherthan on the general preceptsappropriate to theoretical reason. Furthermore,Machiavelliis concerned, as the humanistswere,
to criticizean unreflectiverelationto past examples thatwould take the formof
or a one-to-onecorrespondence.In fact,
slavishimitation,simplere-presentation,
it is preciselyin the absence of correspondence, of a mirrorreflectionof the
exemplar,that the humanistprince or poet findsboth the room to exercise his
own willand the measure of his own achievement.Correctimitationaccordingly
involvesimitatingand realizing a flexibleprinciple of prudentialjudgment or
decorum. And thisin turngivesrise to textsdesigned to dramatizeand inculcate
suchjudgment, whose rhetoricis, therefore,not ornamentalbut strategic.
Thus, in the prefatoryletterto The Prince,Machiavellijustifieshis giftof a
textto Lorenzo de' Medici by suggestingthat the latterwillbe a more effective
rulerifhe learns to imitatethe double perspective,thereflectivedistance,offered
in ThePrince:"To knowthe people wellone mustbe a prince,and to knowprinces
well one mustbe, oneself,of the people" (3 [14]). And in chapter 14, "Military
Duties of the Prince;' Machiavellimakes the humanistclaim fortextualimitation
even more forcefullyby comparing skill in governmentto skill in reading, by
makingthe ruler'slandscape into a textand the textinto a realm of forces.The
prince is advised to learn to read the terrain(impararela naturade' siti)and to
"read historyand reflecton the actionsof greatmen."Here, to imitategreatmen
means to imitateimitation,that is, to "take as a model of [one's] conduct some
64
REPRESENTATIONS
great historicalfigurewho achieved the highestpraise and gloryby constantly
holding before himselfthe deeds and achievementsof a predecessor" (43 [64]).
rather than
Machiavelli'sdefiningtruth pragmatically(la veritaeffettuale),
origin,
or
absolute
a
fixed
to
ontologicallyor epistemologicallyas correspondence
would also seem to be consonantwithhumanism.And yet,ifMachiavelli'snotion
of imitationappears to be essentiallyhumanist,his own pragmaticdefinitionof
truthis not; for Machiavellipreservesthe humanists'strategicsense of rhetoric
only to separate it from its presumed origin in (the author's) and goal of (the
reader's) intrinsicallyethical practicesof imitation.In rejectingthe Ciceronian
the faiththatpracticalreason
and utilitas,
and humanistequation betweenhonestas
or prudence is inseparable frommoral virtue,Machiavallithus turnsprudence
into what the humanists(and theirdetractors)alwaysfeared it would becomethe amoral skillof versutiaor mere cleverness,whichin turnimpliesthe ethically
unrestraineduse of force-in short,virt&.He thus opens up a gap betweenthe
political agent and the political actor-or rather he makes the agent an actor
who is capable of (mis)representation:the prince must appear to be good, virtuous, and so on in order to satisfyhis people and thus to maintainhis power
(chap. 15) .5
This redefinitionof representationas ruse and thus of mimesisas power is
the aim of ThePrinceas a whole,6but it findsa particularlyforcefularticulation
in chapter 18. Machiavellibegins thischapter by distinguishingbetweenhuman
law and bestialforce,but he thenabandons the firstpole of his binaryopposition
and proceeds to locate the range of politicalinventionwithinthe single second
term of bestiality.Imitationmay be a specificallyhuman quality requiring the
exercise of judgment, but the objects of imitationare bestial craftand force.
Furthermore,the imitationof (bestial)nature has as itsgoal not correspondence
to some fixed,determinaterealitybut the appearance of (what is conventionally
accepted as) truth.
Here illusionis being turned against itselfin order to presenta truthto the
people that will at the same time be effectivefor the prince. If, in the age-old
debate between rhetoricand philosophy,the humanistswant a rhetoricthat is
grounded in the truthand also effective,Machiavelli takes the furtherradical
step not of subordinatingor compromisingtruthin the interestsof power,as he
has sometimesbeen charged withdoing, but of mutuallyimplicatingrepresentationand force.Representationno longer involveseven the correspondence to
a practicalstandard of truthbut has instead become theatrical.Correct or successfulimitationno longer demands the exercise of self-knowledgeand moral
discretionbut has itselfbecome a rhetoricaltopic of inventionto be manipulated
in the interestsof power.7Conversely,power becomes in part, if not entirely,an
effectof the representationalillusionof truth.
Machiavellithus borrows-or imitates-the humanists'rhetoricalstrategies
in order to educate his reader to an antihumanistconception of imitationand
and theExampleofAgathocles
Virtit
65
practice. The followingpages aim to clarifyMachiavelli'ssimilaritywith and
divergencefromthe humanistsby takinga close look at what we mightcall, for
heuristicpurposes, the repertoireof figuresin Machiavelli'sstrategicrhetoric.
These heuristicfiguresshould also help us to discoverhow Machiavelli'srevision
of the humanistnotion of practicalreason is at one and the same time the condition of virtu and the potentialobstacle to its realization.As we will see, while
Machiavelli'srealisticanalysisof the realm of politicsavoids the ethicaldomesticationof virtuon the one hand, itthreatensto allegorize,reify,or demonize virtu
on the other,thus finallyunderminingthe flexiblepoliticalskillthatthe strategic
rhetoricof The Prince was designed to encourage.
Irony and Hyperbole
whenthemagnitude
ofthefactspassesall words,
Forhyperbole
isa virtue
[virtus],
the
ourlanguagewillbemore
ifitgoesbeyond
effective
andinsuchcircumstances
thanifitfallsshort
truth
ofit.
-Quintilian8
Machiavelli'scriticismof the humanistversionof pragmatismfollows
from his recognitionof the intrinsicirony of politics,or of action withinthe
contingentrealm of human affairs:"If you look at matterscarefully,you willsee
thatsomethingresemblingvirtue,ifyou followit,maybe yourruin,while somethingresemblingvice will lead, if you followit,to your securityand well-being"
(45 [66]).9 But this formulationalso allows us to see that Machiavelli wants to
controlthisirony,or ratherthathe conceivesof the man of virtu'as someone who
can use the ironies of politicalaction to achieve politicalstability.(The refusalto
act in the face of such ironies Machiavelli called literature;see his History of
Florence,book 5, chap. 1.)10This recognitionof the ironyof politicsleads in turn
partem.The humanists,following
to a revisionof humanistargumentin utramque
Aristotle,believed that it is necessary to be able to argue on both sides of a
question, not so that one mightactuallydefend a false positionbut so thatone
rebutan opponent'sarguments."
could anticipateand therebymore effectively
Machiavelli,however,argues that the prince will actuallyhave to oppose what
mayappear to be good at a given moment.In fact,in Machiavelli'sview,it is the
humanistswho are guiltyof tryingto accommodate at a singlemomentcontrary
qualitiesor arguments(e.g., in chaps. 16 and 17) when theyclaim thatthe good
partemis necessary
and the usefulare alwayscompatible.Knowledge in utramque
according to Machiavellibecause "the conditions of human life simplydo not
allow" one "to have and exercise" only morallygood qualities (45 [65]; cf. chap.
18, 50 [73]).
