Center for the Study of the American Electorate A Non-Profit, Non-Partisan Research Institution Curtis Gans Director For Release: Immediate After Further Review (See Note): ELECTIONS OF 2004, 2008 and 2010 PRODUCE NEAR RECORD TURNOUTS LOWER TURNOUT EXPECTED IN 2012 BEYOND 2012, LONG-TERM GEOGRAPHY FAVORS DEMS Washington, December 27 – Voter turnout increased in each presidential and mid-term election from 2000 – 2010 after reaching historic lows in the decade of the 1990s, a pattern not likely to be sustained in 2012. Turnout in presidential elections rose from 51.4 percent of age-eligible citizens in 1996, the lowest since 1924 to 62.3 percent in 2008, the highest since 1960 and the third highest since 1920 when women gained the right to vote. Mid-term increases in turnout were less dramatic. From a turnout of 37.9 percent of eligibles in 1998, the lowest since 1942, turnout rose to 41.5 percent in 2010, the highest since 1982 and the second highest since 18-20 year-olds were given the vote in 1971. These were among the highlights of an updated report on turnout, partisan turnout and regional partisan turnout from 1948-2010 released today by the non-partisan Center for the Study of the American Electorate (CSAE) including revised state and national turnout figures for the 2000-2010 decade in light of the 2010 Census enumeration of age-eligible Americans and the 2010 American Community Survey figures on non-citizens (see note at end of report but before analysis and commentary). Documentation for this report in the form of summary charts, graphs, detailed charts and methodological notes can be found at csaelectorate.blogspot.com. [email protected] http://csaelectorate.blogspot.com (540) 822-5292 (w) (703) 304-1283 (c) 40220 Haywood Lane Lovettsville, VA 20180 Among the other highlights: Overall turnout in presidential elections increased from 51.4 percent of eligibles in 1996 to 54.2 in 2000, to 60.4 in 2004 (the highest since 1960 and fifth highest since 1920) to 62.3 in 2008. Democratic presidential year turnout in 2008 reached its highest level (33.0 percent of eligibles) since the landslide victory of Lyndon Johnson in 1964 (38.2 percent) and the second highest in the post-World War II period. Republican presidential year turnout in 2004 (30.6 percent of eligibles) was the highest since the Reagan landslide of 1984 (32.9 percent) but far below the party’s post-World War II high of 35.1 percent garnered by Dwight Eisenhower in his re-election landslide victory. In presidential year elections for U.S. House Democratic turnout exceeded Republican turnout from 1948 through 1992. Since then, Republican turnout has exceeded Democratic turnout in every election except 2008. But both in 1996 and 2000 the Republican advantage was minuscule. In 1996, GOP turnout of eligibles exceeded the Democrats by 23.5 percent of eligibles to 23.4. In 2000 the Republican advantage was 24.2 to 24.0. The highest GOP turnout in presidential year U.S. House races was 31.3 percent of eligibles in 1952. The high water mark for the Democrats was 33.4 in 1964. In mid-term elections for U.S. House of Representatives, Democratic turnout exceeded Republican turnout from 1954 through 1990. But since 1990, Democratic turnout has exceeded GOP turnout only in 2006. Democrats enjoyed their greatest advantage in 1974 when their turnout was 21.2 percent of eligibles, while the GOP turnout was 14.9. The largest pro-Republican gap was in 1994, when the party’s turnout was 20.1 percent of eligibles as opposed to the Democrats 17.5. The highest Republican turnout was 22.4 percent of eligibles in 1962. The highest Democratic turnout was 24.8 percent of eligibles in 1958. The gap between the south and the rest of nation has been progressively narrowing due to the Voting Rights Act and the subsequent enfranchisement of African-Americans and the movement of conservative Democrats into the Republican Party, creating two-party competition where there was none prior to 1965. In the 1948 presidential election, turnout in the south was 24.5 percent of eligibles while turnout in the rest of the nation was 58.3 percent. In 2008, turnout in the south was 54.1 percent as opposed to 59.1 in the rest of the nation. In the 1950 mid-term southern turnout was 15.6 percent of eligibles, while the rest of the nation’s turnout was 51.9. In 2010, southern turnout was 35.4 percent of eligibles while the rest of the nation turned out at a 42.6 percent rate. 2 Post World War II Partisan Regional Changes: In this report, CSAE also looks at the changed partisan regional political landscape since the immediate post-World War II period, based on votes for U.S. House. South: In 1948 the Democratic House vote was 18.9 percent of eligibles. The Republican percentage was 5.9. Because of Strom Thurmond’s candidacy that year, 1952 might serve as a better presidential election base year. In that year, the Democrats garnered 27.9 percent of the eligible vote; the Republicans received 10.1 percent. The Democrats enjoyed a continuing but diminishing majority until 1996 when the GOP bested the Democrats by a 22.6-19.1 margin. That expanded to a 28.6-20.0 margin in 2004, but contracted to a 26.7-25.9 margin in 2008. In 1950, Democrats had a mid-term margin of 12.2 percent of eligibles to the Republicans 4.5 percent. The Democrats maintained a substantial but dwindling margin over the GOP until 1994, when an anti-Clinton tide yielded the first Republican plurality (17.6-13.9) since Reconstruction. Since then the Republicans have produced higher turnouts in mid-term House elections in each election year, but by widely differing margins. In 