The Unregarded Prophet: Lord Curzon and the Palestine Question
Author(s): David Gilmour
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1996), pp. 60-68
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
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THE UNREGARDED
PROPHET: LORD CURZON
AND THE PALESTINE
QUESTION
DAVID GILMOUR
manwho eversat in
GeorgeNathanielCurzonwas themosttravelled
a Britishcabinet.Duringhis eightyearsas a youngMP on the Conservative
back benches,he spentpartofeach yearon a longexpedition
toAsia;later,as viceroyofIndia,he travelled
moreextensively
thanany
ofhis predecessorsor successors.Althoughhe was as politicallyambitiousas David LloydGeorgeand WinstonChurchill,Curzonaimedfor
inthe top not by means of parliamentary
oratoryand Westminster
triguebut by establishinghimselfas his country'sleadingexperton
Asianaffairs.The knowledgeacquiredon his journeysmade him the
most highly qualified viceroy(1899-1905) and foreignsecretary
(1919-24) thatBritainhas everhad. This did not oftenenable him,
to persuadeless knowledgeable
however,
colleaguesto accepthis policies. Indeed,severalofthepostwarcrisesin theeasternMediterranean
refusalto heed
werecaused or exacerbatedby theBritishgovernment's
theadviceof its foreignsecretary.
David Gilmour,a Britishwriterand historian,
is authorofa numberof
workson Spain and theMiddleEast. His mostrecentbook is Curzon
(London:J.Murray,1994).
Journalof PalestineStudiesXXV,no. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 60-68.
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THE UNREGARDED PROPHET
61
An "Explorerof Wildernesses"
Curzon's early Asian travels-andthe books he wrote of thembelongedto a vastand comprehensive
projectto studytheproblemsof
thecontinent
and theirimplications
forBritishrulein India.Yethe also
becomeengrossedin thehistoriesand culturesof certaincountries,as
he demonstrated
in his magisterial
two-volume
work,Persiaand thePersian Question.The memoriesof his journeysin the Near and Middle
East wereimportantforthe formulation
of his foreignpolicyin later
years.
Palestinewas the firstAsian land to be exploredby theyoungCurzon. After
leavingOxfordUniversity
in 1882,he travelled
to Greeceand
EgyptbeforesailingtoJaffaand ridingthroughnorthernPalestineto
Damascus. Much of his timein the Holy Land was spentcomparing
places withtheeventsassociatedwiththemin theBible,an experience
whichdepressedand disillusionedhim.He was appalledby both the
imposturesofthelocal guidesand thesuperstitious
credulity
ofvisiting
Christianswho acceptedeveryfictitious
sitetheywereshown."AtBethlehemofcourseone is shewntheprecisespotwhereourLordwas born
and wherethemangerstood-also wherethe shepherdswatchedtheir
flocksetc."'
But he saw and rememberedenough of the land to argue nearly
In
thirty-five
yearslaterthatitcouldnotsustaintheZionistexperiment.
a memorandum
to his ministerial
colleaguesofOctober1917, he asked
whetherit was
notobviousthata country
whichcannot
within
anyproximate
period
an indigecontain
buta smallpopulation,
whichhasalready
anything
nouspopulation
ofits ownof a different
raceand creed... and
whichis suitedonlytocertain
ofagricultural
deforms
andpastoral
be desigvelopment,
cannot,savebya veryelasticuse oftheterm,
natedas thenationalhomeoftheJewish
people?2
For ten years afterCurzon's returnfromIndia, the Conservative
untilMay
partywas in oppositionand playedno partin government
H.H. Asquith,feltcompelledto
1915,whentheLiberalprimeminister,
forma wartimecoalition.Curzon,who enteredthe cabinetwiththe
ratherceremonialtitleofLordPrivySeal, at last had a chanceto influence policy.Buta numberofhis colleagues,notablytheformerPrime
MinisterAj. Balfour,seemeddetermined
to thwarthim.