It is preciselythis intrinsicironyof politics-the gap or lack of a mimetic
relationbetweenintentionand result-that bothallowsforand requiressolutions
66
REPRESENTATIONS
that seem extreme fromthe perspectiveof the humanistideal of mediocritas.12
Hence the place of hyperboleand exaggerationin Machiavelli'srhetoric.On the
one hand, the examples of great men will alwaysseem hyperbolicor excessive
to-beyond the reach of-the imitator.On the other hand, Machiavelliargues,
thishyperbolehas a rhetoricaland pedagogical function.
Menalmostalwaysprefertowalkin pathsmarkedoutbyothersand patterntheiractions
orattain
Evenifhe cannotfollowotherpeople'spathsineveryrespect,
imitation.
through
ofthegreat
a prudentmanshouldalwaysfollowthefootsteps
tothevirtiofhisoriginals,
and imitatethosewhohavebeensupreme.His ownvirtumaynotcomeup to theirs,but
at leastitwillhavea sniffofit.Thus he willresembleskilledarcherswho,seeinghowfar
awaythetargetlies,and knowingthevirtiof theirbow,aim muchhigherthanthereal
theirrealend
target,notbecausetheyexpectthearrowto flythatfar,butto accomplish
byaimingbeyondit.(16 [30])
In thisview,hyperbolicexamples do not correspond to thingsas theyare but to
what theymightbe; theyare figuresof action ratherthan perception,of desire
ratherthancognitionor representation.Hyperboleas a mode of speech or behavior is thus the proper response to the irony of politics: it is predicated on a
recognitionof one's distance both fromthe situationas it stands and fromthe
situationone would like to create,but it also involvesthe recognitionthat such
distance-as in theepigraph fromAdorno-is itselfa preconditionofconsidered
action. Finally,hyperbolicaction is oftenironicaccording to the classical definioratoria8.6.54; 9.2.44 -47) because it involves
tion of irony(QuintilianInstitutio
sayingor doing one thingin order to arrive at its opposite. In short,the world
of Machiavellian politicsis intrinsicallyironic,and the most effectivemode of
behaviorin such a world is theatricaland hyperbolic.An analysisof the example
of Agathocles in chapter 8 will serve to illustratethispoint. At the same time,it
should also help us to see how Machiavelli'sstrategicpracticeas a writerimitates
thatof his ideal prince.
StrategicStyle:
The Example of Agathocles
In a worldwhere a flexiblefacultyofjudgment is constitutiveof virtu',
it is not surprisingthat Machiavellishould offerus no substantivedefinitionof
his terms. This is not simplya failingof analyticalskill,as Sydney Anglo has
the aim of which is to decomplained,13 but a sophisticatedrhetoricalstrategy,
stabilizeor dehypostatizeour conceptionof politicalvirtue,foronlya destabilized
virtucan be effectivein the destabilizedworldof politicalreality.14In thiscontext,
the most effectivecritiqueof an idealistor mimeticnotion of truthand of representationwillbe one thatstages or dramatizesthislack of conceptual stability,
ratherthan simplystatingit as a fact.This rhetoricalindirectionwould not in
and theExampleofAgathocles
Virtit
67
itselfdifferentiateMachiavelli from the humanists.What is importantto see,
however,is thatMachiavelliuses humanistrhetorictheatricallyforantihumanist
purposes. Chapter 8 on Agathoclesthe Sicilian is an exemplaryinstanceof how
the Machiavellian critique of representationimplicatesthe humanists' ethical
pragmatismas well.
In chapter8, MachiavellipresentsAgathoclesas an example of someone who
rises to power not by virtitor fortunebut by crime. Readers of The Princehave
tended to interpretthis example in one of two ways. In this narrative,some
argue, Machiavelliregistershis own discomfortwiththe notion of virtilthat he
has been elaborating: it does violence to his sense of moralityas well as to that
of the reader.J. H. Whitfieldspeaks of Machiavelli'scondemnationof Agathocles,
and Claude Lefortremarkson the"reservetroublante"thatqualifiesMachiavelli's
admirationof thisfigure.15 Others see the storyas an illustrationof a cruel but
effectiveuse of violence. The interpreterswho fall into thiscamp then differas
to whetherthis use of violence is immoral or amoral.'6 But in neithercase is
of Agathoclesas one who rose to powerbymeans
Machiavelli'sown interpretation
of crime subject to scrutiny.17Thus, while the proponentsof the firstinterpretation make note of Machiavelli'squalificationsof Agathocles' actions ("Non si
puo ancora chiamare virtiuammazzare li sua cittadini... ."; 42), they read this
qualificationas a simple pun ("It certainlycannotbe called 'virtue'to murderhis
fellowcitizens";26) and so save Machiavellifromthe charge of failingto make
moral distinctions.The second group of interpreters,in accepting the storyof
Agathocles as an illustrationof the uses of crime ratherthan of virtis,make an
analogous moral distinctionbetweenthe excessivecrueltyof Agathoclesand the
politic restraintof the man of virtit.In both cases one would argue that this
makingof distinctionswas preciselyMachiavelli'sintention.Followingfromthe
storyof Cesare Borgia in chapter 7, the next chapter would serve, in these
readings,to correctthe reader who had begun to thinkvirtPidenticalwithcrime.
In chapter 8 Machiavelliwould then reassure the reader by acknowledgingthat
there is a differencebetweenthe two.
In fact,however,there is hardlya less reassuringexperience of reading in
The Princethan that of chapter 8. And it is a chapter whose disturbingquality
increasesas we read furtherin the work:whilein chapter6 Machiavellidescribes
the relationof virtitand fortunaas a dialecticalone, he goes furtherin chapter
divide theworldof eventsbetweenthem.
25 when he claimsthatfortunaand virtit
How then, we wonder,could crime be a thirdterm in Machiavelli'sanalysisof
the way princesrise to power?
In spite of the titleand the firstparagraph of chapter 8, Machiavelli'sintroductoryremarksabout Agathoclesseem to confirmthe polar oppositionof chapter 25: he tellsus thatAgathocles"joined to his villainiessuch virtisof mind and
body thatafterenlistingin the armyhe rose throughthe ranks to become military governor of Syracuse" (25 [41]). And a littlefurtheron he reiteratesthat
68
REPRESENTATIONS
Agathocles' success was due to virtu':"Considering the deeds and virtuof this
man, one findslittleor nothingthatcan be attributedto fortune"(26 [41]). But,
then,anticipatinghis reader's objections,he quicklyadds:
to
betrayhisfriends,
cannotbe calledvirtito murderhis fellowcitizens,
Yetitcertainly
be devoidof truth,pity,or religion;a man maygetpowerbymeanslikethese,butnot
in facingand escapingfromdangers,
glory.If weconsidersimplythevirtiofAgathocles
itis hardto see why
ofhissoulin sustaining
and overcoming
adversity,
and thegreatness
his fearful
he shouldbe consideredinferiorto the greatestof captains.Nonetheless,
crimes,preventus fromplacinghim
alongwithhisinnumerable
cruelty
and inhumanity,
attribute
to eitherfortuneor virtia
amongthereallyexcellentmen.Forwe can scarcely
(26 [42])
whichhe owedto neither.
conquest[quello]
How are we to make sense of the vertiginousdistinctionsin thisparagraph?