2010, propelled by the recession-driven anti-Democratic tide, the GOP had its largest margin in turnout over the Democrats 21.3-13.0. But it should also be noted that in 1998, the margin was only 12.9-10.7 and in 2006, the margin was 17.0-14.7. New England: Prior to 1960 in presidential years New England was a largely Republican region. In 1952, the GOP’s turnout was 39.8 percent of eligibles compared to the Democrats 32.9. They prevailed by a similar margin in 1956. But by 1960, the tables began to turn. Democrats had a 42.0 percent turnout that year as opposed to the Republicans 32.2. While there some elections in which the margins between the parties were narrower (1968, 1972 and 1984), there was never another election in which the GOP outpolled the Democrats and the trend was for ever-widening margins. In 2008, the Democrats had a turnout of 43.4 percent of the eligible vote, the Republicans 15.3. In mid-term elections, Republicans had higher turnout in 1946 (28.6-23.3) and 1950 (29.928.8), but never again. By 2006, the Democrats turned out 31.5 percent of the eligible electorate, while the GOP turnout was 11.0 percent. In the recession year of 2010, the picture brightened for the GOP, but only marginally. They turned out 18.6 percent of the electorate as opposed to the Democrats 27.3 Far West: In the 1948 presidential election year, Republicans had a turnout of 29.7 percent of the eligible electorate, the Democrats garnered 21.5. The GOP turned out more citizens than the Democrats in 1952 (33.0-28.1). But in the ensuing 56 years, they had a higher turnout in only two elections, in 1968 (31.1-27.4) and in 1980 (25.6-25.5). While the margin of Democratic dominance varied over these years, it reached its apex in 2008 (34.2-20.2). In mid-terms, The Republicans had a higher turnout in 1946 (21.6-17.9) and in 1950 (25.6-21.5). But in the ensuing 60 years, they had a higher turnout just twice, in 1966 (28.2-26.3) and 1994 (21.5-21.4) both elections that featured a national rejection of a Democratic president. While the Democratic margins in mid-term elections have not been huge, the highest in 1974 3 (24.3-16.9), their supremacy has been constant averaging between 5-6 percentage points, narrowing only slightly (to 23.1-19.7) in 2010. Industrial Midwest: This region has been and is a see-saw battleground between the two major parties in both presidential and mid-term elections. In presidential election years Democratic turnout was greater in 1948, 1960, 1964, 1976, 1984, 1996, 2000 and 2008. Republican turnout was higher in 1952, 1956, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1988 and 2004. The largest Democratic margin was 36.4-25.6 in 1964. The largest GOP margin was 37.1-32.1 in 1956. But in most elections the differences were not greater than three percentage points. In mid-terms, Republican turnout was greater in 1946, 1950, 1954, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2010. Democratic turnout was higher in 1958, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1990 and 2006. The largest Republican margin was in 1946 at 28.4-21.5. The largest Democratic margin was in 1982 at 24.8-19.0. With two exceptions, the differences in all the other elections were fewer than four percentage points. Mid-Atlantic: In presidential elections, Republicans had a turnout advantage in 1948, 1952 and 1956 and have not had a turnout advantage since, though they were virtually tied with the Democrats in 1972. In the 52 years since 1956, the degree of Democratic turnout dominance has ranged 0.7 percentage points in 1980 to 12.7 percentage points (34.0-21.3) in 2008. In mid-term elections, Republican turnout exceeded Democratic in 1950, 1990 (15.2-15.1), 1994 and 2002 and the two parties were tied at 25.0 in 1954. In all other mid-term elections in the 60 years since 1950, the Democrats had the advantage with margins ranging from 0.5 percentage points in 1962 (26.7-26.2) to 8.3 percentage points in 2006 (22.6-14.3) Other Regions: In the other three less populous regions in CSAE’s analysis – the Southwest (including Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Arizona), the farm Midwest (which, in CSAE’s regional breakdown, includes North and South Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota and Wisconsin) and the mountain states (Colorado, Montana, Utah, Wyoming and Idaho) – partisan advantage has evolved over the years with respect to individual states rather than regions. In the Southwest, Texas, which was before the Voting Rights Act a solidly Democratic state, has been a Republican state since 1994. Oklahoma has been solidly Republican for more than a decade. New Mexico has been more a Democratic state than Republican for most of the post-war period and Arizona is presently more Republican than Democratic. But all four states’ partisan leanings are likely to be influenced by an ever-increasing Latino population. At the beginning of the post-war period, the farm Midwest had a distinctly Republican cast with the exceptions of Minnesota whose politics was dominated by the Democratic-FarmerLabor Party and Wisconsin which was evenly split between the two parties. Over the whole period of this report, Kansas and Nebraska have remained strongly Republican; North and South Dakota have had Democrats elected to offices on all levels but now are more Republican; Wisconsin is still divided and Minnesota is more so. 4 At one time, the Idaho congressional delegation was Democratic, but now Idaho, Wyoming and Utah are solidly Republican, but both Colorado and Montana can be leaning Democratic or Republican in any given year. Note: This report