R esearch Paper
Research Division - NATO Defense College, Rome - No. 66 – April 2011
NATO’s Fight Against Terrorism
Where Do We Stand?
Claudia Bernasconi
1
T
Does NATO still have a role to play?
1
NATO’s strategic foundations
Positive achievements
2
3
Obstacles and limits
4
Future recommendations
7
errorism has played a major role in shaping the global security landscape over
the last decade, one important manifestation of this being its consequences for
NATO. The 9/11 attacks resulted in a considerable and unexpected commitment
for the Alliance, which subsequently experienced a reorientation towards new
challenges; within a very short time, terrorism reached the very top of NATO’s agenda.
A decade after 9/11 – and with the Alliance nourished by the lifeblood of the New
Strategic Concept – it is time for a critical assessment. What has NATO done? What are
the shortcomings of its actions? What is left to do? The role played by the Alliance,
together with the goals thus achieved, will be brought into focus in the first part of
this study. Following this, an investigation into the real limits NATO encounters in
combating terrorism will lead us to ponder the efforts which are still to be undertaken,
highlighting potential future recommendations.
Cooperation with other
organizations
8
Does NATO still have a role to play?
Contents
Ten years after the events of 9/11, no further terrorist attack of comparable scale,
method or symbolic value has taken place. Considering that a precedent has now been
set, to generate a similar amount of attention and devastation terrorists would need
to implement a proportionally larger form of attack (i.e. using chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons). Although such a threat may appear less
immediate than in the recent past, statistics2 and reliable investigative reports reveal
it is still present and likely to persist for years to come. Terrorism clearly still represents
a shared security concern for all NATO members, though involving them to differing
degrees. It is therefore still relevant to recognize an albeit limited role for NATO in
thwarting this scourge.
Research Paper
ISSN 2076 - 0949
(Res. Div. NATO Def. Coll., Print)
ISSN 2076 - 0957
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The main limit to NATO’s role is the very nature of terrorism. The threat is highly
asymmetric, demanding a form of response which obviously cannot be set up by a
massed military power like NATO. Disrupting the increasingly atomized terrorist
menace is not first and foremost a military problem, while NATO remains at its very core
a military organization, unable to play more than a limited specific role in thwarting
terrorism.
NATO Defense College
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web site: www.ndc.nato.int
e-mail: [email protected]
Furthermore, though 9/11 lifted terrorism from an essentially domestic scale to a global
security dimension, it is still widely believed that the major responsibility in tackling
terrorism is within individual states: terrorism is ultimately seen as a local phenomenon.
This implies that the bulk of actions to counter it are undertaken at a bilateral-national
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© NDC 2011 all rights reserved
1
Claudia Bernasconi holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the Terza Università degli Studi di
Roma. The opinions expressed in this paper are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NATO
Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
2
Brian Michael Jenkins, “Would-be Warriors - Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States
Since September 11, 2001”, RAND Occasional Paper, 2010. See also National Counterterrorism Center, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Annex of Statistical Information http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140902.
htm (accessed November 2010).
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No. 66 - April 2011
phase, mainly through the intelligence-sharing tool.
Anti-terrorism measures include the NATO-wide
standardized threat warning conditions and defensive
procedures, assistance in air and maritime protection,
and assistance to a nation wishing to withdraw its
citizens or forces from an area of increased terrorist
threat 7.
level by law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. Particularly
in Europe, terrorism is seen above all as a crime, which can best
be addressed by crime-fighting procedures and methods, rather
than by military actions3. This perception encompasses the
consequence management area – indeed, it led the UK and Spain,
after the major terrorist attacks they experienced, not to ask for
NATO’s aid, suggesting that Member States tend to respond
individually to terrorism and do not see the Alliance as the main
tool for dealing with the problem.
 Counter-Terrorism: this refers to offensive/active
strategies used to reduce the vulnerability of forces,
individuals and property to terrorism. Including
repression and suppression, counter-terrorism
measures are intended to reduce terrorists’ capabilities,
constituting a mainly short-term goal. Counterterrorism operations are predominantly joint ones, in
which NATO could either act in the lead or in support.
NATO’s strategic foundations
Prior to 9/11 NATO did not have much experience in fighting
terrorism. The 1999 Strategic Concept identified terrorism
among “other risks of a wider nature”, together with sabotage
and organized crime, but no practical measures were adopted4.
The 2001 attacks dramatically changed the scenario: terrorism
rapidly turned into the major international security problem and,
as outlined by the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance5, is
likely to remain among the principal threats over the next 10 to
15 years.