Russell Price has suggested that Machiavelli is differentiatingin this passage
betweenthe militaryvirtuand glory[gloria]thatapply to captainsand the political
virtit
and glorythatapply to "thereallyexcellentmen.'18Of the formerhe writes:
... deservescreditforhismartialspiritand deeds (thatis,as
It seemsthat[Agathocles]
is howhe becameruler,
a capitano)
afterhe becameruler;whatblackenshisreputation
Trickery
and violence
and fellowcitizens.
hisfriends
slaughtered
becausehe treacherously
are tobe condemnedin a ruleror an aspiringruler.... The stainhe incurredbytheway
he seizedpoweris indeliblelikeoriginalsin.(611)
Apart from the dubious appropriateness of an analogy withoriginal sin for a
writerof such rabid anti-Christiansentiment,this analysisfails to take account
of the factthatBorgia also used trickeryand violence to secure his power but is
neverthelessnot being offeredas an example of one who rose to powerbycrime.
Furthermore,although Borgia is not condemned by Machiavelli,neitheris he
called one of the reallyexcellentmen, a phrase that,as J. G. A. Pocock reminds
us, refersto legislatorsratherthan new princes.19
A more sophisticatedversionof Price'sanalysisis presentedbyClaude Lefort,
who argues that the introductionof the theme of gloriain chapter 8 signals a
turningpoint in the argumentof ThePrince.Whereas the earlier chapterswere
concerned with the necessary exercise of violence in the acquisition of power,
oneself to the
the example of Agathocles introducesthe necessityof representing
people in a certainwayin order to hold on to the power one has acquired. While
of the prince,he now
Machiavellihad previouslyemphasized the self-sufficiency
places the action of the prince in a social context in which it acquires its real
significance(380-81). In thisway,virtuitselfis neitheridenticalwithnor exclusive of crime,but it does require glory,and it is thisconcern for glorythatwill
induce the prince to moderate his violentbehavior and take greaterinterestin
the welfareof his people. According to thisreading, in the sentencethatbegins
"Yetitcertainlycannotbe called virtu'to murderhis fellowcitizens. . . ," itis called
thatshould be stressed:virtuis not equal to crime,thougheven a "virtuous"man
Virth
and theExampleofAgathocles
69
(Borgia, for example) may findit necessaryon occasion to act criminally.Yet if
Lefortis not as reassuringas thosereaders who claimthatMachiavelliis asserting
a clear-cutdistinctionbetweenmilitaryand political(moral) virtil,he nevertheless
claims that there is a distinctionbetween Borgia and Agathocles,one that does
not lie in the nature of theirdeeds, since both were guiltyof criminalbehavior,
but ratherin the factthat the deeds of the latter"were committedwithoutjusor withouta pretext[sansmasque],by a man whom nothing,except his
tification,
ambition,destined to reign ... a man-Machiavelli took the trouble to make
clear-di infimae abjettafortuna,the simple son of a potter (nato d'unofigulo)"
(380; mytranslation).
It is not so much the crimes of Agathocles that constitutehis original sin,
accordingto Lefort,as his lowlybirth.But thisinterpretationtrivializesboth the
notion of representationand thatof fortunein ThePrince,neitherof which,as
Lefort elsewhere recognizes, is a static concept involvinga one-to-one correspondence, according to which the bad fortune of lowly birth would forever
restrictAgathocles' possibilitiesfor representinghimselfin a favorablelight.In
fact,by the end of the chapter Agathocles is offeredas an example of someone
who used crueltywell rather than badly, and who was consequently"able to
reassure people, and win them over to his side withbenefits"(28 [44]). It would
seem, then,thatfar fromexcluding Agathocles fromthe categoryof "representativemen;"Machiavelligoes out of his way to stresshis inclusion.
As we have seen, mostreadingsof chapter8 respond to the pressureto make
distinctionsthat is implicitin the apparentlycontradictoryreiterationof virtil.
But itis importantto see thatclear-cutor permanentdistinctionsare finallywhat
cannot be made. Throughout The PrinceMachiavelli sets up concepts in polar
oppositionto each other and then shows how the opposition is contained within
each term so that the whole notion of opposition mustbe redefined.20Thus in
chapter 25 he begins by tellingthe reader that"fortunegovernsone halfof our
actions,but that even so she leaves the other half more or less in our power to
control."Fortuneis then presentedas a naturalforce,a torrentialstreamagainst
which men can take countermeasures"while the weather is stillfine."But this
oppositionis a generalizationthatundergoes startlingrevisionwhen we come to
"the particulars."For a man's abilityto take countermeasures-his virtit-turns
out to be a factof (his) nature and thus a potentialnatural disasterover which
he has no control:
withpatienceand caution,and thetimesand circumstances
If a princeconductshimself
change,
are favorableto thosequalities,he willflourish;butif timesand circumstances
he willcome to ruinunlesshe changeshis methodof proceeding.No man,however
prudent,can adjustto suchradicalchanges,notonlybecausewe cannotgo againstthe
a
of nature,but also becausewhenone has alwaysprosperedby following
inclination
course,he cannotbe persuadedto leaveit.(71 [100])
particular
70
REPRESENTATIONS
In thismore particularview,human natureis itselfa torrentialstreamthatcannot
redirectitscourse withdikes and restrainingdams: the favorableconstraintsare
instead introduced by fortune. The purely formal virtitthat is the abilityto
"adjust one's behavior to the temper of the times"-and that is preciselynot
constancyof character-is not a qualitythatcan be attributedonce and for all:
it is rather a generalizationthat designates only the fortunatecoincidence of
"nature'sliveryand fortune'sstar."Or, as Machiavelliwritesof men of virtilin
of mind would have been in vain,
chapter6: "Withoutthe opportunitytheirvirtit
and withoutthatvirtisthe opportunitywould have been lost" (17 [31]).
If we now returnto chapter 8, we can begin to see why Machiavellicannot
call Agathocles'crimesvirtuous.In thelightof chapter25, itseems thatwe should
place an even strongeremphasis on called: in the case of neither Borgia nor
cannotbe calledany one thing.
because virtit
Agathoclescan crimebe called virtit,
In short,once the temporal dimension of circumstanceis introduced,the fact
thatcrimecannot necessarilybe called virtitmeans also thatit can be called virtil.
The danger of the precedingchapter7 is not onlythatwe mightidentifyBorgia's
murderand treacherywithvirtis,but also that we would identifyvirtitwithany
particularact-criminal or not. The aim of the passage, in short,is to dehyposto emptyit of any specificmeaning. For virtisis not a general rule of
tatizevirtis,
behaviorthatcould be applied to a specificsituationbut rather,like prudence, a
facultyof deliberationabout particulars.