Balfourwas an old friendwho had neverunderstoodCurzon'spassion fortravel.Manyyearsearlierhe had expressedbewilderment
that
Curzonshould havebecome"an explorerofwildernesses"and a "studentof effetecivilizations."3
Yetwhen theywerein the same cabinet,
Balfourrefusedto appreciatethathis friend'sstudiesmighthavegained
himcertaininsightson theworldthathe himself,
who seldomtravelled
beyondFranceand Scotland,had not acquired.In October1915, Cur-
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62
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
zon opposed a Britishadvanceup theTigristo Baghdad,arguingthat
anyforcethatreachedtheancientAbbasidcapitalwould be in a perilous position,liable to be cut offand surrounded.But the cabinetwas
swayedby the opinionsof Balfourand Sir EdwardGrey(the foreign
ofwhomhad been nearthearea and who werequite
secretary)-neither
theoffensive
was a gambleworthtakignorantoflocal conditions-that
humiliations
in theMiddleEast-defeat
ing.4Britain'sgreatestmilitary
at Ctesiphonand surrenderat Kut al-Amara-werethe directconsequences of thisgamble.
AtthebeginningofthewarCurzonhad deprecatedtheidea ofmakoftheMiddleEast.Skepticalofproposals
ingpromisesaboutthefuture
foran Arabcaliphateand a tribalrevoltin Arabia,he consideredit folly
to promisetheArabsan enormousstateon formerOttomanterritory.
position,he observedin April
Britainwould be in a mostunfortunate
1915, if she gavethempledgeswhichshe failedto redeem.5But once
he saw no optionbut to
theyhad been made, howevererroneously,
he toldhis colleaguestwo
humorthem.Britain"mustbe verycareful,"
of
yearslater,"thatany peace programdid not workto the detriment
theArabsand thepromises"made to them.6He thusopposed thecomand theBalfourDeclaramitments
made in theSykes-Picot
Agreement
ofthecorrespondence
tionand also criticizedtheBritishinterpretation
betweenSir HenryMcMahon,the high commissionerin Egypt,and
to McMahon'spledge of supHussein,the sharifof Mecca. Referring
in
territories
conqueredfromtheTurksexportforArabindependence
in
of
to
the
westof Damascus,Homs,
those
lying
"portions Syria
cept
Hama and Aleppo,"Curzonwas unableto agreethatthehighcommissioner"reallyhad excludedPalestinewhen talkingabout the areas to
thewestof the towns."7
as "a millstoneround
Curzon regardedthe Sykes-Picot
Agreement
our necks"and dismisseditas "a sortoffancysketchto suita situation
thathad not then arisen."At any rate,he told the cabinet'sEastern
Committeeat theend of thewar,thatmustbe "theprincipalexplanation of the gross ignorance"with which the boundaries had been
and incredible"thattheywould clearly
drawn,divisionsso "fantastic
lead to incessantfrictionbetweenthe French,the British,and the
Arabs.8Buthe believedthattheproblemsitwould cause would be minor comparedto thosepromotedby theBalfourDeclaration.
TheWarCabinetand theDebateaboutZionism
BythetimethatZionismbecamean issue fortheBritishgovernment,
LloydGeorgehad succeededAsquithas primeministerand Curzon
had exchangedhis ornamentaltitleof Lord PrivySeal forthe equally
venerablepost of Lord Presidentof theCouncil.His new duties,however,werefarmoreonerous.WithLloydGeorgeand LordMilnerhe was
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THE UNREGARDED PROPHET
63
now one ofthekeymembersofthetinyWar Cabinetwhichmetalmost
dailyto discussand directthemainareasofthewareffort:
Itsprincipal
taskin thesummerof 1917 was to decide thestrategy
fortheautumn
offensive
thatled to the hecatombof Passchendaele.Curzonwas also
leader of the House of Lords and chairmanof a greatmanycabinet
committees
dealingwithquestionsas diverseas merchantshipping,a
settlement
forIreland,and a proposalto exchangeGibraltarforCeuta.