 Consequence Management: this includes reactive
measures to be adopted in order to mitigate the
destructive effects of a terrorist attack once it has
occurred. Although consequence management is
mainly a national responsibility, NATO plays a significant
role by providing military support.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the Alliance demonstrated its
determination to cope with this new menace by agreeing on eight
measures to support the United States – ranging from increased
intelligence sharing to more stringent security measures for
facilities, and access to ports and airfields in NATO countries for
operations against terrorism.
 Military Cooperation: this refers to NATO’s effort to
harmonize its procedures of intervention with civilnational authorities, cooperate with major international
organizations, and capitalize on existing programs
(i.e. the Mediterranean Dialogue -MD, the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative - ICI, and the Partnership for
Peace - PfP), in order to optimize its effectiveness in
tackling terrorism.
Following this momentum NATO undertook its first, and still
ongoing, counter-terrorism operation, Active Endeavour,
followed shortly after by Operation Eagle Assist, which ended
in May 2002.
A coherent operational framework to face the terrorism threat
was created with the adoption of the Military Concept for
defence against terrorism (MC-472)6. Approved by the North
Atlantic Council and then endorsed by Heads of State and
Government at the 2002 Prague Summit, MC-472 made defence
against terrorism an integral part of the Alliance forces’ mission.
In this regard, MC-472 indentified four roles:
According to MC-472, NATO’s approach acknowledges that
primary responsibility for defence of citizens and infrastructure
rests with Member States. Since reduction of vulnerability is
considered mainly a “national affair”, the Alliance’s goal is to help
Member States deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist
threats from abroad, as and where needed, upon the approval of
the North Atlantic Council. In this way the Alliance has chosen to
operate largely in support rather than taking a leading position.
 Anti-Terrorism: this combines all defensive measures
dedicated to reducing the chances of being attacked
or the vulnerability of potential targets. It is a long-term
effort towards undermining terrorism by addressing
its root causes, directly acting on the environments
which enable it. Although national authorities are
the main actors in charge of defending population
and infrastructure, NATO has a role in this defensive
The role played by NATO is nevertheless not just supportive, but it
is primarily preventive 8. Although MC-472 covers the full gamut
of actions from defensive to offensive, stressing the importance
of the latter in counter-terrorism measures, NATO has not yet
conducted straight combat operations in a counter-terrorism
role within a NATO-commanded operation. It is surely engaged in
a number of valuable initiatives but has not tailored an offensive
strategy, the imperative so far being to “restrain”. Even NATO’s
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – which had its
origins in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 – was not born primarily
3
David Aaron, Ann Beauchesne, Frances Burwell, Richard Nelson, Jack Riley, Brian Zimmer, 2004. “The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism”, Atlantic
Council Policy Paper, p.12.
4
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept 1999, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm (accessed October 2010).
5
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Comprehensive Political Guidance, 2006 http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b061129e.htm (accessed November 2010).
6
An unclassified version of the MC-472 can be found at http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm (accessed November 2010).
7
It is noteworthy that, though a number of commentators use the terms “anti-terrorism” and “counter-terrorism” interchangeably, the Military Concept draws a clear distinction
between the two terms.
8
The Bush doctrine has generated an intense debate over the terms “pre-emption” and “prevention”. Though they are often interchangeably used, they are not synonymous. The
former refers to the first use of military force when an enemy attack already is underway or at least is very credibly imminent; the latter indicates an action initiated in the belief
that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk. In NATO documents the preference is for the verb “prevent”, in the sense of
creating an environment unfavourable to the development and expansion of terrorism. The preventive role outlined in this paper has therefore to be understood as a “precautionary” role.
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No. 66 - April 2011
Research Paper
as a counter-terrorism operation9. ISAF rules of engagement only
cover a peace-enforcement mission, with a limited mandate
which does not include counter-terrorism (even if it occurs in a
counter-terrorism context).
area under one roof, considering that much of the effort was
previously scattered across many parts of the Alliance. However,
the concrete scope and mission of this new division still need to
be fully clarified. An organization accredited to NATO is the Centre
of Excellence - Defense against Terrorism (COE-DAT), inaugurated
in Ankara in 2005 with the aim of conveying expertise on
terrorism-related issues to NATO members, PfP and MD partners.
An overall rationalization of the organization’s structure has been
completed. While this is a step in the right direction, it remains to
be seen what lasting benefits it will bring.