contains revised turnout figures and percentages from 2002-2010. Turnout percentages are based on the decennial U.S. Census enumerations of those ageeligible to vote minus non-citizens and interpolated each decade between Censuses. For a decade following the previous Census but before and until a new Census, the rate of change in eligible citizens in the previous decade is used and interpolated forward. When a new Census is taken, as in 2010 (and released in 2011), the turnout figures for the previous decade need to be adjusted based on the actual rate of change. The basis for this report reflects one other change. From 1870-2000 (with the exception of the 1960 Census), the number of non-citizens in the U.S. was part of the Census enumeration. For the first time, ascertaining non-citizens was not part of the 2010 Census but rather a part of the American Community Survey, released at the end of September. A complete run-down of all the turnout changes by state can be found under “Documentation” at csaelectorate.blogspot.com. 5 Analysis and Commentary (All parts of this section reflect the views of Curtis Gans, CSAE’s director.) 2012 Turnout Will Be Lower: There have been two explanations for the progressive increases in voter turnout from 2000 through 2010 in both presidential and mid-term elections. One claims the turnout trends are cyclical and the upturn marks the end of the old cycle of decline (since 1960 and ending in 1998) and the beginning of a new cycle of civic resurgence. They additionally believe in a new, activist “Millennial” generation imbued with a higher level of civic values that will reverse the trend of disengagement by America’s youth. They point to the substantial increase in voting of those 1824 in the elections of 2004, 2006 and 2008 as indicators of that enhanced and continuing involvement, reversing a trend which saw each individual age cohort report ever lesser turnout and ultimately leading to lower turnout in every age group other than those over 65. The alternative view (mine) is that the increases across the 2000-2010 decade were election specific, that there is really nothing unique about the “Millennial” generation other than, for those middle class and educated, their devotion to new communications technology, and that turnout is virtually certain to decline in 2012 (with one caveat). The 2000 election was one of the closest in history and the modest rise in turnout that year was against the backdrop of the 1996 election which had the lowest turnout since 1924 and the second lowest since the early 1800s. The 2002 election was against the backdrop of the 1998 election whose turnout was the lowest since 1942, and 2002 was an election held against the backdrop of the events of September 11, 2001. The 2004 election was driven by extreme polarization with fear of change and hostility to Democratic advocacy driving Republicans to the polls and anger at the Presidency of George W. Bush and the war in Iraq propelling Democrats (and particularly the educated young). The backdrop of the 2006 election was a polarization similar to 2004, this time benefitting the Democrats. Polarization and an economic downturn, augmented by two special factors – an emotional outpouring of hope reposed in the unique and eloquent candidacy of Barack Obama and the fact that he was an African-American – brought African-Americans to the polls in record percentages, increased the turnout of college-educated youth over and above their 2004 levels of participation and made possible the highest turnout since 1960. And the 2010 election followed a normal historical pattern of high-turnout rejection of the party in the White House. The 2012 election will be conducted against a totally different backdrop. While there was a surge in youth turnout in each of the elections from 2004 through 2008, it did not herald a new “Millennial” generation of youth activists. The surge in youth involvement was limited to the college-educated and college-resident young. The participation rates of those with lesser education were dismal. With the exception of a surge in educated youth 6 support for Obama in the 2008 primaries, the surge in political involvement of the educated young was limited to the general elections of 2004, 2006 and 2008. The so-called politicized young have not been involved in any other electoral activities – primaries, state and local races whose turnout levels continued to be, with a few exceptions, at historic lows. There is within the current generation a strain of idealism, as is often the case with the young and educated. But, by and large, that idealism has been channeled, sometimes by school fiat, into service programs that have not produced political involvement and, for most, sustained societal commitment. It is a generation that happened on the scene during the polarizing experiences of 2004-2008 and national politics offered an outlet for that idealism. But, in large measure, because of the failure of their efforts, through no fault of their own, in 2004 and because Obama the president did not fulfill the hope invested in Obama the candidate, there has been an enormous sense of disappointment among those young who had been previously politically active and the current crop of college-resident young do not have the same compelling motivation to engage as those who preceded them. For these and other deeper systemic reasons, it is virtually certain that there will be a substantial drop-off in the level of youth participation and voting in 2012 Youth are not the only reason that turnout will likely be lower in 2012. Under normal circumstances, recessions