On one level, then,the conclusionof the paragraph concerningAgathocles'
virtis("For we can scarcelyattributeto either fortuneor virtisa conquest which
he owed to neither")seems to reinforcethe distinctionsbetweenvirtis,fortune,
and crimewithwhichthe chapterbegan-perhaps as an ironicconcessionto the
reader's moral sensibility.On another level, it simplypoints up the incommenand the specificinstances
betweenthe generalizationsoffortunaand virtis
surability
to
that cannot be usefullysubordinated any (conceptual) generalization.How
else is it possible to explain the end of chapter 8, where Machiavelli makes a
distinctionbetween two sorts of cruelty-between crueltyused well or badlytherebyplacing the distinctionbetweenfortunaand virtiswithincrueltyitself:
"Crueltycan be described as well used (if it's permissibleto speak well about
somethingthat is evil in itself)when it is performedall at once, for reasons of
(27-28 [44]). Once again the emphasis is on chiamare("Bene
self-preservation"
usate si possono chiamare quelle [se del male e licitodire bene]"), but here the
temporal dimension is explicit, as is the consequent and necessary making of distinctionswithin"cruelty."And once again, in the parentheticalremark
Machiavelli speaks to the reader's moral sensibility-but he has answered the
impliedquestion even beforeit has been posed. Crueltycan be called "wellused"
because Machiavellihas just done so in the preceding clause. The adverbial bene
then takes on some of the paronomasticcolor of the earlier paragraph on virtis.
and theExampleofAgathocles
Virtu
71
The reader wondersifit is permissibleto speak goodwords(bene)about evil,while
Machiavellireplies by speaking well(bene).21
These lines are importantbecause theycontainin littleMachiavelli'scritique
is compatiblewithutilitas,
of humanism.The humanist'sassumptionthathonestas
reflectedin themaximthatthegood oratoris necessarilya good man, is politically
useless to Machiavelli,howeveritis interpreted.When the goodness of the orator
is interpretedto mean in conformitywithethical goodness (honestas;see Cicero
3.3.11, 3.11.49), then the maxim is a stoic tautologyand the question
De officiis
of the orator'seffectiveness(utilitas)need not enter in. When the orator'sgoodness is interpretedto mean persuasivenessas well as moral rectitude,then the
judgment thatis also idealistic
claim thatthe orator is a good man is a synthetic
and unfounded. One has only to look to experience to see that many morally
good men have been politicallyineffective.Here the criterionof correctaction
moraljudgment of prudence but the
is not moral goodness or the intrinsically
functionalexcellence or effectivenessof virtu':a virtuwe mightsay,parodying
In speaking
Aristotle,thatdemonstratesits own excellence by being effective.22
well ratherthan speaking good words, Machiavelliboth dramatizesand themaHe shows thatvirtuis not a substancebut a mode
tizesthisfunctionalvirtuosity.
of action (not a noun, but an adverb) by speaking well about actingwell.
The linguisticplay of this paragraph and the earlier one on virtu'are thus
part of a rhetoricalstrategyto engage the reader in a criticalactivitythat will
allow him to discover not the contentof "what should be" but the formalityof
what in any particularsituation"can be."23Here, if the reader's "natural" dispositionto make moral distinctions("everyoneagrees .. .") maybe compared to
the natural force of the river in chapter 25, which serves as a metaphor for
fortune,Machiavelli'sprose is the countermeasurethat attemptsto channel or
redirectthiscourse by introducingthe elementof reflection.In the rewritingof
oratoria9.4.7), Machiavelliproposes a style
a metaphorfromQuintilian(Institutio
thatis powerfulpreciselybecause it is rough and broken. He thus duplicateson
the poetic level the practicalproblem of judgment that the prince will have to
face-that of applying the rule of virtu'to the particularsituationat hand. Or,
as Roland Barthes has writtenof Machiavelli'swork,"The structureof the discourse attemptsto reproduce the structureof the dilemmasactuallyfaced by the
protagonists.In thiscase reasoned argumentpredominatesand the history[or
discourse] is of a reflexive-one mightsay strategic-style."24
Theatricality
The suggestionthatMachiavelli'sstyleis strategicmeans not onlythat
the prince may learn somethingabout strategyby reflectingon Machiavelli's
prose (the structureand vocabulary of his examples) but also that the actual
strategieshe recounts may tell us somethingabout Machiavelli'sstrategyas a
72
REPRESENTATIONS
writer.And thisreciprocityin turn allows us to read the example of Agathocles
in the lightof Machiavelli'searlier remarks on Borgia. As a number of critics
have remarked,Machiavelli'spositionas counselor is in some waysanalogous to
and for
thatof the new prince. Both are "student[s]of delegitimizedpolitics,"25
both the problem is how to impose a new form not only on matterbut on an
alreadyinformedmatter.But Machiavelli'svirtisas a writeris not simply,as some
readers have suggested,to dramatize in the writingof The Princethe resourcefulnessand inventivenessof the effectiveruler but also to manipulate his audience in much the same way thatthe prince mustmanipulate his subjects.In the
ofjudgfirstcase, imitationinvolvesthe cultivationof a purelyformalflexibility
in the second, thatjudgment is testedby the appearances
ment or disponibilit&;
of the textitself.Thus in chapter7 Machiavelliproposes Borgia'sbehaviorin the
Romagna as an example worthyof imitation,and in chapter 8 he imitatesit in
order to test whether the reader has learned the lesson of a chapter 7. In
short,there are strikinganalogies not only between the careers of Borgia and
Agathoclesbut also betweenthe effectof Borgia's behavioron his subjectsin the
Romagna and Machiavelli'seffecton the reader in chapter 8.
When Borgia took over the Romagna he discoveredthat"thewhole province
was full of robbers,feuds, and lawlessnessof every description"(22 [37]). His
wayof "establish[ing]peace and reduc[ing]the land to obedience" was to counter
lawlessnesswithlawlessness:"He named Messer Remirro De Orco, a cruel and
vigorous man, to whom he gave absolute powers. In short order thisman pacified and unified the whole district,winninggreat renown" (22 [37]). But like
Agathocles,Borgia knew thatexcessiveauthoritycan become odious,
judge and a
so he set up a civilcourtin the middleof the province,withan excellent
fromeach city.And becausehe knewthattherecentharshnesshad genrepresentative
eratedsomehatred,in orderto clearthemindsof thepeopleand gainthemoverto his
to makeplainthatwhatever
he determined
crueltyhad occurredhad
causecompletely,
Takinga proper
come,not fromhim,but fromthe brutalcharacterof the minister.
in
he had himplacedon thepublicsquareof Cesenaone morning,
occasion,therefore,
ofthisscene
twopieces,witha pieceofwoodbesidehimand a bloodyknife.The ferocity
(22 [37])
leftthepeopleat once stunnedand satisfied.
This storyprovides us withtwo examples of crueltywell used. The firstis
De Orco's, the second Borgia's. The functionof the firstis primarilydestructive
and repressive:to pacifyhis subjects;the functionof the second is theatricaland
cathartic:this too pacifiesthe subjectsbut by the theatricaldisplay of violence
ratherthan itsdirectapplicationto the audience. The firstexample reestablishes
justice fromthe perspectiveof the ruler; the second stages thisreestablishment
fromthe perspectiveof and forthe ruled. As thistheatricaldisplaysuggests,the
storyalso providesus withtwoexamples of representationwellused. In the first
case, thereis an elementof representationinsofaras Borgia delegates his power,
but this delegation is ultimatelya way of concealing the fact of representation
and theExampleofAgathocles
Virtu'
73
(i.e., representationhas become ruse) so thathe can deny responsibilityfor De
Orco's cruelty-as he does so effectivelyby means of (and this is the second
example) his theatricalrepresentationin the public square of Cesena.
The example of Agathocles in chapter 8 is just such a theatricaldisplayon
the part of Machiavelli.Like Borgia, Machiavelliis concerned to make a distinctionbetweenvirtuand crime-not because theyare mutuallyexclusivebut because
they are not identical. And like Borgia, he sets up a court with the reader as
judge. "He determinedto make plain thatwhatevercrueltyhad occurred [in the
example of Agathocles]had come, not fromhim,but fromthe brutal character
of his minister"(i.e., of his example). The reader is morallysatisfiedor reassured
by Machiavelli'ssupposed condemnationof Agathocles,just as the people of the
Romagna were by the dramaticand brutal disavowalof Remirro'sbrutality.But
the reader who is taken in by this excuse is in the position of a subject rather
than a prince-for Machiavellihas not presented the example of Agathoclesin
order to pacifyhis readers but ratherto trythem. In short,Agathocles is proposed as an example for the princewho mighthave need to followhim,and the
abilityto determinethat necessityis also the virtuousabilityto make discriminationsabout whatconstitutesvirtuwithrespectto anygivensituation.The example
of Agathoclesis a testof virtis.