The recently adopted New Strategic Concept puts more emphasis
than its predecessor on NATO’s role in fighting terrorism. It
recognizes that “terrorism poses a direct threat to the security
of citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and
prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread
to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance”10. In
order to face this threat the Alliance will “enhance the capacity
to detect and defend against international terrorism, including
through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultation
with our partners, and the development of appropriate military
capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism
themselves” 11. NATO has thus renewed its commitment to
combating terrorism, espousing a preventive approach.
In the anti-terrorism area, given the importance of science and
technology in adequately addressing modern threats, NATO
has been developing a cutting-edge plan. The Defense against
Terrorism Program of Work (DAT POW) 13, endorsed at the 2004
Istanbul Summit, focuses on ten critical areas where technology is
believed to help prevent or lessen the effects of a terrorist attack.
The main areas covered are: defence capabilities against CBRN
attacks, technology for Intelligence Reconnaissance Surveillance
and Target Acquisition (IRSTA), countering IEDs, and protecting
critical infrastructure. Each single project is led by an individual
Member State. The program – which is still in progress, with its
results awaited – has now migrated into the newly created ESCD,
thus offering a broader platform for development of a wideranging DAT capability. The constant predicament in the area
of technology is how to fill the gap between the USA and its
European Allies, especially regarding intelligence sharing and the
expeditionary operations required to conduct most anti-terrorist
operations 14.
Positive achievements
Since its inception in the wake of 9/11, NATO’s fight against
terrorism has certainly recorded some positive achievements.
At a theoretical level, the Alliance has elaborated impressive
structural, strategic and partnership schemes to fight terrorism.
Yet there are still several impediments which concur to jeopardize
these efforts on a very practical level; these will be the focus of
the following part of the study, “Obstacles and Limits”.
Within the anti-terrorism perspective, NATO has been well
aware of the pivotal importance of timely, accurate and reliable
intelligence in the prevention phase. Increased intelligence
sharing has therefore become a high priority. For this purpose,
a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) was established in
the aftermath of 9/11, becoming a permanent structure in
2003. It deals with so-called strategic-level intelligence, based
on assessments and trends, rather than with immediately
actionable intelligence. The involvement of both NATO and
Partner Countries’ resources underpins the importance of a
multilateral approach, enhanced through the establishment of
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council / Partnership for Peace
(EAPC/PfP) Intelligence Liaison Unit in Mons, Belgium. The flurry
of efforts to improve intelligence sharing includes the setting up
of the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) in Molesworth, UK, whose
ultimate aim is to produce intelligence that supports military
planning and decision-making at the operational level 12.
With regard to counter-terrorism, the Alliance has been seeking
to play a role at the operational level, engaging itself militarily in
the strategically important Mediterranean basin and, indirectly,
in Afghanistan and the Balkans.
NATO’s only functioning counter-terrorism operation, called
Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), started in October 2001 15, its
aim being to patrol the Mediterranean and monitor shipping to
help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity. Started
as an operation mainly relying on deployed forces, OAE has
progressively achieved a new “information focus”; gathering
information and intelligence through a network of sensors and
databases has become its new operational pattern. By opening
OAE to its partners, NATO has de facto formalized the importance
of operational counter-terrorism cooperation in a multilateral
framework, putting extra emphasis on the key role played by
interoperability among Allies and Partner Countries in data
sharing. Overall, the operation is having a positive impact, for at
least two reasons:
The other major structural innovation was the establishment
of the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD), in August
2010. It focuses on terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, cyber defence and energy security, stressing NATO’s
willingness to bring new security challenges to the fore among
its commitments. The basic idea behind the creation of this
division is to bring the different strands of NATO’s work in this
- First, it acts as a major deterrent against terrorist activities in the
Mediterranean area, having a beneficial effect on regional security.
NATO’s naval presence in the basin has become an acknowledged
fact, constituting a disincentive to potentially illegal activities,
9
Brent Ellis, “If it’s not terrorism, it’s not relevant: evaluating NATO’s potential to contribute to the campaign against terrorism”, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Fall
2004, Vol. 7, Issue 1, p. 7.
10
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted by Heads of State and
Government in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm (accessed November 2010)
11
Ibid.
12
For further information on the IFC, see: Laurence M. Mixon, “Requirements and challenges facing the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center”, Air War College, 2007, https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_9a47b0f3-9dcb-41d3-b677-79544cdd6921/display.aspx?rs=enginespage
13
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Topic: Defense against Terrorism Programme, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50313.htm (accessed November 2010).