Overstretched
by workingdaysthatseldomended beforetwo in the
he paid littleattention
morning,
to thegovernment's
diplomaticnegotiations with the Zionist movement.Indeed, he seems to have been
scarcelyawareofthosestrangecombinationsofromanticism
and strategicreasoning,zealotryand altruism,pro-Jewish
sympathyand professedanti-Semitism,
thatwere converting
so manyof his colleagues
intochampionsoftheidea ofa Jewishhomelandin Palestine.Itwas not
until readinga cabinetpaper circulatedin August 1917 by Edwin
Montagu,thesecretary
ofstateforIndia and theonlyJewish
memberof
thegovernment,
thathe decidedto intervene.
In his paper,Montaguhad denouncedZionismas a "mischievous
politicalcreed"thatwould promoteanti-Semitism
and jeopardizethe
statusofJewslivingoutsidePalestine.It was in anycase a futileaspiration,he argued,because therewere"threetimesas manyJewsin the
worldas could possiblygetintoPalestineifyou droveout all thepopulationthatremainstherenow."9Impressedbythesearguments,
Curzon
toldMontaguthatZionismwouldbe bad forPalestineand fortheJews.
I agreewithyouabouttheabsurdity
ofshunting
theJewsbackinto
Palestine,
a tinycountry
whichhaslostitsfertility
andonlysupports
meagreherdsofsheepand goatswithoccasionalterraced
plotsof
cultivation.
You
You cannotexpelthepresentMoslemoccupation.
cannotturntheJewsintosmallcultivators
and grazers.
Youcannot
turnall thevarioussects,religion
outofJerusaand denominations
an adlem.I cannotconceivea worsebondageto whichtorelegate
vancedandintellectual
thantoexilein Palestine.10
community
debated
The membersoftheWar Cabinetand otherseniorministers
theissue at thebeginningofOctober.Balfour,
who had succeededGrey
as foreignsecretary,
declarationwas necesclaimedthata pro-Zionist
fromGermanyand to gainthe
sarytopreempta similarannouncement
supportof AmericanJews,who mightprovidefinancialaid to theAllies, and RussianJewswho, despitethe revolutionin theircountry,
to stay in the war. Montagu
mighthelp persuade theirgovernment
stuckto theissue ofBritish
Jewry,
arguingthatits homelandwas Britain ratherthanPalestine,and pointingoutthatmostEnglish-born
Jews
wereopposedto Zionism.Curzon,bycontrast,
concentrated
thediscussion on Palestineand itsinhabitants.
Accordingto thecabinetminutes:
He stated,
from
hisrecollection
ofPalestine,
thatthecountry
was,for
themostpart,barrenanddesolate;
there
beingbutsparsecultivation
on theterraced
slopes,thevalleys
and streams
beingfew,andlarge
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64
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
centresofpopulationscarce,a less propitiousseat forthefuture
Jewish race could notbe imagined.How was itproposedto getrid ofthe
existingmajority
ofMussulmaninhabitants
and to introducetheJews
in theirplace? How manywould be willingto returnand in what
pursuitswould theyengage?To securefortheJewsalreadyin Palestineequal civiland religiousrightsseemedtohima betterpolicythan
to aim at repatriation
on a largescale. He regardedthelatteras sentimentalidealism,whichwould neverbe realised,and thatHis Majesty'sGovernment
shouldhavenothingto do withit."
Afterwardhe returned to these themes in a paper for the cabinet.
What, he asked, was "to become of the people of this country?"Apart
fromone hundred thousand Christians, "who will not wish to be disturbed,"therewere
withArab,
overhalfa million. . . SyrianArabs-a mixedcommunity
Hebrew,Canaanite,Greek,Egyptianand possiblyCrusaders'blood.
Theyand theirforefathers
haveoccupiedthecountryforthebestpart
of 1,500years.Theyownthesoil .... TheyprofesstheMohammedan
faith.Theywill not be contenteitherto be expropriatedforJewish
immigrants
or to act merelyas hewersofwood and drawersofwater
forthelatter. ..