The Avoidance of Tautology
When we turn from the examples of Borgia and Agathocles to the
rest of ThePrince,we see thatthisworkis filledwithexamples of such extreme,
ironic,or hyperbolicsituationsand actions,the most extremeexample of which
is perhaps Machiavelli'sadvice thatthe best wayto keep a cityis to destroyit (see
chap. 5, 14 [28]; and Discourses2.23, 3.40). Many readers have thought that
Machiavellihere and elsewherecould not possiblymean what he says,thathe is
ironicin the sense of unserious.26But the example of Agathocleshas shown that
whatis mere exaggerationfromthe perspectiveof the conventionalvirtuesmay
be simple pragmaticadvice forthe studentof virtis.This advice willseem hyperbolic because it is beyond good and evil,because it involvesthe transgressionof
theconventionalphilosophicalconstraintson knowledge(knowledgeas cognition
of the truth)in the directionof knowledgedefinedas power.27But here precisely
lies the problem.While Machiavelliargues in chapter 15 thatvirtuinvolvesknowledge that is useful or effective,he does not want to claim thatvirtuguarantees
success. To make this claim would be to fall into a version of the tautologyof
honestasand utilitasthathe condemns in thissame chapter.If there were such a
skill as a virtuthat always yields success, then there would be no fortune or
contingency;but contingencyis preciselywhat makes room for virtis-indeed,
what makes virtunecessaryin Machiavelli'seyes. Still,a virtuthatnever resulted
in success would be patentlyabsurd. Thus Machiavelliclaims earlyin ThePrince
74
REPRESENTATIONS
that if we follow the examples of virtuthat he presents,success will usuallyor
mostoftenresult(11 [12]).
These ambiguitiesconcerningthe relationof virtuto success are reflectedin
deltacosa.On the one hand
Machiavelli'sclaim to be guided by the veritheffettuale
by
ratherthan idealistically,
he means thathe will approach politicsrealistically,
beginningwiththingsas theyare. In thisview,as Felix Gilberthas argued, "the
measure of worthof a politicalfigure[is] ... formed by his capacityto use the
possibilitiesinherentin the politicalsituations;politics[has] itsown criteriato be
On the other hand, implicitin
derived fromexistingpoliticalopportunities."28
is the assumption that such an
the claim to be guided by the verit&effettuale
in short, that one does not simplyimitate
approach will prove to be effective:
necessitybut thatone can manipulateit-effect it-to one's own advantage.
Machiavelli'svacillationis apparent throughout The Prince. Sometimes he
equates virtuwithsuccessfulpoliticalaction; at other timeshe insistson distinguishingbetweenthe two.29In the firstcase virtubecomes the goal of technical
deliberation,and Machiavelli sounds like a dispassionate political analyst,subordinatingmeans to ends. (The danger here, of course, is to assume thatanyone
who succeeds demonstratesvirtis,when in fact success mightbe due to chance
ratherthanto the activityof the individual.)In the second case, virtuis a practical
skillthat may be an end in itself,and thus structurally(although not ethically)
similarto the classical notion of prudence.30In thisway Machiavelli'svacillation
an amoral versionof the structuralprobsimplyconflatesin a single term,virtfi,
lem inherentin the classical and humanistconcept of prudence-the problem
of the relation of means to ends, of prudential deliberation to virtue or, in
Machiavelli'scase, to virtit.
This ambiguityor uncertaintyabout the status of deliberativeskill and its
relation to success is also reflectedin the nature and functionof examples in
Machiavelli'stexts. As I have suggested, a teacher who subordinates practical
judgment to theoreticalreason has only to present the student with general
preceptsand the logical rules of deduction,but a teacherwhose theoryof action
equates judgment withthe exercise of practicalreason or of decorum will have
to educate such judgment throughexamples. Such examples will not have the
statusof mere illustrationsof theory,as theywould if theywere subordinatedto
or subsumed under universallyapplicable abstractprinciples.They will not be
expendable but necessary,since everyjudgment of decorum is a judgment of,
and mustconformto the exigenciesof,a particularsituation.On the otherhand,
if suchjudgment merely
conformedto the particular,it would cancel itselfout as
ajudgment, since it would involveno referenceto a standardotherthan faithful
re-presentation(imitation)of the particularcase. Judgmentrequires distance,
and examples that educate such judgment must contain withinthemselvesor
dramatize this distance. Thus, in the case of humanisttexts,examples are to a
certainextentproblematizingsince theyare designed to provokereflection.But
Virtit
and theExampleofAgathocles
75
theirpedagogical aim also demands a limitto such problematizing:forif exceswiththe particularleads to the collapse ofjudgment,excessive
sive identification
difference(the reflectionon and puttingin question of all possible standardsof
judgment-whether the standard of virtueor virtu)does as well. While Machiavelli lacked the humanists'faithin the ethical criterionof practicalreason, he
was not usuallyskepticalabout the possibilityof deliberationand action. Indeed,
he insisted that such possibilitycould only be realized in a world purged of
idealism.Machiavellithusshareswiththe humanistsa rhetoricof problematizing
examples, and like the humanistshe needs also to limitsuch problematizing.31
The dilemma that Machiavelli faces is thus intrinsicto the problematicof
imitation,but it is also tingedwitha peculiarlyMachiavellianironyinsofaras the
ethicalclaims forhumanistimitationare a rhetoricaltopic contained withinand
thus ultimatelyundermined by the Machiavellian strategyof imitation.In this
context,Agathocles' "overshooting"of moralityis exemplary because, both in
Machiavelli's strategyas author and Agathocles' as agent, it dramatizes and
encourages the distanced reflectionand thus the reflectiveimitationnecessary
to, if not sufficientfor,success.
Irony and Allegory
anddispassionate
itbegins
inrealism
thelowmimetic:
from
Irony
descends
anddimoutlines
towards
Butas itdoesso,itmoves
of
myth,
steadily
observation.
rituals
anddying
intit.
godsbegintoreappear
sacrificial
NorthropFrye32
As I have argued in the preceding pages, Machiavelli'sreflectionon
the politicaluses of representationis tied to his revisionof the humanistconcept
of prudentialaction. The prince is powerfulto the extentthathe divergesfrom
a naive or moralconceptof prudence,but he also maintainshis powerby "naively"
reproducing-the conventional
imitating-or representinghimselfas faithfully
virtues.As in chapter 18, power is in part, if not entirely,the effectof the representationalillusion of truth.But, as the case of Agathocles demonstrates,the
exigencyof representation,if representationis conceived of now as the means
or the abilityto generate the consensus and support of the people (chap. 8, 24
[44], chap. 18, 51 [74]; Discourses 2.23, 3.19-23), also finallyproves to be a forcefulconstrainton the abuse of power.Crueltywillbe wellused if"itis performed
all at once, for reasons of self-preservation;and when the acts are not repeated
afterthat,but ratherturned as much as possible to the advantage of the subjects"
(8.27-28 [44]). The prince mustin the long run please his audience if he is to
maintainhis rule. In the end, the rhetoricaltopic of truthproves to involvean
ironicversionof the ethicalconstraintthatthe humanistslocated in customand
consensus. This constraintalso helps us to see how the analysisof power in The
76
REPRESENTATIONS
Princelogicallygives way to thatof the Discourses:the prince,to be successfulin
the long run, must found a republic because republics are capable of greater
longevityand virtuthan principalities.The "understandingreader" willsee that
when representationand force are mutuallyimplicated,when representation
becomes a means of power, and thus finallywhen power is mitigatedby the
exigencies of persuasion, the short-livedindividual self-aggrandizementgives
wayto communalglory,and the princemustof necessitybecome a fellowcitizen.33
rhetoricof ThePrince.