14
Brent Ellis, Op.Cit.
15
The deployment started on 6 October and was formally named Operation Active Endeavour on 26 October 2001.
3
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No. 66 - April 2011
including terrorism. There has thus been a greater perception of
security for all shipping. According to 2008 figures, NATO forces
have monitored more than 100,000 vessels, boarding some 100
suspect ships. In addition, over 500 ships have taken advantage
of NATO escorts through the Strait of Gibraltar. NATO’s OAE assets
have successfully detected, reported and intercepted hundreds
of suspicious vessels, many of them engaged in transport of
illegal explosives, drugs or other contraband.
especially in the regions where the threats originate. One
of the landmark initiatives launched at the Prague Summit
was the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T), a
cooperation framework between Allies and Partner Countries
with the following essential goals: management of operations
and exercises in combating terrorism, assistance to Partners’
efforts against terrorism, actions targeting terrorist finances, civil
emergency planning, and cooperation with other international
organizations16. The organizations concerned here are the UN,
EU and OSCE, with results of cooperation to be further assessed.
Interestingly, the plan also envisages the establishment of a PfP
Trust Fund to “assist individual member states in specific efforts
against terrorism”, noting that the Fund may be particularly
relevant to Partners from Central Asia, the Caucasus and the
Balkans. This suggests that the Alliance collectively recognizes
the significant contribution that can be made in this area. To
date, the only ongoing NATO/PfP Trust Fund projects involve
support to Partner Countries in destroying surplus and obsolete
munitions or hazardous materials that could pose a security risk
in the hands of terrorists.
- Secondly, it represents an effective tool through which Allies and
Partner Countries have strategically enhanced their international
cooperation and expanded maritime security, with involvement
of international organizations and coastal authorities. The
operation initially involved only Member Countries, but since
2004 Partner Countries have also contributed, formally agreeing
to support the effort with information exchange and/or provision
of ships (physical assets have already been deployed, for example,
by Russia and Ukraine, and Tactical Memoranda of Understanding
have been signed with Israel, Georgia and Morocco). In this way
OAE has acted as a catalyst for greater regional engagement.
Within this military cooperation perspective, a major role is played
by NATO’s program of exercises to develop and practise integrated
civil-military operations, enhancing the interoperability of
different forces and bringing together expertise and know-how.
By using comprehensive NATO standard operating procedures,
a wide range of countries (Member States and Partners) are
developing the capacity to work closely together to respond to
a hypothetical terrorist attack17.
Indirectly, NATO is also playing a part in fighting terrorism in
its biggest operational commitment, Afghanistan, where it has
been leading ISAF since August 2003. Although it is not primarily
a counter-terrorism operation, ISAF is making a significant
contribution to removing the conditions in which terrorism
flourishes.
NATO peacekeeping forces continue to act against terrorism in
the Balkans, focusing on illegal movements of people, arms and
drugs (widely recognized as important assets for the terrorist
network) and supporting regional authorities in ensuring the
level of border security necessary to prevent a terrorist attack.
Obstacles and Limits
Divergences on how to deal with terrorism
In the consequence management area, NATO has sought to
strengthen its capabilities through Civil Emergency Planning,
within which Allies and Partner Countries set up a pool of
competencies, both civil and military, ready to be used when
needed. The platform used as a means of coordinating disaster
relief efforts – despite its very modest size – is the Euro-Atlantic
Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC); since 9/11, the
centre has also been tasked with managing the consequences
of CBRN incidents. Even though its mandate has been extended
to cover terrorism, EADRCC has never been called upon for this
purpose.
The extent to which the Alliance can expand its role in fighting
terrorism is constrained by the absence of a broadly agreed
general definition of “terrorism”, and by lasting divergences on
how to deal with this phenomenon, not only between the USA
and the European allies but also between “old” allies and “new”
Eastern Europe member countries. These divergences of opinion
are briefly indicated below:
•
A step forward was made in December 2003, with the
establishment of the Multinational CBRN Battalion. Based in
Liberec, Czech Republic, this provides NATO’s capability to
respond to and defend against the use of weapons of mass
destruction.
Transatlantic discrepancies: war-fighting vs. risk
management
In facing the terrorism threat, the USA has adopted a
“war approach”, promoting a massive mobilization
of assets and resources at the expense of individual
freedoms, as in the provisions of the Patriot Act. On the
contrary, most Europeans consider it inappropriate to
address the phenomenon as a war and opt for a “risk
management approach” – meaning that terrorism is
dealt with as a perilous hazard to be managed, not
as a war to be won18. Even if not mutually exclusive,
As far as military cooperation is concerned, NATO’s awareness
that most of today’s security perils – including terrorism – are no
longer confined to the Euro-Atlantic region has prompted the
Alliance to significantly extend its commitment to partnerships,
16
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO – Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm (accessed November 2010).