Curzon also Dointedto the Droblemof Jerusalemwhich he regardedas
"a cityin whichtoo manypeoplesand too
religionshavea passionateand permany
Curzonregarded
Jerusalem manentinterest"
forit to becomea "future
as "a cityin whichtoo
capital."'12
Jewish
manypeoples ... havea
came too late to
Curzon's intervention
passionateand permanent
affectan issue on whichhis onlyallywas
interest"
forit to becomea
Montagu,an unpopular and distrusted
"future
Jewishcapital."
figure,and on whichhe was opposed by
the threemost powerfulmen in the government,Balfour,Milner,and Lloyd George.At the crucial cabinet
meetingon 31 October,he admittedthe propagandavalue of a proZionist declarationbut restatedhis misgivingsand his pessimism
about the futureof Palestine.13Largelyin deferenceto his anxieties,
however,the finalversionof the BalfourDeclarationcontainedthe
pledgethat"nothingshall be done whichmayprejudicethe civiland
in Palestine."
communities
religiousrightsof theexistingnon-Jewish
Policy
A Foreign
Secretary
at Oddswitha Foreign
InJanuary1919,shortlyaftertheend ofthewar,LloydGeorgeasked
Curzonto takechargeoftheForeignOfficewhilehe and Balfourwent
AlthoughCurzon did not officially
to Parisforthe peace conference.
triedto restrict
October,
he immediately
becomeforeign
secretary
until
Zionistambitionsin Palestine.At the cabinet'sEastern Committee
meetingin Decemberhe had observedthatZionistswerealreadytalking about a Jewishstateextendingeast of theJordan.'4The following
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THE UNREGARDED PROPHET
65
month,afterseeinga telegramfromChaimWeizmannproposingthat
Palestineshouldbecomea 'JewishCommonwealth,"
he warnedBalfour
thatsuch an aspirationwould lead to an Arabuprising.When theforeign secretaryrepliedthatWeizmannhad neverasked fora "Jewish
Government
in Palestine"and that he himselfwould regardsuch a
claim as "inadmissible,"
it was clear to Curzon thathe was quibbling
overthe difference
between"commonwealth"
and "government."
I feeltolerablysure . . . thatwhileWeizmannmaysay one thingto
you,orwhileyoumaymeanonething
bya nationalhome,he is out
forsomething
quitedifferent.
He contemplates
a Jewish
state,a Jewish
a subordinate
nation,
population
ofArabsetc.ruledbyJews;theJews
inpossessionofthefatoftheland,anddirecting
theAdministration.
He is trying
toeffect
thisbehindthescreenandundertheshelter
of
British
trusteeship.15
WhileCurzonwas awarethatWeizmannsaid one thingto his friends
but"sangto a different
tunein public,"he did notknowthattheforeign
was pursuinga similartacticwithhimself.AlthoughBalfour
secretary
toldhimthenthata Jewishgovernment
was inadmissible,
he had confessedto a Zionistsympathizer
theyearbeforethathe hoped fora Jewish state,and, at a meetingwithChurchilland Weizmannin 1922, he
and LloydGeorgeadmittedthatthe BalfourDeclaration"had always
meant a JewishState."'0LConvinced by
longacquaintancethatBalfourdid notreIn 1922, Balfourand Lloyd
allycareaboutanything,
CurzonneverapGeorgeadmittedthatthe
preciatedthestrength
ofhis attachment
to
Balfour
Declaration"had
Zionism. He believed that the driving
always
meant
a Jewish
forcebehind this particularpolicy was
State."
LloydGeorgewho, he thought,"clingsto
Palestinefor its sentimentaland traditionalvalue,and talksaboutJerusalem
withalmostthe same enthusiasm as about his nativehills."'7
Curzonendeavoredto persuadeZionistleadersand theirsupporters
thattheirclaimsmustbe limitedforthesake ofracialharmony."I am
just aboutto see Dr. Weizmann,"he wroteto a colleaguein April,"who
will receivefromme no sympathy
withthe advancedand aggressive
aspirationsin whichZionism,underhis guidance,has latelyshownan
inclinationtoindulge."'8Buthe was so pessimisticaboutBritain'sabilityto reconcilethedifferent
pledgesoftheBalfourDeclarationthathe
commission
favored
an Americanproposalto send out an international
to consulttheinhabitants
oftheMiddleEast abouttheirfuture.Such a
commission,
he hoped,would "extricate
us fromthepositionin Palestine,"whichwould soon be "untenable,"and mightlead to a United
StatesMandateinstead.19Once again, however,Curzon was heavily
outnumbered
withintheBritishgovernment.