This is the optimisticwayto read the self-destructing
But, as mostreaders have noted,thereis a more radical wayin whichthe analysis
of virtuunderminesitselfand Machiavelli'spedagogy in thistext.As Machiavelli
tells us over and over again, there are no general rules for virtuousbehavior
(e.g., chap. 20, 59 [85]), and thereis no guarantee thatthe skillone practicesin
the interpretationof particularexamples will enable one to respond appropriatelyin the nextsituation.This is, of course, as it should be. As Machiavelliwrites
in chapter 21, "No leader should ever suppose he can invariablytake the safe
dellecose],
course, since all choice involvesrisks.In the natureof things[nell'ordine
you can never tryto escape one danger withoutencounteringanother; but prudence consistsin knowinghow to recognize the nature of the differentdangers
and in acceptingthe least bad as good" (65 [92]). But the essentialemptinessof
the conceptof virtureceivesa ratherdifferentand finallydevastatingarticulation
in chapter25, where the role of fortunein the individual'sabilityto act virtuously
finallyseems to deprive the individual of any initiativewhatsoever.As we saw,
Machiavellibegins thischapterby discussingthe relationof fortuneand virtuin
general terms. On this level he gives fortune a certain allegorical stability,as
thoughfortunewere somethingexternalto virtuthatthe latterhad onlyto resist.
When he descends to particulars,however,fortunehas no stabilitywhatsoever.
The irony of politics and human action becomes so great-the possibilityof
action (as opposed to mere passivity)so compromised-that the distanceconstiTo recognizewhichsituationsrequire
tutiveof reflection
finallycollapsesaltogether.
which kinds of imitationfinallynecessitatesthatthe prince imitatethe absolute
of fortuneitself.But one's abilityto learn is itself,finally,a functionof
flexibility
thefortuneof one's natural disposition,and is necessarilylimitedby it. In thus
conflatingthe realm of necessityor nature withthe agent of virtit,Machiavelli
runs the riskof reducingvirtuto the mere repetition-that is, the willed acceptance-of necessity:the mimeticrepresentationof nature.34 In so doing, he
finallydoes substitutefor the tautologyof honestasand utilitasthe tautologyof
virtuand success. It's not surprising,then,thatMachiavellishould at thismoment
invoke the personifiedfigureof Fortune as a woman in a desperate, inconsequential attemptto redeem the possibilityof action by relocatingit in an interpersonal context.35
A fewremarksabout the allegoricaltendencyof ThePrincemayhelp to clarify
this point. According to Angus Fletcher,the allegorical hero confrontsa world
Virtit
and theExampleof Agathocles
77
of contingency,a world in which the individual has very littlecontrolover the
consequences of his actions, and in which there often seems to be littlecausal
connectionbetweenevents.36Narrativesequence is threatenedby parataxisbut
As a result,the hero
restoredon the level of cosmic,often magical necessity.37
also seems to be not simplyat the mercyof externaleventsbut in the controlof
some external power. In fact,the allegorical hero could be said to operate in a
world of demonic powers,a world in which functionshave been compartmentalized, personified.The resultis thatthe hero himselfbecomes depersonalized,
no longer a person but a mere personificationof a functionas well. In a world
of Fortuna,in short,the hero becomes of necessitythe embodimentof Virtis.
In such a world,then,thevirtuesno longerseem to be attributesof individual
agents; rather,theyrecover theiroriginalsense of powers or forces,of virtis.As
Fletcherremarks,"Like a Machiavellianprince,the allegorical hero can act free
of the usual moral restraints,even when he is acting morally,since he is moral
only in the interestsof his power over other men" (68). To redefinevirtue as
virtuis thus "to rediscovera sense of the morallyambivalentpower in action"(an
advance, one mightsay,in the directionof "realism"),but it is also, ironically,to
run the riskof doing awaywithfreewill.While the intentionbehind Machiavelli's
various exempla of virtuis to help the reader understandthe formal,innovative
characterof thisfaculty,and the role of freewillin determiningwhatconstitutes
virtuin any particularsituation,the quasi-allegoricalstatusof the man of virtit,
of Virtis,
suggeststhatthe individualis not at
or of the prince as a personification
all in controlof hisbehavior-a suggestionthat,as we have seen, becomes explicit
in chapter 25. The way Machiavellichooses to combat thisdemonizationor personificationof the person is to repersonalizewhat was becoming an increasingly
abstractand unmanageableconcept of fortuneby introducingthe figureof Forpartem,
tune as a woman. In a kind of parody of humanistrhetoricin utramque
allegoryis used to fightthe allegorizationor reificationof the prince'svirtit.
In lightof these remarks,one can also see how the allegorical tendencyof
Machiavelli's"realism"is manifestin the sublimerhetoricof his concludingchapbetweenallegoryand
ter.38Fletchercalls our attentionto the structuralsimilarity
the sublime. Simplystated,the experience of the sublime involvesthe inability
of the imaginationto comprehendsensuous experience,whichleads to an awareness of the higherfacultyof reason and to "reflectionon man's higherdestiny"
(249). This discrepancybetween sensuous experience and the higher claims of
reason is analogous to the separation of sensuous representationand allegorical
signifiedin the allegorical text.Furthermore,as Longinus remindsus, allegory
is not only analogous to the sublime but can itselfhave a sublime effect,an
ideological (249) or epideicticforcewhen it "incitesto action" (246). But, as the
in the alleepigraph to thissection suggests,the structuralincommensurability
gorical sublimecan also have an ironiceffect,by suggestingthatthe principleof
78
REPRESENTATIONS
authorityor meaning (reason, God) is infinitelyremoved from the world of
sensuous immediacy.39
Machiavelliobviouslyintendsthe sublimeor divinerhetoricof hisconcluding
chapter to functionas the best of all hyperboles:to incitethe Medici to action.
Consider the followingclaim:
in sightin whomshe [Italy]can bettertrustthanyourillusThereis no figurepresently
trioushouse,which,withitsfortuneand itsvirtit,favoredby God and the Churchof
(73 [102])
whichitis nowthehead,can takethelead in thisprocessofredemption.