For example, in 2008 a major field test, Trial Imperial Hammer, was held in Italy to exercise counter-terrorism technology while seeking to forge a joint all-source intelligence
architecture. Cooperative Lancer and Cooperative Longbow are live land exercises which have counter-IED elements. Similarly, Cooperative Marlin is a maritime live exercise with
elements of counter-terrorism. At the Istanbul Summit NATO leaders attempted, among other tasks, to enhance cooperation with partners in the area of civil emergency planning, including the possibility for MD partners to have direct access to the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre. In the context of this cooperation, field exercise
“Armenia 2010” was the first consequence management exercise open to participation by these partner countries – even if the only one which contributed teams to the exercise
was Israel.
18
Richard Nelson, Expanding NATO’s counter-terrorism role, NATO Review, autumn 2004, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue3/english/analysis.html (accessed 8 November 2010).
17
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Research Paper
Intelligence Sharing
these two perspectives lead to different priorities and
trade-offs. From the American standpoint, pre-emptive
measures are far more strongly emphasized, compared
with the widespread European preference for defensive
measures. This distinct approach is reflected in the
wording used on the two sides of the Atlantic: while
there is widespread acceptance in the USA of the
concept of war and the attendant emphasis on military
terms and means, Europeans have a preference for
fighting against terrorism by prioritizing the use of
“soft power” – i.e. political, legal, diplomatic, economic
and cultural efforts.
Perhaps intelligence is the first line of defence against terrorism,
but the process of sharing it implies the need to overcome a
number of obstacles. Concerns about the security of intelligence
have fostered a prudent approach towards the idea of intelligence
sharing, especially on a multilateral basis. Intelligence tends to
remain a national prerogative and any sharing of data usually
occurs on a bilateral, case-by-case basis20. Allies and partners
have different languages, procedures, databases, training
and capabilities, so that the main challenge is how to bind all
of this together into an efficient effort. The first priority of an
intelligence network is to ensure the secrecy of this broadly
distributed information, but also the resolution of any sensitive
issues regarding intelligence sources and methods, as well as
appropriate vigilance of counterintelligence21. Elevating these
obstacles to a multilateral level inevitably makes the picture more
complex. As Reveron points out, “with some foreign intelligence
services regular meetings may suffice to share information.
Other cases require common training, classification criteria,
standardized security clearance procedures, and compatible
intelligence systems”22. In substance, the gap in capabilities that
has been a constant predicament for NATO is emphasized when
it comes to the area of intelligence; problems of interoperability
are thus increased, both among Allies and between Allies and
partner countries.
Additionally, in the view of several European allies,
the USA made a big mistake in choosing to lead the
operation against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan unilaterally
instead of ceding the initiative to the Alliance, thus
undermining confidence in NATO. This determination
to bypass NATO has been driven to a considerable
extent by the capabilities gap between the USA and
its European Allies, as well as by the so-called “threat/
response gap” – i.e. the gap between the USA and
EU in terms of perception of the terrorist threat and
the counter-terrorism responses this requires. While
the USA are inclined to favour military answers, the
Europeans tend to emphasize the importance of the
so-called “root causes approach”.
•
Why is intelligence sharing within the NATO framework still
fragile?
Intra-European discrepancies
•
European Allies do not share a common threat
perception or represent a wholly united front on how
to tackle terrorism. Eurobarometer polls reveal that
public perception of the terrorist threat varies across
Europe, with Eastern European countries generally
reporting a low threat from Islamic terrorism, mainly
in relation to each country’s track record and current
experience of the phenomenon19. European countries
differ greatly in terms of terrorist incidents experienced,
Muslim communities’ integration and anti-American
sentiment. Additionally, new NATO members in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) are largely concerned by
other security matters – namely energy security and
Russia – rather than international terrorism. Not least,
in the Islamic fundamentalism perspective, CEE is not
perceived as the “West” to the same extent as the USA
or other European countries.
It is valuable to note that NATO has no mandate for
intelligence gathering, and does not even possess its
own intelligence sources, except when NATO forces are
deployed. As a result, it inevitably relies on information
from Member States23. NATO’s intelligence apparatus
is dedicated to interpreting information, but cannot
produce raw intelligence usable to prevent terrorism.