LikeClemenceauin Paris,
LloydGeorgerealizedthatan international
commissionwhichinvited
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66
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
Arab opinionson the futurestatusof the area would sabotagethose
territorial
ambitionswhichBritainand Francehad secretlyproclaimed
in theSykes-Picot
Agreement.
AlthoughtheAmericanKing-Crane
Commissiondid go to theMiddleEast in 1919, itsreport,whichfoundthe
populationnotonlyofPalestinebutofthewholeofSyria"emphatically
againsttheentireZionistprogram"and whichrecommendedits "serious modification,"
was not publishedforthreeyears.This intervalallowed the Britishand the Frenchplentyof timeto pursuetheirplans
successfully.At the San Remo Conferencein April 1920, theypersuaded the new League of Nationsto awardthemmandatesin Syria,
Palestine,and Mesopotamia.
As foreignsecretary,
Curzonwas forcedby theSan Remodecisions
to carryout a Palestinepolicywithwhichhe profoundly
disagreed.As
his predecessorBalfourtold him,"WhetherZionismbe good or bad
(and, as you know,I thinkit good), we are now committed
to it,and
failureto makeit a successwill be a failureforus."20Butalthoughhe
was unable to repudiateZionismor giveup theMandate,Curzonwas
determined
topursuea policyin linewith"thenarrower
and moreprudentratherthanthewiderinterpretation"
oftheBalfourDeclaration.2'
His principalstruggle
was overthewordingoftheMandate.An official attemptto include the word "commonwealth"
was vetoedby the
on thegroundsthatitwas "a euphemismfora Jewish
foreign
secretary
state."22A draftMandate,which he claimedhad been drawnup by
"someonereelingunderthefumesofZionism,"also provokedCurzon's
anger.Respondingto a minuteby SirJohnTilley,who had complained
beabout the Arabsbeing includedin "thenon-Jewish
communities"
cause itsounded"as iftherewerea fewArabvillagesin a countryfullof
withtheauthor.
Jews,"he proclaimedhis agreement
Hereis a country
with580,000Arabsand30,000oris it60,000Jews
ofself(byno meansall Zionists).
Acting
uponthenobleprinciples
determination
and endingwitha splendidappealto theLeagueof
Nations,we thenproceedto draw up a document. .
[that]is an
fora Jewish
avowedconstitution
state.EventhepoorArabsareonly
as a non-Jewish
allowedtolookthrough
thekeyhole
community.23
Curzonwas evenmoreindignantaboutthedraftwordingofthepreamblewhichrecognized"thehistoricalconnectionoftheJewishpeople
Palestineas their
and the claimwhichthisgivesthemto reconstitute
NationalHome." On readingit, he denied thattheJews'connection
withPalestine,whichhad terminated
so manycenturiesearlier,gave
themany claimwhatever.
"On thisprinciple,"he observed,"we have a
claimtopartsofFrance."Butpressurefromhis colleaguesand
stronger
and
fromZionistleaderswas too strongforit to be omittedaltogether,
their
Curzonaccepteda blanderphraseabout theJews"reconstituting
"24
NationalHome in thatcountry.
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THE UNREGARDED PROPHET
67
During1920,theforeign
secretary
was involvedin a protracted
struggle forcontrolofBritain'sMiddleEastpolicy.He lost,and at thebeginningofthefollowing
yearPalestineand Mesopotamiaweretransferred
to the Colonial OfficeunderWinstonChurchill.Relievedthathe was
no longerresponsibleforimplementing
the BalfourDeclaration,Curzon remainedanxious,however,about the futureof Palestine.He was
particularly
worriedaboutArabrightsbecause he realizedthatthePalestinianleadershipenjoyedfarless influencethantheZionistswiththe
mandatorygovernment.