In these lines, Machiavelliconflatesthe fortuneof the Medici withdivine providence and the Church, and thus simultaneouslydebases religionand confersa
certaingrandeur upon the rulers of Florence.40In thislightnecessity,too, takes
on a differentand more positive appearance: it is no longer the necessityof
fortuneor of contingencyor of (one's own) naturethatresistsvirtu(as in chapter
25); rather,necessityis now the "providentialnecessity"thatjustifiesthe actions
of the Medici. Describingmen of virtis,he writes:
Theircausewasno morejust thanthepresentone,noranyeasier,and God wasno more
to themthantoyou.Yourcauseisjust: "forwarisjustifiedwhenitis necessary,
favorable
themtherewouldbe no hope at all."(73 [103])
and armsare piouswhenwithout
of the Medici as theredeemersof Italy,chapter26 would
In itsdivinejustification
be thefinal,brilliantexample of Machiavelli'stheatricalovershootingof the mark,
of a rhetoricof representationthat is neitherconstrainedby logic to represent
the truthnor guided by practicalreason in itsachievementof decorum but that
aims ratherto produce the effectof truth-or to effectit. Yet the obvious alternativereading of the lines quoted above is that providentialjustificationis conflatedwiththe materialrealm of necessity.In thisway,the collapse of the distance
and differencenecessary for action in chapter 25 turns out to anticipate the
rhetoricof chapter 26, a rhetoricthat,paradoxically,seems designed precisely
to recoup the losses of the preceding chapter.In the end, exaggerationcannot
freeitself"fromthe weightof the factual,so thatinstead of merelyreproducing
being it can, at once rigorousand free,determineit" (Adorno; see epigraph). In
a finalironictwist,Machiavelli'sprovidentialrhetoriccan thenbe seen to suggest
(no doubt against the free willhe assumes he exercises; see chapter 25), that,to
answerSchlegel'squestion,only (the hyperbolicfigureof) God can save us from
such ironies.
Virtft
and theExampleofAgathocles
79
Notes
1. Theodor Adorno, MinimaMoralia,trans.E. F N. Jephcott(London, 1978), 126-27;
FriedrichSchlegel, "Uber die Unverstandlichkeit,"
Kritische
(Munich, 1964),
Schriften
538 (mytranslation).1 am gratefulto Charles Trinkausforhis helpfulcriticismof an
earlier draftof thisessay.
2. Sheldon Wolin,Politicsand Vision(Boston, 1960), 224.
3. Niccolb Machiavelli,ThePrince,trans.and ed. Robert M. Adams (New York, 1977),
44. Throughout, I have substitutedvirtitfor the various English translationsAdams
provides.Referencesto the Italian textare takenfromMachiavelli,Il Principee discorsi,
ed. Sergio Bertelli (Milan, 1977), and willbe given in the textin bracketsfollowing
English references,as here: 44 [65].
4. Recent interpretationsof The Princein the contextof the humanistnotion of imitation include Mark Hulliung, CitizenMachiavelli(Princeton,N.J., 1983), esp. 130-67;
Hannah Pitkin,FortuneIs a Woman(Berkeley,1983), 268ff.;and Thomas M. Greene,
"The End of Discourse in Machiavelli's'Prince,'" in Conceptsof Closure,ed. David F.
Hult, YaleFrenchStudies67 (1984): 57-71. Gennaro Sasso also discusses Machiavelli's
notion of imitationin NiccoloMachiavelli:Storiadelsuopensiero
politico(Naples, 1958),
381-89. For earlier treatmentsof Machiavelliin the contextof humanism see Felix
Florence
Gilbert,Machiavelliand Guicciardini:Politicsand Historyin Sixteenth-Century
(Princeton,N.J., 1965), and "The Humanist Concept of the Prince and the 'Prince'
of Machiavelli,"Journal of ModernHistory11 (1939): 449-83; as well as Allan H.
Gilbert,Machiavelli Princeand Its Forerunners
(Durham, N.C., 1938). In considering
Machiavelli'srhetoric,I have also benefitedfromEugene Garver,"Machiavelli'sThe
Prince: A Neglected Rhetorical Classic,"Philosophy
and Rhetoric13 (1980): 99-120;
and "Machiavelliand the Politicsof RhetoricalInvention,"paper given at the third
biennialconferenceof the InternationalSocietyforthe Historyof Rhetoric,Madison,
Wis. (April 1981); as well as fromNancy Struever'sunpublished paper, "Machiavelli
and the Critique of the Available Languages of Moralityin the SixteenthCentury."
5. Machiavelli'sdivisionof the politicalagent fromthe politicalactoranticipatesHobbes
in chapter 16 of the Leviathan.On the distinctionbetweenclevernessor versutiaand
Ethics(henceforthNE) 1144a.25-1144b.
prudence, see AristotleNicomachean
6. See the discussion by Pierre Manent, Naissancesde la politiquemoderne:Machiavel,
Hobbes,Rousseau(Paris,1977), 19: "If ruse is,in Machiavelli'seyes,theprincipalresource
of politicalaction,thatis because ruse responds to theessence of the politicalsituation"
(my translation).
inRenaissancePoetry(New
7. Thomas M. Greene, TheLightin Troy:Imitation
and Discovery
Haven, 1982), 142, 172, 184.
8. This slightlyaltered translationis takenfromTheInstitutio
OratoriaofQuintilian,trans.
H. E. Butler,Loeb Classical Library(Cambridge, Mass., 1976), 8.6.7.
9. Wolindiscusses Machiavelli'sviewof the intrinsicironyof politicsin Politicsand Vision,
227.
10. Cited by Hulliung, CitizenMachiavelli,137.
11. AristotleRhetoric1355a.20-1355b.5.
12. As Hulliung (CitizenMachiavelli,158-59) and SydneyAnglo (Machiavelli[New York,
1969], 244-49) have remarked,Machiavelli'srejection of mediocritas
or the middle
wayis also reflectedin his antithetical,either/orstyleof arguing.
80
REPRESENTATIONS
13. Anglo, Machiavelli,209.
14. NancyStrueverhas an interestingdiscussionof thedereificationof virtiin her unpublished paper, "Machiavelliand the Available Languages of Morality."
15. J. H. Whitfield,Machiavelli(Oxford, 1947), 80 and 108; Claude Lefort,Le Travailde
l'oeuvreMachiavel(Paris, 1972), 376. See below forfurtherdiscussionof Lefort'sposiin and Since
tion.Anotherrepresentativeof thisfirstpositionis JerroldSeigel, "Virtit
oftheHistoryofIdeas, vol. 4 (New York,1968), 476-86.
the Renaissance,"in Dictionary
16. See Gennaro Sasso, NiccoloMachiavelli,296ff.; Gabriele Pepe, La politicadei Borgia
delpotere
(Naples, 1945), 281-82; and Ugo Dotti,NiccoloMachiavelli:Lafenomenologia
(Milan, 1979), 179ff.,for the firstposition; for the second, see J. G. A. Pocock, The
MachiavellianMoment(Princeton,N.J., 1975), 152 and 167.
17. Greene, "The End of Discourse in Machiavelli's'Prince,"' notes the tenuousness of
the distinctionbetween Borgia and Agathocles (65), but sees this as evidence of a
breakdown in the concept of virtitrather than a deliberate strategyon the part of
Machiavelli. Manent, Naissancesde la politique,16, however,sees the distinctionas
deliberatelyfalse.
30 (1977):
18. Russell Price, "The Theme of Gloriain Machiavelli,"RenaissanceQuarterly
588-631.
19. Pocock, TheMachiavellianMoment,168.
20. See chapter 12 on the pseudo-distinctionbetweenlaws and arms, as well as chapter
19 on arms and friends.