The levels of trust, the value of intelligence and existing
diplomatic relationships with other countries are all
factors to be considered in any assessment of shared
intelligence. Most of the time, they inhibit the process in
a broad multilateral approach. This is why the majority
of intelligence sharing occurs bilaterally rather than in
a composite organization like NATO.
Although intelligence sharing has increased since
9/11 (as reflected in the establishment of the TTIU,
the IFC and the EAPC/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit), a
number of factors continue to hamper this process
and limit NATO’s added value in this area. In addition
to the separation of civilian and military intelligence,
the approach towards intelligence within NATO differs
greatly, lacks coordination and, to a certain degree,
entails overlaps24.
In the light of these considerations, it is not surprising that
consensus on how to best face terrorism is hard to achieve.
19
Eurobarometer 72 (2009), p. 102 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_vol1_en.pdf (accessed December 2010). See also: Eurobarometer (2006) “The
European citizens and the future of Europe”, p.17 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/quali/ql_futur_en.pdf (accessed December 2010).
20
Stéphane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation”, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16: 4, 2003, pp.
527-542.
21
Derek S. Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror”, Orbis, Vol. 50 Issue 3, Summer 2006.
22
Ibid.
23
John Kriendler, “NATO Intelligence and Early Warning”, Conflict Studies Research Centre - Special Series 06/13, March 2006, http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/documentlistings/special/06(13)JK.pdf (accessed November 2010).
24
Ibid.
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No. 66 - April 2011
The USA, for instance, are more inclined to tailor
bilateral relationships around clearly defined shared
objectives, a much safer and more manageable strategy
than a multilateral engagement in organizations such
as NATO. This perhaps provides a greater audience
for intelligence; such contexts are likely to generate
counterintelligence concerns, potentially greater than
the value of the intelligence itself. Additionally, even
when the USA have agreed to share information with
the Allies, the process of sharing has been constrained
by delays and restrictions, which in the end have
inevitably compromised operational feasibility.
that we can improve the efficiency of our common
fight against these common scourges of today”26. This
cooperation, especially when it comes to intelligence
sharing on the threat of terrorism, should be a priority
within the MD and ICI platforms.
Even in the case of Europe, the bulk of intelligence
gathering occurs outside NATO, being conducted
mainly by domestic intelligence organizations and
national police forces, and is subsequently shared
through bilateral arrangements or within the Berne
Group network. Also known as the Club of Berne, this
was established in 1970 as a European forum for the
Heads of National Security Services and, since 2001, has
had its own Counter-Terrorism Group. Despite the “need
to share” rhetoric which became pervasive after 9/11,
translating this into a core function means addressing
significant cultural and technological barriers. These
mainly stem from the problem of ensuring protection
of sources when information is disseminated, the
disparity in data protection standards between the USA
and EU, and domestic legal restrictions on intelligence
collection methods. Not least, it should be considered
that intelligence services which used to work against
each other in the past are still distrustful of each
other25.
Though far from being achieved, the multilateral intelligencesharing approach seems to lead to global networking.
Nevertheless, bilateral relationships are still the favoured
approach.
Bearing in mind that intelligence cooperation is
necessarily about building confidence by long-term
efforts, it should not be a surprise that the bulk of
data sharing in the region still occurs bilaterally with
individual NATO members – most importantly the USA,
seen as the regional security provider.
Operational engagement
Operation Active Endeavour, which is NATO’s only current
operation in combating terrorism (albeit actually involving less
and less naval support)27, is limited by several factors. First and
foremost, the boarding of a suspicious vessel can be conducted
only with the compliance of the captain of the ship and the flag
state (so-called compliant boarding). In all other cases NATO
forces can only follow the vessel and alert the port of destination,
whose authorities will proceed with inspection. Second, the
operation is highly dependent on the Automatic Identification
System transmitter, use of which is mandatory only for ships over
300 tons. Identifying any smaller vessel is therefore complicated
and unlikely. Third, OAE is hampered by the shortage of allocated
refuelling ships, which are constantly under heavy demand for
domestic needs 28. That said, NATO’s role in the Mediterranean
is inevitably partial and constrained, limited in practice to
deterrence.
Arab partners are naturally the major focus of Western
intelligence-sharing efforts, given their geographical
and political proximity to the threats of terrorism.
NATO’s outreach efforts towards the Arab world have,
in this respect, increased over the last decade, though
there are still a number of obstacles.
Cooperation: yes, but to what extent?