Untilhis deathin 1925 he regardedthe BalfourDeclarationas "theworst"of Britain'sMiddle East commitments
and "a strikingcontradiction
of our publiclydeclaredprinciples."25
Shortlybeforehe died, Curzon observedthatall the prophecieshe
had made at thetimeoftheBalfourDeclarationhad come true.Had he
liveduntil1948, theywould have come truerstill.Yethe was the only
seniorfigurein theBritishgovernment
at thetimewho foresawthatits
policywould lead to decades ofArab-Jewish
hostility.
Balfour,who as
chiefsecretary
forIrelandhad had considerableexperienceofsectarian
problems,promotedan evenmorespectacularantagonismin Palestine
throughignoranceand disregardforits Arab inhabitants.The other
greatimperialfiguresoftheera-Churchill,LloydGeorge,and Milnerwere similarlyshortsighted,
expectingthe Palestiniansto accept an
alienand romanticdreamthatrequiredtheirlands and theirbirthright.
"One of Curzon's characteristic
weaknesses,"wroteChurchillafter
his death,"wasthathe thoughttoomuchaboutstatinghis case and too
littleabout gettingthingsdone."26But concerningPalestine,at any
rate,thecriticism
was unfair.The case was wellpresentedand theargumentswere prophetic,but it was impossibleforhim to "get things
done"whenopposedbyhis mostpowerful
colleagues.Curzon'sforeign
policysuccesses dependedon allies or the absence of enemies.With
Milner'shelphe was able to forcethecabinetto end Britain'sprotectorate overEgyptand recognizeher as an independentsovereignstate.
AfterLloydGeorgeand Churchillleftofficein 1922, he could reverse
withTurkeyin theTreaty
theirpro-Greek
policyand reacha settlement
of Lausanne. But overPalestinehis isolationwas so completethathe
could achievelittle,bothto thedisadvantageofBritain'sforeign
policy
and to thelastingdetriment
of theindigenousArabs.
NOTES
1. Curzon to Lord Wolmer,3 April 1883, Selborne
Papers.
2. "The Futureof Palestine,"26 October 1917, CP
112/266.
3. Balfourto Curzon, 2 January1893, copy in BalfourPapers,Add. MSS 49732.
4. Minutes of Dardanelles Committee,14 and 21
October 1915, CP 112/161.
5. Curzon to Lord Cromer,22 April 1915, Cromer
Papers,FO 633/24.
6. Minutes of War Policy Committee,3 October
1917, CP 112/136.
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JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
68
7. Minutesof Cabinet Committee,5 July1923, CP
112/266.
8. JeremyWilson, LawrenceofArabia: The Authorized Biographyof T.E. Lawrence (London: Heinemann, 1989), pp. 590-91.
9. "The Anti-Semitism
of the PresentGovernment,"
9 October 1917, CP 112/267.
10. Curzon to Montagu, 8 September 1917,
MontaguPapers AS3/2/9.
11. PRO, CAB 23/4.
12. "The Futureof Palestine."
13. PRO, CAB 23/4.
14. PRO, CAB 27/24.
15. Balfourto Curzon, 20 January1919 and Curzon to Balfour,26 January1919, PRO, FO 800/
215.
16. Richard Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary
(London: Cresset Press, 1959), p. 9; M. Gilbert,
Worldin Torment
(London: Minerva,1990), p. 621.
17. Curzon to Balfour,20 August 1919, CP 112/
208.
18. Curzon to Lord Derby,30 April1919, CP 112/
196.
19. Curzon to Balfour,25 March and 20 August
1919, CP 112/208.
20. Balfourto Curzon, 13 October 1920, CP 112/
288.
21. Curzon to Allenby,16 July1920, CP 112/799.
22. PRO, FO 371/5199, cited in Doreen Ingrams,
Palestine Papers, 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict
(London: J. Murray,1972), pp. 96-97.
23. Ibid.
24. PRO, FO 371/5248, cited in Ingrams,Palestine
Papers,pp. 102-3.
25. Curzon to Bonar Law, 14 December 1922,
Bonar Law Papers, 111/12/46.
26. WinstonChurchill,GreatContemporaries
(New
York,G.P. Putnam'sSons, 1937), p. 281.
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