usually drive turnout higher. This election is likely to be different. There is little enthusiasm for any of the candidates. Polls show that the base of the Democratic Party still supports the president, but the enthusiasm level is much diminished and the disappointment level is much elevated. Latinos, three fourths of whom view Obama favorably in some polls, also in the same polls show a lesser likelihood (less than two-thirds) of voting for him, perhaps because his administration has deported more undocumented immigrants (including many who had committed no crime) than any president. Of the Democratic base, only AfricanAmericans are likely to turn out in percentages similar to 2008. None of the Republican candidates enjoys the full support of all elements of the party. That, in turn, is likely to have some supporters of candidates other than the nominee sitting out the election. The nomination process has forced all of the candidates to take positions on issues in the hopes of gaining the support of the activists who identify with the Tea Party, positions that are likely to undermine the eventual nominee’s support among independent voters. Unless the economy in general and unemployment in particular shows sustained signs of improvement by summer of 2012, the unprecedented level of public dissatisfaction with the direction of the country will grow as will citizen hostility to the leaders of both parties for their total inability to work together to improve the economy and the reckless brinkmanship of the Republican right. The election is likely to offer a minimum of hope and a maximum of televised invective – likely between the perception of a failed president and a party of failed ideas magnified by an unprecedented level of scurrilous and vitriolic and often ad hominem television advertising. Against this backdrop, it is hard to envision anything other than a substantial decline in turnout. This gloomy view could be mitigated by either or both of two developments – a perceived economic rebound and the efforts of Americans Elect (see below). But there have been only two 7 elections in American history – 1992 and 2000 – where the entry of non-major party candidates boosted turnout. Early Summer 2012 and Americans Elect: A bit of history: At the end of the second quarter of 1992, the economy began to recover from what had been a year and a half recession. But because the recovery was somewhat glacial and the citizenry did not feel better about economic conditions, President George H.W. Bush went into the general election at an insurmountable disadvantage. In May of that year, Ross Perot outpolled the president and the all-but-crowned Democratic nominee Bill Clinton. Despite the fact that he had withdrawn from the race and returned and had shown himself, in a variety of ways, as unfit to be president, Perot received nearly 20 percent of the vote. While polls showed citizen belief that the nation was on the wrong track, the depth and breadth of discontent that year was not even close to what it is today. In May or June next year, the public will make its judgment about the state of the economy. If the unemployment rate is at least a percentage point lower than it is now and moving in a downward direction, President Obama will likely be re-elected. If, however, the economy continues to stagnate or worse and there is either no progress on the employment front or it has gotten worse, there is almost no chance that Obama can win. But it is not at all certain that the public will have faith that a Republican nominee, weighed down by the ideological baggage of the Tea Party and Congressional gridlock, could do any better. The question is whether the citizenry might cast a vote for another choice. Americans Elect is attempting to offer that choice. The minimal conditions for such an effort to be successful are five: A deep feeling that the nation is on the wrong track. Disaffection with the two major parties and their candidates. A line on the ballot in every state. Adequate money to conduct a competitive campaign. 8 Candidates for president and vice-president whom the public can feel are competent to fulfill the duties of those offices and who offer hope of something different than what has occurred over what will be then three and a half years (or nine and a half years). If the economy is not in clear recovery mode, the first four of those conditions will be in place. It remains to be seen whether Americans Elect will be able to recruit potential nominees from both major parties that will be credible and appealing. Those nominees will also need to provide content beyond the empty concept of “centrism.” Vision and a credible roadmap to achieve it have been sorely lacking in American politics and leadership. If the nominees of Americans Elect can provide both, they may be able to overcome the disappointment and disdain that now dominate citizens’ attitudes to leadership, politics and government. The conventional wisdom is that such an effort is doomed to failure, as all other such efforts in American history have been. That judgment may turn out to be correct. But I believe that this time the conventional wisdom may turn out to be wrong, and the independent candidacies the Americans Elect online delegates select might win. I base that judgment on the belief that if all five conditions for potential success are met and the economy is in no better shape, they may be seen to offer hope where there might be none to be had in either major political party’s nominees. I also base that judgment on personal experience. In 1967, I wrote the blueprint for and, with