Though “cooperation” became the mantra of the post-9/11
international community, developments suggest that a truly deep
level of cooperation still has to be reached. First and foremost, a
comprehensive anti-terrorism convention has not been agreed
yet, mainly because of the notorious lack of a commonly shared
definition of terrorism. Divergences of opinion regarding the
legitimacy of the use of violence for political purposes have made
it impossible to draw up an all-encompassing and legally binding
definition.
Intelligence sharing is on the menu of options which
Partner Countries can choose to include in their
International Cooperation Programmes (ICP) with
NATO. Given the classified nature of these documents,
it cannot actually be revealed if the option has been
chosen or not. Yet it is evident that Arab partners
are collaborating with NATO in intelligence sharing.
For instance, in 2009 an agreement with the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) was signed for the sharing of
information, this agreement being a facilitator for the
exchange of classified information between NATO
and the UAE. Serious commitment of regional security
agencies is, however, far from being achieved. In
the words of Secretary General Rasmussen, “it is of
utmost importance to have not just a dialogue but
also cooperation, for instance intelligence sharing, so
The ultimate legitimacy of the international fight against
terrorism is provided by UN Security Council Resolution 1373.
NATO is committed to supporting the UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy and contributes to the UN Counter-Terrorism
Committee (CTC). Furthermore, the 2008 UN-NATO Joint
Declaration has brought some optimism regarding future
cooperation. However, as recently pointed out by the Chairman
25
Lefebvre Stéphane, Op. Cit.
Mina Al-Oraibi, “NATO Chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen Talks to Asharq Al-Awsat”, 29 October 2009, http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=18626 (accessed
November 2010).
27
As of today (December 2010) the current naval support to OAE is as follows: Direct Support: 2x surface vessels, 1x submarine; Stand-By (National Operational Control): 4 surface
vessels.
28
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Committee Reports, 2008 Annual Session, 158 DSC 08 E bis – NATO Operations: Current Priorities and Lesson Learned, http://www.nato-pa.int/
default.asp?SHORTCUT=1476 (accessed December 2010).
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Research Paper
Greater intelligence sharing
of the CTC, H.E. Mr. Ertoğrul Apakan, “we can definitely do more
to exchange information on what we are each doing and how
we see the evolving threat of terrorism […] We could further our
dialogue at various levels” 29.
As General Hayden, former CIA director, stated: “the war on
terrorism is an intelligence war” 30; this means that intelligence
sharing should be regarded as a key enabler of the international
response to terrorism. In this respect NATO could play a crucial
role in mobilizing states to overcome the reluctance and mistrust
which ultimately vitiate the intelligence-sharing process. The
Alliance has spent considerable resources in reorganizing
the intelligence structure, but there are dangers in treating
reorganization as a cure-all remedy – namely the risks of
compartmentalization, duplication and overlap. The Alliance
should optimize the mechanism for more effective intelligence
sharing by better coordination among all the units concerned,
and by establishing clearer institutional relationships between
all of them. Additionally, the technological gap between the
two shores of the Atlantic should be narrowed for purposes of
intelligence sharing in combating terrorism.
Regarding counter-terrorism cooperation between NATO and
the EU, extensive talks have taken place, but to what extent
cooperation has materialized is still not clear. What appears
to characterize the NATO/EU relationship in this area is the
divergence in approaches and methods – and even a degree of
competition – between the two organizations, which inevitably
hampers mature and efficient cooperation. The idea of creating
a joint NATO-EU counter-terrorism unit, for instance, has never
resulted in a concrete project.
As far as NATO’s relations with the OSCE are concerned,
cooperation mainly takes place at headquarters level: the Alliance
exchanges views with the OSCE’s Action against Terrorism Unit,
but it has proved difficult to move forwards to a more pragmatic
and effective level of cooperation.
Deeper cooperation with Arab partners
Bearing in mind that today’s security threats – including terrorism
– are no longer confined to the Euro-Atlantic region but are
global in nature, NATO should better exploit the established
network of cooperation in the Arab region. The variety of security
interests and threats it shares with its partners in the region
provide a clear rationale for this. Enhancing partnerships with ICI
and MD countries is a crucial step in creating regional stability. An
improvement of these partnerships could be achieved by:
Future Recommendations
Ten years after the events of 9/11 we are experiencing a
sobering reality: terrorism is still an imperative priority, but not
a determining factor in NATO’s raison d’être. The question is
therefore whether NATO, an alliance developed as a response to a
state-based military threat, is suited to the fight against terrorism,
and to what extent it can make a beneficial contribution. The
key contributions the Alliance can continue to offer are in the
following areas:
•
providing coordination and a framework of cooperation
among Allies, and between Allies and Partner
countries
•
granting a forum of discussion and representing a
platform for sharing of strategic information
•
concentrating on the military aspect of the process of
fighting terrorism.