21. Strueveralso discusses the general conflationof the ethicalgoodand the amoral well
in ThePrince;"Machiavelliand the AvailableLanguages of Morality."
22. Aristotlewrites:"It is thiskind of deliberationwhichis good deliberation,a correctness that attains what is good" (NE 1141b.20; trans. Martin Ostwald [New York,
1962]). My definitionof virtisas functionalexcellence is taken from Hulliung's discussion of the similaritybetween virtu'and aretj: "Since the Latin word virtusmeant
almostexactlywhat aretjhad meant in popular Greek usage, simplyto use the Latin
language as it had alwaysbeen used had the effect,whetherintendedor unintended,
of undoing the Platonic and Aristotelianeffortof reworkingand philosophizing
pagan values. Once again, 'excellence' was synonomouswithall thatis heroic,noble,
warlike,great"; CitizenMachiavelli,136-37. See also pp. 195ff.,253, and passim on
Machiavelli'scritiqueof stoicism.
23. This phrase is taken fromWhitfield,Machiavelli,117.
6 (1967), 72. In
24. Roland Barthes, "Le Discours de l'histoire,"Social ScienceInformation
a book thatcame to myattentionafterthe completionof thisessay,Michael McCanles
proposes a reading of chapter 8 similarto the one I am offeringhere. See "The
Discourse of 'II Principe,'" in Humana Civilitas,Studies and Sources Relating to the
Middle Ages and Renaissance, vol. 8 (Malibu, Calif., 1983). He tends, however,to
maintaina strictoppositionbetweenChristianvirtueand virtu'even as he denies any
substantivedefinitionof the latter.That is, although he argues throughouthis book
for the dialectical understanding of virtu'as necessarilyincluding its opposite, he
suggestshere thatwhat is evil froma Christianpoint of viewwillnecessarilybe good
from a political point of view and vice versa (see p. 63). He also does not discuss
Agathocles'conversionto representationat the end of chapter 8 (see pp. 59-65).
25. Pocock, TheMachiavellianMoment,163.
26. See Adams's remarkson this example in his edition of The Prince,14. See also Leo
Strauss, Thoughtson Machiavelli(Chicago, 1958), 82; and Gilbert,Machiavelliand
165 -66.
Guicciardini,
Virtu'and the Example of Agathocles
81
27. On Machiavelli'santicipationof Nietzsche,see Hulliung, CitizenMachiavelli,30.
120.
28. Gilbert,Machiavelliand Guicciardini,
29. Virtu'is equated with success in chaps. 8 (28 [44]), 19 (59 [84]), and perhaps 25 (71
[100]), where Machiavelliequates the good withwhat is effective;cf. the end of this
chapterwhere failureis equated withinaction.Virtitis differentiatedfromsuccess in
chaps. 4 (14 [28]), 6 (16 [30]), and 7 (20 [34-35]). In theDiscourses(3.35), Machiavelli
of judging by the result,as he does in The Historyof
remarkson the superficiality
Florence,book 4, chap. 7, and book 8, chap. 22. On this problem of the relationof
virtu'to success, see Alkis Kontos, "Success and Knowledge in Machiavelli,"in The
PoliticalCalculus:Essayson Machiavelli's
Philosophy,
ed. AnthonyParel (Toronto, 1972),
83-100.
30. I borrow the distinctionbetween technicaland prudentialfrom Aristotle(NE), who
argues thattechniis concerned withproduction(the end results),whereas prudential
deliberationis a process,and an end in itself.Those manycriticswho argue thatvirtu'
is technicalskillare rightif theymean thatthe prince is concerned withresults,but
wrongif theyequate virtu'withthe resultratherthan deliberativeskilland energyin
is not completelytechnicalbecause technicalskillmustresultin a product
action.Virtu'
(howevermuch thatproductmayreflecta compromisewithone's originalconception
does not have to produce somethingelse in order to be virtu'.
of the object),whilevirtu'
Or, as Ostwald observes (NE, 154, n. 20), "Practicalwisdomis itselfa completevirtue
or excellence while the excellence of art depends on the goodness or badness of the
product" Again, I am arguing only for the structural
identityor homology of virtu'
and prudence or practicalreason.
31. On problematizingexamples, see KarlheinzStierle,"L'Exemple comme histoire,l'histoirecomme exemple,"Poetique10 (1972): 176-98. While Machiavelliwas capable of
using the same examples to illustratedifferentpoints (e.g., Giacomini'sloss of favor
in the Discourses1.53 and 3.16; cited in Gilbert,Machiavelliand Guicciardini,
167), he
needed, if his work was to have any practical effect,to stop short of the radical
skepticismof a Montaigne, for whom examples could be used to illustratealmost
anything.For ifthisis thecase, thenone has departed fromtherealmofveritaeffettuale
and entered the realm of the unconstrainedimagination,the realm of fiction.
32. Northrop Frye,TheAnatomy
ofCriticism
(Princeton,N.J., 1957), 42.
33. Hulliung makes thispointin CitizenMachiavelli,56, 82, 231. See also Strauss,Thoughts
onMachiavelli,288 - 89; Manent,Naissances,19 -25; and ThePrince,chap. 19, 53 -54
[77-78], for Machiavelli'sremarkson the origin of the French parliament. Nancy
Strueverhas some interestingremarksabout constraintin ThePrincein her unpublished essay. She argues that Machiavelli wants to oppose the unproblematicconstraintsof thehumanisttradition(ritual,ceremony,the tautologicalequation of ethical
behaviorwithgood results)to the problematicand problematizingconstraintson the
princeand the reader of ThePrince.These lattertake the formof 1) a narrowlexicon
of politicalanalysis(e.g., virtft,fortuna);
and 2) difficultand ambiguous examples that
force readers to judge and to recognize the moral opacity of the "domain of artifice"in which theyact. For Struever,all of this amounts to the greater"realism"of
Machiavelli'spoliticalanalysis,a claim that I address below.
34. See Manent, Naissances,9-10, 35-39, for a more positivereading of the willingof
necessityin ThePrince.
35. Pitkinmakes thispoint in FortuneIs a Woman,292.
36. See Angus Fletcher,Allegory:The Theoryof a Symbolic
Mode (Ithaca, N.Y., 1964). All
page referenceswillbe given in the body of my text.
82
REPRESENTATIONS
37. On parataxis in The Prince,see Fredi Chiappelli, Studisul linguaggiodel Machiavelli
(Florence, 1952), 40-42 (cited by McCanles, TheDiscourseof'II Principe,'13). See also
McCanles, ibid., 13-15.
38. For some provocativeinterpretationsof this concluding chapter,see Greene, "The
End of Discourse in Machiavelli's'Prince' "; and Sasso, NiccoloMachiavelli,278-80.
39. Fletcherquotes Schiller: "For the sublime,in the strictsense of the word, cannot be
containedin any sensuous form,but ratherconcernsideas of reason,which,although
no adequate representationof them is possible, may be excited and called into the
mind by that very inadequacy itselfwhich does admit of sensuous presentation";
trans.J. H. Bernard
251-52. See also Immanuel Kant, CritiqueofJudgment,
Allegory,
(New York, 1951), 88, 101 (paragraphs 25 and 28).
40. Pocock makes a similarpoint in TheMachiavellianMoment,171: "We mustnot say that
withoutadding thatrealdivine inspirationis being lowered to the level of realpolitik
politikis being raised to the level of divine inspiration."
Virtitand the Example of Agathocles
83