the late Allard Lowenstein, organized what came to be known as the “Dump Johnson Movement” At that time, our effort was seen as quixotic, and the overwhelmingly body of “informed” opinion was that we couldn’t beat an incumbent president in his own party. When Sen. Eugene McCarthy announced his candidacy, he was unknown to 57 percent of the electorate. And when I took a long night’s train ride to New Hampshire to coordinate the primary campaign a month before that state’s first in the nation primary, McCarthy stood at two percent in the polls. But I never had any doubt about our likely success. I knew the 1966 election, where the Democrats lost 47 seats in the House of Representatives and 750 seats in state legislatures, had been a negative referendum on the Johnson presidency. And I knew that if I were any street corner in America, the person on both my right and left viewed Johnson with distaste.* It is, of course, much too early to judge the viability of Americans Elect’s effort or whether the conditions will exist next May or June for its potential success. But, I, for one, take the effort seriously. 9 *A personal note. I am still proud of what we did in 1967-68, and I would do it again were conditions the same. But it is also true that the story of Lyndon Johnson is a tragic one. Had he not prosecuted and escalated American involvement in Vietnam, had he not disingenuously characterized what our country was doing there and had not the combination bitterly divided the nation, Johnson might have gone down as one of America’s greatest presidents. His accomplishments in domestic policy in the year and a half after President Kennedy was assassinated and before he sent combat troops into Vietnam in May of 1965 were the equal of what Franklin Delano Roosevelt did in 13 years. The Future Partisan Landscape: It would be folly to predict partisan electoral fortunes in the 2012 elections at this time. Too much depends on the performances of the economy, the president and Congress. But it is not too early to envision that the Republican Party, as it is presently constituted, may be facing difficult times in future elections. While the party has succeeded in winning the election of two latino governors, one latino U.S. Senator and one southern African-American congressman, it has not made major inroads into either the latino or African-American electorate because of its policies and/or perceived policies on issues affecting those communities. The demographic profile of the party is overwhelmingly white at a time when non-whites are becoming a majority in the United States. The GOP has, since 1972, made major inroads into the white working class which had been a Democratic source of strength since the 1930s, but it is not at all certain they can maintain that hold if the party persists in its anti-union (and seen as anti-worker) advocacy. The regional historical analysis and data in this report also speaks to future GOP weakness. Its drift rightward has almost eliminated the chance of making inroads into what has become a totally Democratic region, New England – Sens. Olympia Snowe, Susan Collins and former Vermont Gov. Jim Douglas, all moderates, to the contrary notwithstanding. Of the middle-Atlantic states, none is solidly Republican and two, New York and Maryland are out-of reach. Of the states in the industrial mid-west, only Indiana consistently leans Republican. The only state among those in the far west where there the GOP can count on winning is Alaska and that condition is likely to continue so long as the party’s advocacy and policies are as far right as they presently are. 10 The south has become a Republican stronghold, but the breadth of its base is and will be eroding. Population growth in Virginia tends to be concentrated in the Democratic-leaning District of Columbia suburbs and in the almost equally Democratic Norfolk area making the state very much up for grabs in future elections. The influx of latinos throughout the region, but particularly in Texas and the border states, including Virginia and North Carolina is likely to reduce Republican dominance. The newer generation of the Cuban-American population in South Florida is not governed by anti-Castro sentiment and can no longer be a dependable base of GOP support. The likelihood is that the certain GOP base in the future south will be limited to Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina and, at least for a time, Louisiana. Outside of the south, the GOP can count on Alaska, Oklahoma, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Kansas, Nebraska and, presently, North and South Dakota and Indiana. In any given election, Republicans can capitalize on Democratic foibles, but its geographic base of support is narrowing and the rightward drift of its advocacy is eroding its appeal. Without changes in its composition and advocacy, it stands a very real chance of becoming a semi-permanent minority party. Vain Hopes for the New Year: That the president stops using the words “middle class” in every other sentence of his stump speeches and starts talking about human beings, their needs, their hopes, their aspirations, and that the Republicans stop repeating inaccurate and meaningless phrases like ”job killing.” That both parties narrow their differences sufficiently to offer the truth that government is essential for many important societal tasks and that attacks on government per se do considerable damage to the bond between citizens and their leaders and help erode citizen will to participate in the political life of the nation. 11
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