All other issues, related to areas of key importance in combating
terrorism such as law enforcement, immigration and financial
control, are well beyond NATO’s area of competence and should
be handled elsewhere. The EU, in particular, is the international
actor with recognised expertise in these fields. Taking into
consideration the financial constraints the Alliance is experiencing,
NATO’s primary goal should be to capitalize on existing assets,
focusing on the following opportunities to improve:
•
developing – in parallel with the current “customer
approach”, which basically leaves up to partners the
identification of their desired area of cooperation
– a coherent NATO strategy, with a comprehensive
consensus on the desired end-state;
•
training, a vital niche where NATO has a lot to offer
and which should be better exploited to make partner
countries able to develop their own counter-terrorism
capabilities;
•
engaging more MD countries in OAE, as the Alliance
has to date engaged only two of them – i.e. Morocco
and Israel – in this operation. This engagement should
be on two fronts: attracting physical naval assets to the
operation, and enhancing intelligence sharing;
•
maintaining NATO diplomatic efforts with a view to
persuading Saudi Arabia to accept a cooperation
agreement with the Alliance, despite the Saudi
government’s cool response to ICI. It is indeed of
crucial importance to involve Saudi Arabia, especially
in combating financial support to terrorism.
However, in all its efforts to improve cooperation, NATO will be
confronted with the fact that, in particularly sensitive areas like
intelligence sharing, many Arab states prefer bilateral agreements
(particularly with the US) instead of working with NATO as an
Alliance.
29
Statement by H.E. Mr. Ertoğrul Apakan, Chairman of the Un Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, at the NATO Council (Brussels, 9 December 2010).
See Remarks of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 30 October 2007 – available at https://www.cia.
gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2007/chicago-council-on-global-affairs.html (accessed November 2010).
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Focus on military aspects
Capitalizing on the fact that NATO is above all a security
organization with a long-standing record of expertise in the
military field, the Alliance should concentrate its efforts in this area.
For instance, expanding its role in civil emergencies – although
this is an area of civil/military cooperation – should not be overemphasized as the focus priority. The added value NATO can offer
is in assisting and fostering the development of Member States’
and partners’ counter-terrorism capabilities, through dedicated
training of their armed forces for possible anti-terrorism tasks
(including explosive detection and CBRN defence). In this regard,
high priority should be placed on Arab partners, considering their
presence in the area where terrorism flourishes; enhancing their
capabilities to thwart terrorism will thus benefit the security of
Alliance members too. Another opportunity for improvement is
in coordination of various Member States’ Special Forces, whose
role in the anti-terrorism campaign will be critical 31. Considering
additional roles for NATO, e.g. protecting critical infrastructure in
energy and other fields as a potential target for terrorism, might
be misplaced and outside NATO’s area of competence.
Cooperation with other organizations
In the light of the aforementioned considerations, in the
widespread field of combating terrorism NATO cannot have an
all-inclusive role. To face a composite threat like terrorism, it is
necessary to move towards a multifaceted approach whereby
NATO concentrates on the military aspects of combating
terrorism. This is where it enjoys a comparative advantage.
There are many other international actors, such as the United
Nations, the EU, the World Health Organization, Interpol and the
IAEA, which should deal with the diplomatic, law enforcement,
judicial, communicational and other aspects. No single approach
can be sufficient on its own: a military action, for instance, can
temporarily annihilate a terrorist group’s operability, but can
hardly ever remove the root cause of the threat. Similarly, it is
difficult to imagine NATO playing a major role in the economic
or financial domain of counter-terrorism. This is the reason why
the Alliance needs to cooperate closely with other organizations,
providing an efficient level of coordination in order to avoid any
pointless overlapping of effort.
In the final analysis, it has become clear in almost a decade of
fighting terrorism that the role NATO can play is limited by the
obstacles discussed above, and that the Alliance will not become
a primary tool in this field. Though not playing a leading role,
its support to the campaign against terrorism will nevertheless
undoubtedly remain of crucial importance.
31
Philip Gordon, “NATO and the War on Terrorism: A Changing Alliance”, The Brookings Institution, 2002, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/summer_globalgovernance_gordon.aspx (accessed November 2010).
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